Your Greatest Opposite Philosopher (only theists/atheists)
If you're an agnostic please get out. Only theists and atheists should be in this room.
For theists: Who is the most convincing atheist philosopher?
For atheists: Who is the most convincing theist philosopher?
I will start; for me the most convincing atheists are Epicurus, Lucretius and the early Greek Materialists. Unlike modern atheists, they seem to have had an understanding of true morality that is lacking for today's atheists. Their arguments are also stronger than the critique that New Atheists attempt of religion, and they provide a more coherent alternative (and scientific!) worldview. Furthermore, their intellectual discovery of the atom is a breakthrough considering that it took around 2000 years for science to catch up to what they already had philosophical reason for supporting, thus illustrating the power and reach of human reason. The swerve of the atom, furthermore is another flash of brilliance, which is much alike the "weird" quantum mechanics effects that science is only now discovering. If anything, all this should make them awe-inspiring, and more philosophical interest should go towards investigating their methods of using reason, which clearly yielded astounding results.
For theists: Who is the most convincing atheist philosopher?
For atheists: Who is the most convincing theist philosopher?
I will start; for me the most convincing atheists are Epicurus, Lucretius and the early Greek Materialists. Unlike modern atheists, they seem to have had an understanding of true morality that is lacking for today's atheists. Their arguments are also stronger than the critique that New Atheists attempt of religion, and they provide a more coherent alternative (and scientific!) worldview. Furthermore, their intellectual discovery of the atom is a breakthrough considering that it took around 2000 years for science to catch up to what they already had philosophical reason for supporting, thus illustrating the power and reach of human reason. The swerve of the atom, furthermore is another flash of brilliance, which is much alike the "weird" quantum mechanics effects that science is only now discovering. If anything, all this should make them awe-inspiring, and more philosophical interest should go towards investigating their methods of using reason, which clearly yielded astounding results.
Comments (174)
Explanation here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinamen
I suppose it is uncannily like a premonition of the 'quantum leap'.
Nevertheless there were sound counter-arguments against the early atomists, the chief one being that, if an atom was truly indivisible, then it couldn't have any sides, and if it didn't have any sides, there was no way it could come into contact with anything i.e. the notion of a 'dimensionless particle' was a logical contradiction.
Why not?
All of which is a digression, for which I apologise.
That makes absolutely no sense. What if it was round? Then there would be no "top", "bottom", etc. because these are relative to a frame of reference, and an objective frame of reference can only be provided by asymmetries in the shape of the particle. But spherical particles would have no asymmetries. They would have no parts - no top, no bottom, no distinctions.
Nah, it's basically the same, just more detailed. Democritus was basically right. The uncertainty principle and probability wave are the swerve. Inability to predict.
That's not my argument, that is a paraphrase of the arguments against atomism by early philosophers.
In any case, a spherical object of any kind is not dimensionless because a sphere can only be defined in terms of the distance of the surface from the centre.
There are many obvious conundrums with Lucretius atomism apparent even to the untrained. For instance, he claimed that 'heat atoms' flowed out from the sun and hit the earth. The obvious question is, what happens to all of them when they land? Why don't we have to clear the driveway of expended 'heat atoms' before driving out in the morning?
For viewpoint of one who is more educated than either of us on this very question, have a geez at Heisenberg's essay The Debate Between Plato and Democritus. (Spoiler alert: comes out against Democritus.)
However I do think Aquinas' ethics is more open for controversy. Natural law theory is unintuitive (to me) and reflects the attitude the Scholastics had at the time - the world was their oyster, ripe for the taking, and was also overflowing with teleology, thus making it easy to feel at home in the world. All you have to do is follow the telos of your natural kind and you'll do fine. I personally try to argue that this essentialist doctrine is nauseatingly oppressive, and puts the natural kind over individuality in terms of importance. I try to argue that part of the existential predicament of man is that he has no telos at all, thus teleological ethics are null. The ability to transcend effectively means humans no longer have a place in the immanent, where all the teleology is at.
I also take the route Kiekegaard and Nietzsche went and criticize how Aquinas seemed to think there was a universal purpose for humanity (what Nietzsche would have called nauseating, which I agree), and that his theological-metaphysics excludes personal experience, a la Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegelian systems. The idea that we'll all be part of some City of God (except for all the animals, cause fuck 'em) gives me a knee-jerk reaction of opposition.
That's the thing about system theories - they are intoxicatingly all-encompassing and yet oftentimes sideline other things in the process. They promise answers to everything and thus act as an intellectual crutch of sorts, the promise of a future complete understanding gives meaning and purpose to inquiry. In my case at least, devotion to an INCOMPLETE metaphysical system is fallacious and inauthentic.
It's also likely that Aquinas was pressured in some ways to synthesize Aristotelian metaphysics with Catholic dogma, which, unless Catholicism is "correct", means Aquinas essentially bastardized Aristotelian metaphysics.
