hypericin

Nonetheless any theory of consciousness and particularly deliberative consciousness needs to explain how our mental features seem to us to be qualitat...

"What is a model?" is maybe not easily answered, but this example of a "model" doesn't seem to capture the notion. The slimmed down evaluations are ap...

It's an interesting question, deserving of it's own thread. But I think this isn't right. Strictly speaking a computer cannot simulate anything physic...

Sorry for the late reply. "Epiphenomenal" was a poor choice of words. I think I was and am at least partially misunderstanding you. Take an example. I...

I absolutely agree with your intuition. Of course, there is a difference between explaining self-awareness and explaining phenomenology. I am trying t...

These are expressions of physicalist reductionism, but this doesn't entail the more drastic reduction to "the 4 Fs". Aw, I had a few more Fs lined up.

Oh? I work in the VR space, I'm interested in this. Do you have a link? Of course, we can make a stab at mapping the sensory ranges of other species o...

Fecundating? Or fertilizing?

Incredible op!!! :sparkle: You have clearly poured a lot of thought into the matter, to great effect. I will read your blog post next, and your paper ...

I find this notion very problematic. When we learn anything, we are training our brains to acquire new competences. Not any other organ. Even though, ...

I'm not saying that they are the consequences of phenomenal experience. I'm saying that mediation makes illusions and hallucinations possible, mediati...

Nice, I wish this could be stickied at the top of every page of this thread. You made it?

I thought this was curious, so I looked it up. It is mentioned in this article: https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/21/133411/rodney-brooks/ The ...

Then, your first part was an argument against a straw man, since an indirect realist can (and should, and does, imo) agree that phenomenological conte...

One question: why did the brain adjust for color constancy in the cube picture but not the snow pictures?

Again, if we do not perceive/experience/have awarenesw of internal objects, what are we perceiving/experiencing/aware of when we hallucinate? External...

If we know it, to "know" must accommodate a degree of uncertainty. If it does not, we don't know it. No, indirect realism does not presuppose a correc...

I like the examples you (and Claude) have been giving, but I don't seem to draw the same conclusion. I don't think indirect realism presupposes or req...

Even if you collapse the distinction, there are still two awarenesses: object awareness, and perceptual experience, which is itself awareness. Object ...

"Correct", "Veridical", or not, is the wrong framing. Consider a live TV broadcast. The images you see may veridical, they may accurately depict the r...

This is not my view. I am noncommittal as to the nature of awareness of perceptual experience. What I am committed to is that perceptual experience an...

Regarding the disagreement about what indirect realism is, ChatGPT decisively favors my interpretation. However, we (or at least I) have apparently be...

Busy, apologies for the late reply. I'm not sure why these are exclusive. If there were a discernable difference; for instance, if the mirror had dirt...

Sorry for the late reply, I've been busy with work. The quote from ChatGPT: "Experience" here is certainly not what we have been calling "perceptual e...

Whatever type is, it is not phenomenal.

So is the implication that there is a hidden feature in the subject's own phenomenological experience that the subject is unable to discern?

Not identical in what way?

It might be that in some ontological sense they are different. But what I meant by the first premise is that from the first person, phenomenological p...

Why? Indirect realism doesn't necessarily appeal to physiological processes. The fundamental distinction is between the qualitative first person exper...

This seems compatible with epiphenomenalism though.

Apologies, I see my mistake. I was focusing on the argument when I should have focused on the conclusion. This is what initiated this thread: I deny t...

(Another) User "true or false: Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have dire...

This doesn't work. What if I had rephrased P2 with the equivalent: P2. If the representation represents real objects... Then your substitution yields ...

"A representation is of real objects" is a nonsensical claim. A representation may be of anything. Rather, "the representation is of real objects". "T...

Cool! I love all your LLM posts, you are our resident expert. I'm curious if it can handle the whole thing (at least, opus?). Ok, ok, I only really go...

That is not a valid substitution. "A representation is of real objects" does not mean that "a representation" equals "of real objects". It specifies a...

If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then: The “direct perceptual experience” is a ...

Perceptual experience is the intermediary. I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, ...

Sorry, I should have said, you can know there is smoke in the room, but never with absolute certainty. Knowing empirical facts always entails doubt, b...

We are aware of objects. But our awareness is indirect, because we are aware of them only via our awareness of perceptual experience. Perceptual exper...

@"Luke" P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences. P2: Perceptual experiences are representations of mind-independent reality. P3: We are aware of re...

I would phrase it: Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience. Indirect experience: Awareness of an object (via perceptual experience) By...

No, none of the links mention the possibility, "representation of a representation". Awareness of a perceptual experience does not imply awareness of ...

Who here or anywhere is claiming that it represents another representation? It sounds like you are a indirect realist yourself, while believing indire...

It is almost as if @"Luke" has become a radical indirect realist! Ironically, I disagree. Objects *are* part perception. But perception is a process, ...

You are conflating perception and perceptual experience. A "perceptual experience" is not a perception when you are hallucinating, dreaming, etc. Ther...

The conversation is not progressing. I will try a different approach. Here is a diagram of my conception of perception. Which parts do you disagree wi...

Object perception in smell, sight, hearing are indirectly mediated by molecules, light, and sound waves respectively. But to be clear, this is not the...

For a "perception to be directly of worldly objects " makes sense to me by contrast with the case when the perception is mediated by other objects, i....

Everything is affected by other things. If X is affected by Y, we don't generally say that X is X and Y Yes, The experience is of odor molecules. The ...