Necessity and god
God is supposed to be a necessary being. Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world.
There is a possible world in which god does not exist.
Hence, god is not a necessary being.
There is a possible world in which god does not exist.
Hence, god is not a necessary being.
Comments (495)
A necessary God is true in any case.
Existing things only.obtain when they exist.
A necessary God must obtain, it cannot be dependent on whether it exists or not.
A necessary God, therefore, cannot exist. It cannot be determined by existence, as it must be true in all possible cases.
Not only does atheism obtain (God doesn't exist), but does so necessarily by the necessity of God
A simplification of your post.
I can't follow that.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Do you mean that a necessary god is one that exist in every possible world?
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Not sure what to make of "obtain" here,
Phew... I thought it was just me.
I suppose a believer would retort that God exists in all possible worlds (an advocate of the ontological argument/ modal ontological argument for example).
No, they would have to argue that there cannot be a possible world in which god does not exist; that there is an inherent contradiction in that very notion. And to do that they would have to deny the very logic of possible world semantics. It's part of that semantics that one can construct a possible world in which any given individual is absent, and god is such an individual.
I suppose arguably, pantheism would survive, since it does not suppose god to be an individual.
Quoting Banno Is this supposed to be a true statement?
Well, take the modal ontological argument for instance, they argue: “if God exists necessarily in some possible world, then God exists necessarily in all possible worlds”.
This may seem odd at first, but in some systems of modal logic, inferences with the logical structure: “If it's possible that it is necessary that X is the case, then it is necessary that X is the case, therefore X is the case in the actual world” are valid (replace X with God exists).
This is a matter of controversy in fact, related to the choice between systems S4 and S5 in modal logic.
God is the only necessary thing. (cut out being)
Why the only one? How is God being defined here?
God exists in every possible world, in some possible world?
But that's 's just "god exists in every possible world" and the argument becomes "if god exists in every possible world, then god exists in every possible world" - not exactly enlightening.
I think that a “necessary” designation doesnt necessarily entail all possible worlds. Why would it? A being can be necessary for one possible world or many or all of them, so by formulating your question like you did you have forced the answer
to be unsatisfying.
Well, no. See
God and Other Necessary Beings
Quoting Banno
Why is it (supposed to be) a true statement?
Aquinas said God is the only necessary thing. If you include "being" it's just going to make it harder to understand the medieval mumbo jumbo because of God's status as existence itself.
I think that snippet shouldn't be read as:. "all these things could be necessary at the same time". but just "at one time or another these things have been considered for necessity-hood."
I don't know what to make of that. The advantage of possible world semantics is that it gives us a grammar in which we can make sense of modal arguments. If you are going to say necessity does not entail all possible worlds, you are rejecting our best understanding of modal logic.
Not going there with you.
Indeed; if one, why not many.
Because I say.
Would you prefer imagine a possible world without god? Same as.
Quoting Banno
The actual world is one among the possible worlds (this again follows in some systems of modal logic). So if one admits that god exists in all possible worlds, that would imply that god exists in the actual world.
So, in those systems, if one accepts that it is possible that it is necessary that god exists in all possible worlds, then it follows that in all possible worlds, god exists in all possible worlds, and therefore “god exists in all possible worlds” is true in the actual world, which is one of the possible worlds in which that statement is true, and therefore god exists in the actual world.
All this follows if one accepts system B of modal logic, from the corollary of axiom B (if the modal ontological argument is valid):
??X ? X (If it is possible that it is necessary that X, then X is the case).
Likewise in system S5, the corollary of axiom 5:
??X ? ?X
Interesting. So from the OP, there is a possible world in which god does not exist. Hence, it is not true that it is possible that it is necessary that god exists in all possible worlds, by modus tollens.
That is, since there is a possible world in which god does not exist, god does not exist in every possible world.
Damn it took me a long time to get that; I must be tired.
I dont think modal logic requires “all possible worlds” in order to make sense of possibility (which is what modal logic is about). It can, but modal logic can also be just about single world possibility, or any other framing of possibility.
So I am not abandoning modal logic I just think when you posit god as necessary across all possible worlds you run into problems in the answer, and like an argument that is logically valid but not sound then the answer to your syllogism isn’t satisfying.
What if instead of all possible worlds you just considered god as necessary to this one? My thought was that you would find a more satisfying answer than when you consider all possible worlds.
Again, there is no clear notion of what necessary might mean, if not "true in all possible worlds". Giving us a clear notion of necessity is the point of possible world semantics.
So, first you have to explain what it might mean for something to be necessary only in the actual world.
A being that necessarily exists cannot coherently be thought not to exist. And so God, as the unsurpassably perfect being, must have necessary existence—and therefore must exist.
Word play or a thing?
How could they not be? Where does the expression 'true in all possible worlds' come from? I think it is a reference to a priori truths. How could a world exist where A was not equal to A? Isn't it a necessary truth?
Logic is needed in order to have the discussion, not as a consequence of the discussion. The laws of physics are a result of the discussion. So they are not on a par with the laws of logic.
So introducing the notion of a priori and a posteriori truths will only serve to muddy the clarity of possible world interpretations.
Yeah, they do say that, but I think it's bullshit. They're simply figments of the mathematical imagination, they're not 'possible' in any real sense.
I don't think so. I think the notion of the necessity of a first cause is a logical notion, not a postulation about 'something that may or may not exist'. Anyway, can't get bogged down in this, work to do elsewhere.
Many "proofs" are not presented this way. Anselm, for instance, presents the matter of what one could come up with on their own. The idea that there is a power beyond what we can imagine is said to be a factor. The argument has drawn many objections but the role of "necessity" is more of a question than an answer.
SO were is it located - in propositional logic? Predicate calculus? What could it mean to claim causation is a logical notion - that it is a variant on implication? DO you want to interpret p?q as "p causes q"?
I suspect that you're thinking of 'God' as 'some existing being', like a cosmic director or design engineer. If you think that such a God doesn't exist, then I definitely agree.
Ya I’m not really understanding why necessity entails all possible worlds. I dont see why we couldn't talk about possibilities of just the one we know about.
Ok, so this is about defining “necessity” as used by the religious folk as an argument for gods existence? And you are unsatisfied because you cannot quite articulate whats wrong with the arguments from necessity? Is that right?
Well, no, as those who began their training with Lemmon's Beginning logic will understand intuitively. A=A is assumed, because assuming A=~A leads to anything; and so is useless.
But yes, in order to be the subject to modal logic, I am taking god to be an individual. IF oyu have an alternative, set it out.
It's too big an issue to try and explain here. The very short version is, that you're denying what classical theologians would describe as 'theistic personalism', which is the idea of God as being a super-person. Terry Eagleton's review of The God Delusion, which got me interested in philosophy forums the first place, might be a useful primer.
[quote="Terry Eagleton, Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching; https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v28/n20/terry-eagleton/lunging-flailing-mispunchin"g]Dawkins holds that the existence or non-existence of God is a scientific hypothesis which is open to rational demonstration. Christianity teaches that to claim that there is a God must be reasonable, but that this is not at all the same thing as faith. Believing in God, whatever Dawkins might think, is not like concluding that aliens or the tooth fairy exist. God is not a celestial super-object or divine UFO, about whose existence we must remain agnostic until all the evidence is in. Theologians do not believe that he is either inside or outside the universe, as Dawkins thinks they do. His transcendence and invisibility are part of what he is, which is not the case with the Loch Ness monster. This is not to say that religious people believe in a black hole, because they also consider that God has revealed himself: not, as Dawkins thinks, in the guise of a cosmic manufacturer even smarter than Dawkins himself (the New Testament has next to nothing to say about God as Creator), but for Christians at least, in the form of a reviled and murdered political criminal. The Jews of the so-called Old Testament had faith in God, but this does not mean that after debating the matter at a number of international conferences they decided to endorse the scientific hypothesis that there existed a supreme architect of the universe – even though, as Genesis reveals, they were of this opinion. They had faith in God in the sense that I have faith in you. They may well have been mistaken in their view; but they were not mistaken because their scientific hypothesis was unsound.
Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.[/quote]
I can see that. Try "necessarily true" is defined as "true in all possible worlds". You are welcome to provide an alternate definition, but the logical systems that ensue form Kripke's account are particularly powerful, so it would be no small task if you would compete with them.
Put it this way: in possible world semantics it is possible to invoke a world that does not include a given individual. Hence there are no necessary individuals. (@Amalac - does that seem right to you? )
But if he cannot be represented as an individual, then where does he fit?
Of course some theologian will argue that he is in some way special, but that's just special pleading - When logic shows the notion of god to be problematic, they claim that logic does not apply to god.
If there was a salient point in your quote, set it out.
Necessity relates to possibility. Something is necessary if its negation is impossible, an a priori axiomatic logical truth, which needs no account of empirical domain.
Quoting Banno
The proposition should read...it is true a thing is necessary if its negation is impossible. It follows that a god is necessary iff the non-existence of a god is impossible. If true the non-existence of god is possible, then the necessity of god is false. If true or false, where it is true or false, is irrelevant.
Piecea cake.
Doesn't 'fit in' anywhere. You have a faulty idea of what you're criticizing, but explaining why is difficult in twitter posts.
...or without quoting someone else, it seems.
If your point that, if there is a god, then he doesn't fit into our logic, then I'll agree with you; to be clear, I do not think that anything of much coherence can be said about god. That's rather the point of this thread - to see if there is a logic into which god might be forced.
I think the putative theist and I needsmust agree that god is beyond logic. While the theist will think this leads to worship, I think it leads only to silence.
That's quite different from @Bartricks view that god can contradict himself, which leads to everything and nothing.
Don’t know, don’t care. I commented on the subject matter, which is enough.
Ill try that
I would agree with you that in the world of metaphysical speculation and higher consciousness posits, this version of God does not appear.
First, let's crucify your opening argument:
Quoting Banno
Well, the conclusion is true, but the argument is shit (it is circular). God is not a necessary being. I believe in God, but I'm not stupid. So I recognize that God, being all powerful, can destroy himself if he wishes. Thus he does not exist of necessity.
Some idiots - you know, the kind of people who confuse the metaphysical possibility of the law of non-contradiction being false with it actually being false - confuse existing with necessity with existing. God exists. But God does not exist of necessity as reflection on the concept reveals.
Your opening line - God is supposed to be a necessary being - is also false. God is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Some theists - idiot ones - think he exists of necessity and some - clever ones - think he doesn't. To make existing with necessity a defining feature is just to attack a straw man.
Now for your next line: There is a possible world in which god does not exist. That's no different from saying that God does not exist with necessity. That is, you are not inferring from it that God does not exist with necessity. You are just stating it in other words. To say that God does not exist in a possible world is one and the same as saying that God does not exist with necessity. And that's also your conclusion. Thus your argument is circular. You've said "God does not exist with necessity.....therefore God does not exist with necessity'.
To remedy matters you need to conclude that there is a possible world in which God does not exist. Presumably you'd have to go via some kind of conceivability claim - that it is conceivable that God does not exist, and as what's conceivable is a fairly reliable guide to what's metaphysically possible, there is a possible world in which God does not exist.
But that argument is relatively weak as the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility is contested somewhat. Plus you'd no doubt reject similar arguments offered for, say, the immateriality of the mind (I can conceive of my mind existing apart from my body, thus it is metaphysically possible for it to....that would not be metaphysically possible if my mind was part of my body, thus my mind is not part of my body). (Note, I don't reject such arguments, I just don't think they're all that powerful, precisely because of the dubious nature of the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility).
Anyway, your argument is circular as it stands.
But its conclusion is correct. Here's my much better argument, that is simple and decisive: God can do anything. Thus God can destroy himself. Thus God does not exist of necessity. Indeed, nothing does. If God exists, nothing exists of necessity. For God can destroy anything and everything at any time. Thus all things exist contingently.
And that also means that......the law of non-contradiction is contingently true (look - 'true'....it's 'true', not false), not necessarily true. It's 'true'. But it is not 'necessarily' true. True, but not necessarily true.
That's one you have difficulty with, isn't it. Ironically, if you think God exists and the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true, then you're involved in a contradiction (for you would be committed to affirming that God can do anything and not some things). To avoid a contradiction, one needs to conclude that if God exists, then all truths are contingent and thus the law of non-contradiction is contingently true.
Anyway, consider yourself lessoned.
First of all, apologies for quoting philosophers here (since you said to Wayfarer that you haven't the time to read too much) but I thought I should give a somewhat detailed reply to this, and because the work of Kolakowski that I quote here (“If There is No God...”) deserves far more attention than it receives at present.
I take Leibniz's definition of a possible world, according to which a world is impossible if it contradicts the laws of logic, and possible otherwise.
So long as the states of affairs in which some individual does not exist do not involve a contradiction, then yes: nothing exists necessarily.
Hume summarized the idea that nothing exists necessarily (in all possible worlds) quite nicely:
So those who hold that God is a necessary being/ exists necessarily would have to hold, it seems to me, that God's non-existence implies a logical contradiction.
There are, however, some propositions which could perhaps be both analytic and existential. Leszek Kolakowski gives as an example the proposition “something exists”:
Wittgenstein made a somewhat similar point: “it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing”.
And so, Kolakowski says elsewhere, those who defend the ontological argument can argue in a similar way:
Hopefully that helped clarify matters a bit.
Yep.
Again, that might be valid, but since there is a possible world in which god does not exist, it would follow that god is not possible.
It seems to me that "A necessary being exists" functions much like (P & ~P), in that if it is a consequence of an argument, then there is a problem with that argument.
I might have to drag out my modal logic texts in an effort to pars this.
I just thought Wayfare's quote was a bit too off-track, and would have preferred had he set out the point himself.
I'll return to this; but for now other duties call.
All you have shown is your confusion. But don't let me stop you. Pray, proceed.
In alluding to your interchange with @Wayfarer so far:
I too find the OP's proposition is relative to what one interprets by the term “God”. If, for example, God is the ground of being, aka being-itself, then in what possible world would the ground of being, or being-itself, not be? (An absolute nonbeing, even if someone claims such a thing imaginable, does not constitute a world.) Again, in this example God is not "a being" but "being-itself" and, as such, is necessary in all possible worlds, and is furthermore beyond the principle of sufficient reason.
As to the common Abrahamic notion of God, where in God is "a being", He is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., and, thereby, was fully knowledgeable of and fully responsible for that serpent incident in the garden which He then got upset about, cursing everyone left and right. That self-contradictory God can well be envisioned absent from some worlds, much including the one we live in.
