Is existence created from random chance or is it designed?
I was thinking about whether or not everything that exist comes from totally random chance or if it was designed and intended to be this way. The conclusion I arrived at is that both options are equally possible.
wait, Hold on...... before you start thinking about how slim the odds are that we all exist due to random chance is, take a moment and think about what infinity means....and also think about what time is.
Time is a perception of our minds, the way we experience existence is from one moment to the next, from our perspective there is a linear progression through time, but the truth is that time is not real, its simply something that our species perceives.
Now think about what infinity means. understanding what infinity is simple, but trying to understand what infinity implies is a little harder to do.
So, lets say everything that every single particle in existence has a infinite amount of "time" to randomly bounce around and interact with other particles. Even if our universe does collapse at some point there would be another universe that burst into existence, or maybe our universe explodes again to create a new universe right after it collapses, either way, the point is that there is always something that will pop into existence...so this means there is a infinite amount of time and/or chances for things to come together in just the right way to create life (aka-us). even if it takes trillions of universe life times to accomplish the task of creating life, we would still eventually pop into existence by random chance at some point. True infinity means that there is no start or end, a truly infinite existence would mean that everything in existence has always and will always exist....in this one continuous moment....think about that for a while.
So now, lets expand this concept further, for the sake of keeping things simple, lets say our universe expands for a certain amount of time and then collapses back into itself and then repeats that same process over and over for infinity, say each time this happens there is countless particles randomly interacting with each other. This would mean that eventually, all those particles will randomly interact with each other in just the right way to create us, just have to give it enough time (in which case our universe has a infinite amount of time/chances to do this). ...
Now here is the insane part, if all this is true then that means it is a fact that we all have lived many times before in every sort of existence you can imagine. It would mean that at some point we all have already lived the very same lives that we are experiencing right now, some past lives could be exactly the same as our current life, everything the same, down to every single atom/particle while other past lives would be the same except for a few differences....other past lives could be completely different to the extreme when compared to this current life.....So even after this life ends, eventually, the random acts of all particles in existence will eventually come together in the same exact way as they did for this lifetime, thus, we live once more.
Now think even further, think about all the possible outcomes that could possibly happen through random chance, what ever you can imagine (and I really mean what ever) has already happened and will always be happening right now in this one infinite moment. every single possible outcome of every single choice you have ever made has already happened and you have already lived it out.....maybe this is why some of us experience de ja vu, we feel like we lived a certain moment before and this might be the reason for it.
wait, Hold on...... before you start thinking about how slim the odds are that we all exist due to random chance is, take a moment and think about what infinity means....and also think about what time is.
Time is a perception of our minds, the way we experience existence is from one moment to the next, from our perspective there is a linear progression through time, but the truth is that time is not real, its simply something that our species perceives.
Now think about what infinity means. understanding what infinity is simple, but trying to understand what infinity implies is a little harder to do.
So, lets say everything that every single particle in existence has a infinite amount of "time" to randomly bounce around and interact with other particles. Even if our universe does collapse at some point there would be another universe that burst into existence, or maybe our universe explodes again to create a new universe right after it collapses, either way, the point is that there is always something that will pop into existence...so this means there is a infinite amount of time and/or chances for things to come together in just the right way to create life (aka-us). even if it takes trillions of universe life times to accomplish the task of creating life, we would still eventually pop into existence by random chance at some point. True infinity means that there is no start or end, a truly infinite existence would mean that everything in existence has always and will always exist....in this one continuous moment....think about that for a while.
So now, lets expand this concept further, for the sake of keeping things simple, lets say our universe expands for a certain amount of time and then collapses back into itself and then repeats that same process over and over for infinity, say each time this happens there is countless particles randomly interacting with each other. This would mean that eventually, all those particles will randomly interact with each other in just the right way to create us, just have to give it enough time (in which case our universe has a infinite amount of time/chances to do this). ...
Now here is the insane part, if all this is true then that means it is a fact that we all have lived many times before in every sort of existence you can imagine. It would mean that at some point we all have already lived the very same lives that we are experiencing right now, some past lives could be exactly the same as our current life, everything the same, down to every single atom/particle while other past lives would be the same except for a few differences....other past lives could be completely different to the extreme when compared to this current life.....So even after this life ends, eventually, the random acts of all particles in existence will eventually come together in the same exact way as they did for this lifetime, thus, we live once more.
Now think even further, think about all the possible outcomes that could possibly happen through random chance, what ever you can imagine (and I really mean what ever) has already happened and will always be happening right now in this one infinite moment. every single possible outcome of every single choice you have ever made has already happened and you have already lived it out.....maybe this is why some of us experience de ja vu, we feel like we lived a certain moment before and this might be the reason for it.
Comments (96)
About the other part, it might be interesting to google "finely tuned universe". There, you will read about a cosmologist named Martin Rees who identifies six physical constants within the universe that science has no theories why they are set the way they are, or of any relationship between them, suggesting they are set randomly (let's set aside the discussion about whether there is such a thing as randomness to keep this simple). If so, then the odds that they would be set in a way that provides for a stable universe that allows human life to form is astronomically small. This has been fueling multiverse theories. These theories basically visualize that there are an infinite or astronomically large number of big banged out universes out there, kind of like a sea of bubbles, and a very super tiny fraction of them would have universes that are stable and suitable for life. Of course any humans out sitting on some planet pondering these things are going to be in one of those rare universes that is set just right to allow for them to exist, so as long as there are enough of these universes out there that it is likely that at least one of them has this, then it is irrelevant how improbable it is for a specific bubble.
So you are presuming the timeless existence of little itty bits of matter floating free in an empty spatial void. And there is zero physical evidence of that being the true story of our Universe. It is how we might usefully conceive of the Universe right now. But it was not true at its start. Nor will it be at its Heat Death.
The bit of your multiverse or ergodic return speculation that can still work is the idea that the universe in its current cold and expanded state - the one where particles in a void is a reasonable classical physics summary - is infinite in its spatial extent. And so there is room enough, if we kept crossing the universe, that we would "have" to encounter an unlimited number of replica Earths, with replica you's and me's living the exact same lives.
There would be an infinite number of near replicas - all the ways those Earths, those us, could be fractionally or, more often, substantially different. And then an infinite number of absolutely exact replicas.
But a logical argument that always returns the answer "yes" on any question ought to be suspect.
"Would multiplying by infinity result in an infinite number of exactly 'me's' on top of an infinity of 'nearly-me's'?" "Yes. Anything times infinity equals infinity."
At what point would one start to wonder if this kind of simple extrapolation - one that turns any possibility into an actuality - is a little metaphysically sus?
Do you really believe that there is not a substantial difference between past and future? If there is such a difference, how can time be "not real"?
The passage of time is literally created from the way your brain perceives the world around you, ask yourself, would time exist if there was not a single conscious being in existence? no, it would not because there would be no one around to even acknowledge its existence. What if you stop experiencing the passage of time as you do now? what if you begin to experience all past, present and future events all at the same time? You would no longer experience the passage of time, everything would simply be one with everything else.....In order for you to grasp what I am saying, you must take yourself out of the picture, remove your self from this reality and allow your perspective to change, you must allow yourself to see the big picture without judgement, once you remove your ego you will be able to fully see things for what they really are.
"Time is a perception of our minds,"
Physics has time dependent equations, such as the Schoroedinger equation, which describe how a physical system evolves over time. Further, this is contrary to intuition. So you have a burden to show why it is more likely merely an illusion.
If time is an illusion, how can you claim the universe can collapse? Are you assuming block time (b-theory)?
Are there infinitely many possible universes, or only a finite number of possibilities? Is the past infinite? There are reasons to think it is not.
Doesn't the geological evidence show that time was passing before there was life on earth?
Anyway, what I was asking you was don't you live your life as if there is a substantial difference between past and future?
Quoting xxxdutchiexxx
Sure, you can make up a fictional scenario in which there is no time. But it's fictional so of what use is that?
Quoting xxxdutchiexxx
OK, I'm ready to play this game. I remove myself from reality, and there is nothing, no universe, absolutely nothing. Where and when do we start? Any assumption we add here, to produce a perspective, will be just an assumption. So "to fully see things for what they really are" requires that we assume a perspective. Do you agree? Without a perspective there is nothing.
First, time neither exists as such outside of the mind, nor is it a mental fiction. Aristotle was dead-on when he defined time as the measure of motion (aka change) according to before and after. So, it is based on the reality of change, yet, it is not change itself, but the result of a humans processing (measuring) change.
Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.
Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.
Fourth, while many cosmologists speculate about a multiverse,
a. A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
b. The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.
c. Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.
i. The most parsimonious assumption is that they do not differ in any fundamental way from ours.
ii. We have no theory explaining why our physical constants have the values they do. Absent such a theory, we can say how they could have different values, and cannot rationally predict that they will have different values in other universes.
iii. If we could deduce the existence of other universes (we cannot presently), our deduction would be based on the physics learned in this universe. But, if another universe had different physics (to avoid fine tuning in that universe), the physics learned in this universe would be in applicable, and the deduction would break down.
d. The reason given for the existence of other universes is explicitly atheological -- not scientific.
Fifth, we know that there are laws of nature that physics studies and tries to describe. if these laws had no ontological reality, physics would be a species of fiction, not a science.
a. These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.
b. They are also intentional. Franz Brentano determined that the defining characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Ideas are about their potential instances. Acts of will are about the states they seek to instantiate. In the same way, the laws of nature (as opposed to their approximate descriptions, the laws of physics) are about the states they bring to pass.
Thus, physics reveals that our universe is fundamentally intentional, both in its laws and in the values of its constants.
1. There are things we don't know about the universe. [me: I agree]
2. Therefore, it must be like this. [me: uh.... wait;.. what?]
3. Therefore, because it is like this, we can conclude the universe is fundamentally intentional. [me: let's go back to 2 again?]
There is speculation that evidence of multiverses may be found in CMB radiation so it's not ruled out yet if any of them are testable scientific theories.
Science has no theories as to why these constants are set the way they are, or any relationship between them, so we do not know that if there are other universes, how their settings would compare to ours. Without additional information, you could be right that they are likely the same, or they could vary across the different universes. We cannot make any assumptions without additional information. I don't share the assumption that it is reasonable to assume they are fixed as it seems that (barring additional info) having the values flow through the ranges seems simple and frees us from having to explain why they are fixed to certain values-- a good challenger for the most parsimonious assumption.
I'm not arguing that we can conclude the universe was not intentional, just that the option of it being random is still a perfectly viable option given what we know.
However, if we do come up with a good reason to conclude the universe was intentional, then that implies the universe is only part of a larger realm of which includes the entity that caused the universe as it intended. But then we just moved the original question (is universe intentional or random) to this larger realm.
There's lots of problems with your claims.
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[I]Second, atomist prejudices aside, there is no reason to think that the cosmos is made of particles. Quantum theory uses wave equations to describe the nature of things, with so-called "wave-particle duality" resulting from an unwillingness to give up the old dogmas.[/i]
Wrong that this was due to "unwillingness." It was due to the observation that photons exhibit the properties of particles in some cases and the properties of waves, in other cases. The duality has been "solved" with quantum field theory, which considers fields as fundamental and particles as quantized ripples in fields.
[I]Third, our best cosmological theories do not see the universe as ending in collapse, but in an ignominious heat death. Thus, the idea of cycling is passe.[/i]
Wrong. Sean Carroll, for example, has proposed that the heat death results in conditions from which a quantum fluctuation can occur which results in inflation ( ie a big bang).
A multiverse is not entailed in any accepted theory. (We have no accepted theory of quantum gravity.)
Not quite true. It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory. However, no specific interpretation of Quantum theory has been shown to be true.
[I]The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological.[/i]
Two errors here:
1) at minimum, a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological
2) multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable.
[I]Even if there were other universes, there is no reason to believe that their physics (including their fine tuned constants) would be any different from ours.[/i]
It is a presumption to claim the constants are "fine tuned." The real issue is: should we believe the physics that we know is truly fundamental? No- and that's because it is clearly incomplete and incoherent. The true fundamental physics would almost certainly have different expressions.
[I] These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of.[/i]
That is a metaphysical assumption, not established fact. The "laws" of physics are abstract descriptions of the physical relations among the things that exist in the universe. The relations are due to the properties of the existents. Properties and relations of physical things do not exist independently of the things that have them.
I don't recall basing any claim on things we don't know about the universe. Could you be specific?
Quoting jajsfaye
It seems that you're the one relying on what we do not know. To be falsifiable, a theory must make a prediction that can be tested. Speculation about an unobserved possibility is not a prediction. If a theory predicted that we will find a specific feature of CMB radiation that is otherwise unexplained, then if we didn't find that feature, we'd know the theory was false. Any theory that does not provide such a definitive test is mythic, not scientific.
Quoting jajsfaye
Exactly. So, multiverse speculation is not a rational answer to the fine tuning argument. Let me be clear. I don't think the fine tuning argument proves anything. Still, it makes a very strong case in the legal sense. Evidence-free speculation about a multiverse with varied constants is not a rational rebuttal to that case. It is only an excuse for continuing to be an atheist in the face of overwhelming evidence of intelligence.
Let's be fair, since the fine-tuning argument is not a deductive proof, it can be ignored in good faith, but the reasons for doing so aren't scientific. They are usually an extra-scientific commitment to metaphysical naturalism. Letting ones faith-commitments influence one's science is no more rational for atheists than for creationists.
Quoting jajsfaye
Yes, and no. It would be larger in a conceptual sense than that assumed by metaphysical naturalists. It need be no larger in a physical sense if the intelligence acted immanently, as suggested by Aquinas, inter alia.
While I agree that quantum field theory, with its second quantization, provides us with consistent theory adequate to its purposes, it does not provide us with "particles" in the classical sense of point masses. Physics has no need of the particle construct or of the concept of wave-particle duality. Quantized fields are waves, not the point masses of atomists.
Quoting Relativist
And is a quantum fluctuation resulting in inflation "cycling" in the old sense of collapse? My choice not to say everything in a finite post does not mean what I do say is wrong.
Quoting Relativist
No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.
Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.
I have strong reasons, based on accepted physics, for rejecting both Schrodinger's cat and Everett's interpretation. As they are not germane to this thread, I will not offer them here.
Quoting Relativist
A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis.
Quoting Relativist
"Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.
Quoting Relativist
I agree. Nonetheless, the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.
As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.
Quoting Relativist
First, as I explained, when I say "laws of nature" I mean the aspects of reality physics seeks to describe with its laws ("the laws of physics"), and not the descriptions themselves. Now either physics is describing (in a limited and approximate way), some aspect of reality ("the laws of nature"), or physics is a species of fiction. So, we may conclude that there are actual laws of nature -- which is to say that they are an aspect of reality.
Of course, the laws are co-extensive with the particles and fields they control, but not because they have parts outside of parts (are extended). They are not. Rather they are co-extensive because that is their domain of operation.
Nor can they be physically separated. Still, they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents.
It is confusing to call laws "properties." "Property" usually means an aspect of a thing that may or may not be found in other things and that can vary between various tokens of the same type. Clearly, universal laws are not "properties" in this (usual) sense. If you are merely saying that we can have no operative laws without matter or fields for them to operate on, I am happy to stipulate that.
