How would you describe consciousness?

Reply to anonymous66

Of those list positions Searle would probably be the closest. Thought Dennett is close too, if you pay attention not what he’s talking about rather than dismissing his thought as brute reductionism (which various interested parties tend to do, unfortunately).

The major aspect people have to get right is treating consciousness as a state of the world. Substance dualism and its spawn (including forms of reductionism )undermine our understanding of consciousness by denying it place in the world.

“The Hard Problem” is the idea it doesn’t make sense for consciousness to exist. Under it no description is good enough because consciousness is not seen to be a state of the world which is caused or causes other states of the world. Rather, it is thought to be of a separate realm which has nothing to do with what’s going on in the world. In understanding consciousness,the chief hurdle to overcome is thinking it of as something other than state of the world we may (and frequently do) know.

I’d go as far as to say it requires direct realism to understand. Since experiences don’t have a empirical manifestation per se (observed states are only correlated to know states of conscious rather than being them), we can only rely on brute presentation within experience. If I am to know the person that’s sitting in front of me is conscious, I cannot to so through the body alone. Action of their body(gestures, language) might indicate they are having experiences, by it takes my knowledge of their existing consciousness to consider that. Without that brute awareness that consciousness exists, I would just see a body moving; philosophical zombies all over again.

I must have direct knowledge of existing experiences within my experience.

Dennett does use the word "illusion" when he describes consciousness. If illusion, then that is all you can say about consciousness.

I think Greg Koukl gets it right...

Koukl points out that in order to recognize something as an illusion, two things are required: (1) the presence of a conscious observer who is capable of perception, and (2) the ability to distinguish between what is real and what is illusion.

If there were no conscious observers who can perceive, then it is impossible to know there is an illusion because the non-conscious do not perceive or know anything. So if consciousness was not real there would be no way to perceive that consciousness was just an illusion. If consciousness is required to perceive an illusion, then consciousness cannot itself be an illusion. Similarly, one would have to be able to perceive both the real world and the illusory world in order to know there is a distinction between the two, and to subsequently identify the illusory world as illusory. If all one perceived was the illusion, they would not be able to recognize it as such.

duplicate post.

Reply to anonymous66 I know... but he also insists people have experiences. The "illusion" he's talking about is really the notion of consciousness in a separate realm, rather than denying experiences are real. Dennett is trying to point out what stinks so bad about our approach consciousness.

He just doesn't quite have the words to clearly state what he's going for, particularly with respect to the substance dualists who are only interested in reading "illusion" and forming the conclusion anything he says about consciousness must therefore be wrong.

It seems to me that what many (including Dennett and Searle) may be trying to express is the reality that our consciousness is evidentially generated by a physical brain, and that out physical brain is not perfect, so neither is the consciousness it generates. It can be fooled. So, we are using a flawed tool to examine our own flawed tool and the (apparent?) reality that our flawed tool allows us to perceive, contemplate and describe.

I can state all the above without resorting to the use of the word "illusion"... Why can't Dennett?

Reply to anonymous66 That's actually a pretty good description the mistake everyone is making.

If we know about consciousness, then our tool is not flawed, at least for this instance. We know, perfectly, that the experiences of ourselves and others exists. Rather than being flawed and fooled, we are perfect and know.

We do not have flawed tools insofar as this context goes. Just becasue we can be fooled doesn't mean we are. And for anything we know, by definition, we are not fooled.

I think that is the point that Searle is making. We do know. If we know anything about consciousness, then we know that it is real. So "illusion" is absolutely the wrong word to use when describing it.

Reply to anonymous66 Indeed... but Dennett clearly isn't just doing that, for he also talks about the presence of our experiences. "Illusion" is clearly trying to get at something else than just the existence of experiences. So is Dennett just talking about the existence of our experiences? Clearly not. Rather, he is talking about how we understand our experiences, what we think about consciousness more so than the experiences themselves. If the "illusion" is not our experiences but what we frequently think of them (that they exist outside of the world), then Dennett's position makes more sense, compliments Searle's and is correct-- that experiences exist outside the world is an "illusion," a case where we've been fooled by our own system of understanding.

Reply to anonymous66 I think your question and then the options you present as answers are incongruous. Based on the latter, you seem to be asking what causes or gives rise to conscious, rather than for a description of it.

My answer as for why there is consciousness is that it is due to brain activity, just as digestion is due to intestinal activity. This is to give an empirical explanation, which we are perfectly obliged to do, but it is also one-sided and incomplete, since all objects, including brains, depend upon a knowing subject and its a priori forms of understanding.

I suppose I could change the wording slightly, but regardless, the question is about the nature of consciousness and whether or not any description or theory is better than others.

I think even Chalmers would agree that there is some correlation between what the physical brain is doing and consciousness. If I understand him correctly, he's saying that the brain deals with behaviors, and our subjective feeling of consciousness is a result of the fact that consciousness is a fundamental property, and that everything is conscious. I don't quite understand, if panpsychism, how it is that I subjectively feel pain when my physical nervous system is agitated. Or why I sense my consciousness as if I am a body, and why the consciousness of other objects nearby aren't apparent. (like Searle says, if panpsychism, then a "smear" of consciousness seems likely- what I experience is very distinct).

Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness

Indeed... but Dennett clearly isn't just doing that, for he also talks about the presence of our experiences.

One might say that experiences are the content of consciousness. One might then continue that one can (or even that one necessarily must) experience consciousness. But this experience, being purportedly an experience of the container, is not the container but the contents, by previous stipulation. Which makes it an illusion.

I disagree with your summation of substance dualism as "there are souls," because that suggests it's a theological position. It strikes me that you've jettisoned the classical Cartesian position so that you could move on to the more modern views. My thought is that substance dualism and it's newer offspring property dualism largely collapse into the same thing under analysis and no real headway has been made by Chalmers or Searle in their new classification system. They've just rearranged the furniture.

Substance dualism hold there are: 1. Physical things and 2. Mental Things. Property dualism holds there is one thing 1. Physical things, but it has two properties A. Physical properties and 2. Mental properties. So, property dualism begs the same question as substance dualism, which is what is this magical substance that contains mental properties? A property dualist simply declares that physical substance has mental properties, which means we have no idea what a physical substance is. It apparently has properties that can't be measured or observed. How does that help us any? Why not just say there are two types of substances?

