You are viewing the historical archive of The Philosophy Forum.
For current discussions, visit the live forum.
Go to live forum

plaque flag

['Confirm Email']Joined: March 22, 2023 at 00:55Last active: October 17, 2023 at 07:0615 discussions2701 comments

Discussions (15)

Comments

I'm adding some stuff from James that goes with the stream metaphor. Note his emphasis on the radical separation of streams. This separation is what m...
October 17, 2023 at 07:02
Now I'll touch on the perspectivism which can't be left out, though my influences usually neglect this aspect. Ontology assumes a shared world/ langua...
October 17, 2023 at 04:14
In the previous post, I claimed that the neutral stream (a perspectival perpetual becoming) was structured like a subject. But (crucially) it is not t...
October 17, 2023 at 03:34
I go on sketching a position for others who might be able to follow. While this is my current position, I may of course change my mind, but I'll prese...
October 17, 2023 at 03:15
.
October 17, 2023 at 02:28
I think the nondual view passes through indirect realism (like Kant's). Mach read Kant intensely when young. Wittgenstein studied Schopenhauer. James ...
October 16, 2023 at 22:01
There is no experiencer. Not fundamentally. The one Eiffel tower appears in many beingstreams (worldstreams, interpenetrating becomingstreams...) My o...
October 16, 2023 at 21:52
No solipsism. Even the opposite in some sense (pure/direct realism). But related to why Wittgenstein cared about solipsism, the problem of 'my' pain a...
October 16, 2023 at 21:51
Our human world is wrapped in darkness. Of course. The only impossibility is logical possibility. This (pseudo-)proposition, which I embrace, manifest...
October 16, 2023 at 20:42
First person consciousness is the being of the world given perspectively.
October 16, 2023 at 20:32
It's hard to beat what Witt did in the TLP, but he is so terse that he didn't get himself understood. Simple analogy: Multiplayer GoldenEye on the N64...
October 16, 2023 at 16:51
The 'soft' indirect realism of Hobbes and Locke does indeed make senes when applied to the worldly ego. Mach discusses this kind of functional relatio...
October 16, 2023 at 15:52
I got wind that Schlick was a neutral monist (I suspected that circle would be so to some degree, given W's proximity), and I found this. Schlick ( p....
October 16, 2023 at 03:01
So you claim, but one can also make the phrase 'round square.' I continue to claim that beyond all and any perspective is nonsense. Kant sometimes see...
October 16, 2023 at 02:23
As far as I can make out, you still don't get it, though it I admit that it's hard to find the right words. And it's hard to let go of indirect realis...
October 15, 2023 at 23:54
Any operational-scientific definition of consciousness will work just fine. We can agree to attribute 'consciousness' to this human body or that moon-...
October 15, 2023 at 22:42
I mentioned a famous very-early lecture by Heidegger above, and I hunted down some passages that some of you might like. https://ia903000.us.archive.o...
October 15, 2023 at 22:16
I think Mill was primarily just trying to make sense of matter, not limit all existence to sensation, but I'm not sure. This is an excellent issue in ...
October 15, 2023 at 21:18
I still think possibilities of experience works in say Husserl or Sartre, but what catches my eye here is that elicited question. Now it is of course ...
October 15, 2023 at 21:04
As Mach put it, we find functional relationships all the time between 'inner' and 'outer' things. This is the point of my Flat Ontology thread. It's a...
October 15, 2023 at 20:51
In case it's helpful for understanding my POV, I endorse this: The Ego is the specific object that intentional consciousness is directed upon when per...
October 15, 2023 at 20:45
:up: I think you've found a weak part in Mill's account. At the very least, he did not go into detail about the experienced unity of the object, what ...
October 15, 2023 at 20:34
Respectfully, what I'm hearing is platitudinal. To me it's such a truism that people think differently that I wouldn't think to mention it. This is a ...
October 15, 2023 at 19:40
As you should be. The theory is interesting because it challenges some vague but strong sense of there being more to physical being than our actual an...
October 15, 2023 at 19:27
Let's forget it then.
October 15, 2023 at 19:26
I don't think objects are very well defined. I think all people end up meaning...being able to find words for...is possibilities of perception. I have...
October 15, 2023 at 19:24
I can't recall the context, but I reject the speculative realists. I sometimes quote their presentations of correlationism, though, for it's one of 'e...
October 15, 2023 at 19:21
I could just say 'fruit' instead of 'experience of fruit' if I wasn't reacting against what I'd call the metaphysical fantasy of aperspectival reality...
October 15, 2023 at 19:18
That power is possibility. I perceive an apple tree, and I understand the possibility of fruit, given certain conditions. If I nurture the tree, if it...
October 15, 2023 at 19:16
Note that most of the objects in the world are not currently perceived (by this or that single person). And I've never seen the Eiffel Tower, but I th...
October 15, 2023 at 19:13
The point is an explication of the pre-theoretical view.
October 15, 2023 at 19:12
Sure, we start in the world of things, not as philosophers. Then we learn to analyze, account for the subjects and objects. But I object to 'non-perce...
October 15, 2023 at 19:12
. That's just a rephrasing, it seems to me.
October 15, 2023 at 19:10
Here's a classic passage that nails the spirit of phenomenology. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm My own philoso...
October 15, 2023 at 19:06
What previous definition ? People mostly use words like tools with pre-theoretical skill. We are concept-mongering practical primates. It's the worldl...
October 15, 2023 at 19:00
Come on though, that's presumption, as you say. Uncharitable. And Mill is dead. So please just try to understand me, and then defeat my position.
October 15, 2023 at 18:58
Explication (unfolding) is not redefinition.
October 15, 2023 at 18:57
As I've said, the issue is semantic. People sometimes worry about whether P is warranted. But they forget to check whether P is meaningful. Respectful...
October 15, 2023 at 18:56
I'd say you'd have to look into his 'deconstruction' of the self too. To be clear, I don't take Mill or anyone really as an authority. But Mill gets s...
October 15, 2023 at 18:54
:up: Of course. But most people aren't philosophers.
October 15, 2023 at 18:47
:up: I'm thinking of using Rashomon and As I Lay Dying as explications of the nondual perspectivist position. Both narratives give us the-world-for-ch...
October 15, 2023 at 18:44
:up: Since that went over well, I'll add some of Heidegger's updating of the software (of the software's self-articulation.) I got this nice quote fro...
October 15, 2023 at 18:35
Despite the occasional lip service, I don't think you understand the spirit of science, or that you are able or willing to get your story straight. So...
October 15, 2023 at 18:03
I won't go any more in this direction in this thread, but it's no small feature of 'mind' that it is profoundly timebinding and historical. The "might...
October 15, 2023 at 06:06
Actually that wasn't the point.
October 15, 2023 at 05:45
It seems to me that you are ultimately arguing that argument is not decisive. I hope you are offering more than the reminder that we could always be w...
October 15, 2023 at 01:33
So is the nature of argument at least truly universal and binding on all humans ?
October 15, 2023 at 01:29
I add this in case anyone wants to pick up the thread. (1) We 'can only ever speak' of being as something we are speaking about. This tautology is sup...
October 15, 2023 at 01:28
To me that's a bold claim which I very much dispute. I take an opposite Hegelian view. The timebinding philosophical Conversation is the actual protag...
October 15, 2023 at 01:23
:up: Sure. And that's the essence of my response.
October 15, 2023 at 01:16