That's fair. I guess I just value it strongly. I don't like people that are just regurgitations of their society's norms, like a leaf getting blown in...
Perhaps: if the instance is not applicable to the general principle, then that would work. I am saying that killing an innocent person is always—not g...
That’s a great question. Firstly, the trolley problem stipulates all else is equal; so we cannot consider that in the original hypothetical. However, ...
It is an avenue worth exploring, but I simply disagree with it. Usually, they will agree that in-itself killing an innocent person is wrong, but there...
If killing an innocent person is wrong, then you can’t do: period. You can’t turnaround and permit yourself to do it in instances where you could avoi...
I am not a deontologist: I am a virtue ethicist. I just happen to think that rights are inherently deontological; and consequentialism utterly fails a...
Fair enough. I am not looking for an actual philosopher (in an academic sense) nor do they need to be overly interested in the various branches of phi...
I can appreciate what you are conveying insofar as it is morally counter-intuitive to the untrained mind; but I think one can appreciate my position m...
I would let the whole world get destroyed; assuming hitler, notwithstanding his past egregious transgressions, is innocent in the actual trolly incide...
Assuming John Wayne Gacy was not moral responsible for anything bad which was occurring in that trolley situation (which is to say that he has not for...
No: I was commenting on what a consequentialist would have to commit themselves to. They would have to claim that sometimes it is morally right (or at...
I am realizing more-and-more that you are right: I didn’t think it would be rare to find someone who at least has thought through their positions, but...
I think the only way a consequentialist can consistently go is to deny that it is immoral to kill an innocent human being: they would have to say that...
It would be immoral to avoid helping save people if there is a morally permissible way to go about it. Letting something bad happen isn’t always moral...
That doesn't make them guilty in the sense that they have forfeited there right to live in this trolley incident. If I am a convicted felon, can you j...
That's entirely fair: I do think I am more likely to find a partner in the world as I am merely doing what I normally do; but that may take some serio...
That is fair: I wasn't sure what to categorize it as. Is it lucrative? Everyone on the other dates seemed perfectly happy chasing fleeting sensual and...
I would never pull the lever, no matter how many people I would save by doing so. Killing an innocent person is always wrong; and one cannot commit an...
Yes, this OP presupposes correspondence theory of truth; which is widely accepted. A moral subjectivism could, prima facie, sidestep this (potentially...
Sorry, I thought there was a moral subjectivism section in there: it is actually here. It appears as though SEP has refurbished the term from ‘subject...
But, then, you are just muddying the waters in an attempt to clear them. I am not following what you are trying to do… I am basically arguing: P1: Ss ...
Unfortunately, we are just talking past each other; and I would just be reiterating if I responded. So I will let it rest. Take care, Philosophim! :ki...
It seems incomplete: independent...of what? I can write it out in sentential form (if that helps): P1: ¬?sp (Stance<s, p>? p) && ¬?sp (Stance<s, p>? ¬...
Did you read the moral subjectivism section? No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon ...
I cannot remember a single time in Nietzsche's work where he references a pluralist idea or notion of truth. Not a single time; in fact, he thought it...
Not quite: that would beg the question and would be false. As painfully noted in this thread, a proposition can be true or false relative to a belief,...
Moral subjectivism is standardly, in the literature, a family of moral anti-realist theories that posit: 1. Moral judgements are propositional (i.e., ...
@"Philosophim" Actually, it is also circular logic (come to think of it). One would be saying E is morally good because of some relevant property of G...
1. If X creates more existence than its absence, then it is good. 2. If Y creates more existence than its absence, then it is good. 3. X creates more ...
I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position; and is not merely the negation of moral objectivism. There...
Are you serious, Janus?!? Your whole position here has been moral (inter-)subjectivism from the start. You’ve admitted implicitly and explicitly to mo...
It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise. All I was claiming is the that the cognitive stance about something ...
They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. I already di...
What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism....
I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relati...
The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. Here’s a great exampl...
You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final...
If truth is objective, then propositions are true or false stance-independently. If propositions are true or false stance-independently, then a propos...
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