Existence is relative, not absolute.
'Existence' is a human concept, and like all concepts requires context in which it is meaningful. The issue was perhaps highlighted my Niels Bohr's argument with Einstein about the existence of 'electrons'.
Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. Einstein, perhaps in line with his role in establishing 'the reality of atoms', disagreed.
A current book by Rovelli (the Order of Time) underscores Bohr's view with the phrase 'things are just repetitive events.
This proposed 'relativity of existence' seems to me to render most philosophical discussion of 'ontology' to be what Wittgenstein called Geschwätz (idle chatter).
Any thoughts ?
Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. Einstein, perhaps in line with his role in establishing 'the reality of atoms', disagreed.
A current book by Rovelli (the Order of Time) underscores Bohr's view with the phrase 'things are just repetitive events.
This proposed 'relativity of existence' seems to me to render most philosophical discussion of 'ontology' to be what Wittgenstein called Geschwätz (idle chatter).
Any thoughts ?
Comments (1018)
You may be correct that existence is relative, not absolute.
Niels Bohr may be correct that Einstein may be incorrect about the existence of electrons.
I really do not know which it is.
I doubt anyone else here does either.
My guess, Fresco, based on nothing but my great admiration of Einstein...is that Einstein probably is correct.
I will spell it out for you, on the basis of 'the relativity of existence'...
God 'exists' relative to believers, for whom it is a functional concept, but does 'not exist' for atheists, for whom it is a useless concept
I'm not disagreeing with "existence is relative." But existence isn't identical/coextensive with the concept of existence.
Yes. Never been a fan of ontology in and of itself, so.....an inclination to agree. It contradicts experience in general to deny the existence of that which affects the senses, even if I don’t know what it is. If I merely think something, whether or not it exists reflects the understanding under which it is thought, in which case I must beware of contradicting only myself, my experience be what it may.
“...Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience—which is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining....”
(CPR, A601,B629)
Obviously, normal biology and physiology is functional from a medical pov, but there is quite a lot resistance to a total mechanistic view. We of course use the naive realism of 'an external world' in our human urges to 'predict and control', but I suggest any supposed 'permanencies' in that world boil down to 'persistences of expectation of events' relative to our lifespans.
By assertng that 'a concept' is not idential to 'the object it conceives' you are immediately dismissing the relativity thesis by stepping back into the naive realism of 'objects'. Bohr was suggesting that what we call 'objects' are focal aspects of agreement about our experiences denoted by 'words'. Common species physiology tends to imply large areas of agreement which we tend to call 'objects'.
This again seems like conflating concepts and what they're concepts of/in response to.
I'm not sure why you're doing that.
First, I am a realist.
Secondly, realism does not at all imply non-relativity.
I don't at all agree with Bohr.
....and presumably you would also disagree with more recent scientific writers like Rovelli, and with the prevalent 'nonrepresentationalist' view of language which has became iconoclastic with respect to traditional (analytic) philosophy.
Rovelli isn't ringing any bells offhand.
Re "representationalism vs nonrepresentationalism" in phil of language, I'm not familiar enough with all of the claims of both sides to say that I'd fall on one side of the fence or another. Insofar as I'm familiar with it, it seems to be trivially the case that representationalism is part of the gist of language, but both sides must be saying something "deeper" than my understanding of the issue for there to be a significant dispute about it.
Is something added by "human" here? Or is a certain metaphysics smuggled by that reference?
Have you read Heidegger's. What is Metaphysics?
Sure...as in Rorty’s non-representationalist attempt to overthrow Kantian epistemology.
————————
Quoting fresco
There was a time when “knowledge” was perfectly adequate for saying that very thing.
The reference to 'human' implies that different species with non human physiologies might be able to communicate different expectancies. We might conceive of dolphins, say, with specialised acoustic systems being able to co-ordinate their hunting activities through what Maturana called 'languaging' which promotes 'structural coupling'.
Then the concept that I have of your mind is identical to your mind, and your internet post and the following replies are a concept that originated in my mind when I read them, not yours (because your's and others' "minds" is just a concept that originated in my mind)? Is that not solipsism in a nutshell?
No. Its meaningless because we are not engaged on any mutual, everyday project. Its what Wittgenstein called 'language on holiday'. Words like 'mind' are irrelevant to a thesis which ultimately implies that 'observers' with 'minds' are inseparable from the so-called 'objects' they appear to contemplate. That point is precisely why Heidegger for one, needed to resort to neologisms
I'm a subjectivist on meaning. Meaning resides in heads. It's not social. It's mental. There's no social mentality.
Quoting fresco
Not sure what that would amount to
Quoting fresco
The notion of nonphysical things is incoherent.
Quoting fresco
We already have three unique topics above. I'll refrain from commenting on a fourth. ;-)
Too bad that!
Physicality is mearly one aspect of 'thinghood'(expectancy of interaction) based on our common physiology. Try an 'abstract thing' like 'friend' or 'problem' as counter examples
You may see three separate topics. I suggest the thesis implies not.
Keep up the mission Frank ! :smile:
So, when the word "cat" is socially acquired, for example, what's actually acquired is the sound "cat" or the set of letters c-a-t if it's writing instead. The sound and the marks are not the same thing as the meaning.
(I'd rather focus on one topic at a time, but we're already all over the map. I'll let you choose which topic to focus on first.)
I think it’s clear there’s something observer independent that you measure when you measure the charge of an electron. The property or feature being measured may not actually ‘be’ an electron - the concept may be incomplete or just a useful fiction to keep track of the properties being measured but that doesn't discount the independence of the actual measurement.
But that doesn’t mean it’s existence as an independent existing thing is absolute either - it is dependent on a space-time position and the reason it’s distinguished and recognized as an object distinct from the background is because of its relevance to us and the way it interacts with us. What I’m trying to say is physicality can still exist but the way it’s catalogued and divided up is not intrinsic and is relative to whether the distinctions we make are meaningful to us. In that way existence of particular objects can be relative while still maintaining the reality of a larger observer independent whole
A child who first aquires the word 'cat' in situations of experiencing furry toys, or real animals, or picture books is quite likely to initiially use that word for what adults call 'dog'. What matters is social agreement about expectancy. Meaning resides in expectancy which is open to negotiation.
How would you have objective (or more simply, observable) expectancy?
What's something you'd recommend on nonrepresentationalism, though? I'll read it and comment to you as I do.
The first level of measurement is 'nominal' i.e. naming of 'the thing to be measured'. The naming of 'space' or 'time' is no exception. 'Space' and 'time' are 'things' by virtue of being useful concepts fof some human endeavours.
There is no point in arguing about naive realistic axioms. The thesis rejects them by definition.
Which thesis are we referring to there? And if it rejects naive realistic "axioms," is it a worthwhile thesis?
If we don't have objective/observable expectancy, then (a) how do we have a social form of that? and (b) how are we getting to external meaning?
The thesis is presented in the title of this thread. It up to you to decide whether it is 'worthwhile'.
It is for me because it exposes the futility of many so called 'philosophical debates'.
I already pointed out to you that existence being relative, not absolute has no correlation to realism/idealism. Maybe you disagreed with me, but then you need to make a case for the correlation.
I don't want to play a simplistic game of 'words' chasing 'words' round the houses.
At the risk of being heckled by the traditionalists, I quote Derrida...'there is nothing beyond context'.
That for me means every word we use, including 'objective' and 'confidence' takes its meaning from the real life contexts of its usage, and not from artificial 'word play' which I like to describe occasionally as 'seminaritis'.
Is that a response to this:
"If we don't have objective/observable expectancy, then (a) how do we have a social form of that? and (b) how are we getting to external meaning? "
If so, I take the response as you simply not having an argument for what you were claiming. Or it's at least you not being willing to get down to the details necessary to understand the discrepancies between our different claims.
You claimed that the title of this thread rejects "axioms of" naive realism.
No it does not. Because naive realism has no correlation to relative vs absolute.
Re the other comment, I wrote this above:
"What's something you'd recommend on nonrepresentationalism, though? I'll read it and comment to you as I do."
I don't know if you just didn't read that or what, but you didn't respond. (I'm assuming that you're specifically talking about linguistic nonrepresentationalism, by the way, since that's the context in which you brought this up earlier.)
All of this suggests a transcendent vantage point, yet your point seemed to be that it's only relatively true.
If it's convenient for me to disagree with you, you'd have to say we're both relatively correct. This would be the case no matter how or why I disagree.
That sort of renders your thesis sort of flimsy, doesnt it?
I suggest anthing on Rorty's or Wittgenstein's 'antirepreentationalism in language.
It would only appear 'flimsy' if you were not familiar with the plethora of literature behind it.
I would suggest perhaps Rorty's ''Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" since this comes to mind regarding Terrapin's comments, but both know what your dismissal procedure is !
My argument was simple. Why do you need a plethora of literature to answer it?
Per you, your thesis is relatively true. It's just one way of expressing your interactions with repetitive phenomena.
I'm free to discard it in favor of a view more convenient to myself.
I have PMN handy here. A lot of it isn't about phil of language or anything that Rorty is characterizing as "nonrepresentationalism" specifically re phil of language (again, I don't recall him using that term as specifically a phil of language term--but maybe I just don't recall that). Anyway, since you're ostensibly better-versed in it than I am, and it's supposedly providing support for views you agree with, could you give page or at least chapter references for the relevant part?
It can’t be entirely nominal or else how could we even have common, reliable experiences at all? At some point there must be primitive referents to which we can slap on symbols.
Wait, is he somehow arguing that "it's all language" (a la "it's turtles all the way down") and that no language is actually referring to anything other than itself?
Of course that 'I' feels free by definition, but the concept of 'self' which might emerge according to the thesis may decide to deconstruct the idea of 'feels free'. Thats part transcendene issue !
You might be trying to tell me that I may be bound to the conventions of my time.
Not sure, though. I'll take your obscurity as a sign that you don't wish to pursue it further. So we'll leave it there.
Bon voyage.
Congratulations! You've wiped away subjectivity and the subject in one swift stroke and redefined "minds" as "objects".
What is a Wittgenstein and what is its relationship with "language on holiday"? It seems to me that you are saying that Wittgenstein IS language on holiday if Wittgenstein is inseperable of the "objects" it contemplates.
It seems to me that all of your posts are a "Wittgenstein" (language on holiday).
You know me, Fresco. Never relent.
Common physiology and common physical needs imply agreement on 'naming' i.e. producing 'concepts'. Anthropology gives examples of how cultures vary on what you want to call 'fundamental', kinship relationships being an example of one 'hot issue' for some. Or consider for example, the four classic elements of antiquity, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water. What could be more 'fundamental' than those at the time.
But that's not philosophy of language, it's epistemology (and implicationally phil of perception). I'm very familiar with representationalism and its alternatives in this realm. As a direct realist, I'm obviously not a representationalist.
You initially seemed to be saying something specifically about representationalist versus non-representationalist theories of language.
What is a Rorty, James, Dewey, Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Derrida, or Heidegger? I'm focusing on your use of language here. Are words just scribbles and sounds or are they about things that arent words themselves? Is Wittgenstein a word, mind, or what? You used the term, Wittgenstein, not me. What is it?
If language does not represent things in reality, then what does the above quote even mean? Is it not a use of language that represents some state of affairs other than it just being a string of scribbles on a screen?
In bold and underlined are other "things" which Bohr should not have used as definitive and yet he did. The argument about the non-definitiveness of reality because of our "unreal" percepts and concepts MUST be a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. What it doesn't answer is, "what are we perceiving or conceiving?" "Can the resources or aspects of perception and conception be non-existent or unreal?"
If what you are implying from that Bohr-Einstein argument is true, then everything we designate as something are illusions/representations. Illusions/representations of what? Illusions/representations in what?
What is existence that it should be relative, instead of absolute? If it's a concept, then, a concept of what? Whence and how is the concept derived?
Referring to something different, where Rorty was actually doing phil of language, would be another matter of course.
However, re this:
The second part of that doesn't cohere very well with the first part, unless Rorty was asserting that beliefs are necessarily linguistic. Otherwise comments about beliefs can't be taken to be comments about language per se.
The rest of that is Rorty commenting contra so-called "ordinary language philosophy," which would have nothing to do with a representationalism/non-representationalism divide re phil of language.
It seems like this is kind of turning out to be you commenting on Wikipedia articles are similar stuff you read on the Internet, by the way.
Agree! I've read quite a few accounts of the Bohr/Einstein debates and I'm in favour of Bohr's attitude (which together with Heisenberg and several others became retrospectively named the 'Copenhagen interpretation'.) Whereas Einstein insisted that there must be a real object that existed independently of the act of measurement - hence his exasperated question 'does the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?'
Notice the similarity of 'things in their own right' and the Kantian ding an sich - I presume that is intentional - and the nub of the issue, also. We can know a lot about such phenomena (obviously) - short of what they really are.
You said it yourself. They are phenomena. What is phenomena? Knowing a lot about something entails knowing what they really are. If you don't know what they are, effectively you don't know what you're talking about.
If you know you don't know something, that's something you know. But in your case, I've never observed that. :-)
That is assuming that you know what knowing really is.
There have been many 'mentions' over night (uk) and it is difticult to answer all of you in detail.
The main (Pragmatist) point I want to re-iterate is that questions that imply a regress of definition (language chasing language) fall into what I take to be Wittgenstein's 'language on holiday'. Language is 'not on holiday' when it applies to communicative situations which involve decision about subsequent action either individually or jointly....
e.g. 'Does global warming exist ? ' only has significance if an answer implies subsequent action.
...in short, everyday usage of 'existence' is relative because it involves 'what's it got to do with us ?'
What I am reacting against by using the term 'seminaritis', are academic scenarios such as 'atheists' arguing with 'believers' about 'evidence for the existence of God'. This never happens in 'real life' where the labels 'atheist' and 'believer' never arise except in social conflict situations, like for example, in discussion of 'educational curricula'. In 'real life', believers and atheists just 'get on with it' with or without the functionality of a God' concept.
I note that some dissenters are arguing from pov's like 'this is epistemology not linguistics' but it is this academic labelling which is under 'pragmatic' attack. Concepts stand or fall on the basis of their contextual functionality...and all we've got as thinkers is 'concepts' !
Thankyou for that comment about 'physiology'. As far as I can tell, all I must admit to are 'other interlocuters' who agree (structurally couple) with this one regarding contextual interactions. Thus shared 'words' like 'common physiology' constitute 'contextual behavioral co-ordination facilitators' with respect to human projects. Obviously, it is difficult to think of universal concepts like 'physiology' in that way, so instead I think of culture specific words like duende which is a common Spanish term used by flamenco lovers to denote a particular 'emotional essence' of the music.
By admitting to 'other intelocuters' I believe I am serving an ontologically minimum requirement for the social interactions we call 'linguistic', and the acquistion experiences of shared words' . In that way the only 'absolutist' digression I might be accused of with respect to 'existence' is that 'interactions exist'., but since these are transitory I claim to escape a major aspect of absolutist.
Whether you're using "significance" in the "meaning" (semantic) sense or in the "importance" (value) sense, both are assigned by individuals, with potentially as much variation as we can imagine, and neither are therefore limited, in general, to answers that imply subsequent action.
Quoting fresco
Not sure what you're talking about there. In real life, people have discussions/arguments about stuff like that often enough. It's not something most people do most of the time, but no discussion is aside from the most superficial interaction about the weather and the like.
Quoting fresco
You're referring to me there. It's really just a way to point out that maybe you're trying to talk a bit "above your head." You presented a representationalist / non-representationalist dichotomy as if there was a well-established one specifically in philosophy of language. If that's the case, I'm not very familiar with it (though I am at least cursorily familiar with some representationalism talk in that field). So then you started getting a bit patronizing about that, and when I pressed you for info about it, it turned out that you were referring to phil of perception (or more broadly epistemological) representationalism vs alternatives (where the alternatives, by the way, aren't actually commonly grouped together under an "anti-representationalism" heading).
For one, should I be surprised that you'd reach conclusions about "philosophers today" based on posts on this board?
I acknowledge that discuesions about 'the existence of God' do occur in what what we might call 'real life' since it can be viewed as a socially contentious issue. However, I assert these 'debates' are always going to be futile precisely because 'existence' is wrongly, in my view, taken to mean 'an absolute state of being' rather than 'a concept like any other which stands or falls on its utility'.
As for your seeming objection to my philosophical 'label jumping', it may indeed be that your appreciation of nonrepresentationalism' has not yet reached the stage of iconoclasm of traditional philosophical,analysis. An extreme view of traditional labelling might relegate that process to a form of 'intellectual dancing'. And just embellish that point, it might be worth reassessing Bohr's position on 'existence' by noting his comments to the effect that 'language has no more than a poetic relationship to physics'. Hence we might assume that attempts to place his ideas under traditional ontological or epistemological labels would appear to be problemic.
Quoting fresco
Just curious here what you consider futility to be in this context. Is it that you're looking for consensus, and you think it's futile if we don't achieve that (this is just a guess to give you an example of the sort of thing I'm looking for in asking you)?
No. The above quote is what Witt meant when he used the phrase, "language on holiday". You are taking his phrase and reusing it in a way that is incoherent.
Witt is often regarded as an anti-philosopher in virtue of his expressed beliefs that “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” Witt even suggested that the subject he was dealing with is “one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called ‘philosophy.’”
Wittgenstein demotes philosophy to a sort of organization of thought, a clearing away of cobwebs. According to Wittgenstein, unlike empirical problems, philosophical problems can be solved “by looking into the workings of our language… in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by reporting new experience, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.”
What you have done is take Witt's own words and twist them into something incoherent and not what he meant, which is no different than bewitching (or insulting) our intelligence by means of your use of language.
BTW I note that W's 'meaning is use' is conspicuously absent from your analysis.
Please...not when I am drinking orange juice just above my keyboard.
Now I gotta clean the keyboard...and it is an odd, not even, year.
...Futile because 'evidence' in the case of 'God' is in the eye of the beholder. The 'utility' of the concept is a psychological and social issue,outside contexts in which 'evidence' is a consensual criterion.
I'll bypass for a moment whether I agree that evidence in the case of God is in the eye of the beholder, because what I want to focus on is why you'd think that whether something has utility isn't in the eye of the beholder.
Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?
Why would we talk about evidence differently only in the case of God?
Why is evidence for your existence different than the evidence for God?
This another great example of Witt's "language on a holiday" - where you "use" the term "evidence" in a way that makes it incompatible with what we already understand it to mean.
As an atheist, I cannot dispute 'the existence of God' for 'believers', because the concept is functional for them, albeit dysfunctional for me. 'Evidence' has nothing to do with it especially when 'faith' is cited as a key issue, and 'observation' remains nebulous and contentious.
Could you answer the question I was interested in:
"Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?"
You're forgetting that the words are used to trigger concepts in other minds via communication. The concept of existence exists as something non-verbal in your mind, which you then translate into verbal form for communicating, but if the same concept isnt triggered in another mind when you use that word, can you really say that the concept was triggered by your use of the word?
Quoting frescoDelusions are functional for those that have them, but not for me.
I think Bohr was simply pointing out our inability to verify, in this case the extreme requirement of actually seeing one, the actual existence of electrons because they're beyond the reach of man or machine. It doesn't mean electrons don't exist as matter behaves as they do (electricity or chemical bonding).
Bohr was exposing human limitations and not that existence is relative and not absolute. A blind man can't see a tiger but can still be eaten by it. It'd take a foolish blind man to say the existence of tigers is relative or context-dependent.
We don't. We simply avoid joint projects in which theistic belief could be an impediment.
If your Joe-Betty scenario involves raising children, one tends to give way to the other.
I disagree. Bohr was in tune with Heisenberg here who said..'we never observe nature directly...only the results of the questions we ask of it'.
This, for me, is an acknowledgment of at least four related issues:
(1) Kant's point about the inaccessibility of noumena (2) Nietzshe's point there is no description -reality distinction (3) Psychological views that perception is selectively active, not passive (4) Measurement begins with 'the nominal', i.e. human naming ,of the selected phenomenon.
The particular case of 'the electron' brings these to the fore, not because of 'size issues' but 'uncertainty' and 'complimentarity' issues highlight point 2.
Your 'blind man' scenario is interesting from a 'comparative physiology across species' pov (...'dead insects dont 'exist' for hungry frogs...) and also the specific human issues of shared language reflecting shared needs. Human use of transducers to enhance active perception could be said to be exemplified by the blind man's stick.
Facts are relative and truths are absolute. Ignoring such fundamental distinctions merely leads to a confused discussion where we talk past each other without realising we’re doing so.
'Delusions' are defined primarily by social consensus regarding 'inappropriate behavior'. The fact that what we call 'brain functioning' may be correlated with this is a more recent view which has tended to replace 'spiritual possession'.
I agree. Our answers are only as good as our questions but that doesn't mean there are no answers to questions we haven't asked does it?
On the contrary all I would argue that ' truths ' are relative except perhaps 'religious' ones. 'Truth ' is a word like any other whose meaning is embedded in a particular transient context.
The concept of truth is too basic to define, so there aren't multiple definitions.
The word "truth" could mean hotdog in some contexts, but that's not philosophically interesting.
So if what we're referring to by "futile" is that something is in the eye of the beholder, utility is as futile as evidence.
which is futile. There is no debate about 'utility' except where the social implications of theism might be imposed on others.
No, delusions are irrational beliefs, not behaviors.
You seem to be saying that P is true IFF there is social agreement about P.
Not sure about that, but are you contradicting yourself accidently? Or does your view on relativity allow you to do that on purpose?
Dont you need evidence that the debate on evidence it futile? What reasons do you have to say that the debate is futile and wouldnt you be using your reasons as evidence?
If the debate is futile then why are you even on a philosophy forum debating it? Those of us that believe the debate to not be futile are at least being consistent in debating it. You arent. If I thought a debate was futile, then I would have abandonded the discussion, but you dont seem to believe your own words based on your behavior, so why should we believe you?
The short answer to your question is 'no' I don't..
Hence why I asked you to give the reason that you're using the word "futile." If the reason isn't that evidence is in the eye of the beholder, then don't say that that's the reason.
People do debate utility, and debating utility was the example I presented. So why isn't utility futile if debating something (that's in the eye of the beholder) makes something futile?
The reason for the futility of the 'evidence for God' debate, is that The 'properties of God' remain disputed, even amongst believers, hence the choice of 'evidence' is arbitrary.
