Was Hume right about causation?
Hume said that it was possible for events to not have causes. But what does that even mean? When we say that an event is uncaused, do we mean that, before the event in question occurred, it did not have a high probability of occurring? For instance, if a flame flickers to the left (in the absence of any breeze or external movement) perhaps we’d say that it had no cause for doing so. Because the flame could have just as easily flickered to the right or in any other direction. But wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that the flame’s leftward flickering was caused by the tendency of fire to flicker unpredictably? Maybe Hume would deny that events necessarily have probabilities of occurring before they occur. But if they do occur, then it follows that they are possible. And either all possible events are equally possible, or some have higher probabilities of occurring than others (anywhere between 0=impossible and 1=necessary). It seems obviously false that each possible event is equally likely to occur at all times, with each event having an instantaneous probability of 1/n, n being the total number of possible events. But even if it were true, we could still say that the events in this chaotic hypothetical world were caused by the universal principle of equal probability.
Comments (46)
From A comes B, but they are conjoined together in mutual inclusiveness, they're constantly conjoined together. Whenever we encounter A, B must be present. Likewise, the statement is in equal value to saying 'when we find B, A must be present'. From there, we are fumbled with a weak form of necessity. Consequently, inductive reason becomes illogical but obviously that is not the case - however, if things are beyond our finite grasp; like the universe, infinity or God, inductive reason cannot define a logical stance towards these sorts of things.
So things that are beyond our contingent, finite grasp are measured by possibility; or epistemic justification. They cannot be measured by inductive reasoning.
But when it comes to knowing the relationship between a cause and its effect, no such logical necessity applies, as what we really observe is only the habitual or recurring conjunction of cause and effect. We customarily call that 'causal' but it doesn't have the same binding necessity as deductive proofs. So how can we claim to know that there is such a relationship? That is his challenge.
It was just this statement which Kant said 'awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers', so have a look at Kant's response, in which he claims that he
(my bolds).
In other words, the validity of such principles as 'the relation of cause and effect', is said to be one of the foundational elements of knowledge itself. So where Hume, the empiricist, presumes that all knowledge is derived from experience only, Kant is showing that, in order for experience to be intelligible at all, such fundamental categories as the relation of cause and effect must obtain. This is closely related to Kant's famous dictum 'Percepts without concepts are empty; concepts without percepts are blind' and his so-called 'copernican revolution in philosophy'.
(However it might be noted that in recent analytic philosophy [e.g. here], Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions has been criticized, however I think it's important to understand it first.)
The existence of natural law does not imply uncaused, contingent things can't exist. Adolf Grünbaum makes the case here.
Perhaps Hume means to say that causation isn't a necessary relationship but wouldn't that be repeating the obvious, afterall isn't causality induction?
On the contrary, Hume appeared to support the notion of a necessary connection between events in nature. All that he said about uncertainty and probability had to do with our knowledge of those connections, as others have pointed out.
Wayfarer has it right...
I think you need induction to determine which causal relations exist and how they occur, but the fact that all events have causes is deductive.
Quoting Relativist
Grunbaum's argument against the principle of sufficient reason only works if we take PSR to mean that every event has an explanation that not only suffices explain it but also precludes the possibility that any other event could have occurred in its place. I think this version of PSR goes too far. We can claim that everything needs an explanation without being determinists.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's true that we don't perceive causal necessitation directly through our senses. But if we observe that various types of events are constantly conjoined, can't we use a priori mathematical and modal concepts to demonstrate that it is extremely improbable that these constant conjunctions occur by random chance?
