The Fine-Tuning Argument
I would like to start a discussion about the so-called Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) for God (or, more generally, Design - but let's not be coy: a sentient being that creates the universe or engineers its basic features qualifies as a god, if not necessarily the God of the Bible).
Personally, I am not aware of any successful FTA. Indeed, the most common problem I see when people casually invoke fine-tuning to support some deistic position is that no argument is actually made after certain scientific premises are stated, other than perhaps an analogy or two. The few more rigorous attempts to formulate an argument as a plausible inference also fail, in my opinion. So instead of presenting an FTA myself, I invite its proponents to do so in this thread. But here is some background to begin with.
First, here is a recent article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Fine-Tuning. The article covers the physical background, fine-tuning arguments for design and some responses to them, as well as anthropic and fine-tuning issues in cosmology and particle physics. It also features an extensive bibliography.
Next I'll state the premise of FTA in its most common form (call it the physical premise):
When the constants and boundary values of fundamental physics* are treated as free parameters of the model, only a narrow range of those values results in a universe where life as we know it is possible. In other words, fundamental constants and boundary values appear to be fine-tuned for life.
* such as the Standard Model of particle physics, which is the basis or the point of departure for modern cosmology.
For example, small variations in quark masses can drastically alter the conditions of nucleosynthesis in the early universe, destroying the delicate resonances that are necessary for producing carbon and other elements that form the basis of complex organic chemistry. Variations in the value of the fine-structure constant can imperil the existence of matter itself. Many other examples of fine-tuning can be found in the literature.
There is some controversy over specific claims of fine-tuning. Some apparent coincidences turn out to be much less surprising when more fundamental factors are considered - which points to the possibility that future physics, for which the Standard Model is an effective low-energy theory, may go in the direction of further unification, making previously arbitrary coincidences a necessary consequence of the theory. But the question will still arise: How fine-tuned is the theory itself? Other constraints turn out to be not as restrictive as claimed when alternative possibilities and compensatory factors are considered. Varying multiple parameters at the same time can produce different, but still complex and possibly life-supporting universes. Still, it seems likely that the total volume of the parameter space that allows for a life-supporting universe is small - so small indeed as to give rise to another sort of problem for fine-tuning arguments: course-tuning.
The problem is that seemingly impressive number coincidences don't actually matter for the usual probabilistic formulation of the FTA: the "tuning" could be many orders of magnitude more coarse without making any difference to the argument. Indeed, any finite volume of the life-permitting parameter space is effectively flattened by the infinite size of the total parameter space, and resulting degenerate probabilities "blow up" formal inferences. But I don't think that this problem necessarily kills the FTA; after all, inference schemes based on standard probability calculus are just some of the ways to formalize rational inference. Asymptotic behavior of relevant probabilistic expressions suggests that they are on the right track, singularities notwithstanding, and indeed some proponents of the FTA have already attempted to treat the problem with non-standard probabilistic analyses. Still, this consideration takes the edge off the numerology that makes the FTA so intuitively appealing to some people.
That said, I suggest we set aside most such concerns over the empirical status of the physical premise [varying fundamental physical laws, constants and boundary conditions nearly always results in a universe that is incompatible with life]. There are also interesting controversies over anthropic reasoning and fine-tuning in physics, but they are best left for another forum. Here I am more interested in what an FTA proponent can actually do with the physical premise, which we can take as given for the purpose of the discussion. Is "fine-tuning for life" in need of explanation? (The answer is not as uncontroversial as it might seem.) And are theistic explanations best suited for the job?
Personally, I am not aware of any successful FTA. Indeed, the most common problem I see when people casually invoke fine-tuning to support some deistic position is that no argument is actually made after certain scientific premises are stated, other than perhaps an analogy or two. The few more rigorous attempts to formulate an argument as a plausible inference also fail, in my opinion. So instead of presenting an FTA myself, I invite its proponents to do so in this thread. But here is some background to begin with.
First, here is a recent article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Fine-Tuning. The article covers the physical background, fine-tuning arguments for design and some responses to them, as well as anthropic and fine-tuning issues in cosmology and particle physics. It also features an extensive bibliography.
Next I'll state the premise of FTA in its most common form (call it the physical premise):
When the constants and boundary values of fundamental physics* are treated as free parameters of the model, only a narrow range of those values results in a universe where life as we know it is possible. In other words, fundamental constants and boundary values appear to be fine-tuned for life.
* such as the Standard Model of particle physics, which is the basis or the point of departure for modern cosmology.
For example, small variations in quark masses can drastically alter the conditions of nucleosynthesis in the early universe, destroying the delicate resonances that are necessary for producing carbon and other elements that form the basis of complex organic chemistry. Variations in the value of the fine-structure constant can imperil the existence of matter itself. Many other examples of fine-tuning can be found in the literature.
There is some controversy over specific claims of fine-tuning. Some apparent coincidences turn out to be much less surprising when more fundamental factors are considered - which points to the possibility that future physics, for which the Standard Model is an effective low-energy theory, may go in the direction of further unification, making previously arbitrary coincidences a necessary consequence of the theory. But the question will still arise: How fine-tuned is the theory itself? Other constraints turn out to be not as restrictive as claimed when alternative possibilities and compensatory factors are considered. Varying multiple parameters at the same time can produce different, but still complex and possibly life-supporting universes. Still, it seems likely that the total volume of the parameter space that allows for a life-supporting universe is small - so small indeed as to give rise to another sort of problem for fine-tuning arguments: course-tuning.
The problem is that seemingly impressive number coincidences don't actually matter for the usual probabilistic formulation of the FTA: the "tuning" could be many orders of magnitude more coarse without making any difference to the argument. Indeed, any finite volume of the life-permitting parameter space is effectively flattened by the infinite size of the total parameter space, and resulting degenerate probabilities "blow up" formal inferences. But I don't think that this problem necessarily kills the FTA; after all, inference schemes based on standard probability calculus are just some of the ways to formalize rational inference. Asymptotic behavior of relevant probabilistic expressions suggests that they are on the right track, singularities notwithstanding, and indeed some proponents of the FTA have already attempted to treat the problem with non-standard probabilistic analyses. Still, this consideration takes the edge off the numerology that makes the FTA so intuitively appealing to some people.
That said, I suggest we set aside most such concerns over the empirical status of the physical premise [varying fundamental physical laws, constants and boundary conditions nearly always results in a universe that is incompatible with life]. There are also interesting controversies over anthropic reasoning and fine-tuning in physics, but they are best left for another forum. Here I am more interested in what an FTA proponent can actually do with the physical premise, which we can take as given for the purpose of the discussion. Is "fine-tuning for life" in need of explanation? (The answer is not as uncontroversial as it might seem.) And are theistic explanations best suited for the job?
Comments (168)
These two seems partially at odds:
The constants found in physics (and similar sciences) are but part of such an assessment. We'd have to take entirely different ontologies/structures into account as well, or we'd still just be looking at ours. (For that matter, we don't change ?, and expect to find circles.) Not a simple assessment to make; how would we come up with such alternate universes...? This would converge on considering modal realism.
Following evidence + current models thereof, life, as we know it, has a window somewhere between formation of solar systems and the beginning of the degenerate era, ever marching towards heat death (cf expansion of the universe). Heat death involves an unfathomable amount of time (even compared to 14 billion years), ruled by the lonely photon in deep cold.
In the meantime, life seems rare, at least from what we currently know. Our present universe is largely indifferent/hostile to life. It's vast, open spaces and lots of radiation, with rocks here and there, gases and stars, and the occasional black hole and supernova blast. Life on Earth requires free energy from the Sun to stay around; energy that temporarily partakes in food chains before dispersing ever on (entropy + expansion).
Isn't it somewhat self-elevating to think of life as a pre-determined purpose of the universe...? Or more specifically, like some seem to think, us? :o Anthropocentric self-importance (even narcissism)? Douglas Adams' puddle comes to mind.
What are the chances of a hypothetical über-designer coming up with our universe?
If we're getting into probability calculations, then let's calculate (or at least assess) the probability on the 2[sup]nd[/sup] of January in the year 601, that we'd be chatting here, at this moment, under these circumstances, with these words. In order to get an impression of how this works, and to compare, let's also make the calculation for the year -816. We might invoke quantum mechanics and general relativity, just for the heck of it. :)
Texas sharpshooter fallacy (Wikipedia)
http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/FINETLAY.HTM
I guess I don't see much difference between FTA and other forms of the teleological argument -- is that an unfair characterization, in your view?
firstly, i am a theist, but not a proponent of FTA as an argument for the existence of God, because it is in conflict with skeptical theism - that said.
The allure of FTA to many theists, is the fractal basis of the conditions are derived from, and therefor consistent with science. This has an obvious advantage for theist who are used to having to argue outside of science
Quoting tim wood
The point is the fine tuning argument assumes life has to be life as we know it and that is where the fine tuning argument goes wrong. Different numbers lead to different types of universes, each with their own carbon-type element that could lead to life. The inhabitants of such universes could be making the same argument like the fine tuning argument without realizing that a different set of numbers led to our universe with carbon-based life-forms.
The FTA starts with the observations that there exist sentient beings like us, and in order for these beings to exist the constraints on the universe are incredibly precise, and for all these precise criteria to happen becomes incredibly unlikely. And then asks for which hypothesis for these observations have a higher probability.
Thanks. All I want to say is that life may not necesarily be carbon-based. In fact there's no contradiction in there being pure energy-based lifr forms.
While our universe is fine-tuned for carbon life forms, other universes may be fine-tuned for silicon or iron or whathaveyou. Our universe may not be the only type that can harbor life.
What we have then is the denizens of each universe making a fine-tuning argument about ''lifr as we know it''. In short our universe isn't special enough as is made out to be by the FTA.
That is just a restatement on the randomness or multi universe hypothesis as alternatives for design. And in the FTA the observation is about the sentient beings like us. The evidence for other sentient beings like us existing in some other place in the universe we experience, or in some other theorized other universe has no more basis than a designer. It just comes down to which hypothesis one feels is more probable than another.
For many, on a scale of 0 to 1 the existence of God is near zero, these folks will find any hypothesis other than a designer more likely.
For others the existence of God is near 1 and they will find any hypothesis other than a designer improbable
And both ends of the continuum are reasonable, meaning are not in conflict with fact, and each conclusion is based on faith - one camp a theistic faith, the other a faith in science/man.
FTA is not a proof of the existence of God, and many including me find it in conflict with skeptical theism. What I find most interesting in it however is the extend atheists and hard agnostics will go elevate science to religion in order to to avoid an acknowledgement that given our current actual provable science, design may well be the best hypothesis. And my aside is the same individuals given any similar set of circumstances as FTA that did not involve God would easily rush to design as the best hypothesis.
Depending on the level of modeling and level of detail, there may be other "fine-tuned" numbers - some are briefly discussed in the SEP article referenced in the OP, more can be found elsewhere. (There are 20-30 constants in the Standard Model of particle physics, and then there are relativistic constants and cosmological initial conditions.)
But before we go looking for a solution, we need to establish motivation: is there a problem to be solved? Is there something that cries out for an explanation? That is far from obvious. That the universe is suited for life is a truism. That the universe could have been otherwise (at least as a conceivable possibility) is also pretty uncontroversial. The only sticking point is this alleged fine-tuning - sensitive dependence of life-permitting conditions on certain parameters of fundamental physics.
Strictly speaking, they are not parameters - in the theories where these numbers are found they are givens, brute facts that go along with equations and other postulates of those theories. But if we treat them as free parameters, as knobs that we can turn this way and that (and why should we?), then there is a sensitive dependence - although just how sensitive is also not so clear - see above.
In physical cosmology and particle physics (Inflational cosmology, String theories, quantum field theory), where the problem to be solved is theory choice, anthropic reasoning and (no-)fine-tuning considerations appear in the context of typicality and naturalness (see chapters 4.4 and 5 in the SEP article for an overview). These are rather controversial epistemic criteria, but at least here we understand what the stakes are and what the reasoning is. Whereas when the problem of fine-tuning is stated out of such context, it is not even clear why it is a problem in the first place.
It undermines the sentiment so eloquently expressed in the opening of Bertrand Russell's famous essay, published right at the beginning of the 20th Century, A Free Man's Worship, which says 'That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms....'
So it implies that the outcomes were not actually accidental but implicit from the beginning, therefore suggestive of 'aims and purposes' which are generally verboten according to post-Galilean science.