The 'utility of belief in God' need not be a futile debate if its minimal psychological function (as a palliative) is contrasted with its potentially pernicious social consequences. But that debate is anathema to 'believers' and therefore tends to be hypothetical. In short, the 'utility debate' rarely happens
Im not asking you to chase words. I'm asking you to be consistent. You arent. Any infinite regress is one of your own making. I'm basically asking you how you resolve the regress your own claims make. But what would one expect from someone who thinks that evidence is in the eye of the beholder?
I don't need 'evidence' to identify that arguments about 'evidence for God' are futile, anymore than I need 'evidence' for the futility of the claim that there is 'evidence for the beauty of the Mona Lisa'. i.e. The context of 'evidential' claims is one of agreed observational criteria.
Your demand for 'consistency' appears to be semantically vacuous.
Which is no different than saying there is no evidence.
No. It means that subgroups of 'believers' have there own parochial observational criteria including, for example, 'the complexity of the life process'. Atheists might agree on that 'complexity' observation but consider it as 'evidence' for some yet to be discovered 'other natural process'.
Does that really refer to anything besides you not observing it very often?
I'll throw that one back at you. How often have you come across debate about 'the utility of theism' ?
Other than Marx's 'opium of the masses' or Putin's manipulative promotion of the Orthodox Church, I don't seem to have encountered the 'utility' issue.
Then why do you believe that the arguments about 'evidence for God' are futile? Why would you not believe that the arguments about the 'evidence for God' are not futile? Any reason you give for your belief is evidence for your belief. Whether it is good evidence - evidence that integrates well with the rest of what we know and how we use language - is a different story.
Quoting fresco
It's not the complexity of the life process, it is the imperfect design of organisms, the extinction of 99% of life that has existed, and the vast areas of existence that are devoid of life that is evidence that existence was not intentionally designed with life in mind. If the properties of God are so difficult to agree on by believers, then how do the believers know that they aren't simply talking past each other? There could be many "gods". God could just as well be defined as an extradimensional alien. Is it the terms that we are disagreeing on, or are we simply talking past each other?
The continuing cacophony of views that you have reported about complexity should be sufficent 'evidence of futility' for you !
I'm not making any general claim about the frequency of one over the other. You are.
That's right...on the basis that 'existence is relative' is an usual or counter intuitive assertion.
Huh?
Here is a Rorty link giving a backcxloth to my assertion.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3enH7ntOAM
Your comment didn't make any sense to me in context. (In other words, "Huh?" )
Heckling is boring don't you think !
I suggest that anybody actually interested in my position should listen to the Rorty clip before further comment.
You could have just gone, "I'm a Rorty fan. Let's casually discuss some of his ideas. Go!" That might have worked better.
Are you saying that my assertion about 'existence' is not supported by Rorty ?
The claim that there are :
Quoting fresco
asserts that there are humans, a world, aspects of that world, and interactions between humans and aspects of the world. They could not interact if they did not in some way exist.
The question then is what are they? The answer is, we do not know. Whether an electron is a "thing" or "object" that exists independent of us is an epistemological question. How one answers the epistemological question determines the ontology, in the sense of what we say, of the electron.
Is the question of the ontology of an electron the same or different than the question of the ontology of, say, the moon? Is the interactions between humans and aspects of the world of the same kind or different in the case of electrons and the moon? Would the moon exist without some form of interaction with humans? Is the aspect of the world of the same kind in the case of the moon and an electron?
And who knows whether 'the thing' we call 'the moon' will not in the future be deemed to be some minor manifestation of a larger 'unit' considered in multidimensional space. (Historical Ref: The Morning Star was found to be identical with The Evening Star')
So does not all this imply that 'existence' is relative not absolute unless we adopt a metaphysical, eternal
'God's Eye' view, in which 'thinghood' gives way to fluxless holism ?
.
I don't believe there's any way to know what frogs aren't aware of.
I did not use the anthropomorhic word 'aware', you did. The empirical 'evidence' is that the frogs starve to death surrounded by a potential food source. And who knows what 'dead flies' humans may be 'missing' ?
You didn't have to use the word "aware" to be saying that. Nothing anthropomorphic about it by the way. Frogs have senses, brains, etc.
There is a pov (Maturana) wwhich would view 'awareness' to be anthropomorphic.
But from now on, I will not be continuing a conversation which is tangential to my opening thesis.
Ah...the "Tis so/No it aint game" !:grin:
I have no idea how you arrived at that based upon my reply.
Check out the Rorty clip above. The relativity of 'existence' thesis renders 'things in their own right' meaningless i.e. Kant's 'inaccessihle noumena' was abondoned by later phenomenologists as a useless concept.
Is there a particular part of this lecture that you'd say hones in on what you want to focus on in this thread? I'm just asking because I'm 15 minutes into it already and I'm wondering when Rorty is going to get to anything like what we've been discussing so far. (And that's actually making it more difficult for me to appreciate Rorty's presentation, because I'm focused on waiting for the punchline with respect to this thread to arrive.)
At the end of the day, Rorty's iconoclastic attack on 'epistemology', has inevitable repercussions on its bed fellow 'ontology'. My assertion about the word 'existence' could be taken as an expression of that.
First, leading up to that, when he says, "Religious beliefs give us a way of thinking of our lives which puts them in an emotionally satisfying context," which seems to be an important premise in his view for what follows, (a) that's not actually disagreeing with the "symbolic" view of religion that he said he didn't find useful, and (b) it doesn't seem to be saying anything other than it's a fiction that some people find it rewarding to believe or to at least act "as if" it were true. Or at least it's consistent with (b).
He says, "Science oversteps its bounds when it tells us we have no right to believe in God . . ."--science doesn't actually say anything like that. Science isn't going to tell us what rights we do and don't have. Anthropology might tell us what rights people say they and others do and don't have, but since there aren't any non-human facts about rights, science can't tell us any.
Then he says, "This way of reconciling science and religion requires us to abandon the idea that there is one way the world really is." No it doesn't. Nothing like that follows from noting that some people find emotional satisfaction in believing or "as if-ing" religious beliefs.
Re "easiest if one thinks of beliefs as tools . . . rather than [something like claims for representing reality]" In making a claim that "x is a tool for y" we're making a claim about what reality is like.
This is already too many different topics to discuss at once, and it's just from a couple minutes of a 60-minute video.
I reject Kant's Noumena for different reasons than I reject Rorty's notion of truth as a property of true propositions(that's not just Rorty's by the way). I reject them both, nonetheless. Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness and/or naming them. That stands good and against the relativity of "existence".
Given that Existence was one of Kant's modal categories of understanding, perhaps Kant was arguing for your very position, namely that existence isn't 'noumenal' i.e. it is an expression of human judgement rather than an assertion of an absolute property.
The relativism of the knowledge of existence is the problem here. Even if everything in existence was absolute prior to our knowledge of it, we can only relate to it through our reletavistic understanding. Anything and everything we can know about existence is a reletavisic truth approximation.
Well, seems to me that it is the very phrase "the relativism of the knowledge of existence" that is the problem here along with "relativistic truth approximation". What do those phrases even say, and what are they saying it about? What is the referent of either? Why talk like that? I mean, what good comes of it?
What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use?
I personally find that the absolute/relative dichotomy is yet another inherently inadequate framework. I mean, what on earth does it even mean to be "absolute in existence"?
Some things exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them. Some things do not. We can know that, and we can be certain of it.
It sets up the dialectical extremes that the discourse is confined to.
Quoting creativesoul
Absolute existence refers to that which exists in and of itself, independent of its relation to other things - a self-contained and self-sustained reality. This contrasts with relative existence, which refers to that which has existence for another, dependent on its contingent relations.
Quoting creativesoul
Of course things can exist prior to our knowledge, but this has nothing to do with whether something has relative or absolute existence.
So first, we should consider existence. What is it? Is it reducible to the concepts apprehended in abstract thought, like gravity as it exists-in-itself? No, this is only the idea of gravity. From the perspective of thought, that gravity exists in itself is an idea. From this perspective, there is every reason to say that gravity has existed for eternity. But the idea of gravity is not actually existing until substantiated as a particular concretion.
Where is concrete existence other than in the direct and immediately experience of the individual in himself. Actual gravity is found in my direct and immediately experience of it, the fact that I don't witness everything float into space that isn't nailed down. My direct knowledge of the existence of gravity is dependent upon many relations, thus, it is gravity as it is for me, and not as it is in itself. Anything that exists for another is relative being.
The discourse is about existence. Since when is existence confined to discourse?
The papaya tree in my yard is not a concept. It exists. It existed prior to our talking about it. We need language to talk about the tree. The tree does not need to be talked about.
Gravity and the idea of gravity.
What's the difference on your view?
It's actually about whether existence is relative or absolute. How we define and use these words in this discussion is of supreme importance.
Existing is one of those slippery terms, like "thinking". The key here would be to establish a criterion for talking about "existing" as existence/being, for the simple fact that we are talking about it. It is important that we don't confounded the actuality with the idea.
If you agree, I know you are the man for the job. :wink:
"Gravity as it exists" is a phenomenon that can only be immediately/directly apprehended, with or without knowledge of it.
"Gravity as idea" is based on the prior knowledge of an existing phenomenon. Before "gravity as idea" was ever conceived, we can be quite certain that it was common sense that a high enough fall resulted in a "splat!". "Gravity as idea" is an advanced product of linguistic thought/belief, and it is not confined to the immediacy of actual existence, but can be projected onto the thought of possible existence.
Surely you guys are missing the point that human word 'existence' implies 'functional for human purposes'. The 'tree' is changing biologically in a continuous manner, but it functionally persists and that persistence is coined by the abstract persistence of the word 'tree'. And in what sense is the functional 'thing' we call 'tree' still a unified entity for other species like birds ? Maybe for a hypthetically 'speaking' bird it's a 'perch' or 'a bunch of perches'.
So IMO, a 'thing-In-itself' is meaningless, because 'thinghood' already implies species respecific functional persistence relative to its lifespan needs.
That's how our discussions always seem to go. creativesoul is a very patient interlocutor.
Quoting fresco
I'm trying not to miss that point. In fact, I find it quite impossible to think of existence as it would be for a bird.
To say I am existence (that all existence in itself is reducible to my existing), is very problematic. So I won't say it.
I can only think of existing as it is for me, but this is not existence as it is in itself, it is an abstraction of it - a thought/belief about existence/being. Moreover, I can only talk amongst other humans about it as an idea, and how it might necessarily pertain to things like trees and birds.
So, you see, the way I approach "existence" is all too human.
Actually, 'thing-In-itself' implies how it is for itself, and not for another. Any species specific functional persistence would necessarily imply how a thing is for another. Even if there is existence in and of itself, it only matters insofar as it appears for us. It is all quite relative.
Ah...maybe you have not spotted that even the thing you are calling 'I' has 'existence' evoked by this transient communicative context. Like the 'tree' that 'I' is a word implying multiple transient functions.
I am making the point here that no 'thing' has permanence even though 'words' are suggestive of that.
Next time you have an internal debate with yourself, you might reconsider what 'I' means !
That is the whole problem, words treat reality as though it is still. This is why it takes great care to talk about "existence/being" .
Quoting fresco
The thing that I am calling "I" has an immediate, direct, and irrational existence that is private to me. The actual existing "I" merely has linguistic, sentiential, rational existence that functions to reference something else. For me, despite its indirect functionality, the former "I" has greater existence, regardless of the fact that it is impossible for another person to access this direct existence of mine. Although my existence is relative for everyone else (dependent on particular relations), it is absolute for me as the existing one called "I".
Well...its a comforting assertion, especially when I bring to mind that crazy 'I' from last night's dream, which was pewrfectly happy with itself at the time !
That was existence for you at the moment of its occurence, was it not?
I find that thought very comforting too. :grin:
Simply put is “existence” a “fact” or a “truth”. If the former it is relative, if the later it is absolute. Skimming through the above posts there is little to no effort being made in distinguishing what is being talked about here regarding the difference between facts and truths.
I find this quite disconcerting ... I’m baffled how this point has seemingly been glossed over (or did I simply miss it being addressed?)
I think we were all implying things as truth and fact, but maybe you could elaborate more on your reasoning here:
Quoting I like sushi
I'm interested.
By constructive logic, "X exists" doesn't refer to a spiritual essence of a particular to which one is presently acquainted,i.e. uniqueness, but merely expresses the ability to locate or to create at least one object possessing the observational properties described by the predicate 'X'.
So the meaning of "Elvis Presley does not exist", "Unicorns don't exist", and so on, without further assumptions, merely expresses the inability to create or to find objects described by the respective predicates.
The difficulty here, is to reconcile the fact that we can talk about unicorns whilst at the same time claiming that we cannot exhibit them. This can be reconciled by first giving unicorns a constructive definition within a hypothetical universe of discourse in which unicorns can be said to exist according to our definitions, and then afterwards asserting that such a constructive definition is inapplicable within our actual universe.
In other words, the non-existence of an object is understood to refer to a constructed object within one universe, that has no equivalently constructed partner within another universe, thereby making non-existence a relation between two universes.
Excellent post, I find it very enlightening.
Quoting sime
It could get very complex. Unicorn as idea is one thing, unicorn as image another, unicorn as dressed up horse is yet another, and finally unicorn as progeny of unicorn, all represent different types of existence for the unicorn.
Quoting sime
This is very applicable to the notion of "I exist" in its sentiential existence. But in the immediate identification of myself as the existing "I" , there is something that can only be discovered/created by me, since I am the one object possessing the observational properties described by the predicate. It is much more difficult to mediate my actual existence, than it is to mediate my abstract thought/belief about that existence. What is required is that I objectifiy the "I" as much as possible through abstraction, so that it can become a quantifiable variable, like the unicorn or Elvis.
Doesn't that depend on how an individual is thinking about the term?
Actual existing and thinking about existence are two different things.
What does that have to do with my comment about what words imply?
Perhaps, that what words imply does not necessarily correspond to what is.
Okay, but my comment wasn't in the vein of "what words imply corresponds to what is." So I'm not sure what that has to do with my comment.
Sorry if I missed your Q about 'fact' vs truth'. My own position is that all words, including 'fact' 'truth, and 'existence' denote concepts , not 'things in themselves' which I take to be a meaningless concept.
Words are the 'currency' of thinking and I am arguing that 'existence of X' implies only the 'utility' of the concept X, for human purposes. It does not imply that 'X hs a state of being' independent of human utility.
As for 'facts' (from the Latin facere to construct) I take these to denote 'agreement as to what is the constructed case'. 'Is-ness' is a construction.
I take 'truth' to be a word denoting 'confidence about what is the case'.
A question that's always haunted me (in a good way :smile: ). But it's another topic, and I doubt there is much appetite here to discuss such things.
Is there?
This is a perfect example that proves the point I made earlier about unnecessarily complex language use.
Think about it this way... if what you say here is true, then anything and everything knowable about existence is relative, and the term "relative" is not doing anything at all. It's not telling us anything about our knowledge, unless it is being invoked against claims of absolute knowledge. Are people still claiming that too?
I find the dichotomy yet another linguistic bottle to get trapped within. There are better ways to account for the world and/or ourselves. The concept of "existence" is determined entirely by us. Not all concepts of "existence" are on equal footing. Common sense helps discriminate between notions/conceptions/frameworks/schema.
The term "existence" exists. All terms are existentially dependent upon language use. All language use is existentially dependent upon pre-linguistic thought/belief. All thought/belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of further subsequent qualification.
All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon same things as terms are. After-all, they are existentially dependent upon terminological use.
What does the notion of "relative" existence add here? Better yet, does it help or hinder our understanding?
The term "existence" has meaning attributed to it that is relative to the users. Things existed prior to language, and thus prior to the term.
That which exists has an affect/effect.
Your second sentence does not follow from the first. 'Things' are focal interaction events (or predicted interactions) by current users. And the concept of 'prior' may also be contingent on current user's concept of 'time' . These points illustrate what I mean by 'the relativity of existence'.
Doubtful. The relativity of existence itself depends on the absoluteness of existence.
Without an absolute, you can't have relative proportions.
Relativity deals with each bread slice, but you can't have bread slices without bread - and that's the realm of the absolute.
Quoting fresco
That's not so. Now, there are human concepts of existence, but they deal with the understanding of existence.
Existence itself is not a human concept and does not require anything save for itself; whereas everything else does require it.
What do you figure the concepts are about? For example, the concept "dog." You don't think that's about "things in themselves" that we're calling "dogs" but it's about what instead?
The first thing I'm confused about there is what people are expecting. Do you mean expecting experiences? Of what--concepts?
Yes they are expecting potential 'experiencies'.
Experiences of concepts? "Things-in-themselves"?
So experiencing language that others utter?
It includes experiencing a projected context in which 'others or 'selves' might do the uttering.
Experiencing a projected context? I have no idea what that refers to. How does anyone (or anything) project a context, and just what would it consist of (physically, for example)?
Does a stranger suddenly stick his head round your door and say 'dog' ? ...Okay, lets say that happened...if you actually heard the word 'dog' (and even that might not happen if you weren't expecting it)...would you not immediately embellish that word with a scenario ...has he lost his dog ?....has he found a dog and think its mine?....is he being abusive?...etc
IMO discussion the word 'dog' in the abstract is an example of what I have called 'seminaritis', and such seminars operate on a 'representalist' view of language which I have already discounted.
You seem to have not understood that I was literally asking you to explain the phrase "projected context."
So it's just another way of saying that there is some context, and that people usually speak in sentences, paragraphs, etc., relative to some context?
(the word "projected" seems weird to me for that, but okay, if that's all you had in mind)
Are you following me ?
At the moment, I'm interested in your account of concepts. So that's why I'm asking questions about it.
Your account of concepts is important for the thread, because you're hinging your argument on claims about what we're doing with concepts, how concepts work, etc.
Good.
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Quoting creativesoul
Better.
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Quoting creativesoul
Best.
Existence: an absolutely necessary empirical condition for human experience, because its negation admits an impossibility.
It isn’t existence that’s relative; what is relative is the paradigm under which existence is understood, re: things exist as they are, or things exist as they appear to us. And THAT is the problem: we do not have the means to know with apodeictic certainty which paradigm is true.
All language does is fuel the war.
Nor need it.
Are you claiming that nothing existed prior to language? Are you claiming that nothing exists prior to our reporting upon it?
I don't think that those two options are exhaustive/adequate.
Exhaustive.....perhaps not; but the two options are certainly adequate for conceptualizing that particular problem. Unless one does not accept the classic rendition of “relative existence” as the proper problem.
No, I am saying that 'things existing',only has meaning in the context of language users. Scenarios 'prior to human observers' is an oxymoron because you the current speaker are the observer of such a scenario in 'your minds eye' as we speak. The fact that we can visualize such scenarios which have explanatory utility for current events is an entirely human activity.
Why isn't this simply confusing epistemology and ontology?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heideggerian_terminology
I like your philosophy, despite what they say. Some of the things you say make a lot of sense. for example:
Quoting creativesoul
That, there, is very clever. :up:
(I'm sure someone even more clever will come along and deconstruct it with their innate genius :roll: .)
Quoting creativesoul
The better question would be, what is understanding, and what is best for it?
That is for the understanding one to decide. I think that the notion of entering a bottle to be a very intriguing enterprise. What does the bottle entail, and what can we find out about ourselves by temporily taking leave into one bottle or another? We will at least discover (on a personal level) that some bottles are better than other -
some filled with rainwater, some filled with whiskey, and some filled with piss. But, one of the best discoveries (imo) might be that one can enter and examine various bottles simultaneously.
Quoting fresco
Good.
What about thought/belief, does its content exist prior to it?
Yes.
Thanks.
It has been argued for. Without subsequent refutation and/or valid objection it does not need to be further argued. I'm seeing where it leads.
Anyone is more than welcome to try. I would think that if it could be done, it would have been by now. Folk around these parts carry axes...
Not the less short answer I was looking for, I know you can do better, but I will accept it so as to avoid complicating matter.
Are you wanting to get into Kantian notions, synthetic apriori thought/knowledge, in particular?
What they need is a feller buncher, like what you drive.
I have no idea what that means, but it's funny anyway. Must be the accent.
Negative. I just wanted to hear your assessment of how the content of thought/belief can exist prior to thought/belief. But, at the bottom of it all, this kantian scheme seems inescapable, so never mind, unless you have a better notion. I'm willing to listen.
Partly, not entirely.
The screwdriver is a screwdriver in relation to its application. It doesn't need that relation to be a screwdriver, but the relation is an inevitable consequence.
So belief does not need an attachment, but may consequently develop one.
This is where it gets tricky. But I am the great Merkwurdichliebe, and I demand reconciliation on this matter...or else! :strong:
Go back to the first sentence and realise the meaning dissolves like salt in water.
Is that because the instant the sentence is posited, the term screwdriver has propositional significance - viz. meaning?
And the original always holds these parts, regardless of their discovery.
The existential constant?
@Shamshir
For a nondescript thing to change into something identifiable, like a screwdriver, because of its apprehension in thought/belief, would entail a problem of perpetual alteration, meaning that discovering anything new (qua functionality, correlations &c.) about the screwdriver would change it into something else. But, by presupposing all its properties in its propositional form (qua the existential constant), it retains its essentiality, despite any subsequent predication (true or false).
So any relative application of the screwdriver would appear additive, but it's actually divisive.
As it's not a screwdriver plus a relation, but a relation of the screwdriver - which would entail, it was latent and merely pulled out.
Now does rediscovery and partition of an object, alter it? No.
It merely alters the perception of the object. The object remains the same throughout all instances, but relative to the observer it alternates, due to the changes occuring with the observer; which is to say discovery.
This would apply to, say, identifying the screwdriver as an ice pick. Perhaps, a screwdriver by any other name?
What even is a screwdriver? A sharp stick of metal.
Can you use a knife as a screwdriver? You can.
But you don't, because you the observer choose not to, not because they are intrinsically different.
But you can't cut with a screwdriver, right?
You can, using the tip - which is the way you cut with box cutters and box cutters are essentially pocket knives.
You are making screwdrivers out to be violent weapons, but can they not also be repurposed to feed our babies? :joke:
Which is what I'm repeating, more or less.
Objects are absolutes. Relations are user experience.
An example of the problem is this: "Scenarios 'prior to human observers' is an oxymoron because you the current speaker are the observer of such a scenario in 'your minds eye' as we speak."
You, as the observer of whatever you're observing, is an epistemological perspective. It's a matter of what we know and how we know it.
Scenarios prior to human observers is not talking about an epistemological perspective. It's talking about an ontological perspective (where we're reading "ontology" as what ontology is about).
So there's no contradiction there (to fuel an oxymoron), because we're not talking about the same thing, in the same respect, from the same perspective, etc., in both cases.
In short, it's the rudimentary error (that persists throughout too much philosophy despite how rudimentary it is) of conflating things like concepts, for example, with what concepts are about. Or, it's conflating sense and reference.
Even the philosophers that I consider myself a big fan of say at least as many things that I think are misguided, misconceived, etc. as they say things that I think are insightful, on-target, etc.
Heidegger is not at all someone that I'm a fan of. Heidegger, in my view, is easily one of the worst philosophers, along with folks like Hegel, Derrida, Sartre, etc. I see Heidegger as consistently being a combo of incoherent and extremely confused, off-track, misguided, etc. So appealing to him won't clarify anything and won't amount to successfully meeting any criticism I'm forwarding.
But thankyou for trying.
Your 'question' is merely an example of naive realism. (...turtles all the way down. )
How do believe that concepts get started?
How would you say that "thrownness" addresses how concepts are started?
(...or maybe you are just stringing me along. It's getting hard to tell )
It depends on your view of how concepts work. Do you believe that we receive concepts from others?
Kant's scheme is neither inescapable, nor adequate for accounting for thought/belief. There's much to be admired about Kant. To his credit, his CI is brilliant. To this day, it can be used as a standard by which to determine whether or not some thought, belief, and/or behaviour is good. And it is very easily taught and understood by impressionable children. Hence, it can still be used to cultivate a society of more conscientious moral actors/agents/citizens, and it inherently induces and/or promotes thoughtful consideration of others and consequences.
His failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief can be chalked up to the conventional (mis)understanding of his time. That neglect produced the notions of reason that are still all too prevalent in philosophical discourse. All of them conflate rudimentary thought/belief with more complex. There are a plurality of inadequate dichotomies at work in all philosophical discourse of the time. We've talked about many of these in past.
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Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Thought/belief is always about the world and/or ourselves.
How the content of thought/belief can exist prior to thought/belief depends upon the thought/belief candidate under our consideration. Thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity. The simplest correlations are drawn between external things and internal things. The most complex are drawn between external things, internal things, and/or things that are both.
This makes no sense. If a screwdriver is a screwdriver in relation to it's application, then it needs a relation to it's application in order to be a screwdriver.
If A is an A in relation to B, then A is existentially dependent upon being in relation to B.
Driving screws is something that all sorts of things other than screwdrivers are capable of doing in resourceful enough hands. Those things are not screwdrivers. If a screwdriver is so in relation to it's application, as you claim above, then all things used to drive screws would be screwdrivers.
You're conflating names of things with uses of things.
Screwdrivers are existentially dependent upon us calling them by that namesake. There's nothing essential about being a screwdriver aside from being called such. Vodka and orange juice is, most certainly, a screwdriver... although one could not drive screws with one. If driving screws is essential to being a screwdriver, then a screwdriver is not always a screwdriver, but knives are.
Witt's criticism of essentialism is apt here. The only thing that all screwdrivers have in common is being called such.
This also harks back to Heraclitus' river and all of it's untenability.
Nay, lad.
A screwdriver does not need a relative application to be a screwdriver, it is a screwdriver a priori. A screwdriver will develop its relative application inadvertently, but not by necessity - ironic as it may sound.
Simply put: If a screwdriver was all there was, it would still be a screwdriver without any external relations; but its external relations being inescapable in this world, become inadvertently part of what a screwdriver is. But it is not dependent on them, they can be added and subtracted at will.
So A's an A in relation to B, as it is, but it is also A regardless of B, as it is always A relative to itself.
Quoting creativesoul
Maybe - but I figure words derive their meaning in reference to application.
Like how shears are shears because they shear and apples are apples because they grow on apple trees.
Then a screwdriver is not a screwdriver in relation to it's application...
It is, in part - and that part is inadvertent, as I told you above.
Agree?
And yet we park on driveways and drive on parkways...
:joke:
An the ON button on the remote is the OFF button on the remote.
It's a strange world out there.
A screwdriver is existentially dependent upon humans.
Agree?
This gets to an important historical issue in philosophy proper, namely the misguided notions of necessity/contingency...
I would like to hear more about this.
Quoting creativesoul
How would we prove this? If man is the measure of all things, then we can only understand this "existential dependency" by the measure of man. It is a perplexing paradox.
The screwdriver is a human creation.
What makes it a screwdriver a screwdriver? Its identity. Where does identity come from: the thing (its inherent properties/attributes) or the one identifying the thing (a cognitive representation)?
I don't know.
Quoting Shamshir
Creativity and discovery - Man as artist, versus man as journeyman...a very interesting debate. And if both, which is primary?
If one cannot simply agree that screwdrivers are human creations and all human creations are existentially dependent upon humans, then there's not much more I can say to such a skeptic.
Quoting Shamshir
We discover things that exist in their entirety prior to our discovery. Screwdrivers are products of our own manufacture.
I might agree, while I do incline towards a rejection of "man as the measure of all things", for argument's sake, I would have to be very clear about what we are talking about by identity to settle on one side or the other.
Wait. I think it's coming.
I would agree if you put it like that.
All we need to do is clarify what is meant by "things can exist in their entirety prior to our discovery of them". In other words, what's the difference between an undiscovered thing, and a discovered thing? Obviously, both exist in a peculiar way.
What part is unclear?
I would not put it that way.
That something can exist in its entirety prior to human contact.
Upon what ground would one doubt that?
I know you wouldn't. And that's what makes you a better philosopher than I.
I don't know about all that.
Well, if the identity-(existence) of all things is reducible to human creation, and all human creation is existentially dependent upon being created by a human, then existence prior to human contact is unthinkable.
It's discovery.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
What follows "then" is not a valid conclusion.
The identity of all things is existentially dependent upon being created by a human. <----- that follows.
I have no issue with that.
Then, a thing cannot exist in its entirety prior to its discovery, unless that thing exists as part of some type of universal understanding (logical architecture) that is inherent to all members of a species.
They're not. They're something that exists, regardless if humans figured it out or not.
The sculpture inside the rock exists, even if you don't carve it out.
I think we are working with two terms, existence and identity. I am confounding them here.
Let me clarify. Existence is something that is independent of identity. Identity is dependent on existence.
If properties are inherent to their objects, we discover them. If not, they are created by the aesthetic application of intellect.
Here's a simple proposition.
Someone who has only ever written with a pen, sees it as a writing implement.
Someone who has only ever been stabbed with a pen, sees it as a dangerous weapon.
It's the same pen - but it looks different from each side, just like how your back looks different from your front.
I think it can be put more didactically. We discover things that exist in their entirety, prior to their identification. There are primary attributes that we cannot help but identify. But through the ingenious creativity of the human intellect, it is very easy to apply secondary attributes to a thing's identity.
Actually, nevermind... I retract this.
Rubbish.
Rubbish. It's a pen. Pens can be put to use in different ways.
The same conflation of names with uses...
Pens are existentially dependent upon humans. Different uses for the same referent does not change the referent.
Yup.
Pens are not existentially dependent on humans.
And you can't prove there isn't a world where pens exist but humans don't, and you can't prove it isn't possible - if you want to go that route.
Quoting creativesoul
It does, when the referent is a part of your own perspective.
But on some pink sunglasses and your sky becomes pink.
You still haven't answered my question: How does a thing exists in its entirety, prior to its discovery?
There it is .
It can be proven that humans invented pens in this world.
Then pens didn't exist in their entirety prior to their invention. What is it without the human touch? Not a pen. Not a tree. Not a galaxy. Not the great Merkwurdichliebe.
Correct. Pens didn't exist prior to their invention.
One who is unfamiliar with a pen can discover one though. They do exist in their entirety prior to their discovery.
That is a categorical error of some kind or another. The pen is a particular invention. Can I not use the blood from my finger as a pen? Now we are getting into the same error of functionality that you were claiming of Shamshir.
The invention of pens is no different from the discovery of pens.
Man's creative capability is dependent on what is possible, and what is possible is dependent on what is.
Every invention is within the confines of the game and was not brought about by humans.
It was played out by humans.
Nah. It's just taking proper account of the existential dependency of a pen. They are existentially dependent upon humans. If there were never any humans, there would never have been any pens. In addition, it also notes that some things that are existentially dependent upon humans can be discovered by another human at a later date.
That is awfully inferential, and requires major qualification.
It also does not exhaust the requirements for a thing to exist in its entirety prior to its discovery. I know you cannot accept this disjunction.
Ya think?
Do we not discover, throughout our lives, the inventions of other people?
Then what about the original discovery. Would that thing exist if it were not for the human intervention?
I do not see the problem.
What have we discovered that did not exist in it's entirety prior to our discovery?
The better question is: what is it that we can actually presuppose exists in its entirety prior to our discovery of its existence in its prior entirety?
I am not trying to be difficult or obstinate. I sincerely want to understand these questions better. And I would never get the chance to work out these things anywhere but TPF.
Rubbish. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former, and not the other way around.
Tommy can discover a pen, by seeing it for the first time. He cannot invent it by seeing it.
I feel a strong sense of time or history to be present in your basic pressuppositions here.
I respectfully disagree.
That's ok.
Don't you even want to know my stupid reason?
Ok, let's say,
Jommy cannot invent it without discovering it , without seeing (experiencing) it.
So there is an obvious distinction between discovery and invention that we are confusing here. How do we factor in identification here?
All notions of "identification" and/or "identity" are existentially dependent upon metacognition. Metacognition... language. Language... thought/belief.
Identification is required for successful reference.
The notion of "identity/identification" is overplayed... All identification presupposes existence, regardless of subsequent further qualification.
Howzit relevant?
"its existence in its prior entirety"? What is that saying?
I wouldn't know what "its existence in its entirety" would be saying, even, that "its existence" wouldn't suffice just as well for (in other words what is "its entirety" adding to "its existence"?), but then modifying "entirety" by "prior" is that much more confusing.
That is what I'm saying. But, if we must, how do we reconcile this complex arrangement of terms? What is it trying to say, and how can it be said better or differently?
It's good to get the terms straight.
So then, you would agree that existence as it is in its entirety prior to its discovery is absolute. And, that any particular relation of an existing thing to absolute existence is relative.
Well, no. I take issue with the above suggestion on several counts...
I reject the absolute/relative dichotomy.
Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety".
It is presupposed within all thought/belief and/or statements thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent further qualification. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations.
Things exist in their entirety. What counts as in their entirety all depends upon the sort of thing we're considering.
Given the history of philosophy proper...
You can say that two times!
:wink:
In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement.
If you are seriously interested, I suggest re-reading a few of our exchanges and asking me about anything you may not find clear enough for your understanding.
Well. I would first suggest a verbatim quote. Re-arranging key terms in an order that I would not use them does nothing to help you understand what I am referring to and/or talking about. As best I know, there are a few notions at work in my work that are novel. So, I expect and welcome questions about the semantics.
If any of them are, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that the thing in question is not capable of existing prior to our account of it.
The interesting feature of this framework is that we can easily swap "being taken account of" with all sorts of other considerations. We can isolate the elemental constituents and assess whether or not any of them are existentially dependent upon any number of things.
It's good to get the terms straight. :grin:
I like that. Existence is a paradoxical concept and impossibly abstract, very much like thought. Whenever we think about existence, we suspend its actuality by translating it into thought. Thought produces the universal, but existence is found only in particular being. If this were not true, then anything I could imagine could be said to exist including (the thought of existence). So when discussing existence, it is important to understand that we are limited to the particular - the thought/belief about existing things, that may or may not be existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
Quoting creativesoul
This is a very important point. Can you give me some examples of both (being existentially dependent and independent of an account)?
Quoting creativesoul
To exhaust all the possible considerations is quite the task. But this seems like a very potent schematic (it takes account of creating, identifying, discovering, inventing, &c.)
It requires humility to attempt a foreign framework and to risk being wrong often. But it is one of the best ways to expand one's philosophical acumen. It also requires an interlocutor who is clear on what he knows, and patient, very patient.
By the way, you reflect a strong logic in your terminology... do you actually work out the logic formally on the side, or just intuit it in your writing?
I apologize for the sheer quantity of disagreements I've levied here. I can only hope that the explanations minimize future possible numbers...
However, it must be done. Coherency is at stake, and while coherency is inadequate for truth, it is certainly a requirement for true statements. Coherency maintains meaning. That is pivotal for shared understanding, for it consists - in part at least - of shared meaning.
Talking in terms of conceptions is fraught. That's objection numero uno. It's based upon the following... All conceptions have linguistic form, and as such all are existentially dependent upon language. Not all other things are.
Acquiring an understanding of that allows one to further discriminate between competing conceptions. When conceiving of that which exists prior to our conceptions thereof, our terminological framework can make or break us.
Thought is not impossibly abstract and/or paradoxical. That's numero dos.
This reads like nonsense on my view. According to the position that I'm arguing for/from...
Existence is not the sort of thing that has actuality. Actuality is what's happened and/or happening. Existence does not have what's happened and/or happening.
Again, put a bit differently, there is no referent for the term except as a use of language. We do not translate existence. We translate our use of the term "existence". All translation is the translation of one language use into another. We do not translate statements into thought. We translate statements of thought uttered in one language into semantically equivalent statements of thought uttered in another(or semantic equivalents within the same language).
We translate by virtue of comparing/contrasting meaning. The term "existence" has meaning. That meaning is attributed solely by virtue of language use. The meaning of the term(as is the case with all terminological use) is determined solely by virtue of the connections drawn between it's use and something else.
"Existence" is a term. Terms are existentially dependent upon language. Language... thought/belief. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
That's it. That is the extent of it. Nothing more can be said, nor need it be. All thought/belief presupposes existence. Some thought/belief is prior to language. Conceptions of "existence" require language. The presupposition of existence inherent to all thought/belief does not.
Statements of thought/belief presuppose existence, truth(correspondence to what's happened), and meaning. Knowledge of all thought/belief enables us to proper account of how that comes to be the case. It also dovetails nicely with Tarski and redundancy.
This misleads... and unnecessarily so. We use thought to discover that which is common to all particulars. If something produces something else, the latter is always existentially dependent upon the former.
The common denominators are not always existentially dependent upon being taken account of. Rather, taking account of something is existentially dependent upon something to be taken account of and an adequate means for taking account.
Existence is not the sort of thing that has a spatio-temporal location. Thus, it makes no sense to say "existence is found only"...
And...
Anything you can imagine does exist. How it exists can be parsed in terms of existential dependency, elemental constituency, and it's affects/effects.
P.S. I have overlooked these differences in recent past, but it seems they ought have been given due subsequent attention. Hence...
Here's the rest...
Quoting creativesoul
Apples are not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
Mt. Everest is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
The ability to draw, and/or the mental activity required in order to draw a correlation between different things is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
The attribution of meaning resulting from drawing the above correlations does not require being taken account of.
The meaning of "existence" requires taking account of it's use in language. A proper account will explicate the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.
If we get thought/belief wrong we get something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. The same scope of consequence applies to getting it right.
I appreciate the accolades.
You're too kind. I do make a concerted attempt to arrive at sound arguments. Verifiability/falsifiability is valuable. Coherency(lack of equivocation and/or self-contradiction) is imperative. I work from statements as foundational premisses that have the strongest possible justificatory ground.
There is a lot here that makes a lot of sense. To be honest, I'm trying to get a better grasp on your methodology. I know existential quantification plays a heavy role, but you are very informal in your approach. So bear with me, I have points to address.
If all conceptions are existentially dependent upon language, and the thought/belief of "existence" is exististentially bound to the linguistic form, then talking of existence in terms of conception seems to be relevant. If the thought/belief of existence is not dependent on language, then it becomes the kind of thing that can be said to exist else-wise, and that seems to be problematic.
I'll put as much as I can into a more formal presentation. It will be later on. In the meantime, you may want to click on my avatar, click on 'discussions' and have a look at a few of mine concerning these matters. It ought be helpful. Check out the successful reference thread. It's relevant to this particular topic.
I'm on vacation and have just scanned the recent exchanges.
You appear to know where I'm coming from with the language focus, but in order to avoid being caught in a word regress, I turn to Maturana's view of 'languaging' as a form of behavior which enables 'structural coupling'. This avoids representational issues by taking a 'systems view' of cognition.
You say in the title of this thread that existence is relative, not absolute. And in the above quoted you say that the term 'existence is relative to the context in which it is used. So, there is no absolute or uniquely privileged meaning of the term 'existence'. This implies that there are different kinds of existence, or in other words there are things which exist in different ways. Taking a certain kind of approach, to find out the way in which anything exists, perhaps we could ask: 'What is it made of?' 'What does it depend upon'? 'What can it do?'
If something is made of some material(s) then it is a physical object. If something is made of thought or imagination, then it is a concept or a mental image. If something is made of emotion or sensation then it is a feeling. A thing depends upon what it made of. So, concepts and images depend upon thought and imagination in the sense that without thought and imagination there would be no concepts or images. Physical things depend upon matter in the sense that without matter there would be no physical things. And feeling things depends on emotion or sensation in the sense that without emotion or sensation there would be no feeling things. Anything which is not dependent upon human beings for its existence is usually thought of as enjoying an absolute existence.
(I will return to this point after a brief excursus into a quite different perspective):
Heidegger, to reference a different approach, distinguishes between three kinds of being: Dasein (persons), things (entities including animals) and the paraphernalia or equipment of human life (everything we use for some purpose or other, for example, hammers, language. computers, books, domestic animals and so on). But Heidegger does not equate being with existence, because for him only Dasein exists, for to exist is to have a reflective sense of being, which allows Dasein to reflectively "stand out" for itself. Other things can also pre-reflectively be for us as either equipment or things which can reflectively stand out for us; but he does not refer to this latter "present at hand-ness" of 'reflectively standing out' as existence. but he could have done, and it is only his disavowal of ordinary sense that distinguishes his schema from the one implicit in ordinary English usage. (I am assuming that ordinary use for German speakers is more or less equivalent to ordinary use for English speakers here). In any case, regardless of the issue of the semantic relation between
So, in a way it seems that the whole question of whether existence is relative or absolute is flawed, because the kinds of alternative answers that become possible will depend on the perspective that always already underlies any question, that is they will depend upon the kinds of metaphysical or ontological presumptions implicit in the way the question is framed. In the ordinary sense of course our different uses of the term 'existence' do have built into them a distinction between two main kinds of existence, dependent on us, in the sense of conceptual, fictional or imaginary and not dependent on us in the sense of physical things and (at least some of) their attributes, and the latter are the kinds of existences which it would be logical to refer to as absolute at least in some relative ( :wink:) sense.
So we certainly do have a notion or concept of absolute existence, which means that if the OP is understood to be asserting that we do not have such a notion or concept then it is mistaken. The other possible sense of the OP: the metaphysical or ontological question as to whether there are absolute existences independent of our idea of them is the kind of question which seems to be unanswerable in principle at best, and incoherent at worst, because from a commonsense perspective it is trivially true that there are such, and it is not clear that the question has any coherently meaningful sense beyond the commonsense.
Thankyou for that thoughtful post.exposing potential flaws.
The psychological game we seem to play regarding the word 'existence' is that we are always drawn to an absolute 'something' but my thesis is that 'thinghood' itself is relative to the needs of human observers. But to escape the 'thinghood of observers' I argue that they are a transient pole of one side of an interaction event we call 'observer-observed'.
Now it may be that those 'interactions' require a transcendent vantage point sometime called 'a God's eye view' but far from evoking deism, I am alluding to timeless metaviews of space-time implied by frontier physics.
I hope you're enjoying your vacation.
I am not at all acquainted with Maturana. But I took a quick tour on wikipedia. I found this caption that might be relevant:
It seems to me, the notion of structural coupling is applicable to the relation between actual existing and the concept of existence. The concept of existence is structurally coupled with the knowledge/cognition of one's own existing, and this link becomes evident somewhere in the recall of sensory-motor coupling.
So, when discussing existence, we are not discussing a concept that represents a seperate reality. Rather, we are discussing a concept that is predicated on itself as the premise, e.g. the concept of existence can only arise (in all its details) as a result of my own existing. Structural coupling means that my existing is entirely apprehended in my cognition, to which I apply greater significance by rendering it as the concept of existence, and my concept of existence can never exceed my existing.
Maybe you can help clarify.
Thanks. I'm studying it.
Do you mean: that which exists being aware of its existence?
I consider this to be a biological counterpart to Wittgenstein's 'meaning is usage'.
No, Existence blue, not red.
...so what I 'mean' by "existence' depends on the communicative context in which it occurs. Philosophical 'discussions' which remove a word from normal contexts do not qualify unless we admit to trying.to influence each others 'behavior' by doing so.
What do I mean by normal contexts?...
..does God exist...do ghosts exist....do electrons exist...etc.
...all of which I claim can be answered by examining the utility of the 'thing deemed to exist' ...and that utility will differ for different users.
Note we do NOT normally ask ...do trees exist (or other humanly agreed 'things' which we don't need to 'deem') except when considering the behavior of other species.
NB. This is a useful reference.
http://www.oikos.org/vonobserv.htm
Thanks for the link. I read it and found some relevant points:
From this article, Mantura comes off, in the philosophical sense, as a phenomenologist, regardless of his scientific qualifications. In fact, in the philosophical sense, science is fundamentally phenomenological, as corroborated in the article: "[...] like Maturana, they [physicists] have realized that it is their own concepts, their own operations of distinction that bring forth the experiential world which they describe in their science." So even if the coherence of his system is valid, it still suffers from the same criticisms that plague phenomenology, as was pointed out in the article.
Nevertheless, I think he is on the right track in reducing reality/existence to the experiential world of the observer, or, cognitive immediacy. Whatever can be explained/described has its reality only in cognitive immediacy as the linguistic form. Even the reality of the meaning of the linguistic form can be reduced to my cognitive immediacy.
Although he rejects the notion of an ontic reality, he can not escape the inference to one, and in his case, the fundamental ontic reality is the experiential world of the observer. Nevertheless, he seems to emphasize the individual as the primary unit of existence, regardless of its cognitive dependency on biology or subjection to the species. . . And I'm ok with that.
Existence?!?!? What's that?
Good !
I have found that most mainstream philosophers haven't got a clue.about this stuff
Regarding 'fundamental ontic reality' bear in mind that 'the observer' is not a fixed entity but may be multifaceted and transient.
That the observer is multifaceted and transient, although possibly essential attributes, are beyond the point of the observer. The observer is essential to it all.
Now let's try an experiment. I am not clever enough to do it alone, but you seem smart enough to carry me along. Let's say existence is dependent on the observer (which is transient and multifaceted), what next?
One thing, I think we must determine is how the observer recognizes "existence" within the medium of it's immediate cognitive experience.
Too narcissistic. It's not all about us.
How should we use it. As a verb? An adjective?
The observer's operations of distinction are in cognition.
This cognitive adaptation to the experiential world is, as you say, a network of focal nodes that comprise the functional knowledge of the world.
The focal nodes that constitute the observers experiential world may or may not persist over time. Yet one focal node is essential to it all:
that of a distinct observer experience, which is necessary to all subsequent operations of distinction.
I mean...
We can point to trees. We can name them. We can talk about features of the trees. We can talk about the differences between trees and other stuff. We can talk about a tree's color, it's bark, it's leaves, it's height, etc.
But...
What are we talking about when we talk about a tree's 'existence' if not the tree?
But you are missing the point..we DONT NORMALLY talk about 'the existence of trees'!
Thats what I call 'seminaritis' or what Wittgenstein might have called Geschwatz.
'Existence' is a word we use in social contexts where utility of concept,like God,is being negotiated but where participants are unaware of the social construction of 'thinghood'. We don't normally (non philosophically) apply the word to agreed utilities like 'tree'. Using the word 'existence' as a noun, mistakenly in my view, implies 'a state of being' or 'reality' independent of contextual social utility. The concept 'tree' is useful by virtue of its agreed potential 'properties' as expected by humans which the word 'tree' triggers. Properties are merely potential interaction events, like 'shade', 'solidity', 'root damage', etc, according to context. The problem with concepts like 'God', is that there is no agreement about its utility, since its 'properties' are nebulous and parochial....hence believers argue for the existence of God as though it implied a 'state of being' beyond its social utility....they want 'existence' to be a noun whose 'thinghood' is beyond utility considerations, and most atheists who argue to the contrary are also unaware of the of those utility considerations applying to all humans call 'things'.
All CONVERSATION is by definition, is not solipsistic, and involves the needs of language users (aka 'us')
The fact that humans can operate verbally (=think) on the basis of a mental 'map' of what they consider to be a representation of 'the world' tends to gloss over the selective map making and map reading processes. Most of the time we do not verbalise/map read and proceed with life on the basis of 'seamless coping' (which is Dreyfus's term to describe Heidegger's observation that 'things' tend to be verbalized on;y when that coping is interrupted. You weren't verbalizing (conscious) of 'chair',were you even though you might be reported to be sitting on one!)
Rubbish.
I asked a question. It is sensible and relevant and cuts to the core of my point.
Do you have an answer?
I'm confident you will agree wth me that his point is as significant as mine: that existence is blue.
I do.
And hence...
Existence is a fancy word that philosophers use to talk about being, or what is. For example, if I say "my finger itches", I am inferring that there is an itchy sensation in my finger. It is something that has the status of being - it exists.
Now it is very easy to discount "existence" as a redundant and unnecessary term in philosophy, but it definitely has important psychological application - especially in regard to the delusional psychotic, like the hypochondriac, paranoid schizophrenic, chronic liar &c.
Most importantly, I can make bold genereal claims in terms of "existence", e.g.: "in all of existence, no distinct objects can be identical in their external properties".
Does blue actually exist?
That comment is going to piss off @Banno. Ooooooooo!!! :grin:
About what?
First, how does exists differ from actually exists?
It doesn't include the term "actually".
To be honest, I was merely using "actually" to accentuate "exists", but I should have simply put "exists" in italics. Sorry for the confusion.
I wanted to add:
"Actual existence" might be distinguishable from "possible existence".
"actually exists" does not include the term "actually"?
He's making it up as he goes along.
Ohh.
I don't understand, please explain.
Oh, he's terrible!
I see you are impressed with my bold claim, huhhh... ahhhh. :nerd:
Still not understanding.
...who convert their neighbour's ox, for they shall inhibit their girth,...
Still not understanding.
So it seems.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
:sparkle:
That's an end to it.
The question was:
Quoting Banno
You seem to have no understanding of what you mean. How tragic :cry:
What?
Hmm?
Oh. Ok. There it is everyone. Hear here, far and wide: Banno has put an end to it all. Please disperse and return to your homes.
[I]Right[/i]? That's what you wrote. How ridiculous.
Graciously, after you.
I am...the gadfly
:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:
That's sad. I just tooled you, and that's your only response. I expect much more from my interlocutors. You get an F+.
What?
Quoting Banno
[I]Right[/i]?
Oh, just go away! Leave me alone!
Very unphilosophical. Just tell me what it means and I will leave.
I was already here, then I noticed a ridiculous comment you made and called you out on it. You have no answer. That's our answer.
Well, what about the juniper bushes over there?
That's not an answer.
Do not tempt Him, shallow ones! Is not the miracle of the juniper bushes enough?!
Quoting Banno
???
I say, those are my juniper bushes.
Ok Nietzsche, enough with the esoterics.
They are a gift from God!
You must be his only begotten son. :grin:
They're all I've bloody got to eat.
:lol:
Lord! I am affected by a bald patch.
So, would you say these juniper bushes exist?
:scream: ahhh I couldn't help myself. :grin:
I am healed! The Master has healed me!
:smirk:
I was blind, and now I can see!!
:kiss:
I hadn't said a word for eighteen years till he came along.
And then he kissed me :monkey:
A miracle! He is the Messiah!
This thread is really going off the rails.
Well, he hurt my foot!
(Actually, I thought it had improved considerably over the last few dozen posts. )
Did Jesus have a peg leg? And an eyepatch and jean jacket with the jolly roger silk screened on the back?
I'm not the Messiah! Will you please listen? I am not the Messiah, do you understand?! Honestly!
That's what Jesus said. And it's what the prophets said he would say.
Only the true Messiah denies His divinity.
And this is how he verifies it for the rest of the world. . .Aummmmmmmmm :pray:
Excuse me.
Are you a virgin?
I'm a nun
Well, if it's not a personal question, are you a virgin?
:yum:
It depends why you're asking. You wanna wrassle?
She is.
Are you asking if she is a "virgin", or if she is "actually" a virgin?
Yeah. Must be. She is. Definitely...
Oh, don't worry about him, sir. He's ma-- he's m-- he's ma-- he-- he-- he's m-- m-- m-- he's m-- he's m--
He's mad, sir.
What do you think about the proposition:
???
I think that the person who would say that is very confused. Not the least reason for which is that "Actually exists" isn't a proposition.
Very good sir. I concur.
Anyway, get on with the story.
So and so.
You don't have to do this. You don't have to take orders.
Merdwurdichliebe is correct in saying disputes about 'existence' have important psychological implications with respect to 'social norms of thinking', but IMO, philosophers are producing word salad unless they recognize that 'trees exist' is either a tautology in the sense that all concepts 'exist', or that the word 'tree', implies a contextual expectancy of potential interaction for the user.
Do you expect a potential interaction with the Big Bang? How so?
Of course ! The concept of the 'Big Bang' immediately raises my potential interaction with at least the literature on the subject, and related concepts like 'time'.
Compare your question with : 'Do you expect a potential interaction with 'splonk'?...the point being that 'the Big Bang' is already in the social domain of shared projects, whereas 'splonk' is not (until now maybe !:wink: )
At least you recognised it. What does this say about the state of modern education, when reciting the classics goes unnoticed?
The point, of course, is that this thread, like so many here, is a muddle. Relative and [i]absolute[/I] are not the sort of thing it makes much sense to predicate to existence. So if one is going to so do, one is obliged to make sense of it all by connecting it to our other understandings of these terms.
SO Quoting fresco drew my ire. Thou shalt not take His name in vain; that is, don't invoke Wittgenstein when what you are proposing is so unclear...
Even more classic are "the meaning of life" and "holy grail".
*Runs away*
It just needs to be unmuddled. Consider a thing that exists. What makes it exist as a tree? Does its existence as a tree depend on its relations to other things? Or is its existence as a tree restricted to its own device and independent of any relation?
The question "what makes it exist as a tree?" is full of philosophical presumption.
You could put the question another way: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?"
'Splonk' is a term (perhaps no longer) used in the automotive body repair industry (in Adelaide at least) to refer to the two part body fillers that are used to fill dents. There are also other idiomatic usages of this term it seems:
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=SPLONK
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Splonking
It's still asking if existence is red.
I thought splonk was a term used in auto repair that refers to the reinsertion of a johnson rod back into its housing . :snicker:
How so? Could you please elaborate?
Modal logic or not, to ask: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?" is nothing like asking: "is existence red?"
The Serbian panel beater from Adelaide who used the term, also extended its use to other areas.
"Where are Steve and Shirley"?
"They are upstairs splonking each other".
"Splonk 'er up".
"He splonked all over her abdomen"
Etc., etc. as you may be able to imagine.
:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:
Well, here we disagree.
In both cases, words have been concatenated in such a way that they appear to ask a question, but don't.
My argument is that the question: "what is necessary for a tree to exist?" makes sense, and can be answer sensically. Whereas, the question: "is existence red?" is complete nonsense.
And as you say, it must not be an hallucination of a tree; nor an imagined tree.
It must be a real tree...
SO here is philosophical progress: what must be true in order for a tree to be a tree, is that it must be a tree.
Hm.
Edit: well, not so much wrong as mislead by your words.
"True" is a much more problematic term than "necessary". And I could swear you were the one talking against muddling things up?
Exactly.
Let me add: we can never answer the question independent of our own percipience, which suggests that existence for us is relative. But when you consider your own percipient experience, it seems to be a closed system, complete into itself, which would make it absolute. It is very paradoxical to exist as a human being.
We distinguish between hallucinated or imagined trees and actual trees on the basis that the latter can physically act upon us. The corollary of that is that actual trees can be seen by others. Or if there are no others I can make sure the tree is real by touching it, smelling it, rubbing against it and hearing the sound of the rubbing, and so on.
Then there is the further question as to what kind of existence the tree must have, whether mind-independently physical or merely mental (in some unknown "shared" way), in order that it should be perceptible to all. These kinds of questions may be ultimately unanswerable, but I don't think it follows from that unanswerability that they are therefore unequivocally nonsense questions.
The natural tree is physically dependent upon many factors (water and light amongst the basic). The conditions that allow for the possibility of a tree are necessary for the existence of any natural tree.
If asking those questions is nonsense, then so is philosophy. Although such epistemological/metaphysical concerns may have no practical or ethical application to life, I still find an unquantifiable value in working out the answers to these philosophical questions.
We can observe and infer these relations, exchanges and interactions; and then the question becomes 'Are these relations, exchanges and interactions totally dependent on our observations and inference of them, or do they have some kind of independent existence or reality?'.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Yes, for one thing asking the questions expands the poetic imagination, and the sense of the numinous. It shows us just what kinds of question we are capable of imagining.
Hm. I don't agree. And also, it's not the terms themselves that cause issues, but the way philosophers misuse them.
SO there is a pretty straight forward grammar for true. Some statement 'p' will be true only if: p. Tarski's T-sentence, disquotation, redundancy and so on. Within this grammar we can manage much of what was once considered philosophically contentious.
And another, not unrelated, grammar for necessity, using possible world semantics to set out how to use necessary and possible.
And running through both is a rather good grammar for existence - existential quantification.
But it seems from your OP that you want to use these terms to talk about existence. And that strikes me as misguided.
Or at the least, there will be much to do in order to show it to be a useful thing to do.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
becomes
Quoting Janus
The central point which I think is being missed is how is the word 'existence' used in non philosophical contexts.
We do not normally going around asking whether 'trees exist'. In fact to do so might imply a social interaction within a 'mental health' context. (or parochially, in the UK at least, 'existence of trees' can be a problem for building permissions).
I suggest, on the basis of Witt's meaning is use, that all normal utterances of the word 'exist' arise in contexts where mutual action is being negotiated...e.g. 'existence of human causes of global warming'...'existence of God as a valid subject in education'...'existence of sub-atomic particles in social paradigms we call 'science' '
I assert that all those usages make 'existence' inextricable from the social contexts in which they are embedded, and in that sense 'existence', like all concepts acquired via mutual language, is relative to human projects, never absolute. Those who would put 'existence' on an absolutist pedestal are playing the game of 'ultimate axiom chasing', which I suggest is futile.
What is added to our understanding by talking in terms of something's existence?
That was the question. I'll let the reader decide whether or not the answer is relevant. By my lights, it's not. I did not ask who tends to talk about a tree's existence most. Besides that, more than just philosophers use the term, and often. So...
You'll have to do better than that.
Thankyou for enlightening me about the contextual usage of the word 'splonk' which I thought I had invented !
(Actually, many verbal jokes rely on sudden 'switched' contexts.
...Foreign official going round inspecting native village....everywhere he goes the natives enthusiastically greet him with shouts of 'ngombo ! ngombo !...he comes to the last hut and asks what's inside...his guide advises him 'Don't go in there - its just full of ngombo !' )
Indeed; in English, existence is I suppose more likely to be asserted using is, as in "there is a tree", or "is there a tree?".
Quoting fresco
Firstly, I'm not too sure what "contexts where mutual action is being negotiated" might mean.
Secondly, I think I see a true Scotsman. How are we to act if we come across an exception to your rule? Will we count it as a falsification, and look for a better rule? Or will we simply count such exceptions as being not normal, and exclude them?
Nothing, of course.
That's just not true, since existence is the one attribute all things, however diverse, share. It is the most general attribute. Also it is common to distinguish between things which exist physically and things which don't, and you may gain insight by considering the different ways in which different kinds of things are thought to exist.
It's an odd comment coming from you @creativesoul who so often talks about "existential dependency", apparently not being satisfied with mere dependency.
Let's think on that. If existence is had by all things, then there can be no difference between things that exist and things that don't...
And hence, that such-and-such exists adds nothing to it that's not already implicit in the such-and-such.
Understandable. I'm trying to work through Quine and the notion that "existence" is not a predicate.
I find that talking in terms of something's existence is just talking about the thing.
Existential dependency doesn't require talking in terms of something's 'existence'. It's more about a common sense method of approach. It requires talking in terms of something's elemental constituency. If something consists of something else, it is existentially dependent upon that something else. If something exists prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Etc.
Put to use:All statements consist of common language use, and thus all are existentially dependent upon common language use. Whatever common language is existentially dependent upon, so too are statements. Etc.
So, that's not talking in terms of a statement's 'existence'. It's talking about what statements consist of, which then offers ground for saying what it takes for statements to first emerge/exist.
Existence is presupposed within all thought/belief. All thought/belief is correlation. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
I have done very little, and already shown its usefulness.
Also , what you say presupposes that usefulness is what we should be aiming at, and that's debatable.
Good for English. But this is philosophy, and in philosophy, "exist" is likely to be asserted as a fancy word for "is" or "to be".
Deus Ex ist Machina. :up:
The mistake is to believe that everyone is talking about language qua language.
Then the mistake, imo, is that we can escape from the domain of 'language' at all.
As 'thinkers' all we have is 'language', whose nonrepresentational nature has become a prevalent view.
And although you have registered your objections to them, both Heidegger and Derrida undescored that point.
Heidegger:"Language speaks the Man"
Derrida: "There is nothing beyond context".
Could you explain why you'd believe this?
Could/would you please re-phrase that answer in plain language? Thanks.
Language becomes essentially meaningless and useless in the absence of linguistic thought, which is dependent on an existing thinker.
Yes, we are not just thinkers, we are existing thinkers. Thinking depends on the existence of something with the capability to think, otherwise Descartes was right.
So, an existing thinker can escape language by not thinking, and just existing.
Interesting. Could you please elaborate?
It's like a fractal - however we magnify our cognition, the same pattern keeps appearing. That is where propositional logic has its merits, it explains the pattern.
Quoting Janus
I don't think propositional logic can do much more beyond explaining the pattern (despite its quasi-ethical prescriptions for how we should talk, as if any mode of natural language can be rendered so as to entirely reflect it). Imo, there is something going on in natural language that elludes propositional logic... the mere power of poetic imagination over the human psyche is evidence enough.
Why would you endorse or stress that point of view?
The noumena issue does lead to some ugly complexities. But the idea of reality apart from our descriptions seems to be baked in to the way human beings talk. Philosophers try to tell one another how it is, what's really going on. If we insist that there is no way that it really is, then we are nevertheless trying to say how it really is. 'The way it really is....is that there is no way it really is.'
The correspondence theory of truth crystallizes something like the phenomenon of us all being in a 'world' together (the same world, the same reality.) This 'world' is not some crisp object but more like the 'primordial' situation of humans talking to one another.
Not easily. Doing so would simply be explaining predicate calculus.
What is salient is that "Existence is relative, not absolute" lies outside these grammatical spaces. That is, it is not something that could be parsed into such language.
And that is the same as @creativesoul's question: what is added to our understanding of a thing by saying that it exists?
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Sure.
I'm fighting the urge to follow that "sure" with "but...". There's a difference between analytic philosophy, in which care and detail are paramount, and what we might call expansive philosophy which draws more and more other stuff into the explantation.
But even if the topic lies outside of those grammatical spaces, those grammatical spaces do little to discount the outlying grammatical spaces in which it does lie. And I've already shown the relevance of those spaces.
It is no wonder that the value of philosophy proper has been considered on a steady decline for so long now by the average joe.
:yikes:
Does anyone here actually doubt whether or not anything can exist prior to our talking about it?
Some things exist prior to our account of them. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. All such things are existentially independent of our account. None of them require being taken into account.
Those things must be said to exist prior to our account.
So, prudent considerations about all acceptable use of the term "existence" will keep in the forefront of our minds that stuff existed long before any and all terminological use.
Existence does not require our account. All notions of "existence" do.
All use of the term "existence" is language use.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition.
All language acquisition is existentially dependent upon rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief. All rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations and/or associations between different things.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation and/or associations between different things.
All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon non-linguistic rudimentary level thought/belief that is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All non-linguistic meaningful thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things.
All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are.
Propositional logic takes account of common language by means of propositional terms. Common language use existed long before it became a subject in it's own right. That is, there must be something to take account of in order to take account of something. Unfortunately, when thought/belief is accounted for solely in propositional terms, it cannot provide an example of thought/belief that is not propositional in content, because by definition/schema/framework/notion all belief is held/thought/believed to be.
That is false.
Not all thought/belief is propositional in content.
What pattern are you referring to? Does it suffer in light of the above true statement?
For me, the import of this discussion is that I assert 'existence' to be on the same level of every other concept which humans denote by a socially acquired languge in specific behavioral contexts.
Thus when Merdwurdichliebe, for example, asserts that 'a thinker must exist', I suggest this is only valid now,in a hypothetical scenario in which we might 'observe in our mind's eye' a focal entity we call 'a thinker'.
If on the other hand we have in our current 'mind's eye' a Heideggerian scenario of seamless coping in which 'observer' and 'observed' remain inextricable, or 'unevoked' for much of the time, then we might argue that the 'validity of existence of a thinker' is dependent on those contexts in which 'the thinker' (or 'self' or 'observer') is circumstantially evoked i.e. when seamless coping breaks down and 'considering behavior' kicks in.
BTW. The 'fresco' which wrote the above reply was evoked by the interactions above. Like 'a tree' its internal state had shifted but its 'conversational identity' via the word 'fresco' remains functionally the same.
I don't think anyone really doubts that.
But the situation is strange if someone tries to grasp it conceptually rather than practically. I'm in a world, and yet this world is 'in' my consciousness. It's a snake eating its own tail.
'Life is a dream.' Does this not resonate? 'We are ripples in the nothingness.' Is this the thoughtcrime AKA language on holiday?
Let's grant that the universe will churn on in the absence of life. But it's hard for us to call that real with the same conviction, because there's no creature left to see it or give a damn.
Quoting creativesoul
Strip away all the fancy specialist terms, and I think The Average Joe can and does get into these issues.
The problem, if there is one, is that it's relatively easy and it doesn't pay the bills. It's nice to fire up philosophy as the gee-whiz machine. Non-intellectual types like to get stoned and talk weird stuff. Just about everyone loved The Matrix.
Beyond the gee-whiz offerings, there's also identity to be had from philosophy. A person reads Plato or Nietzsche or Epictetus (or ?) for an idea of how to live, who to be. Monkey see, monkey maybe do. The more ordinary sort are happy with Jay-Z's autobiography. In terms of the itch scratched, it's the same phenomenon. Find some of it on the 'Philosophy' shelf at BAM! There are subconversations about Life with their own inside jokes and keywords. TPF is centered around one of many.
Then there's the stuff where folks drone on about the essence of a proposition,etc. You mentioned Wittgenstein. Who exactly was he griping at? His own obsessiveness? Not Weininger or Kraus. Not Tagore. And then who cares about Wittgenstein? All I mean is that he is as [s]mummified[/s] memefied as Stirner. Put in a quarter & the speaker says 'language on holiday.' He's great, but it's not as if people weren't doing it right before him. Shaw was right when he said the first rule of style is having something to say. A certain kind of armchair science gets tangled up in its jargon as a way to hide its inanity from itself. Unravel the knot and there is often absurdity or triviality. This is the stuff our Joe sleeps through.
Normal everyday common language users do not get lost in mistaken accounts of what they're doing, unless they are unknowingly misled into such cognitive dissonance.
I can roll with that. Does this mean that fresco is correct in saying:
Quoting fresco
???
Where?
I ask because I want to be sure I understand you.
I referred to the psychological context of "existence".
I also invoked the consideration of whether or not a thing's existence is dependent upon its relations.
Both are examples of how "existence" and the "absolute-relative" dichotomy are relevant.
Maybe they/we are misled, but I think it's more a question of character than intellect. I mean that we get attached to certain games, not language games but personality games that happen within language. We are deaf to those outside that game. (In that game there are friends, foes, and those that don't fit the narrative --usually the ones talking sense in retrospect.) If our fever cools and we step outside, we suddenly understand all the critiques we ignored at the time.
No one will ever take Cantor's paradise away from us, but we may just lose that special feeling and walk out.
Much the same for "consideration of whether or not a thing's existence is dependent on its relations." Is this parallel Quine? @creativesoul?
Is a tree existentially dependent upon it's relations?
That question is very incomplete.
Quoting Banno
I think that those are the kinds of frameworks and/or assertions that Quine is targeting.
This is a hefty thesis. Is it not better to shrug off the handwringing of those who in other modes know better? Who really know how to use the word 'exist' already?
For me it's not that Rorty finally gets things right but rather that he had the right attitude. The attempt to prove the futility of X seems as futile as X itself. A certain approach is discarded, not refuted.
That is also a very good point to consider.
Language is certainly not existence as such. Yet each are it intrinsically bound up in the other. Language only exists, because something else existed prior to it. And language, as a compounding mediation, extrapolates existence from it's own existing (including all its dependecy) by the power of it's own device. As you say, all thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of any further qualification.
You are doing a nice job mapping it out. Maybe, not perfect, but it's a start.
How so?
It is definitely vague. But you know what its getting at. And what it is getting at is spot on.
Any psychological context has to do with cognitive immediacy, like "my toe itches".
You are correct. Psychology is fundamentally phenomenological.
Because I took Quine to be targeting frameworks using the term "existence" as a predicate.
That argument is impotent, it will convince no one.
That has yet to have been determined.
What are we counting as a tree's relations?
Fresco says it is not a noun.
What is it? :chin:
Meh. I don't see anything here worth considering.
One example would be all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for its existence.
You don't want my pearl necklace? But it is the Queen's jewel. :kiss:
I agree with Rorty's opinion regarding social responsibility regardless of strict determinism.
His discarding of truth is a huge mistake. He makes a coherent argument for it. However being based upon the idea that truth is a property of true propositions, it's is based upon a falsehood. Truth is central to everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. If it is a property, it is a property of true thought/belief and statements thereof. Some true thought/belief are prior to language. Thus, either truth is prior to language, and thus prior to true propositions, or true thought/belief does not require truth.
Truth is prior to language.
That's precisely how the use of "is true" becomes redundant when attached to a thought/belief statement. Truth is presupposed within all thought/belief somewhere along the line.
This is beside the thrust of the thread though.
Discarding has no comparison to refutation when it comes to argument. Discarding is a cowardly retreat
No.
To Arne.
Unfortunately your request for 'plain language' begs a multitude of questions about language describing language. This is why philosophers like Heidegger needed to resort to neologisms to account for the coherence of their systems. Think of 'reading Heidegger' like the need for 'cultural immersion' if you were truly to understand the nuances of a foreign language.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Translation would render the question rephrased as follows...
Is a tree existentially dependent upon all necessary conditions that are not inherent to the tree itself, which are nonetheless required for its existence?
Looks like a bottle to me.
Quoting creativesoul
"Necessary conditions not inherent to the tree itself"... What? "... which are nonetheless required for its existence"...
Looks like word salad.
Is a tree dependent upon it's relations?
Is a tree's existence dependent upon it's relations?
How are we to make sense of this?
Yup. I'm beginning to arrive at the same conclusion.
No. That is not what I said. At best, its is a poor poor translation. Best to stick verbatim.
So there are no conditions that are required for the existence of a tree? Explain yourself
Never mind, I know you won't/can't.
It's easy to disagree with a statement when you mutilate it into something absurd.
Is a tree dependent on water for its existence? Does a tree provide it's own water?
You've this very odd habit of claiming agreement, and/or offering praise and then immediately asserting something that does not follow.
Weird.
That which is prior to something else cannot be intrinsically bound up in that something else. The presupposition of existence inherent to all thought/belief is prior to language. Thus, on that level, it is not bound up in language.
Water is not a relation.
Then you agree that a tree provides it's own water. Peculiar. I wonder how that happens.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
What is a condition for existence, that I might answer your question? But I don't think you can tell us. Either there are conditions for the existence of a tree, or there are not... Just as existence is either blue, or it is not blue; and if I say it is not blue, you will insist i tell you what other colour existence is...
But we are talking about existence. So how is it not "bound up" in language?
I'll hold off for a while...
You can do better than this.
But the conditions for a tree can be easily enumerated. It is sensical. The conditions for "existence is blue" are ridiculous, nonsensical.
There is a big difference here.
Where does water come from? The tree?
Another one bites the dust. :cool:
you wanted "Necessary conditions not inherent to the tree itself... which are nonetheless required for its existence".
Are you now saying that the need of a tree for water is not inherent in the tree itself...
Honestly, I am having difficulty thinking in such a confused fashion.
Nah. You're confused. I was talking about that which exists prior to language. I was using language to take account of it.
That which happens prior to language cannot be bound up in language.
I've a little time on my hands over the next few days.
Or do I start my own?
Actually, simpler. I'm saying the tree is dependent upon water which it does not provide for itself.
Go for it. You typically draw a better/larger crowd than others.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
So...
Verbatim...
A tree's relations are described as...
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
I've no need to mutilate something already so butchered. I'm trying to help.
And yet... I've shown how it matters and I've not once invoked God. Thus, the above is not true.
No...I said disputes like 'existence of God'. But certainly unless you refer to existential disputes, Iwould say you have missed my point.
Have you mentioned any other dispute...electrons...global warming.. etc ?
If not we are talking past each other.
I'm simply pointing out that there is nothing - NOTHING AT ALL - added to our understanding by using the term "existence" as a predicate.
Well...
Aside from unnecessary confusion.
Banno foresaw/predicted the no true scotsman earlier.
Sure. The only issue I would take is that there is an existential statement implicit in many other statements; in particular, those that feature "is". Think this was mentioned earlier, too.
Any news yet on why you'd endorse or stress that point of view?
Everything, except for maybe elementary particles, supposing there really are any, and imagining that any could obtain in isolation, is, and is thus dependent on matter in dynamic relations. That obviously includes trees. You can't have a tree without particular kinds of matter in particular sorts of dynamic relations, both internally (internal to what we're considering "the tree itself") and with respect to external matter in dynamic relations, such as the sun, water, carbon dioxide, etc.
...then explain why the word 'existence' was coined in the first place. Surely it can only function in the context of disputes, which is where I claim that relativity refers to consensus, whereas absolutism does not.
First look at the etymology:
One thing it's handy for, especially in the context of the scholastic philosophy from which the term emerged, is talking about the difference between possibles/potentials and actuals. Something closely related is instantiation of (platonic) forms, or instantiations of properties.
As far as Heidegger is concerned I think 'clarity' is problematic when the work is considered in isolation. But as a reaction to Husserlian phenomenology, or as a parallel to Wittgenstein's views on language, it makes a lot of sense to me.
Take the single 'thing' we call 'water'. In other cultures (I forget which) there are at least two concepts of 'things' denoted by different words for that single thing we call 'water' -'water that you can drink' -and 'water that you may cross over which it is taboo to drink'.
In the history of our culture too, not only do we have the four classical elements which 'existed' then, but there was the 'morning star'/'evening star' situation - seperate 'things' then, which were later understood as the single 'planet Venus'.
In short, things require thingers and those thingers are human.
Can I ask you again why you're endorsing that view? ("Things require thingers" etc.)
Is it not obvious that it supports my 'human relationship' comments above ?
No deeply religious person would agree with this definition/usage of the word existence. No fundamentalist Christian would ever say "I use the word God because the concept has utility in my interactions with other religious folk". When they say "God exists' they are using - or attempting to use - the word exists in the same sense as "The tree exists".
Now if - in the context of these philosophical discussions - you want to use the word existence differently than the average person, that may be a valid point of discussion. But it seems to me that instead of using the word existence, perhaps it would be clearer to came up with a new/different word (neologism) to avoid confusion.
Of course believers would not admit to the 'utility' argument, anymore than a naive realist would admit it equally applying to 'the existence of trees' ( or 'rocks', or any other 'thing')!
From a philosophical pov, the term 'naive realist' neatly avoids 'confusion'.
OLP ?
I suggest no problem.
The OLP situations I raise are ephemeral context bound episodes.
The post structuralist view recognizes that transience and seeks to generalize about them.
For example, I have already pointed out, above, that the 'fresco' answering a particular point
was a different 'fresco' evoked on previous points. Each 'fresco' might engage in OLP, but the recognition of the dynamic shifts is post structural.
Ok. Then I think we can all have our cakes and eat them too. Language on holiday for everyone!
Ah...the 'have the cake and eat it' issue is based on the static set membership of classical logic with its 'law of the excluded middle'. But dynamic shifting 'set membership' departs from classical logic towards QM inspired models of human rationality. (Its in the 'rationality' literature).
This does not seem to imply 'language on holiday'...more like 'the limits of classical logic in philosophical debate'.
:blush:
I'm not following you. I'm suggesting that you come up with a different word for "existence" in these philosophical pov discussions to avoid confusing it with the generally accepted usage.
Perhaps you can come up with something better, but for starters, maybe psv-existence?
Quoting fresco
At the risk of extending this discussion far beyond its original bounds, given (among many other things) the on-going history of most major religions to impose their belief systems on non-believers, I do not consider these situations to be ephemeral; they are essential components of many of mankind's past & current conflicts.
No, that wasn't obvious to me. I'm not sure what comments you're referring to. When I searched for "human relationship" over the last few pages I didn't find anything.
We are arguing from very different positions. I look at your posts as trying to justify the 'eternal, and absolute' aspects of 'existence of God', which for me are simply 'essential for the psychological utility' of a God concept. As an atheist, I aknowledge that utility for 'believers' but reject for me as 'an opiate'. The 'utility' argument also extends to 'social control' which accounts for imposition scenarios.
Look at the first para of that post. I used the phrase 'relationship ...with humans'. I apologise if 'human relationships' implies a different concept for you, but for me, all thinging oarises and operates in 'social dialogues' albeit some of those dialogues are 'internal' between seperate facets of 'self'.
So you're saying that the reason you endorse this view over other possible views is that you only value thinking about human relationships/relationships with humans?
I can't see it can be otherwise since all 'thinking' is done via a socially acquired language.
(I would include the metalanguage of mathematics in that )
You'd say that we can only think in terms of language?
What about visualization? For example, visual artists thinking in terms of shapes, colors/saturations, textures, etc.? Isn't that a way that people can think?
No.Your report of that activity certainly involves language, but that activity seems to largely automatic puntuated by occasional internal dialogue. (When I play the piano, it's basically by muscle memory accompanied by critical internal dialogue to modify emphasis).
"Internal dialogue"/"critical internal dialogue" isn't thought?
Yes of course it is, but it's spasmodic with respect to a largely automatic activity like painting. Indeed much of the 'thinking' during such activities could be focussed 'elsewhere' entirely.
Okay, but if that's thought then some thought isn't linguistic, right?
From where I'm sitting it appears that you are using the word "environment" in the same way that most people user the word "existence". Please note that there are other substitutes for the word "existence". 'Reality', 'the universe", 'state of affairs', 'mind-independent and language-independent world', 'things in their own right', etc, etc.
Now is there a 'mind-independent and language independent world'? No one knows . We don't even know if this is the correct question to ask. But it is a rational choice to believe this. It simply means that you accept the evidence as presented to your mind by your physiological capabilities. And yes, we know that our senses can be fooled, but we also know how to determine this.
As you put it in another msg:
Quoting fresco
For the word 'objects', substitute the word 'existence' or any of the other synonyms.
Also- and just for the record - besides unconsciously engaging with my environment? I also engage with my environment consciously. Or at least it certainly seems that way to me :smile:
(I can even recall what I say to myself when playing Bach..'question then answer'....'hold the pause from dramatic impact'...'slow to the finale'..)
I think it couldn't be more obvious that there is, and I see the view that it's a problematic question as pretty juvenile/sophomoric if not infantile (if I'm being honest rather than trying to be PC and not hurt anyone's feelings).
So an internal dialogue of shapes, colors, etc. is a language in your view?
I regret, I cannot philosophically commune with the idea of an 'observer independent world' even though we obviously operate, moment to moment, on that basis as though there were.
What it momentarily suits us to call seperate 'observer and observed' or 'organism and evironment' are in essence coextensive and codefining unities, in which state transitions in the one are isomorphic to state transitions in the other.
As for your assertion of your version of 'the obvious', an entirely contrary holistic view is held by anyone who calls themselves 'a meditator'.
You mean in the sense that it makes the invariant patterns of experience explicit?
What you're missing here is the analysis of the different kinds of existence we can conceive of.
Yes, but you are talking about the existence of things both dependent and depending; that is the point. You can say that something depends on something else, but that is not the same as saying that the existence of the thing depends on something else, or the existence of something else. To talk of existential dependency is already to talk of existence. Try formulating your distinction between existential dependency and other kinds of mere dependency without talking in terms of "existential" "exist" and "existence". The idea of existence or being is just the broadest most general concept we can apply to all objects of thought and experience.
Different kinds of existence. How so?
Quoting Banno
So, you asked the above question regarding my statement about the different kinds of existence we can imagine. And I answered with:
Quoting Janus
So, I am puzzled that you would say that you cannot see the obvious connection between my comment on the different kinds of existence we can imagine and my reply which listed some of those different kinds.
So on your view you can't visualize a shape as shape, you necessarily have the word "shape" in mind?
Oh Banno, you goof you. Do you really not understand what I'm saying? Or are you just altering my words so you have something to argue about?
It's quite basic.
Let's review.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
You seriously don't understand? Let me explain again, in one stroke, instead of scattered posts.
Really...it's really not that difficult.
Inherent to the existing tree is its dependency on water. In other words, the tree needs water for its existence, yet because the water it needs exists independent to it, certain conditions are required that provide direct access to existing water. In other words the very water it depends on is not intrinsic to the tree, thus it depends upon proper conditions, or a set of relations, to obtain this water. The tree depends upon many relations beyond itself that provide what is necessary for its existence.
This, at minimum, shows that a tree's existence is relative.
So existence is the one attribute all things share, and there are different kinds of existence.
Ok, so I am presuming that there must be something that each of these kinds has in common, such that they are all the one attribute.
You have no argument against my line of thought. Every point you have made, I have shown to be confused and mistaken. So it is to be expected that you would prefer to take no interest.
One thing they all have in common, is that any confirmation of any type of existing thing is dependent upon an observer.
Nuh. There are things that no one has seen.
Like gravity, right? We only infer its existence indirectly through the observation of other things that are affected by it. Nevertheless, it still requires an observer to confirm it.
Nuh. Simpler stuff, like one of the grains of barley in the chook food.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Sure - to confirm that it exists.
But it still exists.
That works too.
If I'm following, you move about the world and interact with it on the basis that there is an 'observer independent world'. You just don't philosophically commune with it?
Actually, now that I think about this, I'm sort of in agreement. I also do not philosophically commune with the idea of an 'observer independent world'. I simply accept that this is by far the only rational explanation for the way things are.
I could have been clearer there. When I said 'no one knows', I meant that - at least to my knowledge - it cannot be proven philosophically/logically (or any other way) with absolute certainty.
That said, I have not seen any other explanation that makes any sense. In particular I do not philosophically commune with these notions that existence is some sort of language construct.
As far as I can tell we are on the same side - at least for this discussion.
That's not true, because I'm not talking in such terms. I'm talking about the thing being existentially dependent upon something else. That talk is grounded upon knowledge of what the thing(s) in question consist(s) in/of.
That is not the same as saying that the thing's existence is existentially dependent upon something else.
Right. It's not the same kind of linguistic practice. So, why did you say otherwise above? You're contradicting yourself. Don't get all para-consistent on me here.
:wink:
Here's what I've figured out. When people start using the term "existence" as a proxy, as a noun, as a name for something else, it is as vacuous a notion as they come.
The term "existence" has no referent.
You are talking in such terms, though. The term 'existential' is an adjective pertaining to the noun 'existence'. So when you talk of existential dependence you are saying that something depends, not for some mere function or other, but for it's very existence, on something else. So, the notion of existence cannot be an empty one if you cannot formulate your distinction between existential dependence and other forms of dependence without using it.
Quoting creativesoul
So, why are you using it? Try formulating your usual arguments without using it, and see how far you get.
Quoting creativesoul
I haven't contradicted myself as far as i can see. If you want to show me that I have, then show me where I "said otherwise"?
In some uses.
I use "existentially dependent" and "existential dependency". So here, the term "existential" demarcates a kind of dependency not a kind of existence.
It is very useful and reliable. I'm sold.
Nah. I'm not worried if you're ok with it.
All language use is existentially dependent upon language acquisition.
All language acquisition is existentially dependent upon rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief. All rudimentary level non-linguistic thought/belief is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations and/or associations between different things.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation and/or associations between different things.
All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All use of the term "existence" is existentially dependent upon non-linguistic rudimentary level thought/belief that is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.
All non-linguistic meaningful thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things.
All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
The presupposition of existence does not require language use for it happens in autonomous fashion within non-linguistic thought/belief.
That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence is not existentially dependent upon language use.
All notions of "existence" are.
There it is. Let's critique it.
I think you're being a bit slippery here. The term 'existential' demarcates a kind of dependency which is understood in terms of existence, not of some or other mere function.
To be sure it doesn't demarcate any particular kind of existence. For example something which has only fictional existence is existentially dependent on an author, and you might argue, (since its existence is only imagined and if it obtains its existence only in the act of imagining) it is ongoingly dependent on those who imagine it; that is, the readers.
Right, so it is not an empty concept, that adds nothing to our understanding of things, at all.
Not on my view.
What happens when we lose the talk about kinds of existence?
Clarity.
For example fiction is existentially dependent upon an author.
I was mentioning it.
It can be completely removed from the argument without losing meaning. This can be shown if you'd like. Because it can be dropped without loss, it's use as a noun/predicate is shown to be a superfluous and/or redundant use of language.
My position explains this...
Just don't call me on it...
I may be overstating the case by overestimating my current ability. :wink:
Quoting creativesoul
It remains to be seen whether your argument will be clearer when you have eliminated ( if indeed you can) the terms 'exist', 'existence' and 'existential' from it. I doubt you can do it, but even if you can, I doubt it'll make much difference.
Here's a question for you: what's the difference between a real character and a fictional character?
You always help me. :up:
I'm sure it could be stated better. But it still holds.
Now I will try to help you understand.
If we consider that the external conditions which are necessary for the tree's existence (like a source of water) have no relation to the tree...then, we have to determine by what means the tree accesses water without having some relation to the water. That leads to very problematic conclusions.
One such conclusion is that the tree's existence requires no relations because it is totally dependent on itself, and nothing else. It provides for itself all the necessities for its existence (water, light, &c.). Unfortunately, that conclusion is repugnant to common sense.
I can think of no other explanation for how a tree can exist in the absence of any relations? If there are any others, I'm sure they are detrimentally absurd.
My notion of existential dependency does not require talking in terms of a thing's existence. That's true and is shown.
That argument is taking account of notions of "existence". I cannot effectively stop following the practice of using "existence" as a predicate and/or subject matter in it's own right and remain capable of accurately reporting upon such usage.
Hamstrung.
Existential dependency includes both internal and external elements.
All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. Some correlation is prior to language use. The presupposition of existence is prior to language use. That which is prior to language use cannot be existentially dependent upon language use.
The presupposition of existence inherent to all thought/belief does not require language.
Thus, there is a sensible way to talk about and/or use the term "existence" without talking about kinds of existence. Existential dependency is not a kind of existence, it is a kind of dependency.
So, you agree that the idea of existence predates language. The idea of different kinds of existence may also predate language. That's fine, but the supplementary story is that language enables us to talk about different kinds of existence. I can see no problem with that; proliferation of distinctions can only be a good thing provided the finer distinctions that are created don't, by virtue of their very existence, create confusion, and then trouble us with their need to be eliminated.
I cannot agree. The idea of existence comes after something to talk about. Thus, in terms of being basic to human thinking, the idea of existence is attached to something. Prior to talking in terms of a tree's existence, we first learn to talk about the tree.
No, and you've got me re-considering the best way to parse non linguistic correlation.
It may be interesting to compare/contrast our different methods. I mean I'm wondering what would happen if I attempted to translate the practice when one is setting out different kinds of existence into terms of existential dependency and/or vice versa.
Interested?
Yes it does. And the more we discuss this, the more it appears that many of those external elements that are necessary to a thing's existence include "other things", that have some relation to "the thing" in question. Then it would be correct to say that "the thing's" existence is relative to "other things", other things which it is dependent upon for its existence.
Quoting creativesoul
And yet you said this,
Quoting creativesoul
which seems inconsistent with your later avowal of disagreement.
Quoting creativesoul
On the face of it I imagine that the kind of existential dependency will vary with the different kinds of existence. I don't generally think in terms of existential dependency though; it's not really my thing. Laying it out in various contexts just seems to consist in elaborating on the basic notion that things are determined by what precedes them, and for me that is something that may safely be taken for granted.
The way 'things are' depends on our conception of 'things' and our conception of the duration of 'are'. Other species with different physiologies and different needs would 'see' a different world.
This is crux of the philosophical rejection of naive realism which is a parochial anthropocentric 'rationality'.
Could we also not say that the thing is existentially dependent upon other things?
Quoting Janus
There is a difference between the presupposition of existence within non-linguistic thought/belief and an idea of existence. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use. The former is not.
"Correlation presupposes it's own content" can replace "correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content" without loss of meaning.
An idea of existence consists entirely of terminological use.
I'm thinking that all the talk about kinds of existence can be effectively replaced by better language use. The "better" would be earned by keeping all the benefits while losing some of the detriments, maybe all?
There may be mistaken assumptions hard at work. That can happen when we take things for granted.
Yes. That's probably better.
And I would add, any 'existenstential dependency upon other things' indicates a relation.
...and,
If it is correct to presuppose that any relation between two existing things is existentially dependent upon necessary and sufficient conditions, then this picture of existence is indeed relativistic.
Is a presupposition not an idea?
Quoting creativesoul
This is all very vague. You haven't made clear what you think the "mistaken assumptions" might be or what we might be "taking for granted".
Also you haven't provided an alternative schema involving "better language use", or explained how the "benefits could be kept" or how the "detriments could be lost", or even what the supposed benefits and detriments are.
I just wanted to be difficult, and say: "that which is nonexistent is probably a broader more general concept". :blush:
But, in all "seriously", existence is more like a vast category that includes many many, many many many things
I agree that existence is a vast category that includes many things, that much seems to be a no-brainer.
I agree its usage varies non philosophically, but I maintain that what those significant occurences have in common are 'a dispututed exstence' context , It is in those where I claim that 'relative utility' rather than 'absolute evidence' comes to the fore. Note that the agreement or otherwise on 'existence' is significant only interms of subsequent action (or inaction) on the part of the disputees.
The key here, is that language allows me to communicate my abstract, non-linguistic ideas about existence. Prior to this, any notion of existence is private/subjective.
This is getting more into epistemology, where the real meat of the relative-absolute dichotomy is. It is much easier to prove the relativism of knowledge than existence.
If you want to know my personal position, which is nonnegotiable, I hold existence to be absolute, while I hold my knowledge of it to be relativistic. Yet, any time I relate my opinion of existence to another, I enter the domain of relativism; and, when in Rome...
Wait a second, I think you are setting me up. I'm gonna assert something that doesn't exist, and you are going to tell me how the non-existing thing derives a virtual existence within the presupposed content of my assertion.
So...unicorns, no wait, pink elephants?
:grin:
I'm not sure how you can extricate ontology from epistemolog, other than as an epiphenomon of taking an absolutist stance.
That is what empiricism attempts. Of course it has been completely debunked, so you are probably right. And Nietschze point this out in his own particular manner.
Right, so in accordance with what I said about different kinds of existence, I would say that unicorns have a fictional or imagined, as opposed to a physical, existence.
That is a nice point.
But, let me propose a few more things:
I would say that thinking is dependent on existence, and for the existing thinker, "existence" is primary, and "thought" secondary. Then, thinking about existence would be tertiary.
So ...
When you mention "non-linguistic thinking of existence" as "akin to an unmediated apprehension of existence and hence instinctive, which would be native to and shared by all members of whatever species we are considering", I cannot agree that this qualifies as "thought" without further qualification. As it stands here, it would say that it represents cognitive immediacy, in which a primitive, nonlinguistic mode of thought may or may not exist. But the abstraction of primitive ideation into linguistic thought, is where direct existence (including primitive ideation) is properly mediated into a rational concept.
One more thing, just for fun
One's direct existence/cognitive immediacy can never be communicated directly, for it is dependent on its abstraction into a rational concept in order to be adequately communicated, hence all communication of "existence" can only come indirectly.
Could it be stated as: unicorns are existentially dependent upon fiction/imagination?
(Add. That one is for @creativesoul. :wink: See, I'm trying)
I guess so, for if there were no humans to imagine them they would have no kind of existence at all.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
This seems pretty much right to me.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
I tend to agree with you and I have had this very discussion with @creativesoul more than a few times. I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held".
I also agree with your last paragraph.
That is a great point! For our purposes here, we could say that any thought that can be grasped or held can be called a concept. And any concept can be rendered into linguistic form, given an adequate degree of language aquisition. (consider "god", it is possibly one of the first concepts to emerge out of the primitive idea of "existence". Who knows. . ."Where she goes, nobody knows."? :joke: {Ren & Stimpy Show})
I would also be so bold as to speculate that non-linguistic thought is nearly identical between all animals equipped with the faculty of primitive ideation. This could probably be corroborated by neuro-biology, particularly regarding its speculation on the evolutionary developmen of the brain.
Nice! :cool:
I agree with almost everything you said here. In fact you are onto something good, maybe genius. But if your name is "creativesoul", then you need to put some more creative soul into it. There is something robotic about such formulaic speech, and I think you can 'get down' much better. :grin: Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions.
Re science methodology 101, empirical claims are not provable period. So of course, since this is an empirical claim, it's not provable. That's not a liability here. It's just a truism about empirical claims.
Yes
So, these are all different kinds of the same thing... purportedly. That 'thing' is existence itself(whatever that is). That is the problem for me. What do these different 'kinds of existence' all have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them all a kind of existence?
Genius and five bucks will get you a cup of coffee just the same as ignorance and five bucks.
The more I engage with this talk of existence as a subject matter in it's own right, the more I abhor the practice.
That's a great point?
:yikes:
That is to say that thinking is not having thoughts. That's nonsense.
We talk about our thought/belief. We have them prior to talking about them(some anyway).
There is an actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. The latter requires language, some thought/belief does not.
Janus fails to draw and maintain that distinction.
He might have said it better. But his point is well taken. That, unless a thought is held onto, thinking is as fleeting as sense experience.
He denied that animals can have thoughts at all. He's wrong. Having thought is drawing correlations between different things. Thinking is the same.
Oh, where are my manners?
Thanks.
Then why did he say:
Quoting Janus
???
I suppose he thinks/believes that thinking does not require having thoughts. You'll have to ask him "why?". That's a psychological question.
The answer to your question is right there, is it not?
Having thoughts, according to Janus, requires language whereas thinking evidently does not.
Of course, if we examine the above carefully, we'll see a bit of a problem in the parsing. Thoughts are there, but not held. The animal thinks but does not have thoughts, until the animal uses language to think about the thoughts(precisely formulate them via language use).
Not at all clear or helpful.
As before...
There is an actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief that Janus has neglected to draw and maintain.
If a creature draws a correlation between the sound of a bell and eating, then the creature has formed rudimentary thought/belief. The creature is capable of forming/having/holding thought/belief - however shortlived. The duration of the correlation doesn't matter. The expectation that stands as evidence of forming/having the thought/belief is shown later when the creature hears the sound of the bell once again.
Ring the bell and - only as a result of having already drawn the correlation between the bell and eating - Pavlov's dog thinks/believes that it's about to eat(once again). It's involuntary behaviour proves this. It goes to the feeding place. It begins salivating. It gets excited.
That is behaviour driven by thinking/believing that it is about to get fed. The result of hearing the bell and already having drawn correlations between the sound of the bell and eating.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, it matters if it's what @Janus means when he refers to holding thought. As he'd then be right that they can't hold thoughts, but clearly can have thoughts, which is different when looking at thinking as a river.
A bit of context for you...
That's a critique from Janus regarding my practice of saying that non-linguistic creatures can form, have, and/or hold thought/belief.
Seems we all agree that the way humans have and/or hold belief is more complex than the way non linguistic creatures' do.
Denying those differences results in denying the ability of having and/or holding thought/belief to non linguistic creatures.
That's what I think is going on here.
So, the only commonality between different kinds of existence is the term "existence"?
Well. To be clear, he denied having thoughts too....
I have no doubt animal brains form such persistent neural structures, which enables them to recognize entities and features of their environments, but I don't see animals as experiencing themselves holding specific thoughts or beliefs. We don't really know since we are not non-linguistic animals, so we only say what seems most plausible.
I told him not to take the animals' thoughts away, but he didn't listen.
You can't dispense with the idea of existence, because you use it in your term "existential dependency" to distinguish the idea that something is dependent on something else for its very existence, from other forms of mere functional dependency. If you use some alternative term it can only be an analogue of 'existence', otherwise it won't perform the conceptual job you want it to.
This bears witness to major differences between our frameworks; our criteria for what counts as thought/belief seem to be directly at odds.
You've said something here that caught my eye regarding yours.
It seems that your criterion for having and/or holding thought/belief includes the creature being able to experience themselves holding specific thoughts or beliefs. That's a confusing way to talk, but I think you're referring to a kind of experience that requires using language to talk about one's own thought/belief.
I also do not see animals having such experiences, but those kinds of experience are not necessary for thought/belief formation. No matter how fleeting, if a creature forms thought/belief, it holds and/or has it.... even if only for a moment.
They do have/hold specific thoughts. That is not to say that they have specific thoughts in mind. Having specific thoughts in mind is to think about thought/belief, and doing so requires common language use. Non linguistic creatures have none. Therefore they cannot have specific thoughts and beliefs in mind.
They can and do form, have, and hold specific thought/belief nonetheless.
Yes, but my point was that the thoughts animals may momentarily entertain cannot be held or had in the sense that they cannot deliberately bring it back to mind whenever they wish. To do this would seem to require language, and all humans can do it; but it would not seem to require self-reflective awareness that one is doing it; that would be a further step again; which even many humans probably do not take.The problem with this whole subject is that we can only speculate about it; I can't think of any way it could be rigorously tested.
No, it's not. You can have a specific thought in mind without thinking about thought at all.
To a very large extent, what you say here is undeniable given my own work.
Quoting Janus
Alright...
What's the difference between having specific thoughts and having specific thoughts in mind?
I think I can dispense with the practice of using it as a predicate as well as talking in terms of kinds of existence.
That is along the lines of what I meant when I said that there is nothing (excluding logical contradictions like "round triangles" which are merely words incoherently strung together) that doesn't exist or hasn't existed in some way or other.
Quoting Janus
So you're saying that there's no difference between having a specific thought and having specific thought in mind.
To me, having a specific thought in mind is to be thinking about that specific thought, whereas having a specific thought is drawing correlations between specific things.
I'm having quite a bit of trouble understanding how someone can bring past thought/belief back in mind - whenever they wish - without thinking about past thought/belief.
And more...
What counts as thought/belief on your view?
Actually, there is another way. We show a "holding onto thought" whenever we sustain a line of reason.
And this...
What am I to make of it?
Animals can entertain thoughts that they cannot hold.
:yikes:
I'll stick with what I've got. Although, your criticisms have helped me many times over.
:brow:
And yet you've been also talking in terms of a thing's existence, and that is exactly what Kant was arguing against.
The difficulty you find with my recent meanderings are valid but have nothing to do with your own self-contradiction/incoherence.
Kant argued against using the term "existence" as a predicate(predicating/attributing existence to a thing). You've done that throughout our exchange here, and yet you attempted to invoke Kant as though his position on existence somehow aligns with your own. It doesn't.
Anyway all this kind of talk can easily be plagued by terminological differences or nuances and it is mostly speculative when we begin talking about what animals can or cannot do anyway, so I don't think there's much mileage in going over and over it. I mean what I'm basically saying is that I don't think it is in these kinds of considerations that important philosophy lives.
It is very reasonable to say that an animal could have a transient thought which might compel it to act. But it is hard to imagine that such primitive ideation could be retained beyond its immediacy. Hence it is possible for a thinking creature to continue entertaining a thought, even if it has ceased to hold onto it.
Quoting Janus
So, if this is true then there is no difference between having the same thought on more than one occasion, and having the same thought whenever one wishes to...
That's not what was said.
It makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic animals can entertain thought/belief that they cannot have. Entertaining thought/belief is thinking about it. Thinking about it requires being able to talk about it.
Do you really not understand the problem here?
Compare the first question to the last phrase...
Saying that something has existence is not attributing a predicate; it is simply saying that something exists. It is perfectly reasonable to say that something has existence for as long as it exists. This is similar to the difference between different sense of "is". A thing is, but this "is" not the 'is' of predication.
All philosophy consists of thought/belief. Seems to me that getting that right is imperative.
"Something has existence" is not "Something exists".
The former uses the term "existence" as a predicate. The latter does not.
Kant argues against the former, and Quine... both.
For example "creativesoul has a big head" is equivalent to "creativesoul is big-headed". English in particular is a somewhat ad hoc language with a lot of inconsistencies, but we generally are able to get the logic nonetheless
To me that just seems like stating the obvious, stating what we always already knew. There may be some value in that if someone has forgotten to take it into account to the degree that they may be proposing something which unknowingly contradicts what is self-evident.
Quoting Janus
:brow:
Yeah. I'm done here.
Could you clarify this? Maybe rephrase it?
I'll add a bit. Perhaps it will help.
Non linguistic animals cannot talk about thought/belief. Thus, they cannot think about thought/belief. Since entertaining a thought is to think about it, it makes no sense to say that a creature without the capability to think about thought/belief can entertain thought/belief.
Don't get me wrong...there is much to swallow in Maturana's views, like the idea that 'predators chasing prey' is merely an anthropomorhism which humans use to describe ('structurally couple' with other humans) an automatic structural coupling in other species. This is a 'systems view' of 'life' per se as 'cognition'.
IMO, Maturana attempts an interesting biological backcloth aginst which iconoclastic attacks on analytic philosophical can be viewed.
http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html
Thanks bud.
This makes sense.
My question is, how can we say the prelinguistic creature cannot think of "existence" as it does a "tree"? After all, the tree is not a "tree" in prelinguistic thought, it only factors as something distinct that correlates to something else distinct. So, it is very possible that "existence", like the "tree", can be thought by the nonlinguistic creature.
Yet, I find a problem here, it seems to be beyond the scope of linguistic thought, to speculate whether or not "existence", like the "tree", can factor as something distinct, with some correlation to something else distinct, in prelinguistic thought. As it stands, it is impossible for the linguistic thinker to enter into the mind of the nonlinguistic thinker without going silent...from our perspective, we can only understand the "tree", "existence", or the nonlinguistic thinker through language.
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/3192504/thesis.pdf
Does it?
What about telepaths and mutes?
They are anomalies. Nevertheless, capable of linguistic thought, simply through their natural capacity for conceptual abstraction.
What about Helen Keller?
I suggest you investigate that word 'understand'.
also
There is no logical restriction on 'words' being confined to a phonetic or graphemic domain.
Interesting, please elaborate.
This would mean the existence can be thought of independent of language.
Record player.
What about jellyfish?
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Tell me what you mean by linguistic thought, as I find no grounds for it in the above.
Thought predicated on language use.
Let me add...
Language is the expression of concept. Language use is dependent upon language aquisition, which is dependent on conceptual abstraction. Most humans, including the mute and telepathic, have the capacity for conceptual abstraction, and therefore language acquistion, despite the ability to use it.
That is the essential difference to me. Linguistic thought has the potential to be communicated. Nonlinguistic thought does not.
And, my personal opinion is that nonlinguistic thought is more closely related to actual existence than linguistic thought.
'Words' can be thought of as any repetitive behavioral gesture used to facilitate 'structural coupling' between individuals, or to internally resolve behavioral uncertainties within individuale. Those 'gestures' could manifest at any level, from the neural to the muscular.
The word 'existence' is merely one such gesture whose import is specifically context bound (hence 'relative').
Remove it - non linguistic.
Add it - linguistic.
Come again?
See the difference?
Does this mean...
...that the fundamental experience of the observer is reducible to behavioral gestures? That these gestures appear at any conceivable level of behavior, including language. And language is a peculiar gesture with the power of structurally coupling distinctions made by the observer...
...?
I do. So then, round it off for me. Don't expect me to fill in the blanks, I haven't the means.
The short answer is 'yes', except that 'languaging' (Maturana) always has an 'organizational function'...there are no 'neutral descriptions' as such.
Could you elaborate?
That kind of irony is very unnerving. :grin:
I hesitate in 'elaborating' if you have not read up on Maturana yourself. I appreciate he is 'difficult' and that you would certainly have a problem with that if you were to cling to your 'absolutist stance'. He makes sense to me from a number of pov's ranging from constructivism via pragmatism to post modernism. If any of these is a no go area for you ,we are unlikely to 'structurally couple':wink: .
(The 'no neutral descriptions' point is another version of Nietzsche's point that there can be no operational distinction between 'description' and 'reality'. Some descriptions are simply more useful than others in particular contexts.)
That is a bold accusation. I always argue from the relativist perspective. And I mean always, in capital letters.
I am a philosopher, there is nowhere I won't go
So let's do it.
That wasn't Nietzsche's meaning at all. It was much more fundamental. His point was that there is no necessary correspondence between direct experience (viz. nerve stimuli) and the concepts which supposedly correspond to it, up to and including any notion of functional context. It's all in is essay: "truth and lies in a nonmoral sense". That is a very powerful piece of literature. Conclusion: all knowledge is a lie.
Then go nowhere. :cool:
But I'm already there. :nerd:
Please scan the links I have provided above, together with the Von Glasersfeld comments which are googleable. Now it may be that starting another thread may be more appropriate. Let me know what you think.
And re Nieztsche, I am taking Rorty's 'pragmatist interpretation' of it which can be found by googling the video clip for 'Rorty on Truth'
Yes, absolutely. And I have the ability to speak from other perspectives which are not compatible with my own personal beliefs. That means you will never be able to access, nor discuss these non-negotiable positions that I occupy.
I am Merkwurdichliebe...my love is strange. :grin: :kiss: :death:
I would gladly contribute to that thread. I think you might get across to some people here on TPF. But be prepared for immense criticism from the knowing ones.
I think Nietzsche is best approached directly, and not through the interpretation of another. There are probably less than a handful of historic philosophers that are best approached directly, or maybe all should be approached directly. Who knows?
BTW ' A direct approach' would be pretty useless to a post-modernist like Derrida, who would argue that even the author himself would later put a different interpretation on the text he produced on a previous occasion. It all about transitional cognitive states and shifting contexts.
Prelinguistic creatures do not think of "trees". Rather, they draw a correlation between trees and other things. "Trees" is a word. Trees are not. The tree is not a "tree" in linguistic thought. It is part of a correlation which attributes meaning and as such makes the tree meaningful/significant to the creature.
Nonlinguistic creatures cannot think of "existence" for it is a word. Non linguistic creatures cannot think of existence because it is not directly perceptible.
That's a common belief. It's false. No time now... Later.
And existence is absolute in the sense that there is one ultimate thing that necessarily does exist: the universe (or multiverse).
Any such theory necessitates existence to function. And that specific one begins with everything being compressed to a single point of existence. But there is existence a priori and the theory offers no claims as to how and when it came about.
Even the theory of "languaging", right?
Yes...but the 'words' are contingent on 'directing action' i.e.'transitional states' not permanence. They function as 'nodes of relative persistence'.. So to say 'trees exist' is vacuous unless some hypothetical action is being contemplated by humans' in which the word 'trees' is contextually significant.
The issue of 'time' as inextricable with 'existence' was explored by Heidegger as being confined to humans (Daseins).
Hence my raising of 'time issue' and 'Big Bang' .Without that Heideggerian anchor, there would indeed be an infinite regress implied.
Wait a second.
This needs to be further explained. How it is a tree not a "tree" in linguistic thought?
The only way I can parse it is that no concept can be identical to any nonlinguistic thought, and that all linguistic thought begins with a nonlinguistic distinction/correlation that comes to be correlated with a linguistic form that holds conceptual significance. Linguistic thought cannot apprehend the nameless thing present in nonlinguistic thought, it can only apprehend the idea of it, and retroactively impose its conceptualization on that nameless thing. In this way, I can completely agree that a tree is never really a "tree", for any notion of "tree" is nothing but a correlation.
Even if nonlinguistic thought could hypothetically apprehend "existence" as some unnamed distinction/correlation, it cannot be identified as "existence" until it is correlated with the linguistic form. And even then, it isn't really existence, it is only the idea of existence that is retroactively imposed on an unnamed distinction/correlation.
How about 'non linguistic creatures' don't 'think' !
I'm totally willing to consider that point.
The thing I can't get past, is the idea that there is some indication of cognitive activity occurring in certain nonlinguistic species, the ability to draw basic distinctions/correlations from direct experience.
But since the general view is that perception is 'active' not 'passive', whan can 'direct experience' mean ?
NB One psychological definition of 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a response'.
Direct experience refers to the nondescript content that is mediated through perception into basic thought.
I would say, this is probably a function of 'thought' at some basic level, not 'language'. Language is a form into which thought can be mediated, and a means by which thought can be communicated/expressed and carried into further correlation with other linguistic thoughts.
I can agree with that. I have been trying to really enter the core of nonlinguistic thought. At best, it seems to occurs as an immediate cognitive distinction/correlation, overlayed on my direct experience. I would agree that this operates to disrupt the autonomic S-R sequence of the creature.
I'm not a big fan of thinking about how nonhumans think...in fact, I think its fucking stupid. But I am aware of the evolutionary implications posited through neuro-biology, in which the developmental structure of the brain is recapitulated in evolutionarily related species. So I will entertain animal thought just so I don't have digress into this debate.
The former seems to merely be a medium of thought. The latter seems to be the practical application of thought, perhaps thought in action.
Quoting fresco
The command: "no" to a dog, indicates some mode of thought in the dog. I wonder, is that mode of thought nonlinguistic for the dog? After all, it cognitively responds to language (as opposed to passively reacting to stimuli), and to a distinct and meaningful term at that: "no". No?
The question is about the content of non-linguistic thought/belief. In particular some folk seem to wonder whether or not a non-linguistic creature is capable of thinking about trees and/or existence. To be blunt...
There is no such thing as non-linguistic thought/belief of and/or about existence. Bear with me while I help the reader to understand. Thought/belief is not all that hard to grasp if we just avoid all the unnecessary language use and the bag of historical mistakes it carries alongside and within.
1Thinking about "tree". 2Thinking about a tree. 3Thinking about "existence". 4 Thinking about existence.
Which of these scenarios, if any, are capable of happening prior to language acquisition?
All thought/belief consists of correlations drawn between different things.
1All thinking about "tree" is drawing correlations between the term "tree" and something else. "Tree" is a term. It is a proxy. It picks out trees. "Trees" are not trees. "Tree" is what we've named some of the things in my yard. Trees are not names. Trees are not terms. "Trees" is a term. All thought/belief about the term "trees" is existentially dependent upon language use, for all terms are existentially dependent upon language.
There is no non linguistic thought/belief about the term "trees"(aside from first learning how to use it).
2All thinking about a tree is drawing a correlation between that tree and something else. One without language can have the tree in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" simply by drawing a correlation between the tree and other things. Not all thought/belief about trees requires language use.
Some creatures without language can think about trees. There is non linguistic thought/belief about trees.
3All thinking about "existence" is drawing correlations between "existence" and something else. "Existence" is a term, a proxy. It is always attached to something already named. We begin talking about trees and other things long before we begin talking about then in terms of their existence. All thought/belief about "existence" requires language use replete with a rich background of things to already talk about in terms of their existence.
One without language has no such background, and thus cannot think about a thing's "existence".
4All thinking about existence is drawing correlations between "existence" and something already named. A thing's existence is not directly perceptible. One without language cannot think about existence. All thought/belief about existence requires language use.
One without language cannot think of and/or about a thing's existence.
However, very strange and telling things happen when we attempt to sever "existence" from everything, because we're left with the term "existence", and if it works like other names/proxies, then existence no longer remains although the term does. That doesn't work. The term remains. If anything remains then something exists.
A tree severed from everything is still a tree. The term "tree" severed from everything is still the term "tree". The term "existence" severed from everything is still the term "existence".
Existence severed from everything is nothing.
And
Quoting creativesoul
What about when nonlinguistic correlations don't pan out as expected? E.g. I see a riverbed in the distance, riverbed correlates with a source of hydration, but when I arrive, the riverbed is dry. That would seem to be grounds for thinking about existence in the absence of language . No?
Please, everything in brackets "[...]" is me. Sorry, I assumed it to be obvious.
I'm trying to understand this shit, and I'm attempting to show you that in nonlinguistic thought, existence is just as possible as tree.
Quoting creativesoul
One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist.
You cannot show that. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. That can be shown.
The existent is not existence.
Why? Because all thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification?
But thought is not existence, and that is why a correlation can be wrong, and that brings up the question of how "thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification, yet which some/all of the presupposed content does not correspond to anything concrete or actual?
I think this is a reasonable question.
Okay Terrapin Station. :cool:
Then maybe you can help me to get my point across. Existence is present at all levels of thought, linguistic or nonlinguistic.