We know we can have physical objects that don't have mental properties (like rocks and the like). Why then can't we have physical objects that have only mental properties? How would that particular physical object be any different than a Cartesian mind?

I'm to take it then from Chalmers that we a nebulous monistic universal substance that we call Physical Substance and sometimes it thinks and sometimes it just sits at the bottom of a stream.

My point to all this is that Western Philosophy hasn't moved an inch since Descartes. That's not an indictment. That's just an acknowledgment that he got it right. I do thank Chalmers for writing his fascinating book, though, and I do think Searle remains the clearest and most convincing of the modern day philosophers. I also think that Dennett is a waste of time, highly overrated, and has little significant to say.

Hanover, are you suggesting that Searle is a property dualist, even though that position is one he specifically denies and argues against the idea?

Reply to anonymous66 Your post posted 2 minutes after mine, so I'm first saying that you read quickly.

I'm saying that the distinction between property and substance dualism is a distinction without a difference. He's not addressed any important problem by redefining physical substance to include non-physical properties.

Searle does sound to me like he is promoting property dualism (or maybe even pluralism - maybe there are other properties beside physical and mental?) when he argues that mental properties are real. It's like he wants to accept a consciousness that is totally dependent on a physical brain (so not panpsychism) and that mental properties are real (not illusory, not reducible, not epiphenomenal).

I believe that Descartes did believe in God and souls. So, his was basically a theological position, wasn't it? Although he did use a reasonable scientific approach.

I'm not aware of any description of substance dualism that wouldn't also include souls.

It seems we all feel like dualism is the case. We feel like a mind in a body. So, the simplest solution would be one that included that reality.

Quoting Hanover

I disagree with your summation of substance dualism as "there are souls," because that suggests it's a theological position. It strikes me that you've jettisoned the classical Cartesian position so that you could move on to the more modern views. My thought is that substance dualism and it's newer offspring property dualism largely collapse into the same thing under analysis and no real headway has been made by Chalmers or Searle in their new classification system. They've just rearranged the furniture.

Here, here! This is a theme I was trying to convey in the other philosophy forums.

Can you describe substance dualism in a way that doesn't include a soul? Descartes definitely had that belief, didn't he?

I definitely see a distinction between panpsycism and the possibility that souls exist.

This last year reading Davidson's essay 'mental events' about inter alia his 'anomalous monism' has made me think about these questions differently. I don't mean that I agree with Davidson but at least he addresses the barrier: there is something about 'mental' and 'physical' explanations that we sometimes rather casually intermingle, but they don't fit together, and it may be there are parallel (but not item-for-item parallel) explanations under different descriptions, the mental and the physical.

For me Dennett's stuff about multiple drafts etc. is a bold try at redescribing what goes on in our heads, but I hate talk of 'illusion' in the way he does.

One small point from the op, I wasn't clear why it holds that 'if panpsychism there would be no way to know where my consciousness starts and another begins'. The pan-ness doesn't require us to be part of a universal consciousness. (I'm not a pan psychist but...)

Anyone read 'How forests talk'? That's an interesting zone that I don't finally buy into, but seems an interesting ecological way of looking at these things, but I've only read reviews of the book so far.

I just can't make panpsychism "work". The way Chalmers describes it, everything is conscious, even electrons. Those small conscious things combine to create a subjective experience. How? Maybe the simple explanation is, because they're all touching each other in my body? But, what about when I touch a table? And again, why do I feel the subjective experience of pain when my physical nervous system is stimulated? How is the physical and the mental interrelated?

Quoting anonymous66

I can dismiss property dualism, or at least panpsychism because it seems that if panpsychism there would be no way to know where my consciousness starts and another begins, but what I experience is that I'm a being in a body. And there is still all the issues common to substance dualism (for example, how do tiny conscious things interact with physical brain?)

Externalism brah. The mind isn't an isolated specimen.

Thanks, darth, I hadn't encountered that concept before.

Reply to anonymous66

If you want to say that consciousness is generated by the "physical brain" then how is that not an example of the "naive realism" you have rejected as being "demonstrably false"?

I think that the whole subject is being approached from the wrong direction. I think that the metaphysical question that must be first answered is 'what is intelligence?'. Isn't the Chinese room partially representative of how the brain actually functions by using a constant set of automatic mind states?

If I learn about 3 types of rock, I can pass myself off as a geologist, three types of birds etc
If learn three concepts of philosophy of mind in depth, and talk about them, you would automatically assume that I am intelligent, at least in that subject; where as all I have done is memorized a lot of syntax without any full semantic understanding of the concepts of which I would be talking about.


Is it not also possible that most inter personal communication and indeed most 'mind function' are 'automatic responses' carried out without true thought in a Chinese room style?

Many of us go through life in this state, faking it, living the illusion according to oriental philosophies and religions.


Could it not be that if you get enough layers of multiple syntax simultaneously then the semantics are 'created' from the syntax?

Reply to Jamesk If intelligence were that simple to replicate, AI wouldn't be nearly as limited as it is, especially with regard to the Turing test. As it stands, I think we'd all be able to separate the bots from real people in a matter of minutes regardless of how much intelligence had been programmed into the bot.

Reply to anonymous66 I got you fam. (Y)

Quoting John

If you want to say that consciousness is generated by the "physical brain" then how is that not an example of the "naive realism" you have rejected as being "demonstrably false"?

I'm not aware of any other way to view consciousness. The evidence suggests that when the physical brain is changed or damaged, then there are changes in consciousness. There is no evidence of any consciousness without a physical brain.

And the reality is that different beings sense the world in different ways, depending on their sense organs. So, perhaps there is a "real reality", but whose version should we accept as "real"? The only way we can comprehend our universe is through our sense organs, and we know they are not giving us an objective picture, and that we are susceptible to illusions.

Is it even possible to imagine what the universe would look like from the point of view of an observer without sense organs?

I do believe there is a physical reality out there, I just don't trust that my sense organs are giving me an accurate picture of it. I think the evidence suggests rather that our sense organs are such that they give us the ability to see the world in a way that is beneficial for the survival of our species, not a completely accurate one.

Reply to anonymous66 Here's a link to a book on externalism, or the extended mind, btw: http://www.imd.inder.cu/adjuntos/article/604/The%20Extended%20Mind.pdf

James: I think that the metaphysical question that must be first answered is 'what is intelligence?'