Take a fish and a mammal. The water appears designed for fish AND the air seems designed for mammals but a mammal can't breathe water and fish can't breathe air. The FTA depends on the universe being tuned for life. But we could be like fish in an ocean thinking the universe was designed for us and another life-form could be like mammals thinking the the universe was desgined for them. The FTA depends on this universe having exclusive rights to life but I've just shown you that it works for both fishes and mammals despite the fact that each would die if their universes were swapped.
2. The FTA has nothing to do with God, but is explained by blatantly obvious metaphysics.
(I say the above as a Theist)
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, when considering the probability of fine-tuning we clearly cannot appeal either to observed statistics (we just have one sample), nor to theory (theory gives us fixed values, not distributions). Probability in this context is usually understood as epistemic probability. The modal reasoning goes something like this: for all we know, the constants could have been different, and since we have no reason for favoring any one value over another, we end up with a uniform probability distribution (principle of indifference).
Quoting Moliere
It's a type of teleological argument, or argument from design. Among other examples probably the best-known are those having to do with biological design (e.g. Paley's watch analogy). And like with other teleological arguments, it seems to have a lot of intuitive appeal with some people, and yet when the argument is viewed skeptically, it turns out surprisingly hard to even give it a rigorous formulation, and few even try.
1/ In the very beginning of the universe there was very slight unevenness or presence of non-uniformities in the expanding energy. If the energy had been evenly distributed then there would be no coalescence of matter into galaxies. The amplitude of the non-uniformities is described by the number Q, the energy difference between the peaks and troughs in the density, expressed as a fraction of the total energy of the initial universe. Computer models show that Q had to be very close to 0.00001 in order for any galaxies to form. If it was minutely higher then no structures would form, if minutely lower then all matter would have collapsed into huge black holes.
2/ It was crucial for the expansion of the universe at the first second after the big bang that the expansion energy, or impetus, was finely balanced with the gravitational force, which was pulling it all back together. It has been mathematically calculated that, back at one second, the universe's expansion energy and the opposing gravitational energy must have differed by less than one part in 10 to the power 15 (one part in a million billion). If it was different at all (in either direction) then there would be no galaxies, no stars, and so no planets.
Now this has to be explained. There is no point in suggesting other forms of life if conditions were slightly different - there would be no life unless such exquisite precision was in place. Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal (from whose writings the above figures are derived), realises this and so plumps for a multi-universe theory: we have simply struck lucky from the lottery of trillions upon trillions of possible universes. Occam's razor leads me more to the more parsimonious solution - design.
The probability of all the needed conditions is on the order of 52! That is a very very large number -
this link is a fun way to imagine it.
https://czep.net/weblog/52cards.html
if this question was not about "God as designer" there would be almost no argument is was by design. It is only that many view the possibility of a designer as zero or near zero that makes them support randomness, of the multi universe explanation. In a sentence - it looks like design - except it can't be because there can't be a designer - it has to be something else.
As an example - in the classic thought experiment:
you enter a room and find me at a table with a deck of cards in front of me.
you begin to turn over the cards and see they are i order ace, 2, 3 all the same suit
I give you 3 hypothesis for this:
1. I spent the last 10 minutes putting them in order
2. I just finished shuffling them - and that is how the ended
3. There are a infinite number of me's you's and tables and decks of cards
we are just aware of this one
all honest answers to this question are of course it is 1. And the only real difference between this and FTA is the respondent excepts my existence as a possibility and some unknown God/Designer as un acceptable. It is just an elevation of science to religion.
Why? Can you explain your reasoning? This is one of the things I would like to clear up in this discussion. Is this fine-tuning surprising? Is it unexpected? If so, what are your expectations and what are they based on?
Quoting Antony Latham
How do you figure?
Quoting Rank Amateur
How do you calculate the probability - not of the card deck permutation, of course, but of the universe being life-supporting? Show your work, please.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Explain your reasoning in this thought experiment. What if the card order was not the canonical order - would your answer be different? Why?
I am finding it hard to understand why you don’t see the issue here. The customary post-Enlightenment attitude to this matter has always been that as the Universe was not ‘God’s handiwork’ [i.e. the consequence of intentional creation], then the only alternative was that life arose by chance.
One influential book about this idea was Chance and Necessity by French Nobel Laureate Jacques Monod, a biochemist. The Wikipedia abstract is here. In a nutshell, this is exactly what the book argues - that the origin of life is the consequence of the chance permutations of complex molecules that have given rise to all the myriad forms.
[quote=Jacques Monod]It necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, and of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among many other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one that squares with observed and tested fact. And nothing warrants the supposition - or the hope - that on this score our position is ever likely to be revised. There is no scientific concept, in any of the sciences, more destructive of anthropocentrism than this one.[/quote]
But the fine-tuning argument says - hang on, the antecedents to these so-called ‘chance occurences’ actually seem to have originated at - or was it before? - the beginning of the universe, to have been part of the fabric of the cosmos since the year dot. If life is an accident, it’s an accident waiting to happen, as the saying has it.
It might be an impossible argument to adjudicate or resolve, but one thing I think that can be said with certainty, is that whatever else it is, it’s not a scientific question. Science is after all ‘natural philosophy’ and natural philosophy assumes nature; it takes nature as a given. It’s when it ventures into explaining nature that it assumes the role previously thought to be that of religions’.
Even though I see the logic, I personally can’t draw a line between the fine tuning argument and Christian doctrine in particular. My view is that it should remind us that science doesn’t explain the existence of the Universe. Maybe religion doesn’t either. In which case we really don’t know, which is not a bad place to be. But I think the Jacques Monod kind of arguments that science ‘proves’ or ‘shows’ that the Universe is a chance occurrence can be set aside. Meanwhile it’s an occasion for one of Einstein’s better known quotations.
[quote=Albert Einstein]The human mind, no matter how highly trained, cannot grasp the universe. We are in the position of a little child, entering a huge library whose walls are covered to the ceiling with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written those books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books, a mysterious order, which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of the human mind, even the greatest and most cultured, toward God.[/quote]
http://home.messiah.edu/%7Ercollins/Fine-tuning/Revised%20Version%20of%20Fine-tuning%20for%20anthology.doc
See above
The reasoning is self evident to me at least. And the entire point is the deck is in order. If the deck was in some random order, it would change my answer to randomness.
For most combinations of nob and dial settings, no bubbles are produced at all. This is sad.
For some combinations of nob and dial settings, bubbles occur in strange dodecahedral volumes that burst within an instant.
For a tiny range of nob and dial settings, normal bubbles come out.
For an even smaller range of nob and dial settings, extremely long lived bubbles come out.
I took a snapshot of the specifications for each setting and took each set of specifications for the bubble machine to a bubble machine factory. I made it so that 10000 bubble machines were produced, and that the proportion of that 10000 going to each design was the proportion of summed duration of a specific bubble type to the summed duration of all bubbles. I did this many times, following this rule iteratively.
The machines produce the same number of bubbles (except for machine 1). So if there were 2 bubble machines, one produces bubbles that last 1 second, and one produces bubbles that last 2 seconds, the total bubble duration is 3, so the 2 second one gets 2/3 of the new batch and the 1 second one gets 1/3 of the new batch.
After the first line in the factory:
There are no non-productive settings left. This is because there are only bubbles of duration 0 - no bubbles at all.
There are very few dodecahedral bubble machines. This is because dodecahedral bubbles don't last very long at all.
There are some normal bubble machines.
There are rather a lot of extremely long lived bubble machines.
After the second line in the factory:
There are almost none dodecahedral bubble machines.
There are few normal bubble machines.
There's a strong majority of extremely long lived bubble machines.
The trend gets more pronounced from there. Geometrically so. After thousands and thousands of generations, there are only extremely long lived bubble machines.
...Therefore God designed the factory to produce extremely long lived bubble machines.
— Antony Latham
SophisitiCat you answered: Why? Can you explain your reasoning? This is one of the things I would like to clear up in this discussion. Is this fine-tuning surprising? Is it unexpected? If so, what are your expectations and what are they based on?
It is very obvious why this needs explanation. We are talking about an accumulation of absolutely essential conditions needed for galaxies, planets and life (of any sort), conditions which
Occam's razor leads me more to the more parsimonious solution - design.
— Antony Latham
How do you figure?
Now this has to be explained.
— Antony Latham
SophisitiCat you answered: "Why? Can you explain your reasoning? This is one of the things I would like to clear up in this discussion. Is this fine-tuning surprising? Is it unexpected? If so, what are your expectations and what are they based on?"
It is obvious why this needs explanation. We are talking about an amalgamation of absolutely essential physical conditions needed for galaxies, planets and life (of any sort) to exist. Someone like Martin Rees, who knows the maths, can calculate the odds against such conditions occurring by chance. It turns out that chance, to get this right, would require far more opportunities to come up with these conditions than there are particles in the universe.
William Dembski calls this specified complexity. A pile of scrabble pieces lying randomly on the floor is complex and that arrangement is very unlikely but not specified. A bunch of scrabble pieces which are on the floor spelling out something like "Don't be late home. Dinner is at 7pm and remember we have invited Mrs Bloggs" is specified and needs a design origin. The fine tuning specifies planets and life.
Now if you have an a priori belief that there is nothing beyond the physical (naturalism), then you will baulk at this and have to come up with something like a multiverse theory to deal with the odds. But you will need to admit, while doing this that it is for non-scientific reasons - a particular world view or belief system you have which out-rules any non-physical agent.
Occam's razor leads me more to the more parsimonious solution - design.
— Antony Latham
SophisitCat you answered: "How do you figure?"
The idea that there is some limitless number of universes and we just happen to have struck lucky, is adding a completely new and totally unverified dimension to reality - beyond what we already know. What we already know is that the situation looks very much like design. That is the simplest and most parsimonious solution. That this goes against the prevailing naturalism/physicalism of our times is neither here nor there.
This just seems to push the "gap" back in time. And if we come up with some kind of theory of the constants which explains them in purely physical terms I imagine the "gap" will get pushed further back.
There's always some first-cause which a theist will find satisfactory, and an atheist will not. The plausibility of these arguments comes down to what we already believe.
is similar. I do not find the FTA to be an argument for the existence of God personally, because it is in conflict with skeptical theism.
What I think it is best for is testing declared agnostics to their openness to the possibility that God is. There is no doubt that designer is the most logical answer to the FTA. The primary reason that there is any debate at all on that point is driven by a predisposition on many that the probability of God/supernatural designer is near zero.
Hence my deck of cards though experiment - remove God from the FTA and the answer becomes obvious - put God back in and it becomes impossible.
This is half of what I believe. I'd just add that the primary reason there is any debate is that the predisposition for different persons is either for or against the proposition -- and the plausibility of these arguments has mostly to do with this belief rather than whatever rational merits the arguments claim to have.
It's the conclusion that matters, not the process of reasoning.
I disagree - as per the deck of cards experiment. There is little doubt that design is the most probable answer for the FTA. It is just that theists, or those open to theism easily accept this answer. Others, who's predisposition can not accept theism or its possibility need to find another equally metaphysical answer - this is just an elevation of science to religion.
And even given a rigorous formulation it seems to me that all one would have to do is change or challenge one proposition to obtain the desired conclusion.
The argument bottoms out in what feels right to the person hearing or giving the argument. I would say I agree with you in saying that the constants don't need explanation, per se -- why would they? Does the Ideal Gas Law need to explain its use of a constant?
Adding a constant is a common tactic in making an equation "work" -- even if its not viewed as some kind of fundamental equation, just something that helps to predict a dataset right now.
Maybe because its cosmology there is a feeling that there needs to be some kind of fundamental explanation for why things are just so, and not otherwise. It seems more fundamental than, say, Hook's law.
There is little doubt for you.
It's worth noting that there's a difference between the arrangement of a deck of cards, and existence. The constants in physics are artifacts of our knowledge. Vary them while keeping everything else constant and what you'd predict would differ from what you'd predict while maintaining the exact same theoretical setup.
That's saying basically the same thing, without the numbers to make it look as if these particular constants are a wonder. The constants are constant, so there's no need to think of them as if they landed precisely where they needed to in order for life to flourish. They didn't land at all. They're just the number they happen to be.
Could they be different? Possibly. But it is also possible that they could not be different. They could after all take after their name, and be. . . constant. The evidence doesn't decide one way or the other -- evidentially both are possible.
A better analogy for the deck of cards and the FTA, on this interpretation, would be: Why are there exactly 52 cards? Couldn't there be 60 cards? Well, the answer to that is because that is what makes a standard deck of cards. You could add in more cards, but this is just the way things are.
no, these constants exist - with or without our knowledge of them. They existed long before we were aware of them and had the tools to quantity or express them in ways we understand them.
