Bob Ross

What do you think about, as a moral realist, this argument: P1: How the world is does not entail how the world should be. P2: Moral facts are about ho...

I 100% agree, but @"Banno" thinks that moral facts do have a world-to-word direction of fit, and I am having a hard time getting them to explain (or p...

This is a false dichotomy: I can have a taste such that everyone ought to like vanilla. Unless, are you agreeing that those are not exclusive options?...

:up: I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape.

Yes, but it seems like you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events—e.g., I...

I don't see how this is a form of moral realism, which I think you may be agreeing with me here. Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of...

I disagree: logical and mathematical truths are about how we cognize, which are states-of-affairs in reality; so I reject the notion of directionless ...

Hello 180 Proof! I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond! It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that ...

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is n...

But what distinguishes Bob’s taste that everyone ought to eat only vanilla from the moral fact that everyone ought to eat only vanilla? Fair enough; b...

I would say that moral realism is a three pronged thesis: 1. Moral judgments are propositional . 2. Moral judgments are expressing something objective...

Agreed. But, also, there are new strands of neoplatonism, such as atheistic platonism, that get rid of the Nous. In those kinds of views, we just intu...

I understand: you are arguing that either moral realism is true or error theory is true. However, as I noted before, although intuiting what language ...

Fair enough. Within your view, please define 'fact'. For me, it definitely is a 'statement which refers to a stance-independently existing thing'. Wha...

I see. The problem is that I don’t see you actually describing, even in principle, where or what the moral facts subsist in—so how do you even know th...

Ethical intuitionism is a form of moral non-naturalism, and says that we intuit the moral facts. Its main argument for moral realism is that: 1. One o...

I outlined it in that post, which part did you disagree with?

If you are saying moral subjectivists are misunderstanding the meaning of 'moral' language, then please let me know which part of my analysis of the t...

That is true, P5 should have been "Moral facts are about states-of-affairs".

@"Banno" @"Moliere" Moliere's exposition of directional fitness has got me thinking. Perhaps there is an argument to be formulated in favor of moral a...

Ethical intuitionism & neo-platonism. Interesting. I could see saying moral realists tend to be quicker to judge, but I think this may becoming a bit ...

Interesting, I would say various religious views contain within them moral realist positions (not in the sense that I agree with them but rather that ...

I reject 1. I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" nor why I would need it for this discussion. Metaethics is about, among other thi...

I have not: thank you for the link! I see. So, under your view, how do we know we are actually abiding by the moral facts then? Intuition? What vessel...

Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it jus...

There are facts about our psychology, but those aren’t normative facts. Reducing “one ought to...” to “I believe one ought to...” does not produce a n...

I appreciate your argument! Let me see if I can adequately respond. I think I disagree with premise 2: just because "one ought..." is usually linguist...

Unfortunately, I am unfamiliar with "moral irrealism", but I am all ears if you would like to advocate for it.

Interesting, I would have thought it would be "is there any measure of obligation?"--but this doesn't preclude subjective obligations.

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, so I wouldn't say they are even normative f...

Oh I see...just playing devil's advocate, eh? What did you think of my responses?

I am still not quite following where the moral facts come into play with your view. It seems like you are saying the moral facts are tied to the "Real...

All your concerns target moral nihilism, not moral anti-realism. The former is a subspecies of the latter. As a moral subjectivist, I have no problem ...

Not an argument per se, but here’s my reasoning. Let’s do it by analogy. The feeling of hunger is a biological manifestation of my obligation (biologi...

What do you mean? I feel like you just sidestepped the questions I asked. It still stands: how do we "discover", "figure out", "decipher", etc. which ...

:up: So, for your view, how do we discover the moral facts? I understand you are a moral cognitivist...but how do we evaluate which moral propositions...

Let me explain it back to you and see if I am on the right track. I think you are saying that state-of-affairs about promises made by persons (or orga...

If, theoretically, there were facts embedded into God's will such that "one ought not torture puppies for fun", then it would be a moral fact and meet...

I am with you here (or at least I think I am)! We cannot doubt our immediate experience, although we can certainly doubt conceptually what it truly ex...

Let me give you my concerns with this kind of Abrahamic-Theistic moral realist view and let me know what you think. Firstly, if the moral facts are in...

I agree that semantics are not that important; but when discussing metaethics, isn't it at least useful to use the standard terminology?

:up: I have no problem with this...except I don’t see how it is a moral realist position: morality can have social value (and can conflict with person...

I guess the only issue I face while interpreting your view (thus far) is that I am a moral cognitivist and a moral anti-realist. So, I guess, under yo...

Interesting. So, let me see if I am understanding you correctly. It seems as though you are advocating that either (1) moral facts are ingrained in or...

Absolutely no rush! You always have thought-provoking positions; and, if I remember correctly, you hold some sort of moral realist position and though...

I will entertain either of those. Preferably, I would like to hear (1) how we know there are moral facts, (2) where and what they subist/exist in or o...

Not a problem at all! Admittedly, I haven’t read most of your posts, but assuming it is about this topic (metaethics) then I don’t mind at all. I usua...

No problem! Thank you for bringing thought-provoking material to the discussion board! I would say that my mistake was in not realizing that a subject...

I wouldn’t say I am new to formal logic nor philosophy (or at least metaethics), but, perhaps, I am a newbie compared to however many years of experie...

Banno, we are both moral cognitivists. There's no need to give an argument on that for this OP (: I agree that my original argument has been buried, b...