People don't usually enjoy having their beliefs proved wrong, but some people hate it so much that they simply refuse to accept it, regardless of the ...
Do you mean 'bivalent logic'? There is also multivalent and paraconsistent logics. Thoughts can be composed in many ways, and we can think about world...
A solipsist doesn't publish, but you do. Therefore, you're not a solipsist. The existence of a speaker is not questioned by his/her speech but silence...
One might add that experiences have a hierarchical structure which goes all the way from what fundamental physics describes to the objects and states ...
It is not difficult to build affordable housing, the problem emerged with a financialization that A home is no longer a place to live in but a market ...
One difference between a manipulative statement and a lie is that the former can be true (e.g. selective and misleading), whereas a lie is never true....
The tectonics of Kant's epistemology is not so mysterious, it can be credited a collection of basic concepts and their logical relations to each other...
Little prevents us from sharing epistemologically objective knowledge about our ontologically subjective experiences. We live in this objective realit...
Skepticism regarding perception thrives on the ambiguous use of words such as 'see' or 'experience'. It makes thinkers incorrectly believe that a mira...
Really? Too bad. I think it is fairly clear that there is a difference between seeing something and having an experience of it, such as when rememberi...
Oh, but how could you see a dream banana? Didn't you rather dream the seeing of a banana? What satisfies the possibility that in the dream you saw a b...
I think the word makes sense also in English, at least via the Greek words 'archi' for 'prime' or 'chief', and 'tectonic' for 'what controls structure...
How could it be true unless it is assumed that you don't see the banana but only your own experience by way of which something you call 'banana' is th...
I didn't say you did. I said it is assumed in your question. It is assumed and disguised in its claim that you're having an experience during which yo...
Again, no you can't have an experience of your own experience during which you'd be unable to tell whether it is what you think it is. For example, th...
You can't both see and not see in the same respect, but you can imagine seeing something, in which case the seeing is replaced by an empathic ability ...
I don't see the experienced triangle having any lines or marks of its own, so, obviously I don't see the triangle. I experience it by way of seeing th...
Sure, the experience of that white triangle, for instance. But the triangle has no lines of its own, and it is only experienced, not seen. Instead I s...
Again, I'm not looking at my own experiences wondering which is illusory and which represents reality. That's your problem, not mine. The objects of m...
You're right. Philosophical rejections of naive realism also had the unfortunate consequence of jamming epistemology for the last 350 years with point...
It is trivially true that one either sees something or nothing, also in the case of hallucinations. It is not difficult to know whether one sees somet...
Then, despite your denials, it is obviously assumed that his experience represents either something or nothing, and that the object of his hallucinato...
..and that point arises from the false assumption that there exists something (e.g. sense-data, phenomena etc.) by way of which all things are experie...
Look, there is no need to first figure out what a veridical perception should look like; perceptions are not somehow comparable representations from w...
Your question makes no sense, because when we see the object we also see the light it reflects, not either light or the object. We can also see emitte...
You have the same problem because ocular phenomena are hardly less representational than sense-data. It is not an ocular phenomena that we see in the ...
Obviously not by continuing to assume representational perception; basically your question and problem arises from that asumption, i.e. that you only ...
To be clear, the argument from illusion concludes the existence of sense-data. But in its premise it is assumed that the appearance of the illusion so...
Only under your false assumption that the child would never see the real environment. In the arguments from illusion and hallucination representationa...
In the argument from illusion it is (incorrectly) assumed that we'd never see reality as it is, which basically explains away the possibility to disti...
The life that feels real to you feels real because it is the reality of life that you feel. The dream that feels real to you feels real because it is ...
But as Gilbert Ryle once argued: all of something can't be counterfeit, for then there is nothing left it could be counterfeit of. Seems fairly incont...
Dreams are but experiences of representations of life (memories, beliefs, pictures, descriptions). Life, however, is not a representation: e.g. it is ...
No, there is no such thing to imagine, because the ability to identify what something is like is acquired when one is awake. If you have never been aw...
Also in the case of illusions we see things directly: e.g. optical effects such as refraction, or two lines whose ends make their lengths appear diffe...
Don't you get it yet? There is no need for an exact map when we see objects directly. From illusions it does not follow that all we see would be illus...
Without photons your visual cortex "operates" only hallucinations, in which nothing is seen. That's why they are called 'hallucinations'. And how coul...
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