How eerie. I was just reading up on Epicurus and thought of how prescient this swerve was, even if it perhaps motivated to avoid determinism. There's also a fascinating kind of piety of Epicurus.
[quote=Epicurus]
First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, you shall not affirm of him anything that is foreign to his immortality or that is repugnant to his blessedness. Believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious.
[/quote]
He's something like a practical atheist without, in this letter at least, being a genuine atheist. Perhaps he was quietly an agnostic who saw the use of the gods or of God as an image, or perhaps he thought the world needed a cause (deism, etc.).
So it being a Monday, I'll mention G.K. Chesterton.
So do we roll dice?
So? How does this imply that indivisibility is inconceivable? How does this imply that if the atom has spatial properties it must be divisible?
Quoting Wayfarer
There are solutions to those problems offered by Epicureans through the ages. The heat atoms get reflected or absorbed temporarily in the voids between other atoms.
Quoting Wayfarer
:-} I did read it, and found that it is nothing but Heisenberg inserting his favorite biases without even arguing why. It's so silly. "Uhh fundamental reality is pure mathematics" - yeah sure, give me a break. But other than that, I'll reply to the appeal to authorities more educated than us with another authority:
Read God and the Atom by Victor J. Stenger (Spoiler alerts: Democritus wins)
As I said, Greek Materialism is a tenable position.
Oh yes. They were noted atomic physicists, right?
I got no time for Stenger, sorry. His last published piece was 'Why Particles are for Real' , which I think is entirely groundless, and which ends with the plaintive appeal:
I honestly don't think Stenger would pass Philosophy 101, whereas Heidegger, apart from having helped devise quantum mechanics, is also philosophically astute.
:-} I highly doubt Heisenberg would pass Philosophy 101. If his "philosophy" is like that essay he has no chance. As for Heidegger, he may pass Philosophy 101, but he would certain fail in Newtonian mechanics 101 (forget quantum mechanics 101).
And am I to take that for truth? Am I not to look at their writtings and confirm whether what you're telling me is the truth? And if so, then I have looked at Heisenberg's writing that you offered, and it doesn't sound philosophically astute at all. It's more like propaganda.
Anyway, instead of going off topic with all this, I think you should answer the question of the thread if you have a different opinion.
It depends on who the professor is. Heidegger as a student, writing as he's famous for, when I was teaching Intro to Philosophy courses, wouldn't have passed.
Does that go to show that Heidegger is weak as a philosopher, or that you're weak as a teacher of philosophy? :P
Depends on who is assessing it, obviously.
And does this statement also depend on who is assessing it? >:)
Sure as some would disagree obviously.
You only want stuff with no possibility of different views?
How quaint, that sounds like a good definition for truth no? :-*
Here's a good recipe for no possibility of different views:
(1) turn off your computer
(2) make sure no one else is in your home
(3) lock your doors
(4) cover up your windows
(5) make sure you do not go outside
(6) don't read any books, watch any tv, etc.
(7) enjoy!
Don't skip step (6)
I didn't forget it, but I can still hear the TV you know...
However real talk now - philosophy is a search for truth, and truth is the opposite of opinion. There can be different opinions, but the truth has to be one. So there is no possibility for different views with regards to truth. I mean yes we can have different views about truth, but either (1) one of us is wrong, or (2) we're both wrong.
There would be no way to square this with the actual body of stuff that is conventionally considered philosophy.
Quoting Agustino
So when you say "there's no possibility for different views with regards to truth/philosophy," you're not saying that there's literally no possibility--after all, philosophy of full of different views about everything conceivable re both what truth is and what claims are true, so obviously different views are not only possible but ubiquitous--but you're rather saying that per your view, truth is something where there's only one objective thing that's universally correct. Of course, that's just another view about what truth is, and you think it's right, but so does everyone else who has a view about truth.
Believe it or not Epicurus was not an atheist. He had an argument for the existence of gods. He just also believed they had nothing to do with us, and that we are on our own.
That's practically for all means and purposes an atheist - I am aware of that though.
Yes, that's what I'm saying. And no, it isn't an argument that just because others think their own views are right, therefore they also are right. Thinking that your view is right doesn't make it right - what makes it right is correspondence with reality - with the way things are.
Which isn't what I said. I just said that everyone who has a different view about truth (such as me) also thinks that it's right. You think your view happens to be the one right one contra everyone else's view. I hope you do not believe that you're unique in that. Everyone else, with all of those different views, thinks the same thing.
It's like the folks who are objectivists on aesthetics. Naturally, what they like the most always factually is the best stuff, contra all of those other folks who've just got it wrong. But they all think that, despite liking different stuff.
Okay so? What reason do you have to think that your view (that everything depends on who is assessing it) corresponds to reality for example?
