Exploring analytical philosophy with Banno
One of the outcomes of the behaviorism of the 20th Century was Quine's inscrutability of reference. By way of some reflection on that viewpoint that I could lay out if I really had to, meaning in human communication ends up collapsing altogether.
This bizarre outlook went hand in hand with a philosophy of science that advised avoiding narratives and explanations in favor of recording measurements. Since the physics of the day resisted rational narration, the puzzle pieces seemed to fit together.
The obvious snag in this fabric is that it's an outlook that is incompatible with realism (of the sort that allows for truth apt statements in the colloquial sense), or at least it seems to be.
Our friend @Banno seeks to heal that rift by modifications that I have to confess haven't quite made sense to me. Maybe a way to start would be to ask him to talk about truth with an eye to understanding how it fits with a realistic approach. Or if not, maybe @Wallows could ask the questions he had in mind?
This bizarre outlook went hand in hand with a philosophy of science that advised avoiding narratives and explanations in favor of recording measurements. Since the physics of the day resisted rational narration, the puzzle pieces seemed to fit together.
The obvious snag in this fabric is that it's an outlook that is incompatible with realism (of the sort that allows for truth apt statements in the colloquial sense), or at least it seems to be.
Our friend @Banno seeks to heal that rift by modifications that I have to confess haven't quite made sense to me. Maybe a way to start would be to ask him to talk about truth with an eye to understanding how it fits with a realistic approach. Or if not, maybe @Wallows could ask the questions he had in mind?
Comments (253)
I think he knew it and didn't care.
We do manage to talk about rabbits, despite Quine's misgivings. And he was a clever chap, so I'd give him some credit.
It seems to me that he is not so much saying that reference is impossible, as that a certain sort of analysis of reference will inevitably fail. So, for instance, a student of language who posits that "gavagai" is the exact same as "A rabbit liver still being used by the rabbit" will inevitably be disappointed.
It's this method of translation by equivalence that Quine is having go at.
Now, what's that got to do with my profile?
What I hear you saying is: "There's no problem."
I'm happy to leave it there. Maybe Wallows had something to add.
Well, is it true or false?
I say neither, and hence it does not count as a proposition.
Not sure what this is asking. Are you asking if some folk believe strict nonsense? That's why I added that beliefs might be seen as ranging over statements, so Mad Fred can believe the the present king of France is bald.
I don't see how volition makes sense without belief. How can you will some act unless something is taken o be the case? How does one will oneself to get a glass of water unless there are glasses and water that one believes in?
It's meant to be too simple. What's missing is the distinction between knowing how and knowing thatt; this is about [i]knowing that[/I].
A better revering would be something to the effect that knowing that is a subset of knowing how, such that one knows how to use language in a certain why. So your self-contradicting romantic succeeds in knowing how to seduce, despite the contradiction.
I don't understand your comment'd relevance to my comment...
None. I'm taking truth as fundamental.
:wink:
Goes to show that some folk know how to leave an impression!
Behaviorism? I'm not sure what you think behaviorism has to do with it.
Human communication doesn't end up collapsing. There's just always a potential for ambiguity/it's never completely transparent, because parts of it are simply not observable to others.
Then they fail to convey Quine's point, so I'll have a go.
A uniquely (as far as we know) human faculty is for pointing words and pictures at things, and for discerning and distinguishing the pointings, and determining which words and pictures are pointed at which things.
But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence. Albeit of course a powerful one.
But the pretence largely benefits from suspension of disbelief, amply supplied by habit, perhaps by innate prejudice, and by logic, a kind (when interpreted) of cgi automatic pointing machine; and the suspension of disbelief is further entrenched by more or less conscious attempts to ground the pointing fantasy as a matter of fact. So that the aspect of pretence and fictitiousness does indeed provoke disbelief, as per the OP.
I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour.
Strictly behavior?
But, then we have the private (language) argument creep up all over again. And beetles...
Some forms of behaviorism have no room for reference of any kind, but I shouldn't have brought this up because I have no interest in pursuing it.
Quoting Banno
Yes, you are interesting. And you're pretty comfortable with realism? You see no challenges in it?
This is perhaps the ultimate question.
Oh, I wonder. Not Quine, though, obviously. Quoting frank
Glad you did.
All good, except this bit. If there are parts of language that are invisible, then we can't talk about them. And if we can't talk about them, they cannot enter into our arguments...
It'd be simpler to just drop the very notion of invisible bits.
Edit:
Quoting bongo fury
That's a better way to talk than supposing there are unobservable parts...
I think it is not as bad as its competition...
But I ought point out that such questions are not about how the world is, as about what we can reasonably say about it.
Also, nothing I've written here is original....
I mentioned that in the OP.
... to others, sure.
Quoting Banno
You can talk about them, you just can't directly display them.
It would be like if everyone had their own home, but no one was allowed to go into others' homes, there was no way to take pictures of others' homes, etc. The person who lived there would know exactly what it's like inside, but other people wouldn't. That wouldn't stop anyone from talking about what their homes are like inside, however.
Well yes, Wittgensteins beetle.
Sure. (Although I think my analogy is better. I'm not much of a Wittgenstein fan.)
It makes sense because properties are unique at each spatio-temporal location.
So for example, we have this:
A...............................@......................................B
The properties of @ are different at @, at A and at B (and at every point in between). If A and B are persons with perception, etc., they can directly perceive what @ is like at their spatio-temporal location, but that's not identical to what @ is like at any other spatio-temporal location.
In addition to that, there's also what it's like to have subjective mental content, including qualia, with respect to those perceptions.
Are you saying that if I drew the number 9 in the sand, and stood at the top of the number and someone stood at the bottom, we would have different perceptions of this symbolic representation? That's doesn't really prove anything apart from relativism in perception. Indirect realism rules in my mind.
Yes, of course. Nothing is identical from two different spatiotemporal locations. This is NOT just about perception. It's about ontology (or "the ontic") in general. It would be the case if no people/no perceivers existed.
Are you advocating a form of idealism in ontology?
If we have no people/no perceivers, how do we have ideas (for idealism)?
I'm not saying anything about the third man argument. You'd have to explain the Spinoza comment.
My point is that an observer is redundant if God is one and the same with god being nature. Hence, I don't really subscribe to the ontological commitment of the moon not existing if I don't look at it. Quantum mechanics [s]is[/s] can be (depending on which interpretation you believe in) very idealistic, something that doesn't get mentioned enough.
Again, what I'm saying is NOT just about perception. It would be the same if no people/no perceivers/observers existed.
That's why I wrote "NOT" in big capital letters--hoping you'd notice it more that way. So you wouldn't think that I'm saying something about perception, etc.
Then please elaborate about ontological commitments in light of private content or whatnot?
I'm confused what you're asking about there. I wasn't saying anything about "ontological commitments."
I was explaining how direct realism isn't incompatible with non-shareable mental content.
For one, you're assuming a naive "objective things are just one way" claim. That's not the case. Objective things are all sorts of ways, from different spatio-temporal locations.