I do not. I mean the necessary God must be so in any instance, so it cannot be subject to the action of existence to make it true over not. Therefore, the necessary God cannot exist. A necessary God cannot be put there by existing or not.
But yes, I can see that something radical is needed to counter the criticisms here.
It's hard to determine whether this idea of God as ground of being is useful or not. Always struck me that Tillich was embarrassed by Christianity and wanted to rebrand it in a way that appealed more to intellectuals and those who like wanking about oneness. To me it's a way of redefining God to make the idea less easy to lampoon and heads towards a kind of pantheism. No doubt there were earlier ideas of higher consciousness in antiquity that Tillich probably had in mind as a model.
My impression, too. But lets see.
It seems to be an answer to what was once called "ontological shock" - the sort of thing that inspires posts such as 's recent thread. But it looks a bit like the "theistic leap" - "and this we call god" as the arguments for his existence end.
The error is that you invented the argument in the OP. It's not part of any existing theistic religion.
Quoting Banno
There you go. Your say-so doesn't make a statement true.
Quoting Banno
Of course it can, provided one doesn't just invent things about God.
But this isn't how actual religious theists operate. They operate from the assumption of divine revelation, ie. top-down.
For theists, God reveals himself; it's not the case that man would discover God on his own, without God's revelation.
It doesn't matter whether you believe any of this; but it is a matter of valid reasoning about God. Otherwise, you're just busying yourself with the god of philosophers, a fiction.
Oh, not at all. I'm painfully aware that the philosophical contrivances of our theistic friends are post hoc. That's what explains why they are so poor.
Reminds me of when the caste system would justify poor people through ideology.
Maybe the Palestinians should be shamed for being theists,and not up to bannos secular religion and caste system.
The old play dumb card. Predictable.
Quoting Protagoras
What reminds you of that? You didn't link to a quote, but to me directly.
Everything is permitted must, in my humble opinion, include that contradictions are true. That, in classical logic (categorical, sentential, and predicate logics) is a big no-no! This implies the nonexistence of God entails a contradiction, an impossibility which is just another way of saying there is no world in which God doesn't exist. Ergo, God must exist in all possible worlds i.e. God is a necessary whatever.
It gets complicated though. Everything is permitted is just another name for chaos. Thus, Dostoevesky's statement can be rephrased as If God doesn't exist then chaos = G. Taking the contrapositive of G, we get if order then God exists. Thus any world in which there's order, God must necessarily exist. Our world "has" order. Using the Dostoevesky statement (If there is no God, everything is permitted = if there is no God then chaos = if order then God exists), we can conclude that God exists (in this universe which has order).
Nevertheless, temporary order can arise in chaos (periods of time in which there are laws (laws of nature &, most importantly, the law of noncontradiction) which can and may revert to lawlessness). It bears mentioning that the problem of induction makes this issue explicit (bless Hume's soul). Thus, the Dostoevesky statement can't get off the ground for the antecedent (order) can never be determined with certainty - is it true order or is it an ordered phase in chaos?
There's also this: a contradiction entail chaos (more contradictions) [ex falso quodlibet].; Ergo the nonexistence of God, for Dostoevesky, is a contradiction. In other words, If chaos then God doesn't exist.
Let's tie up all the loose ends.
1. IF order THEN God exists [the Dostoevsky statement]
2. IF chaos THEN God doesn't exist [contradiction = nonexistence of God]
3. True order can't be distinguished from an ordered section of true chaos [the problem of induction]
We're in a tight spot, no?
Your explanation about theists being poor because of their beliefs.
Do keep up old boy.
I don't think I gave such an explanation.
Can you provide a link? 'Cause I'm not at all sure what you are referring to.
Link!!!! It's your short post 23 mins up to baker.
Just scroll up.
:rofl:
This?
Quoting Banno
Oh, I see.
No, it's the philosophical contrivances that are poor, not the theists.
Made my night, that did.
The boot fits. Nice wriggle.
Same thing here
Yeah, but flip the pillow over to the cool side ...
[quote=Albert Camus]The absurd does not liberate; it binds. It does not authorize all actions. "Everything is permitted" does not mean that nothing is forbidden.[/quote]
(Emphasis is mine.)
Indeed, how right you are! IF everything is permitted THEN, IF contradictions are permitted THEN everything is permitted & some things are not permitted (some things are forbidden = "does not mean that nothing is forbidden"). This is precisely what Dostoevesky's talking about!
Nuthin' :rofl:
Tillich and Eagleton, on the other hand, have abstracted all life out of God.
[quote=Tillich]God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence. Therefore to argue God exists is to deny Him. It is as atheistic to affirm God as it is to deny Him. God is being-itself, not a being.[/quote]
Quoting Eagleton (link updated)
I'm not quite sure this qualifies as theism. Here God is an abstract idea, relegated out of it all, something else that's a prerequisite for existence (except the word "something" is invalid). We might call this referent-free idea anything, doesn't have to be related to theism in particular. What can coherently be said thereof, that's of relevance to religious adherents (or to anyone for that matter)? Some parts of this stuff read more like plays on words, or an expression giving an exercise that might be interesting to ponder for a bit.
(As an aside, compare with the Olympians. Once they weren't found on Mount Olympus, they were reassigned to "otherworldly realms". Compare with Sagan's garage dragon.)
Anyway, the original idea isn't that hard to follow. Someone declares G a necessary being, which is in fact a definition by way of the modal terminology. This allows us to reason about G, and that shows G doesn't exist as declared. If we toss logic, then we toss the modal logic. Is that really needed in order to maintain gods/God?
Quoting British (Christian) theologian Richard Swinburne (2009)
I could be wrong, but I believe there are folks out here who would strenuously disagree with that - e.g. @Bartricks (my apologies if I have misrepresented your position)
Modal Logic (SEP)
Modal logic (Wikipedia)
Modal Logic: A Contemporary View (IEP)
Modal logic (Britannica)
The impact of modal logic (Routledge)
We typically uphold self-identity and consistency in general (or meaning is forfeit). Modal logic introduces possible and necessary. Possible worlds are self-consistent. For something to be possible it holds in a possible world (? quantifier), and for something to be necessary it holds in all possible worlds (? quantifier).
Can anyone come up with a shorter description? :)
(As an aside, possible things might lend themselves to verification, and necessary things lend themselves moreso to falsification.)
We may also speak of p being necessary or sufficient for q, but that's a different matter.
Unless you include the abstracs that were presupposed by the logic itself in the first place (like consistency), I guess.
But who the heck ever worshiped, assigned mind to, personified, chatted with, wrote religious scriptures about "the law of consistency"?
Quoting God and Other Necessary Beings (SEP)
This is Spinoza's argument: God must be everything otherwise he is not perfectly infinite. These are very Platonic ideas and they have no true answer
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/harvard-theological-review/article/abs/nonexistence-of-god-tillich-aquinas-and-the-pseudodionysius/948612DB4E9C89584C01B08AAF02C58E
I think these definitions were more of a church public relations matter. Or the necessary starting point for debating with theist. There are a lot of people that seem to believe they have some experience of God, so maybe there is a natural phenomena that can be mistaken for the storybook God. Considering how wide spread the belief seems to persist it must be something fairly common to the human mind. I would conjecture the frontal lobe of the brain regulates and maintains the illusion of a single mind in order to facilitate social exchange while still having the physical capacity for dialectic thought. In addicts and other recovering individuals the idea of giving up power to God seems to initiate a degree of self regulation; which is evidence-flavored in support of the idea. Which is the notion of God is actually the experience of one's frontal lobe. Do you consider yours necessary?
But yes, I am a theist who started out as an atheist and became a theist on the basis of the evidence. It may be relatively rare, but that's because most people determine what's true on other grounds.
If the notion of God is the experience of ones frontal lobe,Is the notion of atheism an experience of one's cerebellum,and maybe agnosticism is the experience of the exact median point of the brain!!!?
Probably
I'm being sarcastic greg!
Belief and knowledge are located in the brain!
Oh. Ye the parts of the brain that process truth as truth is not well known
It's not coherent at all.
Notions are an expression of yourself.
Your self is not the matter of the brain,any more than your arm is your whole self.
It's not coherent at all? There is no way in which we can speak that we can't be misunderstood. Had you considered a generous read? Just for fun? How are you arguing against an incoherent idea?
Reword please.
OK. Is the superego not part of the psyche?
And is the superego in the physical brain?
Can not the superego be mistaken for the storybook of science?
Let's start from the bottom up. The last one is a bit of discomfort with the notion that we know God, because of children's stories. It's a matter of fact in most cases. Your top two questions conflict a little at first glance. The superego seems to track well to human skulls so I suppose it is in or about the physical brain. The superego would be the regulating part of the psyche that facilitates communication requested by these two other minds that sit in your brain and argue with each other. It might be a novel idea, but I doubt it.
Why do you say the physical brain is the mind?
Have you ever thought that what some people call God is a personal experience not from a book or just a story?
I didn't for the sake of semantics and I'm assuming as much for the sake of discussion. It's a topic that can derail itself, so chasing every detail at once might not be necessary.
Quoting Protagoras Yes, in fact this is the basis for my position. Do you see how it follows? Incorrect as it may be?
I say the mind is not the material brain.
So you are saying God is a legitimate experience?
Yes, but possibly misunderstood.
I agree.
In which ways do you feel the experience is misunderstood.
But this contradicts the concept of God: “a necessary being who exist in ever possible world”
So 2 must be false.
I got a concept that tells me something exist is every possible world. What exist in every possible world? Answer, a being who exist in every possible world.
That clear things up.
See if God did not exist in every possible world, God would be thought of as “limited”.
OK, I see, so God exist in every possible world, so God exist in this world because this actual world is a possible world?
So this is how a mere conceptualization becomes instantiated in the actual world?
Wow that is clever.
It doesn't apply to reality. God talk is a Platonic discussion, interesting but useless. Can God be infinite without being everything? Can he be necessary while not being present in every possible world? If God is Reason itself, does he change when he decides to create? Does he know he created and so has new knowledge of his act and so changes his nature? There is no way to know. God is just a vague idea we make up
Whatever that is.
Oh, Davidson.
YOur point escapes me.
So what does Davidson mean by unmediated?
Not at all sure what it has to do with the OP.
If you know you can just tell us rather than ducking what Cheshire said.
Nonsense! Could it be that unmediated shows Cheshire correct.
You sneaky man!
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7043/davidson-on-the-very-idea-of-a-conceptual-scheme/p1
I'm interested. How does this link to Davidson?
And it takes 27 pages to explain one word!
Go engage with Cheshire.
You know he might be using unmediated in a normal way.
As you well know what he implied anyway.
The one time I take a moment to avoid serving an undercooked argument. Davidson's quote indicates the experience of the world is evidence of the world as it is; so a theistic experience should be no different. I think people are experiencing something they are calling God and it indeed comes from the world.
Similar to how some Mathematicians talk about the existence of abstract object and the beauty of the equation, interesting but useless. However, that said, their mathematical inventions/concepts may have some use for us in the real world. So could this ontological argument have some use for someone? Maybe so.
Here's the quote, in full:
SO you are counting god as amongst "the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false"?
Bingo bingo! Shocker!
Unmediated means unmediated.
What a sneaky method of time wasting,obfuscating and meandering to suit your debate/monologue.
We know your game,and it ain't fair dinkum moite!
You mean you don't like it up ya!
If you don't like it,don't give it out.
And do be a bit more honest man. We are after all talking about truth. Truth is not your agenda or personal dogma.
So for a theist presumably god is as familiar as that chair over there... and yet not so for others.
Not sure where to go next. My temptation is simply to say the theist is wrong, but that's a bit trite.
The unstated premise is "God created everything. "
Your statement above is a contradiction of that premise.
Did I miss a double spacing memo? In this case it follows the theist and others experience similar effects, but don't ascribe the same meaning to it. I don't have any good examples really worked out, but maybe the protective instinct that gets an atheist to step back from a cliff edge is the voice of God to a theist. Both experience a regulating effect to whatever emotions drove them there.
It's all based around the construction of the Alpha Zero AI. They made a pretty good documentary about it. But, the main point was that in order for the machine to teach itself; it needs two players and a judge. Maybe, the human mind works in a similar way.
As a footnote it would justify what we are doing here. In the sense that dialectic discussion increases intelligence.
Oh. I get what you're asking. Can God create a rock he cannot lift? It's the "Is God subject to the rules of logic" question. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox
Well, no. IF god is not subject to the laws of logic, there is no point in having a conversation about him - that's the problem with @Bartricks threads.
Rather, if the notion of god leads to inconsistencies, then either, the notion of god cannot be instantiated (atheism) or the notion of god needs to be reconsidered.
We can either say omnipotence is a self contradictory term or that omnipotence doesn't include the ability to defy logic.
I go with choice B.
But that's too simple, don't you think?
EDIT: This conversation about God with an odd interplay with linguistic philosophy. As if a theist sees any meaning in this. Yes, silence, but largely because nothing you raise means anything remotely relevant to the theist. It's as much blather to him as his God is to you.
Maybe that's what you're getting at, beats me
Well, yes:
Quoting Banno
How better to show that it is blather than to drag it out for hundreds of posts?
It is funny that all/many of these arguments were at one point the deck being stacked in favor of theism. It seems the bias to win made them untenable in the long run.
There are really solid empirical and scientific reasons not to believe in God. There are also really good personal reasons to believe in God.
The syllogisms that appear to prove God or deny God's existence seem unperausive to me, contrived attempts to prove something indubitably, in a way nothing else (other than the self maybe) is proved. We don't need an epistemology that renders certainty in other contexts, so I don't know why we reach for it with God.
That is to say, it's not hundreds of posts this argument has lasted, but thousands of years and neither side will lay to rest the issue with a few word mental puzzle.
Let the believers believe and the nonbelievers not. If the question bothers you, ask yourself what you're lacking that leaves it open in your mind.
I beg to differ on one peripheral account, though of course anyone is free to believe whatever.
Until the diverse preachers indoctrinators proselytizers chill out, they should expect others asking them to justify their claims. In case they impose their faiths on others, politics, have their faiths interfere in other peoples' lives, whatever social matters, etc, then they should expect all the more. (Incidentally, Leviticus 20:13 came up recently elsewhere; responses varied.)
If they just want to exchange stories, or they keep their religious faiths to themselves, then sure, no problemo.
The secularists and scientismists do exactly the same public preaching.
They both need to butt out!
"scientismists" :D A new word added to my vocabulary
Science is descriptive, morals are prescriptive.
Secularists prescribe all sorts of rules and "morals". That's what the legal system is.
