Descartes vs Cotard
Cotard Delusion described by Jules Cotard (1840 - 1889) RIP
[quote=Wikipedia]Cotard's delusion, also known as walking corpse syndrome or Cotard's syndrome, is a rare mental disorder in which the affected person holds the delusional belief that he or she [...] does not exist[...][/quote]
Please note the part underlined above.
Cogito ergo sum, kind courtesy of René Descartes, who was deeply satisfied, I suppose, that the cogito, ergo sum argument was, to him and to many of us, irrefutable.
The juxtaposition of Descartes and Cotard in this thread is intended for the purposes of what the US military calls shock & awe.
On the one hand we have Descartes claiming that the existence of the self simply can't be doubted and if one dares to do so, that itself is definitive proof that the self exists unequivocally.
On the other hand, we have people who suffer from Cotard delusion who are convinced that fae "...does not exist..."
It must mentioned though that the Cotard "delusion" is treated as a delusion which immediately defangs any attempt to argue that there's some truth in the alleged belief some people have that they "...don't exist..."
Nevertheless, it can't be denied that people with Cotard delusion present a direct challenge to Descartes' cogito, ergo sum argument. Here's Descartes, confidently asserting, "I exist" and there's patients with Cotard delusion insisting, as confidently if not more so that "they don't exist."
What gives?
[quote=Wikipedia]Cotard's delusion, also known as walking corpse syndrome or Cotard's syndrome, is a rare mental disorder in which the affected person holds the delusional belief that he or she [...] does not exist[...][/quote]
Please note the part underlined above.
Cogito ergo sum, kind courtesy of René Descartes, who was deeply satisfied, I suppose, that the cogito, ergo sum argument was, to him and to many of us, irrefutable.
The juxtaposition of Descartes and Cotard in this thread is intended for the purposes of what the US military calls shock & awe.
On the one hand we have Descartes claiming that the existence of the self simply can't be doubted and if one dares to do so, that itself is definitive proof that the self exists unequivocally.
On the other hand, we have people who suffer from Cotard delusion who are convinced that fae "...does not exist..."
It must mentioned though that the Cotard "delusion" is treated as a delusion which immediately defangs any attempt to argue that there's some truth in the alleged belief some people have that they "...don't exist..."
Nevertheless, it can't be denied that people with Cotard delusion present a direct challenge to Descartes' cogito, ergo sum argument. Here's Descartes, confidently asserting, "I exist" and there's patients with Cotard delusion insisting, as confidently if not more so that "they don't exist."
What gives?
Comments (63)
I found what you have written about as interesting because I have often wondered about whether we can really say that the self exists. I have come across some Buddhist accounts which certainly challenge the idea of the self. I think that this is connected to the nature of impermanence, especially that of ego consciousness.
However, Descartes saw his own identification of the 'I' as evidence for the self, and most of us do have a sense of continuity of a self throughout our life experiences. But, we can question the nature of this self. It may be more of a construct perhaps, in establishing personal identity.
This is the sticking point I believe. I should've thought about it earlier. I recall someone saying quite a few years ago that Descartes' didn't quite get to proving the existence of a self i.e. the "I" in "I think therefore, I am" isn't what most people would call a self and is, according to the objectors, best described as only a thinking thing. The reasons (for the objection) were, if memory serves, drawn from Buddhist sources, specifically the notion of Anatt?. If not, they should have.
On the flip side, in the Cotard delusion, it isn't clear whether the person experiencing is referring to a self with the same meaning as used by those who objected to Descartes' argument or whether it refers to a thinking thing. If the latter, then the Cotard delusion taken with Descartes' cogito argument would amount to a frank contradiction.
Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything.
Cotard's "I do not exist", a delusion, is a pathology; otherwise, as a statement (rather than a feeling) it's a performative contradiction, which says nothing.
In other words, the latter cannot be said and the former need not be said: neither expresses a distinction that makes a difference.
:up: Will get back to you if I think of something interesting but don't hold your breath. :lol:
I believe that the biggest danger is that when we are thinking about the self, whether in terms of Cotard's view or in other ones , to start thinking of the self as an entity as if it is in a box or a container.
Why, may I ask?
phenomenal self modeling[/url]).
