Banno

If...

Not following you here. Bringing together primary and secondary qualities, eliminativism, subjectivism, or subjective qualities, needs more than hand ...

Well, if you see no meaning in this discussion, you are welcome not to participate. Well, there are red tomatoes, and one way of saying that is that s...

Oooh goodness. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11175/philosophical-plumbing-mary-midgley/p1 https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9453/m...

Sure, all that. It's mostly an historical distinction, with little place in more recent discussions, for various reasons.

So you can explicate and maintain the distinction between primary and secondary qualities? I'm not so confident.

I spent time with Tibetan Buddhists and did a fair bit of introductory meditation, but was put off in the end by the stories and metaphysics. I'm not ...

Yep. One might note three stages here. The first is unreflective belief that colour is a part of the thing; the second, the realisation that what we s...

Hypostatisation. Another case of folk mistaking a way of talking for a thing.

I changed it to show that language is more central to this issue than you seem to hold. To say that 'all we do with words is to say them' is to trivia...

If you like. I'm not sure what your view is. Too many posts to keep track of.

This is one of those seemingly innocuous topics that finds itself to be a pivot between quite different philosophies, and indeed between quite differe...

Yes, but unfortunately there are many who take this view, that dreams cannot be identified, as proof of something metaphysical, even if they rarely st...

Someone once commented privately that you have a mind like a freight train, powerful but incapable of considering anything to the side of its tracks. ...

This seems telling. Yes, we all use words in ways other than to simply make statements. You know that. We use them to do all manner of things, from ma...

Perhaps. But that is very much not the same as the claim that we can never tell the difference between having a dream and being awake.

You are thinking of Lucid dreams? I've had them a few times. No, I'm talking generally - we differentiate between dreams and wakefulness.

Odd. Use is determined by... well, what we do. Not by what we say we do.

So in summary, if we could not tell when we were dreaming, then we could not tell if it's a cow or a dream cow. Well, yes. But we can tell when we are...

Hey, careful - you cherry-picked those words, not me. Here:

So you can tell when you are dreaming and when you are awake. Good.

Well, it's the quote you used. There is a tendency to take the argument just that bit further than is valid.

You lost me here.

OK. How do they lean what dreams are?

A child learns to differentiate between dreaming and being awake. How? It's partially to do with their interactions with others.

You show signs of recognising differing uses. Progress. The physiology is not the whole story.

No.

Perhaps there was no real point for you to make.

If this is so, how is it that we have the distinction between dreams and lucidity?

I'll leave you to it. For my part, I don't think you have understood something here. Try going into a shop and asking for the red pens that are not re...

If you wish to present a case that there are no red pens, be my guest.

Again, the physiology is correct, just incomplete.

Quite right. Not quite right. A simple appeal to science would probably not appeal to Wittgenstein. The game in hand is that of making special provisi...

Thanks for the link to the journal. Might be useful. To be sure, what I object to is stuff such as: It seems to me odd that Wayfarer accepts this, sin...

The absurdity of this should be plain. How do you tell that you are experiencing red? Well, because you know what "the colour red" is. So what is the ...

Again, this is blatantly false. Your gears are spinning but not making the connection.

A methodological point. There's a mistaken view of language games that sees them as involving only words. the examples given in PI make it very clear ...

Yep.

Then why the quote marks? But the speculation can be ended by the author. What has been presented here by myself and others shows that there is more t...

More likely that they had not given consideration to the difference.

Ok. There's no reply to that, it's so far off track. Central to the experiment are reports of colours seen.

Sure - in this case. But it would be wrong to conclude that therefore the only way we use "red" is to refer to firing of certain cells in V4 - as worn...

Johnson's is most satisfactory argument.

Then you render your position unfalsifiable? Or you classify Subject 1001 as abnormal? You see, it's not only about biomechanics because it involves t...

Of course it is to do with truth. But you can't say that because it undermines your antirealism. The cup is in the dishwasher. So we agree on this?

Yep. There's a category error happening here.

And yet there are red pens. (note the obfuscation in "the mind", as if there were only one...) To point out that red does not "exist" in "the" mind. H...

The key here is what is to count as an "observer". You presume mind. That's down to you, not the physics. Alternative include "We don't know - shut up...

We can firm it up. There are true statements about unobserved things. "The cup is in the dishwasher" is true, even though we can't see the cup. So if ...

Only part of the machinery acts the same way - V4, apparently... There's an old argument (from Davidson?) that is relevant here. Supose that we propos...