Science is prescriptive in that it elevates "reason" over any other human truths. That's a moral judgement.
I do agree with you here, but don't see this as peculiar to religion and it's not a dispute over theology. You're talking about the violation of others imposing their beliefs on you and your taking reasonable efforts to protect yourself from ideas you disagree with.
You also have to be sensitive to stereotyping by assuming that those who wear the theistic label are in favor of proselytizing and force feeding their beliefs on others. If you're not, you will inevitably attack a theist who was content leaving you alone and will just see you as some irrationally angry atheist with some odd bone to pick.
I get that bad apples exist in both baskets.
I did mean to come back to this, even though it will probably, on experience, meet with a mouthful of abuse rather than anything useful.
Quoting Bartricks
No, it's a modus tollens reductio. That god is necessary is inconsistent with that we can specify a possible world without god. It shows we can have a necessary being or we are able to specify a possible world without some given individual, but not both.
Quoting Bartricks
Well, yes; that's rather the point.
Quoting Bartricks
If it were so, there would be a possible world in which for some proposition A, (A & ~A) however (A & ~A)?B; that is, denying the law of non-contradiction leads to every and any proposition being true.
Now you have made this point several times, and I've countered it several times. The logic you have chosen here lads to the end of conversation.
Which is why for the most part I ignore what you have to say.
Anyway, have you a way of saving yourself from this?
Could there be a possible world which is made of no necessary thing? A world that lacks any necessary thing? Or is it required for a possible world to have at least one necessary thing to be a possible world?
Edit Could there be a possible world in which the quality of "necessary" does not exist (as part of such world)?
I maintain that the suggestion that there is a being who must exist in every possible word - a necessary being - undermines modal logic. But that is indeed the point of contention here.
The actual world.
As an actualist, I can only refer to a possibilist, or 'possible worlds semanticist' (e.g. Kripke, Lewis ... @Banno(?))
Wouldn't possibility entail necessity? it is necessary that the conditions which make a world "possible" exist (or will exist) for such world to be a possible world. A world cannot be possible if the conditions on which its "possibility" rests are not (or will never be) existent*.
That is: the proposition "A possible world is a possible world if and only if it contains (depends on) at least one necessary thing"** is true.
This does not mean that god is a requirement for possible worlds since each possible world could have a different necessary thing. The quality of necessity would be what's common among all possible worlds.
* for a possible world to exist, it must be possible (now or in the future).
** (the necessary thing being that which gives the possible world its quality of "possible")
A statement is possible if it is true in some possible world; but all this means is that we could posit a world in which the statement is true.
So "Donovan might never have gone into music" posits a possible world in which Donovan did not become a musician. We might then proceed to look at the consequences of this - Mellow Yellow might never have been written, or been written by someone else, and so on.
But there is no possible world in which 1+2=4; in every possible world our number still add up. It's not possible that it not be true that 1+2=3; hence 1+2=3 is necessarily true.
So a proposition is possible if it is true in at least one possible world, and necessary if it is true in all possible worlds.
Does possibility entail necessity? Well, Possibly P entail not necessarily not P; that's just the definition of possibility and necessity given above. So yes, possibly P entails not necessarily not P.
Quoting Daniel
The question is ill-formed, since necessarily P means that P is true in all possible world; in effect you seem to be asking if a thing that is true in all possible worlds might be false in some possible world, and that's clearly not going to happen.
Quoting Daniel
But if some thing were necessary, then by definition that means it exists in every possible world. If it is necessary in one possible world, it is necessary in them all. So something could not be necessary in one possible world and not in them all.
All this is just setting out the notion of possibility and necessity in a way that leads to consistent conversations - a semantics of possibility and necessity built form talking in terms of possible worlds. There might be other ways that this could be done, but the best semantics we have for modal logic is possible world semantics. SO if someone wants to reject possible world semantics, they might only do so by presenting an alternative that is of more use.
Yes, but only once you start trying to abuse me rather than addressing my arguments, then I will abuse you back and abuse you better. I'm almost certain that'll happen....but let's see, it's entirely up to you.
Quoting Banno
I explained why it is circular and you have said nothing at all to address my point. So I will just say it again and you can put whatever Latin label you want on it, just so long as you address it. How about that?
To say that a person exists in all possible worlds 'just is' to say that they exist of necessity. Possible worlds talk is just a way of trying to talk about necessity and contingency. That's what it was designed to do.
So, if you assert that God does not exist in some possible worlds, then all you have done is say "God does not exist of necessity". Yet that is what you are seeking to conclude. So it is really no different from this argument:
1. Fromage exists
2. Fromage means Cheese
3. Therefore Cheese exists
1. God does not exist in some possible worlds
2. If something does not exist in some possible worlds that means it does not exist of necessity
3. Therefore God does not exist of necessity.
True, but just pointless.
To be non-circular you'd need to extract your conclusion - that God does not exist in some possible worlds a.k.a. God does not exist of necessity - from some premises that do not assert it.
I then kindly suggested a way - it is conceivable that God does not exist.
If something is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible (that is, there is a possible world in which it is the case).
Thus, there is a possible world in which God does not exist. That is, God's existence is not necessary.
That's not an especially strong argument, as its second premise is dubious. But it is at least not circular.
Note - I am a theist who thinks God exists contingently. And I have a good, non question begging argument for that conclusion. God can do anything, including destroy himself. This he exists contingently. That's a good argument for your conclusion. It also shows it to be a straw man.
As for the law of non contradiction and its contingent status - I do not understand what your problem is. Genuinely. It is true. That is, I think it is true. Not false. True. I just don't think it is necessarily true. I don't even know what it means to say something is 'necessarily' true. I am a sceptic about necessity.
But anyway, I believe the law of non contradiction is true. You think I think it is false, yes? I don't. I think it is true. Show me how I have contradicted myself 'without' helping yourself to the notion of necessity. (For note, I do not believe the law of non contradiction is necessarily true because and only because I don't think there are any necessary truths - I think necessity doesn't exist).
Incidentally, if Graham Priest was on this site, I assume you wouldn't debate him either? He's worse than me. He thinks the law of non contradiction is actually false. At least I think it is actually true (although I am open to persuasion - I wouldn't dismiss what priest says, not at all)
Yep:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
I admit to hitting you back first.
And I will ignore your reply to this post. Just not interested.
To Which we ca now add:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
You ARE an amateur. That's not an insult, it is accurate.
The others were addressed to your argument, not you. Your argument IS shit. You are not your argument.
This is the problem: if I tear your arguments into bits, you think I am attacking YOU - yes? I am not. I am attacking your position.
Now, take a breath and address my criticisms and stop trying to goad. Address the argument. Call it shit if you want, but at least have the decency to explain its shitness as I did yours. Good luck.
Then why did you make it? Just goading, yes? You're not remotely interested in addressing anything of substance that I have said. I assume because you can't.
Now, once more: your argument is circular. You can put a latin name on it if you want. But I am accusing it of being circular, and I explained its circularity.
Your argument is also attacking a straw man, as the credibility of theism in no way depends upon God being a necessary existent. (Theism is true if God exists; he doesn't have to exist of necessity - just plain old vanilla existence will be enough).
I am a theist, and I think God exists contingently. I think that any theist who thinks God exists of necessity, believes a contradiction. That is, they believe there exists a being who can do anything, but also cannot do some things. That's an actual contradiction. And I don't think contradictions are true, because I believe the law of non-contradiction - which says just that - is true. True, not false.
God exists contingently because God can do anything and thus God can destroy himself. Thus God exists contingently. And so does everything else. And every true proposition is true contingently as well, as God can do anything and thus can make any true proposition false if he so wishes.
Thus, there is no such thing as necessity. Which is good, as philosophers don't know what it is anyway.
Thus, the law of non contradiction, though true, is not necessarily true.
No, you claimed it's circular. You did not point out a circularity. Now you engage in the rhetorical strategy of claiming to have presented an argument previously, an argument which is not there. YOu've done this on several occasions before, in previous discussions we have had.
In a circular argument the conclusion is taken as an assumption. In my argument there are two assumptions, that god is necessary and that there are possible worlds in which god does not exist. The point is to set out that these are incompatible, not that one or other is true. Hence the link back to 's post that set the ball in motion - post three in this thread.
You've misread the argument. Not a big problem.
Quoting Bartricks
Yeah, asserting a contradiction is not a very strong argument, even if you assert it three times. Quoting Bartricks
No, I, along with almost everyone else I have met except you, think it is a necessary truth. Just like 1+1=2 is a necessary truth. And by necessary I mean it is true in every possible world.
Here is the argument I presented in defence of that view:
Quoting Banno
Quoting Bartricks
Ok, let's assume you are right that the law of non contradiction is contingent. Something is contingent if and only if it is false in some possible world. The law of noncontradiction is "~(A& ~A)"; So in some possible world, ~~(A & ~A); that is, A & ~A. A contradiction. SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself.
Cheers.
No, I argued it. Here:
Quoting Bartricks
And above, here:
Quoting Bartricks
Now, address that argument.
Where do I assert a contradiction, Banno? Highlight it.
Quoting Banno
So? Get out more. I think it isn't a necessary truth. But I think it is true. You think I think it is false, yes? Can you just confirm that for me - are you saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is false? Because that's false. I think it is true.
Quoting Banno
How does an actual contradiction ensue? I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false. I think it is actually true. How is there a contradiction there? I don't think it is true and false. I think it is true. Capable of being false. But actually true.
Again: I think that if a proposition is actually true, then it is not also actually false.
But I think it is possible for a proposition to be true and also false.
I just don't think any are.
I think all actually true propositions are not also actually false.
Where is the contradiction?
Ok, I bolded it, back in the thread where I showed it.
Quoting Bartricks
No, as I said here:
Quoting Banno
"I... think it a necessary truth."
Quoting Banno
How? I don't follow you. Don't use symbols, I don't know what they mean. Explain in words (if you can't, you shouldn't be using symbols).
I know - I'll explain myself in bold.
If a proposition is true, it is not also false. That's the law of non-contradiction, right? It tells us how things are in actuality - in actuality, no true proposition is also false. Now I believe that's true. And thus not also false. Just true. Now, I also think that it is possible - metaphysically possible - for this proposition "If a proposition is true, it is not also false" to be false. Which is another way of saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, not necessary. But I don't think it is false. I think it is true. Where - where - have I contradicted myself? Don't just tell me that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth. That's precisely what is in dispute. Show me where I contradict myself. Again: "no true proposition is also false" I think that's true. I don't think it is necessarily true. I think it is true. Now show me how my thinking it is true rather than necessarily true involves me in a contradiction.
Bartricks has contradicted himself if he makes an assertion that implies a contradiction.
Bartricks asserts that the law of noncontradiction is not necessarily true.
The law of noncontradiction is ~(A & ~A).
If ~(A & ~A) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, (A & ~A)
(A & ~A) is a contradiction.
Bartricks makes an assertion that implies a contradiction
Bartricks contradicts himself.
QED.
Yes, certainly those claims are true. Although I can actually demonstrate that it is not necessarily true. But here I am asserting it.
Quoting Banno
Squiggle squoggle squiggle squoggle - Bartricks has contradicted himself. Nah, having trouble with that.
No more squiggling and squoggling please: explain how I have contradicted myself.
Really? But you claim to be familiar - even expert - at logic.
"A" is any proposition.
"~" is "not"
Brackets are...well, indications of scope...
So
The law of noncontradiction is: not(any proposition and not that proposition)
If not(any proposition and not that proposition) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, both any proposition and it's negation are true.
That a proposition and its negation are true is by definition a contradiction.
Well, go on, do so.
Someone (a few) declared that God is a necessary being. And that's what the thread is about. If you come up with some different definition then that's not what the thread is about. *shrug*
Inability to come up with a self-consistent (possible) world without any given being (or mind or whatever) is an argument from incredulity. You see Yahweh or life or Bartricks in R[sup]3[/sup] or Q[sup]3[/sup]?
Anyway, ramblery and wasting time go hand-in-hand, over and out.
Oops. You put that word 'necessary' in there. That's question begging. Without - without - assuming that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth - for that's what's at issue - show me that I am contradicting myself when I say that in reality no proposition that is true is also false. But that it is metaphysically possible for there to be propositions that are true and also false. Show how I am actually contradicting myself. You haven't done that. As suspected, the symbols disguised an assumption of necessity (or at least, the argument would need to make one to get to the conclusion that I have contradicted myself).
Quoting Banno
No, I've never claimed expertise in that area. It's an embarrassing lacuna in my knowledge, though it is one that has in no way hampered me. So, despite not knowing what the symbols mean, I'm very good at spotting a valid argument.
I don't see how. Again, it's in the nature of reductio arguments to assume what is in contention and then derive a contradiction from that assumption. that's what I have done here. Assume Bart is right, and noncontradiction is not necessary. Then in some possible word, contradictions ensue. Hence, the assumption is false.
What you need to do, to avoid begging the question, is assume it is a contingent truth and show that 'that' leads to an actual contradiction. Then you'll have shown me to be contradicting myself. But if you have to assume it is a necessary truth, then all you've shown is that I am contradicting you. Which isn't in dispute - I know I am contradicting you. You need to show me to be contradicting myself. So, for the purposes of a reductio, assume the law of non-contradiction is contingent and derive from it a contradiction.
Oh, what an opportunity that would be. Yes, I'd love to discuss dialethism with him.
But as I understand it, you are asserting that the law of noncontradiction is true but contingent, while Priest takes it to be false.
Quoting Banno
I don't deny that there is a possible world in which contradictions are true (whatever a 'possible world' is - I have no idea). I claim that in the actual world contradictions are not true.
Show me how I am contradicting myself.
You are in the actual world claiming there is an instance contradictions are true. game set match
Bartricks claims that there are contradictions in the word. Hence he claims that for some proposition A, both A and ~A are true.
If A and ~A are true, then any proposition is true.
If anything is true, then "Bartricks does not claim that there are contradictions in the word" is true.
Hence, Bartricks claims that there are contradictions in the word, and Bartricks does not claim that there are contradictions in the word.
Which was to be proved.
Edit: Added link to wiki article on explosion.
by way of justification for the line:
If A and ~A are true, then any proposition is true.
Of course it is open to Bartricks to deny this, too; but we are quickly running out of anything that might work as a principle to decide what is reasonable and what isn't. Hence my previously stated opinion that it is not worth arguing with someone who denies the law of noncontradiction.
Er, no. I am in the actual world claiming that in the actual world no true proposition is also false.