I am probably not speaking of some kind of danger, as if we are going to come to harm through such thinking in such a way. I am speaking more of a 'philosophical danger' if such a concept makes sense.
Why is someone's illogical refusal to accept a logical conclusion a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the conclusion?
A tautology does say something. It defines.
No. It merely repeats itself.
A bachelor is an unmarried man. Identity.
A bachelor is a bachelor. Tautology.
The latter does not convey any information; the former is a definition of the first term by the second.
[quote=Wikipedia]People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves[/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]The user illusion is the illusion created for the user by a human–computer interface, for example the visual metaphor of a desktop used in many graphical user interfaces. The phrase originated at Xerox PARC.[1]
Some philosophers of mind have argued that consciousness is a form of user illusion. This notion is explored by Tor Nørretranders in his 1991 Danish book Mærk verden, issued in a 1998 English edition as The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size.[/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]Dennett says that only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at all: "To explain is to explain away".[/quote]
Mind weighing in.
I considered that possibility but it doesn't add up. In my humble opinion, just as Descartes reasoned to the conclusion "I exist", those who suffer from Cotard delusion also reason to the conclusion "I don't exist." How good the reasons are is a different story perhaps worth looking into.
I was also contemplating on the therapeutic utility of the cogito argument on patients with Cotard delusion.
Quoting Jack Cummins
Right! Reminds me of horror movies - there's always one character, usually a girl, who feels compelled to go to the room that she's been warned not to go to! I hope I'm a cat, cats have 9 lives but the problem is I don't know how many I've already used up. :smile:
The cogito is the latter. If the former, it would read, "I think, therefore I think."
Descartes is doing a little bit more than a tautology. He talking about a necessary aspect given a particular existing event. That's to say if there is an experience, there is an individual or entity aware of soemthing.
Quoting Hanover
@180 Proof
To three of you:
[quote=Wikipedia]One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking"[/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard calls the phrase a tautology in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript.[48]:38–42 He argues that the cogito already presupposes the existence of "I", and therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard's argument can be made clearer if one extracts the premise "I think" into the premises "'x' thinks" and "I am that 'x'", where "x" is used as a placeholder in order to disambiguate the "I" from the thinking thing.[49][/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt—his argument from the existence of a deceiving god—Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence, he finds that it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon), one's belief in their own existence would be secure, for there is no way one could be deceived unless one existed in order to be deceived.[/quote]
My own take of whether Descartes' so-called argument is a tautology is similar in vein but to be specific I believe Descartes is committing the petitio principii fallacy (begging the question).
First, let's state his argument in the most charitable way possible:
1. Thinking
2. If thinking then, thinker
Ergo,
3. Thinker
Second, we must remember that Descartes' main assumption - the impetus if you will for the cogito argument - is radical doubt which I interpret as a method that questions the truth/certainty of every belief that one may have and if any such is doubtful, to discard it until by this method of elimination one arrives at (a) belief(s) that is true and beyond doubt. Descartes' claims that this method of doubt manages to undermine every belief except one - his own existence for, he reasons, to doubt implies a doubter and that doubter is none other than himself [cogito, ergo sum].
Also relevant is Evil Demon, its modern incarnation being brain in a vat. As per Descartes there's the possibility that world, external reality as it were, could be an illusion created by an evil demon to deceive us but then, he reasons, even if that were true, there's got to be something that's being deceived and that something is us (him). [cogito, ergo sum]
Notice here a key suppressed premise which is that for every action, there has to be an actor performing that action e.g. drinking, drinker; walking, walker; talking, talker, and so on. You get the picture. I'll make the suppressed premise explicit here:
1a. If action, actor.
This suppressed premise (1a) is required to support premise 2. If thinking then, thinker but where does he get the evidence for it? From the same reality whose reliability he doubts, the same reality he believes could be an illusion created by an evil demon (deus deceptor). That he suspects reality to be an illusion (created by an evil demon) amounts to poisoning the well of reality as it were and instantly makes any and every argument based on it utterly worthless. It would be like drawing conclusions about reality as we know it by watching (say) an Avengers movie (an illusion) - you know how that's going to end, right? In short, Descartes can't prove the suppressed premise 1a. If action, actor, using reality because he can't prove that this reality isn't an illusion.
