You can define terms in any number of ways. Definitions are not claims about reality. They're ways of clarifying our meaning. If you use a different, ...
I can't think of a single reason to support Kant's Transcendental Idealism. He invented it to avoid Hume's very sound analysis showing that time-seque...
I have already said that the laws of physics are human descriptions. I agree that these are arrived at inductively. When I say "laws of nature" I am n...
Would you care to clarify how meaningfulness depends on being a quantity? It sounds like the long discredited claim of Logical Positivism. My, what a ...
Of course, for judgements are acts of mind. That does not mean that existence depends on our judgement of existence, a la Berkeley's esse est percipi....
There's nothing wrong with fruitfulness. Variety in conclusions don't necessarily mean inconsistency. If two arguments lead to contradictory conclusio...
No, they are a bunch of particulars with the same intelligibility -- the same power of evoke concepts. Until a concept is actually evoked, there is no...
There were no actual universals prior to subjects thinking them. There was common intelligibility. In the biological world, this can be traced back to...
Yes and yes. Yes, but the observer problem goes even further -- abstracting away the observing apparatus (even though it is physical and subject to ph...
I am using these as separate terms of art. By "laws of physics" I mean approximate human descriptions of the ordering relations in nature. By "laws of...
Since I haven't read Hegel, and don't particularly want to read Hegel, the fact that you mention him gives me strong reason to think that you're burde...
We need to agree to disagree on what Aristotle means by "hyle. 1. I have read De Anima a number of times and parts in Greek. 2. You are confusing our ...
This would come as a surprise to most scientists. We do not see ourselves as engaged in fiction writing, but in describing reality and especially how ...
I don't reject hylomorphism, but I do reject Aquinas's version. See my "A New Reading of Aristotle's Hyle" The Modern Schoolman 68 (March, 1991): 225-...
We can only measure quantities and intentionality is not a quantity. "Intentionality" does not name a construct. Constructs are inventions designed to...
These seem like incompatible positions. Physics has nothing to say about the logical order and universals belong to the logical order. I see no reason...
I think we are misunderstanding each other. By "subjective experiences" I don't mean experiences, such as dreams, devoid of objective content. I mean ...
Thank you for the reference. I think the proper formulation is to say that secondary qualities depend on the relation of particular sensory modalities...
Differences can be either actual or potential. Only if the identity in question is quantitative. Two numerically different protons can have identical ...
I am discussing the actual form of the argument. You are not. Changing the FTA's form to what it is not gives you an easier target, but doesn't rebut ...
Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion." Yes, ...
No, not as abstract information, but as an intelligible aspect of reality. I did not say it interpreted the laws. It simply acts in a uniform, orderly...
There is no knowing without a subject knowing, no willing without a subject willing. So, our experiences as subjects are essential data in understandi...
I know Aristotle's views quite well. While I respect Peirce, I don't know as much about him as a should. What should I know of his view of causality? ...
I would be happy to comment. I follow Aquinas on a number of issues, but depart from him on a few points where he has a Neoplatonic, rather an an Aris...
Just to be clear, by A and A' I meant two simultaneous instances of the same type, not one A at successive times. So, I'm not sure that we are conside...
Three points. 1. I'm anything but agnostic on the existence of God. I am a theist. 2. The points I've discussed in this thread are an insufficient to ...
As philosophers we are not interested in subjective experiences because they a particular to each person, but because they they are tokens of types of...
A and A' are not different because they are identical, but because they are made of different atoms and occupy different locations. So, I do not see t...
You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference...
They do not determine "existence," but the time-development of material systems. However, the relation to God has deep historical roots. Jeremiah, who...
I mean that they inform future states. Of all the metaphysically possible future states only a determinate future state is actualized at a given time....
My logical propagator argument shows that the laws of nature are in the same genus as human intentions, not the same species. My comparison with human...
Yes, I think he would. Consider: -- Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 87, art 3. You're right that, beginning with Descartes, philosophers have posited that we ...
Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion , and in other cases it is not ...". Until yo...
With regard to the first point, the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science: Every act of knowing is both objective and subjective. It involves bot...
No, it does not. The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its cons...
Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support ...
I was not addressing consciousness in my post, but the idea that the whole is convertible with tits parts. As for consciousness, I see no reason to th...
That was not what I was asking. I was asking for a philosopher who calls himself a "neutral monist" and, as you suggested, follows Scotus in ontology....
The question conceals an error. We do not know that there is any "fundamental building block(s)." The history of recent physics reveals that each obje...
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