Yeah, this part I don't entirely get. If I were a direct-realist, then there wouldn't really be unsharable content in my mind. Let me know why would you think otherwise?
Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol
That makes it an epistemic issue, not an ontological one, derp.
The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue?
So you agree or not that it is an epistemic issue?
It would be difficult to tell whether I agree from me asking you a question, wouldn't it? How about just addressing the question?
I asked this: "The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue? "
Because this: "That makes it an epistemic issue, not an ontological one, derp."
Made no sense as a response to this: "Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol "
I'm lost here. Just where did this start and where are we going?
You wrote: "One thing, that doesn't make sense is to say that people are direct realists, yet have beetles in boxes, what do you think @Terrapin Station?"
I responded with "It makes sense because . . ." and then I explained.
You asked a clarification question. I answered.
Then you got sidetracked/confused by an issue that I said my response was NOT about--you figured I was saying something about that . . . right after I made sure to explicitly say that the response was NOT about that. And then things seemed to devolve into increasingly weird, incoherent (at least in context) responses.
Yeah, but if we're Borg, then I don't ANY issue.
Yeah, as if that were self-explanatory. Spill the beans already, why is direct realism NOT incompatible with private content?
Just to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, you're not thinking that direct realism amounts to eliminative materialism, are you? (I need to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, especially as you didn't understand my earlier explanation of this.)
Look, I view the issue as epistemic, so what you mean is the following?
Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?
To that, one might want to add a long list philosophers who have rejected epistemological foundationalism on the basis of either phenomenological or causal arguments, for inscrutability is a simple corollary of holism and uncertainty.
Whenever an engineer measures the 'false positive' rate of a prediction rule, it is always in relation to a definition of ground-truth, that varies from experiment to experiment. For example, in a face-recognition machine-learning problem the definition of 'ground truth' is the particular image dataset used to train the classifier algorithm. But there cannot be an all-encompassing data-set for defining what a face image is across every face recognition problem, because every situation has different and conflicting auxiliary premises, such as what counts as a 'disguised' or occluded face.
I don't think Quine meant to imply anything more than that.
I don't know how you'd see the "beetle in the box" part as an epistemic issue. It has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological issue.
Quoting Wallows
Re this question, "Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?" I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. For one, what are the right arrows symbolizing there?
It's epistemic if you're an indirect realist. That's the best way I can put it. Seems like you didn't read too much On Certainty by Wittgenstein or Moore.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Starting from substance, in that order, ending with the mind.
How is it epistemic if you're an indirect realist? The issue is whether there's something inherently private and not directly shareable (in the show and tell sense). That has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological situation. So how do you see it as being an epistemic issue if one is an indirect realist?
Quoting Wallows
What is starting with substance? The world? Someone's theory? Someone's discussion preference?
It's remarkable that when it comes to simple AI agents such as Amazon Alexa, we tend to avoid attributing beliefs to them because we are confident in our causal understanding of their linguistic behaviour. So for instance, if Alexa expressed a false sentence we might for example say she was merely reporting the contents of an outdated database, or directly expressing a programming error or sensor failure, rather than accusing her of literally harbouring a false belief. In short i think we tend to be externalists relying on the causal theory of reference when it comes to understanding artificial brains, which ironically makes us more forgiving of AI than of humans to whom we tend to subconsciously attribute miraculous causative and representational internal properties without scientific justification.
Examples such as this tempt me into thinking that the notions of belief and volition will gradually be eliminated from human psychology and ordinary discourse, along with the epistemological notion of 'objective' truth, and replaced by a richer and environmentally-integrated holistic notion of behavioural semantics that is specific to each and every individual. Such a notion would appeal heavily to the causal theory of reference when it is used to understand the state of any human or AI agent, to the effect that the notion of a 'shared' linguistic semantics would effectively be abandoned.
Well... yes. "The moon is full"; a proposition. "John believes that the moon is full"; John's attitude towards that proposition.
What words would they use then?
Sure. Just so long as we agree that what is true for A is also true for B - subject appropriate translations. I'm thinking of the Principle of Relativity.
Quoting Terrapin Station
The furniture in your house - mental or unvisited.
I'm not convinced that there is a "what it's like", for bats or otherwise.
Einstein might disagree. He went to great lengths to show that they were identical.
YOu've lost me... How is direct realism incompatible with private content? Set it out for us.
Yep.
But I don't see why I shouldn't. A belief is a proposition taken as being trusted. I ask Siri where the nearest fish and chip shop is; why not say that Siri believes it's 600m to the north?
There's some good arguments against our folk psychology being replaces by a more - should I call it a scientific - approach. The one I find convincing simply asks is there a difference between Siri or Alexa having a faulty database and their having a false belief? Perhaps that's all a false belief is.
I'm not convinced that anyone isn't convinced of that. I just refers to properties as such. I don't think it's conceivable to think of anything sans properties.
Quoting Banno
More fool him then.
Quoting Banno
It often won't be (also reading "true" as "what's the case for")
I'm a bit lost as to what part of the thread this is about...
What is meant by "unsharable content" in this thread? That you can't talk about it? Or that other people can't directly access it?
Even direct realists have dreams, which they can talk about if they remember, but someone telling me their dream doesn't mean I get to experience it. I can imagine what the dream was like, but it's not the same thing as having the dream myself. And so it goes for every other experience. But the point of dreams is that they're not perceptual, and thus direct realism is irrelevant to them. So there are experiences outside of direct perception to deal with for this kind of discussion (whether mental content is shareable).
And so the problem still presents itself for direct realists, because it's not just about perception, but all subjective experience.
For Terrapin, but for others, too. Einstein developed a set of transformations that allowed the laws of physics to be the same for all observers. The principles here is that what is true for one observer will also be true for another observer, given the appropriate translations.,
gives us the neat example of a shape in the sand. You see a 9, I see a 6, but we both realise that if we swopped places, I would see a 9, and you would see a 6. There is no disagreement as to the facts, once they are expressed well enough.
I think of Davidson as having presented a more general case of the same principle. It's the flip side of the Principle of Charity: Assume that what your interlocutor is saying is true.
If something is true, it can be expressed in such a way that there is general agreement.
As a direct realist, maybe you can explain what the problem is supposed to be, because it's not clear to me what Wallows was thinking.
Yeah, that's a key issue: what is it that is unsharable.
What's easier to see is what is shared - our shared world gives us a basis for talking to each other. And we can talk about things like pain on the basis of our shared experiences, even though in the normal course of things pain is taken as private to the person in pain.
So keeping to our shared world is a good idea. Hence my caution when it comes to Qualia.
I don't see dreams as a problem for direct realism. There's a clear difference between dream experiences and conscious (waking) experiences. We can agree that a direct realist whop dreams of flying sheep is not obligated to assert that there are flying sheep.
I'm not a realist on physical laws, but aside from that, the fact that the laws of physics would be the same for all observers is different than the properties that something has relative to a particular spatiotemporal location. For example, something might be round from one spatiotemporal location but oblong from another spatiotemporal location.
I am not a direct realist. I think the supposed dichotomy between realism and - whatever - is muddled.