The decades themselves aren't a reason for holding that it's true. What's the actual reason? What are the observations in question?
Yeah, it's an abbreviation for the decades worth of particular material, which understandably, I'm not going to write a set of books detailing it all on a message board (assuming I'd even be able to remember all of it, which I wouldn't).
So effectively you refuse to provide a reason why you take your statement as true?
It's not like I have some stupid little 5, 10, 50 line argument for it or something like that. That's not how I formulate views or how I think they should be formulated. I might have some compact argument about some very specific thing, but that's not the case here--this isn't some very specific thing.
Well your view seems to have serious logical and conceptual difficulties. First of all, it can't even be true, because if it's true, then it really isn't true, because it's just an opinion. That's fucked up.
There's a very rudimentary scope problem in that criticism.
All you're saying is that if it's true (under theory x--namely, the theory in question), then it really isn't true (under some different theory, y).
Okay, what exactly is theory x and what is theory y? Get down to specifics, I doubt you'd be able to pass one of your own introductory classes with such general writing.
y is some incompatible theory, yours for example.
No wait a minute. You said if it's true under theory x. So "everything depends on who is assessing it" is true UNDER "everything depends on who is assessing it". That doesn't follow.
Quoting Terrapin Station
What's my theory?
I can't make sense out of that set of sentences. The biggest hurdle is the last sentence--"That doesn't follow." I don't get what's supposed to be following what here. Also, the part in quotation marks isn't something I said or would say. I would say that truth-value depends on who is assessing a proposition. Truth value isn't "everything" however. It's rather a very specific activity that persons engage in, and that's it.
Quoting Agustino
The pertinent part is objectivism re truth.
Say person X is getting beaten up. Does the truth value of "X is getting beaten up" depend on who is assessing the proposition?
Yes. To understand what I'm saying, first it's important to understand that I'm making a distinction between "truth" and "fact."
Facts are states of affairs (of or in the world).
I'm not at all saying that facts depend on anyone's assessment (at least in most cases--there are exceptions, of course, such as when we're talking about what someone's assessment is. There's a fact about that).
I'm agreeing with the received view in analytic philosophy that truth value is a property of propositions (and not a "name for" a fact).
What I'm saying that's unusual is twofold: One, that propositions only obtain in individual's minds, which I believe because of my semantics (my philosophy of meaning).
Two, that the property of propositions in question--in other words, the property of truth-value, is a matter of an individual making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else--such as facts in the world if they're using correspondence theory.
So someone is getting beaten up--let's say that's a fact. That fact in no way hinges on what anyone thinks about it. But facts and truths on this view are not the same thing.
Truth is rather a property of a proposition, such as "Joe is getting beaten up." Again, this part is the standard view in analytic philosophy.
My unusual view, however, is that the only way that property of a proposition can obtain is via someone (a) thinking the proposition--that is, assigning meanings to those words in that sentence in that combination, and (b) making a judgment about how that meaning "matches" states of affairs in the world (if we're using correspondence theory).
So part of what I'm saying is the view (or unanalyzed assumption as it often is) that "Joe is getting beaten up" somehow (a) has meaning, and (b) matches or fails to match states of affairs in the world independent of someone thinking about it is nonsense.
Would you also argue that independent of someone thinking about it, there would be no moon?
Is there any room for deists in this discussion? Or pantheists, or panentheists? Or believers in Logos?
Sure, but what would you take your opposite to be? :P
But truth - when you consider the meaning of truth besides merely "truth value", applies to the world. The truth includes the facts that hold true, and their connections. So certainly "Joe is getting beaten up" is true if Joe actually is getting beaten up regardless of whether there is someone to affirm it. The notion of truth is built into the notion of fact - a fact is something that is true. I can't speak of false facts. If they are false, they aren't facts at all.
Why?
The thing with Hume... it's very easy to take out his atheism and replace it with theism given his philosophical framework. Johann Georg Hamann did exactly that.
Well, let's just say that I went through an atheist "phase" and that I was influenced by the history of the concept of Logos in general. I was also influenced by Paul Davies (I'm reading The Mind of God- I also would like to read The Goldilocks Enigma) the Stoics in general, and Max Jammer and his book Einstein and Religion: Physics and Theology.
"The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," and "possibly" and "possibly not," and "maybe" and "maybe not," we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," and "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not," so that for the sake of conciseness we adopt the phrase "possibly not" instead of "possibly it is not," and "maybe not" instead of "maybe it is not," and "perhaps not" instead of "perhaps it is not." But here again we do not fight about phrases nor do we inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we adopt them, as I said, in a loose sense. Still it is evident, as I think, that these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is" is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory phrase "perhaps it is not" by his refusal to make the positive assertion that "it is." And the same applies to all the other cases."
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 21.
That's why:
Quoting Agustino
Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;)
That's classical scepticism, not whatever Hume was doing:
"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able."