But, I was not claiming that there are multiple universes. I was simply stating it as a possibility, given the limits of what we know. The original question was about whether or not the universe was designed or random, and it is a possible explanation that allows for the "random" option (I will use random broadly here for the sake of simplicity, to mean anything that varies over a range of options). I am not declaring that things are this way; it is just a hypothetical possibility and nothing more, given the constraints of what we currently know.
I don't know how atheism fits into this. I actually consider myself quite spiritual, but those spiritual feelings are irrelevant here.
As far as I know, science does not know yet why these constants are set the way they are, or of any relationship between them. The multiverses is one option being presented to explain why the universe is so finely tuned to allow us to be here, given that astronomically low probability that it would be set that way if the properties were set randomly.
Until a scientific experiment is performed that adjusts our confidence level past a threshold that a scientific theory can be accepted that multiverses exist or not, it is in the realm of the unknown. This does not mean that we can assume they exist. But is also does not mean that we can assume they do not exist.
You seem to be assuming they do not exist until we know otherwise; therefore, we can conclude that a designer created this universe. Your concluding sentence was: . What I am saying is that no, we cannot make such conclusions yet because there are other hypothetical options of which we do not yet know enough to rule them out with high confidence.
Part of your logic was to rule out the random option on the assumption that it is not as parsimonious as the conclusion that the universe is designed. That is, given these two possibilities:
A: There are multiverses and these have a range of parameters such that there is reasonable probability that at least one of them is finely tuned to support us being here.
B: There is either one universe or they are all set to the same parameters, but there is also a designer with the intelligence and capability to set the universe to be finely tuned to support us being here.
You seem to assume that B is more parsimonious and, thus, must be assumed to be true. It is hard for me to agree with that.
[i]Relativist: It is entailed by the many worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory, so in that respect it is entailed by accepted theory.
Dfpolis: No, actually, it is not so entailed. If you actually read Everett's paper, as I have, he does not propose many worlds in any ontological sense, but only in an epistemic sense. What he argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states (a sort of Schrodinger cat). Each sub-state of the brain then represents one possible outcome of the quantum observation. So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.[/i]
Everett wrote: " from the standpoint of our theory, it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. " and "In our case, we wish to make statements about "trajectories" of observers. However, for us a trajectory is constantly branching (transforming from state to superposition) with each successive measurement."
Irrespective of whether Everett himself was a realist or an instrumentalist, a realist perspective on his interpretation is absolutely ontological .
Even if true, Everett's interpretation is entirely useless in rebutting the fine tuning argument, as each supposed representation has exactly the same physics, with exactly the same (fine-tuned) constants, as every other representation.
Of course it doesn't rebut the FTA on its own, but in conjunction with the potential for more fundamental physics it constitutes a mechanism for actualizing alternative realizations of localized physics.
"What[Everett] argues is that as the measured quantum system is represented as a superposition of states, so we should model the brain of the observer as a corresponding superposition of states"
Everett does not use this characterization in his dissertation, and it would be problematic when you consider potential consequences of different branches (one branched brain states gets one girl pregnant, while another branched state gets a different girl pregnant. This results in different offspring in the two branches).
So, we do not have many worlds, but many representations of one world.
Only with a specific interpretation of Everett's paper. The MWI interpretation has a variety of post-Everett flavors.
[i]Relativist: "a multiverse hypothesis is metaphysical, not mythological"
Dfpolis: "A metaphysical conclusion is one based on our experience of being (existence). A mythological claim lacks an adequate experiential basis -- as does the multiverse hypothesis."[/i]
A multiverse metaphysics has as much standing as an Aristotelian metaphysics (consider Aristotle's hypothesis that "essence" exists). Metaphysical theories are not the product of physical experiments. They are explanatory hypotheses that attempt to explain that which exists, and is posited to exist. If your simply making the epistemological stance that we have no right to believe something that is not subject to experimental confirmation, I don't really take issue with it - I just object to applying different epistemological standards in order to argue for something one would like to believe.
[i]Dfpolis: "The multiverse hypothesis not falsifiable (since other universes are, by definition, dynamically isolated from ours), and therefore not scientific, but mythological."
Relativist: "multiverse hypotheses are tied to broader hypotheses (incomplete scientific theories) that are falsifiable."
Dfpolis: "Tied to" does not mean "derived from." When there is no logical implication, a hypothesis must be judged on its independent merits.[/i]
Each specific multiverse is actually derivable from an (incomplete) scientific theory, so your objection has no merit. Here's an excerpt from a survey of Multiverse Theories written by P. C. W. Davies:
This flavor of string theory entails multiple possible "low energy physics" (the physics we observe), and this string theory is falsifiable.
Dfpolis: the physics we have now is more than adequate to many purposes -- just as Newtonian physics continues to be more than adequate in its verified realm of application. So, while we can and should expect further, fundamental, revisions in our present physics, there is no reason to expect that the conclusions of a revised physics would overturn the conclusions of our present physics in its verified realm of application.
Sure, but its "verified realm of application" is limited to this universe. It's premature to declare that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed.
As the arguments for the fine-tuning of the various constants are sound applications of present physics in its verified realm of application, there is no rational reason to think that advances in physics would lead to their rejection.
There is no good argument for the "fine-tuning" of the constants! - they all depend on the presumption of design. But there is very good reason to think further exploration into more fundamental physics would change our views on what is physically possible: the Copernican principle (or principle of mediocrity): why should we think our portion of the universe is representative of the whole?
" they can be separated in thought, so they are a different aspect of the universe than its matter and fields -- an aspect which is immaterial in the sense of lacking parts outside of parts and material constituents
The fact that we can think abstractly about some properties of physical states of affairs doesn't imply there is anything immaterial about those physical states of affairs. It seems a tangent to discuss the nature of mental objects, like abstractions.
"It is confusing to call laws "properties."
Get used to it, I didn't make it up. Physicalist philosophers like D.M. Armstrong and Michael Tooley have been using this terminology for years.
In brief: everything that exists is a "state of affairs". A state of affairs has 3 sorts of constituents: a (thin) particular, its relational properties, and its non-relational properties. ("Thick particular" = the particular with its properties).
There are "state of affairs types" - i.e. sets of particular states of affairs that have one or more properties in common. Example: a specific electron is a state of affairs, whereas "electron" (in general) is a state of affairs type.
A law of nature is a relation between states of affairs types. Ergo, under this account, laws of nature are relational properties that exist between states of affairs types. "electrons have an attractive relation to protons" is a law of nature. The law is instantiated in specific pairs of electrons and protons.
I agree, it is a possibility. That is why the fine-tuning argument is not a proof, but merely a convincing argument on the model of a court case.
Quoting jajsfaye
That's fine, but this definition of random does not exclude the idea of intentionality.
Quoting jajsfaye
No, I am not assuming that the multiverse hypothesis is wrong. I am merely pointing out that while it is logically possible, it does not rise to the level of a scientific hypothesis, because the only support there is for it is the argument that if there is no God, there must be a multiverse.
Quoting jajsfaye
Let me be clear. I have already said that the fine tuning argument is not a proof. It merely presents us with evidence of Intelligence. (By "evidence," I mean rational grounds inclining us to a conclusion, as legal evidence does.) On the one side, we have physics telling us, in a way unlikely to change with further advances, that the cosmos is fine-tuned for life. On the other hand, we have an unfalsifiable logical possibility, unsupported by a shred of evidence and in violation of the principle of parsimony, that there may be a myriad of other universes -- and that those other universes might just have different physical constants -- then again, they might not. I think any rational evaluation would see the fine-tuning argument (revealed by physics) as the stronger case.
That said, I don't rely on the fine tuning argument because there are unrefuted deductive arguments (aka actual proofs) for the existence of God as the ongoing sustainer of the cosmos.
You have not commented on my analysis showing that the laws of nature are intentional. That is my main argument for intelligence, with fine-tuning playing only a supporting role. If the laws of nature are intentional in character, then we must call their source a mind -- not a mind like ours, but still, a mind.
Quoting jajsfaye
This mis-states the case. Most of B is known fact, not assumption. We know that this universe exists and is fine tuned. So, the only hypothesis in B is that there is a single intelligence at work.
On the other hand, A posits (1) a myriad of other, complex, universes and (2) that each of these has (for reasons unknown) independent values of its physical constants.
Clearly, the hypothesis of a single intelligent Being is simpler than the dual hypotheses of a myriad of other universes and that physical constants vary between universes.
Finally, I do not think that God "designed" the universe. If God exists, He is necessarily changeless. So there can be no sequence of design and implementation in God. There can only be intentional implementation.
The constants found in physics (and similar sciences) are but part of such an assessment. We'd have to take entirely different ontologies/structures into account as well, or we'd still just be looking at ours. (For that matter, we don't change ?, and expect to find circles, I don't anyway.) Not a simple assessment to make; how would we come up with such alternate universes...?
Following evidence + current models thereof, life, as we know it, has a window somewhere between formation of solar systems and the beginning of the degenerate era, ever marching towards heat death (cf expansion of the universe). Heat death involves an unfathomable amount of time (even compared to 14 billion years), ruled by the lonely photon in deep cold.
In the meantime, life seems rare, at least from what we currently know. Our present universe is largely indifferent/hostile to life (by far). It's vast, open spaces and lots of radiation, with rocks here and there, gases and suns, and the occasional black hole and supernova blast. Life on Earth requires free energy from the Sun to stay around; energy that temporarily partakes in food chains before dispersing ever on (entropy + expansion).
Isn't it somewhat self-elevating to think of life as a pre-determined purpose of the universe...? Or more specifically, like some seem to think, us? :o Self-importance (even narcissism)? Douglas Adams' puddle comes to mind.
Texas sharpshooter fallacy (Wikipedia)
When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned. I agree that he is speaking of real brainstates in real observers; nonetheless, these brainstates image different mathematical projections of one and the same world.
To understand this, you need to understand what a superposition of states is. It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions." Any state represented by one set of eigenfunctions can be mathematically transformed into representation in terms of any other complete set of functions. So, the mathematical structure (representation) of a particular superposition is not a natural property, but a reflection of how someone has chosen to represent nature. Thus, however we choose to represent a natural state by alternate sets of functions, it remains one and the same state. It is never many states, and certainly never many states with different physical constants as would be required to rebut the fine-tuning argument.
When I read Everett's paper I was truly impressed by the clarity and consistency of his thinking. Still, it is based on bad physics. It is not necessary to criticize his thinking here because, as I said, Everett's "many worlds" are all one and the same world with one and the same set of physical constants.
Quoting Relativist
If it does not rebut the FTA on its own, it does not rebut the FTA. As I explained in another post, just as the advances of 20th century physics left Newtonian physics in tact with respect to phenomena in its verified realm of application, so any further advances, however fundamental, will leave 20th century physics in tact in its verified realm of application. Nothing will make a description of one world with one set of constants suddenly become a description of many worlds with many different constants.
Quoting Relativist
Indeed it does. That is why we need to examine notthe "interpretations," but the logic Everett used to justify his proposal.
Quoting Relativist
So, the physics showing that minute variations in the constants leads to conditions unsuited to life depends on the assumption of design? Would you care to provide an example showing how this assumption changed the calculations? Or even how it could change the calculations? The vast literature generated by naturalists to support the possibility of a multiverse as an explicit alternative to fine-tuning shows that some very prominent physicists and cosmologists take the calculations quite seriously.
Quoting Relativist
No, it does not. Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances, and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.
So, while Aristotle's account of essences is entirely empirical, no account of multiverses is. Thus, multiverses are not "metaphysical" -- they derive from no adequate empirical foundation and are rightly classed as mythic.
Quoting Relativist
Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.
String theory is indeed "incomplete." So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms. I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.
Quoting Relativist
I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.
I have never said or implied "that the quest for more fundamental physics, and the possible implications of it, are doomed." It is not something I believe, and so it seems a bit underhanded to suggest that I do. I will say until we actually have empirically verified advances in fundamental physics, it is irrational to pretend to know its implications.
Quoting Relativist
Because it exhausts our knowledge base. Either we base science on actual data, or we admit baseless speculation. Natural science, with its hypothetico-deductive method, will never achieve metaphysical certitude. Logically, there will always be other possibilities -- but we can't base science on possibility alone. Science needs to explain our actual experience of nature -- not possible mythic realms.
Quoting Relativist
You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.
Quoting Relativist
It is no defense that Armstrong and Tooley are equally confused. Properties are logical "accidents" -- aspects of individuals. Some apples have the property being red or sweet. Others do not. The laws of nature operate universally. Of course you can take a word and extend its meaning. But, when you fail to see that it means different things in different sentences, you open yourself to the fallacy of equivocation. Precise thinking requires sensitivity to variations in meaning. Lumping equivocal meanings together is a sign of confusion.
Quoting Relativist
Indeed. The conceptual space you are projecting reality into does not span the available data. When you employ a projection that is not one-to-one, you leave data on the table. Other projections, into different conceptual spaces, are better suited to the data you have abstracted away. Your projection ignores intentionality. Intentions, while real, need not be reflected in physical states of affairs.
If the universe came by chance, this implies a God who is an idiot savant. He has no clue what he is doing. He is unable to plan, but periodically he will come up with something by chance. He will throw all the parts of a car in the air hoping a car appears. If something else happens, fine. He is not very smart but depends on luck for anything to happen.
A God of determinism is more mediative and is able to plan things out. He is the genius old brother of the idiot savant. I like this religion better.
The ancients always assumed determinism instead of random, in terms of the larger things, because creation was connected to the Gods and random creation meant their God or Gods were mentally defective, unable to do what human could do; think and plan.
Random was never satisfying, except by those who were trying to overthrow the Gods and put man in his or their place. An idiot savant God can be made subservient, since he can't counter the planning of man, in a timely fashion. A God of determinism is always steps ahead of man.
[Quote]When I say that Everett's interpretation is more epistemological than ontological, I am speaking about the "manyness" of the worlds envisioned...It is not many worlds on top of each other, but a mathematical means of representing a single state in as a sum of mathematical forms called "eigenfunctions." [/quote]
Sure: there is one all encompassing state in a quantum system, but the issue is: how does the classical world that we experience emerge from the quantum system that comprises reality. A realist view of MWI is based on the ontological commitment that physical reality is a quantum system, and that the classical world of experience is an eigenstate of that QM system. So the "world branching" is (technically) just a classical perspective: each eigenstate is a classical "world."
You also mention there being exactly one set of physical constraints, and I agree - but that doesn't mean we have a complete understanding of what the true constraints are, since we can only see how they manifest in our classical world.
It's moot what you see in the literature because you're seeing response based on a flawed premise. The alleged "fine tuning" is a product of post hoc analysis. The FTA has the unstated assumption that life was a design objective. Consider any metaphysically possible world W, which contains complex objects of type T. One could argue that W was fine tuned for T. What is special about life? It's special to us, but that doesn't make it intrinsically special. I feel special to myself, and am the product of a series of improbable accidents of pairs of individuals who happened to reproduce: was I the product of a priori design? If you disagree with my analysis, try reformulating the FTA without assuming life is intrisically special, or assuming the world was "fine tuned" (a question begging concept).