Quoting Moliere
You are in disagreement with established science who believe they need to be, in many cases, almost exactly what they are for life to flourish. And again, as above, the conditions were there, and existed long before we developed the ability to quantify them, or establish them as constants. Science didn't invent the constants, they explained the existing phenomenon.
Quoting Moliere
The FTA is applying different hypothesis to "what is". You can't change the "what is" as an argument against. FTA starts with facts, we exist, these criteria for our existence, exist. the collective probability of all the criteria existing is incredibly incredibly incredibly unlikely. All FTA does is ask how probable we view different hypothesis for how this collection of facts could occur.
Quoting Moliere
No it would not, yet again you want to change the factual perception of what is. The only thing you can change and stay within the FTA argument is the "why" not the what.
Let's take this:
Quoting Antony Latham
So it could have differed in one direction or another direction, hypothetically speaking. But it didn't. Why didn't it?
One explanation is that there was a designer who intervened in the formation of the universe to ensure that life could arise within it.
Another is that it didn't differ, and there's nothing terribly controversial about accepting a fact as a fact -- it just happened that way.
Another is that there's a multiplicity of universes being spit out by some universe-engine, and so given infinite time we would eventually pop out of it.
Another might be that there's some reason for the specific ratio that we haven't discovered. Perhaps gravity acts in a particular way because of [x].
**
The fact is the ratio between expansion and gravitational energy. The prediction is that with a difference then there would be no galaxies, no stars, and no planets. But the latter is not a fact -- we simply do not know what would have happened had it been otherwise. We'd have to run an experiment.
It's something that follows ceteris peribus. -- given such and such set of propositions, this is what would happen. It's reasonable enough to speculate, but we'd only know the fact of the prediction if we generated a universe with a different ratio.
We don't know what would happen if things were different than they were. There is no fact to the matter. We can make guesses and evaluate said guesses in terms of what seems right, sure. And I'd contend that's exactly what we're doing in positing the above 4 possible explanations of the fact.
yet again - you are trying to change the "what is" That is not an argument against FTA. You are in effects saying "ok lets just say the facts were different" Changing, the facts is not an argument.
or - if all you are doing is saying there could have been other combinations of differing criteria and who knows what would have been. That just seems like a long way around to saying the best hypothesis is randomness. Which brings me back to my deck of cards. In any example I can think of almost no one would assign randomness to set of criteria like this. It is only the prospect of some acknowledgment of the designer that makes it unpalatable in the case of FTA.
Again all arguments against FTA at their heart begins with the assumption the probability of a designer is near zero, no matter how good the logic is, because there can't be a designer, because.
Hrm? I'm granting the facts. What you're quoting is a rephrasing of the argument. So we have the facts from the SEP article:
The strength of gravity
The strength of the strong nuclear force
The difference between the masses of the two lightest quarks
The strength of the weak force
The cosmological constant
The global cosmic energy density is close to ro sub c.
The relative amplitude Q of density fluctuations
The initial entropy of the universe
I'm not changing these.
The argument goes -- at least if I'm reading any of this right -- that these are really specific values that could have been different, but weren't. The values that they are support life -- and there are very few such values that would support life. So the best explanation for these specific values is that there is a designer who chose them.
I'm giving alternate explanations. One is that there simply isn't one -- that constants are facts, and there isn't anything special about them. Adding a designer is just messy. You might as well add a designer to explain why the spring constant of a spring is just so. Or you could just accept that the spring constant is exactly as it is, and there's nothing special about it (even though only a very specific spring constant would support this particular mechanism)
Another is the multiverse theory. And another would be something more fundamental, that things ended up just and so because of some physical reason that is hitherto unknown.
Thing is that bubble machines and factories are designed by intelligences. So the evolutionary bubble process has it's start with intelligent design and intentional decision making to setup a filter process for longer lasting bubble.
My understanding of the argument goes:
1. sentient, moral agent beings like us exist.
2. in order for beings like us to exist those values, along with other criteria have to be
near exactly what they are - if any were changed appreciably - we would not exist.
3. the probability of all possible combinations of events needed for all of this criteria to
exist is incredibly unlikely - on the order of 52! or more.
Which hypothesis for these facts is most probable.
1. This system was designed as such to support 1. therefor there is in some way a designer
2. As improbable as it is these were all just random events that allowed 1.
3. There are an infinite number of universes or conditions that are in existence, making the odds that one like ours exist highly probable.
— Antony Latham
SophisitiCat you answered: "Why? Can you explain your reasoning? This is one of the things I would like to clear up in this discussion. Is this fine-tuning surprising? Is it unexpected? If so, what are your expectations and what are they based on?"
It is obvious why this needs explanation. We are talking about an amalgamation of absolutely essential physical conditions needed for galaxies, planets and life (of any sort) to exist. Someone like Martin Rees, who knows the maths, can calculate the odds against such conditions occurring by chance. It turns out that chance, to get this right, would require far more opportunities to come up with these conditions than there are particles in the universe.
William Dembski calls this specified complexity. A pile of scrabble pieces lying randomly on the floor is complex and that arrangement is very unlikely but not specified. A bunch of scrabble pieces which are on the floor spelling out something like "Don't be late home. Dinner is at 7pm and remember we have invited Mrs Bloggs" is specified and needs a design origin. The fine tuning specifies planets and life.
Now if you have an a priori belief that there is nothing beyond the physical (naturalism), then you will baulk at this and have to come up with something like a multiverse theory to deal with the odds. But you will need to admit, while doing this that it is for non-scientific reasons - a particular world view or belief system you have which out-rules any non-physical agent.
Occam's razor leads me more to the more parsimonious solution - design.
— Antony Latham
SophisitCat you answered: "How do you figure?"
The idea that there is some limitless number of universes and we just happen to have struck lucky, is adding a completely new and totally unverified dimension to reality - beyond what we already know. What we already know is that the situation looks very much like design. That is the simplest and most parsimonious solution. That this goes against the prevailing naturalism/physicalism of our times is neither here nor there.
You are equivocating on two meanings of "chance"; depending on the meaning, the "chance/design" dichotomy is either obviously true or obviously false, but in no case is it profound or relevant to our topic.
If "chance" means unintentional, accidental, then it translates into "The universe and everything in it is either the consequence of intentional creation or it is not" - a truism. If "chance" means random, lacking any pattern, then it is obviously false, since most people before, during and after the Enlightenment had at least some idea of the universe as a fairly orderly place. As such, it is to be expected that the universe was always constituted in such a way that life would be possible in it at least at some time and in some places. This is in no way a novel, unexpected finding. Neither is the idea that the universe could conceivably have been constituted otherwise.
None of this has much to do with the notion of fine-tuning, which specifically has to do with sensitive dependence of life on certain "parameters" of physical models.
Heh. Well, we had a different understanding then.
I'd say that your 2 is at least uncertain, and is what I was speaking to before. If the values were just constants then they wouldn't change. There isn't a physical possibility that they differ.
And I'd say that your paper tries to address 3 by talking about epistemic probability. But I'd just say that such probability caches out as plausibility. We can evaluate whether something is likely or not, but the likelihood we'll come up with depends on our priors.
I don't think there's a reasonable way to evaluate them. Not really, anyways. One can sound good to someone and so they'll adopt it. We can make some argument -- about the probability space, for instance -- that makes it seem like we are really, really, really certain of a probability.
But all three are congruent with the facts, at present. So it's not on an evidential basis that we could decide such a probability. We may make arguments, but these would in turn just appeal to our intuitions. Those intuitions would already play a part in what way we believe in the first place, hence my thinking that it just depends upon what we believe.
There's no reason to close inquiry to any of the three, as far as I'm concerned.
Here’s where your analogy fails. Why? Because it begs the question. In the situation at hand what you really have is nothing whatever. If you have a machine already, then your argument begs the question.
That is the philosophical crux as far as I'm concerned. I quoted from Bertrand Russell's 'Free Man's Worship' which depicts man as 'the accidental collocation of atoms', and also from Jacques Monod, who says the same. The whole thrust of 20th century mechanistic atheism was that whatever order does exist in the universe, is also the consequence of chance, of happenstance, of material necessity. So if you don't see that as central to the argument, then it explains why you find the whole question meaningless - because you're not seeing what it means.
I think what is almost universally lost in this argument, is the fact that science doesn't explain 'the order of the Universe'. Sure, if you watch Brian Cox then you would be forgiven for thinking so, because this is what he and his ilk gloat over almost continuously. (Isn't science marvellous?!?') But science doesn't explain 'why things are the way they are' in the grand meta-narrative sense that our culture seems to assume it does. It starts by 'bracketing out' the very question which is here under consideration and then - surprise! - declaring there's 'absolutely no evidence' for it. Only the appearance of evidence, which in reality can be 'explained' on the basis of (physical) chance and necessity. As Dennett, another of the uber-atheists, insists (referring here to organic molecules):
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 202-3.
What is factual about them?
In order for us to know 2 we'd have to run an experiment. So we'd start a universe with different values and see what came up (if that were possible to do). 2 follows if we accept all of current scientific statements as true, and then decide to treat some constants as variables to see what might happen in a universe that is remarkably similar to ours, but with a few changes.
But it's just a prediction, not a fact. We'd have to actually see that happening to say "This is fact"
And 3 depends upon treating those same constants as variables, too. But if they don't vary then there isn't a range of possible values for the constants to be. It's kind of hokey, from my viewpoint. I mean, shoot, the number line is infinite, so we might as well say that the probability of a constant is 0 (giving the event an infinitely great improbability, sans someone putting it there), given that it's just a single point on an infinite line.
jeeprs... go thumb your dog-eared collection of quotes and moan about the evils of atheistic materialism somewhere else. You don't seem to understand what we are talking about.
It was all the response your snide post required. Ditto for this one.
Which apparently is nothing of any significance.
I'd say that neither is any more a waste of time than arguing itself.
Plus science is all about arguing over facts. It's not like it's all just settled. There are arguments, not doctrines.
If W is the width of the range of parameter p within which life is possible, then no matter how large W is (eg anywhere between 10^(-googol) and 10^(+googol), which is an inconceivably wide range ), we can show that the probability of the constant falling within that range is less than any given tiny number epsilon, no matter how small, simply by hypothesising that p has a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 2W/epsilon].
So no matter how wide the range of life-permitting values, somebody that wants to argue that they are fine-tuned is able to do that.
Robin Collins attempts to address the problem with so-called "epistemically illuminated regions," if I remember correctly. That is, he suggests that instead of taking the largest conceivable range as the total probability space, which would be infinite for many of the fine-tuned parameters, we should only look at finite ranges that we have actually examined for life fitness ("epistemically illuminated.") The problem here is that for at least some of these parameters we have no trouble examining the entire infinite range. We could (and probably should) vary all so-called parameters simultaneously and thus end up not with a single range but with a multidimensional parameter space. However, even though it might be analytically and technically difficult, nothing in principle prevents us from theoretically examining this entire infinite space for life fitness. If we do, and it turns out that the life-supporting regions in this space have a combined measure of zero, that would undermine Collins's probabilistic analysis. It seems unsatisfactory to bet your entire analysis on such a contingency.
If we then allow the laws themselves to vary (and there is no metaphysical reason why we should consider the laws to be fixed while relaxing constants and boundary conditions), we run into an even more severe problem: the "collection" of all possible laws is too big to even form a set (since it will be as "big" as the set of all sets - a paradoxical concept, as Russell famously demonstrated), and so no measure theory - and thus no probability - could possibly be applied here.
But why stop there? Who said that there have to be laws? They are not a metaphysical necessity. So, as long as we allow constants, boundary conditions, and then laws to vary, we should also consider possible universes in which laws do not operate, or operate inconsistently. That broadens the space (which is not a space!) inconceivably.
Is this a fatal blow to the FTA? Well, it is to Collins's Bayesian argument, but frankly, I think there are better reasons than that to reject Collins's argument.
Isn’t there an empirical reason, namely, that they always are? Could it ever be F=MA[sup](most of the time)[/sup]?
I followed the link that Rank Amateur gave to the Robin Collins argument but it fell at the first hurdle, comparing the FTA to our finding a high-tech domed structure on Mars. That demonstrates he's missing the point so badly that I could not read any further.
We have seen a large number of examples of uninhabited landscapes - in deserts and under oceans on Earth, on the Moon, on Mars where the Rovers have been, and on other planets and their moons through telescopes on passing spacecraft. That experience gives us strong empirical evidence that sophisticated domed structures do not arise without being constructed by intelligent beings.
