Heh, I got in before the edit. An existing body state is not cognition here. Spinoza's attribute of cognition is not referring to the existence of our...
They are extended, they are never cognitive.. If you speak about a state/mode under the attribute of cognition, you are not longer talking about in ma...
Extension and cognition are different in any case. The former is a sort of thing that exists (i.e. when something is present or true by existing), whi...
Spinoza is pretty close to most modern materialists in terms of thinking existing states being exhausted to existing, their empirical relations and no...
The change of "is sweet" to "has sweetness" is an attempted metaphor (one may be unsure of how successful) to draw attention to how relation beings ar...
Sartre is giving account of the person who attempts a removal of meaning to them, to arrive an account of existence itself. Roquentin, who is searchin...
It's a reverse reductio. I'm taking it is true God is necessary and then examining what it entails. Since a necessary God is given regardless of what ...
I do not. I mean the necessary God must be so in any instance, so it cannot be subject to the action of existence to make it true over not. Therefore,...
We can do even better than that. A necessary God is true in any case. Existing things only.obtain when they exist. A necessary God must obtain, it can...
I would agree compared to the days of the old place. Here, I'm not so sure. I think lots of knowledgable regular posters becoming less active has had ...
Descartes is doing a little bit more than a tautology. He talking about a necessary aspect given a particular existing event. That's to say if there i...
Spinoza is describing how it happens: if qualia is produced by non-qualia, then it is a mode of substance. We get the causality in the presence of tha...
For Spinoza, qualia is modes of substance. Qualia is both a mode of body and a mode of mind. A mode of body, in that qualia is an instance of existenc...
Spinoza's metaphysics are like a Xantos Gambit. What he's describing and analysing is what is necessarily true. He's not doing speculation of possible...
The question does not make sense. Spinoza's metaphysics recognise the question has no answer because it fails to understand what it is talking about. ...
I did nothing of the sort. I'm pointing out you are enforcing everyone must have an identity of male or female to find physiologically. It would only ...
I'm worried about the contradiction in your statement here. You say you aren't for enforcing identity, yet that's exactly what your ontology does. Why...
Why then are you insisting humans must have a male or female soul? That's enforcing an identity. You are saying the must have either of these identiti...
Reproduction is not sex or gender. It's done by bodies. Bodies which act in reproduction as they do, whether they are female, male or anything else. P...
1. We are talking about is mind, not ping pong. If we talked about ping pong, we would be describing something else entirely. Why call it mind? That's...
Itself. It is mind. This is why there is no hard problem for Spinoza. Matter does not create mind. Both matter (attribute of extension) and mind (attr...
Panpsychism, in the sense you are thinking, is too reductive for Spinoza. Spinoza says all things are animated even when experience does not exist at ...
My comment would be there is no effective difference, much like Kant's critique of the ontological argument-- one can say there is a necessary real. O...
The reason I say you are a dualist is because you hold experiences are a different type of reality, such that they cannot be affected, explained, rela...
1. A rock might have experience and think. It's down to whether a rock exists with experience, just as with a human. (a lot of the time people just th...
Not quite, the existence of an alcoholic who drinks in conjunction with having sorrows is under the attribute of extension. It's meaning in ideas is u...
I suspect there is not a way to do so. Eugen appears to a dualist who thinks anyone who has one substance, of which there are explicable instances of ...
I think they confused the attribute of mind with the presence of an all encompassing thinking being, a finite casual actor, who wills things. I was ab...
Not at all, thought it might seem that way with the amount of philsophers who try to suggest we know nothing about conciousness-- some of them would l...
The question doesn't make sense because it is impossible for the hard problem to be true. Spinzoa is a materialist, so if that were wrong, he would be...
We know there isn't a hard problem. We have to equivocate consious experience with something else to even suggest it. The hard problem is logically in...
The latter, there has never been and will never be a hard problem. Unconscious matter can create conscious states. It just one state matter (the exper...
Well, at the level your asking, that's how all causes work. Why does the paper get soggy in the rain? The state of soggy paper results from the paper ...
I say it makes conciousness because the brain (and other states of the body) are distinct things. When I look at a brain, I'm not looking at the exper...
The experience is a new state of matter generated. It is what the given relation of things does. Water, when combined with paper, produces new states,...
In the common case of our experiences, our body responding to an environment. Light hits my eyes, soon after, the state of experience of me seeing som...
I mean neither. Every conscious experience is its own unique state of existence. When a concious experience is produced, it isn't a combination of thi...
Conscious states are modes of body. To be conscious is to have existing states of conciousness which are caused by other things. It's just a causality...
They are modes of extension. States which have been caused to exist. At some point, specific modes extension generate another mode of extension, a fee...
It's not a problem at all. Indeed, it is a possible set of events. We don't know what a body can do-- if we had atoms which produced states of conciou...
The discintion is embedded in morality itself. If all it took was the existence of something to make an ought, then anything that existed would be mor...
The is/ought distinction gets confused because people mistake it for a suggestion morality is not.. Really, it's a logical discintion that a fact of e...
Yeah, but that's exactly Sophsitcat's point: the "is" amounts to an objective account of who someone is with respect to normatively. We have described...
Indeed, but Nietzsche neither accounts for everything nor equates value with merely existing. By "independent" I do not mean of something other than t...
This is the mistake. Actions do not just makes sense to given objective. Someone doesn't just have reason to do something because they exist with a re...
I do not agree. Moral claims were always justified by something other than the fact a person makes a claim, by an ought significance which is truth in...
Sartre is doing something closer to description of a new state. Essences don't work because they substitute some type of eternal idea or concept (e.g....
The reason you seem to think otherwise is because you are still ascribing people have a rational reasonof taking action, absent the presence of the ou...
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