Wrong question. It's not a matter of why. It's a matter of how we come to think in terms of existence.
Stuff exists prior to thinking about it. That's not the same as saying that existence can be in the mind of a non-linguistic creature. Existence is not directly perceptible. Only directly perceptible things can be the content of non linguistic thought/belief.
Don't make it an ethical contest. :grin:
Quoting creativesoul
Existence is attributed to things merely experienced. Making any distinction/correlation , linguistic or nonlinguistic, is predicated on the pressupossition of existence. So it it rather illogical to say that existence does not factor into thought prior to language acquisition.
I hope you can convince me otherwise.
Nicely put.
There is no such thing as non linguistic predication...
I'm seriously re-thinking how to parse that bit. "All correlation presupposes it's own content" does what it needs to do, for now.
And what happens when something that is thought to be directly perceptible is not perceived? Then there is the thought that it does not exist (perceptually). It is easy to see how existence factors into nonlinguistic thought...As I said:
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
If the entire history of language use including the term "existence" is not enough to prove that we name and think of things long before thinking about them in terms of their existence, then nothing else I could argue would hold more clout.
Does correlation require predication?
Thinking that something is directly perceptible requires thinking in those terms. Those terms require already having picked something out to think about in terms of whether or not it qualifies as being directly perceptible or not. All thinking in terms requires language. Non linguistic thought has none.
:brow:
No. It is quite the reverse. All predication is correlation. Not all correlation is predication.
Not when making nonlinguistic correlations.
Think/believe what you like. Gratuitous assertions are inadequate on my view.
I've been defending everything I've said without subsequent valid objection aside from the "presupposing the existence of it's own content"...
That, I think, can be maintained by careful ad hoc.
Like:Quoting creativesoul
I agree.
Anything reasonable can be maintained by careful ad Hoc. That is why all knowledge is relative.
Just tell us. Not everyone is as clever enough to distinguish them as you.
Any and all. I'm a philosopher. I have nothing to prove, and nothing else to offer but speaking all my opinions clearly and directly.
Sorry, but for me ' existence' is merely a word like any other whose meaning/import is embedded in its context of usage, therefore I cannot argue for its non linguistic viability. The non philosophical contexts of its usage involve disputes about 'utility', which for the purposes of naive realistic posturing replace utility with the word 'existence' instead as though the disputed concept were independent of an observer.
Now once we entertain philosophical contexts of usage, I assert that 'existence' presupposes at least an element of naive realism.
It’s a tough job being a naive realist. All that posturing - it takes a lot out of a person.
Why just this morning I made breakfast. I ground up some coffee beans, made the coffee, poured some cold cereal in a bowl, added skim milk, ate it - and I also drank some coffee. And in all of this I did not once use any words whose meaning was embedded in it’s context of usage.
Dang it, all that posturing was hard work. I need a nap.
I'm completely ok with dismissing the notion of nonlinguistic thought. The more I consider it, the more it becomes apparent that it is quite redundant and that it unnecessarily complicates matters.
Think what this means, though. How much time would you give to refuting the 'lizard people' conspiracy theory? A little more realistically, how willing are you to wade into various proofs of the existence of god? Are you in suspense until you do so? Is it a cowardly retreat to recognize the futility of certain approaches? And then to recognize the futility of trying to show this futility within that approach? Refutation of the flawed approach within the flawed approach is just confusion.
In this context I agree with @fresco in terms of attitude, but they are laying down one more system that depends on idiosyncratic uses of words that already work just fine. If the gist is a rejection of armchair science, then what is needed is paint thinner and not another coat of theory (unlearning, discarding).
I relate to the attitude expressed above.
It's not that I think that meaning isn't embedded. I think I understand what people mean by that. I guess the issue is whether it's used as a pointer to what we all already know or something clever and elusive. Perhaps a better approach is just listening to ourselves in real life. Theories are fine, but when it comes to meaning we aren't exactly locked outside of the laboratory.
It is a glorious victory to recognize the futility of all approaches, but discuss them nevertheless.
:cheer:
What exactly are you calling "nonlinguistic thought"?
:brow:
Looks like a conflation between an account and what's being taken into account.
Care to offer an argument for how you've arrived at those conclusions?
Looks like your breakfast scenario was mostly 'seamless coping' .For example, I"m prepared to lay money that at least one or more of the words you used in your later report never came into your head at the time. Nor I suppose did you contemplate the existential dependency of your 'items"on a human cultural context even though they were.
Naive realism is the default mode for seamless coping. You don't need to work at it.
One can present the utterance, "That man ate many green boats." I imagine those through whom there is to be made passage of judgement, would seek to offer recognition with much sincerity in mind, only of the absence of true meaning, as conferred by means of the former(phrase), upon their apprehension of what it shall entail, insofar as it be deemed representative of the course, spoken of. Therein lies the modality of such restriction in depth; the latter attribution would serve to preclude, and by means of the same facilitate dismissal of the prospect in which the prior utterance, that unto which we affix our sight, expresses without incurrance of lesser clarity, what is the case in truth. ('That man may very well have eaten many green boats, yet we discard the prospect of such truth outright for the absurdity in tone which it presupposes and therefrom dispense with the liberty to describe that very instance, should it arise.') In judgement we ascribe prejudice unto that of which we strive to express and thus persist in mere reflection, for the principle under which all else remains contingent. In concurrence with the preceding condition, no basis through which there is granted entailment of representation, in form, corresponds without fault to that of the object of which it alone stands reflective.
For the sake of brevity;
"The map isn't the territory, nor can it ever be otherwise." -
"Loss in clarity needn't entail loss in meaning."-
"All representations must impart a sense of understanding on our behalf, of the distinct forms (and properties) which they seek to designate, if their usage is to be vindicated."-
"All our renditions of phenomena are only partial, with respect to each phenomenon thereof." -
Any thought that doesn't involve language.
Has one clear example of nonlinguistic thought even been posited?
One can conceive without fault of an instance in which the sole modality of thought, lying in pertainment to the same, harbors entrenchment in mere imagery, and shall exemplify no basis for conflict, amongst that of all manner of predication, for itself. One must descend beyond such a condition, in that of which oneself has conceived, since, insofar as there be sought description of the object held in mind; yet the image of the latter, can persist in spite of its absence.
There can be thought without language, though the converse stands destitute of truth; there can be no language without thought.
All unspoken ones then?
What other modes are there?
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
If there be permitted no means for such expression, none shall speak as consequence.
No. All thoughts are unspoken. Speech is not thought, it is a medium through which thought can be communicated/expressed.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
So, what counts as not involving language?
:brow:
Definitely not speech or writing. Hmmmm...I just can't seem to find a good example that illustrates thought that doesn't involve language.
So, you're saying that non linguistic thought is any thought that does not involve language, and you cannot offer an example of that.
That would explain the dismissal of non-linguistic thought/belief.
Wouldn't it be better to realize that the approach you've been using is inadequate for taking proper account of it?
Certainly we agree that some language less creatures are capable of thinking?
I find this quite problematic, my friend...
Statements are statements of thought/belief.
Quoting creativesoul
I said speech is not identical to thought.
Statements are something else. Not all statements are posited in the form of speech, and not all speech counts as a statement. Statements can also be thought or written.
So, it would be more correct to say: statements about thought/belief are statements, regardless if they occur in thought, speech or writing.
I see nothing philosophically interesting there to talk about. Looks like an exercise in arguing semantics.
I have yet to determine the means by which there has been made commitment of mere blindness toward much of what is to accord with the condition unto unto which we have sought to ascribe precedence. All manner of imagery; that which is to be regarded as pictorial in form, can subsist in thought, in spite of the absence of certain aspects thereof which insofar as each be present, serve to facilitate linguistic expression.
Imagery of object's, irrespective of content, can be regarded as distinctly representative of instances' in which no such modalities are conferred, and would as consequence fulfill the criterion you have set forth.
Suppose that one has chosen to conceive of a material object; its sight is then retained in the mind of the subject. One can offer recognition of the form of such an object, and differentiate it from what is without true semblance, with respect to itself, whilst inferring certain attributes of each, which reflect unto one another through associations hitherto drawn.
Thus, we have made discernment whereof imagery, inasmuch as it pertain solely to a particular sight, is an instance of non-linguistic expression, and by virtue of that, the same sentiment holds true as a matter of thought.
That's pretty much where you go astray.
I don't see much of an argument here. Speech and statements are distinct, just as thought and speech is distinct. So what's the problem?
Why, is speech blue and not red? Or, is it that "medium through" does not include "medium". What nonsense criticism are you trying to get away with this time?
The problem, I suspect, is the framework you work from. My suspicion is that there are inadequate criteria at work.
Settle it for me.
Thought, speech, and statements...
What counts as each?
But it's s much a part of the picture you have in mind that it will make no impact on you.
That criticism wasn't nonsense. It was not understood by you, apparently. It was spot on though, given the context.
Quoting Vessuvius
Thanks. That makes sense.
I don't know what you were reading, it was a bunch of irrelevant nonsense.
Doing philosophy is not his purpose here.
Existence is not.
Thanks for the tip... being the all too trusting chap that I am, I do not recognize insincerity very well.
And, preceding that,
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Sure we can think in images and so on. That's fine. Merk is saying much more.
I don't intend to settle anything. Rather, allow me to stir things up with some opinions...
Thought is the product of thinking. Thinking can produce either linguistic or nonlinguistic thoughts ( distinctions/correlations).
Speech is the product of speaking or making audible words with one's mouth. It is an audible mode of language that depends on linguistic thought. But it does not directly reflect linguistic thought, rather it mediates it beyond thinking, and into something perceptible that is meant to communicate thought.
Statements are the product of language, or rather, grammar. Anywhere language exists, statements are possible...they can be linguistically thought, spoken, or written.
I'm sure these statements are inadequate, but I wrote them anyway.
So, Merk, have you a reply to Wittgenstein's critique?
A few phrases that we cough up on demand don't begin to do justice to the complexity in our effortless employment of these words when we aren't tangled up in a peculiar game.
'Naive realism' can be thought of as a reporting mode which assumes that the 'thinghood' of what we call 'objects' has nothing to do with the needs of the observer who 'things' them.
Compare your breakfast scenario with one in which 'seamless coping' was interrupted.
Mugging scene from Crocodile Dundee
(...Punk pulls out stilleto and threatens Mick and Sue..)
SUE:' Careful Mick...he's got a knife'
MICK Knife ?(..pulls out his big bush knife...)'That's a knife !
(...Punk flees)
Note how the 'thinghood' of 'knife' is being negotiated according to its contextual utility.
It is my assertion that all 'things' are contextually defined and potentially subject to negotiation. You discard naive realism when you realize that.
Cool. Do you know the specific pages? I want to check it out. Then I will do my best to reply.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4520/philosophical-investigations-reading-it-together
I promise to read it closely and carefully, and then reread it even more closely and carefully.
I did not see any negotiation going on.
The punk's mental attitude changed when he realized he had picked the wrong people to rob. Sue's attitude changed in that she realized that Dundee could handle himself in the big city.
But the underlying "thinghood" of the knife did not change. It was exactly the same object both when it was hidden and after it was revealed, it did not somehow morph from a small knife to a big knife.
Of course the usage/meaning of words changes with context. Well know example is "John shot some bucks". What exactly went on? Did John go hunting or did John lose some money at Las Vegas? We need context to determine the meaning. But the underlying "reality" (AKA "objective truth", AKA "state of affairs", etc, etc) of what occurred to John did not change.
If you cannot understand that even the 'physicality of atoms' depends on the utility of that concept for humans, we will fail to communicate.
One simple example I gave earlier was a visual artist thinking in terms of shapes, relationships of shapes, etc.
All conceptions stand predicated by means of that to which each shall lie in pertainment; yet therein has dwelt a certain form by which what One is to speak of, remains bound. That which serves as the centrality for what is to designate a particular sentiment, its most necessary tenant, needn't harbor entrenchment in the determinate, beyond that which is ascribed unto itself, by virtue of the tone for which it is to stand without dispensation, to express that of which it remains representative as imbued by certain externalities. What had been regarded as contentious throughout the course unto which we affix our sight coincided with the advent of much force, by which he was found to have drawn toward each, though in time the intensity with which all thereof had come to manifest, grew absent and thus no longer exerted bearing, as consequence.
The lesser breadth in form which your assertion shall entail, insofar as it be deemed as having mere veracity, ought not to be held in sight, in a manner such that it be seen in the eye's of the many as a basis for true representation of the whole which it had been to describe, with much effectuality as was the intent. One can conceive of an instance in which what is to be designated, through usage of a term, as it be given, precede no ascertainment of that to which it refers, in either respect, inasmuch as there be absence of a conceptual scheme which must yield the former, if its utility is to be granted vindication. The modality which accords with the function of all thereof, can be discerned most readily, only through that of the state of which it is reflective, in contrast to that unto which it imparts much fulfillment, and be spoken of as such, prior to the inception of its central form.
All manner of linguistic expression, in its myriad forms, and constituents, which lend themselves to the formation of a cohesive whole, an unity, ought to be understood through their distinct role in particular instances, and the variegated considerations amongst each rather than as sole terms which remain isolated from that to which all are to pertain. The function in which each term serves as it be contingent upon the rest is the most effectual basis for identifying what all are to designate, and convey. Yet the whole is no less pertinent than the sum of its every aspect, nor of lesser meaning as alone all therein must stand destitute of that attribute, though in full there can be no grander form of expression; seldom is it true that much else be comparable. It is nonetheless vital, that those through whom there be made passage of judgement, bear in mind the requisite for mere differentiation, and strive to preserve the inconstancy, within the series of actions which have no semblance to that of the rest, beyond itself, and are thus dissimilar in regard to the same, by means of recognition of such distinctness, hitherto drawn.
That's a good point. A musician too, thinking in terms of sounds and rhythms.
Thanks for the link. But I have the book. Can you tell me which §'s you were referring to?
You start like that, yet want me to read the rest of it?
Yes, for what sake would my preference be otherwise, if it be the case at all?
Alright then, I wish to concede.
It seems to me that our own preferences in regard to manner of speech are nothing short of dissimilar from one another; owing to that in the hope of inciting a fruitful discussion, I shall eschew that toward which I have striven thusly, with respect to the same action for your sake, and mine.
Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; something of an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known soon, in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.
All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has associated, in the past; there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to all conceptions, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' to be proper in form and conduct in the act through which it is expressed.
The functions of certain terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest through speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, in a spoken sequence. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted through itself unto both the clarity and meaning, as granted expression by means of such a sequence. The cumulative whole of any spoken sequence of terms is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant, variable even. in the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst the other stands destitute; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.
I would hope this to suffice, here.
Nope.
Fucking hell, man. This shit sucks, for me. Here.
SO what are you wanting to say?
Language is formed primarily through associations in the meaning of particular terms, and forms of consideration which have bearing on the sentiment expressed. Yet to inquire as to whether the singular constituents, the terms themselves convey meaning, alone, would preclude much of what is most relevant to the matter itself. Meaning is best discerned, linguistically, through recognition of a particular statement's role, in an instance; a "language-game" as has been termed, since. The reason for which, I believe to owe itself to the ever greater expansion in complexity of the many forms of mere sentiment, that coincide with ever greater depth, in what is expressed, and their relations.
For instance, suppose that one wishes to speak of a fondness for some model of automobile, and convey this sentiment to another in such a manner that it be understood without fault. The other neither can identify the form of such an automobile by association of its assigned name with a specific model, nor deduce it from observance. How can the subject find resolve to the dilemma, if it be bound by each condition? One must describe it, in depth. Therein arises the question of how one ought to describe it. Well, one could say, "it is quite large and bears a distinct insignia atop its front." Yet each modality is pervasive, and indistinct from much else as a great many models' of automobile can rightfully be spoken of as 'large' in proportion as can an equally numerous array be described as distinct in the insignia each is to bear.
What thoughts' have you come to, in relation to this?
What manner of 'issue' is it you believe we harbor? Beyond of course what you had spoken of, thereafter.
(Though I imagine the latter of which would serve to preclude a sense of mutuality, with regard to the same.)
I'm sorry, did I miss something?
I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'. Its really a simple request. I don't know why he's having such a hard time with it. I'm beginning to think he has no idea what he is talking about. Or maybe its just a reflection of his hollowness as a philosopher. :grin:
I tend to agree with you. I understand opposing views and would once have argued for them, but now they seem more clever than serious. Anyone who disagrees with you would seem to be telling you that you are getting some state of affairs wrong. A slier opponent might just suggest that his approach is better...for no reason. Or if a reason is given, it's hard to imagine some state of affairs not being invoked. That thinghood == functionality or that it's [s]turtles[/s] interpretation all the way down. Typically the superstitious concept (reality, the thing considered apart from its purpose) in employed in the theory that denies it.
To be clear I'm not saying that the atoms of the knife or its measurable qualities are the thing itself. The notion of 'what is the case' is intrinsically murky, 'beneath' our ability to decisively analyze it while making that attempt possible.
All of them.
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Doubtless.
So you agree? That's refreshing. It seems so simple, and yet the alternative is so tempting. Or it was once long ago. And still is for others. Though perhaps I'm just trying to play the same game in the next Mario world.
I remember [s]those are pearls that were his eyes[/s] that the present king of France is bald.
Quoting Banno
Garbage.
Really? That's all you can come up with? What a plop.
Talking stick. :blush:
Each is to serve as that of the conception granted by means of the effort expended on behalf of another, from which he remains exempt.
"Jabberwocky"; circa 1871; Lewis Carroll
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!”
He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought—
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.
And as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!
One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.
“And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”
He chortled in his joy.
’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe." -Through The Looking Glass; Lewis Carroll; circa 1871
For you stands' only what is contrary, in both tone and substance; as I see you have never once sought to offer, here, that which is enough. Little else I can say, with equal clarity, and conviction.
Quoting unrelated fiction...that's what Banno does when he can't keep up and has nothing relevant to add, which is more often than not.
I have yet to encounter reason to suspect otherwise.
The words/language that we use to describe objects - and (however it works) the thoughts underlying them - do indeed depend on the utility of the concepts.
But our thoughts cannot change the underlying physicality of objects or atoms. The moon existed before humanity (and there were no observers), it existed when the early Greeks thought of the moon as the goddess Artemis, it exists today now that people have walked around on it, and it will exist in the future even if humanity self destructs and there are no observers (as we seem to be doing). But none of this changed or will change any of the atoms comprising the moon. The utility of our concepts - or the absence of any concepts - of the moon have had no impact on the physicality of the atoms that comprise the moon.
If this is naive realism, then I'm content with that label. I'll let you have the last word - which I will read. In the meanwhile I think I'll have a cup of water heated to a temperature of 180 degrees Fahrenheit suffused with coffee molecules.
BTW - just on a personal note, I don't know if it was deliberate, but I appreciate that in our exchanges you expressed yourself in plain language.
Yes, of course we can imagine a pre-human moon in our current mind's eye, in order to explain current human observations....but do you not see the essential role of humanity in all that ?
The concept of number is a human concept, but human judgments of number have an objective character in matters of fact. The concept of existence is a human concept, but human judgments of existence -- for instance about what is said to exist and what is said not to exist -- have an objective character in matters of fact.
I'll agree, it seems far too much philosophical "ontology" amounts at best to idle chatter. I often repeat Rorty's slogan: There is no privileged ontology. We can and do construct various ontologies, or recognize various entities and sorts of entities, to suit various discursive purposes. I suppose we may say accordingly that particular judgments of existence vary along with ontological context and discursive purpose. I see no reason not to allow that this variability is a sort of "relativity" of judgments of existence. But this ontological relativity is a matter of conceptual flexibility, and does not support claims against the objective character of judgments of existence.
In the investigation of nature, we refine our terms against the grindstone of experience, and let the world speak for itself with our language.
Note that the word 'fact' comes from the Latin facere-to construct
For me 'facts',are human constructions with a high degree of consensus.
Note that, in the literature, there is at least one paper discussing 'the half life of facts'.
Well said. I agree.
You can go that way, but it leads to some counterintuitive conclusions. If most of us disagree with you, I suppose you haven't stated a fact.
And maybe it was once a fact that the world was flat or that God created the world in 7 days.
It seems easier to say that people tended to believe X, etc.
I do get it, though. I have played the pragmatist ontological-epistemological edgelord. I still think that I was right in spirit. But there are sore spots in the position. Because you are trying to give us the facts.
The constructivist view of 'facts' is basically an anti 'naive realist' stance, which recognizes that 'facticity' can be negotiated and shifts over time. Facticity is basically about the human preoccupation with prediction and control which are aspects of another psychological construct we call 'time'.
You are correct in saying that this pov makes little difference to everyday transactions, except where 'facticity' is being disputed as in the recent topic of 'fake news'. I don't think logical contradiction' is a valid analysis involved in 'fact about fact'. Like with Wittgenstein's view of Russell's Paradox as 'aberrant language use', I think binary logic with its axioms fixed set membership, has its limits as a semantic tool.
I hear you. But isn't this view itself presented as a fact? (Or is it only edifying? A cheerleading for open-mindedness?) I've been reading A Thing of This World, which is great. It starts with Kant and moves to Derrida and weaves a narrative that largely focuses on those 'shifts over time.' Nevertheless, it's a theory about the 'filter' that still depends on some sense of reality beneath it all. With Kant we have a static impersonal conceptual scheme. After Kant we get dynamic schemes. Folks try to go beyond dynamic schemes (beyond the scheme/content model), but I'm not so sure that this can be done well.
I suggest that we just look at the structure of communication. The notion of [s]world[/s] or 'what is the case' is elusive and yet seemingly always with us. Representational thinking dies hard.
I'm with you on the centrality of prediction, control, and time. I'm mostly relate to what you write. I'm really only arguing with you about a finer point. Our differences seem to be mostly cosmetic.
There's just one issue perhaps at the root of my quibbles.
I'd like to hear what you think of the phenomenon of 'world. '
[quote=link]
3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense—not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'.
[/quote]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heideggerian_terminology
It's this 'wherein' that serves as the 'real' or 'living' thing-in-itself, I suggest. All the confused mind-matter babble is maybe dancing around this 'wherein' that grounds communication in a way that we find hard to specify.
[quote=Wiki]
The naïve realist theory may be characterized as the acceptance of the following five beliefs:
There exists a world of material objects
Some statements about these objects can be known to be true through sense-experience
These objects exist not only when they are being perceived but also when they are not perceived. The objects of perception are largely perception-independent.