Compare that to the FTA and our spacetime. Our sample size is one! And in every element in our sample, intelligent life has arisen. So if we want to throw observation-based probabilistic arguments about (which I would not!) the observationally-supported hypothesis is that there is a 100% probability that a spacetime will contain intelligent life.
The argument is just a re-heated version of Paley's 'watch on the heath' argument. All that's been changed is that the heath becomes a planet and the watch becomes a dome. Has Collins never even bothered to read any of the critiques of Paley's argument? Does he really think that just giving the two key objects different names will somehow resurrect a dead argument?
From that abominable start, does it get any better? Are there any pages that are less naive and worth reading?
An assessment would perhaps have to include something like modal realism, which isn't really feasible.
In a very large probability space, the probability of any observed particulars (in our universe) becomes very small, whether involving us, or life, or the rocky moons in our Solar system, or whatever.
Also, how would we assess the chances of a hypothetical über-designer intentionally coming up with our universe (without begging the question)?
And maybe we're just a side-effect of an über-designer studying micro-chaos versus macro-constraints or whatever?
How would we differentiate?
Looks to me like the Texas sharpshooter fallacy applies.
1. embodied sentient beings like us exist.
2. There is a significant number of physical criteria necessary for 1 to exist
many of these criteria need to be within small tolerances for 1 to exist
3. In the realm of possible options, there is an incredibly low probability
all of these conditions will exist.
(I may not have done a good job on those, but when stated correctly they are all scientifically verifiable facts)
All FTA does is as for a probability guess on how such a condition can come into existence. FTA pro ports that it is by design. The only other hypotheses i have seen on this is either it was random, or the multi- universe statement.
Again - when stated correctly - you can not dispute 1, 2, 3 without leaving established science.
the discussion in on the explanation, and all 3 hypotheses are reasonable ( meaning not in conflict with fact ) - just a judgement on which one is more probable than another.
You are taking a hike in the mountains.
You come to fork in the trail,
at the fork you see 10 flat rocks, one stacked upon the other largest on the bottom
smallest on the top, making a pyramid.
you are given 3 options for how these rock came to be there:
1. someone found them an stacked them that way
2. they randomly fell from the mountains and landed that way
3. there are an infinite number of you, in an infinite number of universes, in this infinite
set one with such a stack exists
No. Item 1 is an observation.
For the sake of argument let's provisionally agree that the claim in 2 is justifiable.
But 3 is a claim about probability, with no support at all. As has been shown above, we can put whatever probability we like on the conditions obtaining, and each probability has as much support as any other, which is none at all.
More generally, statements about probabilities are never observable facts. They are based on a model, and models are interpretations, not facts.
In reverse order
I propose the probability of rolling a 1 on a fair 6 sided dice is one chance in 6 is a true statement.
Quoting andrewk
That is a fair point, even if I could understand the physics behind this, which I probably can't, not sure many others could either. And I am sue it would take up a few pages of posts to provide the support you ask for. As I said on my post, I will freely admit I may not have stated perfectly. But when the argument is made professionally, this point is supported and its basis is completely consistent with current scientific knowledge. If you can't accept that, google is your friend.
Sorry, my comment about the factual nature of statements about probability was supposed to go with this.
This statement seems to say 'what I said is correct, even though it doesn't sound right, and if you search the internet you will see why it's right'.
I'm sure you'll understand why nobody would take such a proposition seriously. I'm guessing that's not exactly what you meant. Perhaps you can restate it if that's the case, so we can understand what it did mean.
Quoting Rank Amateur Most people, not being trained in Kolmogorov's formulation of probability theory would agree with you. But the more one learns about the foundation of probability theory, the more one realises that every statement about probabilities is based on a model, and is not truth-apt. Even if one accepted it as truth-apt and true, one would be going a lot further out on a limb to say it was a fact, which implies it is directly observable. How could we ever directly observe that the probability is one in six? We'd have to roll the dice infinitely many times and, even then, we could only make a statement about the probability that the probability was 1 in 6.
Ok, so what is the chance I roll a 1 on a fair die ?
I completely agree with that. You can never prove the reality or otherwise of God by inductive or deductive reasoning. I recall reading once that the medieval 'proofs of God' were never intended as polemics to convert unbelievers, but as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful. In any case it is obvious when you see the contempt with which such arguments are dismissed by atheists that they have already decided against the conclusion and that nothing said in their defense will make the least difference.
Nevertheless, I think that the appeal to the notion of multiple universes, so as to avoid the apparent implication of the 'fine tuning' of the Universe, is also completely disingenuous. In a cover story on the multiverse in a copy of Scientific American, one of the standard arguments for the 'multi-verse' is the contention that it provides a 'tidy explanation' for the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe - and this is by well-known science educators and commentators like Leonard Susskind and Steven Weinberg.
Likewise, there are instances where Stephen Hawking indicated his distaste for any cosmological theories that implied the idea of an absolute beginning (see Why Physicists can't Avoid a Creation Event). Here again is an attempt to avoid a disliked metaphysical inference by steering research and consideration away from that direction.
There's already a lot of controversy about whether the notion of the multiverse is a scientific theory at all. So appealing to it on philosophical grounds as a defense against the argument from fine tuning, seems to me to be every bit as disingenuous as ID arguments made for God on the same basis.
Would you agree?
Personally I am conflicted about the multiverse notion. I feel that it may well be true, not because of the FTA but rather because I just wonder - if there's one spacetime, why shouldn't there be more? Yet I hate the idea of an infinite collection of spacetimes because that might mean that in some of them, all the worst things imaginable happen and the suffering is indescribable.
My approach is that I think consciousness is primary and that what we think of as matter and energy, physics in general, is derivative from consciousness. This is the opposite from Materialists, who think it's the other way around. But both are hypotheses and I can't imagine either being provable or disprovable.
I'm not keen on the multiverse defence against the FTA, although I suspect I don't view it as negatively as you. My problem with it is that (1) I am afraid of multiverses and (2) it is unnecessary because the real counter to FTA, as Sophisticat has indicated above, is that it cannot be formally stated because there is no basis on which to estimate probabilities.
That may have been Hawking's sentiment, but the "edge free" model didn't originate with him.
See XXXI. The Possibility of a “Finite” and Yet “Unbounded” Universe by Einstein for an earlier discussion.
That's the first here:
The model wasn't concocted in order to defy religious apologists.
But ...
[quote=attributed to Mark Twain]never let the truth stand in the way of a good story[/quote]
I didn't think it was. But the New Scientist article simply notes that Hawking opined that 'A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God.' And as Hawkings was a popular intellectual who frequently expressed anti-religious sentiments, I think it's significant that he would deprecate a theory on those specific grounds.
It does, I think. It's been a while since I read his exposition of the argument; the latest, most complete version, according to him (which I haven't read, but intend to do), is his entry in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology: The teleological argument: An exploration of the fine-tuning of the universe. I agree, such half-arsed analogies as that do more harm than good to the argument, but Collins does make a brave attempt to justify his conclusion with sound reasoning, and I like that about him. Not being satisfied with faith or unexamined intuitions and prejudices, he plays the philosopher's game, delving into the hows and whys, laying bare his reasoning and making himself vulnerable to criticism. Which is a whole lot better than blandly stating, like @Rank Amateur does, that the design inference is "obvious," and if you don't agree, it's your own damn fault, you closed-minded atheist.
Of course, I agree with @Moliere that, at the end of the day, it still comes down to subjective judgments, whether they are based on epistemic or esthetic or ethical criteria (they are all closely related, anyway). But it seems to me that a teleological argument, especially one as technically specific as the FTA, is amenable to analysis, so we shouldn't be satisfied with gut feelings.
Take @Rank Amateur's favorite card deck analogy, for example. It is just the kind of toy example where Bayesian analyses (which Collins favors) shine. And it is instructive to consider. I won't bore you with formulas (which are elementary, anyway), but the idea here is that the canonical ordering of cards in a deck is far more likely to be the result of a deliberate action (whether because it was just removed from its factory packaging or because someone deliberately arranged it in order) than of a random shuffling. But we know this because we know something about decks of cards, how they are labeled and handled, and about people and their habits and preferences. We have some rational expectations, or priors, in Bayesian lingo, which are based on our experiences of the world.
The case of fundamental laws and constants is disanalogous to this example in a number of ways. One, already mentioned, is more technical, having to do with normalizability. But more importantly, we can have no rational expectations with regards to fundamental laws and constants - that is just what makes them fundamental. (By contrast, we can potentially make some predictions, or even precise calculations for the spring constant in Hooke's law.) There is nothing in our experience that could give us any clue as to why they have the structure and the values that they have.
Of course, we could still hypothesize that some supernatural entity made the laws and constants just so. And of all the ways a supernatural entity could have done it, it made the laws and constants to be compatible with the existence of life in the universe - lucky us! Perhaps then of all conceivable supernatural entities - what are the chances?! - the one that is responsible for the fundamental laws and constants of our universe is a kind of personal, anthropomorphic being that had both the power and intention to make the world suitable for humans. In any case, it seems that, as @jorndoe points out, this supernatural being is exquisitely fine-tuned!
Quoting Wayfarer
Teleological arguments deal with counterfactual possibilities. Empirically, fundamental constants are just what they are (most of the time) - that is why we call them constants. The FTA considers the possibility of them being something other than what is empirically observed. I am just saying (and I am not being particularly original here) that we could, with the same justification, vary fundamental laws as well.
And it's the right way to think of probabilities, in my opinion - at least in this context. After all, we are interested in beliefs (such as God beliefs), and how new evidence (such as the evidence of fine-tuning) affects them. After you learn this new evidence, and taking into account what you already know, what would be your most rational bet? That is just the kind of probabilistic reasoning that Collins and some others attempt to pursue.
Because they might just be in your head, generated by having the beliefs you do in virtue of the religious culture you were raised in.
When I came to understand that my religious experiences where being generated by my brain, I stopped having faith. I understand that not everyone views religious experience and faith the same, but for me if it wasn't real, and thus true, it wasn't worth having.
To quote St. Paul, "If Christ has not risen, your faith is in vain." What's the point of going to church/temple/synagogue/mosque and praying and all that jazz if it's just made up? If you need help getting through life, then just eat, drink and be merry. Or pass time arguing over impractical issues on philosophy forums.
If you want to feel spiritual, go look at the stars on a clear night.
It should be kept in mind that historically, "multiverses" in cosmology were not proposed as a solution to the fine-tuning problem. For example, the kind of bubble multiverse that results from chaotic or eternal inflation is just a generic prediction of inflationary cosmology, which has its own raison d'etre, not having directly to do with fine-tuning.
Some cosmologists argue that, as an added bonus, such multiverses solve the fine-tuning problem, but there is no settled opinion on this. There is, for example, an ongoing argument over whether such a solution commits the "inverse gambler's fallacy."
If that works for you, good on you. For other people, going to church, temple or synagogue might work better in which case, good on them as well.
Quoting Marchesk That's one of many points on which Paul and I differ radically. I reject that statement utterly.
Personally I'm a fan of St Thomas - the patron saint of scientists and sceptics.
Where does the term 'fine tuning' come from? It comes from high quality old fashioned radio sets, that had both a Tuning and a Fine Tuning knob. Turning the Tuning knob as much as possible - say a range of three complete turns - would cover the whole range of frequencies the radio was capable of tuning. For the Fine Tuning knob, the full range of turns - say three again - would cover a small fraction of the frequency range, say only 5% of the range, thereby allowing more accurate tuning to a frequency than was possible with the Tuning knob.
What makes the Fine Tuning knob fine is the ratio of its range to that of the Tuning knob, 5% in the above example.
To apply this concept to fundamental constants, we need to divide the inner range - the range in which the constant allows life to develop, by the total range. But unlike in a radio receiver, we don't have a finite total range, so there's nothing to divide by. So it's meaningless to say the constant is 'fine tuned' because it must be fine tuned in comparison to something (eg the other knob) and there's nothing to compare it to.
So, your ‘religious experiences’ were hallucination. Good you recognised that.
Quoting SophistiCat
I don’t read the argument as being that the fundamental constants might be other than they are. What it says is if they were other than they are, by very minute percentages, then nothing could exist. So the constants are fundamental empirical truths, if you like. What I think we loose sight of, is that science doesn’t explain them; they are simply given. So if there is another level of explanation, then, whatever it might be, it isn’t scientific, but can be considered philosophically, as we’re doing here.
Of course, because you don't think there is any resurrection of the dead into a world where we don't have the incessant meaningless drive of the desires Schop and Augustino are always complaining about.
To put it in more Buddhist terms, if I really believed that following the 8-fold path and spending lots of time mediting would grant me nirvana after death, where some essence of me continued to exist without suffering in a grand sense, then I would probably buy in and make it my life's goal.
But I don't believe that, so I'm like, meh, I'm sure meditating and thinking a certain way is helpful in this life, like exercising and eating well. Kind of like going to church for the social aspect. But it's not something I'm going to base my life on, because it's merely helpful, and it's still just this life, with it's readily apparent imperfections.
Some people might object to having faith for a payoff, but let's put another way Say there was the possibility of a technology that would greatly expand your life in all dimensions. You would end up healthier, stronger, smarter, longer lived, etc than any human. But it would require dedicating your life to achieve. How many people would go after that if they thought it was possible?
That's what St. Paul was talking about, in a non-technological sense. That he would get to share in a god-like existence forever, otherwise, why bother? Also, keep in mind that Paul and many of the early Christians were legitimately persecuted, so it's not like they looked at religion from the relative ease and comfort of a modern western lifestyle, where playing tennis is just as good as going to church on a Sunday morning, because what does it really matter?
There is currently no scientific explanation, but it is entirely conceivable that there may be one day. A new, falsifiable, more fundamental theory may be developed that, amongst other things, mandates that the value of the constants must be exactly what they are.
Then we can just ask - but why is the universe described by that theory and not some other? But that challenge can be made to any explanation, be it scientific, philosophical, religious or something else. All an explanation does is explain a phenomenon in terms of some other phenomenon - which can be observed or just hypothesised - that is, ideally, easier to believe, or already believed. For any explanation we can always ask 'but why?', and children often do.
Wanted to add an additional comment on this. There is a sense in which both Christianity and Buddhism are tying to find an out for this life. They're both predicated on life being fundamentally rotten. Christians hope for a utopian existence after death. Buddhists try to fix the problem by quenching desire, and which may result in achieving a final state without suffering, which could transcend this life to a more permanent state.
There are also the techno-optimists who think that science and technology will one day deliver us from the awfulness of being animals who live short lives, feel pain and constant want, and are severely limited in the capacity to experience.
Nick Bostrom has written a couple short stories on that possibility. And then's tons of scifi stories exploring that idea. The thing that all threeshare is agreeing that life generally sucks in lots of ways, and having faith in the possibility of attaining a better mode of existence.
No ‘essence of me’ in Buddhism. Arguably, belief in such a thing is the very problem that has to be overcome.
Quoting andrewk
A promissory note, eh? The thing is, the religions don’t provide any kind of theory in the terms science would recognise or approve. I know you and I have talked about Karen Armstrong in the past, and her analysis is valuable in this context. She shows, in her Case for God, how early modern science drew upon the tropes of the Christianity of which it was part, but how this became a double-edged sword. That the idea that ‘the heavens shewed the handiwork of the Lord’ could just as easily be deployed to support the opposite, as the heavens were shown to be mostly ‘appalling vastness’ [in Pascal’s phrase]. But what is the essential point of Christianity? I had the idea it was the commandment ‘you shall love one another as I have loved you.’ And that really doesn’t depend on any kind of scientific rationale whatever. As Armstrong says, ‘Religious truth is a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.’ And the religious accounts do indeed appear absurd if you think about the question in scientific terms - unless, of course, they’re interpreted symbolically, or mythologically, as I think they’re supposed to be.
So - where we’re at culturally is that science has supplanted ‘religion’ as the source of how intelligent people ought to think. And there’s a lot of merit in that as far as it goes. But it doesn’t go a long way to being a theory of literally everything about life and mind, and trying to fit everything into that Procrustean bed is invariably reductionist. I think we have to try and interpret the issue charitably, not out of the sense that the Western religious heritage is an outmoded and superstitious view of the world.
Okay right, my fault. What I meant was something that continues to be alive, to experience the state of nirvana, not simply ceasing to exist. Because suicide easily accomplishes that without needing to spend a life becoming detached.
FTA is not making a truth statement about the nature of probability theory . Better said the truth statement would be, using the existing knowledge of probability theory, the probability of the current conditions existing that support life are very very unlikely.
Which is no different than saying, given any situation that mattered to you, you would use the existing knowledge of probability theory to evaluate the alternatives. If forced to play a game of Russian roulette, and it was your option to choose to load one or two bullets in the gun, you would not allow your skepticism on the underlying theory to interfere with your choice of one bullet because it increases the probability you will live.
Also given any such scenario as FTA supplies without the need to accept the possibility of supernatural designer, you would not allow your skeptical view on the validity of probability theory to change your answer.
If given the situation you find 10 flat rocks stacked on top of each other, largest to smallest, on a hike in the mountains. And given the choice of 2 hypothesis of how that came to be as:
1. Someone found those rocks and stacked them that way
2. they randomly fell from the mountain that way
Or if you found me at the table with a deck of cards in front of me, and as you turned them over and found them in order. Given the choice between:
1. I spent the last 10 minutes putting them in order
2. I just finished shuffling them, and that is how they ended
In both cases you would pick 1. And your objection to probability theory would in no way become an issue.
Which is the point. You don’t have an issue with FTA because of the issue of probability, you have an issue with FTA, because you have an issue with any answer that allows for a supernatural designer.
IMO FTA fails as a proof that God is. It does so because it is in conflict with skeptical theism. The only value I find in it, is as a test of those who claim to be agnostic. It is a very good test to see what degree someone claiming to be agnostic is actually open to the possibility of God is.
On the broader proof of God question. My view is there are 3 ways one can know something and believe it to be true, and act accordingly.
1. It is a fact, or demonstrably near fact. example. 2 + 2 = 4, Gravity
God is, is not a matter of fact. God is not, is not a matter of fact
2. By reason, given a set of truths one can believe by reason to believe something that is not a fact, to be true, and act accordingly. Anything one believes by reason however can not be in conflict with facts.
example. It is not a matter of fact that unicorns do not exist on earth. But it is reasonable to believe unicorns do not exist, because we would know a unicorn if we saw one, we have been looking in a very very large sample of places for a very long time, and we haven't seen one yet.
Both God is, and God is not is reasonable to believe.
And IMO the better conclusion to the traditional proofs of God is " therefor it is reasonable to believe God is"
3. by faith. By faith, one can believe anything, with the only caveat that it can not be in conflict with faith or reason.
For me, the only reason I argue the proofs of God is to support my Theism, which is a matter of faith, is a reasonable belief, against the argument that it is not reasonable. The very regular, Dawkin's "it is a fairy tale, flying spaghetti monster comments" that are so often given.
I think the deck of cards thought experiment is a very good way of visualizing and appreciating the improbability and randomness the FTA expresses.
This is exactly the point I have been trying to make. If one believes in the possibility of a supernatural designer. A true agnostic ( not so sure there are any) or a theist. They view FTA exactly as you view above. If however, one believes the probability of a supernatural designer to be near zero, you have to leave the logic of the answer as above, and develop some challenge of the best existing science that FTA uses as the base observations. Or develop some other option, as equally un-provable as a supernatural designer, that one is more comfortable believing.
Let's take the gravitational constant. 6.67408 × 10-11 m3 kg-1 s-2 -- I'm not certain at all what the units would be analogous to in a deck of cards, but the specific number would be analogous to an individual card. So we happened to draw, in the creation of the universe (assuming the deck metaphor) 6.67408 × 10-11 m3 kg-1 s-2 when we drew our gravity constant card.
But what are the other cards? What is the possible domain over which we're figuring this probability?
If the possible domain for the gravity constant is only one card, then it is a 100 percent probability that we'd draw that card -- it'd just be a constant, as I've been saying, and evaluating its probability wouldn't mean anything at all.
But if it could be otherwise, then what else could it be? If it can't be otherwise, then there is nothing improbable about the gravity constant being what it is.
The thought experiment using the deck of cards, is firstly about the order of the deck of cards. When one observes something that seems ordered, and given options as to how such order came to happen between design and randomness most would view design more likely. FTA proposes the that the universe is ordered for embodied, sentient beings like us to exist. Even vary minor differences in many different criteria ( all of these are easily looked up) would make it impossible for beings like us to exist.
When facing such an ordered system FTA proposed design and the most probable hypothesis as to why.
I am not sure what the difference is between your point that there may have been no other options for all these varied criteria than there is than, it was designed. Sounds like a round about way of saying the same thing.
Right. But it does so on the basis of your next sentence:
But what if a difference, however minor, isn't possible at all? How do we infer that these minor differences could have been the case?
Conceptually, sure. I can conceive of them being different.
But physically?
To me it's just like stating a fact. So it is physically possible that Washington, DC is not the capital of the United States. But it is not possible in reality (earmarked to a certain time) -- it is a simple fact.
A bit more abstractly, it is metaphysically possible that the gravitational constant could differ, where all other laws and constants of the universe remain the same. But it may not be physically possible, earmarked to the universe we happen to inhabit. It could just be a simple fact that has no major significance, since it could not have been otherwise.
If it could not have been otherwise, then there's no need to posit that someone made it that way. It's just the way things are.
My point is, if the gravitational constant could only be what it is, and the weak force could only be what it is, and the strong force could only be what its, and on and on for a bunch of other constraints could only be what they are. And if any of those was even marginally different. Life could not exist. That sure sounds like they were designed for that purpose to me. I see no difference is saying things are as the are because they were designed as such , or there was no other alternatives. You are just moving the question up one level - why are there no other alternatives.
To me it just looks like a fact, because I see no reason to believe they could have been otherwise -- in a physical sense.
Well, strictly speaking I'm only posting another possibility. Strictly speaking I don't think you can rule out a designer. In a looser sense I have my beliefs and find them reasonable enough, but I can acknowledge others -- on those same looser standards -- as being reasonable enough with different conclusions.
For this particular possibility the reason the constants don't vary is because they are constant. It's just a simple fact, in the same manner that Washington DC is the capital of the United States in 2018 doesn't vary, or that when you mix yellow with red paint you get [s]green[/s] orange (EDIT: lol. Temporarily forgot the actual fact. Sorry) paint. There may be more to explain than that -- Washington DC became the capital because of such and such history, or red and yellow paint make [s]green[/s] orange paint because they absord such and such frequencies in the visible light spectrum -- but that explanation doesn't change the very basic fact that the gravitational constant, that the capital of the United States, and that the color combination of paints are what they are.
I suppose I should say that I don't think every fact has an explanation, either. I don't think the entirity of everything that exists has some kind of cohesive explanation. It could, but it doesn't need to. Sometimes a fact is just a fact.
To reiterate, I'm saying this is a possibility. It's one that I find more congenial than positing extra-planar beings choosing what the physical constants are, but I merely find it congenial and know that even an extra-planar being is possible, and can recognize why others might find it so even if I do not.
It could also be possible -- to give the other two examples I said -- that there is a multiverse engine creating universes, and that there is some other physical theory we do not yet know (just as we did not yet know how color worked at one point, though we still knew what color combinations would bring about which colors).
Is this better -
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Collins-How-to-Rigorously-Define-Fine-Tuning.pdf
No, not even close. The only point that you've managed to make in this discussion, and which you keep repeating over and over, as if it wasn't stupidly obvious, is that you know that you are right, and those who disagree do so only because they are prejudiced. We get it. You can stop repeating it and leave, since it is obvious that you have nothing else to say. Take Wayfarer with you, too.
Making presumptive, and completely wrong, assumptions like that reveals the emptiness of your argument.
I am completely open to theism, and have no objection to designer-based spiritualities. My only objection is to when people who, because they lack faith in the designer-based spirituality to which they try to adhere, make up silly arguments to try to prove to themselves that it's the right one.
I respect faith. I don't respect faux logic.
My point is very easy to argue against. Show me another complex system where you believe chance was more probable than design, and I will readily admit I was in error.
Secondly, I do not understand the angst. Believing that a supernatural designer does not exist is completely reasonable. The atheist position that FTA is false because the probability of a supernatural designer is 0, or the strong agnostic position that it is very near zero therefore it is something else is a completely reasonable position.
I don't know what you mean by 'chance was more probable than design', but there are plenty of systems with simple or disorganised inputs that have complex, organised-seeming outputs. Three examples that pop to mind are Conway's game of Life, Mandelbrot sets and interference patterns. I have recently been playing around with continuous endomorphisms of the number plane and found a very simple function that, to my surprise and delight, gave a lovely flower pattern as output. I have attached it below. The alternating red and blue lines are the transformed images of concentric circles.