The etymology of 'intelligence' is interesting: actually comes from 'inter-legere', 'to read between' or 'to choose or pick out'. There is also a Buddhist definition which is parallel, meaning 'the ability to make distinctions'.

But the nature of intelligence and that of consciousness are surely different questions, as there are conscious organisms that are unintelligent.

Anonymous66:The evidence suggests that when the physical brain is changed or damaged, then there are changes in consciousness.

But that works both ways! Damaged brains can be healed because the mind seems to work out ways to re-route its activities - even to the extent of re-purposing parts of the brain that are usually associated with one function, to another function, in the event of damage to the original functionality. Those are amongst the findings of neuro-plasticity.

Anonymous66: I think the evidence suggests rather that our sense organs are such that they give us the ability to see the world in a way that is beneficial for the survival of our species, not a completely accurate one.

But reason surely owes its power to its independence, and nothing else. If you say that reason is an adaptive organ, then how can you present any argument? You're just another type of organism, making another type of noise. :)

Can "consciousness" even be described by the conscious entity? How do we exteriorize ourselves to our own consciousness so that we can observe it, and still be conscious?

I think that is an excellent question! In one sense, you can say a great deal about consciousness from the perspectives of cognitive science, philosophy of mind, psychology and other disciplines. But on the other hand, as one of the salient characteristics of consciousness is its first-person nature (which is the basis of Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness' argument), there is another sense in which consciousness can never be an object of itself. As Hindu sages put it, 'the hand can grasp another but can't grasp itself, the eye can see another but cannot see itself' - a saying I regard as axiomatic.

Quoting anonymous66

the reality is that...

Quoting anonymous66

So, perhaps there is a "real reality", but whose version should we accept as "real"?

Not yours.

Quoting anonymous66

I think the evidence suggests rather that our sense organs are such that they give us the ability to see the world in a way that is beneficial for the survival of our species, not a completely accurate one.

Why believe the evidence that the evidence is not to be believed?

Quoting Bitter Crank

Can "consciousness" even be described by the conscious entity? How do we exteriorize ourselves to our own consciousness so that we can observe it, and still be conscious?

This is what consciousness consists of: the interiorization of itself. Thus it is always exterior to itself. One is conscious of being conscious whenever one considers the matter, and that is the description that one can give - the experience of the subject of experience. The illusion, therefore, is that there is some division between experience and the subject of experience such that the subject can be outside or inside.

Reply to Wayfarer "But the nature of intelligence and that of consciousness are surely different questions, as there are conscious organisms that are unintelligent."

It is exactly this type of statement that made me ask my question. Which organisms are conscious and unintelligent? Insects display intelligence, bacteria could even be said to display some level of intelligence depending again on how one defines the term 'intelligence'.

On what do we base these terms 'intelligent, and conscious.'.

@unenlightened
I get the sense you're saying that it's not possible to form an opinion about the nature of consciousness. What of evidence and scientific studies? Do you have an opinion about which of the possible choices I gave is closest to what is the case? Or are you suggesting its a waste of time to even attempt to come to any conclusions?

I would describe consciousness as an information architecture - or a model of sensory information for the purpose of modeling one's attention. It is useful to have a real-time model of all the information coming from the senses and how it compares to the information stored in the brain (our memories). This is how we learn - by comparing, in real-time, the information coming from the senses and the information stored in the brain.

Consciousness provides organisms a way of being aware of instinctual behaviors - behaviors that weren't learned but were designed as an inherent part of the system - so that the organism can filter these behaviors, essentially selecting which behaviors benefit them at the moment and which don't.

Reply to anonymous66 Not at all. I'm giving my opinion. But evidence is evident to consciousness; evidence of consciousness is evident to consciousness. Therefore consciousness is evidence; evidence is consciousness.

What I was saying before is that one needs evidence to doubt evidence, and there is no other place to obtain it but experience. To doubt the reality of experience one needs the access to reality that one seeks to deny.

Reply to unenlightened Your conclusions do not appear to follow. Anon is right to suspect that if your view has merit... it isn't formulatable.

I guess I only see a couple of options. I can accept naive realism, despite the fact I know there is no known standard way to view the world (all creatures sense the world through their sense organs, all creatures sense the world differently- and the human brain is capable of being fooled) Or I can accept radial skepticism or solipsism.

Or I can accept that there is a reality that we are experiencing, despite the fact I also know about the flaws in the human brain.

Did I miss any other options?

Reply to anonymous66 I know I am sometimes mistaken too. I have the evidence. I just painted the garden wall, thinking it was going to continue dry and sunny, but now it's raining. Damn. I know I was mistaken only because it is indubitably raining, and I have indubitably just painted the wall. There can be no evidence for radical skepticism, because it radically undermines itself.

That I am always wrong must be wrong. Therefore my sophisticated realism is that I trust the evidence until the evidence tells me not to, at which point I trust the new evidence. Thus I can say that I was wrong, but it makes no sense to say that I am wrong; that would be equivalent to saying nothing, which is what the genuine radical skeptic and solipsist should do - say nothing.

Reply to Mongrel Can you say where the gaps are in my argument? I might be able to fill them.

@unenlightened
Which of the poll options do you suppose is closer to what is the case? I think Searle is closest.

Quoting anonymous66

If anything is real, consciousness is...

I'd add to that a pseudo-cartesian 'If anything is unreal, consciousness is real.'

So Searle, I guess.

You said: Quoting unenlightened

Not at all. I'm giving my opinion. But evidence is evident to consciousness; evidence of consciousness is evident to consciousness. Therefore consciousness is evidence; evidence is consciousness.

This part just didn't make much sense to me. You and I might look for evidence of consciousness in regard to a third party. In that case, the evidence we gather would not generally be considered to be consciousness itself.

I have never asked a fellow human "Are you conscious?" Nor have I ever asked myself that. But it seems clear to me that talk of "evidence of consciousness" doesn't have much to do with either case. Interestingly, I'm able to say the preceding with a fair amount of confidence in spite of my inability to clearly define consciousness. My knowledge of it is apparently more in the "know how" department.. that is, the ability to correctly use the word.

unenlightened:What I was saying before is that one needs evidence to doubt evidence, and there is no other place to obtain it but experience. To doubt the reality of experience one needs the access to reality that one seeks to deny.

