Bob Ross

You keep resorting to reverting back to your initial claims, without engaging in my responses. Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or...

Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best; saying word-salad at worst (e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, y...

Correct. That is why a moral subjectivist will deny that, strictly speaking, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is propositional; instead, they wi...

(@"Lionino") Moral subjectivism is a three-pronged thesis: 1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism). 2. Moral judgments express so...

I was referring to: Claiming that “good” is “to ought to be” is incoherent. Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘shou...

:brow: If you are not talking about a position which holds that moral judgments (1) are propositional, (2) express something subjective, and (3) at le...

Now that you have abandoned your first refutation, please elaborate on where in the OP I make any such conflation? If you are just noting that some pe...

That is the standard way of thinking about a belief, see: SEP Entry Wiki Entry Britannica Entry

That’s fine; but it makes no comment on whether or not “torturing babies is wrong” is (1) propositional nor (2) true: you would need to abandon moral ...

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good (...

The obligation towards a moral proposition, is its truth-binding nature. If you deny this, then you are saying that you can affirm that it is true tha...

You are just saying "an emotional commitment makes the proposition true or false" with different words; and that is incoherent. The only other thing I...

The problem is that you are using a concept of "good" that is incoherent; and it is the base of your entire theory. Without a proper concept of "good"...

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is...

In that quote of me, I was presupposing that one understands the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute. If one wants to deny...

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then you are obligated to not torture babies. You can’t affirm that it is true that “I should not torture ba...

This is what a moral subjectivist would be inclined to say; but it isn’t a rejoinder to my OP: as far as I can tell, you just explicated the position ...

I am glad to see you are more active again on the forum! I am guessing the new job has settle down a bit (: We have discussed a lot of this in depth, ...

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different ...

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A moral proposition is any proposition which is normative that pertains to what is morally good. Propositions like “I believe <...>” are NOT normative...

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I changed the OP to help dissolve this dispute: That is all I need to convey the original point. I disagree with your characterization of it as "truth...

(@"Michael",@"Count Timothy von Icarus",@"ChrisH") I don't mind the underlying meaning you are referring to by "relativity to belief"; so here's a way...

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The only dispute we may have, is: I would be wary to say that P has its truth relative to a belief; because this would mean that "I believe that alien...

I completely agree with your assessment, and I think you understand what I am trying to convey. I have been trying to explain this to @"Michael", but ...

Yes, what he is noting is that "I believe <...>" is true or false depending on whether or not the person, being referenced by "I", has the belief. Thi...

"?" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false re...

It has been addressed at length, but you refuse to engage in the conversation: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/903115 https://thephi...

:roll: Repeating yourself three times, while ignoring my responses, does not help further the conversation.

That is fair: a moral subjectivist could get out of this internal inconsistency by positing that moral judgments are propositions because they are jus...

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions tr...

This is correct. This is false; and does not follow from the former claim you made. I already explained this in great detail, so let's try a different...

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The answer is "yes".

I just meant that whether or not a thing is true or false, is independent of the stance one has of whether it is true or false. That's all.

(@"Count Timothy von Icarus") Correct, but no need for “Tarski’s T-schema”: it plainly and obviously follows that p ? p. You are also correct that “I ...

:up: I would add, that a proposition can never actually be true or false relative to a belief; and this is the real, underlying problem. Many people a...

Yes that is a proposition, and whether or not it is true or false is independent of any belief about it: that's what you keep missing, because you kee...

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for ...

I apologize: I was using “distinct” and “independent” interchangeably: reread my response as using “independent” instead of “distinct”.

#1 sounds like this form of “moral subjectivism” denies moral cognitivism; which is a contradiction in terms. #2 is absolutely a required, essential a...

That doesn’t help at all: I provided an argument, which outlines a certain way of thinking about it, to demonstrate the conclusion; and all you have d...

I gave examples and an elaboration here, which you seem to have ignored. If there is anything in there that requires further elaboration or clarificat...

Do you think that a stance about the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of something? I think we have to ...

Yes, by “truthity” I just mean the trueness of falseness of something. “torturing babies is wrong” is truth-apt. 5A is about whether or not your belie...

This is just a re-iteration of your previous post, which does not address which premise you disagree with. In terms of your “P3”, I responded here.

This seems to be the crux of your argument, and I am not following this distinction you are making. All I meant, was that the truth-value of something...

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or...