Just as I am in the actual world claiming that there are no unicorns in the actual world
I claim that it is 'possible' - metaphysically possible, not epistemically possible - for true propositions also to be false. That does not mean that I am asserting that any actually true proposition is also false.
It is also metaphysically possible for unicorns to exist. That doesn't mean I think unicorns exist or that I ride to work on one.
So, not 'match', rather you've tried to return my serve using your face as a racket and now you are wondering why all your teeth are on the grass and not in your mouth.
Quoting Banno
No, I claim that there are no true contradictions in the actual world. I mean, I've said that now about a 100 times. Maybe you should learn English 'before' you start squiggling and squoggling.
Now, again, Bartricks claims that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I think that's true. True. True . True. True. Is there a squiggle or a squoggle for true? Maybe it'll sink in if I squoggle it. How about this - $. Let $ mean 'true'. Now let % mean a proposition. Now let ! mean not. And let ? mean false. And * can mean Bartricks.
* thinks that it is $ that if a % is $, then it is ! also ?
There - has that helped?
And if you like, we can call that claim a Bartrikium Tartidium, as I know you like Latin and that sounds a bit Latin to me.
I've shown how that leads to contradiction.
So to match your shifting goals, here's an alternate rendering:
Quoting Banno
Good. But....Quoting Banno
Squiggles and squoggles. Let's get rid of them, shall we. So, you have attributed to me the view that I think that for some proposition A, A is both true and false. Yes? That's not my view.
My view is that any proposition that is true in the actual world, is not also false.
Look, you might as well give up - you need a bridge from what I say about possible worlds to this world. But you don't have one. Necessity is what'd give you it. But necessity is what's at issue.
You're not going to be able to get from contradictions being true in a possible world, to contradictions being true here. Not without necessity's help. And necessity isn't there to help you. The instant you try and get necessity to help you, the game is up - you've begged the question.
Again, you need to show that I've contradicted myself and you're just not going to be able to do that. All you're doing is showing that I am contradicting you. But, thank God, I am not you.
Well, no, since they are part and parcel of the logic you claim to understand, and they permit us to see the structure of the arguments more clearly.
Quoting Bartricks
No, I have demonstrated that the view that for some proposition A, A is both true and false, is a consequence of your view that the law of noncontradiction does not apply in some possible worlds. Reject noncontradiction in any possible world, and you reject it for every possible world.
Quoting Bartricks
On this we agree.
So, just to be clear: you think it pointless to engage in philosophical discussion with a philosopher who thinks the law of non-contradiction is true, but you'd love to engage in philosophical discussion with a philosopher who thinks it is false? Peculiar.
No, they make it less clear for I don't know what they mean. YOu might as well express yourself in German. If you genuinely wanted to be clear, you wouldn't use the symbols. Now, once more: I don't know what they mean. Use English.
Quoting Banno
No, how does that follow? That's no different from saying that if I think unicorns can exist, they do. That is, that if I accept there is a possible world in which they exist, then I must accept they exist in all possible worlds. Er, no.
I think there is a possible world (whatever one of those is) in which the law of non-contradiction is false. It doesn't follow that it is false in all possible worlds. How does that follow?? It just plain doesn't.
Why do you think that? That is, why do you think he'd make an excellent argument for it?
And of course it is missing here - I am not arguing that the law of non-contradiction is actually false, but that it is true, just contingently. Or rather, that there is no contradiction involved in holding that view. (I can argue for it too - excellently - but that would be off topic).
Well, here's the odd thing; those symbols are pretty standard, and anyone who has taken the trouble to study logic will be familiar with them. But also, there is an audience to these proceedings,a nd I am writing for the as well as for you.
Quoting Bartricks
I've presented the argument three - or is it four - times. Its just applying the so-called principle of explosion to modality.
Quoting Bartricks
You are very fond of demanding that folk address your argument. I have presented an argument showing that it does. Please address it.
So you are arguing that there is no contradiction involved in holding the view that non-contradiction is false.
You are arguing that there is no contradiction involved in holding the view that in some possible world there are contradictions.
Well, I have told you several times that I don't understand them. If you just expressed yourself in english rather than symbols it'd be clearer to us all that your arguments don't stack up.
Quoting Banno
Yes, and I keep asking you to remove the symbols - they come in at the crucial point and I think that's no accident. I think you can't show me to be committing a contradiction, because I claim not that the law of non-contradiction is false, but that it is contingently true. And to get from 'there is a possible world in which it is false' to 'it is actually false' you'd need to help yourself to the notion of necessity, as I keep saying. Perhaps you think that if there is a symbol for necessity, then you're off the hook. No. I will just keep pressing you to express yourself in English until it becomes clear. You are arguing in a circle. As ever.
Quoting Banno
You presented it in German, as far as I am concerned. Express it in English.
Quoting Banno
That's not what 'knowing your stuff' involves. Plato wouldn't have had a clue about the squiggles and squoggles. I think you don't know your stuff and you are hiding behind squiggles and squoggles. Come out from behind the squiggles and squoggles, Banno, if you dare.
Oh dear Banno. Don't you read English, Banno? I think the law of non-contradiction is true. Remember?
If I thought the law of non-contradiction was false, then of course I'd be affirming a contradiction, for I would be saying that some true propositions are also false in the actual world.
But that's not what I am saying. I am saying that the law of non-contradiction is true. It is just not necessarily true, that's all.
When is the penny going to drop? I wonder....
Logicians using secret symbols to hide their dark deeds. Quoting Bartricks
You do understand that "possibly P" is the same as "not necessarily not P" I hope - so if I am helping myself, it's because necessity is already there.
Quoting Bartricks
Yes, it is. Again, any one with a philosophical background ought be able to follow the simple symbols "A" and "~". Especially anyone claiming even a cursory understanding of logic.
So as it stands, you are now claiming not to understand my argument. So how can you tell I am wrong?
As for the rest, you are simply repeating yourself.
Quoting Bartricks
As do I.
No, it is 'possibly' false. That doesn't mean 'false'.
And now you say that necessity is there because 'possibly false' means 'not necessarily true'. Er 'not necessarily true' is a denial of necessity's presence. That's what 'not' means.
You see, I don't know what the symbols mean, but I can reason well. You can't. That's the difference between knowing your stuff and not. I can see that there is no contradiction involved in saying that it is metaphysically possible for the law of non contradiction to be false. You don't need to know the symbol language to be able to see that. You just need to be clever (and tbh, not very).
So, once more, prove me wrong - using English words, not symbols (so no little wiggly lines Banno - I know you like them, but they just make you look silly - and no saying you already have. You haven't. No wiggles. Just words.
Do you understand the task? I am claiming that the law of non contradiction - according to which if a proposition is true, it is not also false - is true, but contingently true. You are claiming that I am contradicting myself by saying that. But so far all you keep doing is saying that again and again without showing it. And everytime you attempt to show it you just assume that it is true of necessity and not contingently. Which isn't a demonstration that I have contradicted myself, but a demonstration of poor reasoning skills on your part.
I will take any squiggle use to be an admission of defeat. And likewise for the claim that you have already done so. No squiggles. No fibs. Just English. Do it.
Why not say that in this world logic applies and in another works something beyond logic could apply, a logic that dovetails our own in a way but is not contradictory? Why insist that contradiction instead of sublation is possible? You don't know if your God experiences his contradictions as contradictions
Maybe "God", who you say can do anything, predestined that Banno be right is this discussion and you wrong. But you don't like to be contradicted and hate when others disagree with you because you throw what appear as tantrums because you think you are so smart. I don't think you're a bot but others of have claimed this already. You don't learn from other people and that is an issue of maturity
So maybe God can do everything but doesn't do any contradictions except one: to make Bartricks always wrong. Maybe "she" is out to get you
Now Banno has a shit argument. Banno thinks that if the law of non contradiction is contingently true, then it is actually false. Which is, irony of ironies, a contradiction! Banno thinks if something is contingent, then it is not contingent. An actual contradiction!
He thinks I am committing contradictions. He has no argument to show this and is himself committing a contradiction, given he thinks that if something is contingently true then it is also false. He is VERY confused, but doesn't know it. Which is the worst kind of confusion, because it is so hard to remove.
So how do you know God hasn't made it such that everyone should believe in the law of contradiction except she predestined you to not agree with it in order to convict you of a sin. God can do anything, even make this seem improbable to you as you slip towards hell. You think this world is home but God can do anything anything, make you wrong in this debate, make you evil though you don't know, anything whatsoever she wishes
I think it is 'contingently' true. Most think it is 'necessarily' true. I understand why they do and other things being equal it is an eminently reasonable thing to believe about it, given virtually everyone's rational intuitions represent it to be. And that's very powerful apparent evidence that it is necessarily true.
But the issue here is whether, in believing the law of non contradiction to be contingently true rather than necessarily true, I am committing a contradiction. And clearly I am not.
So the law of contradiction can be set aside for us. So God can make you always wrong and me always right, you bad and me always innocent. God can do anything in our world. Maybe he make you bad last night and the rest of the world good such that you are the only bad person in existence. This is your logic not mine. Your trying to find a bubble but God can do anything so you have none
If God exists, then there are no necessary truths. One would be affirming a contradiction if one thought otherwise.
The irony here is that though I think the law of non contradiction is contingent, I seem to be the only one concerned to obey it.
I have not contradicted myself. But you say you're right when God might have made you wrong. There is no probability to what God might do in your system. Your total relativism, with God at the top, is self contradictory
2.Quoting Bartricks
3.Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Cheshire
My statement is maintained by number 2. There is no rational qualification that removes the contradictory nature of claiming true and false are compatible values. Maybe you could demonstrate dividing by zero when you get done failing to defend your position.
How do you distinguish a possible from an impossible world?
Your questions and posts on the topic of "God" indicate otherwise. They indicate that you're trying to arrive at certainty about God via an abstract logical reasoning, in a bottom-up manner.
Instead of relying on divine revelation in order to come to certainty about God, you're relying on your own reason (+some outsourcing to the forum folks).
Riddle me this:
How to arrive at certainty about God?
What's your answer?
Exactly. Instead of treating it as a philosophical artifact, treat it the way religious theists have been treating it for millennia: a matter of divine revelation. (Which you personally just don't happen to have.)
I think this requires a different approach. First of all, don't let them dictate the terms. As long as we attempt to discuss "the existence of God" or request them to justify their claims, we're letting the theists dictate the terms, and we're playing by those terms -- and we have set ourselves up for certain failure. We must not let them drag us to their turf where they can play, and win, on their terms.
Why would anyone trust ancient religious texts when they are just human writings and contradict each other?
In the end your refusal to address my argument inspires pathos. Quoting Banno
Quoting Bartricks
No, i've pointed out that your insistence on a contradiction leads to explosion.
Quoting Bartricks
Your insistence on obfuscation and denial count against this.
Quoting Bartricks
This is advice you might do well to follow.
Quoting Bartricks
Is that a necessary truth?
You do not quite understand necessity and contingency.
Here's the thing: continuing on in this belligerent irrational way will only render your posts here irrelevant. Folk will increasingly ignore you. As it stands, very few of the top posters bother to reply to you. Your posts are taken up by new members, who entertain you only until they realise your foibles. It's not a winning strategy.
Possible worlds are just fiat. We make 'em up. This isn't anything magical, it;s just a way of talking about them that allows us to make sense of modality.
So you might ask "what would happen if I went to the shops today?". That's the same as asking what it would be like to be in a possible world in which one went to the shops. it's not bringing worlds into being, it's just a way of talking about "what if..."'s
An impossible world is one in which there is a contradiction; so there is no possible world in which 2+3=6.
Fifty years ago Kripke presented a formalisation of this stuff, ginving us a basis for considering the consequences of "what if..."'s. It's still a subject for discussion, but for a while it was a big focus in logic.
Yep.
Quoting Bartricks
That's not a reasonable reply.
Quite explicitly, I am arguing that the arguments for and against the existence of god are inconclusive.
More generally, it seems to me that statements about god are undecidable.
SO if someone is certain about god, it is not as a consequence of deliberation.
Quoting baker
...and as a consequence it is irrational; it stands outside of rational considerations. It is perhaps there are a part of what Wittgenstein called "hinge propositions".
The issue then becomes the extent to which such beliefs should be taken into consideration when deciding what to do.
Quoting Gregory
Indeed. And yet these are used in deciding issues such as abortion, euthanasia, women's rights and so on.
As Nietzsche pointed out, gods are metaphors. People explained themselves through the antics of their gods. For the last 2000 years, the primary western image of divinity has been about suffering and sacrifice. Pretty poignant, actually.
How do we explain ourselves now?
Acknowledge three instances of God. The God in children's stories. The God of theistic experience. Perhaps an empty space for a speculative God that emerges as a collective conscious of matter until proven unreasonable. That's the direction I was thinking of going.
Here's the rub; the assumed link between god and what is we ought do. This is what must be broken.
Yes, the part that can't be updated falls under children's stories.
Prior to the advent of non-Euclidean geometries, couldn't it have been claimed, with all sincerity, that there was no possible world wherein, or no conceivable circumstances whereby, two parallel lines would intersect, as this would have "obviously" constituted a blatant violation of Euclid's parallel postulate?
And didn't the machinations of Descartes' evil genius comprise a hyperbolic situation whereby a possible world is conceived wherein the meditator is constantly being deceived into thinking that 2+3 can, and does, equal 6?
Oh, indeed. What was salient is an account of how geometry could be kept consistent when the rules are changed. It is still wrong to assert that two parallel lines meet in Euclidean space.
So if you can show us a consistent arithmetic in which 2+3 is 6, go for it. As it stands, making that assumption undermines our capacity to do arithmetic.
And that's the point of the discussion above with @Bartricks; if one accepts a contradiction, then anything follows, and further discussion ends. If Bart were able to present an account in which contradictions occur but do not result in a logical explosion, there would be a point to his posts. And indeed, that's what Dialetheism seeks to do, with debatable success.
Nietzsche would say Bartricks is relying on a metaphor that works for him, though he doesn't realize it, and that the atheist is doing the same thing. Often the atheist is the more confused of the two because she's actually stranded between two distinct worldviews. In other words, 'God' is still part of her decision making process, just in disguise.
You're too sensitive here, almost a political correct language you're demanding. He uses ensoulment where secularists would refer to it as the moment a fetus gains personhood. His post was pro-choice, with limitations not unlike most pro-choice advocates.
Along these lines, I'd point out that the most important truths we learn are through fiction. What then of this fiction that speaks the truth? A paradox of biblical proportions.
@frank
Perhaps. But see . I'd be looking for a better analysis than personhood; and I think that is found in, say, Nussbaum and the notion of flourishing.
