Banno

That's no fun. My ramblings yesterday were unclear. Perhaps I can tidy up a little bit. Folk tend to talk of names and statements on the one hand and ...

We're a fair way off it anyway. Think we might have to let it roll. Some thoughts on I and E language. I-language is indeed not a private language in ...

I have no idea what you are asking.

4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said. The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are.

Hence the ineptitude of pragmatism. In making use of the certainty of language it undermines its own scepticism towards language.

In a nutshell, I can't see why generative grammar requires analyticity.

Yeah, the idea that language is built by an algorithmic process from this or that simple, eb it names or propositions or whatever, just can't get off ...

Enrico Cipriani provides some additional context and discussion, extending the argument to Kripke. If I have it right, Chomsky takes there to be an in...

Starting at p102, Paul Horwich's Chomsky versus Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction has a potted history of the issue from Frege through Russe...

That's not just a rewording. it's saying something completely different. The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", s...

Ok. We agree. Then the salient stuff is that this is a large part of what is different about PI. The Tractatus is of interest in consideration of how ...

Where the logical atomism of the Tractatus differs from that of Russell is that Russell took individuals to be basic, while in the tractatus it is fac...

Some apocryphal...

Not sure I have what you mean here. Atomic propositions are not each learned a priori. I hope youa re not saying that. But one might say that the cate...

I suspect that Chomsky may well have had something not unlike the thought experiments used by Quine in Word and object. So the question arrises as to ...

Your idea is that all analytic statements are the direct result of performative acts. For plane figures, if the sum of the internal angles of a polygo...

Can you explain Quine's objection to analyticity?

Ok, so let's reset. Now the next question is how one gets from a fact to a proposition - so to the elephant in the corner, proposition 6. This seems a...

Thanks for the Scientific American link. Nice summation. The issue is if a statement can be true in virtue of the meaning of the words alone. But we d...

What I said was correct. Facts do not cry. Babies cry. This is silly.

Yes, , philosophy is quite difficult, isn't it. Kant went to all the trouble to develop these terms, only for others to show that they don't much work...

Where did I do that? All I've done is point out that your: does not set out a distinction. If anything, it says that facts and propositions are the sa...

? You only do OP's?

So this thread is about @"invicta" discovering analyticity. Next step is to deal with Quine. Then Chomsky. Then Davidson.

@"Sam26", have you looked at Anscombe's An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus?

Hmm. Neither does the fact. You're thinking of the baby.

SO The fact: the baby is crying The proposition: "The baby is crying" ?

That explanation does not make the difference at all clear.

Just like dogs.

But hence TLP 6.5... "to say nothing except what can be said". Oh, well.

The wide collar would make them seed and dirt collectors. I prefer Blundstone 659's. But I don't like horses.

Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts. Facts and states of affairs are propo...

Yeah. Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, ...

So far as I understand, you can pay for the privilege.

Or is it that between analytic and synthetic statements - which is not quite the same thing? Yep.

SO — not a thread about imaginary numbers then.

Both, I suppose. It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form - and this regard...

Maybe. My only point is that rejecting Krauss does not mean there must be a god. With the corollary that sometimes overreaches what can be concluded f...

Strictly, Quine's target is the analytic/synthetic distinction. This seems to be what you are so vaguely addressing. His main argument is roughly that...

No. Scientific work show that the world is ordered. Your cited article does odd things with italics, but so far as I can tell the flow is that Krause ...

If what you suggest were true, then one could do science in a world with no order by supposing that there was some order. But one could not. Instead, ...

No. Truth is not duplicitous. It is simple. "P" is true iff P. That's all there is to it. The "...is true" in "It is true that triangles have three si...

Quite the opposite. That reality is ineligible is the conclusion of the scientific process. Science works. Therefore the universe is intelligible.

So what are we to make of this self-contradiction? My simple answer is that truth remains constant, but that what is true can vary by context; and tha...

See, if you changed your title to "Is what is true always context dependent", I'd say yes. But I suspect from what you have wirtten that you wodul say...

Yes. Yes. So what.

That's two different sorts of sentences, not to different sorts of truth.

What the baby and the dog want can be put into a statement. Seems propositional to me.

:grin: I'm not at all sure what it is you are saying in you OP, so I am not in a position to say if what I say is agreeing with or "counteracting" it....

That's the nature of philosophy.