[Quote]Aristotle was an empiricist. He did not "hypothesize that 'essence' exists." He said that our definitions of universal terms reflect common elements in their instances and that we may name those common elements the object's "essence." In other words, essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. I do not see how any empiricist could deny that there are real differences, found in individuals, that allow us to say this is human and this a canary. Biologists do that every time they determine what species an organism is.[/quote]
Aristotle's reasoning was a product of his time, but with advances in science and analytic philosophy, we can see that the notion of essence has no empirical basis. And yet there continue to be philosophers who embrace the metaphysics (e.g. Edward Feser).
Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation and for delineating "kinds." What are your necessary and sufficient properties vs your accidental properties? Would you be YOU had there been a single gene that was different? How about a single day of your life having different experiences?
What are the necessary and sufficient properties for being a horse? Consider the evolution of horse throughout the evolutionary history of its ancestry: it is arbitrary where you draw the line between horse and non-horse. Species is a sortal, based on vague boundaries, not some underlying metaphysical distinction.
[Quote]Really? "Incomplete" theories now have evidentiary standing? This merits no further discussion.[/quote]
We weren't discussing evidence. You had alleged the multiverse hypothesis was "mythological" and that it was not falsifiable. I showed that you were mistaken on both counts. I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse, but there are good reasons to think this might be the case - as I discussed. Multiverse is consistent with what we know, and it is entailed by some reasonable extrapolations about what we know (these extrapolations are what I referred to as "incomplete theories"). Science advances in this way; accepted theory does not arrive in its final form.
[Quote]" So incomplete that it has made no falsifiable prediction and its supporters mix results from logically inconsistent versions. I will not repeat the harsher and less charitable criticisms.[/quote]
Errors in the analysis are self-correcting - that's what peer review is for.
[Quote] I merely note that dressing ignorance in mathematical lace doesn't make it a thing of beauty.[/quote]
Agreed, but this doesn't make metaphysical speculations that are devoid of math any prettier. I bring these things up not because they are necessarily true, but rather to show why we shouldn't be seduced by metaphysical explanations that implicitly rely on arguments from ignorance. We should be agnostic to the existence of multiverse, not hastily dismissing it for insufficient empirical basis while declaring victory for a deism that also lacks an empirical basis.
[Quote]I have no problem with physics that only works for empirical reality. I am not sure why anyone would -- accept to rationalize a faith position.[/quote]That's fine as long as you refrain from arguments from ignorance as I just discussed.
[Quote]You're arguing skew to the point here. It is not a question of whether we think abstractly or not. The question is: what are the properties of the object of thought. We think abstractly of quanta and fields, yet we know they are material because they have mass-energy and parts outside of parts (extension). We think abstractly of works of art, but we know they are composed of atoms. When we think of the laws of nature, our concept does not involve parts outside of parts -- they are not spatially divisible -- or the possession of mass-energy. Thus, laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter -- not because our thoughts are abstract, but because what we are thinking about falls into a different category.[/quote]
You seem to have some physical/metaphysical framework in mind, and are judging the Armstrong-Tooley framework from that perspective. That is the category error. Armstrong developed a fairly complete metaphysics, and it can account for everything you've discussed - but it of course does so very differently. So, for example, from the perspective of Armstrong's metaphysics, it's meaningless to assert "laws of nature lack the defining characteristics of matter". We don't really need to debate which metaphysics is true, as long as you don't implicitly insist that your metaphysical assumptions form the proper basis for exploring metaphysical truths.
No, in quantum theory, the actual world is always a superposition of states. Eigenstates with respect to one dynamical variable are superpositions of many states with respect to another. So the only "special" thing about being an eigenstate is that the corresponding eigenvalue is one of the possible answers if we try to measure the associated variable.
But, as I keep repeating, the MWI is not evidence against the FTA because every "world" has the same physical constants. Also, it is based on defective physics.
Quoting Relativist
As they are determined by how they "manifest" in the classical world, that is all we need to know -- whatever you may think contrasts with "manifesting in the classical world."
Quoting Relativist
No, the FTA infers that life was intentional from the fact that the variables have the exact values required to produce life. Suppose you ran a store with only one thing costing $1.59 and a young person plunks $1.59 on the counter, looking at you expectantly. It would be a rational inference to conclude that the child wants the one thing costing $1.59.
Quoting Relativist
This is simply false. For the argument to be persuasive, you need the additional datum at the core of the FTA, viz., that minute variations of W's constants would preclude the existence of Ts.
Quoting Relativist
This is nonsense, as shown by my example of biologists making taxonomic decisions. There is a foundation in reality for essential definitions, and that is what Aristotle defines as a thing's "essence:"
"The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se" Metaphysics Z, 4 -- and saying what something is, is defining it.
Quoting Relativist
You are confusing my individual characteristics with what allows me to be called a "human." Aristotle's essences are not individual, but specific. So, "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for individuation" is simply false. "Essence entails the existence of necessary and sufficient properties for delineating 'kinds'" is true.
Quoting Relativist
Biologists have -- defining different species in the ancestral line of the modern horse.
More fundamentally, you seem to be thinking of essences as something imposed from the outside. What actually happens is that we humans develop conceptual spaces in response to our experiences. Then, when we want to be more precise, we formally define what we mean by various terms, and necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term are, collectively, the essence of what we have defined.
Since essences are only found in concrete things, they don't pre-exist their instances. As species evolve, so do the properties we use to define them, i.e. their essences.
Remember: Aristotle started by teaching logic. His primary concern is precision in language, not Plato's Ideal World. His discussion of essence and existence is about how what we say reflects our experience of reality.
Quoting Relativist
Let's take the concept
Quoting Relativist
A theory is mythic if it has no evidentiary basis. It is unfalsifiable if no evidence can falsify it. You did not show I was wrong on either count. ("I admit there is no evidence for a multiverse.")
Quoting Relativist
Being consistent means it's logically possible. I agree a multiverse is logically possible -- that requires no supporting evidence. One can extrapolate in any way one wishes. Experience shows that "reasonable extrapolations" have no epistic value. "The earth looks pretty flat to me," though true, does not support "The earth is flat." "The stars appear to rotate around the earth," while true, does not entail "The stars are embedded in a crystalline sphere." I require actual evidence and adherence to methodological canons to call a theory "scientific."
Quoting Relativist
I quite agree. But, for every accepted theory there are thousands that turn out to be utter rubbish. I'm not saying no one should research multiverses or work out the consequences of alternate hypotheses. If I were refereeing a paper working out a reasonable hypothesis, I wouldn't reject it because it involved a multiverse. This is not a discussion about freedom of thought or the right to discuss various hypotheses, but about what it's rational to think true given what we actually know.
Quoting Relativist
This is a contradiction. Errors don't self-reflect and think themselves wrong. People correct them -- and I'm one of those doing so.
Quoting Relativist
You seem confused as to my position. I'm open to the possibility of a multiverse. I even think it's a sensible line of inquiry. What I'm discussing is the current epistic value of the multiverse hypothesis as opposed to the FTA. It should be obvious that any hypothesis lacking supporting evidence (as you agree wrt a multiverse) has no epistic value. On the other hand, the FTA is based on evidence and peer-reviewed calculations. I agree that the FTA is not a "proof," but it does have epistic value. So it makes a far stronger case in the legal sense.
Quoting Relativist
You've bandied about "arguments from ignorance" for a while I don't recall advancing any -- nor you pointing out any. On the other hand, you're using our ignorance wrt a multiverse as a counter to the FTA. Please be specific as to any arguments from ignorance you think I'm making.
Quoting Relativist
My metaphysical framework is dynamic realism -- that "existence" is convertible with "the power to act in some way," and a being's "essence" is a specification of its possible acts. (This isn't Aristotle's definition of "essence,") My epistemological framework is my projection paradigm -- that all we know is a dynamic projection (dimensionally diminished map) of reality, i.e. the result of reality acting on us in some limited way.
Feel free to criticize of my framework.
Quoting Relativist
Do you know what a category error is? If so how am I making one?
Quoting Relativist
I am willing to grant this is the case. Since my sentence is perfectly meaningful in normal English language discourse, I conclude that Armstrong's metaphysics is inadequate to normal English discourse. You are perfectly free to limit yourself to their framework. I prefer to be open to many complementary projections of reality.
my head hurts reading all that.
let's say we were not intentionally designed, but rather began from an explosion that led to the division of a "single celled organism" right?? that led to...well everything we are now??
our bodies have very few parts to them that we can live without.
they all depend on each other.
we need a brain to make all of our organs function, but we need the organs to allow our brain to function.
for instance,
our brains tell our lungs to breathe
our lungs draw oxygen from the air and send it into our blood stream.
our hearts (also told to beat by our brain)
pump the oxygen rich blood through a network of arteries to the brain so it can continue to tell the body to keep doing what it does.
SO --
when this single cell was splitting....
when it was one, it became two, and so on, right?
how many cells is a brain made of?
or a heart?
or even our veins?
at what point did a single cell decide it was going to start splitting and growing into a heart?
and if it DID, why?
was it already a brain that knew it needed a heart?
was a Primordial Goo Brain smarter than we are now?
that it (accidentally randomly) knew it needed a complex operating system??
but even if it WAS that smart -- how the heck did it manage to keep the body alive while it was
3D printing itself over a million years? one. piece. at. a. time. when all the pieces function as a WHOLE?
i am so confused right now
Regarding the relationship between MWI and the multiverse, I refer you to this paper: The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
You've reference the Fine Tuning Argument, and I inferred that you were referring to the FTA for God's existence. If I'm mistaken that your agenda is to "prove" God's existence based on the alleged "fine tuning" of these constants, then there's nothing really to discuss. But if that is what you have in mind, then I see an argument from ignorance behind the reasoning: we don't know why the constants are in this narrow life permitting range, therefore it must be due to design.
I'll assume you actually do believe "fine tuning" entails God, so I'll continue.
And as I keep repeating, we don't know what the true fundamental laws of nature actually are. All we can know is what we have access to, and that's the way the laws of nature manifest in this universe. To avoid continuing to go in circles, I'll interject that our fundamental disagreement is really metaphysics, not the physics. We can agree that known physics does not entail a multiverse, much less variations in the so-called fundamental constants. This takes our epistemic quest out of the realm of (narrowly defined) physical possibility. What is the implication? It just implies the answer is beyond the realm of current physics. If you were to claim, "therefore it must be God" you would be committing an argument from ignorance. Why should we think a supernatural being is more likely than an unknown natural cause? The converse seems more likely because we don't know that there exists anything other than the natural world.
I apologize in advance if I am mistaken in assuming your objective is :"prove" God's existence from the alleged fine tuning, but if I have correctly anticipated this - then my arguments are relevant.
So what? This universe happened to produce a set of things that we characterize as "living." Why regard this as special?
You are relating a coincidence (two things unexpectedly coinciding). What is life coinciding with?
I considered this implied, but OK, let's formally add it: Consider a metaphysically possible world, W, which contains complex objects of type T which would not exist had the fundamental constants differed from what is actual in that world.
There are many sorts things that exist in THIS world that would not exist had the constants been different.
I believe you're right about Aristotle. I had confused his metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomist metaphyics has the view of essence that I was referring to: it is an integral part of his metaphysics, and yet it is pure assumption that there is such a thing.
Sounds similar to Thomist metaphysics, and it again sounds like an assumption - not something that we know exists due to evidence, but rather something that is postulated. My issue is that if you're going to accept unprovable postulates in your preferred metaphysics, you must accept them in alternative metaphysics to avoid a double standard. Every metaphysical theory depends on postulates (sometimes called "first principles").
All physics is rooted in empirical data, even when at the stage of hypothesis. Any physics hypothesis may assume physical structures that are not observable- consider quantum field theory. Nevertheless theories are falsifiable, and so are the rigorous multiverse theories, such as Loop Quantum Cosmology which is derived from Loop Quantum Gravity (an incomplete quantum theory of Gravity.
This seems another case of you trying to constrain naturalistic metaphysical theories to known physics, while (I anticipate) availing yourself of unconstrained supernatural assumptions. If you applied your stricture consistently, you'd have to treat "God" as mythic. It certainly fits your definition (no evidence).
The dependency of life on the universe having these constants within a narrow range is accepted science, but it is still nothing more than a post-hoc analysis. It's somewhat interesting that we wouldn't have existed had these constants differed. The error in reasoning occurs only when attempting "prove" God's existence by this fact. And it most certainly IS consistent with the scientific endeavor to explore whether or not there's a reason for the constants being what they are - and the only valid way to explore this is to consider if and how they could have been DIFFERENT. This has nothing to do with figuring out why there is life, because life just happens to be something that exists in this universe. Some naturalists fall for the bait and try to answer it, but they're as misguided as those who tackle the equally presumptive question: why is there something rather than nothing?
You are mistaken about Armstrong's metaphysics - it's pretty complete, and it's coherent. We don't necessarily need to explore it in detail. And no, I'm not actually committed to Armstrong's metaphysics. I bring it up when other metaphysical assumptions are made to show that any conclusions that are made are contingent upon those metaphysical assumptions being true.
You had made this claim: "These laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of." Immaterial laws exist in the mind. If you were to claim they exist independent of the things that exhibit the described behavior (e.g. as platonic entities) and they somehow direct or govern that behavior, then you would be making a debatable metaphysical assumption. Of course, I may be mistaken that you had this in mind, in which case this is all moot.
The evolution of complex structures is not due to decision making. I suggest you read up on natural selection.
The op is very cyclic and denies some significant components of our lives which refute the idea of 'chance'; such as the law of CAUSE & EFFECT or INTELLIGENCE. Cause implies reason which negates 'chance'. Also, the very idea of progression/evolution (a fundamental activity of the intelligence aspect of life) implies a moving forward, not forwards and then backwards. While life does have cyclic events, they do not alter its progression. Metempsychosis (Reincarnation) is a better super-normal explanation of that 'deja vu' or it's just the mind doing what it does best: drawing connections. It may be like how we understand other people's family drama even though the circumstances and the people are different. Deja vu is more analogical than factual.
But I think that is a misrepresentation of the real conclusion. The real conclusion is a probability question. It is, what is more likely, that this is by some design, and there is a designer, or are other explanations that are more likely. The 2 most given ones are, yes it is all just an accident. Or there are multi universes, maybe an infinite number of alternative universes and it is therefor more likely one would be like this one.
As a theist, I like this argument - not so much for its support of theism, but to show the length some will go to find any answer other than it is more likely there is a designer. In general to the atheist, or hard agnostic there is almost nothing that is less likely than God is.
This is long - but does a very good job of presenting the argument from a theist POV if anyone wants to take the time.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6qWzxKVBko
If you've read my posts, you would have seen me state 2 or 3 times that I do not think the FTA proves God's existence. It only makes a strong case in the legal sense.
The FTA is an argumentum singum quia (an argument based on signs). Such arguments are only deductively sound when the signs can only point to one thing. That is not the case with the FTA or design arguments such as Paley's. Nonetheless, the FTA is persuasive, as a number of atheists have admitted -- giving it as a reason for positing a multiverse.
I've also said that a Multiverse is logically possible -- and more, a possibility worth researching. Also, I would be happy to see a theory that would actually allow us to calculate the fundamental physical constants -- even if it showed they could have different values under different circumstances.
