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This is Brandom on what I call Hegel's liquid logic. Braver writes of impersonal conceptual schemes, which I take as unstable historical articulations...

. You are just proving my point.

Basically one would infer (along with so many other things) that a person walking into that room would find that apple still sitting there, still red....

:up: This is why I view it in terms of discussing which way of talking is better. It's hard to make sense of one side as right or wrong. We make the r...

:up: This is why a phenomenological approach is nice. We don't act or talk as if we are seeing images rather than objects. Certain figures of speech s...

Hi, Tobias. We seem to pretty much agree on Hegel, so it looks like you misread me. For instanceL Elsewhere I've used the phrase liquid logic. I also ...

No. I thought you were. We see the red apple and not its image, and it's still there if we close our eyes ---and still red. If we really wanted to (as...

That's fine, but Also, a philosopher’s account of perception is intimately related to his or her conception of the mind, so this article focuses on is...

It's the same world viewed by different people with eyes in different places.

I don't mind if I haven't convinced you, but I don't think science answers metaphysical questions, and I don't think my views interfere with science. ...

Perceptual realism is the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers. Direct realists also claim that ...

It's not like we can't introduce fake apples, fake voices. They would be as real as promises and whiskey, if we treated them as such in making inferen...

That's plausible enough, but (as Derrida might point out against Sarl) you are putting hearing voices in quotes for a reason ---because the voices are...

I like Democritus: By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and voi...

Sure. But there aren't any voices. People can be fooled (by their own nervous systems) into making incorrect judgments about the world. It's not disas...

I agree. So it's not crazy to adopt a metaphysics of intermediaries (fake voices, fake apples). It's not like saying 2 + 2 = 3. I just think it's less...

It's not confusion. I'm well aware that the linguistic norms are less decided here. My position (if memory serves) is close to Sellars' position. Cons...

I can elaborate in some directions but strategically leave the wrong kinds of questions unanswered. I am defending a minimal direct realism in an unus...

I've referred to inferentialist semantics several times by now. A mentally ill person might mistakenly think they heard voices.

That's its virtue.

My position is minimal. To me philosophy is not psychology. Instead it's more like hermeneutical phenomenology, which is to say a making explicit of w...

I understand why that view is plausible, but I think it doesn't hold up. Kant was shrewd enough to make the hidden Real completely indeterminate. The ...

:up:

I think I am. I believe I've already explained and argued for this above. It's true however that I'm not a metaphysical realist as described in the qu...

I've been trying to defend direct realism from a position that takes the philosophical situation itself as the only meaningful center of reality. I ta...

I'll leave you to your monologue.

I've read Braver's A Thing of this World. But I don't like all this ism talk. I like Hegel & Heidegger, so yeah I guess I could be classed as an antir...

Well I guess I don't embrace metaphysical realism. At least that description pretends that promises and divorces aren't real. Nor are scientific norms...

I think I just don't fit into your categories yet. But I'm not coming from nowhere. I have well-known influences.

There's one real world that we live in and talk about. I find it funny that that's not supposed to be realism.

Logic is normative. As an inferentialist, I take it that 'red' gets its meaning from the claims involving the concept. The key point is which inferenc...

I reject the idea of 'innate' nature. It's like asking me to talk about the apple as it is when no one is talking about it.

If I close my eyes, the apple is still red.

Sure. But concepts are normative. Logic is liquid. The meanings of words change. Our notion of rationality itself changes. The world is not a chess bo...

This might help. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/#BeiWor According to Heidegger, Descartes presents the world to us “with its skin off” (...

I'd say I'm a pretty hardcore realist in some sense, but not in a sense familiar to you. I like pragmatic neorationalist at the moment. Or normative m...

At least without further specification, it's just way too vague.

This is a silly question !

I've already explained that we shouldn't bother with folk psychology. This is a matter of how best to talk about this stuff. We aren't doing math eith...

The scientific image is counterintuitive. No doubt. But you still seem to be assuming that that image alone is the truly real and not just a layer or ...

Our ordinary life in which we shop for groceries, promise to walk to the dog, return books to the library....is real. Some entities exist now (men mar...

:up:

Our articulation of the world is deeply historical and constantly being revised, but we live in that articulation (as well as in nonlinguistic aspects...

I really don't think you've grasped my approach to this issue yet.

I'm not sure what ism is best. I like old school commonsense philosophy, on this issue at least: https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Thomas_Rei...

All of our concepts exists together interdependently in a system. That's a key point.

I largely agree with Popper, so I'm probably a critical realist. But that doesn't mean that atoms are more real than marriages or the scientific norms...

There's nothing strictly wrong about indirect realism talk. It's just clumsy. We aren't doing math here or playing chess. We are debating which approa...

I don't think the scientific image is the Real beneath some paintjob of color and values.

Apples are red.