To recoup, the nomalizability objection draws attention to the fact that a uniform probability distribution, which the Principle of Indifference compels us to adopt, is undefined on an infinite domain; thus, for those fine-tuned parameters for which the range of epistemically possible values is unbounded, we cannot even have prior probabilities (this objection has been made by a number of critics of the FTA). The coarse-tuning objection points out that, even if the nomalizability problem was somehow dealt with, we would end up in a strange situation, where the width of the life-permitting region of a "fine-tuned" parameter doesn't actually matter, as long as it is finite; it could be 10[sup]10[sup]10[/sup][/sup] times as wide, and this would not make any difference to the argument. (@andrewk has pointed out that the metaphor of "fine-tuning," which comes from analogue radio and instrument dials, breaks down here.)
Collins makes a number of arguments in favor of considering finite ranges in parameter space. I have already mentioned his concept of an "epistemically illuminated" (EI) region, which has an affinity with intuitive arguments made, for example, by John Leslie in his 1989 book "Universes," who at one point compares fine-tuning with a bullet hitting a lone fly on the wall: even if other, remote areas of the wall were thick with flies, he says, this would not make the pin-point precision of the hit any less surprising. I am not convinced by such analogies; I suspect that they trade on intuitions that work in familiar human surroundings, but break down in the vastness and strangeness of modern physics, especially when it comes to highly counterintuitive infinities. (For example, when we imagine bullets randomly hitting broad targets, we don't really imagine infinite targets with uniformly distributed probability; rather, we probably have in mind something like a very wide normal distribution, which is nearly flat within a finite region in front of us, but drops off to virtually zero far away from us.) In any case, if the analogy is justified, there ought to be a rigorous statement of the argument that vindicates it, and I still haven't seen any, which makes me distrustful.
Perhaps the most interesting argument that Collins makes is that we are not justified in considering unbounded ranges for physical constants, because all our scientific theories have a limited domain of applicability (for fundamental physics it is mostly the energy scale; our current theories are low-energy effective field theories). If we deviate too far from the actual values of physical constants, the very models where these constants appear break down; in those remote parameter regions we will need some different physics with different constants. This is a good point that I haven't considered in relation to the FTA, nor have I seen it addressed by FTA critics. However, my objection to this argument, as well as the less formal arguments for EI regions, is that limiting the range of epistemically possible values cannot be justified from within the Bayesian epistemic model used in the probabilistic FTA. In particular, this move doesn't sit well with already highly problematic indifference priors, which are inversely related to the size of the range. It follows that specific, finite probabilities with which we operate depend on these squishy, ill-defined choices of EI regions. Moreover, the limitations of EFTs are only contingent, and only apply to their boundary conditions and perhaps constants, but not to the mathematical form of their laws.
Although he puts the most effort into defending the idea that the size of epistemic parameter ranges is necessarily limited, Collins also considers the possibility of using non-standard probability theories, perhaps those without the requirement of the so-called finite additivity, and thus not suffering from paradoxes of uniform distributions over infinite domains*. As I said earlier, I am generally sympathetic to this idea: I am not a dogmatic Bayesian; I recognize that Bayesian epistemology is not a perfect fit to the way we actually reason, not is it a given that Bayesianism is the perfect reasoning model to which we must aspire. An epistemic model based on something other than classical Kolmogorov probability? Sure, why not? However, such a model first has to be developed and justified. And the justification had better be based on a large number and variety of uncontroversial examples, which is going to be highly problematic, because we simply lack intuitions for dealing with infinities and infinitesimals.
And that is a general problem for arguments of this type, which also include Cosmological arguments: at some point they have to appeal to our intuitions, be they epistemic or metaphysical. But the contexts in which these arguments are invoked are so far removed from our experiences that intuitions become unreliable there.
* I have also thought of another solution that he could propose to address the challenge of infinite domains, along the lines of his epistemically illuminated regions: epistemically illuminated probability distributions, which, he could argue, would be non-uniform (most likely, Gaussian).
I would be interested to hear more about this. I'm having trouble relating it to a statement that says something about the constants.
GR and QM both have limited domains of applicability. QM doesn't work in the presence of very strong gravitational fields and GR doesn't work on a very small scale, so there is an overlap region where the two contradict one another. But I can't see any way of going from that to saying something about limits for what the constants could be. Different constants may make that overlap region larger or smaller, but that seems to me to just tell us something about the approximate nature of our current theories, rather than something fundamental about the universe. That doubt seems to parallel the point you make about EFTs being contingent on a particular form of the laws.
[math]\begin{align} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} p(x|\alpha,M)p(\alpha|M)d\alpha\end{align}[/math]
The normalizability challenge can then be answered with considerations such as that the applicability of the model is limited to a finite range of parameter values (e.g. the Planck scale), as well as considerations of "naturalness" (which present another can of worms that we need not get into.)
The bottom line is that in physics we are not agnostic about at least some general physical principles, and more often we are working with quite specific models with known properties and limitations, which can inform the choice of probability distributions. Whereas in the most general case of the FTA we are agnostic about all that. Any form of a physical law, any value of a fundamental constant represents an epistemically possible world, which we cannot discount from consideration.
One thing caught my attention though. While discussing the fine-tuning of stars - their stability and the nucleosynthesis that produces chemical elements necessary for life - Barnes writes:
He then includes this curious footnote:
Barnes credits this insight to Smolin's article in the anthology Universe or Multiverse? (2007). Oddly, he himself does not make the obvious wider connection: the same argument could be just as easily applied to every other case of cosmic fine-tuning. For example, it could be similarly argued that the lower bound of the permissible values of the cosmological constant is to avoid a re-collapse of the universe shortly after the Big Bang. We know that the universe did not collapse; the additional observation that, as a consequence, intelligent life had a chance to emerge at a much later time is unnecessary to reach the conclusion with regard to the cosmological constant. And yet, in this and other publications Barnes insists on referring to every case of fine-tuning (except for carbon resonance, for some reason) as fine-tuning for life.
So why talk about life in connection with cosmic fine-tuning? Why would someone who objectively evaluates the implications of varying fundamental laws and constants of the universe - which is what Barnes ostensibly sets out to do - single out fine-tuning for life as a remarkable finding that cries out for an explanation? Well, one could argue that life is the one thing all these diverse cases of fine-tuning have in common. And the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for some feature (in the sense that this feature exhibits a sensitive dependence on fundamental parameters) to such a great extent is inherently interesting and demands an explanation.
To this it could be objected that the target seems to be picked arbitrarily. Picking a different target, one could produce a different set of (possibly fine-tuned) constraints. Indeed, in the limit, when the target is this specific universe, the constraints are going to be as tight as they could possibly be: all parameters are fine-tuned, and all bounds are reduced to zero. Is this surprising? Does this extreme fine-tuning cry out for an explanation? Certainly not! Such "fine-tuning" is a matter of necessity. Moreover, even excluding edge cases, one could always pick as small a target in the parameter space as one wishes; it then becomes a game of Texas Sharpshooting ().
Another objection is that life, being a high-level complex structure, is going to be fine-tuned (again, in the sense of being sensitive to variations of low-level parameters) no matter what. In fact, any such complex structure is bound to be fine-tuned. (Physicist R. A. W. Bradford demonstrates this mathematically in The Inevitability of Fine Tuning in a Complex Universe (2011), using sequential local entropy reduction as a proxy for emerging complexity.) So if there is something generically surprising here, it is that the universe is fine-tuned to produce any complex structures.
It seems then that, objectively speaking, whatever it is that the universe is trying to tell us, it is not that it is fine-tuned for life. What then would be a legitimate motivation for framing the problem in such a way? One such motivation can be found in the observer selection effect in the context of model selection in cosmology, where it is also known as the weak anthropic principle: out of all possible universes, we - observers - are bound to find ourselves in a universe that can support observers. Thus fine-tuning for life (or more specifically, for observers) is offered as a solution, rather than a problem. Of course, this requires a scenario with a multitude of actual universes - in other words, a multiverse. Barnes considers existing multiverse cosmological models in his paper and finds that, whatever their merits, they don't solve the fine-tuning problem; if anything, he contends, such models make the problem worse by being fine-tuned to an even greater extent.
So we come back to the question: Why do people like Barnes consider fine-tuning for life to be a problem in need of a solution? I think that theologian Richard Swinburne, who was perhaps the first to formulate a modern FTA, gave a plausible answer: we find something to be surprising and in need of an explanation when we already have a candidate explanation in mind - an explanation that makes the thing less surprising and more likely. And God, according to Swinburne, presents such an explanation in the case of intelligent life. So there is our answer: the only plausible reason to present fine-tuning for life as a problem is to make an argument for the existence of God (or something like it), and anyone who does so should deliver on that promise or risk appearing disingenuous.
If I understand correctly, you seem to be challenging premise 3 of Collins argument by changing the order in which we view the Big Bang. Instead of wondering how the Big Bang shaped a world so specific that humans emerged, you say that the pre-conditions to the Big Bang are irrelevant to the existence of God in that the Big Bang simply set the world in order and humans are a product of that, not a design element. In formal writing:
1. There are no required conditions for the Big Bang
2. If there are no required conditions for the Big Bang, then the outcome of the Big Bang is essentially random
3. If the outcome is random, it cannot be designed
4. Our existence naturally fits into the laws of the universe established by the outcome of the Big Bang
5. The existence of specific laws of the Universe is irrelevant to the design argument (theism)
My objection to that argument (hopefully I have represented you honestly) lies on premise 1. The idea that there are no required conditions for the big bang falls into the logical fallacy of producing something from nothing. In physics (and I am no physicist) there is the law of conservation of energy which states that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. Thomas Aquinas describes this concept in his “Argument from Motion” (https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/motion.shtml). While a little elementary in his knowledge of physics, the thought-concept is the same. Something cannot come out of nothing, as something cannot be moved without a mover. In this way, it seems implausible to reject the idea of some sort of Creator to establish conditions for the Big Bang for it to happen (especially considering the results!). If there is a Creator, it follows that the argument of fine-tuning is relevant once more.
I'm not necessarily implying that the Big Bang was random, or that randomness would necessitate lack of design. Specifically, I'm saying that new information and calculations do not support the argument for a creative designer. That was the main point I tried to illustrate in my example.
If we want to broaden the discussion to the entire argument from design, then I can provide my thoughts there as well. Firstly, "producing something from nothing" is not a type of logical fallacy. I can see why some people would take issue with the idea, but it's not a logical fallacy in the way that equivocation or appeal to authority are.
Secondly, the idea of the universe requiring an Unmoved Mover does not convince me. If the universe cannot arise from nothing, we can ask the same question about God. Who would have designed God? If God does not need a designer, then why does the universe? Collins attempts to address this in his essay, but he does not answer the question. Instead, he contends that the universe as we know it is more likely to occur under the guidance of a god-designer than out of nothing. But if that god-designer came from nothing, then I don't think we've made any real progress. We still face the same question - how can something come from nothing? God does not answer that.
And to briefly consider your example, it is true that energy cannot be created or destroyed. However, it can be transformed. Einstein's famous E = mc(^2) is an equation for converting energy into mass. I'm purely speculating here, but perhaps there was something before our universe that energy and mass came out of. Or perhaps there was nothing. I do not think the argument from design solves this problem.
I'm not quite sure I understand what you're saying here. Do you mean that you agree with my assessment that the science does not support his argument? But that you disagree with my belief that the argument overall doesn't succeed?
Quoting tim wood
I realize that this was meant to be a silly example, but a ham sandwich is not better than nothing as an explanation for the universe. A ham sandwich that preceded the Big Bang would raise more questions than we already deal with. If you read my response to Ben Hancock, you'll see that I believe the idea of God does not provide us with a solution to our problem, and therefore is not better than nothing.
Thank you for clarifying. The illustration you used in the first example seems to suggest that the reason the new information and calculations do not support the argument for a creative designer is because the Big Bang came first, and so human's development afterward is in relation to the 'rules' that were established at the Big Bang. However, if we look at the Big Bang first, we are still left with no answer to the question why we are here. Us being here certainly does entail that the necessary requirements for us being here were met, but offers no answer to why. Richard Dawkins responded to this objection called the anthropic principle here: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXpX-jLofpM). Dawkins uses and example from John Leslie quoted here: "If fifty sharp shooters all miss me, the response "if they had not missed me I wouldn't be here to consider the fact" is not adequate. Instead, I would naturally conclude that there was some reason why they all missed, such as that they never really intended to kill me. Why would I conclude this? Because my continued existence would be very improbable under the hypothesis thatthey missed me by chance, but not improbable under the hypothesis that there was some reason why they missed me. This question of why would persist no matter what the preconditions of the universe in discussion was. Observing those preconditions, and finding them to be incredibly specific, it is quite rational to then apply those statistics to a Design argument, because it is more likely that those entailing requirements would be so specific if there was an end in mind than by a random generator.