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 4.
Not according to this...
But this suggests there is some disagreement about how to interpret Epicurus' views on the gods...
There are differences of opinion (see Konstan and Sedley above)...
But, at first glance, Epicurus believed there are ethical, powerful eternal beings who live in a different realm, and that these beings created us.
No, not at all.
That's not the case on the standard view re analytic philosophy that I'm referring to and operating in the context of. Facts are simply not at all the same type of thing as truth on this view. (And truth is just one mode of truth value.) Treating them as the same sort of thing, on this view, is a category error. So if you can understand this, it should be easier to understand what I'm saying.
Quoting Agustino
Here is where my view is idiosyncratic. "Joe is getting beaten up" is not true regardless of whether there is someone to affirm it, because when it's just pixels on a screen, or ink marks on a page, or sounds (or magnetic patterns etc.) on a recording, or anything like that, it (a) has no meaning--so we don't even have a proposition in the first place, and (b) has no relation to anything of the relevant types--correspondence, coherence, etc.
Quoting Agustino
That you can't speak of false facts is the primary reason that facts are different than truths on the standard view in analytic philosophy. On analysis, folks are uncomfortable with the idea that falsehoods would be a different kind of thing than truths. Truths and falsehoods should be two different modalities of the same kind of thing. What would they be two different modalities of? A particular sort of property of propositions. So there are no false facts, and there are no true facts. There are simply facts. What's true or false are propositions. Hence why it's a category error to equate "truth" and "fact."
Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Why is that?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Again, what's the motivation for saying they should be that?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes but why can't there be true or false facts? There can't be false facts, because if something is false, then it can't be factual. And there can't be true facts, because the notion of true is already incorporated within the notion of fact. When you think of a fact, you always think of something that is already true. When I tell you "that's a fact", then I mean that it is the case - ie it is true.
I think it makes a lot of sense, as I explained in that post. I rather don't think it makes much sense to say that truth and falsehood would be a completely different type of thing, rather than different modalities of the same thing. That would suggest that something is going wrong with one's analysis. It would be like saying that blue is a particular frequency range of electromagnetic radiation, but orange is a type of tennis shoe, or that a major scale (ionian mode) is a particular sequence of whole and half steps, but that a minor scale (aeolian mode) is an emotion.
But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. If your philosophy student comes to you and says my dog ate the homework, you're going to say "No, tell me what the truth is!" What the truth is! The truth can't be the modality of a certain proposition, at least not in that context. When you're asking for the truth you're asking for some states of affairs. And truth is simply used in this manner in everyday language. It's part and parcel of what we understand by truth. So fine, you can arbitrarily decide that for philosophical use truth will represent a property of propositions, and fact will represent states of affairs. But if you do that, you merely take the meaning people commonly attribute to the word truth, and split it in two different words. You're still going to have the same issues you had before with truth, only that you'll shift them in two different words. And I think that's problematic precisely because it is mere semantics, it doesn't change the fundamental issues.
Ok, for example, because of that distinction, you'll tell me the truth of everything depends on who is assessing it. And I will say, oh I don't mean truth in your language, I mean facts. Do facts depend on who is assessing it? No. Well that's what I mean when I say that not everything depends on who is assessing it. You're merely shifting the problem in a conceptual labyrinth, nothing else.
That's a tough one... maybe Don Cupitt... He believes that God is not real, (but does deny being an atheist- although if I read him correctly, he believes we invented the concept of God- w/o man God wouldn't even exist) and calls himself a Christian non-realist.
Which implies, "Category errors can not occur in normal language usage." Do you really want to claim that? And would you be claiming it as a definition of "category error," or are you just saying that there's some relation between the two that prevents category errors from ever occurring in normal language usage?
At any rate, philosophy isn't journalism about how people colloquially think about language re what their beliefs are with respect to the terms they use. It's not simple philology, lexicography or anthropology.
Neither.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used.
And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. If jealousy means pink, then to speak of jealous trainers isn't a category error, because the meaning of the word is different. Why is it so hard to understand this @Terrapin Station?
I would say that philosophical analysis of a term like "truth" is largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage, relative to coherence requirements, relative to what actually exists, etc. And that is the context in which truth refers to a property of propositions.
Quoting Agustino
It's a category error because using truth as synonymous with facts means that falsehoods are something completely different.
Well but it's not. If someone tells you "tell me the truth" in a specific context, say you lied about where the car keys are, then you're not going to answer with any proposition which has the modality true. They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! So in what sense is the philosophical analysis largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage? If it was that, then you'd see that part of the meaning of truth includes facts.
Instead of answering with words, you could point somewhere for example. Are you then still using a proposition? And if you're not, according to your notion, how are you giving them the truth? This is just so incoherent.