This was directed at anon's evolutionary theory (which is accepted by a fair number of pretty intelligent people). I think for those who think it all the way through, it's easy enough to posit some special parting with the veil of ignorance supposedly cast by nature. It's actually reminiscent of the concept of gnosis (or maybe revelation.) Every generation thinks they're the first to puzzle this kind of shit out.

"Imagine that we inhabit a two dimensional space and that we ourselves are two dimensional. Consider how it would seem to us if a spoon passed through our world. Perhaps we would eventually evolve to the point of being able to discern the truth that is beyond our powers of perception."

-- the adherent to "special insight"

Reply to anonymous66

The point is the belief that there is an independently existent physical brain just like the one we perceive is an example of naive realism.

Mongrel:This part just didn't make much sense to me. You and I might look for evidence of consciousness in regard to a third party. In that case, the evidence we gather would not generally be considered to be consciousness itself.

It's not about looking for evidence. Evidence itself is the point of contention. What exactly is evidence? The term specifies something specific: a particular kind of thing, a showing of the world or logic, such that we can say: "Yes. That claim is accurate. We know something about the world or logic." Evidence is observation, seeing, hearing, touching, thinking, reasoning.

For any instance of evidence to be, something must be demonstrated, must be shown in thought or perception, and understood. All instances of evidence are experience. The only coherent position is that evidence is consciousness itself-- the states of consciousness which are the respective instances of evidence. If there is evidence (the world or an idea shown), then there is a conscious state.

Quoting Mongrel

I have never asked a fellow human "Are you conscious?" Nor have I ever asked myself that. But it seems clear to me that talk of "evidence of consciousness" doesn't have much to do with either case. Interestingly, I'm able to say the preceding with a fair amount of confidence in spite of my inability to clearly define consciousness. My knowledge of it is apparently more in the "know how" department.. that is, the ability to correctly use the word.

When dealing with a casualty, the first-aider will typically squeeze an earlobe quite hard to see if they respond to pain. A response is taken as evidence of consciousness. One never needs to ask, because any reply is always sufficient evidence - 'no' serves as well as 'yes' to confirm consciousness, and any question will likewise serve to elicit a response 'what's your name?' for example. Similarly, non-verbal responses are evidence of consciousness (or perhaps you prefer the term awareness here) in an animal such as a dog.

None of this is obtuse philosophical speculation. If you know how to use the word, it will be perfectly understandable.

In one's own case, there is likewise never a need to ask oneself. To be conscious is to be aware of being aware. If one asks oneself any question, one is already aware of being aware, and that question is therefore entirely superfluous.

Again, I am not telling you anything you do not already know perfectly well, and it makes me suspect your motives in your reply. One does not need to look for evidence of one's consciousness, because looking for anything is evidence enough. I don't generally need to look for evidence that it is raining, either; it makes itself evident.

Quoting Mongrel

This was directed at anon's evolutionary theory (which is accepted by a fair number of pretty intelligent people).

I am not a democrat of the understanding; many intelligent people have held to all sorts of nonsense.

Quoting Mongrel

"Imagine that we inhabit a two dimensional space and that we ourselves are two dimensional. Consider how it would seem to us if a spoon passed through our world. Perhaps we would eventually evolve to the point of being able to discern the truth that is beyond our powers of perception."

-- the adherent to "special insight"

Nowhere have I suggested that evidence cannot point beyond itself. One does not need to imagine another world; footprints in the sand point to unseen feet. A A Milne's seminal work goes into this in the chapter 'Where the woozle wasn't'.

It still seems to me that I can either conclude that we know virtually nothing of reality- so solipsism or radical skepticism, or that what mankind is (and has been) doing when we explore the world around us, is akin to a drunken man, prone to hallucinations, stumbling around in total darkness with a faulty flashlight while trying to explore a beautiful mansion.

And exploring consciousness is rather like a man crawling around outside his car trying to diagnose the problems with his car(engine and suspension problems), in total darkness, while it's hurtling down the highway at 100 miles an hour.. oh, yeah, and he has a faulty flashlight.

I'm not sure if I'd call that naive realism, but that's where I'm at. And it seems most similar to Searle's view than any other.

That's a very enlightened if somewhat old-fashioned position.

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing."
Socrates.

My unenlightened and more fashionable way of saying the same thing is that all knowledge is provisional and fallible, rather than absolute. I usually know when it is raining, but I might be fooled by a well aimed garden hose. Still, if there is a suspicion of a problem with the car, I'd suggest slowing down and pulling to the side of the road.

Reply to unenlightened Apparently you didn't understand anything I said. So we're even.

@unenlightened
I think we're on the same page, as I often speak of provisional knowledge and fallibility. but in my analogy, to stop the car would be analogous to trying to study consciousness while unconscious.

Reply to anonymous66 Yes, that probably wouldn't work too well. But it might be possible to stop the car without switching off the engine, or to stop the rushing chatter of thought without becoming unconscious.

Well, regardless of the analogy used, yes, I think we can compensate for the fact we're using our brains to examine our brains. And I think we both acknowledge that there is something of a learning curve (provisional knowledge and fallibility).

And regarding the other analogy, even a drunk man prone to hallucinations can presumably keep records of his progress while exploring the dark mansion (and we can imagine that he's not always drunk... even drunks have moments of lucidity).

I think that with all of our modern technological advances, the fact that we are no closer than Descartes to having the answer might mean that we are looking at the question wrong. We still simply do not know enough about the nature of our physical universe to give an answer right now any more accurately than Locke or Berkeley could have.

I am starting to believe in a new, yet not fully defined, form of dualism that I believe eventually the scientific community will find no alternative other than to accept the possibility of. If one point of light can exist in 2 places at the same time, as the quantum guys have proven, or if atoms exist in all places at once until you 'observe' them, which they are trying to prove right now, how can the door to dualism not be opened and properly explored?

@Jamesk
Regarding a new form of dualism... I think you may have something there. I mentioned earlier that Searle accepts both physical and mental properties... and that certainly sounds like dualism- and may even hint of pluralism (if physical and mental, what other properties?)

It seems, no matter how strange, that the evidence suggests there are mental and physical properties. So, monism, when it comes to substance, but dualism in regards to properties. And yet Chalmers is no closer to convincing me that consciousness is a fundamental property.- so not panpsychism.

We first need to recognize the human brain / mind as the crowning achievement of evolution / creation / the universe as we know it so far. To fully understand the brain, the mind and ultimately ourselves is just as hard as fully understanding the deepest questions in physics.