One can overthink this perception stuff.
Sure, you see a 6, I see a 9. We are looking at the very same thing. You understand why I see a 9, and I understand why you see a 6.
What's the problem? There's no disagreement here.
I understand it to be that since direct realists deny the contention that we're aware of some mental idea or representation when perceiving (instead of the physical object itself), then there isn't some inaccessible mental content that can't be shared. Instead, we're just talking about the objects themselves.
However, there are experiences in addition to perception such as dreams, and the problem of sharing those experiences comes up. Also, there are going to be issues even for direct perception between differing abilities. If you're a super taster and I'm not, then my ability to understand your taste experiences will be somewhat limited (inaccessible).
Do you think bats have experiences that might differ qualitatively from ours in some aspects? If not bats, then dolphins, dogs, chimps even other people?
That's not quite the same as a "what it's like".
These issues are resolved.
Dreams are also directly perceived. They are just different things we are encountering. To see dream dragon is to encounter a different thing to my house.
Differing abilities aren't a problem either. Each object itself is multiple. It is what anyone perceives of it.
Are you saying that the contents of dreams are real? Your use of perception in dreams is highly non-standard. In any case, dream experiences mostly don't originate with the use of the sensory organs.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you asserting idealism? This sounds like some TGW philosophizing.
Maybe. You're taking issue with the language usage. I take it you think that leads to a problem that might not be a problem.
It's what you see or perceive.
I see or perceive a tree. The tree is not a quale, it's a tree.
No, not that, Banno - your perception-of-the-tree is the quale.
So it's sort of a thing in my head? But my perception-of-tree, what I see, changes as I move around. Which of them is the tree-quale? or is it all of them? and if it's all of them, how is it different from my seeing the tree?
What gets added or explained by bringing qualia into the already complex story?
Oh, yeah.
Yes, real, but not existent on Earth. When you encounter something in a dream you are experiencing something which is there. It's a fact of the world someone can be wrong about.
I'm asserting that existing things are many different ways. A simple example is colour: any given thing is not just one colour, but ALL then colours which are there to be perceived. The banner of our forum is not only purple, but also, for example, grey (as seen by those who cannot see any hues)..
It's important to understand that direct realists are not saying that we're not dealing with perception. Direct realism is a stance in philosophy of perception after all. It's not a stance that essentially says "there is no perception." So we're not actually just talking about the objects themselves. We're still talking about perception, about mental phenomena.
What makes the difference is the character of perception, not whether there's perception or not.
An analogy that's useful is that of a camera. No one is going to say that the camera isn't involved in the camera taking photos, or that the photos aren't a product of the camera. The issue is whether the photo "directly captures" the subject matter, and whether we can know this, in addition to being able to know when something is going wrong because the camera isn't capturing something right, versus whether we're going to claim that all we can know is the camera qua the camera, so that it's presenting images of the camera itself somehow, and we don't know what those images' relationship is with the external world, presuming there is one.
Sure, so we could stick with perceiving properties of things. Then that can lead to questions over whether all those properties belong to the things perceived, or whether some belong to the perceiver. And then from there you have Locke and can bootstrap your way to Nagel, and then you're a short step from Chalmers.
I am not sitting in my head looking at an image of a tree. I am looking at a tree.
I am not sitting in my head experiencing tree-quale. I'm looking at a tree.
No one of these has primacy.
Why would you think of homunculi with cameras? You think there are little people inside of cameras or something?
There's not a little person in the camera taking a picture of a tree. The camera takes a picture of the tree.
So per the analogy, the difference we're talking about is whether the camera is directly taking a picture of the tree, or whether (at least we can only know that) the camera is producing an image that's the camera itself, where we have no idea how it connects with other stuff.
Has nothing to do with homunculi.
It's in the dream, sure. The fac tin the world is that this happened in a dream.
Yes, and the dream exists, so that fact happened in the world.
The camera is coloring it, sure. The issue then is whether we can know this or not. Direct realists say we can. Representationalists say we can't know it.
as opposed to... indirectly taking the picture?
I'm lost, and don't mind admitting it. Are you just talking about the physiology of sight? In which case you are doing physiology, not philosophy.
Quoting Banno
...
As opposed to (as I've just explained a couple times) presenting images that are of/generated by the camera itself, where we have no idea how it connects to the outside world.
This definitely has a lot to do with physiology. It's philosophy of perception after all. That's going to involve studying how perception works/being aware of the scientific study of that, etc. You can't do philosophy of x where you simply ignore the study of x by other fields, especially when the target is just as much something that another field studies.
There's no us in the analogy.
Direct realists tend to say objects are colored, that's why we see color. Indirect realists are fine with perceivers coloring in the world. We can know this through scientific inferences. Thus objects have shapes, but probably not colors, although they do have reflective surfaces.
And yeah, I'm aware that @creativesoul and a few others will take issue with that. But this is where the qualia argument gets started. Because there are reasons to think that some prosperities of our experience are mind-generated, while the other properties are good for scientific investigation.
Direct realism does not at all posit that we're infallible.
Re fallibility, it posits that we can know that we're fallible when we get things wrong. We can know what's going wrong (because we can know what's right), and we can develop scientific accounts of what's going wrong.
Representationalism can't do this, because per its claims, we can never directly access the world. The best we can ever do is conjecture.
You seem to think that you are alone in the world, and can't decide if the camera is telling you what is real and what isn't.
But even having the notion that some things are real and some are not requires that you are embedded in a conversation with other folk.
I'm saying the exact opposite of that.
I don't know why it's so difficult to communicate that.
Good.
Quoting Terrapin Station
...
It does leave itself open to skepticism.
What if we said that we directly perceive some aspects of an object, like it's shape and location, but other aspects. such as its reflectivity to visible light are indirect?
We can see this with eating shrimp. We can know things about the shrimp from putting it in our mouth, like size and solidity and that it's an animal, but we don't know about its chemical makeup from the taste, without developing a science of chemistry first.
Quoting Terrapin Station
A and B can agree as to the facts, by considering what @ looks like from the other's point of view.
You and I can agree that there was a filter on the camera.
Only if both A and B agree on what defines @. @ is not 'seen' at all, it does not 'look like' anything from any perspective without a model which defines @ as being something distinct from everything surrounding it. We must already decide what @ is, then look to see if we were right. The looking doesn't come first, the model of @ comes first, the looking is just to check.
Ask @Terrapin Station?
Think of the man who just is infatuated with love. He says that it goes beyond what is sayable.
Paradox?
Well, direct realism isn't saying that you directly access "the complete set of details" of anything (as if "the complete set of details" isn't a ridiculous idea in the first place).
And as I've pointed out a number of times, you can only access what the world is like at a particular spatiotemporal location, where there is no reality for anything "at no particular spatiotemporal location(s)." (Or as it's sometimes more commonly put, there is no "view from nowhere.")
Sure, they can, but those facts won't be the same at the same spatiotemporal location, and their agreement is still something nonidentical, at different spatiotemporal locations.
Wrong and wrong. Your model is wrong.