Quoting Hanover
I don't actually disagree, so much as puzzle over this mode of expression. The way "truth" is being used here is not the way it is used in, fir instance, "It is true that 1+2=3".
Another problem with your argument is that God, by definition, does not exist in worlds, but as the creator and sustainer (if God exists) of all worlds. The ontological point really is that God's existence, if God exists, is ontologically necessary.
1+2=3 is a deductive logical construct, obviously differing from empirical truths. Do you not mean that true is what corresponds with reality?
But you agree, so we're in agreement.
If fiction is the path to truth, you've lost at least one basis to abandon religion. You don't have to believe the sea parted, just that there is a truth being told there.
But what is that truth? The moment you say what it is, you are wrong.
That's basically the Ontological Argument. Note, as I pointed out to @Banno, it is not the Logical Argument (although of course the entailment of the conclusion from the premises is deemed to be logically valid).
Anyway, perhaps dimly recognizing that you have nothing to say once deprived of your symbols, you just resort to your favourite thing: talking about me, and not my arguments.
Quoting Banno
Aw, has the nasty reasoning man exposed you as an empty kettle again? Aw, diddums.
Then that's wrong because you just said it, right?, and that was wrong, right?...
Truth as we can best say is the best I can say. The noumenal is not knowable.
Descartes wasn't concerned with undermining arithmetic truth. He was, in fact, a pioneering mathematician who extended the nature and scope of such truth.
But he did try to ascertain if there was a kind of truth, unlike arithmetic truth, that could survive the test of hyperbolic (unreasonable) doubt. The kind of truth that would be valid in all possible worlds.
He claimed to have found this kind of truth in his own and in each person's Cogito Sum performance.
In other words, if, when, and while I am thinking in the first person present tense mode, in all possible worlds I must be existing.
In all possible worlds, my Cogito Sum performance will be existentially consistent and, therefore, existentially self-verifying.
Yep. That's what this shows.
Not now that you said it. Can you please ignore truth instead of agreeing and thereby falsifying it?
It's a reverse reductio. I'm taking it is true God is necessary and then examining what it entails.
Since a necessary God is given regardless of what exists, in any case, the necessary God cannot be dependent on being made true by existence. There is no counterfactual or other possiblity to the necessary God.
Therefore, the necessary God cannot exist. For the the necessary God to exist would deny God's very necessary, as it would mean God's presence would have to be made true by existing (as opposed to not).
I think Freddy was referring to gods of ancient peoples as "metaphors". For we compost-moderns, gods are anxieties, not entities (agents). We "explain" ourselves today through commodity fetishes (placebos) and Prozac, etc.
Ok, see if I can work through this.
God is a necessary being; hence god exists in every possible world (definition of necessary being).
A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Not sure how to parse this. Seems to be the same as "A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists".
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
So there are no possible worlds in which god does not exist. True by definition of necessary being.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Seems something like that if god existed his being would be dependent on the existence of other things. I gather this would be in contradiction of what was said above, that "A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists".
and the conclusion is that god does not exist.
Something like that? Seems to have bits missing.
You have a good point. Necessity starts with us instead of realizing some necessary outside ourselves. That's what came to mind when I read your post. If I have the idea "1+1=2" then the necessary truth of it is in my mind and is my mind, because the mind is an organic unity. When I perceive the world I know I must exist because I exist in the moment. The necessity of life is felt when there is no anxiety. God would have to be our own consciousness if the idea of it is necessary
Quoting Banno
I would add that Bartricks believes in absolute relativism because his God is so powerful it can do a contradiction. He wants to make a nuance that God created the world with laws but there is the point still that his God can change that and *anything* else while we are having this discussion
That strikes me as a misunderstanding of the "power" of logic. Logic is just grammar. So, yes, god can say what ever he likes, but if he is going to make sense he is going to have to avoid contradicting himself, as must we all.
It's on a par with saying god is so powerful he can move the bishop onto any square of the chess board.
Well, yes. So can I. But that's not chess.
Logic is just grammar how exactly? You don’t think logic describes anything about the way you things work?
You don't have an argument. If you do, present it without asserting the crucial claim or squiggling and squoggling. So, a deductively valid argument with no question begging assumptions. Remember, you are trying to show that MY position entails a contradiction, not that my position contradicts yours. And so you are not allowed to assume that the law of non contradiction is a necessary truth. You must assume it is contingently true - TRUE not FALSE- and derive a contradiction from that.
You won't be able to. So I suggest sticking to fibbing and saying you have and criticizing me as a person and dispensing condescending advice on how to be more like you.
Well, good thinking, perhaps.
Edit: oh, noticed the typo - the way you think works or the way that things work?)
And so for you there are possible worlds in which contradictions occur. That contradiction implies that anything can be true, not just in that possible world but in any possible world. The Principle of Explosion is not restricted to just that one possible world.
Hence if contradictions can occur in any possible world, they can occur in every possible world.
Pretending to be you for a bit, to help you out, you would have to come up with an argument that showed how contradictions in some possible world must be restricted just to that world. But (p .~p)?q does not do that. q can be any proposition.
Putting it formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world.
And you will now bitch again about squiggles, but the fact is if you are going to talk about this stuff, you need to learn to use the squiggles.
I don't see how this follows. Allowing for the sake of argument that the law of non-contradiction is only, contingently, not necessarily, true in this world, the fact that it is possible that contradictions might be true in other worlds does not entail that they must be capable of being be true in this world. You haven't provided an argument, as far as I can tell, to support that conclusion.
Ya I meant “things”, like in the sense that logic is describing something about the way the world works, an observation about physics for example. It seems like things have a logic to them and our grammar is an attempt to describe it. So I would say yes logic is grammar in one sense but it is also a reference to something as well, something observed and not created by humans.
Im not sure what is being described by logic if logic is just grammar alone, so I inquired about what exactly you meant.
Hmm. Ok, worth having a think about it again.
Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition q will be true, including propositions the actual world.
But that might be, Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be true in that world.
IS that something like what you haver in mind?
But that argument assumes what it seeks to prove; the universality and necessity of the law of non-contradiction.
Quoting Banno
Yes, that seems to follow. Any proposition will be true in a world in which the law of non-contradiction does not obtain, but this would have no bearing on worlds where the law of non-contradiction does obtain, as far as I can tell.
You are profoundly confused about contingency and necessity. If there is a possible world where the law of non contradiction is false, then some contradictions - at least one - will obtain in that world. Not all worlds. That world. To insist it is 'all' worlds is just to assume the law is necessarily false or necessarily true. That's obviously question begging. I think it is contingently true and you need to show how that view generates a contradiction. You haven't. You have just assumed -the law of non contradiction is necessarily true or necessarily false and then reasoned that as I think it is false in some possible worlds I am committed to affirming its falsity in all possible worlds. Why? Why the hell would that follow?
Well, yes - the point being that removing the las of noncontradiction leads immediately to absurdity. But OK, I take your point.
Quoting Janus
Well, I can't see why it wouldn't, since there seems to be noting that limits the q in (p & ~p)?q to any particular word; But I will take you word for it.
Even if the argument form explosion did not work, it remains that (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world.
I agree that the idea of a contradiction being true is impossible to parse. So, yes, a contradiction could not be a coherent (and much less a self-consistent) thesis, which I guess means it could not be a thesis at all, and could be nothing more than nonsense.
Monotheistic gods too. His abiding point is about what the Christian metaphor means.
Quoting 180 Proof
But it's amazingly easy to de-adapt from that stuff when the impetus comes.
A priest is the fool on the hill, the psychologist, the philosopher? Ironically, Nietzsche was a priest. Maybe Jordan Peterson. Not sure.
Just wanted to point out that Bartricks couldn't figure out your symbols when they are actually really easy to read even for me who has never studied symbolic logic. He has an inflated idea of his abilities, and probably borderline or some thing
I came to same the conclusion. To maintain possibility there is a minimum requirement of defining a subject. Without contradiction to hold the line; then contradiction itself becomes both true and false which isn't a coherent state. Is a world of nonsense possible, maybe, but there isn't going to be a rational argument that can confirm it. Except for maybe randomness? A random world could defy or 'side-step' contradiction because no two things could be reliant. A world of total superposition where all things are in all possible states. Which doesn't imply coherence anymore than the above.
You are demanding an argument that doesn't presuppose logical contradiction. Which is clever as an impossible demand for evidence, but also incoherent, because there isn't criteria left to determine what is or isn't an argument. Ergo, an assertion is just as valid or not.
I think the law of non contradiction is actually true. True, not false. So I am sensitive to actual contradictions. I don't think any are true. So, if my belief that the law of non contradiction is contingently true can be shown to generate an actual contradiction, then I will take that to be evidence my view is false.
But what @Banno is doing is presupposing necessity and presupposing - not showing - that the law of non-contradiction is either necessarily true or necessarily false. That's precisely what I deny. He insists my denial of that is contradictory - he needs to show that, but he can't.
So again: I am not denying the law of non contradiction. I think it is true. I think it is 'contingently true'. I think all truths are. I don't believe in necessity. But what many here - including banno - don't seem properly to grasp, is that 'contingently true' means 'true' not 'false'
Quoting Banno
As some have already hinted, classical theism maintains that God is necessary being, not that God is a necessary being. In other words, God is not conceived as an individual being who "exists" in the sense of reacting with other individual things.
Quoting Banno
We can reformulate this as a conditional proposition that should be utterly uncontroversial: If there is a possible world in which there is no God, then God is not necessary being. On the other hand, we can also formulate another conditional proposition that should likewise be utterly uncontroversial: If God is necessary being, then there is no possible world in which there is no God. Taken together, what we have here is just a definition of "necessary being" in terms of possible world semantics: God is a necessary being if and only if there is no possible world in which there is no God.
The debate, then, is whether there is any possible world in which there is no God; theists say no, atheists say yes. Deductive logic, classical or modal, cannot settle this question. Charles Sanders Peirce instead turns to retroductive (also called abductive) logic in his 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." He suggests that the reality (not existence) of God as necessary being (Ens necessarium) is a plausible (not certain or even probable) hypothesis to explain the origin and order of the universe. I wrote a paper about this if anyone is interested in further details.
But you say theists think God exists of necessity - but they don't, only some do. I am a theist and I believe God exists contingently (and that it is incoherent to think God exists of necessity). What makes one a theist is the belief that God exists.
So his argument, as well as being circular, addresses a straw man. Theism doesn't claim that God exists 'of necessity' but only that God exists.
No, I said that classical theism maintains that God is necessary being.
Anyway, the idea that God exists of necessity is not definitive of theism. Indeed, it is incoherent.
Contingency implies there is a subject that our point of interest is contingent on. An offer to purchase something is contingent on the funds or credit to make the purchase. The maintenance of non-contradiction is contingent on what exactly?
Thanks for the clarification.
...is quite right, in that rejecting noncontradiction renders all arguments void. If (p & ~p) then everything follows. So in a sense the argument I presented could not depend on logic, since @Bartricks has implicitly, and apparently unawares, rejected logic.
So yes,
Quoting Janus
... is more rhetoric than logic, because it aims to have Bart accept logic as a basis for discussion.
I reject NECESSITY. Not logic. NECESSITY.
You think that's the same, right? That's dumb. Really dumb.
The law of non-contradiction is TRUE. Contingent. But true.
You think that means I think it is necessarily false. Which is bonkers. I mean, just crazy. How does that begin to follow??
Reasoning well isn't about knowing what symbols mean. As you are demonstrating.
To everyone: don't let banno use symbols. Ask him to explain in English. Then notice his arguments don't work or don't exist.
So my question would be 'what is it?' If a proposition is 'necessarily' true, what in the universe corresponds to the word necessary that makes it true?
The equation of God with being seems odd, since being or existence, (per se, as opposed to individual beings or existents) seems necessary, if anything does. And God, at least the Abrahamic God, does "react with other individual things" via revelation and prayer. Also, the distinction between being and existence seems forced and unnecessary. A being is logically equivalent to an existent, and being is logically equivalent to existence, or so it seems to me, as I cannot see any distinction which doesn't seem artificial in the sense of not being based on ordinary parlance, but on some tendentious stipulation.
Quoting aletheist
If being is necessary, as it seems to be and God is equated with being, then it would seem to be tautologically, and hence trivially, true that God is in all possible worlds, since being must be so, or else it would not be a world. That said, it seems odd to talk about being or God being in a world, since a world is being, and God is taken to be the creator and sustainer of worlds. So, the argument looks silly to me from the get-go.
:up:
In the meantime, good luck with your symbol spells. Bartricks has contradicted himself because he believes that the law of non contradiction is contingently true...but now watch the magic symbols (^)*%$#@€£¥???? . ...Kazam!!! A contradiction!! That's logic children. Logic with Banno. Remember kids, it's not how you think that counts, it is the symbols you use - #$%/#!!!^&*¥ Kazam!
If the law of non-contradiction is contingent, how do you know it is true right now. It might have been true five minutes ago, yet now not true; how would you ever be able to tell whether it was true or not at some particular time?
And yes, it could cease to be true at any moment. But I could cease to exist at any moment, yet i can be sure i exist.
You are confusing 'necessarily true' with 'certainly true'.
The law of non contradiction is certainly true, just as my own existence is. But both are contingently true.
It is a misunderstanding. We're flipping a coin and you are saying that it may(contingently) come up heads, so Banno is claiming this implies tails. Which would mean the other side of the coin must have tails. He sees that demonstrating the impossibility of tails demonstrates the necessity of heads.
Claiming that God is necessary being is not equating God with being.
Quoting Janus
Classical theism, even in its Abrahamic versions, maintains that God is simple (not individual) and impassible--God acts on the world, but does not react with it.
Quoting Janus
Not when existence is understood as only one mode of being--reaction with other individual things in the environment. Possibility and conditional necessity are other modes of being.
Quoting Janus
Like I said, it is really a definition rather than an argument.
You've evaded the question by changing terminology, but for the sake of the argument I'll play along; how do you know the law of non-contradiction is certainly true?
I don't understand how being can be divided into necessary and contingent.Non-being cannot be, so being must be necessary. It is only beings that can be contingent or so it seems to logically follow.
Quoting aletheist
If God is distinct from other beings then God must be individual, no? Is the Abrahamic God impassible? Does He not become angry and disappointed with his creatures? You say God does not react with the world; does he react to it, and if so, is that a difference that makes a difference?
Quoting aletheist
I guess we can use terminology however we like provided we are consistent in that use. Ordinary parlance, however, would have it that possibilities and conditional necessities exist, albeit in different ways than concrete entities.