The fact that it is only by virtue of having minds in the first place are we able to even ask the mind body question, or to allow us to ask questions about relativity or gravity.

The three biggest questions in philosophy, as I see it, are; "what is the universe made of?", "What are we? (the mind body problem) and "How are we supposed to behave as human beings?" . The answer to the second question can only really be found in the answer of the first question.

The problem with that answer is that, until about .04 seconds ago (in evolutionary terms) we had zero concept that there were either brains or galaxies. We had no idea of the big bang, evolutionary biology, or neuroscience. Yet, 2,500 years ago, Socrates read the inscription over the gates of the Temple of the Oracle of Delphi, 'Man, Know Thyself'.

Quoting unenlightened

When dealing with a casualty, the first-aider will typically squeeze an earlobe quite hard to see if they respond to pain. A response is taken as evidence of consciousness. One never needs to ask, because any reply is always sufficient evidence - 'no' serves as well as 'yes' to confirm consciousness, and any question will likewise serve to elicit a response 'what's your name?' for example. Similarly, non-verbal responses are evidence of consciousness (or perhaps you prefer the term awareness here) in an animal such as a dog.

None of this is obtuse philosophical speculation. If you know how to use the word, it will be perfectly understandable.

In one's own case, there is likewise never a need to ask oneself. To be conscious is to be aware of being aware. If one asks oneself any question, one is already aware of being aware, and that question is therefore entirely superfluous.

I wouldn't be so sure you know how to use the word. A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way. Why would a dog be conscious and a robot not?

You then claim that to be conscious "is to be aware of being aware". Do you believe a dog is capable of that? How about a robot? There is certainly no evidence that dogs or any other non-human animal is "aware of being aware".

I have no idea what the correct technical terms are, but "consciousness", as in what we lose when we go to sleep, is certainly a property shared among higher animals. But "consciousness", as in the qualia that exist at a particular time, is uniquely human. They are distinct attributes.

Tom:A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way.

...one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.

— René Descartes
Discourse on Method in Discourse on Method and Related Writings (1637).

Tom:There is certainly no evidence that dogs or any other non-human animal is "aware of being aware".

See the mirror test. True, it might not indicate 'awareness of being aware' but it does indicate that at least some animals (and birds) recognise their image in the mirror.

Quoting tom

I wouldn't be so sure you know how to use the word. A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way. Why would a dog be conscious and a robot not?

In common parlance, which is where I deliberately started, the word 'conscious' is used in relation to humans and higher animals, and is not clearly distinguished from 'awareness. Such beings are said to be conscious or unconscious. Whereas when I contact the emergency geeks, they do not ask whether the patient is conscious and breathing, they do when I dial 999.

Later, I make a distinction for philosophical purposes between 'awareness' and 'consciousness' exactly for the purpose of clarifying the difference between human and animal. This is a stipulated distinction and not a matter of common usage. I am exactly not claiming that dogs are aware of being aware, but merely that they are aware, when they aren't in common parlance 'unconscious'.

Whether these terms might have an extended application to a hypothetical robot, I rather doubt, but am open to persuasion. At the moment, I am of the opinion that awareness is not a computation, so I tend (with the rest of the world) not to say when my computer freezes, that it has become unconscious.

Searle already answered this question. Even if the robot can seemingly 'display' consciousness, it only a syntactic display of consciousness lacking and semantic understanding as shown in the 'china room' theory. A jelly fish can 'respond' to outside influences and so is 'conscious' on some level, but you cannot compare a dog or robot feeling pain to a ballet dancer dancing.

Right. Searle points out that there is a huge difference between simulating consciousness, and actually creating an artificial intelligence that is actually experiencing consciousness. In a computer simulation of a rainstorm, no one gets wet.

The problem is, we currently have no way to determine the difference between a simulation of consciousness(behaviors), and the real thing (the subjective experiences that make up consciousness).

Quoting unenlightened

Later, I make a distinction for philosophical purposes between 'awareness' and 'consciousness' exactly for the purpose of clarifying the difference between human and animal. This is a stipulated distinction and not a matter of common usage. I am exactly not claiming that dogs are aware of being aware, but merely that they are aware, when they aren't in common parlance 'unconscious'.

Are you sure that dogs are aware rather than just conscious? If by "awareness" you mean they possess qualia - i.e. they not only detect a particular shade of grey (dogs may not be the best animal for this) but are also aware they are detecting it, there is no evidence for that or reason to suspect it beyond anthropomorphism. There is no evidence that non-human animals possess qualia, which seems to render them, by your definition, unaware.

Quoting Jamesk

Searle already answered this question. Even if the robot can seemingly 'display' consciousness, it only a syntactic display of consciousness lacking and semantic understanding as shown in the 'china room' theory

A couple of problems with Searle's Chinese Rooom are that it is unphysical - i.e. it cannot in reality be performed, and that it is not computationally universal - i.e. it is irrelevant.

Quoting tom

Are you sure that dogs are aware rather than just conscious? If by "awareness" you mean they possess qualia - i.e. they not only detect a particular shade of grey (dogs may not be the best animal for this) but are also aware they are detecting it, there is no evidence for that or reason to suspect it beyond anthropomorphism. There is no evidence that non-human animals possess qualia, which seems to render them, by your definition, unaware.

I don't remember mentioning qualia. I did say that I regarded consciousness in the full human sense to be being aware of being aware. This surely makes clear that I am using awareness simple as a precursor to human consciousness. So I am saying with some sureness, but not infallibly that dogs are at least aware, but not necessarily conscious, i.e. not necessarily aware of being aware.

And now we have to talk about evidence again. Anything whatsoever that is evident to me is, if the term means anything, conveyed through my qualia. My qualia are my evidence but they cannot be evidence of your qualia, let alone a dog's.

So the evidence of awareness of others can only be behavioural, which surely is the point of your robot trick. Dogs behave like people in so far as they go to sleep and wake up, they get excited and frightened, and so on. And they die. So I can distinguish between a dead dog, an unconscious dog, and wakeful dog with a degree of confidence except at the margins. Awareness shows itself behaviourally as responsiveness to the environment; that is the only possible evidence.

Let's talk about the Turing test. There are robot cars these days that are responsive in an intelligent way to the environment. Like a well trained sheepdog, they go where you tell them to and adapt on the way to the circumstances. But they fail the Turing test as soon as you let them off the lead.