The strength of the FTA lies in the fact that when many improbable means coordinate to effect the same end, it is usually the case that they are intelligently directed to that end. This is the kind of reasoning used in court cases. So it's quite rational, even though not airtight.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, but we do know that whatever the fundamental laws are, they closely approximate the physics we have in its verified realm of application.
Quoting Relativist
For example? As I read it, some of the constants control times that are important mainly, if not exclusively, to biogenesis.
Quoting Relativist
No, Aquinas follows Aristotle in his discussion of essences. Aquinas' treatment of existence goes beyond that of Aristotle.
Quoting Relativist
Aquinas is quite clear that neither essence nor existence are "things." They are just "principles" -- the foundation in reality (objective basis) for saying that a thing is (existence), and what kind of a thing it is (essence). So, if you think that there's an objective basis for saying something exists, you agree with Aquinas that it has "existence," and if you think there's an objective basis for saying you're human and Fido is a dog, then you agree that you and Fido have essences. There is nothing more to essence and existence than that.
Quoting Relativist
No, its not an assumption. Its a couple of definitions based on experience. Things have to exist to act. What does't exist, can't do anything, and what can't do anything is indistinguishable from nothing (non-being). Nothing we encounter in nature can do everything, but if we know what it can do (e.g. walk like a duck, quack like a duck, etc), then we can tell what it is. So, the specification of a things possible acts tells us what it is (its essence).
Quoting Relativist
We know our fundamental facts directly from experience, not indirectly, via proofs. So, if you know your premises from experience, I'm all for them.
Quoting Relativist
What is the specific falsifiable prediction?
Quoting Relativist
The approximate descriptions of the laws of nature exist in our minds. You have already admitted that there are fundamental laws and that we do not fully understand them. Without laws of nature operative in the universe, we have no way of explaining the origin of the cosmos or the evolution of life. Our scientific explanations only work because we grant that the laws we observe now were operative in the past.
Quoting Relativist
I am not saying that they can operate independently of the things they operate on. That would be nonsense. I am saying that we can grasp the existence of laws of nature that are logically distinct from, but physically inseparable form, material states.
In 100 billion million gazillion years, evolution could never "natural selection" a wedding cake with a little plastic bride and groom statue on top.
I'm just a stupid girl and I can do that;
but not even the smartest man on the planet can make a human body or even fully understand it.
There's no way we are "random."
Someone designed us;
and that someone is a genius.
That is all anyone could hope for, but my position is that the alleged persuasive power is a consequence of people failing to see the inherent problems that I've brought up.
I agree with the approach, but disagree with your claim that there is intelligent direction "to that end." This characterization continues the same flawed reasoning by implicitly assuming there is an end (or goal or objective). That is one of my most important points.
Which sidesteps the important issue. The "realm of application" is the universe after Planck time. That's problematic for drawing conclusions about a broader scope - and a multiverse, and the possibility of differing "constants" is a broader scope.
Sandstone and snowflakes, to name two. But keep in mind that if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds - and a multiverse with differing constants is every bit as metaphysically possible as is a God. You can't dismiss multiverse for lack of evidence and then propose a God which also has no evidence.
Aquinas distinguishes between essence (necessary and sufficient properties) and accidents (contingent properties). Consider humans: there are no necessary and sufficient properties for being human - every portion of human DNA is accident. You can define a sortal - i.e. a set of properties that divides up all beings into two sets: human and non-human, and if you only did that with the set of people alive today, you'd have no difficulty. However, try to divide up all living things that have ever lived on earth into human and non-human, and you will unavoidably have to draw an arbitrary boundary. Among the ways one identifies a species is that members of that species can breed and produce another of that species. Consider an ordered set of all your ancestors through the evolutionary past: each generation was the same "species" as the prior generation - able to interbreed. And yet, you are not the same species as your Australopithecus ancestors (as well as a great many other ancestors in the evolutionary chain.
If you treat essence as nothing but a sortal of accidental properties, then Aquinas definition of God goes awry (according to Aquinas, God is a being in whom essence and existence are identical).
I brought up essence just as an example of a metaphysical postulate. Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident. It's coherent, but it is not the only coherent metaphysical paradigm, so one can't claim to have an objective case for something that is based on any particular metaphysical paradigm.
The nature of the things that exist (such as whether they consist of form and substance, or whether they are states of affairs) is not a "fundamental fact" that comes from experience - rather, it is a postulated paradigm - an assumption.
The Loop Quantum Gravity cosmological model is dependent on Loop Quantum Gravity theory being true, which is testable in principle (see this). The Cosmology also predicts observable remnants in the CMB, but will require more precise measurement.
That's not what I asked. I asked if you believe the laws of nature EXIST (not operate) independently of the entities that exhibit them.
Then you can only hope that people will listen. You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.
Quoting Relativist
As I said, I am a determinist in physics. So, there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend. The question is, is the existence of a determinate end evidence of intentionality? If we accept Brentano's analysis of intentionality, it is. The essential characteristic of intentionality is "aboutness." Just as my intention to go to the store is about achieving a state in which I am at the store, so the laws of nature are about the determinate states they give rise to. That means that the laws of nature are "intentional" by Brentano's definition.
If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature. That does not mean that it's a mind just like ours. Clearly, it is not. Still, it is rationally classed as a mind.
Quoting Relativist
I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse. On the other hand, the verified realm of application does include the calculations showing that small variations in the physical constants would preclude life.
Quoting Relativist
Really? I think this requires a bit more argument. The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.
Quoting Relativist
No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence. No consideration of "possible worlds" can add anything to what we actually know. Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.
1. As Claude Shannon pointed out, information is not possibility, but the reduction of possibility.
2. We have know way of knowing if any world is metaphysically possible other than the one world we know to be actual -- for nothing impossible can be actual.
3. Imagining that a "world" is possible is not adequate grounds for concluding that it is possible. Russel and Whitehead imagined that the self-consistency of arithmetic was provable. Goedel showed it was not.
4. Possible worlds don't provide a rational basis for representing propositional probabilities because the density of possible states cannot be objectively defined.
Quoting Relativist
No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, he is seconding Aristotle on that. Some properties that humans have make no difference in there classification as human. You can be tall or short, fair or dark, have red hair or be bald, and still be human. If you agree with this, then you agree that some properties are "accidental" wrt being human.
Quoting Relativist
While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog. All that's necessary is that, as a result of my experiencing you, the concept
Quoting Relativist
No doubt. What does that have to do with anything? I am not saying that our conceptual spaces are predetermined. I am not a Platonist or a Neoplatonist. I don't think you are a person because you participate in an Ideal or because you reflect an exemplar idea in the mind of God. I'm saying that, as a result of experiencing the world around us, we abstract concepts that allow us to make rational judgements. As abstractions, these concepts leave out many notes of intelligibility (lots of data).
Why do we use abstractions? Because our brains can only represent 5-9 "chunks" of information at a time. So, we can't deal with reality in all its complexity. Thus, abstractions (universal ideas) are a "stupid human" trick for reducing the complexity of reality to our limited representations capacity.
God knows all reality exhaustively, so He has no need of the stupid human trick of abstraction, of universal or exemplar ideas. We humans on the other hand, can have different conceptual spaces. For example, Metaphysician Undercover and I have different, but related, concepts we call "truth." 19th century slave owners typically had a concept they called "human" that did not include blacks, while mine does -- and we all know how Nazis thought and think.
Quoting Relativist
Of course, I don't. I sort by what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural.
Quoting Relativist
I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence). So, I can't follow your thinking.
Also, while Aquinas does show that essence and existence are identical in God, I don't recall him using this as a definition.
Quoting Relativist
And I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.
Quoting Relativist
All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.
Quoting Relativist
I'm sorry. First, It is more than "coherent" or self-consistent. It is based on reality, so it can be used to analyze reality.
Second, the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.
If we have many diverse projections of the same reality, we can recover some of the dimensionality lost in each. Combining them gives us a more complete model than any one alone can give.
Quoting Relativist
This is a false dichotomy. We can take the same experience of reality and project it into an Aristotelian conceptual space or one preferred by analytic philosophers. There is nothing about thinking of objects in terms of matter and form, substance and accidents that precludes us thinking of the same experience in terms of sequences of events or states of affairs. This kind of territorial exclusivity is totally irrational -- but typical of modern philosophy.
What is fundamental is our experience of reality in all of its complexity. How we choose to think of it is in no way fundamental. Thinking of it in one way or another makes philosopical problem solving easier or harder in the same way that the choice of coordinate systems makes the mathematics of a physics problem easier or harder.
Quoting Relativist
The laws of nature only exist insofar as they operate to produce order in nature -- as producing order is their essence. So, they are physically inseparable from the matter and fields on which they act. They are, however, logically distinct, and so mentally separable.
That is a very interesting interpretation, although I would like to consider a counter argument.
If you consider the reality of numbers, these are abstractions that can't necessarily be described according to this argument. I'm not going to try and define what number is, as it is still a highly vexed issue. But Platonism in mathematics is the view that abstract objects such as numbers are real independently of any act of thought on our part, but can only be grasped by the mind; ergo, real but immaterial (which is why Platonism poses a conceptual challenge to materialism). That is why Platonism is sometimes categorised as a form of objective idealism (i.e. to differentiate it from the subjective idealism of Berkeley.)
I would argue that one consequence of this, is the ability to arrive at what Kant called the synthetic a priori - 'a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subject—i.e., synthetic—and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experience—i.e., a priori'. So in such cases we're relying on abstractions to make genuinely new discoveries; and the modern history of science has very many examples of just this kind of reasoning (as per Wigner's famous essay). That is because through reason the mind is able to grasp facts that it could never obtain through experience alone; which is why I am dubious about the belief that the grasp of abstractions is something that comes from experience.
In my case, I'm pretty hopeless at mathematics; and no amount of experience will make me an excellent mathematician. Whereas excellent mathematicians are able to see things that I simply cannot; and I don't think this is a matter of experience but of innate intellectual ability. And this ability is, as platonists argue, an insight into a real domain, namely, the domain of mathematical truths, which is not objective, but transcendental in nature.
For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. No belief is held in isolation, and this makes it difficult to judge an argument the same way a non-theist would (even an open-minded agnostic who is open to both God's existence and non-existence). The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs.
BTW, I haven't mentioned my own position. I call myself an "agnostic deist." This means that I consider it possible that there exists some sort of entity that created the world, but it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact. My reason for thinking a "deity" is a distinct possibility is the existence of consciousness - which is difficult to account for under materialism. It actually would have bearing on my position if the FTA were at all convincing. I try to look at it as objectively as I can, although I'd never claim I'm better than anyone else at this.
Interesting perspective, but I have two questions about it:
1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future?
2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it.
There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. This is inconsistent.
Then this removes God from consideration.
Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. You are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. You could use epistemic possibility (as far as we know, there might be a God), or conceptual possibility (God is conceivable, and therefore possible), or broadly logical possibility (God's existence entails no broadly logical contradictions). But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. Clearly, God is not physically possible, so you can't use this.
Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements, planet formation, atmosphere, liquid water on the planet surface, evaporation, a narrow range of atmospheric and surface temperatures, dust in the atmosphere.
Sandstone also requires a planet with certain minerals present, water flowing - and thus the presence of sufficient water so that it will pool and flow, a narrow range of temperature on the surface, and in the atmosphere. Silicon only exists because very large stars previously existed that could fused it and later when supernova. Water itself is dependent on the production of oxygen by stars as well.
Snowflakes and sandstone are probably more prevalent than life in the universe, but their existence is still dependent on prior conditions - conditions whose probability is indeterminable.
More correctly: it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. The only modality in which the possibilities for both God's existence and non-existence can be evaluated is epistemic modality. But a multiverse is also epistemically possible - you admitted this.
The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing.
You're forgetting that my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. I didn't claim it was incoherent. Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. This seems so trivially true, I can't understand why you'd deny it.
No you didn't! You denied the concept is related to DNA, even though you earlier claimed species entailed essential kinds. That is contradictory. Now you've claimed it's not just a sortal of accidental properties, and made the vague assertion "what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural". What exactly does essence refer to? Identify something about dogs that set them apart as an essential kind from wolves, that is not simply the accident of DNA variation.
Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? It is a way to account for the things that exist. Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. I'm not going to argue that Armstrong's account is true and Aquinas is false, because they both account for everything - they are simply different, unproveable paradigms.
What you call a "conceptual space" is what I'm calling a "paradigm" - but other than this, I agree completely. But there's an important corollary: one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. Thomistic metaphysics is popular with theists because it entails a God, but if someone claims this constitutes an objective proof of God's existence, they are ignoring the epistemically contingent nature of the Thomist paradigm.
This is not a philosophical question, but mathematical, since you are trying to find out what is the probability between two options. We can use Bayesian probability method to find the answer.
Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. (Idea of macro evolution in a reality without God is ultimately a random process of creation, or in other words, result of randomness.)
"Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. "
The prior probability of any specific world existing is infinitesmal (not strictly zero) and yet some world would have to exist, since SOMETHING has to exist.
The issue is about probability for created unit of reality to exist. We are created unit of reality, meaning we are created through a process, we don't exist as is in eternity.
With any other potential world, the issue is the same. Was that world created through a process or does that world exist as is in eternity? In any case, though, we exist and we are created. That means that there is practical or an absolute 0% probability that we are created through some random unconscious act of some other prior potential world.
If something has to exists, as you say, that includes possibility for God to exist, not exclusively some undefined world or worlds. And then, just taking into account randomness in our reality, we can conclude that there is practical or an absolute 100% chance that God, conscious creator of our reality, exists, since there's opposite probability that we exist as a result of randomness.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. This is the view that Aristotle shows to be due to confusion in his definition of "quantity" in Metaphysics Delta. There he notes that there are no numbers in the physical world, only discrete realities, which are countable, and extended realities, which are measurable. So, numbers arise as a result of counting and measuring operations.
We teach children numbers by counting various kinds of things. When they realize that counting does not depend on what is being counted, they have abstracted the concept
This does not make the concept of number material, as the concept is result of a mental act (being aware of counting), and not merely a physical operation.
Quoting Wayfarer
Kant was trying to avoid Hume's sound analysis of time-ordered causality as having no intrinsic necessity. Hume's conclusion was well-known to Aristotle. to Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and to Scholastic philosophers who called this kind of causality "accidental." Kant appears to have been ignorant of this tradition and thought that the idea that earlier states necessitate later states was universally accepted and so a synthetic a priori. As far as I can tell, everything we know is a posteriori wrt to the experiences underwriting it, even though if it is applied a priori thereafter.
Of course, there is a truly necessary kind of causality, called "essential causality" by the Scholastics. Aristotle's paradigm case of essential causality is: The builder building the house, which is identical with the house being built by the builder. In time-ordered or accidental causality we are dealing with two separate events, which, being separate, can have no necessary connection. in concurrent or essential causality we have a single event (the builder building the house) which can be distinguished into a cause (the builder building) and an effect (the house being built), which are are necessarily linked by identity.
The failure to grasp this led Kant to postulate a speculative structure that continues to distort philosophy. As accidental causality has no necessity, there is no sound argument for determinism in human choice. As essential causality is intrinsically necessity, Kant's critique of the cosmological argument fails when applied to the forms employed by Aristotle and Aquinas.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that we have diverse talents, but talents are not innate knowledge -- only an ability to deal with knowledge.
I assume you're using "created" in the sense of a contingent being that is the product of causation.