Quoting Janus
Quoting aletheist
I was responding to this:
Quoting aletheist
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox#:~:text=So%2C%20God%2C%20by%20nature%20logical,object%20and%20an%20unstoppable%20force. Particularly the section "Language and omnipotence."
I don't find it particularly helpful, but you might, considering your affinity for the source.
Look! The devil quoting scripture... :wink:
The epistemology of the theist doesn't rely upon facts, but upon fiction. Unapologetically. For me at least.
My reply was with the impression "contingently" was implying a contingency, but I find it is instead a place holder for without explicated necessity. What corresponds to the word necessary? All the other corresponding facts related to the truth of a proposition essentially make a truth necessary. Like, drawing two line segments of a triangle. The third one's length will be a necessary truth for a triangle to exist. Arguing the length of the third line could deviate from one outcome without basis, because it suites an unknown principle seems mildly dubious. Is there a good reason to suspect it is the case?
I haven't changed the terminology. You are changing the topic from metaphysics to epistemology. Now, you tell me how you know the law of non-contradiction is true - i mean, you think it is true, right? - and that'll almost certainly be how I know it is true as well.
Then you tell me how you know that it is 'necessarily' true, and I will show you that it is contingently so.
What? No, he thinks that if it is 'possible' for the law of non-contradiction to be false, then it 'is' false.
I think that's absurd - that there is no argument for that claim that doesn't just assume necessity.
Note, the question isn't whether the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth or a contingent one.
He is claiming that my view - that it is a contingent truth - implies a contradiction. An actual contradiction. It doesn't. He has no argument to show this.
Whether it is actually contingent or necessary is another matter. What's at issue is whether my view - not his, mine - is self-consistent.
I don't know what that means.
If a proposition is true, it is true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs. Now, what is the truth maker for 'necessary' in 'necessarily true'?
If that question doesn't really make sense to you, join the club. Propositions are true or false. There's no such thing as 'necessarily' true. Just true.
Yes, I know - he, not I, is 'arguing' that I am contradicting myself. So, he - not I - is 'arguing' that as I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, then I am committed to thinking it is actually false. So it is he, not I, who does not understand the notion of metaphysical possibility.
It seems like your misrepresenting his argument.
Yes, I know. It's the same. But it doesn't get us anywhere. It's like giving me the Dutch for necessary. I want to know what the truth-maker is of the claim that something is necessarily true (or, if you prefer, impossible-to-be-otherwise).
Fair enough.
No, I haven't. You made a metaphysical claim; that the law of non-contradiction is certain but contingent. I asked you how you know that it is certain (or for that matter how you know it is contingent).
I know the law of non-contradiction is necessary....for rational discussion. I make no claims beyond that. Any claim beyond that would probably be a category mistake anyway. You cannot say the law of non-contradiction is contingent by saying something self-contradictory; to make sense, anything you say must itself be a non-contradiction: which rather proves the point.
I'm not. He can come in at any point and clarify, but he'll just squiggle and squoggle and hope that others will accept that he's doing what he isn't.
I am saying that something - the law of non-contradiction - is possible false. Metaphysically possibly false, not epistemically.
He is insisting - 'arguing' is much too kind - that my view involves a contradiction. An actual one, not a possible one. Now, how can that be? How can one get from 'possibly' false to 'actually false' without helping oneself to the notion of necessity - the very notion I am claiming has nothing answering to it in this case or any other?
It is not a misrepresentation. He has no argument. He has this: Bartricks thinks the law of non-contradiction is possibly false....squiggle squoggle, Kazam!....Bartricks has contradicted himself. That's what he's got. And it's rubbish.
And then what he does is insist that Bartricks thinks the law of non-contradiction is false. And then he insists that this means that it is not worth arguing with me. Even though he'd jump at the chance, he says, to argue with Graham Priest, a contemporary philosopher who thinks the law of non-contradiction is actually false!
So, you know, we're not dealing with a very clear thinker, are we?
How? How do you know it? Look, I am not going to get into a tedious 'how do we know anything' debate. If you think the law of non-contradiction is true, tell me how you know it. Then I'll tell you that I know it to be true the same way. See? Then you'll be satisfied, won't you? So, tell me how you know it. Or do you not? You just assume it, and that's that?
Then tell me how you know it to be necessarily true.
So, you are saying it is metaphysically possible false because it can hold a truth value. Not, because of known possibility.
I don't know what you mean. I don't think the law of non-contradiction is false. I think it is true. This is getting a bit mind bending. I think it is 'true' not 'false'. It doesn't 'have' to be. Nothing 'has' to be true. 'Hasness' 'mustness' - these are not real features of reality.
Are you asking me what makes it true?
How do you establish possibility without deducing an alternative state of affairs? The only reason I can imagine is because it has a truth value. I'm not saying it is a good reason.
I don't know what you mean. I think propositions are true or false. I don't think adding 'possibly' adds anything, apart from when it is being used to express the utterer's lack of confidence in the proposition's truth.
So, my claim is that the law of non-contradiction is true. Not necessarily true - I don't know what that means. Just true.
Is it possible for it to be false? Well, I don't know what that means either. I only say that it is 'possibly' false as a way of conveying to others that I do not think it is necessarily true. But if you press me on what 'possibly' means (beyond functioning to express a speaker's lack of confidence), then I do not know and don't need to know, as it is the opposite of something nonsensical, namely necessity.
So, I say "the law of non-contradiction is true". I deny that it is 'necessarily' true. There are different ways of saying that. One can say that it is 'possibly false'. Or that it is 'contingently true'. But when I say those things, I just mean by them "not necessarily true". ANd I mean that by them because I haven't a faintest idea what 'necessity' is.
Take flugemont. Is the law of non-contradiction flugemont true? No, I don't know what 'flugemont' means.
Ah, someone might say, if you don't think it is flugemont true, then you think it is flidgemey true.
Okay, I say, I think it is fligemey true.
What makes it fligemey true?
Well, I don't know - i've no more idea what fligemey true means than flugemont true - isn't it enough that I just think it true? I don't think it is flugemont true, and I say it is fligemey true simply as a way of denying that it is flugemont true, but really I just think it is true and don't add anything to it.
Dispense with necessity talk - it is easy if you try. And contrary to what many here seem to think, doing so will not mean one cannot reason. Far from it. One will reason better.
So, I think this argument is valid:
1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q
That is, I think that if 1 and 2 are true, 3 is too.
A believer in necessity who isn't completely stupid will agree that the argument is valid. But they will insist that if 1 and 2 are true, 3 'must' be too.
Well, I think that 'must' has nothing corresponding to it in reality. And I think the person who sticks the must in doesn't have a clue what they're talking about.
But we both think 3 is true if 1 and 2 are. So we can still reason with each other, it's just that they - the believers in necessity - keep sticking this word 'necessary' in all over the place.
I might say that something 'must' be the case as well sometimes. But when I use the word 'must' it functions expressively (as it does when everyone else uses it, with the exception of philosophers). That is, I am conveying to my listener that I really want them to, or that it is really important to, or some such. That usage comes with no metaphysical baggage.
How would you know if the law of contradiction changes suddenly? Can it change for you and not us? Why or why not?
Why are you arguing with people who might have a different epistemology then?
There are some propositions like that - such as "this proposition is false". The jury is out on whether they are really true and false at the same time. But it may turn out that the best explanation of why those propositions appear to be true and false at the same time is that they are; and in that case the law of non-contradiction would be false. Some propositions are true and not false, but some are true and false.
No. From your ontology on God's nature you have to posit that each person might have their own soliptistic epistemology and truths. So why are you on this forum?
Bartricks: "the law of non-contradiction is true, but not necessarily true"
Groggy: "So you own a cat?"
Bartricks: "What?
Groggy: "Epistemologimagically you said you own a cat and no one else owns a cat".
Bartricks: "Er, no I didn't. I said what I said, which isn't at all what you just said"
Groggy: "So, solipsticimagically, you said that you are the only cat in existence and everything else is a figment of your imagination. Correct?"
Bartricks: you're mad.
Wrong again. How do you know your God of relativism hasn't given everyone their own truth. Your "guy at the top" has no logical rules to follow, so there is no reason for you to argue with people who (perhaps) have a different truth value to follow. You are the one painted yourself into a corner. To be logical you can only stop arguing with people
You're stuck, stumbling, and stalling
For the third or fourth time, how do you God didn't make contradictions true for everyone except Bartricks? Why arguing with people whom your Lord of Contradictions may have given true wisdom? You don't try to figure other people's posts, admit you are wrong, or try to learn from others. That makes you not a good person to have a conversation with
Because he does not seem to have done so. It appears to everyone that if a proposition is true, it is not also false.
Be assured, I test it every day. I go into my local and I say "I would like a pint". The bar lady says "that'll be $7. I say "I have paid you". She says "No you haven't". I say "I know I haven't. But I have". She then says "That makes no sense. You can't have paid me and not paid me. You either paid me or you didn't. And you didn't". I then ask everyone else in the bar if they agree. They invariably do and so I conclude that the law of non-contradiction remains in force for me and everyone else in my vicinity.
Yet you say you are Cartesian. Descartes thought God couldn't lie to him about what he say around him and how people were. Yet your God of Contradictions can do this. How can you be sure of your own thoughts if you are contingent? And if God can make contradictions everywhere around in between any second on any day, God can fool you in any way possible. You become a Quietest. I've never come across a relativism so complete as yours and I think about the theory every day
She's not 'my' God, she's God. And she's not a god of contradictions, for it is due to her that there are not any.
Quoting Gregory
I don't understand the question. You must be confusing 'necessarily' with 'certainly'. I exist with certainty. I don't exist with necessity.
Quoting Gregory
I agree with a lot of what Descartes said, but I am not a follower. I follow me. If Descartes was alive, I think he'd be a Bartricksian too.
So every second that follows in the future has a 50/50 chance of staying consistent? And what about the past? If God can do contradictions "she" can make the past such as that you were never born, nursed, or grew up.
Why would it be 50/50? I have a coffee every morning. I don't have to. I just do. But the chance that I will have one tomorrow is not 50/50, but about 90/10.
Quoting Gregory
Yes. Powerful, eh?
It is philosophers who mistakenly think that these terms do not just function expressively, but can sometimes function descriptively - to describe curious features of the world called 'necessity' and 'contingency'. There are no such features, just the fallacy of reification.
Our reason tells us that some things 'must' be so, and others are merely 'possibly' so. Philosophers (with the occassional exception, such as me) then think that there is, in addition to truth, 'mustness' and 'possibility'. There is not. There's just God being adamant and God being tentative.
We were talking about God acting not you
Quoting Bartricks
So you reject all history because "God" can make the past different from what he was. Descartes just as likely started WWII in your worldview as Hitler, and Buddha was the big bang!
Your position on relativism leads straight to solipsism. I've had threads on relativism but not any as extreme as yours
As I said, I won't make any metaphysical pronouncements; I am only saying that the LNC is necessary if there is to be rational and sensible discussion. And that is not going to change either.
Quoting Gregory
No, I do not 'reject history' (whatever that means).
Quoting Gregory
No it doesn't.
As I have said before, show your working. How - how - are you getting to these conclusions? I am currently rather fancifully imagining that the inside of your head contains a slowly revolving cake whisk with some post-it notes on it with philosophical expressions and theories written on them, rather than a brain. Now please will you explain how you got from what I said to those bizarre conclusions? Or did the 'solipsism' paddle just hove into view?
You don't know, I suspect. That is, you don't know how you know it.
Doesn't matter. I think it is true too. So, this mysterious way by means of which you know of its truth - just attribute it to me too. I know of its truth just as you do. Happy?
We both agree that it is true.
How do you know it is 'necessarily' true, as opposed to just true?
I can't believe I have to spell this out. If God can do anything then he can change the past. So it's as likely you never had parents as that you did. You've thereby destroyed your existence because of you insistence on some she God
God can change the past. That doesn't mean he does or has. 'Can' doesn't mean 'has' or 'is doing'. Bloody hell.
And being 'able' to do something does not mean there's a 50% chance you'll do it. How do you not know this?!
I am able to take the glass in front of me and smash it into my face. That is something I can do. That doesn't mean there's a 50% chance I will. There's a 90% chance I will out of frustration at this discussion!
We were talking about God, not you. If we don't know what will happen at all as it is the case with God we treat it as 50/50. We all do that
You have no logical reason believing you have a real past
You wouldn’t be able to tell if he did or didn’t so you have no reason to think he hasn’t.
That's as silly as thinking that I can't know there's a cat in my kitchen because there isn't necessarily a cat or necessarily a kitchen. That is, it's tremendously silly. I have a kitchen and there is a cat in it. Deal.
How do you know your hair is not Aristotle? Your position is against common sense because your God is without any rules or even common sense.. You believe is a fire of rule-less will who can make and sustain any contradiction whatsoever to infinity
Look, I don't have a limitless supply of glasses to smash into my face.
Generally, I'd say I am agreement with skepticism when comes to knowing we have established truth beyond doubt. But, extending it to self-referential systems like logic or mathematics might be further than reason allows. Put another way the law of non-contradiction is maintained in certainty because of the meaning inherent in something being true or false. But, truth in reality appears so often an approximation instead of a binary assignment that I suppose the opposite could be true in practice.
1+2 can't have more than one answer, but miscounting is always in play.
Quoting Bartricks Why not leave it on an agreement. At least till sunrise.
Just a bit. :wink:
[s]I'm quite happy to debate this, if you like. Fancy a bit of formality?[/s]
Ah, on second thought, it would be flogging a dead hose. I take it back.
Quoting Janus
So I know that it is necessarily true that the LNC is necessary for rational discussion because its negation leads to the negation of all possibilty of rational discussion.
What you say is false, incidentally.
But I want to know how you know these things. Not 'that'you know them,but how you do. How did these beliefs get in you head? (Not that beliefs are in heads, of course)
See the "because" in Quoting Janus
The stuff after that is the reason.
And it's the same one I explained to you previously.
So the problem is that you don't recognise reason...
I didn't mention necessity once so you're just pulling things out of your ass.
I'm saying your God has the ability to change the past, and your memories of it, and not tell you. In which case you'd have no way of knowing whether or not he did so. So, you have no way of knowing whether or not he has or has not changed the past. You have no evidence in support of either proposition.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Ah so every time someone disagrees with you, you smash a glass in your face. I see the problem now.
I think you're using "necessary" in a way different from how the classical theologians used it. God is said to be necessary in the sense of "required for".