The best way to conduct a Turing test is to refuse to say in advance what it will be, because as soon as one tells the programmer, he can program the appropriate response. So I have given away my secret here, but there are plenty of others...

Quoting unenlightened

The best way to conduct a Turing test is to refuse to say in advance what it will be, because as soon as one tells the programmer, he can program the appropriate response. So I have given away my secret here, but there are plenty of others...

Is the Turing test a test for the subjective experience that (hopefully) we all agree determines and defines consciousness? Or is it a measure of whether or not some AI can fool people with its behaviors?

There is still the question of simulation vs the "real thing."

Quoting anonymous66

There is still the question of simulation vs the "real thing."

You are simulating well enough to fool me. ;)

It's a test for responsiveness, and that is all you ever have. All you have are my posts; I hope they are sufficient to convince you that I am conscious some of the time, because I cannot offer you my subjectivity. Turing is saying that if you cannot tell the difference between a person and a program, then it is unreasonable to claim there is a difference.

Quoting unenlightened

And now we have to talk about evidence again. Anything whatsoever that is evident to me is, if the term means anything, conveyed through my qualia. My qualia are my evidence but they cannot be evidence of your qualia, let alone a dog's.

There is clear evidence that other humans possess qualia, the most striking of which is the creation of scientific and other knowledge, also art and culture. At a more mundane level, human meme transfer requires qualia. We extract the rule, the meaning from a message, and discard the sequence of actions that comprise the message.

On the contrary, we know from animal studies that they do not extract meaning from actions, but simply behaviour-parse. Here's a wealth of information on animal learning!

The 2003 classic "Byrne, R W (2003) Imitation as behaviour parsing" is the one to read.

Animals do not create knowledge, but exist entirely within the constraints of their genetic programming.

Quoting anonymous66

Is the Turing test a test for the subjective experience that (hopefully) we all agree determines consciousness? Or is it a measure of whether or not some AI can fool people with its behaviors?

The cognitive aspects of an artificial general intelligence cannot be tested for simply behaviorally i.e. via its inputs and outputs.

The ability to form a semantic conception from syntactic actions must be the measure for intelligence / awareness / consciousness. Sheep have some intelligence, and awareness even be a 'dim' one, Humans display the highest known level of intelligence that leads to a high level of conceptual self awareness that separates us from the rest of the animals.

Even if our brains do function on some level in similar ways to other species or computers, what separates us is this ability to learn seemingly without boundaries.

Also talking about concepts such as artificial intelligence, hallucinations and zombies as if they are real doesn't help us to make progress with the mind. I know that this view will not be popular here.

Quoting Jamesk

Humans display the highest known level of intelligence that leads to a high level of conceptual self awareness that separates us from the rest of the animals.

But it can't be simply that intelligence leads to self awareness, or computers would be self aware, groups of people qua groups would be self aware, and clever animals would also be self-aware.

Quoting Jamesk

Even if our brains do function on some level in similar ways to other species or computers, what separates us is this ability to learn seemingly without boundaries.

But computers and animals don't create knowledge. To create knowledge, you need to be self-aware.

Quoting tom

Animals do not create knowledge, but exist entirely within the constraints of their genetic programming.

This is quite untrue; as your own reference states:

"Socially mediated traditions of behaviour, although known in many species of animal (see, for example, Galef 1980, 1990; Roper 1983; Terkel 1994; Reader & Laland 2000; Rendell & Whitehead 2001), are particularly striking in the chimpanzee Pan troglodytes (Whiten et al. 1999), and the variation among the tools made and used by different chimpanzee populations is so rich that it has been studied as ‘material culture’ (McGrew 1992)."

This translates as know-how transmitted socially and not genetically.

I also came across this:

"Dogs are able to follow pointing by head and eyes, or by hand, even if the hand is opposite to the side on which the target lies — ‘crossed pointing’ — and even if the hand remains stationary or the human moves in a direction opposite to their pointing. These impressive abilities raise two questions. Firstly, is this a special-purpose skill or part of a complex of abilities with wider implications? In humans, pointing and gaze-following have been causally linked to reference, one of the fundamentals of language [1]; moreover, pointing and gaze following are generally seen as part of a suite of abilities that together confer ‘theory of mind’ [2]. Nothing in the normal behaviour of dogs gives convincing evidence of any canine ability to understand mental states, let alone reference."
Animal Communication: What Makes a Dog Able to Understand its Master?Richard W. Byrne

That dogs do not have a theory of mind goes very well with my earlier suggestion that they are aware, but not aware of being aware. I won't expound further on the connection between a theory of mind and self awareness, but I think it is a close connection.

Tom:But it can't be simply that intelligence leads to self awareness, or computers would be self aware...

Computers aren't intelligent. They can model aspects of intelligence, but they're devices, they're not beings; they're large arrays of switches. A computer is no different in essence from a very sophisticated abacus. I don't think your intepretation of 'qualia' is correct, either. That awkward bit of pseudo-philosophical jargon simply refers to the qualitative aspect of experience - what experience 'feels like", or how it manifests subjectively. While obviouslly we can't see things ffrom a dog's point of view, I think it is implausible to deny that dogs are subjects of experience. Whereas I deny outright that computers are subjects of experience. If I put an axe through the iMac I'm typing this post on, it would be a great inconvenience for me, but it wouldn't warrant compassion for the iMac. Whereas if I yell at my dog to stop following me from room to room, he doesn't like it. There's your 'qualia' ;) .

I am interested in the self-awareness aspect of consciousness as it appears in animals as disperse as elephants, apes, corvids & dogs.

It is somewhat surprising that dog's and perhaps some other animal don't appear to have self consciousness, however, this may be due to how we test for self-awareness.

A recent study took dogs pee and posted it up on a wall in an enclosed room, then let each dog who had peed enter the room. The dogs all sniffed and sniffed the other dog's pee, didn't bother with their own pee.

Perhaps a dog's consciousness favors scent over its other senses and it is self-aware, just not how we think about self-awareness.

Also, covids,with a little brain about 20 grams can use tools, & figure out simple analogical puzzles, perhaps suggesting that perception itself contains structural information already embedded.

I feel like idealism might have some substance behind it, but it seems to fail to account for accidents, as well as the experience of discovering something new.

