Banno

Goodness. But you agree that any argument can be rendered valid by the will of god? Saying otherwise would limit god's omnipotence, no?

Well, if you say so. Really?

If you are god, as you supposed in your OP, and if god can will anything, including apparent contradictions, then whether there are any contradictions...

But since, as god, you can do anything, you can decide which contradictions are not contradictions, and which are. SO there's no point in your asking ...

That's the point. Any contradictions would only support your thesis. Presumably, for example, you can be both god and not god.

Hmm. Your omnipotence explains the many contradictions in your posts.

See Davidson's On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. How would one recognise that one was looking at an alien's conceptual scheme, unless one has a...

Indeed. Sometimes one's beliefs are in error.

So far as I can see your problems have been addressed successfully. While modality has been used in deontic and temporal logic I am not aware of any i...

Just drawing attention to The Concept of Religion and to the tread on that topic. Where's @"Wayfarer"?

But... there, at the very start of this thread, you set the discussion up in modal terms.

Nice try. Michael might think he is making a modal point when he is making an epistemic one. On that basis we might interpret as just saying that one ...

, , OK, just to be clear, I am adopting a particular grammar here. It's I think a grammar that is common to all philosophical thinking. It is to be se...

Suppose p?q. One might phrase this as "p makes q true". No causality is implied. That's how I read the bit from Davidson you cite. I don't see any way...

What is "make" doing here? You said it's not causal. We have the logical relation of the IFF in the T-sentence- what more do you want?

Not if it is a true belief. See the word "actually"? It sneaks in a misplaced modal quantifier.

No, because the second is modal. So what?

IF your belief is true in reality, it cannot be false, and so you could not in reality be wrong. But even if it is true in reality, it may be wrong in...

SO what's the problem?

If you actually know, you cannot actually be wrong. (If you know in this possible world, then in this possible world you cannot be wrong)

If you know aliens exist, then aliens exist. (if they do not, then you didn't know...) Hence, if you know aliens exist, you cannot be wrong. Nor can y...

What?

And the way to make this consistent is to observer that if you know something to be the case in reality, you cannot be wrong in reality; but there mig...

But when you know something, you are not wrong. If you were wrong, you didn't know it.

I did, previously, but you refused to entertain possible worlds, and so missed the answer. Here it is again. If you know the cat is on the mat in real...

I don't think temporality has much to do with it.

You're tying yourself in a knot over the term "possible world". All it is, is an alternative state of affairs - like the world being the same except t...

Cheers.

Well, he gets his whole own section in the SEP article on truth; more than classical correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories put together.......

Yep. Why? I think the cat is on the ottoman. It moved there after the sun went off the mat.

Love this. Nothing. Of course - that's what the T-sentence says. "It's true that my teacup is on my desk" IFF my teacup is on my desk. So not a lot of...

T-sentences do not set out how "truth" ought be used. They set out the way it does functions in logic. SO no, your third position does not apply to T-...

I don't follow that. But: "Take something as" as in decide if it is true or not? That''d be a theory of belief, not truth. Our deciding if something i...

Disquotationalism.

Scratch, scratch. When faced with the existential crisis of German bombing, Witti took a job as a hospital orderly. Otherwise philosophy becomes waiti...

g(X) is true IFF f(X)... The alien conceptual scheme can only be recognised as a conceptual scheme if there is an interpretation for in in our concept...

So you want to make the questions unanswerable, to make them no longer questions, and yet to still ask them. I gave you reasonable answers, but what y...

Again, seems as the modals are being muddled. What we can conclude is that omniscience can know everything and yet things might have been other than t...

I think it rather the reverse, that questions of belief cannot be answered without a discussion of truth. If one specifies the conditions under which ...

From the contents list for the SEP article: Which one of these are you proposing? Which is true? The point, of course, is that since it is far from cl...

Which raises the interesting issue of how Wittgenstein would respond to the misuse of language. Have you had a look at A nice derangement of epitaphs?...

An illocutionary act with the following conditions: It has as content some proposition p The speaker has evidence for the truth of p It is not obvious...

Not about things you know - they are true.

Better. That's not a good rendering of 4. A better would be something like "I believe that in the actual worlds, p, although in other possible worlds,...

But the actual world is a possible world... So when you say that she might be 30 in the actual world, you are saying she might be 30 in some possible ...

So now I'm backtracking to the Strawson-Austin debate. Roughly, and here mimicking Strawson, if you know what an assertion is, you already know what t...

No; more about the distinction between belief and truth. Also, I don't think Davidson holds that there is some causal link between the antics of famil...

The assumption that because there is a predicate - "...is true" - there must be a property of which that predicate is the name , is fraught with reifi...

Typo... not sure what this is. Nice rendering of Ramsey, though.

A statement's being judged true or false is very different to it's being true or false.