I have no idea what you even think you are, exactly. Presumably your model there isn't anything like the standard account of evolution. Unless you think that life had the capacity to create models prior to being able to obtain any sensory data.
Yes. Friston has demonstrated active variance reduction in sensory inputs of amoeba, even in programmed automatons. Modelling, in a mathematical sense, does not require any higher cognitive functions.
First, there's no Friston or amoeba in the real world in your view, is there?
It depends on the context of our discussion. As I have said countless times, I hold that beliefs are dispositions to act as if, I can therefore hold different beliefs in different contexts, there's no reason why the model I use in one context (where I assume there are such things as Friston and amoebae) should in any way cohere with the model I might use when discussing the way things 'really are'. You're acting like the nerdy child who says in the middle of an game of Star Wars "you're not really Han Solo though are you?".
We're talking here (using models which we all share) about reasons to think that our model of the world itself is some way or other.
We use language to discuss the meaning of language. We make knowledge claims about what sort of thing knowledge claims are. It's not some new concept that we use some given concept to analyse the wider context within which it sits.
Regardless, you're ALWAYS talking about models that you have, and not observations of the way the world really is, because you do not think you can access the latter. So there's no Friston or amoeba in your view outside of it being a model you have.
Or is this not the case?Quoting Isaac
How is there a "we" beyond your personal model?
If you're going to endorse this sort of nonsense, don't expect to not be constantly called out on it.
But he just said how he feels, and then he goes on to say that what he feels isn't sayable? It's a contradiction, not a paradox, no?
What does he mean when he says that his feeling goes beyond what is sayable? I mean, this is a common saying. We say things like "it is indescribable" or "words can't describe it". How is it that it has become a common saying (it has a meaning in its use) if the listener/reader can't ever get at what it is that they are talking about? What does anyone mean when using those words and how can it become commonly used?
Is it that he doesn't have the vocabulary and that there are words that do describe what he is feeling, but he just isn't knowledgeable enough in the language to explain it? Is it that the language he is using doesn't have words to describe the feeling, and maybe another language does? What does he mean when he says that a feeling goes beyond what is sayable?
I feel as though the issue is resolved if we disregard the behaviorism. One must resort to talking about intentionality and volition, which come before words?
Exactly.
When we use the words, "what did you mean?", we are asking about the relationship between what was said and the idea that they intended to convey, not how what was said is defined in a dictionary. If that is what we meant then we would go look in a dictionary and not ask about the intention or the idea that was in the person's head. But do the words in the dictionary adequately portray, or exhaust, what the user meant when they used the words? Of course not. Words in the dictionary are just ink scribbles on paper. The ideas in someone's head aren't composed of ink scribbles on paper. They are composed of colors, sounds, shapes and other sensations, of which words themselves are composed of. So we don't think in words. We think in colors, shapes, sounds, etc. and pointing to shared sensations is how we use words.
Bannos explanation doesn't seem to allow us to do that. If you heard someone say, "I have an upset stomach. I feel like I need to vomit." for the first time in your life, how will you understand how those words are being used, and then use them yourself correctly, if you can't see what the words are pointing to - their feelings. All you can see is their behavior of them holding their stomach and then that is how you use the words by emulating their behavior without associating it with a feeling. You would be misusing the words or be lying.
That's were the un-detached rabbit liver comes in. We have no word for such a thing, but it is not out of the reach of our language.
Apparently foreigners can see ABC shows now, so take a look at this article about untranslatable emotions. Notice that the emotions are translated?
SO I'm going to invoke Davidson's article on conceptual schema again and say that there cannot be cases of things that are accessible in one language and not in anther.
It's such a common way of thinking, and I think it wrong. Or at least muddled. We do see the same things from different perspectives, and because we are embedded in language, we can understand how they look from the perspective of other folk.
And we can interpolate these other views into our own.
It's no use denying this; you rely on maps made by other folk when you move into new territory; you believe that China invaded Tibet, or at least that it was annexed; you are happy to have a doctor remove your painful appendix. All of these require that you accept, not just the views of others, but their collective understanding.
This is not the view from nowhere. It's more like the view from everywhere.
That's the point I've addressed to you, Terrapin, a few times.
Quoting Banno
Same point. You don' have to make it all up for yourself from first principles.
Yeah - one sees a "9", the other a "6". But is they swap places...
Yeah, not so much. The idea of models is fraught, and ultimately fails, for reasons outlined by Davidson in On the very idea of a conceptual schema.
Given that, I suspect we will find that the models used by amoebas are not quite like the models you propose that we use.
It is? Usually no one quite understands what I'm saying.
Quoting Banno
I don't know if you're saying that
"? sees @ from perspective y (and it's like ?) and ? sees @ from perspective x (and it's like ?)--so @ is the same thing," which I'd agree with,
OR
"? and ? both experience @ in ? way, just from different perspectives (a la different spatiotemporal locations, say)," which I'd not agree with.
Quoting Banno
There must be a better way to say that (that maybe I'd agree with)?
Quoting Banno
We can do this on my account of what understanding is, sure. But my account of what understanding is is probably very different from how you'd describe it.
Quoting Banno
That's not available either.
What we'd agree on is that you can have spatiotemporal perspectives that are combinations of various other spatiotemporal perspectives. No two are going to be identical, though.
Quoting Banno
But I'm not saying anything at all like that.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You'll see the vomit soon enough. No need for the feeling yet; but you will recognise that, too, when given the opportunity.
OK - some agreement.
That last bit - "no two are going to be identical"...
Your "6" will be my "9"; but if that's all you mean, then there is no substantive difference in our opinions, is there?
As far as I know what goes on inside a black hole might not be in any way sharable other than some noumenal aspect of the mind, which may or may not have private content. And even if there is such a thing as a private language of sorts, then what else can we do about it? Nothing much really.
So there's no distinction between "I feel like I need to vomit" and "I'm vomitting"? One is pointing to a feeling and the other to a behaviour. Are you a p-zombie? How is what you're claiming different from what a p-zombie would claim about word use?
You know that is not what was said.
The "view from everywhere" is available if we accept that you and I and the humans are "embedded in language" - that is, if you accept that we (not 'you' or 'I' in isolation, but we) are making determinations regarding the nature of the real via "a conversation with other folk." A shared language (including shared notions and behaviors, e.g., trusting a map made by a stranger; performing and receiving appendectomies) provides the "view from everywhere."
That's my guess.
It was a question asking for clarification of what you meant not an assumption of what you said. If it was already assumed what you said, I wouldnt need to ask for clarification of what you meant.
It was said before they vomitted, so what are they pointing to when they use the word, "feeling" before they vomit?
Quoting Baden
Meh. I'm not so wild about Harry.
...consists of parts common to every view.
This is simply how Banno works.
...then this forum is in worse shape than I thought.
Well, mention it to Terrapin Station that facts are mind-independent in logical space. His idealism fails for superfluous facts that only he perceives.