Quoting Banno
Here's an example of that sense. In the same way that you say logic is needed to have a discussion, theologians say that God is needed to have the world which we have.
Yes, you can conceive of a possible world, which does not require God, but that's irrelevant because God is determined to be necessary for the world which we actually have.
See, it's a different sense of "necessary". It is the sense which describes how a contingent thing actually exists. A contingent thing requires the appropriate efficient cause to bring its actual existence from a mere possibility. The efficient cause is said to be necessary for the thing's existence.
I'm using a more recent notion.
So the takeaway here is...God is a dick and may randomly screw with our memories/past for personal entertainment. Or to have faith that God is not a dick and while having said ability does not use it as doing so destroys any ability we have to learn or grow from any point in our life.
Alternately, there is no God. Our past is functionally what we need it to be and therefore exactly as we remember it at any given moment, which allows us our identity and an ability to move forward/onward in life.
Lastly...How exactly do you know what my, or anyone else's, God can, or cannot, do? My God might be limited to only making a decent hot turkey sandwich, because that is all I need him for. Yet somehow you know this already...
We were discussing the God as explained by Bartricks
First, objects don't have potentiality. They have actuality in a form which can change to something else. That doesn't mean they have potentiality within them as an attribute.
Second, there is no contingency or necessity in objects in the sense you think. A balloon can be popped so there is one of it's contingencies. A sidewalk will kill me if I drop to it from 10 floors. These are contingencies and necessities known in science. Your ideas on them are abstract and unprovable
That is an interesting Camus quote - would you mind either explaining or directing me to a good explanation, maybe by Camus himself?
Hey, my OP, my god.
It's pretty clear that Bart is using a confused notion of the relation between necessity and contingency. His notion of God is consequently impaired - see his thread about god making mistakes. See also the comments about the poverty of this sort of argument in the new thread "What is the Obsession with disproving God existence?"
Bart's god is incoherent.
For that reason, we read:
Quoting Banno
With that demand, the puzzle remains in the knot intended.
The theist would hold that God is dependent upon only himself as the uncaused cause, with the term "cause" including not just physical causes but logical causes. He is not a necessary being. He is contingent upon himself, not logic.
A math puzzle more than a God puzzle.
Is this another way of rendering what you are saying, or claiming?
God can be defined as a necessary personal being.
A personal being can be defined as necessary only if it can be demonstrated to be true that it exists in every possible world.
But if it can be demonstrated that there is a possible world in which god does not exist, then God cannot be defined as a necessary personal being.
My further comments will depend upon your response.
No need for "personal being" - the argument would apply to a necessary rock, were that posited by someone.
And truth ranges over statements, not things, so get rid of that, too.
And no need for "demonstrated to be true"; just being true would suffice. SO a better version would be:
Quoting charles ferraro
I'm not so sure. Kripke broke the link between necessity and the a priori; do you want to put it back? Do we have grounds to do so?
Whom exactly are you asking this and for what purpose?
As I've been saying all along.
Yes. A hinge commitment.
Taken into consideration by whom?
Deciding by whom?
What exactly is being used: those texts, or some people's certainty about them?
When arguing against someone, one isn't arguing against their arguments, but against the other person's certainty of those arguments, ie. one is arguing against the strength of the other person's hinge commitments. (That's why logic and evidence so often have so little bearing on persuading people, because logic and evidence don't address what the argument is actually about.)
Why must it be broken? Justify.
Really?? Pure wishful thinking on your part. You seem to think that if I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false, then I think it is false. 'If' is not an assertion.
I think the law of non-contradiction is true. I don't think it has to be. I just think it is.
It's you who doesn't seem to understand that in saying something is possible, one is not asserting its actuality.
So, again: unicorns don't exist. They're not impossible. They just don't exist. Presumably you don't think that's a contradictory thing to say?
Now: the law of non-contradiction is true. It doesn't have to be. It just is. Why - without recourse to silly symbols - do you think that's a contradictory thing to say?
It may be an implausible thing to say - most consider the law of non-contradiction to be a necessary truth - but it is not a contradictory thing to say.
You think it is. You've got no argument, however. Just squiggles that you can't translate into English.
And how on earth is my view of God incoherent? Someone who thinks God exists of necessity has an incoherent view - demonstrably so. They are affirming a contradiction. Someone who thinks God exists of necessity is an idiot, for they think God can do anything and can't do something (namely, not exist).
God exists contingently. God is omnipotent - so, can do anything - and thus God exists contingently. Why? Because he can do anything. Which means he can destroy himself. Thus he exists contingently.
How is that incoherent? Coherent. That's what that is.
And i note you just toss in that I am confused as well about God's ability to make mistakes....oh, am I? Really? Why?
It's not clear that this is what all actual monotheists mean by God being necessary (apart from those in particular who argue like the above). Rather, the necessity of God's existence in monotheism is to be understood in contradistinction with the optionality or relativity of human existence, as in: God is necessary, but man is not; man is only optional.
Such would at least be the Christian reasoning, but not, say, Hindu. In some forms of Hinduism, man isn't merely optional; man is necessary and contingent on God, while God is not contingent on anyone or anything.
If we want to talk about the necessity of God's existence, we need to be clear which particular monotheism we're (indirectly) referring to, and justify our choice.
Why the Christian notion of necessity of God's existence, why not the Hindu one?
Quoting Banno
Not to be glib, but you're supposed to feel that truth in your heart.
Bettelheim's The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales is probably one of the most well-known (even if not original) studies of the importance of fairy tales.
For the more serious reader, there's Heuscher's A Psychiatric Study of Myths and Fairy Tales; Their Origin, Meaning, and Usefulness.
Why do we watch Star Wars or the Hobbit films and such? To feel good, to feel like we can handle life's problems, to feel like life has meaning. A feeling that can otherwise be extremely hard to come by; it's so elusive, yet so important for one's wellbeing and proactiveness.
In order for the Kripke objection to be applicable, you would have to show that your OP didn't make an analytic a priori claim but that it was synthetic a priori. That is, was your claim more akin to "all bachelors are unmarried men" or was it more akin to "the morning star is the evening star." The former being analytic a priori and the latter, according to Kripke, synthetic a priori in that it requires some empirical knowledge to know it's truth. I am aware of the Quine objections to synonymity, but one issue at a time.
Your OP stated "God is supposed to be a necessary being." I would consider that analytic a priori because I don't know how one should be expected to know God is necessary a posteriori. That attribute of God as you've presented it appears purely definitional. Thus my analysis holds.
Outside of philosophical contexts, I've never heard God being described as necessary, certainly not in a deductive sense, as if God is the product of a syllogism. I was raised Jewish. Perhaps the concept of necessity appears somewhere, but I've not run across it. God is generally described as eternal, so the idea that he was caused really doesn't make logical sense.
I'd also point out that in a hyper-monotheistic religion like Judaism, the oneness of God can't be challenged. See, Maimonides 13 articles of faith, #2: http://web.oru.edu/current_students/class_pages/grtheo/mmankins/drbyhmpg_files/GBIB766RabbLit/Chapter9Maimonides13Princ/index.html
This oneness prohibits assigning attributes (or properties) to God. God is not considered to be a strange substance with various properties, but he is one and only one and indivisible in any way. Whether that makes sense or not I leave to the rabbis to better explain, but I did want to point out that these arguments that point to an attribute of God and then they try to explain how that attribute might be inconsistent with the concept of God is violative of the concept of his oneness.
The point being that these attacks of "God" take God as a very basic concept without contextualizing him into the definitional schemes of established theological systems. A believer of a particular faith would shrug off these objections as being inapplicable to what they believed God to be in the first place.
One source for the necessity thing is Aristotle. That form was transmitted to Christianity through Aquinas. The general theme is the need for some first cause to avoid an infinite backward regress of causes.
Those proofs weren't supposed to be persuading atheists of anything. They just executed atheists. They didn't argue with them.
Because people shouldn't replace morals with Leviticus 20:13 (for example)?
Incidentally, inquiring into possible readings of Leviticus 20:13 was run elsewhere (facebook) not long ago.
Some responded that the edict only applied to those tribes back then, others raised translation problems, others still suggested that it's not for humans to take action but leave it to post-mortem judgment, yet others held the US Declaration of Independence over the Bible, ... So, some of those responses were seemingly due to employing morals not defined by the Bible.
As anticipated, enough people in the groups were hesitant or silent or outright refused to give straight answers, one might hope due to moral quandaries, rather than fear of being boo'd out of town or something.
Anyway, it became clear enough that the passage can be read in detrimental ways by someone, and leaning in such a direction is just one step away, ... And that's sufficient to deny the Bible as a moral authority.
In Islam, there's a common sentiment that one must submit wholly to the Quranic Allah, and apply the Quran (and Hadith) to all aspects of life, which exposes a similar problem.
[sub](nope, I'm not homosexual myself, not that it matters, I'm just a regular heterosexual, in case you're thinking of motives/self-preservation)[/sub]
No, I don't.
You have claimed that LNC is contingent. I've explained in several different ways how this leads to inconsistency. A couple of other folk have made the same point.
I suppose if I am going to be charitable I might just say that you are working with an eccentric notion of contingency and leave it there.
Possible doesn't mean actual. The law of non-contradiction is actually true. That's all you need to know. And my saying that does not - not - involve me in any actual contradiction.
Can't God make you wrong is this discussion without informing you? So you don't know you're right
Yeah, I did. Several times.
Try this one:
All theorems of propositional calculus are necessary theorems of modal logic.
The Law of Noncontradiction is a theorem of propositional calculus.
Therefore the Law of noncontradiction is a necessary theorem of modal logic.
If the Law of Noncontradiction is a necessary theorem, then it is not contingent.
The law of noncontradiction is not contingent.
QED
You are a bad and conventional thinker. That's your problem you are impressed with mediocrity and have no originality. Stop helping yourself to necessity. Show me to have committed a contradiction without appealing to any necessary truths. Or concede that you cannot.
I'd say that was an impossibility, but for you, that's not a problem.
If it's necessary than it is due to being self referentially the case. The true things can not be false without dissolving the meaning of true.
If it's contingent, then it is contingent on the future corroboration of cases where the LNC is maintained. There may be some unknown or unthought of statement in which the LNC doesn't apply; such as superposition or other funny physics we haven't discovered.
I think the question of whether it's rational to be skeptical in this case and if so when is not rational to be skeptical is the issue.
Yes, that's the point.
If we came across an apparent example of something's both being and not being the case, we would first assume that we had missed something, that somehow our description of what was going on was incorrect. We do this surprisingly often. It's the logic behind a reductio ad absurdum.
If we could not find an error in our observation, we would need to change the logical system we were using quite radically. That's the path to paraconsistent logic. Have a skim of the SEP article.
Note that Bart is not following this path. Paraconsistent logics claim that LNC is not true. He claimed that LNC is true, but not necessary. As I pointed out above, LNC is a theorem of propositional logic, and all such theorems are necessarily true.
Superposition is not an example of a real-life contradiction. If it were, we would be able to conclude absolutely anything. Rather, superposition is described within a mathematics that takes LNC to be true.
Finding a contradiction would be like claiming that 1+1=2 now, but we might find a case in which 1+1=3. Well, not, you can't find such a case, and if you think you have, then you are doing it wrong. But if you persist that 1+1=3, you need to present a new arithmetic in which this might happen, and then to how that it is better than the arithmetic we have now.
It's pretty clear that Bart does not have much of a grasp of logic, despite his protests.
The LNC is a model of our expectations about the world. The model is undeniably consistent, but the assumption it will always correspond to the facts for the rest of time out into infinite starts to seem just as bold as questioning the LNC when you take the scale into account. Would finding an exception have implications; I imagine, but some exotic singular case could flicker through reality for a moment. But, it does feel like irrational speculation.
I don't think time plays a role here. I think logic tells us what we can reasonably say, and helps us recognise when we've said stuff wrong. Our response to any apparent contradiction must be to rephrase the issue.
I don't think the empty chance of the model failing warrants further consideration of anything tangential. But, the universe is very big and time implies it's in constant flux; so in a nearly trivial point of ceremony I'd have to reserve an or not, but ignore it without any trouble. If something can be dismissed perhaps it ought be doubt concerning the LNC. I don't disagree and see the counter-point as the definition of arguing at extremes.
I'll agree with that.
I thought the issue was the lack of even a metaphysical coherence? Qualifying it as "not real-life", implies some other type of existence. If the assumptions of the LNC being true are consistent with a metaphysical contradiction then the LNC proves it's coherent. Or not.
But your original accusation was that 'I' am contradicting myself in holding it to be contingent. So to make good on that charge you do not need to defend its necessary status, you need to show how believing it to be contingently true commits me to affirming an actual contradiction.
I don't believe there are any necessary truths. That's 'why' I believe the law of non-contradiction is contingently true. I am happy to argue against there being any necessary truths, but you are question begging if you just assume there are in the course of making your case that my position is contradictory. Again, you need to show my view to be self-contradictory, not banno-contradictory.
All this does is show that you havn't understood the relation between a necessary truth and a contingent one. A truth is necessary only if it is not possible for it not to be true. You don;t get one without the other.
Quoting Bartricks
I see. So there can never be any necessary truths, in any circumstances.
And presumably that there are no necessary truths is not a necessary truth - after all, if it were, you would be contradicting yourself.
SO that there are no necessary truths is itself a contingent truth. And yet true in all situations. And this is not a contradiction.
Basically, you've got no idea.
I deny necessity. One way to express that is to say that one thinks all truths are contingent. But I don't need that word 'contingent'. I don't believe there is a property of contingency that truths have in addition to being true.
And it is you who is confused: you seem to think that there are necessarily necessary truths - how do you make that case without begging the question?!?
Quoting Banno
You don't see. How does that follow? How does my claim that there are no necessary truths imply that there can't be?
You seem to have real trouble understanding the difference between saying that something is possible and something is actual.
There are no necessary truths. That's actually true. But it doesn't have to be. It just is.
Quoting Banno
You laid out a compelling argument for specific evidence. Banno produced it.
The negation of "necessary" must be at least equal to the force of it's assertion. Now, the LNC alone not necessary; but nothing necessary just means we throw out the LNC because it's not nothing. Poor strategy for such a long reach.
He didn't. He just assumed that there are necessary relations (precisely what I deny) and then appealed to them to try and show how the belief that it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false commits one to affirming its actual falsity.
If you are trying to show that someone is committed to affirming a contradiction, then you have to grant them their premises, not insist on your own. Otherwise all one is doing is showing that they are contradicting 'you', not 'themselves'.