Kant thought that causation was an a priori concept through which all sensuous experience had to be filtered. I think he believed that without the concept of cause, we'd be unable to perceive time, as there would be no order to its moments. For instance, you wouldn't be able to process a basic phenomena like walking if you didn't understand that each step caused you to move forward and your position one second ago was therefore ahead of your position two seconds ago. Thus, by his logic, the only reason we understand the world as ordered by causality is that if we didn't, intelligible experience would be impossible. But I think the causal order we observe goes above and beyond what would be necessary just to allow us to differentiate between moments in time. We've discovered highly intricate principles of cause and effect both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. These principles aren't prerequisites of experience. We've been experiencing things for thousands of years without knowing about microbiology or general relativity. So why are we capable of making scientific discoveries and using them to great effect (e.g. modern technology)? To me, it seems like the best answer is that causal relations we infer into our observations actually exist in reality.
Quoting StreetlightX
I'm pretty sure you are wrong, although most of what you said is correct. You're right that Hume's main point was to show that we cannot establish that necessary causal relations exist. But in order to make this point, he argued that there's no reason to believe that events couldn't occur without causes.
Quoting Maw
Yes, Hume was trying to show that we can't have knowledge of causes. But if he's correct, then it follows that causes don't necessarily exist in reality, at least as far as we know.
Produce the quote. We can take it from there. As far as I know, 'to make this point', he denied the principle of the uniformity of nature; or at least, denied that such a principle could be upheld. Not that 'there's no reason to believe that events couldn't occur without causes.'
"We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principle" (Treatise of Human Nature, Book1, Part 3, Section 3)
I was trying to prove him wrong on this point in the OP. You are right about epistemology vs. ontology. He is talking about what we can prove and not what exists. But I think that if we can prove something to exist, then it does exist.
Not axiomatic? :chin:
That's true, but I also have to agree with other posters that only deduction can be known for certain, and that Hume was right to say, in cases of inference, there can be no absolute certainty that causality exists.
We need to remember Hume is talking about the necessity of [i]a[/I] cause. The problem here isn't a question of proving existence. We do that every time we encounter something. Each time we encounter a concurrence of events, we've observed/proven they existed together (as fast as that goes).
The necessity of a cause asks for more. It's not just a proof of existence, but a demonstration that a presence of one state can only lead to another.
In other words, it is not about what exists, but rather what doesn't exist . If I'm dealing with necessary causality, I'm trying to the presence of something resulted in something happening rather than not. My goal is to say every time this thing occurs, it will mean this other state MUST occur rather than not.
This is the impossibility, to have or show this necessary connection. Since any causal relationship is defined by its effect, none can be stated as necessary in terms of a cause. Any cause we might consider is caught without the existence to make it case.
Will I wake up tomorrow? The fact causes might exist doesn't tell me. It's not yet defined what those causes, if any, lead to. We cannot yet say whether my heart has caused me to live tomorrow or not. I might be alive (heart working as it is right now). Or I might be dead (heart stopped).
The nature of any cause has to wait for how I exist in the future. A necessity from cause alone is impossible.
But we still validate all of those discoveries against experience. That is what experiment and observation does, after all; you predict what will happen, and then you observe what happens, to either confirm or falsify your prediction. Experience has a fundamental role in all that. Besides, one of Kant's basic questions is how is it possible to arrive at synthetic a priori judgements, which surely are fundamental to all mathematical physics.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Yes, but - we have had very many contentious debates on this forum about the philosophical implications of physics. I don't want to divert this thread down that rabbit-hole, except to note that it's precisely the reality of the so-called fundamental particles which has been called into question by physics (hence the profusion of science titles about quantum mechanics with sub-titles about 'the quest for reality'.)
So, science makes predictions that work - no contest there. But that can be accomodated in terms of instrumentalism, without presuming anything about what 'actually exists in reality'. So, I'd just be mindful of the implications of presuming 'what exists' on that basis. There are still many open questions.
Quoting ernestm
That is the reason why Hume is categorised with the sceptics. It is why Russell says in HWP that Hume essentially called into question the notion of scientific certainty.
Conceptually the difference between correlation and causation is that causation involves some kind of force, which can be conceptualized as an exchange of energy, and in fact that notion is absolutely central to the sciences. Where do we derive our idea of force or energy? Don't we feel those in our own bodies? We feel ourselves pushing and being pushed by other things. We feel the force and resistance of gravity, the cooling of the wind and the burning of fire. We know directly, as directly as we can know anything at all, that these natural forces act on our bodies.