To respond to the idea that a God simply elevates the problem of intelligent design up a level, I propose that this is only a problem if we understand God as something created. If God is the greatest of all possible beings, He must be self-created and self-sustaining. The Universe is evidently not the greatest of all possible beings, as we can, in our own minds, imagine a Universe that is perfect. God, however, is not dependent on any other if He is the greatest of all possible beings, and so is created and sustained within himself.
That does leave the question of 'why does a timeless god exist?'. Similar to the question to 'why does anything exist?'. We have the Anthropic principle to provide a pseudo-answer to 'why does anything exist?': 'we are here so it must'. Could be argued that triggering the Big Bang required an intelligence, hence a god, so the Anthropic principle would apply also: 'we are here so there must be a god'.
If there is a god and I ever meet him, I will ask why he exists. If he does not know, I will throw my hands up in disgust at the meaningless nature of existence.
The whole point to why theists claim that a Designer is necessary is because of the beautiful and complex "design" of the universe. So it would be a contradiction to then say that God is beautiful and complex but it doesn't need a designer.
What it comes down to is that the universe wasn't designed at all. That is why it doesn't need a designer.
This is to misunderstand Ockham. His principle is that we are not to multiply causes without necessity. It is not, as you suggest, that we have no need for causes.
The standard theist claim is that God is ultimately simple -- not that He is complex
Separately, I can understand why it seemed as though I was invoking a version of the anthropic principle in my original post. I was not attempting to do so, and perhaps my example could have been more clear. I fully agree with the story about the sharp shooters.
However, to broaden our discussion again, I disagree with many points in your final paragraph. It also seems as though you are drawing on the ontological argument, which is a separate line of reasoning from the design argument. I'll attempt to address both briefly.
Quoting Ben Hancock
I could also contend that this is only a problem if we understand the universe as something created. The Big Bang implies a beginning, not a creation. And to put on my (very inadequate) speculative astrophysicist hat, perhaps the Big Bang is not even a beginning, but simply the start of a form that we recognize. We do not know what came before.
Quoting Ben Hancock
Is it true that we can imagine a perfect universe? What are the specific requirements? I find it hard to imagine a concrete list of attributes that compose a perfect universe. Perhaps I could suggest a few improvements, but by no means does that imply a finite list of steps to take to reach perfection. So, in fact, I'd say we can't really imagine a perfect universe.
Similarly, I find it difficult to imagine what a greatest of all possible beings would look like. I can easily attach adjectives to this being -- omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent -- but these attributes raise intricate questions that the Big Bang does not. When we first engage the origins of the universe, we ask one complex question: is there a cause for the Big Bang? When we arrive at the solution of a self-creating God, we must ask many complex questions. Personally, I do not find it satisfying to trade one mystery for several.
To clarify, I am not implying that an atheistic view of the universe offers more answers than a theistic one. I am saying that when we wonder about the Cause of Everything, our current notions of God should not satisfy us.
Occam's point is to pick the simplest solution when given a choice. We see the universe but we don't see god. The simplest deduction is the universe is and god is not. That does not mean there is no god, it's simply one of the methods I use to justify my opinion.
The purpose of who designed the designer is for atheists to point out the added complexity of a designed universe. If god can just be, so can the universe.
If we expect to see God, we will be disappointed; the universe is too large and too young for God to have had time to see us:
- 1 x 10^24 estimated stars in observable universe
- 5.1 x 10^12 days since start of universe
- God must visit 195,694,716,242 star systems a day for God to have visited all star systems in the observable universe by today.
Talk about a hectic schedule. Lack of communication from God can't be taken as strong evidence for his non-existence.
You'll get no argument from me that there is a possibility of a god. My only certainty is that god's of human invention are just that, inventions. I personally think a non-created universe is more likely but not a certainty.
Yes, it strikes me as strange no-one tries to formulate a more believable religion than the ones we have currently. A Religion with a creation story rooted in arguments from physics and metaphysics. A religion that would appeal to the rational thinker.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
I mess with probability a lot trying to work out the likelihood of God. I'm coming out more positive than you but who knows...
A non-explanation is not a solution. It is a cop out.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
You seem not to understand how deduction works. It is far different from jumping to conclusions. We can see rainbows, but we cannot see the law of conservation of mass-energy. Does that mean that there are colored structures in the sky, but no laws of nature? Not to a rational mind.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
No, not if you want to think rationally. For science to work, everything must have an adequate explanation, even if we do not know it. If you admit exceptions, then any new phenomena could "just be." It is only because we know this is not so, that science seeks adequate explanations. Thus, everything, including God must have an adequate explanation. The distinguishing things about God is that, as the end of the line of explanation, God cannot be explained by something else (or he would not be the end of the line). So, God must be self-explaining.
Not just anything can be self explaining. If A explains B, the nature of A is sufficient to account for B. That means that if God is self-explaining, what God is must entail that God is.
Let's reflect on that. As intimated by Plato in the Sophist, anything that can act in any way in any way exists. Conversely, some "thing" that can do absolutely nothing, cannot evoke the concept of existence in us and so does not exist. So, existence is convertible with the capacity to act. Existence is not the ability to act in this way or that way, but the unspecified ability to act.
Extending this line of thought, if we knew everything that an object could do, we would have an exhaustive knowledge of what it is. If something can do everything a duck can do, and noting a duck cant do, it is a duck. Thus, essences, what things are, are specifications of an object's possible acts.
Putting these pieces together, if a being is to be self-explaining, its essence (the specification of its possible acts) must entail its existence (the unspecified ability to act). That means that the range of its possible acts cannot be limited, for then it would not entail the unspecified ability to act. So, a being can only be self-explaining if it can do any possible act. The universe cannot do any logically possible act.
Then why is it so difficult and contradictory to define?
It depends on what kind of definition you want. The dictionary does an adequate job with "creator and ruler of the universe." If you want a definition based on genus and specific difference, the problem is that God is not in a genus because genera are defined by a limiting specification, and, as I explained above, God is unlimited.
That may be true but one needs information to conclude, I don't believe we have enough to dis/prove a god.
Quoting Dfpolis
Deduction may be the wrong word. Does belief, perception or answer work?
On the other hand when I say "see" I mean "perceive." Perceiving empirically, without delusion or malfunction. That being said there is no emperical evidence of a god, none, anywhere; but that of the universe is insurmountable. We're pretty sure the universe is here.
Given those facts one can deduce that god is not and the universe is. No assumption of a creator is necessary to prove the existence of the universe as we experience it. A god however, one that is invisible from all facets or who has simply not visited this section of the universe can't be proven or disproven as of now, which is why I'm not a dogmatic atheist.
Quoting Dfpolis
One can "see" the conversation of mass-energy. Otherwise it wouldn't be a scientifically proven phenomenon.
Quoting Dfpolis
Yes and no, science is the process of discovering reality not the collection of ultimate conclusions.
Quoting Dfpolis
Or non-existant.
Quoting Dfpolis
A bit nitpicks but I believe "interact" would be a more accurate expression. "Act" implies intent or intelegence. Rocks exist but don't act.
Quoting Dfpolis
I disagree, they occur in and thus by the universe, all of your actions and thoughts are included within that. If one goes by the multiverse theory even more so.
One had to first conclude there is a god, without evidence, to go by your concept. But I do like the concept.
Quoting Devans99
I'm with you.
I think a beginning implies creation. If anything comes into existence, it seems like it should be explainable in some way. For instance a tree is created by a certain combination of factors, and, as with most things, seeing that something exists. It would seem that anything which has a beginning, at least in the observable world, is created in some sense. So it seem rational, if we see a beginning to the universe, to wonder what kind of conditions led to that beginning. I think you agree with this, but you seem to think that it is equally reasonable to claim that there were random preconditions which caused the big bang and that there was a Divine creator which caused the big bang. The problem with this is part of the neatness of a creator is, at least with most conceptions, is he possesses the quality of aseity, or he explains himself. Any other pre-conditions, the argument suggests, would lead you into an infinite regress until you reach something which is self-explained.
Also in your response to Ben, you seem to think that when we accept some kind of creator, we welcome a whole new host of problems which does not come with an atheistic explanation, such as what kind of being is this “God”. This only seems tangentially related, as the point of the fine tuning argument is not to arrive at any particular conception of God, but rather that some sort of being we could conceivably call “God” exist. The only attributes one can imply based on this argument are God’s aseity and eternity. Also, it would seem that that however many complications come with some version of God, it would be less complicated than another explanation. Again, because, if we take an a se being to be the cause of the big bang, we don’t have to explain his existence, whereas it would seem that any other cause would require a more complicated explanation. In other words, it doesn’t seem that we are, as you put it, “trading one mystery for several”, but rather we are solving potentially infinite mysteries with one.
Thank you for sharing your faith. Now, do you have an argument a rational person could consider?
The fact that rocks persist is more than adequate. See my video #15 God & Scientific Explanation - Existence Proof https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJUIxaSDfU0.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
Unexamined belief? The point is simple. Not seeing something doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. We apply reason to the data of experience to discover causes that we cannot see.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
I ask you to think for a moment. Evidence requires the skill to use it before a conclusion can be reached. Fifty years ago, no one knew how to use DNA as forensic evidence. That did not mean that crime scenes had no evidence, it only meant that we did not know how to use it. The only way to know that there is no evidence for p is to know that p is false. So, your claim is either based on some non-existence proof, or it is baseless.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
At last! We deduce the existence of things we cannot see from things we can see. The first sound deduction of God's existence I know of was by the father of mathematical physics -- Aristotle. He deduced the existence of an unmoved mover from the fact that things change. Since then many other sound proofs have been added.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
I did not say it was. I am saying that the notion of "brute facts" (things that "just are" for no reason) is incompatible with science. Cosmologists even look for explanations of the big bang. So, no exception is made for the universe, nor should it be.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
The choices are everything has an explanation and so God exists, or some phenomena have no explanation and so science is an irrational enterprise.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
By "act" I only mean doing something. Doing something may or may not involve conscious intent. Rocks act by scattering light, resisting pressure, exerting gravitational attraction, etc. -- all with no minds of their own.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
You are contradicting yourself. Since a multiverse is possible, there are possible acts that are not possible in this universe. So this universe cannot do all possible acts and cannot be self-explaining. Since the laws of physics are contingent, and not metaphysically necessary, it is logically possible to act according to laws that are not instantiated in even a multiverse. So physical systems cannot be self-explaining.
Quoting Grey Vs Gray
This is a plain statement of closed mindedness. As I noted earlier, the only way to know that there is no evidence is to know that there is no God. As you claim not to know this, you are letting your beliefs stand in the way of an open consideration of the data and their implications.
On the other hand, having examined a number of sound proofs, I know how to use the evidence we have to prove that God exists.
Quoting Devans99
God knows He is self-explaining because His essence is His existence.
I don't think God exists, but there are different versions, some of which don't have the same objections.
I think you make a very good point about the Fine-Tuning Argument being an explanation potentially generated from a preselected argument (i.e. existence of a God). However, I would like to challenge your assertion that “whatever the universe is trying to tell us, it is not that it is fine-tuned for life.” It seems to me that what is truly remarkable about our universe is how the complexity throughout allows life- abundantly and diversely. In searching to explain human existence, purpose, and even explain our own need to search for meaning, we reach a point where the natural world can explain no further…yet we recognize that the natural world seems perfectly balanced to accommodate our existence and is things were slightly different (on a biological, chemical, astrophysical level), human life would be impossible. At this point it seems reasonable to consider whether our physical world exists in the way it does by accident, through random change, or if something outside of our universe orchestrated this world, explaining its seemingly fine-tuned nature and the human desire for a greater meaning in life. Thus, complexity that allows the firing of neurons to construct thoughts about an explanation for existence itself seems very improbable under conditions that very easily could have been otherwise.