You're not at all comprehending the idea that philosophical analysis is NOT a reporting of how someone happens to think about a term re their beliefs about what it is. Your objection here is that someone doesn't think about it so that they're asking for a proposition.
No this isn't about their beliefs. This is about how they're using the term. What are they asking you for when they ask for the truth?
Functionally? They want the person to make a statement that matches the facts.
As I JUST SAID: They want the person to MAKE A STATEMENT
Okay, say I don't make any statement, and I point my finger to a drawer opposite me. They seem to be satisfied by that, and yet I made no statement. So how for fuck's sake do they want me to make a statement?
Pointing your finger has no meaning?
It has meaning, but that meaning is not a statement. It's not a proposition.
What meaning does it have?
It shows them the state of affairs they're interested to know about.
How does it show that? Not by indicating something like "There (is) . . ."?
Yes by indicating "there it is". But even my dog understands what pointing my finger means - it means "there's the ball" - a fact, not a proposition in this case, because my dog doesn't understand language, and isn't a language using animal.
How is that not a proposition?
You understand that propositions are not the actual words used, right?
Does my dog understand propositions?
Can propositions exist outside of language?
I don't believe that we have a very good idea what animals like dogs' minds are like, but I think it's safe to guess that they understand many things, that they can apply meaning, etc.
They're not language per se, they're meaning. It depends on whether you consider all meaning (like pointing a finger to say "there is is") language or not. That does have meaning, and expresses a proposition.
A proposition is not identical to the sentence "Snow is white."
It's rather the meaning expressed by the sentence "Snow is white."
Okay, so according to you, truth is a property of meaning right? Meanings can be true or false?
Yes, on the standard view truth-value is a property of those meanings (since that's what propositions are). On my view, the way that property obtains is by making a judgment about how propositions relate to facts, for example (on correspondence theory). It's not just any meaning, by the way. It's meanings that can be expressed by declarative sentences, for example.
I wouldn't say "everything," but "all truth." Not everything is truth (judgments). That's just one activity that sentient beings engage in. It's a very small percentage of all phenomena in the world. Also, this part is my idiosyncratic view. On the standard view, just how the property obtains is left unanalyzed.
Okay, so how does a property of meaning, truth, depend on who is assessing it? Do you mean to say that truth is assigned to meaning by the person?
You can approach this from two angles.
The first is that my philosophy of meaning has meaning as something that occurs in individuals' minds and that can't literally be made external to their minds. Assessing how a proposition relates to facts is a matter of (i) thinking about the meanings and concepts assigned to words, phrases, sentences, etc. for example, and (ii) thinking about whether those "match" facts (on correspondence theory) per how the person perceives them. (At least that's the nutshell version. A priori things the person accepts factor into it, too, for example, but we don't need to get into all of that here.)
The second is that on the standard view, there's no plausible, coherent account (and usually there's just no account period) of how propositions would relate to facts (on correspondence theory) independently of individuals thinking about this.
Truth-value is assigned to the proposition by an individual.
This analysis is nonsensical; there can no more be false truths than there can be false facts. Qualifying this I would say, though, that facts are properly equivalent only to empirical truths. The ambit of truths is larger than the ambit of facts. There are spiritual truths that are simply not determinate enough to coherently refer to as 'facts'.
False truths? What in the world are you even talking about?
Your analysis contends that truths and facts are different because truth and falsity are two modes of one thing. But this is nonsense because just as there can be truth and non-truth (falsity), there can be factuality and non-factuality, or actuality and non-actuality.
The ordinary sentences 'it is a fact that' and 'it is true that', at least when it comes to empirical and logical propositions, seem to be perfectly equivalent.
How would you say that non-factuality obtains ontologically, Mr. Meinong?
Did I say anything about non-factuality "obtaining ontologically"? Can you explain what 'obtaining ontologically' means?
You said "There can be non-factuality."
How can there be non-factuality, exactly?
Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly?
It is perfectly normal usage to refer to "non-factual statements'. What do you think 'counterfactual' means? It means the same as 'non-factual' or "contrary to fact'; in exactly the same way that 'false' means 'non-true' or 'contrary to truth'.
So you're referring to statements, or propositions? In other words, falsehood is a property of propositions?
Yes some statements or propositions, if you like, are false; which is to say that they are non-factual.
7th reply. ;)
Should I laugh or cry? Ah...this :-!
Right, so on your view, "false proposition" is a synonym for "non-fact."
And you'd say that "true proposition" is a synonym for "fact," right?
No, I suspect you're trying to tendentiously distort what I have said.
On my view 'false proposition' is synonymous with 'non-factual proposition', and the obverse for ' true proposition'.
I have answered your questions in good faith, but you always seem to avoid answering mine. I have seen several other posters pointing this out to you, to no apparent avail.
Earlier I wrote this:
"Did I say anything about non-factuality "obtaining ontologically"? Can you explain what 'obtaining ontologically' means?"
