Moliere

Well, I extrapolated, I'll admit. :D - glad to amuse, though. I agree with this. Philosophy is useless, after all. (at least, it should be ;) ) -- one...

Another thought in the back of my mind, though to develop it more I'll have to look at temporal logics now -- But this exchange reminds me of Kant's d...

Hodge-podgy reply Also @"Luke", from the exchange about named entities being true. I think I'd say the above is not a belief, but a belief-mediated pe...

Fair, I'm distracting you. :) I think, for me at least, the next step would be -- if you accept that a natural language can be a meta-language -- to a...

It could! but you'd have to be more specific, I think, to convince anyone. Seems like an interesting thought, but anyone would have to know more about...

OK, that helps me understand "object language" a lot better. It's a literal moniker - a language for objects and objects only, and especially not its ...

Yes. Though I say the following without prescription, only description. I don't know what would work for you. Mortality is scary. "Death is nothing to...

I agree with your method, but I think it takes me elsewhere. I like where you start: "When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe...

Accepting a third truth value basically rejects the principle of bivalence. A good read @"Banno" - you simplified it enough that I think I followed al...

Heh. Well, I have more reading assignments then.

One advantage of excluding temporality is that we can then discuss what we mean by temporality. If the logic we employ uses temporality, then there ar...

Ah, OK. I misread.

"this sentence" is not well formed. It does not fit the form of a proposition. It is only a subject, and contains no predicate.

Yeh, an unsatisfactory result, though. A kind of anti-realism that no one would really want.

I entertain dialethism, but actually the liar's paradox is one of the things I think I've come around on in saying it's not dialethic. Or, it can be, ...

To that I'd say that logic excludes temporality. Not that it should do so -- but that's the idea. Temporality is introduced through the power of Engli...

Right. And that's somewhat a whole other subset of thoughts on truth -- how to resolve the liars paradox. I'd say that's an answer, but I didn't want ...

But with the caveat of the liars paradox, right? I said it just because it seemed like the most obvious thing that would break the logic.

You succeeded in derailing my thoughts to Davidson, now. :D I have the book on my table to read A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. We'll see which one ge...

I agree with you here, I think. Though we'll see. Would you agree in saying there is no universal theory of truth? I think the examples elucidate the ...

Welcome to the forums!

Ah, OK -- what's wrong with correspondence. Why bother switching out what works? I think that in specifying what correspondence consists in we end up ...

Heh, hopefully I'm just making a point about the domain of "P" -- though this is philosophy, and I wouldn't be surprised if I'm on team anti-parade :D

Cool. So truth is a family-resemblance concept. There are no hard and fast definitions that work for all contexts. So, consequently, there is no unive...

I think that'd be part of our conclusion more than a starting point. That'd be exactly what's controversial, right? So for your use of Keats, at least...

Well, yes -- and also everyone who might still be interested of course. Where else would we get a pool of example statements from? Universality could ...

Heh. Well, that's why it's a "for us" predicate. Sort of like a rule to a game, you could say. If an incision matters to a community of users, well --...

Kneel before the error theory! embrace the error theory! :D That's the elegant solution.

But if it's balking at the limitation of truth to human interaction -- yeah, that's pretty much what this would limit it to. No propositions. The focu...

Mostly to say, this is a "good enough for us" predicate. If we care about the liars paradox, say, then these things can be introduced through the powe...

Not truth, but the meta-predicate "-B", let's say -- to mark its queerness.

Clumsy there -- in text I should be more precise. I continue to mean statements. So of the form of propositions, sure. But that, itself, is just a sti...

I'm not sure I'm satisfied with that, especially in part because I don't like the directional metaphor -- more, or less than? Up or down? I suppose it...

I agree with that understanding as you've spelt it out here. So stipulating English statements.

To what extent I understand that paper, I agree with you. I'm just ripping the schema from Tarski more than applying what Tarski said, and putting tog...

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements. At the very least, this is how we talk about them. S...

Well, P is not the way the world is. "The way the world is" is part of the metaphysical picture of truth that I posited. In the metaphysical picture y...

I'm pretty sure this is what disquotational theories are trying to get at. So -- The distinction between the way the world is and the sentences that r...

I find it strange that you're not wanting disquotationalism, then. That seems to me to be what is accomplished by the logic -- no sussing out the mean...

This is interesting because the other theories don't seem to present a logic, so much, as a description of truth (hence, substantive) -- but they cert...

I guess I had more thoughts: I agree with the notion of the ethical-boundary of truth that's been floated: Since there's no Grand True Unifying Theory...

There's a few things that I get stuck on in thinking through this, but I think the most succinct one is this: Taking meaning as primary, as you note, ...

This is how I feel about them. The only thing wrong with deflationary theories is they are obviously false. But that's a feature, given how the others...

You mentioned depression, so I'm responding with that frame in mind - I'm speaking from the perspective of one who manages his own depression. I know ...

There's that word "just" again -- any one name is easy to put aside, when you have another set of names and operators. {J}(NAME) -> "just an invention...

I'd question this desire for something more than survival instincts. Our attachment to life isn't "just" survival instinct, it's a complex of attachme...

True, you're right. I should say it is a foolish question to believe you can have an answer to. The desire to know, and intellectual curiosity, are go...

I think the question is a bit foolish and undecidable. There is no fundament or ultimate principle that all knowledge can be derived from. Knowledge i...

I'm not sure I understand. I took that to mean he's rejecting any solution to the question which proposes contraries, like the-Many/the-One, rather th...

Heh, these are pretty hastily pulled, I'll admit -- so this is more at the idea-bouncing phase than carefully pulled quotes, just to give a little con...