Did you ask? Seems pretty straight forward. It just says that something is the justification for P. If P is justified, then something is the justifica...
No. Rather, you wish that "all truths are justifiable" while maintaining that there can be truths that do not have a justification. I can't see how to...
This is your game. you get to decide, I supose. I have asked you to tell me what you take a justification to be. Presumably "is justified" means we ha...
Only if you do not wish to allow for justifications in other possible worlds. Hey, you are the one who wants to introduce modality... I think quite un...
Sure. Do you really want to say that if a proposition is true than in some possible world there is a justification? Fine, then for you every truth has...
If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, you can drop the modality. p?Jp If a truth is justifiable, then for that ...
Not I. The set of true propositions is on your account a proper subset of the set of propositions with a justification. Hence a proposition can only b...
Yeah, you do. If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, then for any given truth there is some justification. On yo...
You introduced constructivism, as I maintain that there is stuff that is true even if we don't know, believe, or whatever, that it is true. Do you agr...
Sure, all that; and yet we also have surprise, error and agreement. So the world is not completed by experience. I would take that remark seriously if...
Whatever it might have been, it is not "The world is me". He stepped beyond the solipsism that traps you. Then I haven't been able to follow what you ...
This sort of question is risible. The Orion Nebula is not dependent on you, nor are trilobites. But your saying anything (thinking, believing, doubtin...
But you know that this is mostly crap. Realism/idealism is a false opposition. Propositions are bits of language, so they are human... "mind-dependent...
Yes. And if B then A?B, for any A or B. So if we take justification as being the consequent of a material implication then that any truth is justified...
And again, if that is no more than that it can be made the consequent of a material implication, that is trivially right. So again, what is it to be "...
I don't see that you can substitute ?(p ? ?Kp) for ?p(p ? ?Kp). I've tried doing that with the argument at SEP 2. The Paradox of Knowability, but... S...
Just to be clear, my target here is the idea that a proposition can only be true if justified. That suggests truth is a two=place predicate over propo...
Yep, something doesn't seem to grasp. And by "justification" we mean...? The antecedent of a material implication? - too Strong, since anything can be...
You are playing silly buggers until you fill in what it means for something to be justified. But given that you cannot get your head around material i...
Interesting that you think this a problem. That there are "unjustified" truths is pretty obvious. Of course, now we have to look towards what it is to...
Sure. And they do this by rejecting classical logic. Yep. Realism does not commit to vat brains. This is an odd objection. Sure. Is any of this incons...
You tell me. We are talking about realism and antirealism. You brought in constructivism. Set it up for us, if you like. Is this the second Warble, or...
:grin: Then we have a more explicit impasse. You seem to me to be always verging on saying something interesting, which is what keeps me in the conver...
That's... rather the point at issue... :roll: Let's not. Nuh. It can just be extensionally equivalent. Tarski and Davidson and so on. Meaning needn't ...
How long is each warble in Farnarkling? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X454D3Fzwso A warble lasts exactly as long as John Clark says it lasts. "A war...
One way to give a deflationary account of truth is to say that "P" is true IFF P. Hence for any statements of the sort ("P" is true) we can write P, r...
Yeah, they can reject it all they like. It doesn't follow that they are right. ?p(p??Kp)??p(p?Kp ...and knowledge is a propositional attitude, a relat...
Well, no. That's far too vague. One is about the weather, the other is about a sentence. But (1) and (2) are arguably truth- functionally equivalent. ...
Frankly, there was a lot in the post I made above that remains unaddressed, yet far more pertinent to the issue than the direction you are taking. htt...
...I would say no more than: “It is raining” is true? it is raining. Nothing here about meaning. I think you introduced "meaning" into the discussion ...
And you think it was clear for you? I was only copying your use: We have a choice between dropping meaning and looking to use and dropping meaning and...
But "'it is raining' is true" means that it is raining, not "it is raining". That looks trivial, but it isn't. A name does not have a truth value. "It...
Knowledge, belief, and so on are relations between us and propositions. They are two-placed predicates. Truth is not relational. It is a single-placed...
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