numberjohnny5

In that case, I don't think that animals that are relatively dissimilar to us perceive qualities as "beautiful" apart from them being able to do so fo...

They have no extra-mental existence. We apply those concepts to extra-mental things.

Do you mean a hierarchy in which certain animals that have evolved particular capacities to evaluate qualities (like beauty) in other animals that hav...

I see. Thanks for explaining.

Hmm. I thought randomness involved equiprobability. Could you explain?

Thanks for taking the time to explain. I'll give what you've written some thought.

I'd also go further and add that not only does the object look a particular colour in a particular light, but that that object IS that particular colo...

Well, I'm an internalist on meaning, so it's not "meaningless" in my view. Re your example, "food" as a word would refer to particular objects we migh...

I think Terrapin Station is suggesting that that's only one way to initiate or arrive at ontological claims or commitments. Some philosophers might no...

No problemo. I was actually thinking about starting a thread on it anyway.

I see. So the difference between an ontological claim and ontological commitment is that the former just simply arrives at or states, for example, tha...

Indeed, I'd also say there is such a thing as phenomenal certainty in the current/present moment, and faith. I see. Maybe it's because it's unclear to...

I agree with that, hence why I view RDs simply as signifiers or signposts in terms of law of identity (LOI) claims like "Aristotle is Aristotle". I do...

What makes some x invariant in all possible worlds is that that x is that x, implying the LOI.

I don't quite know what you mean by "a strong adherence to the LOI is a route to hard determinism". LOI is just the application of a logical concept t...

Well could you explain to me why it's "really not it" and what "it", as in RDs, really are then? The whole point of me starting this thread was to und...

Indeed, and the LOI is necessarily true, hence how RDs just "pick out" or signify some existant among and relative to others in lieu of LOI obtaining.

Yes, as I said in previous posts, the law of identity is implied when using RDs to refer. I can't think of another use for RDs in terms of what's enta...

Useful as a signifier/marker/signpost that the law of identity obtains for existents insofar as one can make references to existents. That's the only ...

Ah, thanks for letting me know; I've not studied predicate logic yet.

It would be acknowledging that in some possible worlds A = A for some particular X relative to some possible worlds in which that X doesn't exist (¬(A...

I'm including fictional existents too, like Pegasus, for instance. The law of identity matters in virtue of this discussion because if it didn't obtai...

So in the possible worlds where you don't exist, all the rigid designator is doing is acknowledging ¬(A=A), therefore, ¬A relative to the possible wor...

Naming some thing is about using a sign/symbol to refer to some thing. Rigid designators name some existant, no? They refer to some particular thing -...

A name is necessary in virtue of what? Insofar as rigid designators are used, they appear to me nothing more than signifiers or markers that a particu...

Did you manage to read my other longer post (above) re "So it seems, then, that rigid designators are just "markers" of some sort that reflect, acknow...

I wrote a post above along those lines -- that rigid designators are akin to signfiers a la Mill's non-connotative proper names, in which they just re...

For the sake of argument, let's say that wasn't true: that instead words are used as signs/symbols that individuals assign private meanings onto; and ...

Another idea is that a rigid designator could be just implicitly stating that the law of identity is necessarily true and using particular/objects/etc...

It seems to me that, at least in some respects, rigid designators are like signifiers similar to Mill's notion of non-connotative proper names. If a r...

Although I'm aware you're making that distinction there, would you also agree that definitions can be or are mental since they have to be constructed ...

You're not alone; I've noticed a similar thing on other forums. The ones I've interacted with seem to believe that internalism is necessarily a solips...

I see what you did there! But can one argue out of this contradiction if they believe the first claim to be true?

Thanks for the link. I've read more on semantic internalism/externalism than epistemic so this is helpful. I'll need to digest the subject-area more, ...

Sure. As I mentioned in my initial post: "I am aware that some experience is occurring as I type this," or "I sense things in this moment". To be hone...

Hi Mongrel. First, I want to clarify what I mean by "know" or "knowledge", just so that we're on the same page. I'm using the common philosophical def...