Quoting creativesoul
Worthwhile insofar as we can ascertain and crystallize and circumscribe a set of persons in cahoots. A precarious agreement contingent on some notion of "a reasonable person" and possibly a surreptitious notion of the sane. Watch for: 1) Exclusivity of outliers deemed not reasonable (those "doing bad philosophy"; those "talking nonsense"). 2) In-group and out-group exclusivity to ensure the world-as-understood-by-us retains primacy in experimental-to-farflung discourse.
The "view from everywhere" underscores an essential realism at the core of (reasonable or sane (as understood by the in-group)) human interaction. It's an antidote to armchair fables. But armchair fables are fun and fascinating and have a deeper purpose than the (generally fruitless and divisive) quest for Truth: obliteration of psychic boundaries and a suspension of dogmatic endstops.
Beyond the somber quest for Truth lies the prospect of philosophy as play.
:razz:
Gotta admire the modest self deprecation...
But when I say it, they are "doing bad philosophy" and "talking nonsense".
Profundity lays here.
That which is common to all views. <-------That's what I'm fostering. None of the proposed attitudes above are inevitable as a result of pursuing such a notion, so...
There's a point to the notion of the view from nowhere that doesn't gain purchase within the analysis in which I indulge. Existentialism is seen as better at bringing this out. But I'm not so sure.
The silence at the end of this analysis is quite on philosophical issues, but not on what is to be done. It's not "shut up and do nothing", but "shut up and get on with it".
Is there a benefit to doing that?
Quoting Banno
I dont know where we agree or disagree because you won't answer my questions.
Quoting Harry Hindu
And I can't answer your questions because I can't see what you are asking. Hence, our conversations remain unproductive, and a bit frustrating.
The thing you might consider is, I'm apparently not the only one who has this problem with your posts.
Go back to this:
Quoting Harry Hindu
Now to me you might as well have asked me what colour my car is. Your question has nothing to do with what we were talking about.
But in the interests of furthering the discussion, here's a direct answer: Of course there is a distinction between "I feel like I need to vomit" and "I'm vomitting".
Now, show me what this implies.
That's the point.
Meaningless! Meaningless!”
says the Teacher.
“Utterly meaningless!
Everything is meaningless.”
3 What do people gain from all their labors
at which they toil under the sun?
4 Generations come and generations go,
but the earth remains forever.
5 The sun rises and the sun sets,
and hurries back to where it rises.
6 The wind blows to the south
and turns to the north;
round and round it goes,
ever returning on its course.
7 All streams flow into the sea,
yet the sea is never full.
To the place the streams come from,
there they return again.
8 All things are wearisome,
more than one can say.
The eye never has enough of seeing,
nor the ear its fill of hearing.
9 What has been will be again,
what has been done will be done again;
there is nothing new under the sun.
10 Is there anything of which one can say,
“Look! This is something new”?
It was here already, long ago;
it was here before our time.
11 No one remembers the former generations,
and even those yet to come
will not be remembered
by those who follow them.
--Ecclesiastes 1:2-11. NIV
Take this for instance:
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Does the view from nowhere really underscore an essential realism at the core of human interaction? Is it really a fact that armchair fables are fun and fascinating and have a deeper purpose than the quest for Truth? Is what is being said here hold true for everyone whether they read this post or not, or whether a reader believes it or not? If not, then what is the point in saying it?
Is the above quote an armchair fable or a truth that is the case for everyone? If it is only applicable to some then, why? What makes a statement about some state-of-affairs applicable, or useful, to some but not others, and isnt that just another state-of-affairs that can be talked about and is the case whether everyone believes it or not?
Are you saying the distinction lies in the pattern of scribbles, or what the scribbles symbolize - like the actual state-of-affairs of there being a feeling of needing to vomit, and the actual state-of-affairs of vomitting?
If words are used, then volition must be involved.
It seems to me that it requires volition to have a belief. Beliefs are constructed from observations.
Positing a "view from everywhere" is an act of circumscription and exclusion: that which is thought of as unreasonable or insane must be excluded. Always: the-view-from-everywhere-minus-X. I think of the brilliant schizophrenics peopling Louis A. Sass's Madness and Modernism. The far-flung world-structures described by these schizophrenics would have to be excluded. At the same time there may be elucidation of profound mystery in the insights of these madmen. I imagine the terror of a schizophrenic confronting a map fashioned by a stranger; or vis-a-vis the prospect of a physician snipping his appendix. I mention this as a limit case. But there will be more minor and possibly unnoticed circumscriptions and exclusions in classifying human notions and interactions as within or not within a "view from everywhere." That which is considered unreasonable would have to be excluded: for example, eating the flesh and drinking the blood of christ. Consuming christ-blood and -flesh may well be central to the world-structures I inhabit, but it would be considered an unreasonable notion and centerpiece by an atheist logician, and excluded. Which says nothing at all about the real but says a good deal about the in-group.
So, always: the-view-from-everywhere-minus-X: X signifying that which is thought of as unreasonable or insane.
I say what I say because it gives me pleasure to exercise my mind and imagination and interact with smart strangers. Why do you say what you say?
You do not inspre me to put in the effort needed to reply to you. Take:Quoting Harry Hindu
They might be making the claim so it only applies to them, or so it applies to everyone, or something in between; they might be referring to reality, and yet also have their words symbolise reality; they might be the observer, they might not...
and so on.
You just have not said anything.
It's a peaceful thing to be named among the unremembered. It gives me peace to think of it and I think of it often. The peace of world-decay.
Of course it's false to say the generations are unremembered but it will possibly be true post-supernova or post-crunch.
As to the nothing-new: I'm not sure what sun you're looking under. Not my sun.
That's a fact if I ever smelt one.
Answer my questions. I'm not asking for much really.
Quoting Banno
But you skipped over the actual posts specific to your replies to take on a post that was asked in general of everyone. If that post was uninteresting to you, ignore it and address the others. I was simply trying to point out how we seem to take for granted how we use language to refer to reality in a way that we expect others to agree with us - as if they have the same view and that the same conclusions about reality can be reached independently without collaboration between ourselves. Take the theory of natural selection. It was reached independently by two different people - Darwin and Wallace came to the same conclusions independently by making similar observations.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Is it the language use that exercises your mind, or the things you think about before you start typing that exercises your mind?
On a philosophy forum, I typically say things to try and get logical responses or criticisms to fine tune my understanding of reality.
No. I am under no obligation to you.
Yeah, I wasn't talking about 'define' in terms of language. But anything less than a very superficial reading of what I wrote would reveal that, so I'm not sure it's worth my time pursuing this.
Briefly then, I'm using the word define as in to categorise. A and B in the example do not 'see' @, they 'see' every photon of light that makes it onto their retina from the scene. To see @ requires that they have a prior view as to what might be @ and what might be 'not@'. Their occiptial cortex then receives signals with prior filters applied by the vorbis based on their expectation of what @ looks like. Information wildly opposing that expectation is not given high focus, sometime completely ignored (there's been some delightful experiments on this where people have ignores such things as changes of colour, shape, even large object appearing and disappearing, simply because the scene is set up to create a strong expectation). So I'm just pointing out that what A and B are exchanging is their prior-dependant models of @, not @ itself.
I'm not disputing that A and B can talk to each other about their perspectives, even when there are language barriers to doing so, I'm disputing that A and B are thereby approaching @.
Really, so what's the alternative?
https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/conceptualscheme.pdf
If folk are interested, it might be worth a seperate thread to work through this.
Thanks for the link, an interesting article which I hadn't read (although I have been peripherally aware of the idea). I seems to nicely intersect with what @fdrake and I have been discussing about how the distinction between the model, that which is modelled, and that which does the modelling affects ideas of model-dependent realism. I've been reluctant to give it up purely on the grounds of what seems to be a necessary distinction because the alternative seems even less plausible. Something like what Davidson is saying here is what I've been looking for, that we can talk across schemes (what I'm calling models).
What I'm not getting from the article is why you think the very idea that we experience reality through models is fraught. I get why the idea of incommensurability is fraught, but all this seems to require is some 'translating' model with a language which can fit one scheme to the most effective equivalent in another. After all, nothing is available to measure if we've got the translation 'right', so it's appearing to work doesn't mean anything beyond pragmatism.
But it's fine if explaining would take you further off topic than you'd like, we can just shelve it there.
Perhaps that language can't fully capture experience, or do proper justice to how one feels on occasion.
That would just be a view from a lot of different places (and only if we assume that somehow the language has the views packaged into it and it's not just sounds, text marks, etc., or just meanings for that matter (not that I think that language has meaning objectively embedded into it somehow)).
It's both. Mind and imagination.
Oh yeah, this is when you clam up because you don't have any interesting comebacks.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Volition is prior and more fundamental than beliefs.
And if we can reach the same conclusions about reality independently without interacting with other human beings, then what does that say about reality and the human beings in it?
Quoting Marchesk
But didn't he just use language to describe the experience? Saying it is indescribable is describing it with words, no? Is "indescribable" a description? If not, then how did it become a common saying? How did other humans learn to use the phrase?
I agree with that.
Unless we accept that "you and I and the humans are 'embedded in language'". That is, all the humans, all embedded. Banno's view-from-everywhere requires universal participation.
"I finally achieved Nirvana this past Sunday."
"Oh yeah? What was that like?"
"Truly Indescribable. Beyond words!"
"Ah, I see. That explains it perfectly. Thanks for sharing! So what's the meaning of life?"
"42."
"Of course! I understand fully."
Quoting Marchesk
I don't see how this answers my questions.
Quoting Harry Hindu
The answer is inscrutable. I'm sure you understand.
We developed the cognitive ability to point to things we can't properly express. Unknown unknowns and what have you.
This is better.
Why can't we express them? Is it that the language is limited, or our cognitive grasp of the language we're using, or something else - like maybe a misinterpretation of what you are actually feeling?
When someone else uses the phrase, "The feeling was indescribable!", how would others learn how to use the phrase if it was truly indescribable? It seems that "indescribable" is a description. It has a definition in the dictionary.
I say that he did describe the feeling, and I say that your Nirvana post is a description as well.
In other words, at least in philosophical/scientific contexts, words are used to explain reality, and it is expected that others would come to the same conclusions given the same observations of reality. We are trying to use words to create observational sensations in others so that they might see the world as we see it. Most of our words are visual - meaning that they refer to, or initiate, visuals in someone else's mind - so that they can see things as you see them. If this wasn't the case, then why post anything at all on a philosophy forum? If you're just posting how you feel and it is only useful to you, then why post it? If it would be useful to others, why would it be useful to others if there wasn't some objective nature to reality?
Quoting Harry Hindu
"It's indescribable" is indeed a description. But, in light of its non-specificity, it's a poor one. As connected to visuals: there would be no transfer of visualized content - more a confession of the inability to transfer visualized content.
Which is why I asked how others might learn to use the term when observing someone else use it.
Indescribable: too unusual, extreme, or indefinite to be adequately described.
If it isn't specific, then why does it have such a narrow definition? I mean, is there any way to misinterpret what someone is saying when they claim their feeling is indescribable? If so, then how can others learn to use the phrase?
Is it that they know the feeling, but there aren't words to refer to it, or is it that they don't know the feeling and therefore wouldn't know the words to refer to it? Would someone else who has the same feeling be able to use terms other than "indescribable" to describe it?
Folks use the expression to circumvent a variety of communicative difficulties. Folks learn that when communicative difficulties - of various kinds - arise, it's acceptable to deploy the expression. The singular feeling in common is that of an inability to communicate a portion of the content. The incommunicable content obviously varies.
The singular feeling in common (namely, "I'm having a problem communicating X") justifies applying a narrow definition to the expression. The incommunicable portion of the content is left to one side in favor of the communicable. What's communicable is the incommunicability of a portion of the content.
Hey Harry,
Perhaps there is some disagreement here. What I meant by volitions and intent, was not separate from words, otherwise, it would rather lead us to the sort of conclusions of a homunculus living in the brain of sorts. What I do think actually happens, is something @creativesoul has been talking about for a great while now, about prelinguistic "content" or the 95% of communication that gets passed over on these forums because we can't see behavior or hear tonality.
Koan.
How would "being embedded in language" aid us in having a view from the spatiotemporal location of, say a particular quark near a particular star in the Andromeda Galaxy?
It wouldn't, obviously. It would limit us to a human perspective.
I'm not sure "the view from everywhere" is linked to spatiotemporal perspective. I understand it as assaying (and failing) to encompass the range of human perspectives. Banno may have something to say about it.
So first, what I was talking about was spatiotemporal situatedness.
And if some spatiotemporal situatedness is excluded, we wouldn't be dealing with "everywhere," every unique spatiotemporal location.
I think because the "6 or 9" example was linked to "spatiotemporal situatedness" Banno's notion of "a view from everywhere" was linked in your mind to space and time. I don't think Banno looks at it that way.
I'm sure he'll let you know.
For me it's a carry over from critique of indirect realism. When I talk about my cat, Jack, I'm not talking about a model-of-Jack that sits in my head; I'm talking about that cat. When you talk about Jack, you are talking about the cat, not your model-of-Jack. So we both manage to be talking about the very same thing - Jack; and not two seperate things, our distinct models-of-Jack.
But check out the last couple of pages of the article I shared, and this, the paragraph before the one I quoted above:
(My italics)
The criticism of presented in the article applies equally well to folk with supposedly very different models to our own, and to folk with supposedly identical models.
It's easier to see the point if one looks at language rather than perception, although it holds in both cases.
The physical example, relativistic theory, is very clear. Given your predilection and understanding of physics, @Terrapin Station, I'm puzzled at your resistance here.
I cannot speak for Banno, but I think his invocation of the view from everywhere leans on the inevitable social element of language that all views have in common, with the possible translation between views being paramount to remember. It places the ability to talk about the same stuff in the forefront. In addition, I do not think that Banno thinks that an individual worldview has to include one and only one sense of any given term within it. I could be waay off here, but I think that that's at least an incomplete but fair summary. Edited to add:I also have come to believe that Banno, much like myself, does not think that one must adhere completely to any pre-established view... to any "ism", simply because one has adopted some aspect or another into their own view.
In comparison...
My earlier addition regarding the view from everywhere is probably far away from Banno's, in that it's more about the methodology used as a means for establishing reliable premisses/conclusions that ought be used as a basis for assessing viewpoints. On my view, I have found that all views share the same basic set of common denominators at their core. This set is determined by seeking to identify and isolate that which is common to all world-views. These are the basic element constituents of all thought and belief, including views that may or may not agree/conflict with our own. So to that degree, while I think your cautionary measures are relevant in such discussions, the method I'm invoking ought steer clear of precisely what you're cautioning against. To be blunt, you're cautioning against exclusion of some, whereas the method I'm working from, advocating for, and promoting demands inclusion of all...
So, no worries.
I doubt that 95% would be how much information is lost in communicating on these forums. Maybe when communicating with Banno you'd lose 95% of what he means, but what do you expect from someone who thinks language is a game?
I'm not sure what you mean by volition being seperate from words, unless you mean word-use. Like I said, if words are used then volition must be involved.
Something uses the information in working memory (consciousness) to make decisions whether it be which route to take for work based on the current traffic conditions, or which sound to make with your mouth to communicate the information present in working memory - kind of like how computers use different protocols to communicate with other computers. I dont think "homunculus" would be the proper term for that something. How about "central executive"?
I think much of the problem lies in what people mean by, "use".
I don't really understand this comment.
Yeah, I may have overestimated. But, some large percentage of communication is non-verbal, and that's something you could use as an argument for volitions or intentionality existing, just throwing that out there.
So theres no beetles in our box when it comes to communicating uncommunicatible feelings?
Quoting Wallows
But when it comes to communicating philosophical/metaphysical or scientific ideas on forum like this, what useful information would be missing?
More like a zoo in a box.
Or an X in a box.
You don't see people talking in full sentences in every-day life. At least, here, there's a demand for rigour and logicality, which is good and all. On the flipside, remarkably (rather), philosophers have been able to put into words existential issues that are deep moods, and feelings that go sometimes beyond the trivial and mundane of every-day life. Isn't that rather remarkable, given how much of communication is actually non-verbal?
Well, being embedded in a shared world, they would.
There are, I'll contend, some who ought be excluded; the law of diminishing returns applies here.
You're saying information is lost, but what I'm saying is that the information is probably irrelevant to what is being said. Information is everywhere but we only focus our attention on what is useful at that moment.
Then your either a closet pragmatist or simply lost your way into this forum, I believe.
Surely youre not a rationalist. So the force behind your words us mostly personal sentiment.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7043/davidson-on-the-very-idea-of-a-conceptual-scheme
Indeed, although being born into a shareable world is a better starting point. Language makes it shared. The result, of course, is that the world is already meaningful, and hence all world-views involve being embedded in a shared world.
I make room for the rudimentary level thought and belief that are part of, prior to, and necessary for all common language use, and hence all worldviews.
I would agree. The trick is to acquire reasonable ground for establishing the criterion used to determine which ones ought be excluded.
Could you set out how the law of diminishing return applies to how we determine which folk ought be shunned?
LOL. I'm guessing that for Banjo it's really the law of diminishing interest. :wink:
In any case it is for me. :grin:
Do we? Suppose Jack (or Jacqueline for this example) were to have kittens. You're saying that it would simply be universally agreed at what point the fertilised egg ceased being Jacqueline and started being little Jack the kitten?
As I said, I can't see anything in the article you cited that renders models unintelligable and reproducing the author's opinion that he has doesn't really help in that regard. Perhaps you could , in preference to quoting, give a summary of the argument you think lead him to that conclusion, so that I've got something to go on rather than essentially an argument from authority ("Donaldson reckons it's the case so it must be the case")
Primarily, perhaps, if you're going through with this model-less view, which route do you take to deal with the multiplicity of existent objects, dualism or idealism, or do you reject the spatiotemporal model most of us seem intuitively to have?
If Jack relates to each of you differently - which is at least minimally likely - then what you talk about when you talk about Jack will be different. The ideas you have about Jack will be different - unless you are tracking carefully what the other is likely experiencing of Jack. If one of you was bitten by a cat when young and doesn't realize how this affects how you view cats or feel around them, this will affect your senses of cats and Jack. You are both trying your best to talk about one creature. I am not suggesting that there are two cats or some kind of immenent multiverse. It might make more sense to say you are each talking FROM your models (though I might prefer some other term like aggregate of assumptions/impressions and conclusions (pardon it's unweildiness.)
In any case, if you each spoke to others they might very well get very different ideas about Jack. And that's even if neither of you were quite careful to work from your experiences and both good observers. This would likely be even more true if Jack was a person.
Quoting Wallows
I don't see the reason to label people, especially from a standpoint of your limited interactions with me.
Like I said, information is everywhere - which is to say that there are things in the universe that can be talked about that would be irrelevant to the current discussion. That other information in the universe is relevant to other discussions, or would be useful in other contexts. So, what is useful is what is relevant to the current topic.
So I ask you, what percentage of information is lost when you write your posts and I read them? What information isn't getting to my brain that you would like to? And how is it that we can't get there simply by talking it out a bit more with relevant information?
We don't speak in full sentences when the context fills in those gaps for us. We use words to categorize our thoughts into bits for transmitting to other brains - kind of like how a analog-to-digital converter transforms analog signals (like the sound picked up by a microphone) into binary so the computer can use it. The context provides a template of what can be relevant to the current discussion. Those bits just fill in those fields of the template, so we don't need all of the information sent to us because we get that from the context (template).
Word-use is an action and all actions require energy, so it seems plausible that we would try to find shortcuts in using language to conserve energy.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Well, it's something that is in all of our boxes that is similar, or else we would never be able to get to a common understanding of what people mean when they behave a certain way - like when making sounds with their mouths and moving their hands in a particular way. As a matter of fact, our experiences and interpretations of each other's and everyone else's behavior when using language would have to be similar or else how could we all come to a similar understanding of how to use those words?
A large degree. Though, we've had several interactions for me to determine that you're not a troll or insincere in your engagement on these topics. Yet, please use this as an example. Say, that I am some psychopath that is trying to get you confused because I get a kick out of making people feel bad. How do you know that I am or am not one? I suppose it would be harder for a psychopath to convince someone to die over the internet, despite the hot topic of bullying on places like Reddit or elsewhere.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yes; but, the context of what exactly, the map or the territory(?)
Yeah, but what percent? A majority of it? You're the one on that end that knows what they're typing on the screen and how much of it is missing. What exactly is missing? I'm trying to get specifics here, so I'd appreciate a more specific answer.
Quoting Wallows
Then, as a psychopath, you're goal of trying to confuse me isn't relevant information to this specific topic that you and I are both discussing.
That's what lying is. In order to lie, we'd already have to have some inclination into what the other person is thinking, or how they will interpret our words, in order to manipulate them into thinking something other than what is relevant to the facts. You can't lie to someone who already knows the facts.