Other than idealism, property dualism (a la Spinoza) is one of the better positions imo. In certain formulations it might seem like panpsychism; for example we could theorize that the mental is merely a relationship between two material objects. The experience of red is the secondary quality that derives its existence from the relationship between the perceiving subject and the object reflecting radiation.

I don't really understand Aristotle's psychology, maybe that has something to it.

Quoting unenlightened

This translates as know-how transmitted socially and not genetically.

Yes, the paper is called "Imitation as behaviour parsing" for a reason. Behaviours are transmitted between apes without understanding or intentionality. There is a set of behaviour primitives from which apes construct complex behaviours. Apes cannot learn new primitives as that would require the creation of knowledge that is not in their genome.

A couple of examples are that apes can pick up a stone, but they cannot orient the stone. They also cannot follow pointing, which dogs can.

Humans are not constrained in this way, obviously.

Searle says that humans have the unique ability of being able to lie, some animals can deceive but cannot lie. I am not sure if I understand properly the difference between deception and untruths in this case.

I had a dog that would shiver violently when left outside in the winter. It would show me that it was cold and wanted to come in by shivering. However when the summer came along and it was warm outside, but the dog wanted to come in anyway, it would pretend to be cold by violently shivering, even though it wasn't cold. Whether this was a deception or a lie it still shows an admirable level of intelligence in manipulation.

We simply do not understand enough about intelligence to give conclusive theories.

My own view is that everything resembles the original creative impetus of the Big Bang and the human mind and brain are actually creative engines, hence, the reason they've driven all the psychologists, philosophers, physicists, and neurologists nuts. While reliability is great, creativity is more important in a universe of unceasing change explaining, for example, why the human brain has a theoretical memory storage capacity of over a petabyte, yet, human memory is notoriously fallible. This also fits in with mathematical examinations of evolution which have concluded that its about staying two steps ahead of the competition in guessing the punch lines coming, yet, evolutionary advances require generosity.

Reply to Jamesk One difference between a manipulative statement and a lie is that the former can be true (e.g. selective and misleading), whereas a lie is never true. Perhaps the dog was truly feeling cold despite the temperature...

How would I describe consciousness?

I would argue that consciousness is the presence of a world.

Metzinger has some interesting thoughts on this:

For minimal consciousness:

• Constraint 1: Globality - consciousness is globally available for many different functions
• Constraint 2: Presentationality - consciousness implies presence, or an experience of "now"-ness
• Constraint 3: Transparency - a phenomenological concept that implies epistemic darkness, or an inability to explore the roots of consciousness itself by consciousness alone. I would personally call this "limited flexibility", or what Metzinger calls "autoepistemic closure".

For a robust sense of self:

• Substantiality - the feeling that one could exist all by oneself, see Avicenna's "floating man" thought experiment.
• Essence - the perception that one possesses an "innermost core" of essential, unchanging properties
• Individuality - the feeling that one has a unique personal psychological identity.

For a more robust consciousness:

• Constraint 4: Covolved Holism - i.e. "nested" structures-within-structures (pace Salthe)
• Constraint 5: Dynamicity - change and duration, existing within the background of presence (constraint 2)
• Constraint 6: Perspectivalness, or the relationship between a stable "self" and a stable "environment"

There are more constraints and much more detail in the link above. It's a great example of modern neuro-phenomenology.

Reply to anonymous66 What is consciousness ? Is it something else then the content of your mind ?

Is it not your memories, your suffering, your agony, your experiences, your relationships ( at least what you call a relationship ). Is consciousness not an attribute of the mind? Does it exist by itself with no mind to hold it? Did thought created the psychological structure of " ME ?
So is thought the building block of consciousness ?
If so, is it not material?

What about neutral monism? For Example:

• there is only one kind of substance (consciousness)
• it is distributed in atomic parts (for example elementary particles)
• atomic parts are individual conscious being
• atomic parts do interact producing conscious experiences on each other
• atomic parts have volition and perform actions in strightforward ways according to what they feel (which in turn is determined by what kind of interactions they are having with each other)
• the statistical behaviour of large numbers of atoms produces apparently deterministic or probabilistic behaviours that follow some "laws of physics"

Quoting anonymous66

I can dismiss Searle because his view requires naive realism- and that is demonstrably false

LOL

The awareness of a being to it's essential presence in existance.

Consciousness is a biological phenomenon, it arises from conditions of satisfaction such as a brain and things to be conscious of. So, I would describe it as such.

Quoting jkop

Consciousness is a biological phenomenon, it arises from conditions of satisfaction such as a brain and things to be conscious of. So, I would describe it as such.

What is a "brain"? "Brain" is a term we use to describe a very broad class of information-processing structures build up with a network of neurons, sometimes we also speak of "electronic brains" and we also have artificial "neural networks" (which are non-biological) but we don't have a precise definition of what should be considered brain and what should not.

Reply to Babbeus
Your questioning of 'brain' is unwarranted, I write 'biological', recall, and brains are literally biological. You can't get more precise than that. Electronic devices are called "brains" metaphorically under the assumption that they would share behavioural or functional characteristics with biological brains. But that assumption is controversial, and the 'brains' in 'electronic brains' is far more imprecise since we don't know whether electronic devices could be conscious at all. We know, without doubt, that literal brains can be conscious.

The crucial point to recognise regarding the phenomenon of our most irreducable experience - that of our consciousness itself - is that, uniquely, it is a non-sensory experience - capable in principle of being undergone in a state where all of the five interactive senses are negated. The significance of this fact consists in the consequence that our experience of consciousness is inimical to the method of scientific description, capable soley of describing our sensory perception of material interaction, from which the palpable inadequacy of scientific attempts at its description descends.
It requires to be recognised that this specific reason renders an adequate description of the phenomenon of consciousness in principle beyond the capacity ot the human mind. You may pile the sophistication of scientific argument, ex: Quantum physic scientific methodology, as high as your capacity to comprehend compexity permits, but it will not thereby advance your argument a single nanometre accross the chasm existing between the manifeststion of sensory and non-sensory phenomena - the sophistication on the one hand of scientific argument and its demonstrable inadequacy on the other perhaps ironically serving thereby merely to emphasise the point! - You might as fruitfully attempt employing the scientific method to envisage a fourth primary colour!