Eternity can simply mean existing at all times, which is consistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and cannot have been created: because for a thing to be created, it had to have not existed prior. There is no "prior" to the existence if time.
I agree it is epistemically possible that god exists - this is just another of the "random" possibilities. I see no basis for claiming a god is more probable than a brute fact that results in our coming into existence. In fact, by your reasoning, it seems that "god" is nothing more than this brute fact that entails our existence.
https://czep.net/weblog/52cards.html
So here is the comparable thought experiment. You come into my house and see me sitting at a table with a deck of cards in front of me. You pick up the cards and begin to turn them over, and they are in order. Ace,2,3 etc all by suit. I give you 2 options of how that happened.
Option 1. I spent the last 10 minutes actively putting them in that order.
Option 2. I randomly shuffled the deck, and they ended that way.
I ask you decide which is a more likely event.
There are only two possibilities here, not a random amount of possibilities. Either process of creation is random or it's not random. And when we observe our world, I think that the only true conclusion is that it's either practically or absolutely impossible that creation of our reality is, ultimately, random, meaning without consciousness that drives the process of creation.
The only consciousness, ultimately, that can drive the process of creation of our reality is God, because that's what God is - eternal conscious creator of our reality. God is the reality, and then God creates a reality. Since God is, by definition, completely conscious from eternity past, meaning God was completely conscious always, God is not a result of randomness. We cannot understand how God can exist for eternity, as is, without creation through some random process of unconscious evolution, but there is no natural law that says that we have to understand everything about reality.
One can argue over God's identity, whether God has this or that characteristic, and make up billion possibilities, but all those possibilities would still be God. We could also make a theory about billion possible universes that randomly existed prior to ours, but all those possibilities would be uncounscious entities, random drivers of creation, and as such there would be practical or absolute 0% chance that any of those possibilities are the ultimate source of our reality.
It is not only possible that God exists. If we take into consideration accepted observations about our reality, God exists with highest certainty. If you don't want to take such consideration, it is still impossible to reasonably come to conclusion that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist.
"The FTA is a probability argument that says what is more likely. For life as we know it to exist the odds of all the requirements happening as the did is astronomical on the orde of 52! "
The problem is that it's post hoc reasoning. Here's another post hoc analysis: you would not exist had your parents not gotten together and produced you. Each of your parents wouldn't exist had their parents not gotten together and so on- back through the generations of both your human and nonhuman ancestors. The odds are extemely low that all those specific pairs of indiviuals would have gotten together and produced the line of offspring that resulted in you. Your existence is therefore extremely unlikely.
The existence of life is similar: post hoc analysis show how unlikely it is, but had life not come to exist, other things would have existed. What's so special about life? It's special to us (just like your existence is special to you), but life (nor you) is not objectively special.
Your analysis depends on the assumption there is something objectively special about life. It's true that the odds are against the existence of life (unless there is a multiverse, which can't be ruled out), but the odds of any specific sort of existent is also extremely low.
I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process.
That means that there is practically or absolutely 100% chance that source of our life is, ultimately, something other than randomness.
One can argue whether opposite to randomness is only God or there are some other possibilities. But I don't see what those other possibilities would be. I think that when we go through the issue, we come to only two possibilities - either randomness or God. Mind you, God here is not identified outside of fundamental meaning for God - eternal conscious creator of our reality.
"I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process."
Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity.
Consider the old claim that monkeys banging away randomly at keyboards would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare. The probability is low that monkeys hitting on keyboards will randomly produce Hamlet, but it is highly probable that they will accidentally produce some words. Imagine randomly selecting sets of words: it is improbable that random collections of words will organize into a play, but less improbable that phrases and then sentences will be produced, and so forth. As long as each stage of increasing complexity is viable, able to exist and be combined, further organization becomes inevitable.
Secondly, for the purposes of FTA it is unimportant if you say we exist because of all these incredibly specific criteria. Or because of all these incredibly specific criteria we exist.
Again, FTA is not an argument that is a proof God exists. It is just taking verifiable observations, and testing those observations against possible hypothesis, and making a judgment on which you find more likely.
It actually doesn't work as a theistic prof, because it is inconsistent with sceptical theism. As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy.
Thank you for the very clear explanation. I am not entirely persuaded by it, but it's given me a much better idea of the problem, and also where to look for further reflection on it.
Quoting Relativist
I think it's highly unlikely that they would produce anything at all unless they were trained to perform the action of pressing keys on the keyboard - which would undermine the point of the experiment. Otherwise there would be no reason why a chimp would perform any action whatever. Even then, the chance of them even producing a word would be very small.
You might just as well say: create an algorithm which produces random strings of alphabetical characters and then set it to run indefinitely. I can envisage such an algorithm running for millions of years without it producing a single phrase, let alone an entire play.
Quoting Henri
There is a terminological issue which is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether God exists; which is whether the very word 'exists' is correct in respect of God in the first place. That is dealt with by the use of analogical language in Aquinas - that the manner of the existence of God is different from the manner of the existence of humans. So to say that 'God exists' is to reduce God to the level of phenomena; a point that was central to the theology of Paul Tillich.
' "Existence" refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy and heteronomy abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from, yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite' Therefore existence is estrangement.'
All that said, I agree with the comments in this thread that the 'fine-tuning argument' doesn't constitute a proof of God, as I don't think it is something that can ever be proven. But it is 'evidentiary' i.e.suggestive. The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness.
You are missing my point. There's a tendency to incredulouly look at life as magically appearing from primitive substances. But this overlooks the development of increasing complexity. So while it is highly unlikely that a living creature would come to exist from random processes applying to simple things, it is not unlikely for something more complex to arise from something that is somewhat less complex.
"The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness."
Hardly. Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse? My impression is that theists jump to the conclusion they already "knew" to be correct, while dismissing all alternatives. Earlier, someone said "yeah, but there's no evidence of a multiverse" - and yet they have no problem suggesting the answer is something else that lacks evidence: God.
"As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy."
It reflects bias to dismiss one possibility due to lack of evidence, while embracing another that also lacks evidence. So it would be poor reasoning for an atheist to claim there must be a multiverse, and equally unreasonable to claim it must be God. We should therefore agree that both are possible, as far as we know. Right?
And I think the counter to that is for anything to emerge, there has to be at least some order. Given that there is some order, then all kinds of things are possible. But if there were really no order, then the appearance of order would indeed be magical. And the point of the fine-tuning argument, as far as I understand it, is that the order that is observed in the Universe ultimately derives from a very small number of fundamental constraints - 'just six numbers', as has been said. So a natural theologian will always be able to argue that these constraints are pre-sets - and science really has no counter to that, as it's not a matter for science. Science can't get behind the order of nature, it can only theorise on the basis of the order that already exists.
Here's an interesting story. 'Big Bang' theory was originally developed by Georges Lemaître, a physicist who happened to be a Catholic priest. He first published it in an obscure journal and it didn't get a lot of attention. But as people began to take notice, there was a lot of push-back because it sounded too much like 'creation ex nihilo'. 'by 1951, Pope Pius XII declared that Lemaître's theory provided a scientific validation for Catholicism. However, Lemaître resented the Pope's proclamation, stating that the theory was neutral and there was neither a connection nor a contradiction between his religion and his theory. Lemaître and Daniel O'Connell, the Pope's scientific advisor, persuaded the Pope not to mention Creationism publicly, and to stop making proclamations about cosmology. While a devout Roman Catholic, he opposed mixing science with religion, although he held that the two fields were not in conflict' (Wikipedia).
I also noticed recently that Vera Rubin, the brilliant but under-rated cosmologist who first floated the idea of 'dark matter', 'was Jewish, and saw no conflict between science and religion. In an interview, she stated: "In my own life, my science and my religion are separate. I'm Jewish, and so religion to me is a kind of moral code and a kind of history. I try to do my science in a moral way, and, I believe that, ideally, science should be looked upon as something that helps us understand our role in the universe." (Wikipedia).
So in both these cases, here are religiously-minded scientists, who nevertheless have no wish or desire to argue the case for their faith on the basis of their scientific work, and also see no conflict between them. Whereas popular modern atheism is nearly always rooted in the argument that there is an inevitable and real conflict between science and religion - that it's either one or the other. But this is mainly based on a misunderstanding, which is the subject of a book by Karen Armstrong, The Case for God - not a Christian apologetics book but an analysis of the different 'ways of knowing' represented by 'mythos and logos', and how this distinction became lost in the early modern natural philosophy.
Quoting Relativist
No, but I do suspect that those terms are essentially meaningless in this context.
As I said in the comment above this one, 'existence' is the wrong term for 'God'. Even if 'God' is real then God is not 'something that exists' in the sense that you're naturally inclined to understand by the term 'existence'. There is not anything 'out there' that answers to the name. This is the meaning of 'transcendent'.
As for 'lacking evidence' - this is really based on the question 'how can theists believe in "something invisible"? You know, the fairy-at-the-bottom-of-the-garden, the flying spaghetti monster, and all the other memes of Internet atheism. The point is, again, 'God' is not one term in an empirical hypothesis, not a cause in the sense that fire is the cause of heat or water the cause of rust. So, an appropriate theistic answer to the question of what evidence there is for God, is the fact of existence - that God is the reason that anything exists whatever. Not up there in some design lab, fashioning beetle wings or bacterium flagella, which again, is an unfortunate consequence of early modern natural philosophy.
From Terry Eagleton's review of The God Delusion; and Eagleton is also not a religious apologist, but a British leftist literary critic.
The long and short is, that for anyone who doesn't accept the literal truth of biblical creationism, the fact that it's not literally true doesn't add up to much of an argument for anything, other than personal conviction.
I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis. The only facts in it are the observations. We exist, these are the physical conditions that allow us to exist. It is just a question of does that system of events is designed is more or less probable than they were random, or some other explanation.
The usual argument is whether there is any degree of freedom or chance involved in the universe and to that I would argue the preponderance of evidence in modern science including quantum mechanics is there are degrees of freedom and unpredictability albeit quite small.
"The difference between no freedom and a little freedom is all the difference in the world" Charles Hartshorne process philosopher
Whether one attributes the order in the world or even existence itself to chance or to some concept of "God" does not seem a scientific question at all.
"I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis"
Do you understand that it is still an argument intended to persuade someone that God exists? Arguments needn't be deductive to do this. The FTA is presented as an abductive argument- an inference to the best explanation. God is an explanatory hypothesis, offered to explain "fine tuning". That is a reasonable approach, but to be persuasive it must be shown to be a better explanation than alternatives. In this case, an alternative is a multiverse. Of course, if you approach it with the prior belief that God exists - you will see no need to look further. I have no objection to that. But if you are going to claim this has some power of persuasion, you have to show why it's a better explanation.
The best explanation for the order is the existence of laws of nature.
That is not correct. The FTA is based on the obsevation that life as we know it would not exist had the constants been different.
Then you should agree that the FTA has no persuasive power.
This seems a nuance one might consider after deciding there is a God.
That's great rationalization for the absence of evidence for a God if he exists, but it doesn't provide a reason to think God, rather than (for example) multiverse is the reason for the alleged fine tuning for someone who is open to both possibilities (God's existence and nonexistence).
Regarding Dawkins: I have no interest in discussing his polemics.
The point is, if God does exist, then the kind of difference it makes might really matter. I mean, I'm not a church-going type, but have nevertheless had Bible readings at my son's wedding and do reflect on what they mean. The whole Judeo-Christian heritage has become the focus of much of the philosophy of the Western tradition, and it's more than just a physics theory, or an internet argument for that matter. It's a basis for ethics and indeed the basis of Western civilization up till now. Whereas science as such doesn't and cannot provide a basis for values in that its concern is wholly and solely with quantitative data; bracketing out 'values' is part of its methodology.
Furthermore scientists can't even agree on whether 'the multiverse' is a legitimate theory at all. There is a huge controversy raging over this very point, which was kicked off by an OP in Nature called defending the integrity of physics. This article notes that the very idea of falsifiability is being called into question by string theory advocates. And the critics of these speculative metaphysical models say it makes no testable predictions and may never be either validated or falsified. Whereas, there are indeed first-person methods for ascertaining the truth-claims of religion.
One of the authors of the above OP also wrote a Scientific American cover story about 'the multiverse', DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. It includes among the 'questionable arguments for the multiverse' this:
Don't you think there is at least a slight inconsistency in declaring speculative model of trillions of universes a 'tidy explanation' for anything at all? It seems more like desperation to me.
But, I do agree it's a pointless debate, because it really does come down to dispositions. Some people have a religious or spiritual outlook on life, and some do not, and that is very rarely changed by discussion and debate.
Notice that in his conclusion, Ellis says:
"Nothing is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it "
i do not claim belief in God is irrational, but I do think many of the arguments for God's existence (including the FTA) are problematic. It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation.
That said, it can still be reasonable for a theist to look at fine tuning as the point at which God's hand in our existence can be seen. But recognize that this interpretation follows from a belief in God, it doesn't establish such a belief.
The logical conclusion to make, exclusively based on probability, is that life is not the result of random process because God created it.
If you want to claim that "life is not not the result of random process" in a reality with no conscious creator of that life, no God, then that's absolutely not true. In such case life is absolutely the result of, ultimately, randomness.
In order to set one level of complexity, random materials are randomly working with other random materials, through randomly set "laws of nature", with the probability for that random process to result in a new, more complex and consistent unit of reality being near 0% or an absolute 0%. If it is even possible that new, more complex and consistent unit of reality comes into existence this way, that unit of reality now faces even greater hurdle of fighting the odds that newer, even more complex unit of reality will come out of it, through the next cycle of randomness.
With each next stage the already impossible odds diminish even more, exponentially.
When we get to a human, a highly complex being with highly complex consciousness, odds that such being came into existence through history of practically innumerable stages of gradual increases in complexity, driven by randomness, is practically or absolutely 0%.
There are various basic problems with the idea of macro evolution in a reality without God.
For example, we haven't observed a single case where a non-human being evolved into a human or other being with 100% observable and demonstrable human-like consciousness and abilities that result from that level of consciousness. So, based on our observations, nobody can claim that such feat has to be possible. In other words, not only is there a small chance for it to happen, it actually might not be even possible. The only way to claim that it has to be possible is to assume 100% chance that creator of our reality doesn't exist, but that's extremely bad assumption, because it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist.
Or the whole idea of "natural selection", for example. "Nature" doesn't consciously select anything, so the term is either directly or indirectly intended to deceive. But not only doesn't nature select things, natural environments themselves are an unconscious result of previous random processes (in a reality without God).
Much more importantly, what's ill labeled as "natural selection" is, within macro evolution paradigm, only a consequence of observable law of our reality which says - randomness produces new, more complex units of reality at the rate of near or an absolute 0%. The consequence of this law is that most random connections are either failures or status quo. Hence, "natural selection". Since it's a consequence of the nature of assumed possible change, it's not a driver of said change. As such, it is not a factor that should be taken into account, in any capacity, to explain the existence of change. In other words, what's deceptively labeled "natural selection" can only, theoretically, show the rate of proposed change, not the change itself.
I get your point. What do you propose as solution? If not to say "God exists", what to say then? Maybe I missed it in your post...