Of course, on a basic chemical level, reactions need energetically favorable conditions to occur unless there is an input of energy, trending towards increasing entropy which makes complexity in general impressive as randomness is preferable. Yet life thrives on the principles of thermodynamics. The chemosynthesis of photoautotrophs is powered by maximizing the energetically favorable conditions while still building complexity. I don’t think it follows that:
“Another objection is that life, being a high-level complex structure, is going to be fine-tuned (again, in the sense of being sensitive to variations of low-level parameters) no matter what. In fact, any such complex structure is bound to be fine-tuned”
Part of what makes life so remarkable is not only that it exists complexly, but there is a trend in increasing complexity. Life is not just surviving it is changing and adapting- which sets it apart from being any “high-level complex structure.” The tenacity and development of life should be considered in fine tuning. Looking at the evolutionary process and how life has been facilitated and increased in complexity, the development of flagella is a classic example. The probability that this mechanism would arise, this fundamental piece in cell mobility and eventually multicellularity seems so unlikely but happened with extreme success. Evolution informs us that random genetic mutations lead to diversity which will persist if it does not harm the individual’s reproductive ability…. That conditions would exist such that the intermediate steps in flagellum development would have occurred, leading to a such increased biological complexity seems to be another aspect of what our universe is “fine-tuned” for. If it were fine tuned to any other standard (even just complexity in general), a convincing argument would need to be made for what the fine-tuning is for and again we would again be faced with the problem of explaining life as some big accident with in a universe finely-tuned to a different standard.
:up: :) True, but it's even more simple than this, they just have no clue.
Well, if you consider the 10exp500 pissible solutions to string theory no clue... I don't, but there are ideas. Problem seems to be how is chosen between them. And even then, 10jexp500 is nothing in the face of infinity.
The basic free parameters to be settled are the coupling strengths of three charges and the value of the gravity strength. Vary one of them and the universe collapses. Is there maybe a hidden relation between them, I don't know, if this has been looked at. I'm not even sure now what I said about varying them couplings. Would it all be very different? Not sure. It seems pretty obvious though that space gotta have 3 dimensions.
What about the speed of light and Planck's constant? The speed of light gotta be finite in order for mass to exist and events to be spatiotemporally separated. Are that speed and the coupling strengths connected? They all have to do with space, time, and mass. They gotta have a connection somehow.
So, are the parameters contemplated? Yes. Probably.
Ahh, very interesting. :)
I remember watching a video lessons on geometry back a decade or so ago. The speaker, a lady, goes to great lenghts to point out that geometric definitions must end at some point (pun unintended). Either this must be because the simplest geometric idea (like a point) can't be defined for there's nothing simpler in terms of which a definition could be constructed or because the problem of an infinite regress rears its ugly head. The only viable option seems to be use circular definitions, despite the rules of good definitions forbidding such tomfoolery.
What sayest thou, sir?
All definitions end with what the definitions point to in the world. You may look up a word in a dictionary and get more words, but eventually those scribbles on the page refer to something that is not just more scribbles, or else what do the scribbles mean? What makes a scribble a word and not just a scribble? If you wanted a definition of "circle", would you look in the dictionary, or would it be better if I just pointed at several examples of actual circles in the world? It seems like the latter is more direct while the former is indirect. It seems like the former would only be useful if there were no circles around for me to point to to show you what a circle is.
A circle is a (geometric) shape, true, but its precise definition - the set of all points equidistant from one other point (the center) - is more precise and is in words.
However, my point is if one faces difficulty with defining something, it might mean you're dealing with an undefinable (point, space, time, etc.) or that you've come to the realization that you're up against [math]\infty[/math] (infinite regress) and that's always worrying.
Question: In math at least definitions of an object seems to be a matter of deconstructing it into parts e.g. a triangle has 3 sides (read lines); lines are a set of points, and so on.
Is this true of nonmathematical objects too? For instance a dog is a tame wolf (genus & differentia), but tame and wolf are not exactly parts of a dog are they? Maybe they are...
Then the precise definition only refers to imaginary objects in the mind. There is no such thing in the world in which the set of all points are equidistant from one other point (the center). If what we are talking about only exists in our minds, then that is something that I cannot show you and can only describe to you, hence my explanation that we use words to describe something to someone else that they cannot actually see. You can try to draw one based on the precise definition, but you will fail utterly. Depending on what measurement we are using, one point will not be equidistant as all the other points. There will be a point that is a micrometer more or less distant from the center than other points.
Nirvana fallacy? There are certain margins of error we must be willing to accept, especially since the world is, for some reason, imperfect. The human mind, all life in fact, has been, for the most part of its earthly existence, has been a constant struggle against nature's imperfections, oui? I frankly find it odd that you would demand flawlessness in a world that is, well, flawed. Perhaps it's proof, as Plato believed, our minds are not of this world. How else could it have ever conceived of forms?
-"The human mind, all life in fact, has been, for the most part of its earthly existence, has been a constant struggle against nature's imperfections, oui? "
-Imperfection is an unnecessary qualifier. Humans have being struggling against nature and their own nature. Perfection is a goal we strive for and we project it on to nature as if it is possible for anything perfect to exist especially in the eyes of subjective observers.
Our ability to produce minimalistic concepts is evidence on how demanding for our brains is to hold complex details in concepts. We need those concepts to apply shortcuts in order to "survive".
A circle is a mental shortcut representing a simplified version of all round things we have ever experienced in our world...until Cad and DTP programs brought them in to our lives. lol
Why using any simple concept that appears weird to us as an excuse to make a magical claim about the nature of our existence?
I get it, humans need their lives to have meaning in a cosmic scale so they need an ideology that can remove them from this finite world and place them in a magical realm where everything is perfect....even our expiration date in there is a....circle.
Again a friend of mind reminded me that Philosophy is an exercise of frustration...not a buffet of comforting ideas to put in our mental plates...
PSR?
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
You missed the point then.
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
Sometimes it'll do, sometimes it just won't. The trick is to know when it will and when it won't. :up:
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
Maybe some, not me! I've had my share of grandiose delusions!
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
:up: However, most philosophers seem happy & content!
The point of philosophy was bewilderment and that invariably leads to frustration, but that's tenuous link (re aporia, ataraxia, bushido).
But that's the point. Are we talking about defining objects in the world, or defining objects in the mind. We need to make that clear or else we end up talking past each other.
It's not that the world is not perfect. Perfect is just another model in the mind, and not a feature of the world outside of the mind. The world just is a certain way and the way we model it is another, but representative of the way it is. Life is not adapting to imperfections. It is adapting to the way things are, which is constantly changing. Using the terms, imperfection/perfection is implying that you have knowledge of what a perfect world would be like and that everyone would agree with you.
:up:
No the point is fallacious.
Quoting Agent Smith
-the existence of "circles" prove that we tend to simplify aspects of reality through idealistic concepts.
You are referring to an irrelevant aspect.(whether it is useful...while I address what our brain does).
Quoting Agent Smith
Again you always seem to miss the aspect of the thing in question.....nice talking to you agent smith...
Mmmm...Non. Imperfections need to be embraced. Only where due, you should look for it. In the modern era, perfection seems to be attended to mostly in the physical domain of bodily appearances. The body is tried to be reshaped in an ideal resembling a horrible abstraction from the natural standard. Resulting in mental sickness and dissolvement from reality. And even the mental domain seems prone to the same abstractions, reshaping the mind into a logical process resembling the the so beloved computers and logical processes inside. Just listen to the CEO talk and (mainly) his (mainl) perfect wife accompanying (mainly) him in perfect silence. The perfect constructor of the perfect world to come "communicating" logically perfect ideals.
Only where it's due, perfection should be sought.
I won't try to explain why you're wrong.
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
The brain is a simplifying apparatus. Telos?
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
Possible, very possible! Thanks for your comments.
:up:
Fine-Tuning is synonymous with perfection insofar as the conditions for life is at stake, oui?
I am not sure that you could even if you tried.
-" Quoting Agent Smith"
-No....our mental shortcuts create simplifications of reality.
Quoting Agent Smith
-Possibility needs to be demonstrated...not declared.
We're derailing the thread! I'm partly responsible. Sorry OP. Good day Nickolasgaspar!
I get it, most of you have invested in specific metaphysical ideologies and people who mesh with your echo chamber are recognized as a treat so you feel then need to derail the conversation in an "unchallenging" state.
I must admit I'm a bit lost. Do pardon me.
Quoting Harry Hindu
We not only adapt to truths, we do the opposite as well, adapt truths to us. Stoicism may have been popular 2.5k years ago, it no longer is; in fact the modern world is distinctly anti-stoic, won't you agree?
Come now to definitions vis-à-vis simplicity.
How, in your view, do the two relate?
As things get simpler, are they easier/harder to define?
In my humble opinion, it should be harder for the reason that entire series of definitions must begin somewhere (to avoid an infinite regress) and ergo there should be some undefined terms to get the ball rolling, these being invariably the simplest of them all.
P. S. I'm still in a bit of a fog so bear with me.
No, no! You've made some very important points. It's just that there are too many lines of inquiry for me to handle. I'm feeling overwhelmed. :smile:
Its your choice....
Ok. Can you lay down these standards (of philosophical inquiry) for my benefit? I'd love to know. I've always suspected there is one and I even have my own ideas about it. Just to be clear, I prefer free-flowing inquiry rather than channelling it down some particular path.
Try the following lecture...https://youtu.be/YLvWz9GQ3PQ
Okay, being a good scientist, let's analyze this precious piece of language..
"I get it"
That's the question. Do you really get it? A tough one! What is there to get in the first place? The thread is about universal fine-tuning. But the "I get it" uttered here seems to refer to the next part of the sentence. So what is thought to be gotten? For that, let's continue our journey in "fun to analyze!!"
"most of you have invested in specific metaphysical ideologies"
Is actual research done for this conjecture? How many is most? What are "specific metaphysical ideologies"? Too vague to be of any scientific interest. We might conclude this part of the sentence is uttered as a rhetorical device by subject Nickolasgaspar. Let's continue!
"and people who mesh with your echo chamber"
This expression seems to conjecture there are people meshing with our echo chamber. Does subject N. compare our brains here with an echo chamber? Meaning that echoes of meshing around are heard? Does subject N. refer to brain surgery maybe? Is brainwashing involved? What is meant? Does he maybe mean we heard things or read stuff? If the last is the case than the expression seems to have objective and justified truth value. On we go!
"are recognized as a treat"
People who are "recognized as a treat". We can only fantasize what is meant here. As fantasizing has no place in rigid scientific discovery I will refrain. But, no worries.
"so you feel then need to derail the conversation"
It's unclear from the grammar or syntax, to which previous part of the sentence is referred here. To the specific metaphysical ideologies adopted, to the echo chamber meshing or to the treat part. And is this actual following? Do most feel the need to derail in the first place? If so, what is there to derail? Too much unclear and unfounded conjecture without any empirical content. Again we conclude nothing else that rhetorics are uttered. And then, a conversation is named. But is that what's going on here? Mmmm....On to the final analysis...
"in an "unchallenging" state"
This expression seems to me indicate that the conversation has become an unchallenging one on the basis of a previous conjecture for which there is no actual proof. Subject S. seems to indicate to be unchallenged. That might be the case.
So far, the analysis. Seeya next time!
"Ah! A woman philosophizing!" So I thought when looking at the video. She just introduced the actual philosopher... :sad:
Quoting Agent Smith
Yes, we are part of the world, not separate from it. The world affects us and we affect the world. This is simpler than trying to think of us as separate (dualism) from the world (soul vs body, mind vs. brain, physical vs. mental, etc.).
Quoting Agent Smith
I don't see how having undefined terms to get the ball rolling actually gets the ball rolling. It seems to me that our terms have to refer to something or else there essentially is no ground to roll the ball on.
I think that our language-use has become so complex that it seems like the world is more complicated than it actually is. Most philosophical problems are the result of a mis-use of language, or poorly defined terms.
Well, I'm of the view that definitions, like propositions, are subject to the Münchhausen Trilemma:
1. Infinite regress of definitions/proofs
2. Circular definitions/proofs
3. Undefined terms/unproven assumptions.
What I wished to convey was that, at least in math, the choice is 3: We begin with undefined terms e.g. points.
What's this little idea you always seem to be alluding to about points Agent Smith?
:lol:
I can't remember the rest of the lecture! :rofl:
Then it seems to me that you believe that ultimately no one is talking about anything. We would simply be making sounds with our mouths and making scribbles on this screen. What makes some scribble a word, and not just a scribble?
It seems to me that your trilemma only describes the mis-uses of language that I described as being the the root of most philosophical problems. Ironing out our definitions and determining whether or not they actually refer to some non-contradictory state-of-affairs resolves those philosophical problems.
point = .
That was easy.
Could you kindly expand and elaborate? Gracias.
Are you going Wittgenstein on me?
I'd prefer to say that I'm going logical on you. It seems that one can logically arrive at that conclusion without ever having read Wittgenstein.
https://simplyphilosophy.org/study/fallacies-of-language/