How about answering the questions I posed there?
The post after you asked that question was an explanation of what that referred to.
Okay, so false propositions and non-factual propositions are synonyms on your view, and then presumably true propositions and factual propositions are synonyms.
What would you say the relation of true/factual propositions is to facts?
Bullshit, you wrote this there:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Explain to me exactly how you think that answers the question as to what "obtaining ontologically" means? The question obviously refers to what it would mean for factuality to obtain ontologically. Instead of answering my question, all you're doing is asking me to answer more of your questions.
Quoting Terrapin Station
You responded as if you were unfamiliar with that terminology. So I worded it differently for you, which was the post in question.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That was the whole point of that post. It was a rewording/slightly more in-depth explanation of what I was asking you.
Bullshit, you wrote this there:
Quoting Terrapin Station
It is obvious that my question refers to what it would mean for factuality to obtain ontologically. Explain to me exactly how you think that answers the question about what it means to obtain ontologically.
When I ask you how non-factuality obtains ontologically, I'm asking you how can there be non-factuality, how is there such a thing, in what manner does it occur or is it present, etc.
You really are either a very poor reader or deliberately and dishonestly evasive. I've already pointed out that I haven't claimed that anything "obtains ontologically". That's your term and, apparently, your claim. So I'm asking you about factuality exactly the questions you are unjustifiably asking me about non-factuality.
Now, to preempt your answer, if all you are going to tell me is something along the lines of ' 'X' obtains when there is X", I will reply that in your own terms then ' 'Not-X' obtains when there is no X'. 'X' is the factuality of X, and 'not X' is the non-factuality or counterfactuality of X.
No one said it was your term. What you said was: "There can be non-factuality."
I was asking you how there can be non-factuality.
I've explained that if there can be factuality then in those same terms there can be non-factuality.
It remains for you to show how there can be factuality in a way (presumably " obtaining ontologically" although you apparently cannot explain what that means) in which there cannot be non-factuality. If you can't explain that then you have no argument. But this what it always seems to come down to with your apparently poorly thought out 'position'. I have seen this many times with your 'interactions' with others as well, and seen them express the same frustration when they realize you have nothing to back up your claims. Apparently you just like the sound of your own voice and have no intention of participating in discussions with an attitude of good faith. :-}
Well, facts, or "factuality" if you like, are states of affairs. So non-facts, or "non-factuality" would be, what--"non-states of affairs"?
I'm just asking him questions about his view (with the upshot that eventually it would explain so he (and you) could understand why truth and facts are analyzed as they are in analytic philosophy).
In any event, you're saying that the being of truth and falsehood is the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs?
Yes, it would be, after a correspondence theory of truth at least, the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs. Propositions which describe possible but not actual states of affairs are false (in other words the proposition relates in such a way with the states of affairs present, in this case by not matching them) and propositions which describe actual states of affairs would be true (because the propositions match the states of affairs existing).
You realize that what I said above was that truth and falsehood are (judgments of) the relation of a proposition to states of affairs (on correspondence theory), right?
What would be the judgement except becoming aware of the relation between a proposition and states of affairs? I don't get to choose what the relation between a proposition and states of affairs is, do I?
Could you answer first if you realize that that's what I said above?
Above where? I realised that's what you said in our conversation, not in your conversation with John. But I don't agree with it.
Where--in this thread.
Okay, so the only difference between what I wrote and what you wrote is the parenthetical "(judgment of)", right?
Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking this. My judgement can be wrong if I don't know the facts for whatever reason, but think I do. For example I have a hallucination, and thus think there's a tiger in front of me. "There's a tiger in front of me" is false, but I judge it to be true, because I don't correctly understand the fact that I'm having a hallucination and am not actually perceiving a real tiger.
I'm asking it because you're turning out to say that truth and falsehood are the same thing I said they were vis-a-vis being a relation between propositions and states of affairs (on correspondence theory).
But initially, you were arguing that truth and fact refer to the same thing--or at least that they can. And John was also arguing about facts/non-facts. (You actually shifted the discussion back to truth/falsehood above.)
I said I don't agree with your point of view but it's consistent, so now I understand it at least. As in, I understand why someone could think that. The reason why I don't agree is that I don't think everything that is referred to as truth could be placed within those bounds. For example, spiritual truths would have no place under your framework, would they? Yet I have reason to think such truths exist, and therefore the framework we're using to judge is wrong.
I think you are mistaken about that.
To say that facts Quoting Agustino is not to say that facts exist. That is a category error, which is what I have been tying to point out to Terrapin.
Truths also "represent those states of affairs which ARE", so to say that facts exist is essentially no different than to say that truths exist.
Are spiritual truths truths by virtue of being a relationship between a proposition and states of affairs under your framework?
Wait, why on your view is it a category error to say that facts exist?
How do facts exist? What is the difference between factuality and actuality?
No - because there are no "facts" in the spiritual realm the same way there are "facts" in the empirical realm. So yes, it is the relationship between a proposition and a spiritual reality, which "facts" don't adequately describe, possibly because the participant is also always involved in what the spiritual reality is. If facts are snow flakes, then that which describes spiritual reality would be alike drops of water. The liquidity of the latter cannot be captured by the rigidity and solidity of the former - and the former are ultimately a derivative of the latter.
Fact is defined in relationship with actuality. Fact is part of what is actual. It belongs to their essence to exist :-O like God!
By being present/occurrent. They're states of affairs that obtain.
Quoting John
There is no difference. They're synonyms.
You didn't explain why it's a category error on your view to say that facts exist.
Not that I can make any sense out of why spiritual reality wouldn't be factual, but so then you'd say that spiritual truths do not fit under correspondence theory?
Because whether we identify facts with being true, as would be shown by the equivalence of 'It is true that the cat is on the mat' with 'it is a fact that the cat is on he mat', or identify facts with being actual as would be shown by the equivalence of 'the cat being on the mat is factual' with the cat being on the mat is an actuality' ( and neither of these equivalences is perfectly coherent, in any case), the problems with saying that facts exist, or actualities exist are still similar to the problem with saying that truths exists. Truths, facts and actualities all obtain. Even actualities do not exist; rather actualityis existence. And you still haven't given any explanation of what it could mean for something to 'obtain ontologically' as opposed for it merely to obtain. That's what you still need to do if you want to show that your position involves a coherent difference that makes a difference.
Why would I say that? They do correspond - although in a loose fashion. But the underlying reality is such that saying "this is like this" becomes impossible - once it is said, it changes the underlying reality, which is no longer precisely as described (although neither is it completely different from the description). Much alike quantum mechanics - acts of observation, in this case acts of becoming aware of what the facts are, makes them become different and change. In quantum mechanics, the nature of particles are such that - they don't have a precise combination of position/momentum. So the nature of spiritual reality is such that we can't achieve the precision that we can achieve in the empirical world - and thus we can't speak of facts. In other words, the distinction between being and non-being becomes blurred - becomes more like a gradation than a yes/no switch.
What is the fact then? That the cat is on the mat. The fact is identical with the existent state of affairs.
I can not make any sense out of this.
First, saying that facts exist is a category error because "the problems with saying that facts exist or that actualities exist are similar to the problem with saying that truths exist"???
So on your view, category errors occur because something has similar problems to something else? I just can't make any sense at all out of that.
And then truths, facts and actualities all obtain but they do not exist??? What in the world? Obtaining IS existing. And if actuality is existence, then actualities exist.
And there's no problem with saying that truths exist in the first place. Truths do exist.
"'Obtain ontologically' as opposed to merely 'obtain'"--"ontologically" is in the first phrase simply to stress that that's what I'm asking for. An explanation of whatever being you suppose "non-facts" to have.
Because correspondence theory, on your view, is this: "correspondence theory of truth . . . the relationship between a proposition and states of affairs."
But when I asked you if spiritual truths are truths by virtue of being a relationship between a proposition and states of affairs, you responded with "No."
So you started asking me yes or no questions as well? >:O
I responded with a qualified no. Not facts in the same sense as facts existing in the empirical world.
I don't know why sense would matter. "Facts is facts," even if there are two senses (whatever those senses would be). And if your characterization of correspondence theory is only one sense, and not the relevant sense, then that's why you'd say that. (that spiritual truths do not fit under correspondence theory)
Facts can describe/be states of affairs which are not affected by your very observation of or interaction with them. There is a tree in the garden - that's not changing based on my observation of it or immediate interaction. The tree doesn't suddenly disappear after I make the observation. But in the spiritual world, when I say, for example "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen", the underlying "fact" described is unlike the fact of "there is a tree in the garden". To have evidence for faith, you must have faith - so your very participation is part of what creates the underlying spiritual reality - the underlying spiritual reality is not INDEPENDENT of what you do (the way the existence of the tree outside is independent of the attitude you have towards it). So if you don't have faith, then there is no evidence for faith. But if you do, then there is evidence. That's what the spiritual truth says, and of course there are degrees of faith, and therefore degrees of evidence too, and so forth.
But there are a lot of subjective facts in general (keeping in mind that subjective simply refers to mentality). For example, if you desire a surf green Stratocaster, it's a fact that you desire a surf green Stratocaster, and that's certainly not independent of you/what you do. That makes it no less a fact. It's a state of affairs that you desire a surf green Stratocaster. "Fact" in no way only refers to objective (non-mental/person-independent) states of affairs. It refers to ALL states of affairs, including mental, spiritual etc.--whatever there is.