Quoting Babbeus

Brain" is a term we use to describe a very broad class of information-processing structures build up with a network of neurons, sometimes we also speak of "electronic brains" and we also have artificial "neural networks" (which are non-biological) but we don't have a precise definition of what should be considered brain and what should not.

If you wish to apply computer science terms to a biological organ that shares some similarities with computing devices, then okay, I guess. Lots of people seem to want to do that. I don't think the brain is a computer, network or information processor, those are just the best technological metaphors we can come up with.

Quoting Babbeus

What is a "brain"?

Ask and you shall receive:

.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain

Reply to jkop Quoting jkop

Your questioning of 'brain' is unwarranted, I write 'biological', recall, and brains are literally biological. You can't get more precise than that.

If someone whould have told me that "soul can exist only inside humans" I would have asked what is a human. The same I do when someone says that "consciousness can exist only with brains". Concept like "humans", "brains" or "chickens" are not philosophically well founded: they are just fuzzy patterns with undefined boundaries. There is a sequence of organism that starts from unicellular ones and ends with human beings, where each member of the sequence is the father of the following member. Which is the point where the members of the sequence actually start to be "human"? When do they start to have a "brain"? What is there that actually "trigger" the consciousness that didn't exist before?

Reply to Babbeus

What terms referring to "everyday objects in the world"/"natural kinds" are not "fuzzy patterns with undefined boundaries" in your view? Give an example of a few of those.

Quoting Robert Lockhart

. . .consciousness itself . . .is a non-sensory experience - capable in principle of being undergone in a state where all of the five interactive senses are negated. . . .

What's it like to be senselessly undergoing a state of negating something?

Quoting Robert Lockhart

. . The significance of this fact consists in the consequence that our experience of consciousness is inimical to the method of scientific description, capable soley of describing our sensory perception of material interaction. . .

Please feel free to describe a senseless experience of an immaterial interaction.

Reply to Terrapin Station Very few, this is why when we want deeper understanding of reality - in science, mathematics or foundational philosophy - we usually don't rely on common everyday-life understanding of the words but we go deeper and become more formal with the definitions. Do you have a different view?

Quoting Babbeus

Do you have a different view?

Yes--my different view is that words like "brain," "rock," stereo speaker," etc. aren't that confusing. I don't have to wonder what they could possibly refer to when people use them unless they use them in a very strange/unusual way.

Reply to Terrapin Station Reply to Terrapin StationQuoting Terrapin Station

Yes--my different view is that words like "brain," "rock," stereo speaker," etc. aren't that confusing. I don't have to wonder what they could possibly refer to when people use them unless they use them in a very strange/unusual way.

1) "That confusing" is misrepresenting what I said
2) What is "usual" and "unusual" depends on contingencies and can change over time (maybe you wanted to say that you would make deeper consideration on the meaning only when you personally feel it strange/unusual wrt your experience but this is just your personal psychological attitude)

Quoting Babbeus

1) "That confusing" is misrepresenting what I said

"Confusing" in the sense that you can't make out what a word like "brain" refers to.

Quoting Babbeus

) What is "usual" and "unusual" depends on contingencies and can change over time

Yeah, obviously. You're not a non-adaptable robot are you?

Jkop: We could of course agree that, in order that it be objectively examined, a phenomenon requires to be isolated from all super-imposing effects. So then with the case of our experience of consciousness itself: Without conducting the experiment, we could agree that in a situation where the awareness of all five of our interactive senses was negated – say in a laboratory contrived artifice for example – we would yet in principle be capable of retaining our conscious self-awareness. This simple observation suffices to demonstrate then that our experience of the phenomenon of consciousness is, uniquely, non-sensory in nature.
In this regard all scientific theory, from for example the most basic of the geometric theorems of Pythagoras to the most complex mathematically argued propositions relating to the sub-atomic phenomena which the Large Hadron Collider was built to evaluate, are comprised of reasoned propositions intending to provide a logically rigorous description of a putative relation existing between sensorialy perceivable observations. It requires to be recognised - in principle - that such a methodology is fundamentally incapable of describing such a connective relationship between a phenomenon which is perceivable sensorialy and one which is, as is uniquely the case concerning consciousness, susceptible to non-sensory perception!
It is for this reason in practice therefore, in their inevitable incapacity to provide such a requisite connective description, that all scientific attempts at describing consciousness are of a standard that would not, in the context of describing sensorialy perceived phenomena, be accorded the status of scientific theory at all!

Whence the rhetoric? I asked you two straightforward questions.

Reply to Terrapin Station Consciousness is the totality of memories, experiences, knowledge and thoughts that one has. All those together are assembled by thought into the " ME " - the self-aware being. And therefore you identify yourself with your memories, knowledge, beliefs etc. - and you can say: " I am this and that ... "
It is a material process, those memories and experiences are stored in the brain, it is not a Hocus Pocus magic thing. Your consciousness is You.

Reply to unenlightened The container is the content, like the observer is the observed.
There is no separation in that. It's like saying " I must control my anger - and separate anger from yourself, instead of acknowledging that you are anger itself.

Reply to Benjamin Dovano

I'm confused why you're addressing me in your reply. Did I seem to be saying that I thought that consciousness is a "Hocus Pocus magic thing"?

Reply to Terrapin Station I might have pressed the wrong reply.. :) sorry

Reply to Benjamin Dovano Who's been reading Krishnamurti, then?

Jcop: My post was an attempt to argue in favour of the proposition that the scientific method, capable as it is soly of describing interaction between sensorialy perceivable phenomena, is in principle therefore incapable of describing the interaction by which the brain produces consciousness in that our experience of the latter phenomenon consists ultimately - as I attempted to point out - in the form of a non-sensory perception. Setting aside the adequacy or otherwise of the exposition of the argument in my post, the idea being advanced is hardly a rhetorical one.
The OP might have been better titled, ‘How in terms of an analogous sensorial experience, the perception of which we accordingly would all be capable of undergoing, might you provide a description of consciousness capable in principle of being commonly agreed?’ The short answer to that question then would be – in that there exists no sensorial experience which is annalagous to our experience of consciousness – you could not provide such a description.

As to your two ‘straight forward questions’ – ‘What’s it like to be senselessly undergoing a state of negating something?’ and, ‘Please feel free to describe a senseless experience of an immaterial interaction’ – these statements do strike me as examples of meaningless rhetoric, accordingly permitting no possibility of framing a reply.