Quoting Wallows
Both, if the map is accurate. If it isn't, then the map is irrelevant information, no?
Doesn't the strong version of that support conceptual schema relativism?
Uhh, intentionality for starters???
Quoting Harry Hindu
No, that's just plain bullshitting. Lying requires one to know what the truth is and hide it from plain sight when engaging an interlocutor.
Afaik, same shit.
If it gets you to the top of the mountain I'd say it's a good map.
Quoting Isaac
No.
Since we are here to talk philosophy, one should be charitable to someone who presented a criticism of what one had said, and to try to understand the critique. But if the critique remains unclear after a few posts, and if one's antagonist has a history of similar incoherence, and if others have agreed as to the opacity of their posts, then one might reasonably not reply.
Incoherence is a mark of incapacity or lack of effort.
If you're not interested, you can just say so. I'm not handing in an question paper to be marked, I'm contributing to a discussion. If you can't even be bothered to write a proper reply then just don't reply. Replying just to get some condescending dismissal in is just rude.
Nothing much worth objecting to...
So, what more could I say?
...
Quoting Isaac
But, as I said, if you're not interested, that's fine, just have to say so.
Was someone suggesting that there are actually two objects of discussion? Or was it more like each of you is discussing your model and not Jack? If it is the latter case, this certainly happens? I would guess you encounter people who are referring to a person or a thing, but in their description you are convinced they are not really experiencing that thing. For example their ideas about what the thing is like are so strongly affecting their descriptions they are not describing that thing. As opposed to somewhat accurately describing their experience of the thing or person their itneractions have eilcited. So it seems possible that people can be talking about their models, at least to me. Then to me it is a question of how much they are doing this.
If you didn't intend to type that and submit it, then how did it get on the screen for me to read?
Are we talking about your intentions, or the topic of this thread? Again, I'm making the distinction of relevancy. What your intentions are, other than typing and submitting posts of your ideas on this topic, are irrelevant to the topic.
What else is missing? You're the one that gave dropped the measurement of percentages into this, so what is the percentage? How high would it have to be for you to consider language-use a waste of time?
Quoting Wallows
I don't understand what you mean by bullshitting. You simply said what I said after that. Part of knowing the truth, and is relevant information when you're going to lie to someone, is whether an interlocutor knows the truth or not. Your map has to include their map as well as the territory.
Quoting Wallows
Sure, if your goal is to get to the top of the mountain. The territory has rest-stops, and hopefully your map has the location of these when your need to use the restroom.
https://www.google.com/search?q=what+percentage+of+communication+is+nonverbal
The only reason you'd need to use tone or body language is when you are more vague with your word-use.
That communication is more effective in person. I suppose that is the obvious conclusion here?
I'm talking to you, not to words on my screen, but our conversation is via words on our screens. Your talk of "I talk about cats, not about models-of-cats" doesn't seem to address the philosophical point made by indirect realism at all. It's just a word game that conflates our ordinary way of talking with a deeper analysis of perception and epistemology.
:confused:
Uhh... Go back and read that question again. Your answer is for a different question that I did not ask.
Quoting Harry Hindu
What information is in your tone or behavior, that is relevant to your posts on this topic, that I am missing? If you're not making yourself clear and you know what information is missing to make yourself clear, then why aren't you including that information via words? If I held these beliefs that you do - that 90%+ information is lost when communicating on philosophy forums - I wouldn't waste my time trying to communicate with others on a philosophy forum. You avoided that question to: What percentage would you consider it a waste of time to communicate via written words on a forum? How is it that stories in books get interpreted similarly by different individuals if written text is missing 93% of it's relevant information? Answer the questions and be specific.
If this were the case, then there would never be a case where someone doesn't know what they are talking about - meaning their model is inaccurate and they are pointing to the model, not the thing. We can inform them they are wrong because someone else has the correct model thanks to the proper observations. Observation is how the model gets updated with more accurate information, or else the model is full of imaginary information. Effects, which are the observations, are about their causes, like Jack's existence interacting with light in the environment, which then enters your eyes. Notice how the model of the cat, Jack includes information about light in the environment too. Turn out the lights and your model of Jack the cat changes.
Quoting Michael
And the via is relevant how? As grounding the pointing fantasy in physics?
Edit: also, talking to isn't talking about.
It's relevant when we consider that the historical disagreement between the direct and indirect realist was one of epistemology. To what extent do our experiences provide us with information about the external world?
So what information do the words I see on the screen tell me about Banno? What information do the colours and shapes I see tell me about the chair?
Although Banno is causally responsible for the words I see on the screen, they're not him, and so reading them doesn't really tell me that much about him. The words I read are an intermediary. But despite that, it's still correct to say that when I read and respond to them I'm talking to him, not to the words on the screen. It's much the same if indirect realism is the case for seeing a chair. Even if the chair is causally responsible for the colours and shapes I see, they're not the same thing. But despite that, it's still correct to say that when I see them I'm seeing the chair.
The main point I'm trying to get across is that being an indirect realist about perception doesn't entail arguing that we don't see chairs, just as being an "indirect realist" about talking over the internet doesn't entail arguing that you and I don't talk to each other. Even if we argue for an indirect connection between ourselves and some other thing/person, it doesn't then follow that we can't appropriately say that we see/talk to this other thing/person.
I see chairs and trees; the same chairs and trees that you see. But given how perception works we are right to wonder how much of what we see is true of the external world and how much is a product of observation. In the case of things like colours I would argue that they're a product of observation. The redness I see is just "in my head" and not the same thing as a surface that reflects light at a certain wavelength, and there's nothing in principle problematic with the inverted spectrum hypothesis – and if you and I see different things (even very different things) when looking at the same thing then what can we say about what that thing is like when neither of us is looking at it? Can we say anything, or is it unknowable, à la Kant's noumena?
It almost has to be that way. I guess the color realist would argue that human brains are recreating colors out there in the world, but I'm not sure this always works out with the colors we see versus reflective surfaces and lighting conditions.
Also, because the color we see is because of a small part of the EM spectrum, raising a question as to whether colors are associated with the rest of it, and if not, why not? If our eyes could detect radio rays, would we see some color range coming through the table and all around us? Is visible light special because if reflects off molecular surfaces?
So which, if not all, of
are we talking about?
And yet you all but repeat it , here:
This is why this account of the "directness" of direct realism fails to address the epistemological questions that gave rise to the distinction between direct (naïve) and indirect realism in the first place. Does perception show us the objective nature of the world? The naïve view is that it does; that the qualities of experience (e.g. redness, roundness, etc.) are objective properties of things, and the indirect view is that it doesn't; that these qualities are mental phenomena, albeit causally covariant with these objective properties (e.g. redness being a response to stimulation by a particular kind of light), and so we don't really know what the world is like when we're not looking.
But this other account of direct realism - that is concerned with what counts as the object of perception – doesn't help answer this question, as it can be the case both that external world things are the objects of perception and that the qualities of experience aren't objective properties of these things, and so indirect realism is compatible with this (non-naïve?) direct realism.
Perception depends on the perceived either way.