Hence, the only reliable piece of information that's available to him, that he claims he can't doubt at all, that he can use to prove the suppressed premise 1a. If action, actor, is his own thinking but now the problem is if he infers a thinker (actor) from thinking (action), he's assuming the very thing he wants to prove (premise 2) - a petitio principii.
For clarification, I'll make Descartes' argument explicit below:
1. Thinking [premise. If one defines thinking as experiencing mental phenomena, this premise is true]
1a. If action, actor [suppressed premise. Descartes' can prove this using the only reliable piece of information he has viz. that he's thinking but then he can't infer there's a thinker from thinking because that is exactly what needs to be proven (premise 2 below) - begging the question. Remember he can't rely on reality as it could be an illusion (deus deceptor)]
2. If thinking (action), thinker (actor) [from 1a above but as you can see this can't be proven]
Ergo,
3. Thinker [conclusion but the argument is now unsound as premise 2 hasn't been proven]
I think of Descartes' "I exist" as a tautology because it is a conclusion that repeats its presupposition: to say "I exist" one must exist.
Look here
It's a delusion. A necessary condition for uttering any sentence (esp. "I don't exist") is existence. We can quibble about what "I" means, but putting that aside, a person who claims they don't exist is wrong. The only thing that can refute Descartes is the existence of a nonexistent thinker.
No. Descartes' "Cogito" already refutes itself:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/539399
Delusions are generally conceptual confusions or metaphors about experience.
Agreed but the question, to me, is which is the delusion? Descartes' cogito argument or Cotard "delusion"? Don't be fooled by the word "delusion" in Cotard delusion - that's not as cut-and-dried as it's made out to be for it assumes Descartes is right and that's precisely what needs to be proved.
Quoting RogueAI
This is the nub of the issue. Let's discuss the Descartes' argument and Cotard's argument and may be the truth will emerge from it.
Descartes' cogito argument (argument D)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I exist (as something that's thinking)
Cotard delusion argument (argument C)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am not that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I don't exist (as something that's thinking)
Both arguments have two identical premises (1 & 2) but differ with respect to premise 3 and, quite obviously, the conclusion.
As is evident, premise 3 in argument D is being challenged by premise 3 in argument C.
Perhaps premise 3 in argument C can be explained in terms of an incongruence between the patient's idea of who fae is (the patient's I) and the "something that's thinking." Cotard delusion has been reported to occur after severe trauma (major vehicular accidents for example) and such patients may argue in the following way.
1. Nobody could've survived the accident I was in
2. If nobody could've survived the accident I was in then I'm dead
Ergo,
3. I'm dead
4. If I' m dead then I don't exist
Ergo,
5. I don't exist
Could Descartes' cogito argument help cure Cotard delusion? Suppose I offer Descartes' cogito argument to someone suffering from Cotard delusion. If the delusion is deeply entrenched, the patient will not accept the argument and the only way that's possible is if fae believes premise 3 in argument C which is. 3. I am not that something that's thinking, and we've circled back to where we began, is the I = that something that's thinking?
At this juncture, it seems we need to discuss the notion of "something that's thinking" (see premises 2, 3 in argument C and D). Everyone is "something that's thinking" because everyone thinks. Ergo, if I = something that's thinking, you are me, I'm you, you're Descartes, Descartes is me, so and so forth until I = everyone.
Argument E
1. I = Something that's thinking
Ergo,
2. I = Everyone
Ergo,
3. I = You
4. I'm thinking about Descartes
5. You're thinking about the woman in the red dress (homage to The Matrix) [you're not thinking about Descartes]
6. If I'm thinking about Descartes and you're not thinking about Descartes (the woman in the red dress) and I = you then, I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes
7. I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes [contradiction]
So,
8. I = You is false
Therefore,
9. I = Everyone is also false
Hence,
10. I = Something that's thinking too is false
Looks like, from line 10 just above, those who "suffer" from Cotard delusion are spot on (see premise 3 in argument C)
What next?
If you ask me, the only option we have to identify ourselves with the mind is to base it on thought content. In argument E, we noticed that a single individual can't think about, say, X and also not think about X. So, if I were to claim that there are two thoughts occurring at the same time viz. a thought about Descartes and a thought about a woman in a red dress (not Descartes), I could immediately infer on pain of a contradiction that there are at least two persons (I's) involved.
Taking this a step further, let's do a thought experiment. Imagine a universe U with the following setup:
1. You don't know how many persons are there in this universe.
2. The only activity possible in this universe is thinking.
3. There are only two thoughts available to wit, A and B.
4. The only information given to you is/are the thought(s) taking place in this universe.
Imagine now that you're told that at time t1, the thoughts in U are A and B (not A). You can immediately infer, on pain of contradiction, that there are at least two persons in U - one is thinking A and the other is thinking B (not A).
At another time t2, you're informed that the thought in U is A. This is insufficient to infer anything about the number of people in U: it could be that everyone (more than one) in U is thinking the same thing (A) or it could be that there's only one person thinking A.
At a different time t3, you discover that the thoughts in U are, again, A and B. From this, as before, you conclude there are at least two persons in U - one having thought A and the other thought B.
There are now two distinct sequence of thoughts:
Thought sequence P
1.A at time t1, A at time t2, B at time t3 [AAB]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3[BAA]
or
Thought sequence Q
1. A at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3 [AAA]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, B qt time t3 [BAB]
The sequence of thoughts is critical to the identity of a person (the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument) in U because uniqueness, as you can see above, is to be found in the sequence of thoughts [AAB, BAA, AAA, BAB, all unique]. What we can infer then is, either as per thought sequence P, there are at least two persons viz. AAB and BAA or as per thought sequence Q, there are, again, at least two persons viz. AAA and BAB. In short, the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument is a label for a one particular permutation (order matters) of all possible sequences of thoughts.
Firstly, such a conception for the "I" in the cogito argument seems to be a big disappointment. How comforting it is to believe the "I" = "something that thinks" for to say "I exist" then is more meaningful, more tangible, more uplifting. As just or nothing more than a sequence of thoughts, the "I" loses its luster, becomes dull, unappealing and uninteresting.
Secondly, I wish to discuss the matter of how it's possible for two persons to experience the exact same sequence of thoughts. There's no reason why you wouldn't find out that in universe U, the thoughts were: at time t1, A; at time t2, B; and at time t3, A. The sequence of thoughts would be ABA. Given this data, you wouldn't know if there was only one person thinking ABA or a gazillion persons thinking ABA since they can be duplicated precisely. In other words, because no sequence of thoughts is going to be exclusive to one person, a sequence of thoughts doesn't really provide you with a foolproof method of identifying a particular person in universe U. This means, in the simplest of terms, a sequence of thoughts also can't be the necessary foundation for Descartes' "I".
In summary, we have only two options for a referent for Descartes' "I" viz. 1. "something that's thinking" or 2. a sequence of thoughts and both don't make the cut so to speak. Ergo, in full agreement with those with Cotard "delusion", I don't exist. :chin: :chin: :chin:
The cogito wasn't supposed to be some sort of positive pinnacle. It's the ground: the place where doubt stops.
It's only a revelation to people who have their heads in the clouds.
I don't agree with that. "I" /= "something that's thinking". "Something that's thinking" is a necessary condition for the self to exist, but it's not a sufficient condition. I like the definition of the self as "this particular conscious awareness".
It's indubitable, whether it has any use to you or not.
Also, besides, "the Cogito" was basically laughed out of court philosophically by Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Dewey et al.
I know what Hume said about it. Could you share how the others thought of it?
I'm pretty familiar with Schopenhauer and I don't remember his mentioning it, but it wouldn't have been a problem for his outlook.
It's vacuousness interested you enough to comment 8 or 9 times in this thread, and when asked for a few sentences on how a parade of philosophers ”laughed it out of court”, your interest falls off. Uh huh.
But thanks for the encouragement to learn something about philosophy. That's a great idea.
So if you're wrong about those two, I figure you're probably wrong about the rest.
Have a good evening.
We're on the same page.
If yes, then state what such grounds might be.[/i]
If no, then it doesn't matter whether or not one can "doubt doubting" because one cannot doubt without grounds, and therefore, by default, one must believe whatever one cannot doubt exists exists.
:roll:
With respect to Kant at least, there’s no philosophical laughing, but there is a basic refutation.....
“...The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings necessarily. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained—because....”
....and I say basic because it occurs in a mere footnote to B422, and I say refutation, as shown by the “ -because...”, insofar it is only so in accordance with Kant’s philosophy, which employs a conceptual scheme Descartes didn’t, re: the categories.
On the other hand, Kant congratulates Descartes for not making the same absurd claims with his idealism in general, as Berkeley made with his, so.....it’s a wash. Praise on one hand, criticism on the other.
Why would Descartes need "Everything, which thinks, exists" to be true in order to infer his own existence from the fact that he's thinking?
Ahhhhh....the subtleties of philosophical investigations.
What do you think “infer his own existence” to mean?
Up to this point he's been wondering if he could be tricked into a false belief. Now he asks if his belief in his own existence could be wrong. Is he being tricked again?
He realizes that he can't be wrong because he's aware of his own thoughts.
Is the complaint that he hasn't executed a proper ontological proof?
Thanks for being open to subtlety.
I don’t think Descartes meant to infer his own existence, with the predicate “...therefore I am”.
I don’t think Descartes needed an ontological proof for anything, insofar as his sole intent was to prove a distinction between mind and body. The method for proving a distinction does not need an ontological proof for its elements, as much as it needs validation of an absolute necessity of one of them. All he had to do was show how the doubting one set of conditions for a thing, was impossible for doubting some other set of conditions for some other thing. It follows that if doubt of that other thing is impossible, that other thing must be absolutely necessary. He then has no need to prove the existence of it, having already proven its necessity. So it is, that because “I think” is undoubtably, “I am” is given necessarily.
Another way to look at it is, logical consistency reduces the “I” that thinks, to be the very same “I” that is thinking. “I” think, therefore “I” am. As such, “I” isn’t proven to exist, only that it is simply proven, by its thinking.
I think Descartes’ mistake was not to eliminate the extension of “I am” to phenomenal existence. So in effect, I guess you could say he failed to provide an ontological proof for the impossibility of mind as such. And he failed at that, because, as aforementioned, he didn’t consider, or at least didn’t use, the categories, as did Kant, it being reasonable to assume he knew about them, at least in Aristotle-ian form.
As an aside, there is also a standing Kantian metaphysical argument, unknown and/or not recognized as valid by Descartes, that existence cannot be a predicate in a logical proposition. So, if “I think” is true, “I am” is given immediately because of it. I mean....how could it be that “I think” but “I am not”.
Subtleties indeed. As in Tonini, I’ll wager.
Could you explain how his outcome would have been different if he had?
Quoting Mww
He believed a thing's essence can be examined without knowing whether a thing exists, except for God, which apparently exists by definition.
So maybe the meaning of the cogito is obscured by the change from medieval to modern ideas about existence?
Quoting Mww
I get the impression IITs proponents think of it as a first step.
In Part 1 he says:
Descartes first stated intention is to break with the past. To begin again without reliance on what others have said.
Part 4 begins:
'I' occurs 10 times in this paragraph, 'myself' and 'me' occur once each.
He begins anew with himself.
Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
He only pretends to doubt because as a practical matter one cannot doubt everything. In matters of knowledge or science Descartes replaces the doubted authority of the "learned" with "I" or one who uses the method of rightly conducting one’s reason.
No, not with any legitimacy. I can philosophize all day long over it, but that would never be any more than making inferences based on my understandings, which are most likely not even be close to his. He had a different mindset and different authorities to answer to than I, after all.
I like the “Principles of Philosophy” exposition more. Simpler, with a follow up for what he means by “think”.
From the Meditations:
One thing I find odd about the Principles is that he says it is not necessary to define terms (10) but he says this right after defining thought (9). It may just be a response to critics who did exactly what some here are doing.
Is it the same to define a term, as it is to declare how it is meant to be understood? Descartes tells us what he means by the use of a term, e.g., P.P 1,9, on “thought”, insofar as when he is thinking all these listed mental occurrences are predicates of it, but he didn’t really define it, per se, as did Kant with his “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”.
As well, in P.P. 1,10, he warns against over-complicating “items of knowledge”. Then it is the case that “logical definitions for very simple and self-evident matters” should be unnecessary, because these should be taken as the very principles upon which the treatise is grounded.