No but spiritual reality isn't like that at all. It's not crisp - it's vague. That desire is not only subjective, it is crisp as well - precise. It's more alike desiring something, but not knowing EXACTLY what is desired. So in that sense, what is desired isn't factual - and neither is it non-factual. Fact/non-Fact fails to describe such a situation.
If it's vague, isn't the state of affairs--the fact--that it's vague?
Yes, that's what I'm saying. That's why I said that in terms of spiritual reality, there are facts, but they aren't facts in the way we generally conceive of facts in the empirical realm (ie crisp, precise, and uninfluenced by subjectivity)
I would say that anyone who thinks of "fact" as connoting "crisp, precise and uninfluenced by subjectivity" has a misconception of what facts are. Facts are simply whatever is, and if there are things that aren't crisp, precise or uninfluenced by subjectivity, then "fact" can't connote those qualities.
Sure, I can agree with that!
That's a contradiction. The spiritual reality is defined by how it is not vague at all.
"Faith" is in knowing exactly what to practice and think-- a belief, a ritual, an understanding, a feeling. It's actually crisp all the way down. So much so that it is a beacon that holds or someone returns to even in when assaulted by vagueness. The person beginning to doubt their way of life is called to "have faith," to turn away from the uncertain and the vague, to the particular crisp practice of faith.
The person who doubts their way of life don't have much faith, and therefore they don't have much evidence for their faith either. There's nothing crisp about this. As you noted in some other thread, I don't take my faith to be an act of knowledge for example. When I say I believe God exists, I'm not entirely sure what I mean by that.
Indeed-- they are not crisp enough in their thoughts. The doubter doesn't stick to the particular thoughts, feelings and actions they are meant to under faith. In the face of possibility (e.g. God might of might not be) the become unsettled. They start thinking: "Well maybe my faith isn't right, perhaps my way of life needs to be something else," becoming lost in a sea of vagueness.
Contrast with the Knight of Faith who, in the face of possibility (e.g. God might or might not be), affirms their way of life in no uncertain terms. Despite, the possibility of their way of life being wrong (e.g. God might not be), they affirm their faith. Indeed, the way of life is thought to be necessary, despite the truth of possibility otherwise. Crispness is the point. Not even a necessary truth of possibility can challenge the necessity which is the crispness of faith.
You are not entirely sure what you mean by "God exists" because it doesn't, in terms of existence, mean anything at all. It's a confusion created by mistaking an affirmation of faith or reason for faith ( "God exists" ) for empirical commentary. You use "God exists" to defend and understand a way of life you practice-- the point is to be crisp in that way.
Encyclopedias are (purportedly) full of facts. Are they full of states of affairs?
I don't think this is right at all. Is truth not "defined in relationship with actuality"? If factuality and actuality are the same thing, as Terrapin says, how could facts be defined in relation to actuality. A fact would then be an actuality, and it seems ridiculous so say that a thing is defined in relation to itself..
There are at least two senses of 'fact'; I have already acknowledged this. In one sense 'a fact' is synonymous with 'true'. "It is a fact that I went to the shops this morning". "It is true that I went to the shops this morning". These sentences are synonymous, which makes 'true' synonymous with 'a fact'. Really the common usages of 'true', 'fact' and 'actuality' are not very consistent. Which means the whole argument devolves to a terminological issue.
My concern with Terrapin, since he now apparently says that truths, facts and actualities all obtain, and that to obtain is to exist, is to find out how he thinks it is consistent to both say that truths and falsities are modalities of the same thing, and that nonetheless truths may obtain and exist whereas he would presumably say that falsities cannot. Does he mean that truths "obtain ontologically" and that falsities merely obtain, just as he seems to think in the case of factuality and non-factuality. I want to know, and he doesn't seem to be able to tell me, what the difference is between obtaining and obtaining ontologically. Personally, I think all this is really just playing with words, "pouring from the empty into the Void", as Gurdjieff would say.
That's the whole point of truth-value (truth, falsehood, and any other modalities we'd allow) being a property of propositions, and on my view, being a judgment of how a proposition relates to facts (on correspondence theory). Truth is a judgment that the proposition matches facts. Falsehood is a judgment that a proposition doesn't match facts. Both clearly exist. Both are clearly modes of the same thing.
Where one gets into trouble ontologically is when one says that truth and fact are, or can be, synonymous. Again, this is the whole impetus in analytic philosophy for analyzing "truth" so that it's different than "fact."
I wouldn't say that there is such a thing a "non-factuality." That's rather what you claimed.
Quoting John
In fact I already answered this. I added "ontologically" simply to emphasize that that was what was asking you about. It was simply in anticipation of receiving an answer that wasn't addressing what I was asking for, since I'm so used to that in the context of message board discussions.
What if you're an agnostic-theist?
If so then he's my opposite; I'm an atheist. But the way he lived was enough to make me very briefly want to be a theist.