Again then: the law of non-contradiction is true. That, we can surely all agree, is not a contradictory thing to say. And it is what I say. Banno thinks that it is a contradictory thing to say (which is somewhat ironic). It isn't.
One does not need to add anything to it - one does not need to say that it is 'necessarily' true in order for it to be true. It is just true. Plain and simple.
Now when it comes to necessity, I think it names nothing clear. The point, though, is that not appending the words 'and necessarily so' to the claim that "the law of non-contradiction is true' is not needed to avoid violating the law of non-contradiction . Again: the law of non-contradiction is true. And that's all I need to say about it. And saying it does not involve me in a contradiction. If Banno thinks it does, then he needs to show it - and show it not by just assuming it is necessarily true, but by showing how denying this commits one to a contradiction.
Ok, sounds about right.
very happy to see that i wasn’t the only one who didn’t get it either :sweat:
You're letting yourself be dragged onto their turf, exactly what I warned against.
embarrassingly ironic.
All of this comes down to the extremely uninteresting claim that he believes God exists. That God does exist has not and cannot be demonstrated, and so, it is is, as he acknowledges something he believes. Until shown to be otherwise God's existence remains a matter of belief, or to state it otherwise, whose existence is contingent upon belief.
I'm still here.
If you have something to say, say it, and I will reply.
But see How to Deal with a Passive Aggressive Person
Several times I entered into conversation with Protagoras, who then followed the pattern described in the article cited.
He has since been banned.
If your unstated statement is that I am passive aggressive, then I beg to differ. I'm mostly just aggressive.
He is an intelligent fellow who has perhaps missed out on receiving a decent education. Hence he grasps half-formed ideas and nails them to the mast; he then feels obliged to defend them to the point of absurdity, quite literally.
One of the things that happens - or should happen - in formal academic study is a student spending considerable time and effort in developing ideas, only to have them torn to shreds. It teaches one what to do when one is wrong.
Given a better background in logic, he might be able to mount a case in terms of fideism and Dialetheism. That would be interesting.
That's a good point. "Everything is permitted" refers to humanity as a whole, freed from the constraints of a deity imposing moral law from above. But of course many things, namely those which create egregious social disharmony, will not be permitted by persons.
Although this is not directly addressed to me, it goes back to your last response to a post of mine which I did not in turn respond to. Recall that I said that the LNC is necessary for rational discussion to be possible; so the necessity of the LNC is relative to, contingent upon, the possibility of rational discussion, well actually to the possibility of any rational thought. I was not proposing any more absolute necessity than that. I hope this clears the point up for you.
I suppose it is possible but very difficult to make it through while maintaining the belief that you have all the answers.
Quoting Banno
This is a valuable lesson. Some drop out rather than learn it.
What's that, then. As in, it's pretty unclear that there is a workable sense of free will.
Did we do that? I don't think I've expounded on that for a good while. Maybe a new thread.
I don't think it is necessary for rational discussion even in that non-metaphysical sense (and this is demonstrable, for there are philosophers who deny the actual truth of the law of non-contradiction and they do engage in rational debate over the matter). But putting that aside, I affirm the law of non-contradiction, I do not deny it.
What I want to know from you, however, is how you know the law of non-contradiction is true. Even if you are correct and its truth has to be presupposed as a condition of being able to engage in reasoned debate, that is not how you can know it to be true.
For an analogy, let's say you claim to know that God exists. I ask you how you know this. You answer that belief in God is a precondition of going to church being rational.
Well, that's questionable, but even if it is true, that wouldn't be an answer to the question. Pointing out that belief in X is a precondition of the rationality of a certain practice - be it reasoning or going to church or anything at all - is not an answer to the question 'how do you know it to be true?"
So again, how do you know the law of non-contradiction to be true? I think it is true and I have my own answer to the question, but I want to know what your answer is.
It makes sense to most people.
Yes, and I already said earlier, a couple times if I am not mistaken, that I make no metaphysical claim beyond saying that the LNC is necessary for rational thought and discussion.
Quoting Bartricks
Do their arguments contradict themselves?
Quoting Bartricks
I don't know what you mean by asking your question here. I haven't said the LNC is true, but merely that it is necessary for rational thought and discussion. Forget the LNC, if it makes it easier to understand, I'll just say that not contradicting yourself in your rational thoughts and discussions is necessary for the sense and integrity of those thoughts and discussions.
Yep. until they think about it.
The same thing happens with cosmology. The universe makes no sense... yet
To be sure, Dialethism is a respectable option for a philosopher. But it involves asserting that LNC is false. Bart has asserted that it is true.
There's no unified theory. We don't know shit.
Then how do satellites work. The Bible never make anything
We know there is no unified theory.
I think all that that implies is quite impressive. Awesome, in fact. My suspicion is that you are trivialising it for rhetorical purposes.
But then, you haven't said what it is you think so what you mean is a bit hard to assertion.
I took you to be saying that volition is problematic because we don't have a schematic for it.
The same is true of the big bang We can therefore be skeptical about whether the was a big bang, but we don't toss the idea aside simply because we don't have an answer yet.
That seems to me to be wrong. That there was a Big Bang was proposed because there is such a schema.
I'm not following you.
You need to watch more PBS Space Time.
I really don't. I'm not keen on the lack of depth, nor the way there is an emphasis on how little we know, when one might well emphasis how extraordinary it is that we can talk sensibly about the beginnings of the universe. There's more than a bit of "those cleverdick cosmologists are not as smart as they think" about it all. For fuck's sake, compare modern cosmology to the nonsense found in Genesis, and try claiming we havn't made progress.
But you seem to be just mouthing off.
Honestly, I was thinking: do I really have to explain this? This is one of the many challenges facing physics:
So if we don't understand how time began, but get along just fine assuming it did, we can do the same with free will.
I'm a determinist, BTW.
It's like you read my posts but didn't process what was said. YEp, there are problems. But that there are problems puts the lie to your
Quoting frank
The conclusion is that your claimed position is not seriously held.
You win. I'm an idiot. Have a good day. :up:
Which was to be proved.
PBS also has one saying bb is correct
Have a glance at this section of the SEP article on Dialetheism: Themes for Further Research
This quote:pretty much is my approach to the topic. That a contradiction could be held to occur in the world is a category mistake. I've phrased this as: if we come across an apparent contradictory state of affairs, then we've said it wrong.
While it would be interesting to explore this further, I am at a bit of a loss as to how to go about it.
Hence I tend to equivocate between realism and antirealism.
Then I don't know what you're disputing or what you're asking me.
Let's recap, because so far as I can see, you're just being tedious.
I believe the law of non-contradiction is true. True, not false.
Banno thinks that somehow commits me to affirming an actual contradiction. I don't know why. I keep asking him to explain why, but he just squiggles and squoggles at the crucial point. So I don't think he knows, or realizes that it doesn't have this implication at all. But meh.
If memory serves, you asked me how I know that the law of non-contradiction is true. That's a separate issue, and rather than get embroiled in a pointless debate in which you eventually espouse some form of extreme scepticism about the possiblity of any knoweldge whatsoever, or just arbitrarily affirm some kind of empiricism, I asked you how you know it is true. Either you will be unable to furnish an answer, or you will give one that works. In the latter case, I will simply affirm that that is how I know of its truth too, and as you must accept that answer we can then move on.
Anyway, your answer was not really an answer at all. Now, if you're not willing to give one, then there's nothing further for us to discuss is there?
Yes, you evaded a question with a question. I told you how I know the LNC is necessary for rational thought and discussion, and that I make no further claim than that. Now, the ball's in your court, since you claim to know the LNC is contingently true (whatever that could mean), to explain how you know that. Your explanation will also, no doubt, explain what it means to say that the LNC is contingently true
But that's a mortified equine.
They could do either one depending on how deep they want to dig. The BB cannot be extrapolated beyond the reach of physical theories to time 0. BB is a thorough mathematical theory that unites the present state of cosmological theories. In our tiny corner of the observable cosmos the theory is sufficiently supported, but very serious astronomical doubts still exist. Some astronomers still aren't convinced that the theoretical age of 13.8 billion years is long enough to explain the oldest stars.
Quoting Banno
Fully in terred, I hope! :wink:
No, I explained why I asked you that question. Your answer will be my answer, if answer it be.
What you have said so far is no answer at all.
Learn to focus.
Again, however you know that the law of non-contradiction is 'true', is how I know it to be too.
Now, what point do you have? DO you have one?
How do you figure?
We only think we exist.
There is, in reality, no past or future.
Only the present.
Every moment passed, or to come, is an illusion
If God Is, then like us, He can exist.
But He exists in the same way that someone can account for hearing that tree fall in the forest, either by being present, scientific analysis, or common sense.
In spite of all of this, God has to be, in order to maintain this.
Those are statements without evidence. Talking about things part from the world is very strange and unnecessary
Strange, yes.
Unnecessary?
Depends who you’re talking with :smile:
What convinces one person because they want the disease of religion to cloud their mind will rightfully look like nonsense to a normal person
A species of sorts.
They used to just torture heretics. That seemed to work. Killing them was Plato's idea.
Oddly sexist.
Is ”effeminate" an insult here?
Where is the reply button?
Interesting.
But what does it have to do with God?
Do you think Bin Laden would agree?
Click the three dots at the bottom of a post. The reply button appears. If you scroll over a sentence or paragraph you can click "quote" too as it appears
He was a power monger
Did you want to talk about God?
A feminine power monger?
Feminine means passive. Not that all females are or should. Thats just how people process this. Religious people think they are purified because they become passive to an all powerful deity. It doesn't make sense for man to be masculine towards God. That is what Job is about. Best not to be religious
No, it doesn't. If you meant passive, why not say passive, instead of the implicitly sexist language you chose?
Actually, I would have used "submissive"; a taunt to Islam.
There is a sexual element to it. Most religions have called the highest god a "He" for a reason, which is that piety is making you know God as Father and Husband. That how most traditional religion are
Historical patriarchy, which your comment reinforced.
Submissive would have been a better choice.
Effeminate means a perversion of the feminine, but females are generally more submissive to men than the other way around. But I imagine you think that's bad? Anyway it doesn't take away from the potency of what I said or is that a bad word too?
Try highlighting a sentence by scrolling over it and then click the quote button that appears. Then you'll be all ready for this forum
Quoting frank
I thought the thread was about God.
But yeah, I would like to talk about God if anyone is interested.
I take it the majority here are atheist
/agnostic?
It's about necessity as it relates to divinity. You can start a thread about God if you want. Just make it philosophical. ”Religion bad” is not philosophy.
Clearly, you have not met many women.
Because you bring in biblical references, thus moving the discussion onto their turf.
Which per se doesn't suffice for religious membership, and God belief without religious membership is worthless.
People are social and so do share spiritual ideas. But does your logic imply a new religion cannot start? Every religion was once new
“Religion” and “theism” aren’t necessarily connected, anymore than formal education and living a materially successful life.
Religion is, at it pure core, education for the spirit-soul aspect of our being. It can get you to the point of self-realisation quicker, in general, than following your own path.
Good religious knowledge is superior to philosophical banter IMO. But I get your point. :smile:
Not at the moment. You?
There you go. So you're no better than the atheists you bitch about.
Never claimed to be.
I don’t “bitch” about atheists
I just tell it like it is
No, your just giving your view. A view of a non-committed theist.
How is it possible to be a “non-committed” theist?
Are you a theist?
Did anything come of this...? Seems to have gone off-track.
I am trying to get the description of the topic clarified (for me)...
Quoting Banno
1) Is this a hypothesis or an assumption?
2) In what sense and why is god necessary?
Quoting Banno
3) What are the possible worlds?
4) Why do we need to talk about other worlds, from the moment that the existence of a god has not been even proven --beyond doubt or at least as a commonly accepted truth-- in our own world? Or has it?
@Bartricks comments distracted me into consideration of paraconsistent logic, so it remains to return to this thread in an attempt to see if they can be applied in a coherent fashion to god.
What happens to the necessity of god if one reject explosion? If one takes
not to be true?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11437/inconsistent-mathematics/
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11395/a-counterexample-to-modus-ponens
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11363/a-question-concerning-formal-modal-logic
Especially
Quoting Banno
Does paraconsistent logic give us a way to unbind god from logic?
1) Is this a hypothesis or an assumption?
An assumption for the purposes of a reductio ad absurdum.
2) In what sense and why is god necessary?
That is the question to be addressed in this thread.
3) What are the possible worlds?
Mere conjectures. Kripke used them to secure a formal analysis of modal logic. They provide our best way to deal with "what if..."
4) Why do we need to talk about other worlds...
You don't. You do not need to be here. But if you are going to talk about god being necessary, you might consider the consequence.
In theory; it might. But, in practice it seems like people need to tie the existence of god to some part of their reality. It's why we keep getting new forms of creationism updated every few years. Because in practice theist have trouble imagining a world without a god being necessary for making it. You aren't a declared theist, so you can imagine a world without a god being necessary. The logic is regular consistent based on a belief in god.
I think a god experience emerges from the world, so I don't hold god as being necessary.
Or the obvious answer I suppose. If ever an alternative system of logic were needed to cope with
with a matter; it would probably be the necessity of god, from an atheist position, under the supposition of an idealist model depicting the many worlds hypothesis, then this may be it. Stack anything high enough you'll need a taller crane.
Showing ‘God’ as Not Necessity
(Outline)
The fields form and exhaust reality,
As partless, continuous—there’s no Space!
Reality maintains itself in place
As the net of objects interacting.
Copernicus’ revolution’s complete;
External entities aren’t required
To hold the universe; God’s not needed,
Nor any background; there is no Outside.
Nor is there the ‘now’ all over the place.
GR’s relational nature extends
To Time as well—the ‘flow’ of time is not
An ultimate aspect of reality.
All is Relational: no entity
Exists independently of anything;
There are no intrinsic properties,
Just features in relation to what’s else.
Interactions and events (not things) are
Quantum entangled with such others else;
Impermanence pertains all the way through—
What Nagarjuna means by Emptiness.
There are no fundamental substances,
No permanences, no bird’s-eye view
Of All, no Foundation to Everything,
Plus no infinite regress ne’er completed.
The fields are not from anything—causeless!
Or ‘not from anything’ is of lawless
‘Nothing’, which can’t ever form to remain.
There is no reason, then, to existence.
Hope’s Necessary ‘God’ vanishes!
This realization of Impermanence,
No Absolutes, and Emptiness,
Is Nirvana, though coincidently.
Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky
SP
You're one, per your own admission:
Quoting Jan Ardena