Still, I would agree P.P. may very well be a response to critics, in which he is clarifying his intended use of terms, or, “items of knowledge”, rather than setting definitions of them.
What did you have in mind with “exactly what some are doing here”?
I think there is some truth to this, but first an objection. How a term is meant to be understood is by definition a definition. He does make a distinction though:
I take his point to be that we do not gain knowledge by analysis of definitions. It is in this regard a rejection of the method of Euclid.
But how he uses the term 'thought' is not "self-evident" or "sufficiently self-explanatory". His use of the term 'thought' includes sensory awareness. Can the mind/body distinction be made if sensory awareness is a matter of thought? He elsewhere claims the "substantial union" of mind and body. This is problematic because he identifies himself as mind or soul, in which case the body is other than one's self. The union then would a union of self and other.
Objection noted, and agreeable in principle. A definition is the complete representation of the conception, which always arises spontaneously from the understanding alone. How I define a term is represented by how it is understood by me.
Problem is, of course, there is no promise of necessary congruency between a plurality of understandings, from which follows the possible disparity between definitions, i.e., complete representation, of the same conception. I rather think how a term is meant to be understood, is the explanation of it, integral with its propositional employment.
Minor point, far deeper into the weeds than necessary.
—————
Quoting Fooloso4
Correct; knowledge is far more complicated than that.
—————
Quoting Fooloso4
How about......awareness of, e.g., pain, is an indubitable certainty, a product of mind, even if its cause is not, it being a product of body. Difference between aware of, and aware-ness of. I suppose there’s all kinds of ways to distinguish one from another, right?
I wanted to follow up on my comment about Euclid. Cartesian coordinates lined Euclidean geometry and algebra. Descartes sees it as a method for solving for any unknown. Symbols replace things.
Quoting Mww
One question that occured to me but I did not pursue it before is, why does he want to distinguish them?
In modern parlance.....the quest for the unconditioned? The irreducible. The absolute certainty. From which the possibility of knowledge itself is given.
Recognition of the validity of thinking outside the Bible.
Some thoughts:
Descartes also did work in natural philosophy, optics, mechanics, physics, medicine, and so on. By regarding the physical world as mechanistic he jettisons final causes as well as the idea that mind or reason or God guides the course of things.
Quoting Mww
Descartes, like all educated people of his age, knew the Bible. I think he used the Bible to do something that was at once consistent with it and contrary to it.
Aquinas advocated a mechanistic approach to the world, and final cause has yet to be jettisoned from science because it's embedded in biology.
There is no clear point at which the churches, Protestant and Catholic ceased to be Europe's champions of education and science. It happened slowly.
Aquinas' physics is Aristotelian. It includes formal and final causes. In addition, his use of the term substance is different from Descartes. For Aquinas a substance is a thing. He uses the example of Socrates as a substance. For Descartes substances are not particulars, there are two substances, thinking and extended.
Yes. Socrates is an Aristotelian substance because he isn't a dependent entity. That doesn't conflict with my point.
I don't think particulars as substances is compatible with Descartes' mechanistic view. Descartes does not deal with such things as prime matter and substantial change.
Quoting frank
Are you claiming that final causes are embedded in Descartes' biology? He does, after all, regard animal bodies as machines, automata.
But perhaps I have missed your point.
I’m aware of but not well-versed in Descartes’ science, having more interest in his metaphysics. I shall have to take your word for it, that he regards the world as deterministic, so jettisons final causes. But if he claims that mind, body and god all are not responsible for guidance in the course of things, does he then claim Nature itself, is? I mean....what’s left? That, or the course of things isn’t guided at all, I guess. Excluded middle kinda thing.
—————
Quoting Fooloso4
Yeah...if you’re gonna upset the applecart, ya gotta be ready to appease the owner.
A mechanical system, a clockwork for example, does not need guidance. It is all just a matter of the shape of extended things in motion.
I see I misspoke: you said mechanistic but I wrote deterministic. Sorry....not paying proper attention.
Anyway, agreed, mechanical systems need no guidance. What ground is there or attributing extension to systems, when Descartes in Principles only attributes extension to “corporeal substance”?
It is not the system that has extension but the things that comprise the system
Ok. Thanks.