Clearly, it does. To quote mathematician and astronomer Bernard Carr, "If you don't want God, you better have a multiverse!" This shows both the persuasive power of the FTA and the shabby motivation for positing a multiverse.
Quoting Relativist
Of course I hold related positions. However, I'm not relying on the fact that i can prove the existence of God in a number of sound ways to judge the FTA. Examine the arguments I gave, and you will find no such dependence. Further, I reject a number of arguments for the existence of God as both unsound and as making bad cases, e.g. the Kalam cosmological argument and Anselm's ontological argument. So, please avoid red herrings and stick to my actual reasoning.
Quoting Relativist
Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation. If you start allowing exceptions to this principle, science becomes impossible. Imagine Antoine Henri Becquerel presenting his discovery of radiation at a scientific conference. He says that the image of a key appeared on a photographic plate kept in his drawer with a sample of pitchblende, and concludes that it is caused by a new aspect of reality, which he is calling "radiation." Someone in the back of the hall stands up and says, "But, my dear Professor, this may be one of those phenomena that has no explanation -- a brute fact." What is Becquerel to say but, "All phenomena have an adequate cause. The idea of brute facts est tout simplement fou!"
Quoting Relativist
As I tried to indicate in my original statement, "final state" is a term of art in physics. It need not, and generally does not, name what happens at the "end of time" or infinitely far in the future, but only the state at the end of the process we're considering. In the same way, my arrival at the store is not the end of intentional guidance in my life, but only the end of the segment we're considering.
Quoting Relativist
I did not use the existence of God as a premise in arguing that the laws of nature exhibit intentionality. If you read what I wrote, I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness.
So, we distinguish aspects of reality into those possessing "aboutness" and those not possessing "aboutness." A stone is not about anything. It doesn't "point" to anything beyond itself -- it's just a stone. An idea is about its real and potential instances. A commitment is about what we commit to.
Quoting Relativist
Right -- if by "scientific" you mean "in the purview natural science." As I said in another post, (1) the fundamental abstraction of natural science leaves it bereft of data on intentionality, and (2) no science proves its own premises. Examining the foundations of physics belongs to metaphysics, just as examining the foundations of arithmetic belongs to metamathematics. It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.
Quoting Relativist
1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.
2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.
3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility.
Quoting Relativist
No, it does not. The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration.
More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God. I give one in my video: #15 God & Scientific Explanation - Existence Proof (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJUIxaSDfU0). I provide a more formal proof in the appendix of my book, God, Science and Mind: The Irrationality of Naturalism.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, it is. Nonetheless, it's ill-defined and lacks an adequate epistemic foundation.
Quoting Relativist
I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, but since we can show that God existsl, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.
Quoting Relativist
I do. I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God.
Quoting Relativist
The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.
Quoting Relativist
For some people; nonetheless, it is metaphysically certain that God exists and is metaphysically necessary.
Quoting Relativist
"Primitive" is not an objection, but a term of irrational derision. The relevant question is, is there an objective basis for the fact that you evoke my concept
Quoting Relativist
Our nature is not "an accident" in the sense of being random. Physics sees all unobserved processes (including the evolution of species) as fully deterministic -- not random.
On the other hand, if you're opposing "accident" to "substance," these are not opposing concepts. Aristotle defines a substance (ousia) as an ostensible unity -- a whole we can point out. Your whole being includes all of your "accidents" -- all of the things that can be said of you -- your height weight, hair color, genetic code, etc., etc.
Finally, whatever our genesis or mode of analysis, it is an experiential fact that billions of individuals have the objective capacity to evoke the concept
Quoting Relativist
It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept
Quoting Relativist
Thank you for sharing your faith.
Quoting Relativist
You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept
As I have also said, there is nothing predetermined about our concepts. They arise from our individual and cultural experience. So, it might well be that some people's concept
Quoting Relativist
It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.
Quoting Relativist
I have already agreed that we may project the same reality into different conceptual spaces. So if you want to project reality into the conceptual space of physics, interpersonal dynamics, networks of events, sequences of states of affairs, etc., etc, I say go for it. I don't see that any conceptual space, including those of Aristotle or Aquinas is "complete," i.e. capable of exhaustively spanning human experience.
I do demand, however, that whatever conceptual space we use, it has a foundation in reality. That it's not the result of speculative postulation a la Kant's transcendental idealism.
Quoting Relativist
Conceptual spaces are like vocabularies. Vocabularies are not true or false, though they may be more or less adequate to expressing what we know is true or false.
What is properly true or false is judgements we make about reality, and the propositions that express those judgements. Whenever we prove anything, we need unproven premises as starting points. Still, "unproven" need not mean "unknown." We can know some truths directly, by reflecting on experience. And we can show other people their truth by leading them to look at their corresponding experiences in a similar way.
So, we can have a structured knowledge that is not merely possible, but known to be true -- but only if we are open to reality.
I am addressing the argument from incredulity that arises from considering only the two endpoints: the quantum fields (as an example of what may be fundamental) and the existence of conscious life. It's hard to imagine how life could have just "happened" from random behavior of quantum fields. However, if one considers the natural processes that give rise to increasing complexity, it's not so incredible after all.
Laws of nature are not "randomly set, " they just are what they are, although they may manifest themselves differently depending on the context.
A metaphysical investigation should start with what we know (in the loose sense of "know"), and we know that there are laws of nature. There is nothing impossible, or even surprising, about the fact that these laws of nature (as we know them) led to the existence of complex, functional entities. Hydrogen is more complex than the quantized quark and electron fields from which it arises. Stars are more complex than the hydrogen of which they are mostly composed. The heavy elements produced by novae are more complex than the lighter elements that fuse to form them. Planets are more complex than the individual elements that coalesce into them. ... No laws of nature are broken anywhere in the chain, and yet complex functional units arise. And it's wrong to call this a product of randomness - because they occur as a consequence of the laws of nature.
You're going from a bad argument to a worse one. I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed.
You don't have to engage. You still don't have any good argument for your position.
Again, it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That can be the starting point in understanding anything else.
You presume that because small change within a unit of reality is observable (skin color, for example), an undefined high degree of change must be possible (one that includes going from non-life to human life as the idea of macro evolution states, for example). That's not logically correct. I could use the same "argument" as yours - you are going from a bad argument to a worse one, and I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed - and at least it wouldn't be empty.
By the way, laws of nature are certainly randomly set, if they weren't set by conscious creator. That's the definition of random. You can't explain reality with "it is what it is" as an argument.
'Is' might suffice ;-)
Your wording is loose. The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. This is abductive reasoning, specifically: inference to the best explanation. A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives.
If there's a God, it's reasonable to infer that the "finely tuned" constants may be an act of intentionality by God. But if there's no God, there are two sub-possibilities: 1) there are many universes, each with different constants, so it's reasonable to expect some would be life permitting. 2) life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance.
Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. With regard to #2, the only response I've noticed is your claim that life entails a coincidence - but you haven't specified anything that life is coincident with.
Assertion without evidence. You quoted Carr, but all he does is to put the God hypothesis on par with multiverse - indicating both are metaphysical claims. Carr hasn't even considered #2, so I'll give you another quote:
“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams)
Every phenomenon is explainable because there is natural law. How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact.
All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives.
That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God.
You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot.
The persuasiveness of your claim is similar as Johnny Cochran's persuasive case for O.J.'s innocence: convince the jury to ignore the full picture. "if the glove does not fit, you must acquit"; "God provides an answer, so look no further." Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented.
I have no idea what you're talking about.
Perhaps there are, but we're discussing the failure of the FTA specifically.
Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science is equivalent to saying the multiverse is (narrowly) physically impossible (a modal claim). Then you proceed to claim this makes a persuasive case for the God hypothesis, despite God also being physically impossible (your solution must be implicitly "possible" to be considered, but clearly it's not the same modality of possibility). I admit you hadn't couched it in these terms, so I'm happy to rephrase the error as a special pleading if you prefer.
We can show God exists?! Are you referring to some other, unstated argument? I'd be happy to discuss these at some point, but let's first complete our FTA discussion, and clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence - that would be circular. We have to approach it abductively, but then you need to meet the challenge of comparing it to the 2 "not-God" hypotheses.
That would be interesting to discuss, but I'm discussing an evaluation of the FTA without presumption - and it is presumptive to assume God exists when approaching the FTA. If you're willing to agree the FTA fails such an evaluation, then we can move on to the evidence you have for God outside the FTA.
Regarding snowflakes: snow and liquid water are not in the form of individual snowflakes any more than humans are just a hodgepodge of water and hydrocarbons. Regarding sandstone: Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae; quartz (silica) particles are the predominant mineral in standstone, but the quartz has been particalized and compacted over time- which depends on a series of activities and environments.
It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out.
I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption.
If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed.
The postulates are well thought out, but they are postulates nonetheless. Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. See what I mean about assumptions?
You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does.
The point is, scientific methodology has one golden claim: that what it does, works. Stick this electrode on this plate, and bingo, copper sulphate - or whatever. And Ellis' contention is that, while there may be nothing the matter with the 'scientifically-informed speculation' arising from string theory, it's not actually science. So here you've given up the one thing that actually distinguishes science, and then asking of the resulting argument 'well, how is that any different from a religious metaphysic?'
And there is actually an answer to this, which is that religious faiths make demands. There is an element of validation required, which is you have to have enough faith in the doctrine, to commit yourself to it. Then it's not simply empty arguments or word-games. To those with skin in the game, the fact of the matter, matters.
So the fact that the most non-scientific aspect of current science, namely, the speculation of 'billions of unknowable universes' is said to be a counter-argument against having to go to the bother of seriously considering any metaphysical claims, suggests a failure of the imagination, at the very least.
You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.
also there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers. What I find interesting is those who support the multi universe often do not appreciate that all they are doing is elevating science to a religion.
They prefer that hypothesis simply as a matter of faith. There really is no difference in believing the multi-universe as a matter of faith in science, or believing in God as designer as a matter of theistic faith.
Your point on a theistic bias is exactly the same thing as those with a scientific bias.
Let me update the deck of cards thought experiment and look forward to your response:
You walk in and find me sitting at a desk with a deck of cards in front of me.
You pick up the cards and begin turning them over, and see they are in order ace, 2,3 etc and according to suit.
I give you 3 possible explanations and ask you which is most probable:
1. I have spent the last 15 minutes putting them in order
2. I have just finished shuffling them and that is the order it ended in
3. there are an infinite number of other me's and you's and desks and decks of cards
and in that infinite set, there is one deck that randomly is in order, and that is
the one we happen to be conscience of.
You are conflating science with physicalism (as a metaphysical theory). A physicalist believes that only physical things exist, and this is based on the observation that every aspect of the world is explainable in physicalist terms, and that the physical sciences are the means for exploring the nature of what exists. A physicalist will ask: why assume immaterial things exist, if reality is fully describable in physicsl terms? It violates the principle of parsimony.
Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. I have raised two objections that no one has refuted. You seem to accept my objection about the multiverse. I needn't show that multiverse is more likely than God, just that it is equally likely.
Agreed, but consider the implication. The hypothetical open-minded agnostic approaches the argument on the fence, neither affirming nor denying God's existence. If the argument is consistent with both his existence and non-existence, then it doesn't shift his position.
there is no truth claim being made by the FTA, just an assignment on one's belief on the relative probabilities of differing hypothesis on some observed data. There is no more need for the theist to support his belief in a designer than the atheist/agnostic need to support their belief in randomness or other non designer alternatives.
You walk in and find me sitting at a desk with a deck of cards in front of me.
You pick up the cards and begin turning them over, and see they are in order ace, 2,3 etc and according to suit.
I give you 3 possible explanations and ask you which is most probable:
1. I have spent the last 15 minutes putting them in order
2. I have just finished shuffling them and that is the order it ended in
3. there are an infinite number of other me's and you's and desks and decks of cards
and in that infinite set, there is one deck that randomly is in order, and that is
the one we happen to be conscience of.
No, I'm stating a fact. It is absolutely impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That fact has nothing to do with the Fine tuning argument, so I don't know why you mentioned it in reply to me.
Anyhow, anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).
From that irrationality other mistakes follow, including ones you presented in this thread.
We must not be referring to the same thing. I'm referring to arguments like this:
1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.
The conclusion is presented as a truth claim, one deduced from the premises. The premises are also truth claims. I have seen arguments like this presented as a reason to believe God (a designer) exists.
This is the sort of argument I am refuting.
My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. It's tempting to base it on the principle of indifference, but that has a major flaw.
1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely -
What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.
for a way better explanation see this:
http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/FINETLAY.HTM
http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Modern%20Cosmology%20in%20Philosophical%20and%20Theological%20Perspective.pdf
more information on his site on this than any or us need
[Quote]
1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely.
What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.[/quote]
That is equivalent to saying:
The probability of (life given design) >probability of (life given no design)
Let's analyze the reasoning.
1. Every metaphysically possible world entails some type of existent (E) whose existence depends on the properties of that world - irrespective of whether that world is designed or exists by chance.
2. The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)
Conclusion 2 seems a truism, but does not imply there was design, because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance.
I looked at the linked paper, and confirmed it does not address this objection. It treats observers in a privileged way.
yet again, i think the point you continue to miss in your objection, and why it is not addressed in the formal argument, is you continue to revert to the conclusion
The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)
as some truth statement to the effect - therefor there is a designer. That is not the argument. The argument in total is:
The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design) - that is all. It is not a proof of any truth statement - just an argument that design is a more likely hypothesis than others. It demands no proof or completeness of hypothesis from any of the alternatives.
the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.
OK, but then the statement, "The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)" is vacuous. I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what?
I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged. In any world, something will exist, and the a priori probability that it would exist is infinitesmal. Yet, something must exist.
Consider a lottery: what is low probability is that a chosen number will match what is drawn - this entails a coincidence, two sets of numbers coinciding. Sentient life has no prior thing that it is coinciding with. It is just something that happens to exists.
I don't think that is a valid argument. It would be if the argument went I looked at 1 million grains of sand, they all had the exact same irregular shape, therefor it is more probable that they are designed.
it is the only observation the FTA addresses. Your point here is just another way of saying life as we know it is a random event. It is just saying if the criteria were changed some other form of live could have been, but it didn't so we have this one. That is just the random argument said differently.
Or conversely the multi universe argument that there are an infinite number of different types of life - we are just aware of this one.
In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence. For example, in positing the inverse square law of gravity, Newton fit a hypothesis to facts such as the relative accuracy of Kepler's laws. Those facts were evidence supporting his gravitational hypothesis.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, if there are other, viable hypotheses, it is rational to compare them.
Newton did not do this in the Principia. In point of fact, Newton's theory, while simpler than Ptolemy's, was inferior in predictive power and continued to be less accurate for over 100 years after its publication.
I am not sure what relevance this has. I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions. You mentioned predictions made by a version of the theory, but if these don't pan out, that wouln't falsify the idea of a multiverse. Supporters would say only one version was falsified -- not the basic idea.
Quoting Relativist
You seem not to understand how an argumentum signum quia works. It does not begin by hypothesizing its conclusion. Rather, it argues that certain facts (here, the fine tuning of various constants in the manner required to produce life) are signs of the operation of some cause (here, the intelligent direction of nature). The way to a attack this line of reasoning is not to attack the conclusion -- because it is not a premise -- but to attack the significance of the relevant facts. You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say. You have made some arguments to this effect. This is not one.
