First, anyone saying that would be saying something descriptive about a culture. In other words, it's more like doing anthropology in that respect. Wh...
Why, in your view, (a) would information theory be a waste of time, (b) would technology based on information theory not be possible, (c) would comput...
One problem is thinking that whether a sentence is what I called "substantive" is simply a matter of its form. I wouldn't say that it is. But arguably...
The more we'd talk about this the more of a mess it would become, because I have very unusual views on what meaning is/how it works, what concepts are...
I'm more in the camp of agreeing with Lozanski, but not exactly for the same reasons, even if my reasons for agreement are similar in some ways. Howev...
I don't agree with Michael's view (in my opinion, morality IS just preferences of a certain sort), but his view makes logical sense: He's saying that ...
Not objectively, no. First, it's not going to be that you believe it was factually or objectively wrong. Keep in mind that ethical right/wrong to a su...
For one, believe it or not, some people do actually care what (at least some) other people feel, simply because they like and care about other people,...
There's a "domain" confusion here. "Might makes right" is a descriptive aphorism about what happens--or at least tends to happen--socially. The ethica...
Here's something I wrote just last week in this very thread: So what's going on in the case of a proof about the set of primes? We're playing with the...
And again, I do not agree with that. I'd agree that it's an interactive upshot of properties, but it's not what they are. Properties/qualities/charact...
I wouldn't say that that's what "property" means. That's an upshot of properties, but properties are simply qualities/characteristics. Anyway, it seem...
Sure. But how does that at all amount to an argument that idealism fails? "There's no good reason to believe this in my opinion" is very different tha...
Thats one view. It's not a view I share. As I said, I disagree that the painting analogy works. I already said that, so i don't know why I'm having to...
You said "There can be non-factuality." How can there be non-factuality, exactly? Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites a...
It's more that "claims" can include conditional implications, so that we're just talking about possibilities,. Also I wouldn't say that ontological co...
I wasn't talking about myself. What was presented was someone who would say that a painting of a unicorn and a unicorn are different. Of course, you'r...
Folks focused on ontology as primary would say that in order to have an epistemic "channel," there needs to be existents in the first place, and one n...
Not that you'd disagree with this (hence your "at least"), but I think it's important to stress that there aren't just those three. I don't agree with...
It apparently seems intuitively obvious to you that if there are universals, then that is a good reason for particulars to behave regularly, but that ...
Why would we believe that everyone has some mental attribute regardless of what anyone might say about it? I also don't even really know what that wou...
If someone said either one of those, would you read them as saying that the unicorn is just paint or that Hogwarts is just a story respectively? Or wo...
Yeah, I'd say they count, too. And yeah, the cult/religion line seems to be one of just how many followers/just how much history, etc. the movement ha...
In my opinion that's ridiculous. If someone says "it's a perception of a computer, not a perception of visual sensations," then obviously they don't b...
. . . has inexplicable regularities as real abstract/non-particular laws of nature that govern individual things and events. Yes, of course. ?? Why ot...
Hadn't paid attention to this thread before. Anyway, in my view the problem is simply that "I am lying" and "This sentence is false" don't actually sa...
Well, except that I don't think that perception works like painting. The representationalist view is that it works like painitng, where we can only kn...
It rather seems dubious to me that there are any scientific theories that are not arrived at via a combination of inductive, abdutive and deductive re...
If so, what's the explanation? It wouldn't be the same as a description of what realism is (Because otherwise we could say that nominalism does explai...
Yeah, if it is just a set of sensations, but it doesn't seem to be, and there's no good reason in my view to believe that it is. Well, I don't know if...
I think that induction is good enough, especially since in my view, certainty isn't something to be concerned with. I'm a subjectivist on justificatio...
It wouldn't have to be a formal argument. For one, I don't think it's immediately obvious because it sure doesn't seem to be the case. When I perceive...
No, I'm not saying that. Again, I don't think that it's inadequate to simply believe that that's how particulars "behave." The point was that a lack o...
You can approach this from two angles. The first is that my philosophy of meaning has meaning as something that occurs in individuals' minds and that ...
Well, just to start at the start, in the following... ... why does it matter that (a) Peter Millican later expanded on Hume's view, (b) that the Ash'a...
I wouldn't say "everything," but "all truth." Not everything is truth (judgments). That's just one activity that sentient beings engage in. It's a ver...
Yes, there's no explanation for that just like there's no explanation for it in terms of particulars. Classifying it in Aristotlean terms doesn't expl...
Yes, on the standard view truth-value is a property of those meanings (since that's what propositions are). On my view, the way that property obtains ...
Comments