Bob Ross

The difference is that in physics we are using our convictions to attempt at latching onto a fact-of-matter about the world; whereas, according to mor...

What you quoted states that moral anti-realism comes in three general flavors (listed above): that’s what ‘disjunction’ signifies in that sentence you...

Moral anti-realism is the position that there are no true moral facts. P2-A is derived from P2-A*, which you conveniently left out. Also, P2-A is not ...

I suppose, if I am understanding correctly, that the ‘state of affairs’ would be the correspondent that T would be latching onto (i.e., referencing pr...

In a nutshell, “P2-A*1: If Hume’s Guillotine is true, then P2-A is true.” is going beyond Hume and, consequently, the entire argument: Hume never actu...

I understand, but I am saying that simply because there is a mind-independent fact that "one ought not harm another" it does not follow that it is of ...

If you can't provide a syllogism, then how am I to know you have a logically valid argument? Honestly, I don't think you do: you are going from 'this ...

I think I see what you mean: technically, I did not provide an argument for my conclusion (in a valid syllogistic form) but, rather, just explained it...

Please put it in a syllogism so that I can see where you are coming from. Saying "One ought not harm another" truthity could be subjective or objectiv...

I think this is an unfair and uncharitable interpretation of the OP: I clearly outlined how I think Hume’s Guillotine, if true, provides us sufficient...

I think I may see what you are saying now. I would say that every normative fact, T, can be and honestly probably should be rewritten as "There is a n...

So, the confusion, I think, is in the ambiguity of ‘I ought to do something’: that could be an expression of a normative fact or non-fact. The point i...

What about, for starters, the seeming object permanence (of things)? That seems to suggest, at least, that there is an external world.

Great post J! Although I am not sure that I fully followed, let me try to adequately respond and you let me know if I am on the right track. It seems ...

I would say that, in terms of just evidence for the existence of the world, doesn't it at least seem like you are in an external world?

For my argument, I was using ‘moral’ language as signifying ‘that which one ought to be doing’. Yes, with respect what I regard as ‘moral’ significati...

I didn’t quite follow this: it is not sufficient to explain manifest conduct that does not conform to it in what manner? I would say that our own sent...

Oh, you don’t. I agree with you there: I would say it just seems like I am not dreaming, but, at the end of the day, I cannot definitively prove that ...

:up: Let me know if you have any further thoughts! The point of the argument in the OP is essentially what you described: if we are to take 'moral' la...

My argument only gets one to moral anti-realism, and doesn't speak about moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism. Personally, I am a moral subjectivist,...

I am not sure what is being argued here, but I agree, and my argument in the OP agrees, that there is a possibility for normative facts: they just are...

Fair enough. A 'fact', for intents of the argument in the OP, is 'a statement of which its referent corresponds correctly to something in reality'; or...

Those examples don’t make sense to me (and perhaps I am simply misunderstanding): for example, traffic signs exist and that is a fact; but that there ...

Correct. Saying that "T is a normative fact" is not itself giving a prescription (as far as I can tell), and P2 is always going to take that form, and...

My argument did not posit that facts are only about material things or sense data.

I have no problem, fundamentally, with this (other than labeling it as a moral realist position) because it didn’t specify the mind-independent fact o...

I wasn't saying that all colloquial speech is very imprecise but, rather, that it seems as though the OP's conclusion is due to the confusion with the...

P1 can be true and be subjective. It would be a true statement because it corresponds to one’s psyche, and the prescription itself is non-factual (bei...

Moral nihilism is a form of moral anti-realism, so my argument is more broad than that position and could be deployed by a person that holds that posi...

The way I see it, P2 will also be a description, which itself can encompass a normative fact but is not a normative fact itself. If you think I am wro...

I am confused, because you proved my point. What the OP was claiming is clearly false when you explicate it unambiguously, which is exactly what you d...

This is exactly my point: you can’t claim you are experiencing if there isn’t something which you are experiencing. Whether or not ‘I’ or everyone exi...

This negates the OP and does not suffice to win my proposal (in the response you quoted of me), since they were claiming that your #2 is a description...

That’s true, but Hume was only interested in the fact that one cannot derive a prescription from an indicative statement—not that one cannot derive a ...

But if you accept that experience is about something, then why don't you accept that there is a world? I am confused.

Why would a proposition existing need have intentional content about itself? That doesn’t make sense to me. The platonic form doesn’t need to think it...

What do you mean by ‘true statements’? Propositions? If so, I see no reason to believe that propositions could not exist as platonic forms (or somethi...

First, let me ask you for a brief elaboration of your own view: what is 'experience' if it is not of something, under your view? That way I can provid...

:up: I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought...

I would say I have to two main reasons why I think there is a world: 1. My experience of things strikes me as I am really in a world experiencing thos...

That is fair.

I don’t consider any AI to be a trustworthy source of a definition when it comes to specialized fields of study, as, so far as I understand, it is sim...

Moral nihilism (error theory) is not the view that there are no right or wrong answers to moral questions. If you are interested, then I would suggest...

I don’t think I am fully understanding your ethical naturalist theory yet, so let me try to explain it back to you (and tell me if I am on the right t...

I am not sure that I entirely followed the question, but I would say that they should influence moral behavior. If there is a moral fact X, then that ...

That is very interesting: I agree that our biology can most certainly motivate us to do things (even to an extreme level). But I think we both agree t...

But wouldn't that entail that you don't think there are moral facts, since you think that no one has found any?

:up:

No, moral non-cognitivism is a flavor of moral anti-realism, not moral nihilism.

I agree; but my point is that I am positing that there really are moral facts which are not just mere interpretations of phenomena, and evaluating the...