Quoting Relativist
The FTA is not a physics argument, even though it uses physics as support. Physics concerns itself neither with intelligent vs non-intelligent causality. On the other hand, the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.
Quoting Relativist
We have abundant evidence. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.
Quoting Relativist
I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." Since the physics of unobserved processes is deterministic, if you think that biogenesis and evolution are physical processes (as I do) then they are not random, but determinate. As I have argued in a number of places, including my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" paper, the laws of nature are a species of intentionality. If life is the determinate result of intentional operations, who can it be "accidental"?
Quoting Relativist
For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.
Quoting Relativist
Quoting Relativist
When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply. For now, I merely observe that purely mental constructs (assumptions) can't operate to produce real phenomena -- only causes operative in reality can.
Quoting Relativist
First, I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe. Second, just because a fact is fundamental in a particular theory does not mean that it has no cause in reality.
Quoting Relativist
No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.
to be continued
Quoting Relativist
Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.
Your argument is like saying that since Russell and Whitehead assumed that arithmetic could be reduced to logic (which Gödel showed to be false), all metamathematics is based on assumption.
Quoting Relativist
Right, I have not. It is irrelevant to the discussion of the merits of the FTA that other, more cogent arguments exist. Still, my statement is relevant to your claim that our knowledge of the existence of God rests on possibility instead of actuality.
Quoting Relativist
I have. I showed:
(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.
(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.
(3) That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).
Quoting Relativist
What I am talking about is that Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, defined "information" as the reduction of possibility. For example, in a binary message each bit we receive reduces the possible messages by half. Thus possibility is not information.
Quoting Relativist
I have not done that. I explicitly said a Multiverse is logically possible. I also gave this possibility as one reason the FTA is not a proof. I did say that the FTA is supported by accepted heuristics, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.
Quoting Relativist
Yes.
Quoting Relativist
I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA. One can examine the merits of an argument whether or not one agrees with its conclusion. Some arguments are sound, some not. Some conform to accepted heuristics, others do not. Some are taken as serious threats by opponents, others aren't.
If we were debating the existence of God, I would rely on sound arguments, not the FTA.
Quoting Relativist
"Fusion processes create many of the lighter elements up to and including iron and nickel, and these elements are ejected into space (the interstellar medium) when smaller stars shed their outer envelopes and become smaller stars known as white dwarfs. The remains of their ejected mass form the planetary nebulae observable throughout our galaxy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nucleosynthesis.
Thus, large stars and novae are not needed.
Quoting Relativist
I don't see any confusion in deciding which present day creatures are human. So, all of those people have the objective capacity to evoke the concept
As I said before, if I lived in a different time or culture, I might have a different
If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept
Quoting Relativist
That's like saying that I must show that Trump usually tells the truth to show that there are people who usually tell the truth.
Quoting Relativist
This is utter nonsense. I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data.
Quoting Relativist
So Armstrong agrees with Aristotle's discussion of substance and accidents -- as do most medieval Scholastics and modern Aristotelians.
So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?
Quoting Relativist
Definitions are not assumptions. They simply tell others how you are using words.
Quoting Relativist
You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality. It did not work for St. Anselm, and it does not work here.
I agree with this, but the point is that those same facts serve as evidence for each of the hypotheses to be considered. However your next statement is problematic:
It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis.
I've done that, by providing alternative hypotheses that explain the facts.
Wrong. Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis. You are overhasty in dismissing it as a physical hypothesis, and you fail to take it into consideration as metaphysical hypothesis.
Defense of the Multiverse Physical hypothesis:
1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground.
2. There are valid scientific reasons to believe there is multiverse, for example : multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation (which is widely accepted science). (see this). Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. These hypotheses are consistent with established physics; they simply assume there's a more fundamental basis for the laws of physics as we know them.
Defense of the Multiverse Metaphysical Hypothesis:
Multiverse is conceptually possible, it is consistent with a variety of physical models of physical reality, consistent with physicalist metaphysics, and it has explanatory value. Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis, even if one were to reject it as a valid scientific hypothesis due to some presumed methodological restriction (as you do).
Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, and this again betrays your special pleading in exempting the designer-hypothesis from this methodological criterion.
This is a key point that deserves more discussion. Obviously, we all value human life - it's human nature to do so. And this explain why many people uncritically accept the FTA (and hence, its persuasive power is due to a lack of imagination in challenging a questionable assumption) - it seems to us that human life is special. The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. Holding human life to be of value obviously has a survival value, and so our having this value is consistent with natural selection and doesn't depend on there being an objective truth that we're (magically) grasping.
I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended".
You're missing the point: the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it.
You're changing the subject. I was pointing out that a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, because accounting for the existence of natural law is in the realm of metaphysics (science just investigates what actual natural laws exist).
Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". Logical priority pertains to epistemic investigation of propositions that are about reality, and hence it has no bearing on what actually exists. Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon.
You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. But I inferred that you were claiming the "finely tuned" constants entail intentionality, and I'm pointing out that this is a presumption - or just an alternate way of presenting the fine-tuning hypothesis. Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God. So this doesn't in any way support your case, it's just another way of stating it.
A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete, but it certainly does depend on speculation and assumptions. Consider a nominalist metaphysics: it's the product of sound reflection and analysis, and it can account for everything that exists, but it is founded on the assumption that universals do not exist. An assumption of universals existence/non-existence is not an arbitrary assumption - it takes a great deal of analysis to convince oneself either way, but clearly these are pivotal to a metaphysical system and their existence can be neither firmly proven nor firmly disproven.
The facts presented in evidence for the fine-tuning also serve as evidence for a metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. That's why I've said we have to consider this an "inference to best explanation."
Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. We could debate how many assumptions are entailed by multiverse vs God, but I doubt we'd ever find common ground.
Special pleading: failing to apply consistent criteria to the various possible explanations.
IF we choose to consider life as something objectively special (which you have not shown), then we need to account for fine-tuning. We've discussed two metaphysical hypotheses that can account for it: 1) God; 2) multiverse. Neither is falsifiable; neither is entailed by established physics - although multiverse is consistent with established physics while God is not.
Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. However, it doesn't even apply to the physical: all physical hypotheses are consistent with that framework, it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR.
Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer).
We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. Each generation was capable of breeding with the prior generation (and many generations back), throughout evolutionary history, so any criteria that might be developed will necessarily draw an arbitrary line. Each change that has occurred in evolutionary history is an accident, and therefore every property that exists in humans today is accident -there is therefore nothing to distinguish an accidental property from an essential property.
All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters.
It is a postulate (which is an assumption) that has explanatory scope and is consistent with physicalism. These relations are also universals. It's used to account for the observed regularity in the world which could also be accounted for through trope-like behavior that a nominalist metaphysics might have).
That is my point. One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. Both are developed consistent with observed reality through contemplation and analysis. Both are coherent. The one that concludes "God" is basically "defining itself a conclusion about reality."
No, it does not. The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction. We have many examples of coordinated means signifying intelligent direction. Thus, the FTA is an argumentum signum quia -- an accepted form of heuristic reasoning. It is used, for example, by Forest Service look-outs when they call in fires after seeing smoke.
On the other hand, the Multiverse hypothesis, which pretends to be "scientific" violates fundamental canons of the scientific method. There is no experiential basis for taking life as a sign of the existence of a myriad of unobservable physical objects.
Quoting Relativist
Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable. The falsifiability requirement is methodological, not discipline-specific. Unless hypotheses have testable predictions, there is no epistic point in deducing their consequences -- so instead of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, we have hypothetical reasoning -- the kind of "reasoning" used by conspiracy theorists.
Quoting Relativist
As I said, this is not an analogous case.
Quoting Relativist
Of course it does. As Freud points out in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science. Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.
Some As require a B.
This is an A.
Therefore, this requires a B.
Is an obviously invalid line of reasoning.
Quoting Relativist
Baloney! Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.
Quoting Relativist
This is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.
Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way,
Quoting Relativist
I think I did, but if you'd like a more detailed argument, look at my discussion of "Logical Propagators" in "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution) (pp. 5f in the on-line version).
Quoting Relativist
Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.
Quoting Relativist
First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.
Quoting Relativist
There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.
Quoting Relativist
No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.
Quoting Relativist
This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."
Quoting Relativist
Conceptual possibility is utterly worthless. It does not even entail logical possibility. In the late 19th century it was conceptually possible to reduce arithmetic to logic. Goedel showed it was logically impossible.
Quoting Relativist
As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.
Quoting Relativist
False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.
Quoting Relativist
It is "special" because as humans (which we all are), it has, objectively, a special relevance.to us.
Quoting Relativist
As I pointed out in my last post
The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.
Quoting Relativist
OK, then it's begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments (such as Aquinas's 5th way, Paley's argument from design, the FTA and my discussion of Mind in evolution).
Quoting Relativist
No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.
I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.
Quoting Relativist
Since reality cannot instantiate contradictions, grounding metaphysics in the experience of reality guarantees its consistency. The notion of a "complete" science is the result of self-delusion.
The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution. Any and all a priori assumptions close the mind to reality. (if you're interested in my take on universals, see my video "#46 The Problem of Universals" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7l2SSENSKvA)).
Quoting Relativist
No, the Principle of Parsimony tells us to favor the explanation with the fewest assumptions. The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.
Quoting Relativist
Right, because the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.
Quoting Relativist
The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.
Quoting Relativist
We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion. I may agree with the conclusion of an argument, but still judge it to be unsound (as I do with Anselem's Ontological Argument) or not a proof, but conforming to accepted heuristics as I do with the FTA. What an argument aims to prove is irrelevant to the formal question of its merit.
Quoting Relativist
1. What is said was that "I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data." I did not say that I actually do, or even can, have such a set of criteria.
2. Any criteria we may devise will not be "arbitrary." They will reflect objective commonalities actually observed in our (historically conditioned) experience. They will reflect them in a way that we deem relevant to our situation.
Quoting Relativist
I never said that there was agreement "on all matters." That would be ridiculous. Some issues are quite difficult, but over time, we develop more understanding.
Quoting Relativist
Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.
Your reasoning assumes the existence of time. How about block-time theory? In it time does not exist prior to physical reality, the existence of which you also assume, so there can be no random chance for anything to be made before there is something. Neither can anything be designed however before there is something to design anything.
In response to the time factor and how we continue living the same lives over and over, this is pressing. It would make sense that time is something we have conceived to give us a sense of life; however, what if we’re stuck in an infinite time loop. (In this case infinity would be given meaning) We live an infinite life but at different moments. So as you stated, we just continue living the same life over and over again and this is why we experience deja vu and may be the reasons behind our life-like dreams. We could be stuck in a moment, our life, for infinity; but then we must also question why our life ends. Does this mean infinity is merely a term used to describe a time loop. The answers are out of our hands but this was a great topic that really makes you think about the lives we live and why we are here in this moment.
But the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. Each hypothesis deserves equal consideration, and they should all be evaluated on the same basis- this is the heart of my objection to your analysis. If all hypotheses that lack direct empirical evidence are to be excluded, then you won't get very far. If you're going to enter the "fact" of fine tuning into evidence for your preferred hypothesis, then you have to accept them into evidence for the alternate hypotheses as well.
Special pleading. Apply the same rules to your preferred hypothesis.
It is absolutely analogous to my objection concerning the value (or specialness) of life - the objection that you have not dealt with much at all, as I'll show in a bit.
You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. There may be a "first cause" (and I think it likely), and this doesn't undermine science. In fact, I expect a lot of scientists would find that laughable (consider the Hartle-Hawking "no boundary" proposal, or the Carroll/Chen model.
Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle), so your claim commits the fallacy of composition.
You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations.
You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. "Logical priority" only applies to the descriptions of the sequence of states. Descriptions are products of mind (abstractions), and don't exist in the absence of minds. The physical evolution of a quantum system has no dependency on description of that evolution. Each physical state deterministically evolves to subsequent states (there being no "final" state contrary to your locution), and "logic" (i.e. reasoning) has no bearing on this physical evolution.
You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context.
Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. Our interactions were temporal, from the reading of a post to the thinking about the post, to the formulation and typing of a reply. To have a new thought entails a prior state in which the thought is absent.
I'm not seeing anything that contradicts my analysis. The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. A byproduct is logically equivalent to an unintended consequence. Your analysis is incomplete if you fail to examine both logical forks: a) the constants as being intentional; b) the constants being unintentional.
From your paper:
This again suggests you're considering life an ends. I completely agree that if you make this assumption, that this entails intentionality, and a mind to hold that intention. But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). This is the point of the Douglas Adams quote.
I still contend that the most complete analysis of fine tuning requires stepping back from the narrow analysis you seem to be contemplating, and applying consistent principles. The inference to the best explanation analysis I proposed is a fuller analysis.
When I said it "seems entailed" I was referring to statements like this (from the article I linked):
"In most of the models of inflation, if inflation is there, then the multiverse is there. It's possible to invent models of inflation that do not allow [a] multiverse, but it's difficult. Every experiment that brings better credence to inflationary theory brings us much closer to hints that the multiverse is real." - Stanford University theoretical physicist Andrei Linde.
The referenced inflationary models constitute the available evidence, and so the preponderance of evidence implies the multiverse is entailed. Of course, one of the contrary models could still be true, even though it seems unlikely given that they are in the minority.
The fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as the alternative you're pushing. The facts you submit into evidence for inferring intentionality are the same facts I'm submitting in evidence for multiverse - so your claim is false.
When entertaining the metaphysical possiblity of a multiverse, I agree it's unfalsifiable, but so is the metaphysical possibility of intentionality in nature. But as I pointed out earlier, most inflationary models entail multiverse - and these physical models are certainly falsifiable. If I were to play the same game you play, I could use this fact to simply exclude your intentionality hypothesis. But I'm interested in a balanced analysis, not merely interested in proving something to myself that I already believe.
You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. This can occur during a change of phase when the system undergoes a temperature change - that's the way it's treated in inflation models. here's a tutorial.
Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation, with its wavefunction collapse at observation has fallen from favor, and never really made sense as anything more that an instrumentalist's heuristic. 21st century physicists understand that an "observation" is just an entanglement between an observer and an eigenstate of the quantum system. Eigenstates can become entangled with anything in the environment. Clearly a classical world emerges from the quantum system of the Planck epoch, so there is ample environment to become entangled with.
So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking of eigenstates of superpostion quantum states. I don't claim this necessarily occurred, but it's consistent with the available facts.
I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable.
When I refer to this as a metaphysical theory, I am not claiming this constitutes a metaphysical system, but rather that it is metaphysically possible: the space of possibility that is broader than the narrow physical possibility you use as a methodological hurdle to dismiss anything not entailed by established science. This is the same space of possibility where your intentionality hypothesis resides: broadly logical possibility.
Your entire case depends on utilizing methodological "norms" as rationale for special pleading. You overlook the fact that all disciplines of study (science, history, mathematics, philosophy...) are unified in being a search for truth. An epistemological method valid for one discipline is not invalid for another - either it serves to advance us toward truth or it does not. There are more stringent norms for science, like falsifiability, only because the empirical nature of scientific investigation makes it feasible - so we needn't settle for less. But metaphysical investigation (i.e. looking beyond science) has to settle for less, or it doesn't get off the ground. So even if it were true that a scientific multiverse hypothesis fails to meet the norms of science, it's fair game to consider it in our search that looks beyond science, and it deserves that same looser standards under which any other metaphysically possible hypothesis is tested.
I agree - and this seems problematic for your position.
If you do not start with the assumption that life has value then what is your basis for claiming there is intentionality for life? As I brought up earlier, you can't claim there's a remarkable coincidence without there being two coinciding things. The existence of life coincides with nothing - unless you assume it is coinciding with an intent for life, which is circular.
I didn't decide it! I've merely argued that you have not even considered it. You're the one claiming fine tuning entails intentionality/a mind/God - so you have the burden of proof to show why "intended" is more likely than unintended. You've agreed to take value of life off the table, so what's left?
Obviously we're not omniscient, and we can't prove coherence - but philosophers try to prove incoherence in the theories of those they disagree with. The opponent then responds with a new or revised account that maintains coherence.
That reflection on our experience beings results in a conceptual framework. The objective and hope is that the conceptual framework actually corresponds to reality (i.e. "is true" per correspondence theory). Correspondence can't be vague and imprecise, it must be a perfect match to be true. Is it true, or is it actually just assumed true? I contend it is the latter. As an example, consider Aristotelean agent causation - as I pointed out, reference to agents does not fully account for causation. Unless you can fully account for causation, then there's clearly something untrue about the conceptual framework.
I wasn't suggesting philosophers had failed to do their due diligence of reflection and analysis. Rather I'm highlighting that this reflection and analysis leads to different answers among different philosophers. I'll assume each of them has a rationally justified belief in whatever they decide - so how do we account for the differences of opinion? I submit that this is due to assumptions within their analysis - there have to be, because it's not based solely on analytic truths.
The variability of physical constants is due to exactly one assumption: that the constants are a product of quantum uncertainty - that they arise from entanglements with the environment from a superposition of all the possibilities. This one additional assumption is not superfluous, because it explains the alleged fine tuning.
Provide an account of intelligence in the cosmos based on standard physics.
That observational basis has taken decades to reveal itself, but GR was accepted physics long before that.
I agree, but my problem with your argument is your creative special pleading, holding multiverse to the higher standard of science while using a looser standard for your preferred solution.
I have yet to see any such sound reasoning. They all depend on assumptions.
There are. But the first thing an atheist does wrong is not understanding what the claim for God actually is, including it's consequences. When you truly understand the claim for God, then you see that it's absolutely impossible for even a single atheist to base his or her position on rational, logical grounds. Same cannot be said for at least some agnostics (who's position is, "I simply don't know, it's 50/50") and at least some people who think or believe that God is real to any degree higher than 50%.
In other words, there are agnostics and people who think or believe that God is real who came to their position on rational, logical reasoning. There is not a single atheist who came to his or her position on rational, logical reasoning (because it's impossible to do so). Again, the reason why it's impossible is found in implications of the claim for God.
How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further. We could call it "lazy reasoning." But if agnostic actually understands logical reasoning for God being real but dismisses it in order to stay agnostic, then that's not rational also.
Henri - How do you define "atheist"? I'm anticipating it won't apply to me. My position is that of "agnostic deist" - i.e. I acknowledge the possibility that there exists some sort of first cause, that either constitutes the world (such as in pantheism) or transcends the world. It is also possible that the physical world is all that exists (possibly with the addendum of some things that are ontologically emergent). I acknowledge this possibility because it's possible that one or more of the various arguments for "God's" existence is sound. Those arguments do not actually make a case for God (as usually defined by theists); they only make the case (say) for a first cause, or source of goodness.
This position puts me in the "atheist" category, because I think it's quite unlikely that a God exists - where "God" is defined in the usual theist sense of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent.
I disagree that one can assign epistemic priorities consistently. This has been analyzed by epistemologists, and I think they've shown it to be untenable.
It's interesting you'd say that, because it is the exact opposite of what I think. The atheists and agnostics I've engaged with invariably consider themselves on a perpetual search for truth. For example, I wouldn't at all mind being shown I'm wrong - I invite criticism of my reasoning. I adapt what I believe based on what I learn. On the other hand, every committed theist I've engaged thinks they have the truth - and this certainty ends up being an end-point - they have no motivation or desire to look further. IMO, one should always be open to the possibility he is wrong, and it depends on seriously entertaining the possibility that one is wrong. Do you seriously entertain the possibility a God does not exist?
That said, I actually do agree that theism can be a rational position. So can atheism - at least per my definition (someone who believes God probably doesn't exist). That doesn't mean all atheists and all theists actually reached that position rationally.
I am discussing the actual form of the argument. You are not. Changing the FTA's form to what it is not gives you an easier target, but doesn't rebut the actual argument. I've shown that the FTA is an argumentum signum quia (depending on our prior experience of works of intellect), not a case of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.
This kind of bait and switch tactic is common with naturalists. Many say, for example, that free will is compatible with determinism, but to make the case, they re-define free will. Others redefine "intent" in a way that excludes our experience of intending. I give numerous other examples in my book.
I am not responding further to this distortion.
Quoting Relativist
You are confused. Any scientist can limit her field of interest, but doing so does not undermine the fundamental principles of science. Specifically, we can rationally confine physics to quantifiable phenomena, but doing so does not posit the existence of uncaused phenomena. As my Becquerel example shows, denying the principle of sufficient reason undermines the structure of science.
Quoting Relativist
There are many meanings of "causation," but the definition you've given does not describe how the laws of nature cause phenomena. A "thing" is an ostensible unity. The laws of nature aren't "things" that can be pointed to. I'm unsure how you are defining "physical," but if you're referring to objects with localized space-time coordinates, clearly the laws of nature are not "physical things" in that sense.
The laws of nature are real, not because they are "things," but because they are an intelligible aspect of reality. Further, there is no space-time separation between the laws and the events they control. They act concurrently. If the the law of conservation of mass-energy is not operational here and now, mass-energy will not be conserved here and now. Since there is no space-time separation between the law as cause and its effect, there is no physical relation to be discerned.
Still the laws are causes -- we scientists point to their operation when we wish to explain the time development of the universe or the evolution of species.
Quoting Relativist
Thank you for sharing your faith.
Metaphysical principles are no more or less than fundamental lessons of experience that apply to all existence.
So, of course there's an empirical basis for a different, concurrent view of causality. Aristotle's paradigm case of concurrent ("essential") causality is a builder building a house. This is one, unified event with two intelligible aspects linked by identity. The cause is the builder building the house and the effect is the house being built by the builder. These are necessarily linked because the builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.
On the other hand, as Hume famously showed, there is no intrinsic necessity to causality considered as the orderly succession of pairs of events. Something can always intervene between separate events.
Quoting Relativist
This is pettifogging. "Explanation" has two meanings, one is the aspect(s) of reality that bring about a phenomenon. That is what I am discussing. The other is a representation of how those aspects of reality bring about the phenomenon. You can tell that I'm talking about the reality by my reference to "grounds."
Quoting Relativist
You seem terribly confused. Note that the subject of my first sentence is "Physics problems." Physics problems are mental puzzles that arise out of reflection on the physical world. They are not in the world, but in the mind reflecting on it. Thus, they are part of the logical order. In short, I did not say that "logical priority" is an aspect of the physical world, but of thought about the physical world.
Quoting Relativist
Of course all thought and writing about reality is incomplete. We think in terms of abstractions that always leave data on the table.
The point is that Humean-Kantian ("accidental") causality is defined as the temporal succession of events according to rule, and so involves time in its very definition. On the other hand, Aristotelian concurrent ("essential") causality involves a single reality considered in different ways so, time does not enter into its definition.
In other words, essential (concurrent) causality does not reflect the emergence over time of a new state. It reflects the fact that in any given state, there are active and potential aspects and the reality of the potential aspect(s) (effects) depends on the operation of the active aspect, aka the "cause."
Quoting Relativist
When I say that time does not enter in an essential way, I do not mean that my thinking of you occurs outside of time. Clearly it does not. What i mean is that time is the measure of change according to before and after, and my continuing thinking of you (as opposed to my starting to think of you), involves no essential change. Since it involves no essential change, time does not enter continuing thought in an essential way -- only incidentally.
Quoting Relativist
Objectively, life is the end of the process we call "biogenesis," just as the emergence of specific species are the ends of the processes we call the "evolution" of those species. I don't see what objection you can have to me thinking of states that are objectively the end of identifiable processes are ends. What am I missing?
Quoting Relativist
To say that life is the end of the process if biogenesis is not to assume that it is intended. It is simply an observation. The fact that life is the termination of biogenesis may be evidence that life is in some sense intended, but being evidence for x is not "assuming" x.
Note that Daniel Dennett, a dyed in the wool atheist, makes a lengthy argument that these kinds of processes are intentional in his The Intentional Stance. So, seeing intentionality here does not require one to be a theist.
Quoting Relativist
No, it does not. You continue to ignore how heuristic reasoning works. It's not deductive, and certainly not ironclad. Instead, it reflects on analogous cases and concludes that the present case is like them. "Where there's smoke, there's fire," doesn't mean that smoke invariably entails fire -- it just says that fire is a very rational conclusion when we see smoke. It's certainly possible that aliens made the smoke by pouring oil on the exhaust of their hyperdrive, but we've never seen that happen before, while we've often seen fire make smoke.
Quoting Relativist
Aliens pouring oil on their hyperdrive exhaust.
Quoting Relativist
I am sorry, but as a theoretical physicist, I do understand "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. It was investigated by Pierre Curie, who came to the conclusion I gave you: By definition, perfect symmetry can never be broken. As far as I know, no one has ever shown that Curie's analysis is flawed. That does not mean that "negligibly" imperfect symmetry cannot be made manifest by inflation.
Quoting Relativist
I am not a proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation. I think the best approach is to avoid "interpretations" and look at what physics actually tells us. Still, this is not the forum to discuss interpretations of quantum theory; nevertheless, as long as the equations continue to work, we can be confident that the time-development of unobserved states is deterministic.
Quoting Relativist
You are arguing against a position I have not taken.
Quoting Relativist
You are baffled because you have still not understood what I'm telling you.
1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.
2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.
3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.
I do not think it is worthwhile to continue this discussion, as we are making no progress.
This seems a difficult concept for many to get their hands around, not sure why.
I meant "is an argumentum signum quia," of course. I corrected my post.
And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. I do not dispute that some paths lead in the direction you are defending, but merely point out that other paths do not lead there. You object to my label of "assumption" to metaphysics, but label aside - metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. You would recognize this problem better if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics - this is a clear deficiency in your analysis. I strongly suggest you read A World of States of Affairs and What is a Law of Nature?, both by D. M. Armstrong. Then you could perhaps show why this path is a blind alley, but ignoring it doesn't make your perferred path any more credible - indeed, it makes it seem misleading.
Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? This is my issue with ignoring other metaphysical theories.
BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. Short of that, you can argue against it by identifying areas in which its accounts are deficient. I'll even give you a tip: physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence.
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. That sums up my objection. I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. Your argument therefore has no persuasive power to me. I suggest that anyone who understands that there are indeed multiple (but incompatible) coherent metaphysical theories would agree it is unpersuasive.
yeah, so you wrote this in the first post, and you may have gone through this but, can infinity be proven in any way? are there "anything" that CAN be infinite?
There's nothing wrong with fruitfulness. Variety in conclusions don't necessarily mean inconsistency. If two arguments lead to contradictory conclusions, at least one is unsound.
Quoting Relativist
Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them.
Quoting Relativist
Coherence is no guaranty of truth. J. K. Rowling tells very coherent tales.
Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience. See my videos "#35 Induction and Abstraction" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VvqcL9LILiA) and "#36 Abstraction & Metaphysics" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9ohvFQn1J0).
Following a path we find fruitful does not mean other paths are "blind alleys," We all have to judge how to spend our limited time. If you present some pivotal insight(s) I'm missing by not studying Armstrong, I will be glad to discuss them.
Quoting Relativist
There are also thousands of well-written, coherent works of fiction.
Quoting Relativist
First, the FTA is not "my argument." I use abstraction and deduction in metaphysical reasoning, not probable arguments. That does not prevent me from analyzing the FTA and the counter arguments -- judging their strengths and weaknesses.
Second, not all theories are equally credible. I won't pretend they are.
Quoting Relativist
I agree. Still, being coherent does not imply being true. The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.
Quoting Relativist
It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.
Quoting Relativist
No, it is not.
Quoting Relativist
You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.
A method to avoid imperfect metaphysical theories would be a monumental achievement - it would finally, after all these centuries, remove all controversy from metaphysical inquiry. I'm a wee bit skeptical.
Regarding examples: Metaphysical theories of natural law are a good example of disagreement. Here's a handy outline depicting the variety of metaphysical theories about natural law.
I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.
Of course not, but the point is that incoherence is a guaranty of falsehood.
Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.
I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.
Instead?! Surely you misspoke. Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested. Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. This can help us decide what metaphysical beliefs are worthy of belief, and on which we should withhold judgment. Your assertions have not given me any reason to change my view that judgment should be withheld, and the fact that you're unaware of alternative metaphysical theories makes me think that you may have settled on something a bit hastily.
You can define terms in any number of ways. Definitions are not claims about reality. They're ways of clarifying our meaning. If you use a different, incompatible, definition, it does not make either of us wrong. It just means that we're discussing different things.
Quoting Relativist
We agree.
Quoting Relativist
No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness.
Quoting Relativist
Conclusions adequate to reality will automatically be self-consistent. So, self-consistency is not a separate consideration.
Quoting Relativist
Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens,
I agree falsification is not abduction, and I never suggested it was. I said, "Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested.
How well each theory accounts for reality can often be judged, even if the judgment is subjective. That judgment is an IBE. The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle).
Quoting Dfpolis
What you are "aware of" is belief. The conceptual framework in which you interpret this awareness is belief, and your conclusion is belief. Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.
I gave you a link to an outline listing a variety of metaphysical accounts of natural law, this was to demonstrate to you that there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts - which demonstrates that metaphysical analysis can get it wrong, in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician. It may seem like an exact science to you, but it isn't.
I have looked up "IBE" and still have no idea what you are referring to.
Quoting Relativist
Which shows that there are rational approaches to reality other than the hypothetico-deductive method.
Quoting Relativist
I can't imagine why you feel competent to comment on what I am aware of.
If I am aware of reality, most people in our culture would call that "knowing" reality.
If I choose to treat a proposition as true, most people in our culture would call that "a belief" -- especially if I did not have sufficient grounds to know it is true.
Quoting Relativist
Knowledge is not a species of belief. I can know things are true, but chose not to believe the, especially if believing them would cause me pain. Again, Decartes tells us he was in his chamber when he was doing his philosophical reflection, but chose to doubt it -- thus knowing, but not believing. That would be impossible were knowledge a species of belief, as many contemporary philosophers teach.
Although the terms have many analogous uses, primarily, knowing is an act of intellect, and believing is an act of will. That is why Descartes' methodological doubt does not have anyting to say about knowing properly so-called.
Quoting Relativist
I never doubted that. The question is, are there contradictory accounts based on sound methodology?
Quoting Relativist
I am still waiting to see the sound arguments leading to contradictions.