These objects are also able to retain properties of the types we perceive them as having, even when they are not being perceived. Their properties are perception-independent.
By means of our senses, we perceive the world directly, and pretty much as it is. In the main, our claims to have knowledge of it are justified."
[/quote]
It's almost a description of common sense. Other 'isms' add a useful complexity to the model. Heidegger's 'ready-to-hand' versus 'present-at-hand' is brilliant. And we can think of the schemes that divide the world into just this or that system of objects 'preconsciously.' And we can think of those schemes or paradigms as evolving, dying, being born via new dominant metaphors/frames.
But all along we talk about reality, what is the case. We inform and disclose the situation, a situation that is implicitly shared --else who are we talking to about what? What could we have to say to one another and about what if we aren't strangely located in the same [s]place[/s]? The world isn't a ball of mud. It isn't even a system of objects. It's 'here' and we are 'in' it together, talking about it. Any system of objects is 'in' this world with us. And, as Heidegger stressed, this 'in' is not a spatial relationship. We are just using a spatial metaphor as we try to express the elusive ground of expression.
Back later.
On the one hand stated that all thought is unspoken, while on the other called thinking in musical terms "non-linguistic" thought...
He's said enough.
The World As It Is Of Itself; A Priori
1: All manner of conception which stands contingent upon the whole of the world, and each aspect arising therein needn't cast reflection unto that of the object for which one harbors the privilege to strive to adjoin one's sight unto the former, as it be absent and thus separate from an act of observance. One could speak of the form with which a particular object, if not series thereof is to manifest; yet one would be unwise to eschew abidance by that of the requisite through which there is yielded true apprehension of what is spoken of, as if each were to be greater in substance, than that which serves merely to represent the object held in sight; in contrast to that which is of the truest form, independent of its appearance in our eyes. One ought not to seek dismissal of either, as each bears much pertinence.
The Relation Amongst Thought And Experience
2: Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.
The Necessary Association Of Subject And Expression
3: All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has hitherto associated, there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to the sum of all linguistic conceptions in a certain domain, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' proper in form and conduct in the course of all modalities, pertaining to expression of itself, as preceded by the action of the subject.
The Functionality Of Terms In Usage And Their Influence Upon The Structure Of Expression In Full
4: The functionality of all terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest by means of speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, sequentially. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted unto both the clarity and meaning, expressed through the former. The cumulative whole of any sequence of terms whether spoken, or otherwise, is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant. In the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst that of the rest lie in destitution; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.
The Indirectness Of The Nature Of Our Apprehension And Its Consequence
5: None can garner apprehension of the form with which an object is to manifest, beyond the farthest reach in the breadth of sight, nor can one make discernment of that of which it alone is constituted. The means through which one can apprehend what rests within the principal domain of one's faculties of perception, never once shall be permitted to exceed that toward which it remains able to venture forth. Whilst one bears the liberty to conceive of such notions, insofar as each be bound by the aforementioned condition, there must prevail the subject; one whose course may facilitate its advent. Yet it need be a matter of truth that in the absence of either, no sense of understanding is to be conferred, as no manner of judgement can be granted passage. In concurrence with the prior attribution, the world and every aspect therein must persist, destitute of all that which seeks to ensure apprehension of itself, for the sake of the subject only through whom can the latter of which be yielded.
For the sake of brevity;
"What is spoken of, to describe an object of the world, is contingent upon, yet independent of that which it serves to represent; the object as it truly is of itself."
"The faculties which permit our own apprehension, and all aspects contained therein constitute matters of the world themselves, and thus their every form, remains determined by the conditions of the world, and all it comprises."
"The World As it appears in our eye's needn't bear semblance to itself, as it is in truth independent of observance; a course from which it can never deviate, merely affirm."
"As consequence of the prior condition, of which I have spoken since, the world as it is neither must conform to our prejudice as a matter of truth, nor be reflected without fault by the forms of apprehension, and sight, through which it is expressed."
"All of that which we apprehend, as objects of the world, can never lie beyond the boundaries of representation for itself, as granted through the mind of the subject and thus, stands only partial; offering sight of the object, yet all the while lessening the clarity of its image."
Well I do look forward to talking with you. Your posts are fascinating and I even enjoy your arrogance (says one god to another.)
Re: your common sense view, I suggest you consider replacing 'objects existing whether perceived or not' by ' expectation of functional persistence evoked by the abstact persistence of a naming word'.
That 'functionality' can only be related to human needs, including the need to predict, say, animal behavior. Thus Maturana makes the point that ' a predatator stalking its prey' is meaningful for human purposes, but in the animal,world in which 'self awareness' is debateable, there may be no separation of roles, merely the automatic conjoint behavior we might call 'a chasing'. IMO, it is only by thinking about non human (language) species that we can understand the significance of talking about the relativity of 'existence'.
Exactly. The construction with a high degree of consensus is actually that "fact" refers to "state of affairs."
And as Von Glasersfeld implied in his analysis of Maturana, it is 'gut instinct' which tends to point the way towards a contoversial, yet potentially transcendent vantage point. After all, we are attempting to language about languaging !
http://www.oikos.org/vonobserv.htm
Yeah, I think we agree here. Our difference might be (correct me if I am wrong) that I don't equate what is this the case with the 'physical.' (I see that the physical is strongly related, but I don't think a satisfying reduction of world to any other concept is possible.)
I see why someone might want to do that, but now we just have a new kind of object, a new noun, an 'expectation.' So...objects are expectations. This is idealism, no? I'm not anti-idealism, but I am trying to cut through the confusion.
Note that I also object to some simple reduction of objects to the physical. Like objects are 'really' atoms, etc. We can experience the same object in different modes and thru different theoretical lenses. We can view the object as an expectation, but we already have a pre-theoretical sense of the object that makes that metaphor possible.
I understand this, but in order to make the point you are holding some kind of content fixed and viewing it through different schemes. I agree that 'what is the case' or reality is experienced through the 'lens' of this or that impersonal conceptual scheme. For one conscious entity, reality may be a system of 4 objects. For another conscious entity, a richer system of 4000 objects, not including the original 4.
But we humans seem have some sense of 'what is the case' or 'state of affairs' or 'reality' that makes assertion possible.
Quoting fresco
I don't think this does away with the difficulty. I admit it doesn't matter much practically. But since I enjoy the challenge of trying to get clear on the issue, I must object to this as handwaving and not proof.
Yo, there's got to be a clearer way to say this.
Let me try to translate. We have to fit reality 'into' or 'through' our conceptual scheme. Reality (for us) can only be as 'big' or complex (for us) as this scheme. So maybe reality is more than we know of it. So maybe we only see part of it. And maybe what we do see we don't see in high resolution.
Is that close?
While that's plausible, there are famous problems with 'reality in itself' understood as part of an exact model.
Let's get mundane.
I 'm pretty sure I still have $55 in my wallet, a 50 and a 5 dollar bill. But then I look and there's just a 20.
Most representation is not aimed at some impossible beyond.
'Getting clear about what's being said' may not be feasible from a transcendent pov which attempts to look at 'languaging' as behaviour rather than 'thought'. Such a pov is a bit like swimming without the buoyancy aids of fixed axioms.
Your own iteration of what I had sought to convey at the time of such inception, lies in subsistence, destitute of all manner of fault.
Let's get mundane; you are correct in your assessment, for which I wish to commend you.
Not to grant the implication that the notion of correctness(nor commendation) each are mundane in form. Though in my mind the latter of which ought not to be striven toward for its own sake, much unlike the former.
I do agree that meaning does not live in individual words. Meaning is more like a fluid that moves through words and time. I think you agree. It's risky to write 'meaning is X' because maybe the primary point is that we are always already doing it. We live in meaning(s). We already know. So any theory like 'meaning is a fluid' is 'really' an anti-theory. It directs individual investigation this way or that.
Quoting fresco
For me it's more like our neural network coming pre-trained by evolution to grasp the world as a system of objects 'in' a world (and not just spatially). Of course there is an artificial layer (our theory about it), but I think it's clear that dogs for instance recognize objects.
So maybe we have [biological <- cultural <- personal <- ] conceptual schemes & philosophy has trouble with the notion of intelligibility and the subject/object issue because these are deeper than the cultural scheme.
Within the cultural scheme we can notice the limits of the cultural scheme. We can find where it tends to glitch out.
Thank you. I say that's getting mundane in a good way. I didn't have to slowly translate it. It's your business, but you are asking quite a bit from strangers when you have too much fun with the poetry. These issues are tangled enough already.
I am glad to see lots of different personalities around though, so I don't mean to be unfriendly.
Nor do I hope for that consideration either; that much we can affirm on a basis of commonality. Irrespective of which it is clear to me that the vastness in breadth of your contribution remains incomparable to all my own, thus far. Owing to the prior, I stand in gratitude of your acknowledgement, for my sake and yours.
Right. And I've been drunk on Rorty's kool-aid, which is good kool-aid.
Anyone who can roll with Rorty will of course do just fine in ordinary communication. And we could use other names like Nietzsche to symbolize the insouciance.
I still think that the smoke clears and we are left with contradictions or sore spots. These don't really matter. Maybe Rorty and Nietzsche are primarily attitudes. They are to be digested more like musicians or comedians than as earnest theorists about reality, it seems to me. And I like them.
But I'd like to hear your thoughts if any on 'world.'
[quote=Wiki]
Heidegger scholar Nikolas Kompridis writes: "World disclosure refers, with deliberate ambiguity, to a process which actually occurs at two different levels. At one level, it refers to the disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as much to the disclosure of new horizons of meaning as to the disclosure of previously hidden or unthematized dimensions of meaning."
[/quote]
To me it doesn't matter that Heidegger said it but that once pointed out I actually find it there. (Heidegger is useful, but I don't like when the talk shifts from a concern with what is and how it is to a concern with what so and so says as the focus. )
1. Derrida (endorsed by Rorty) pointed out that the import of any assertion (pivileging) was contingent on its negation i.e. aporia was inevitable.
2. Genetic epistemology (Piaget's philosophical extension of his developmental psychology) suggests the limitless continuity/rolling scenario of state transitions between 'knowlege' and 'world' as each 'discovery' raises more questions.
3. Human language is 'generative' (Chomsky) which implies a potentially infinite set of meanings.
I agree that aporia is inevitable if we try to do traditional metaphysics on the subject and object.
I also agree with genetic epistemology, which sounds like Hegel without finale.
I also agree about an infinite set of meanings.
But what am I agreeing with you about if not the 'world' as a phenomenon or structure of communication or a 'how it is'?
If Rorty tells me I should abandon the lens metaphor, then why should I believe him? How is he going to make a case without describing reality in some way? A person could try to just lead by example and ignore metaphysics. But even if doing this we are going to get descriptions of reality.
If we try to do non-fiction at all, we are talking about reality. Just because a stiff or word-math approach to metaphysics leads to aporia doesn't mean IMO that we have transcended being in a world together.
[None of this is of much practical importance. I see that. But it's fun to try to get clear on. So I am offering the thoughts that softened my adoption of Rorty and other thinkers. The attitude is right, but they only cut the knot. They don't untie it.]
Thanks. I hope you stay around. I love reading philosophy, but there's no substitute for paraphrasing and debating, in my opinion.
As far as writing style goes, I also found places like these great for experimenting. To me there's no substitute for just trying stuff and seeing how it goes.
My intent rests on abidance toward the same form of sentiment, in the hope that it confer betterment in apprehension, greater than that which would bear truth were we to act otherwise.
I can merely offer ever more an extent of affirmation than before for that of which you have yielded much advocacy since, as we regard each, as a matter of consensus; absent of all disputation amongst ourselves in its every aspect.
(Thanks man, you as well.)
I would say you are agreeing with a shifting world and shifting self where 'is-ness' amounts to little more than a snapshot memory or a projection in the mind. This matters little unless we are concerned with 'meaning' or 'purose of life', in which some sort of permanent anchor is being sought as in most religions or rigid political preferences. Unfortunately, the majority of the species may not have the time or intellect to understand this, and tribal conflicts will continue, perhaps resulting in eventual species extinction.
Yeah I think we have the same attitude and sense of transcendence of dogma. We embrace a dynamic, shifting reality.
And, indeed, our human journey is probably back into the void. We form groups in terms of a feared-hated-despised other, and the same individualism that allows for explosive creativity also keep us from working together. And then we die like dogs after a short life and can't be bothered with the long-term consequences of our actions.
My response: try to act decently and also laugh with gods now and then.
Agreed.
Yes, and unfortunately the current conditions are looking ripe for an escalation of global conflict such as we have never before witnessed. I doubt that species extinction is likely but radical population reduction is on the cards and much less eventually than one would hope, I think.
Your pessimism is well understood. And the 'Gaia hypothesis' seems to imply the inevitability of wars as a limiting factor on population.
Uh-oh. We might not exist anymore :scream: . Yet, I pity the one who doesn't not exist, what a fuckfest :monkey: .
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
Doesn't not exist? I couldn't possibly fail to disagree with you less! :joke:
Long thread, but a clear OP to be directly spoken to.
Strictly speaking, no objects are identical with themselves over time. What remains unchanged over time are certain properties that find expression in the laws of conservation of energy, momentum, electrical charge, etc., these necessarily being closer to the basis of all.
It appears to us, though, that the world consists of parts that have continued from “a moment ago”, and thus still retain their identity in time; yet, matter really only appears secondarily as a congealed potentiality, a congealed gestalt, as it were, a hub of relations.
Note that the fundamental level,of 'measurement' is 'nominal' (i.e. naming or asigning identity)
What helped my sanity on this was when I started to try and understand what absolutely nothing was, as it was the only thing I could imagine that could exist without an explanation. I figured it could not have physics (what mechanisms are driving the behavior described by those laws?), or properties (what is holding onto that property, or lack thereof?). And, well, I could not say that Thing A exists inside a realm of absolute nothingness, nor could I say that Thing A does not exist. There was nothing that was holding the existence of Thing A, or lack thereof.
This got me thinking about existence differently than my brain was trained for. It seemed relative, in that given any sort of hypothetical realm that included a description of something we might see as "existence" for this realm to exist, then that realm exists, but only with respect to itself. If the hypothetical description of this realm includes mechanisms to allow for things such as our laws of physics, and for existence (with respect to that realm or with respect to something within that realm), and allows for universe to big bang out and form people sitting on some planet thinking about it, then that that could make sense to me as what we have.
Existence is absolute in the context that everything can be designated as such.
I think this has to do with point of view. We accept that human selves have a point of view and that animals have a point of view, however, can there be a point of view from everywhere?
The pov scenario tends to imply a dichotomy between 'observer' and 'observed' as self contained entities. I suggest that the 'interaction event' involves co-extension of observer and observed, i.e. 'thinger',and 'thing' are instantaneously co-established (In a Heideggarian sense of Dasein and present-at-hand.)
Indeed this could be the 'view from everywhere' !:wink:
Sounds like panpsychism.
All this assumes a representalist view of language. The nonrepresentalist view takes 'languaging' to be a behavior in which the meaning of words like 'mind' 'reality' and "existence' cannot be extricated from the ephemeral coordinative roles they play in transient contexts.
Sure, things are repetitive events.
Hence, there are repetitive events.
Hence, there exist repetitive events.
But what makes 'em relative?
Note that 'observation' involves 'verbalization'...assigning 'thinghood'...we are not considering interactions that go unnoticed, nor are we going beyond the operations of 'the minds eye'. There are no unobserved' silent falling trees in the forest ...saying it has already implies observation in the minds eye !
Words re-present events...allow for re-experiencing them,(Vorstelling in German)
Are you observing the silent falling trees in Iraq, right now?
Well, because they'd not be silent, yeah.
That would have to be some freaky physics.
If there are no absolutes, there isn't anything to philosophically find out. It's all blah, blah, blah.
Why would you be talking about us?
'Mind is existence' means only 'mind is [a part of] existence', therefore these words are not equated, but rather related as a part and the whole. If the whole of something is existence than its part is existence two.
So phrases like 'he changed his mind' is a semantically useful way of conveying 'he altered his position about something'. A proposed concept of 'mental substance' has no utility for me, even if it does for you. So it 'exists' for you but not me. At this point, consensus might be sought to establish utility.
Anything that cannot be easily measured with absolute precision will be regarded as relative. A ways of measuring things are always to some degree relative. The human mind's ability to reconcile the truth is always marked with some degree of relativity. This does not mean there is not absolute truth, it just means absolute truth is very hard to come by.
I leave all absolutes, particularly 'truth', in the hands of religionists.
Not from itself and the things around it, though.
I read Rovelli. What's thought of as 'things' are events, some of which can be very long.
If we can show that there are no absolutes, then we'll be close to knowing a heck of a lot, with not anything intrinsic being so in relational totality.
I'll take it that since there can't be anything outside of Totality that Totality must be relational.
Perhaps the two non-existent absolutes, if true, as None and One, say, as then being boundaries that cannot be reached, indicate that Totality is thus somehow in between as…? Fractionals? Whatever that means!
More useful might be Lakoff's views on 'metaphor' which he relates to bodily experience.
Useless to talk about no absolutes and relations, due to too many metaphors but useful for hard reality addressing?
I still have a theory…
Insofar that humans have similar bodies, whose experience may form the bedrock of 'metaphor', they may share the same 'reality'.
Wittgenstein: "If a lion could speak, we would not understand him".
A feather in what conditions/what context?
Yes, it produces sound. Sound is just pressure waves caused by vibrations in a medium, which any falling item (not in a vacuum) would produce.
So, is it silent?
Inaudible to us? And the feather you mean? Sure, unless we manipulate it to be able to hear it (for example, we could mic it and change the frequency). But why would we be focusing on our sensory experience in questions like this?
Again, sound is just pressure waves caused by vibrations in a medium. Loosely, though, we could say it's "just vibrations," yes. That's what sound is.
No, that is sound. Your subjective experience of sound is your subjective experience of those pressure waves by vibrations in a medium. It's important not to conflate your subjective experience and what your subjective experience is of.
Based on what else, other than a consolidation through interpretation?
Again, that's what we're subjectively responding to. Those pressure waves in a medium. They reach our ears and as long as our ears work--we're not deaf, and as long as they're in a frequency range that our ears can respond to, our ears respond to the pressure waves, they send information to our brains, and we have the subjective sound experiences that we do.
No, it's your subjective experience of sound.
Do you think that your subjective experience of Mount Everest is identical to Mount Everest?
Obviously. Otherwise, on your terms, it's just a bunch of atoms.
So this is just turning into you saying that you're not a realist?
You just said that "obviously" you think that your subjective experience of Mount Everest is identical to Mount Everest.
What are the implications of no absolutes on our notions of God, free will, meaning, and more?
thats fair. Medieval people very often believed things that weren't true but would be proven wrong 100s of years later.
For 'free will', 'meaning' etc they do not apply since there are no limits to the contexts in which they occur.
Can that dichotomy take proper account of that which is existentially dependent upon and consists in/of both, and is thus... neither?
To exist is to have an affect/effect. It is to interact. All things thought, believed, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered are relative, in a common-sense-sort-of-way.
Existence is always marked by interaction.
And yet things exist prior to us.
:brow:
Yup.
Either existence is not existentially dependent upon our notion of 'time' or we've gotten something horribly wrong in our notion of 'time'.
(Your logic above appears faulty...' That much is undeniable.'.....No, that doesn't make sense from the relativistic pov....Things require thingers)
Back later.
NB According to Rovelli, we have got things wrong about 'time'.
Some things exist prior to us, and thus prior to our reports.
Are you denying that?
I doubt if there are primitive 'thingers' in philosophy today, even in phenomenology, having a specific method of analysis. Therefore the concept of a thing needs a more precise definition. The thing as I see it is a phenomenon; the thing as I believe, theorize is some quantity of energy, God's creation or what comes to a theoretical/religious/mystical mind. 'Unthinging' of our reality doesn't do anything good to it.
You are using 'existence' as an absolute. The thesis here is that 'existence' is a word used by humans regarding what is 'a useful concept'....nothing more ! Time is a 'useful concept' in social contexts but not in frontier physics which demotes it to a 'psychological construct'. Similarly 'science based' comments can be made wbout concepts like 'mind', phenomenon' and even 'causality'.
IMO we need a dump a whole bunch of axioms about 'existence' which might require moving from 'definitions' to 'neologisms' (as emplified by Heidegger's attempt).
'Reality'...? That is just another word used in social contexts to denote agreement about 'what is the case'. The fact that humans have much physically, psychologically and socially in common, implies they are often in agreement. Actually, the word tends not to arise at all except when potential disagreement occurs.
I am using common sense.
I refer you back to the OP point about the Einstein Bohr debate. Einstein took a basic step,away from 'common sense' in his deconstruction of lay views of 'time', but as a 'realist' he could only go so far, and refused to accept quantum theory 'illogical' notions like 'nonlocality' which he called 'spooky'. It turns out he was emprically 'wrong'.
Finally, I ask you what 'common sense' would make of Brian Cox's sub-title for his book on 'Quantum Physics'....'Whatever CAN happen, DOES happen !'
How do you define existence?
If you define it relative to the individual experience, then it is relative to that one person. If you define it relative to the collective experience, then it is relative to that group. But if you define it relative to the total spatio-temporal configuration of the objects in the universe, then most people would call that absolute.
Now, I am not a physicist, but I do know that there are quite a few contending (equivalent, to the extent of their empirical confirmation) QM interpretations. Some allow you to make a claim that may never be verified - i.e. they are counterfactual.
I can tell you - this coin has "99%" chance to land tails, and if it lands heads, I can say that the result confirmed with my expectations. If I tell you (for the same coin) that it now changed and has "99%" chance to land heads, and it lands tails, I can take this as validation again. If the coin obeys consistent probabilistic behavior, the results will almost surely provide intuitive confirmation after infinite amount of time. But almost surely is not surely (and this is very important point). And infinite time is a lot of time. And no confidence can be extracted from observations performed without apriori model. (You need to have started with evolutionary trait that provides initial intuitions.) So, I am skeptical that we understand probability (other then according to our definitions), less so physical non-determinism. At this early stage, I think QM is a very nasty philosophical tool. We know how to use it and probability to our benefit, but that is far from complete understanding.
Regarding relativity, again, I'm not a physicist, but it seems to me that it offers a switch from the prior definitions, rather then a reform of our reality. Instead of measuring using a single device, or particular global periodic phenomenon, it measures relative to the local physical processes. Which, makes much more sense physically, but doesn't preclude any measurement of time or space one could wish. In fact, the theory doesn't really afford "ontological" space and time, merely parameters that trace the physical relations.