Another point is that there is a difference between accepting the idea that events are caused on account of in a sense knowing (not with deductive certainty of course, but by a familiarity of which there can be no genuine doubt) that causal forces are at work in our world and knowing precisely what those causes and forces are. If things are globally interconnected then we might be talking, not about exclusive causes, but merely about more or less proximal causes. And further, there is Aristotle's four categories of causes to be considered. As Kant pointed out in response to Hume, the question of causation has to do with the synthetic a priori logic of our common experience.
Judgements of experience, or judgements with empirical content, are synthetic, yes, but they have nothing to do with experience if their content be a priori, or contain an absolutely necessary relation, re: mathematics.
Would you mind, and how would I be wrong, if I re-wrote your statement as: Kant pointed out to Hume, the question of causation has to do with the synthetic a priori logic of our pure understanding, and in no way our common experience, which had thus far been described by mere habit.
“....But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely wanting. (I do not here have the advantage of looking around in the field of experience)....” (A9, B13)
Not sure what you meant by a priori logic. Perhaps you intended it to stand for the categories, which holds cause and effect in the category of relation. While these apply to cognitions with respect to experience, they are derived a priori from conceptions alone.
Bottom line.....Kant was saying Hume misunderstood the power and function of the faculty of understanding.
Just a thought.........
Did he? I thought he was famed for his scepticism.
My understanding is that the synthetic a priori conditions of and for possible experience requires prior experience in order to establish just what are the necessary general conditions of and for experience. Once it is established (by experience and the phenomenological examination of experience) just what is essential to all coherent experience (that it be spatial, temporal, causal etc) is a priori in the sense that further actual experiences do not need to be examined in order to know that these conditions will necessarily apply.
Problem is......no experience or possible experience, from which that kind of knowledge arises or may arise, will ever connect the concept of cause with the concept of effect essentially, or which is the same thing...necessarily. Put another way: immediate knowledge of cause is not given by knowledge of effect.
Once logically established, yes, but such establishment is the purview of reason, not common experience.
And yet a human without language - and thus without reason - can and does learn that touching fire causes pain. The attribution and/or recognition of causality does not require reason. It only requires common experience. It only requires drawing a correlation between the behaviour and the subsequent onset of pain at the location of the body that actually touched the fire.
That is to think about the fire and to believe that touching it causes pain.
It only requires pre-linguistic thought/belief.
No language required.
Hume's edifice is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of the attribution/recognition of causal relationships/causality.
Causality is prior to our account of it. The subsequent attribution and/or misattribution of causality is as well. The former can be wrong. That is, we can misattribute causality. Causality cannot be wrong. Rather it is simply a part of the ever-changing universe, and thus not only an integral part of what actually happened but necessary for anything at all to happen.
Causality existed long before we become aware of it.
All reason is existentially dependent upon rudimentary thought/belief. All experience is as well. There is no reason completely devoid of experience and/or emotion.
Any such notion is akin to a brain in vat; such notions are based upon logical possibility(coherent use of definition) alone. There are no brains in vats prior to language use for "brains in vats" is a name for a particular kind of thought experiment. That experiment is itself existentially dependent upon thinking about thought/belief. As such, it cannot glean knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to language.
Causality. Meaning. Truth. Thought. Belief.
All of those things existed in their entirety prior to account of them. Any account to the contrary is wrong.
The problem with some logical possibility is that they stand in direct contradiction to the way things actually are. All talk about apriori is bunk. All talk about reason without emotion is bunk.
A priori reason is equivalent to the most delicate of apple pies without apples. It is a brain in a vat. A brain cannot do anything by itself. Sensory stimulation/interaction is necessary in the sense of existential dependency. A brain in a vat cannot think for the same reason that an apple is not enough for an apple pie. A priori reason is itself existentially dependent upon experience. There is no reason absent and/or devoid of experience. Reasoning in the manner set out by Hume and Kant is a kind of experience that requires thinking about thought/belief.
I'm not approaching you in a combative stance, by the way... My approach sucks. The above reflects some of our past discourse. I think we agree much more than we disagree.
Causality does not.
We can learn about that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Language can be used to impede our efforts or help facilitate our success in doing so.
No problems; I didn't read this response as combative. My definition of "a priori" is simply that which we know that experience must look like in order to be experience at all. Of course this knowledge requires prior experience and phenomenological examination of that experience in order to discover what the general common attributes of all experiences are.
Quoting creativesoul
And here's an example: I agree!
Quoting Dusty of Sky
As you can see, Hume didn't say anything of the sort. His thesis is that we can never demonstrate the existence of a cause. Again, Hume wrote about human understanding - how we come to know, whether we can know - not about the nature of things. He didn't actually have much to say about metaphysics and ontology, he was mainly concerned with epistemology.
In a way, his epistemology was his metaphysics - what is known is identical to what is.
I am by no means an expert on Hume, but I don't think this is true. Where does he say this?
He doesn't say anything like that. This is simply one way I interpret his philosophy as a whole, especially as taken in its historical context.
Close enough.
Half the world thinks causality is a construct of pure reason, half the world thinks causality is an intrinsic property or attribute of Nature thus “existed long before we became aware of it”.
Chalk me up in Column 1.
Don't forget that pure reason is a construct of Nature, and existed long before we became aware of it. :grin:
Aye. Methinks ‘tis a mighty fine line betwixt conditions for and causality of.
How did you come to know about and understand causation - on your own by trying to integrate all of your experiences into a consistent and coherent whole, or by hearing others mention it? It seems that any refutation of causation refutes itself.
In logic, what is the relationship between some evidence, or some premise, and its conclusion, if not a causal relationship? Does not the conclusion follow from the premises? How can you even say you are being logical without causation? You must refer to reasons (causes) to support your conclusion (the effect). Logic is a causal process.
If causation "isn't" the case then solipsism necessarily is the case. And even then causation would exist if I (the solipsist) were to think of it and causation would still be the case because my thinking causes its existence. The solipsist would be the first cause.
The pre-linguistic child can learn that touching fire causes pain. It does not require repetitive behaviour. Hume was wrong. The child does not have pure reason but does attribute/recognize causality.
Yes knowledge of many sorts requires thinking about thought/belief... Language.
Nicely put. :up:
But the learning you describe relies on memory, the memory that fire gave rise to pain in the past, and therefore might do so again, if we get close enough to the flames.So what is it that our memory stores, in this example? I suggest it is words, or some functional equivalent. Something that allows us to describe fire and the pain of burns, so that when we recall the memory, we can make sense of it. So I think language, in some sense, is required for memory to work. :chin:
The reverse is actually kind of true: his position on causality is metaphysical and has profound consequences for our accounts of how metaphysical principals relation to the world and our knowledable.
Hume account of causality more or less states our logic and ideas gave no power over the world. The world will do what it does no matter if we understand, it makes sense to us us or it breaks our beloved ideas if how the world must work.
In terms of our metaphysics this has severe consequences. Any form of essentialism is untenable. Possiblity must be taken to seperate from the actual, allowing basically anything to happen. We cannot pose any sort of eternal, omnipotent actor in tradition sense, since there might always be another who destroys them or could beat them.
I'm sure I could find a few more. In this respect, I would say Hume is absolutely a metaphysician because he's really dealing with logical relationships to our epistemology and the world.
It's the other wait around.
Language is composed of words and words are just sounds and scribbles - sensory impressions - empirical.
Pre-linguistic children are not mentioned in my particular library. I doubt there’s anything I could learn from them. You know......they being not all that talkative.
Recognition of causality was never the issue.
Sounds and scribbles that carry meaning, and thus become able to be used as a communications tool. :chin: