What are facts?
I've been reading and rereading the SEP entry on facts, and am still as puzzled about what facts are as I was before reading the SEP entry. Specifically, I have issues with understanding this part:
1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer,
2) A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs,
3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.
From.
How can facts be sui generis types of entities? Is this some sort of attempt at constructing Libernzian monism or some modern rehash of logical atomism?
1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer,
2) A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs,
3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.
From.
How can facts be sui generis types of entities? Is this some sort of attempt at constructing Libernzian monism or some modern rehash of logical atomism?
Comments (166)
So a fact can be a truth-bearer, in which case it's a statement; because it is statements that are able to be true or false.
And a fact is also a state of affairs, and so not a sentence at all.
So some conclude that a fact is sui generis, because they think the word "fact" is the name of something.
And they would be correct in that conclusion. Facts are names but not ridged designators regardless if they are contingently true or necessarily so.
But if something attains the status of a fact, for example in science, then it by extension becomes a name, albight a complex one.
If you combine all three categories given in the OP, then a fact seems to become a name, no?
But - there is a way of understanding (defining, knowing the meaning of...) the statement that cannot be set out in words, and instead is shown by what happens in the world.
So "The cup is in the cupboard" is a statement, used to tell Fred where the cup is, and Fred shows his understanding when he goes to the cupboard to retrieve the cup.
Then I again ask, what is the difference between the fact that the cup is on the table and the cup being on the table?
If you are using "fact" to mean a state of affairs, then there is no difference between the cup being on the table and the state of affairs of the cup being on the table.
Confusion arrises when these two are mixed.
No, I mean to use fact in all of the possible senses provided in the OP. There seems to be a fundamental difference in stating something as a fact in the specific senses provided instead of treating it as a speech act of some sort.
In other words what is the performative meaning of something being a fact under the above uses?
A fact just is.
Fact is the name of a category or set of data.
Like cheese is the name of a category or a set of curdled milk.
Is that unusual for SEP, or academic philosophy in general?
But the SEP article says that the word "fact" is used with more than one meaning,and so isn't necessary to reconcile those different definitions, or to choose one to be the correct one. Isn't it just a matter of agreeing on which meaning is meant in a discussion. And don't we here always mean "state of affairs"?
Referring to those alternative meanings:
One thing that SEP suggests at one point is that a fact is what makes a truth-bearer true. So, by that meaning, a fact isn't the truth-bearer itself. That agrees with how I'd interpreted the meaning.
A statement is an utterance that (truly or falsely) tells about a fact.
As used here, doesn't "fact" always mean "state of affairs", where "a state of affairs" can also be worded as "an aspect of the way things are."?
Another meaning the SEP article states, which seems to mean the same thing, is that a fact is something that contains one or more objects, and a property, or a relation among them. That sounds like just a different wording of "state of affairs" or "aspect of the way things are".
So, regarding how "fact" is used here, there doesn't seem to be a disagreement or confusion about what we mean when we say "fact".
Of course any word could be analyzed-to-death, finding endless confusion, because no finite dictionary can non-circularlly define all of its words.
...and of course Western academic philosophers exploit that to the hilt. .(probably to provide themselves with endless topics for publishing and debating--an endless gravy train and meal-ticket)..as is so often evident at SEP.
Michael Ossipoff
Thus defying proper definition, or at least non-circular ones.
Like a pure demonstrative, but for "that which is true".
This doesn't seem to apply to some cases, especially when it comes down to epistemological degrees of knowledge. Take for example,
Sally loves Harry.
and,
That Sally loves Harry is a fact.
Again, different statements that hold different meanings. How? Well, one has the exclusivity of being verified to some degree of knowledge, up until the utterance can be said to be certain. Leaning on this one can say that some facts are indisputable because of their ability to verify and ascertain their true value.
So, the truth bearer of Sally loves Harry has been verified, by for example asking the question, how do you know? I know because they told me they're getting engaged, and is not something I have heard from Joe in the workplace. This is more apparent in cases of scientific facts, think water boiling at sea level at 212°F.
How do I know? I have verified it! Thus it is a fact.
2+2=4 is a fact
Nothing has been said on face value, but, it could be understood that adding 'is a fact' denotes that the person understands the rules of the language game (in this case a formal language) and has verified the truth of 2+2=4 by understanding the rules of the formal language game. This is just another instance where verifying something lends it to being 'a fact', depending on one's level of knowledge about the world.
1) The snow is white
2) It is a fact that the snow is white
... Could even go further and say
3) It is that the snow is white.
?
Well, going back on my previous post, it can be asserted that the snow is white because we know that the snow is white due to it being an established fact through many observations. It just so happens that this is a trite fact that has no content. More like a tautology.
Not true. A claim that something is a fact is already assuming that the proposition is true, through verifying it via different means, depending on the context of the proposition.
See:
1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer
How is a fact a true truth-bearer? Through further examination/investigation of the utterance or verificationism.
I mean, the prominence of 'facts' started with the logical positivists after all. So, verificationism is somewhat a given.
But, what's most interesting is that the notion of the discovery of scientific truths is upheld through (in this case of facts and scientific facts) verificationism and not fallibilism.
No, because 'the snow is white' is not ' "the snow is white" '. both 1) and 2) state the proposition as a fact, only 2) makes it explicit. We could distinguish :
1) The snow is white = assertion
2) It is a fact that the snow is white = explicit assertion
3) It is that the snow is white = assertion
4) "The snow is white" = non-assertion
That sounds right.
Michael Ossipoff
It seems to me that 2+2=4 is best regarded as a hypothetical fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract if-then fact:
Definitions::
"1" means the multiplicative identity specifed in the multplicative identity axiom of the real numbers (or rational numbers, or integers)...
...and 2 means 1+1
....and 3 means 2+1
...and 4 means 3+1...
"If " Premise:
If the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true...
"Then" Conclusion:
...then 2+2=4.
...an inevitable abstract if-then fact.
Michael Ossipoff
A fact is a group of words that express an idea that has a positive truth value. Whether that counts as a statement would depend on the definition of statement. And yes that does seem circular.
Then other philosophers reject bivalence in an attempt to justify the mixing...
This. '2+2=4' doesn't seem to be anymore a fact in itself than '2+2' or '2=2'. It is a mathematical proposition, which means that it is dependant on mathematical forms of assertion. A proof is probably is good way.
It is important to treat this as an epistemological question, not an ontological one. That is, "What is a fact?" is a question about how best to use the word "fact", not a question about what sort of thing a fact is. We don't need to make assumptions about there being things called facts.
So the question becomes one of working out a suitable grammar for epistemological reflection. We are looking for the place "fact" occupies amongst other words like "sentence", "statement", "true", "false", "belief", "justification" and so on. Our task is to understand how we can coherently and cogently talk of facts.
Thoughts?
More to come.
Some sentences have a simple subject/verb structure, and are called declaratives or statements. Other sentences can have other structures.
Statements can be used to make assertions.
Statements can also, generally, be assigned a truth value. That truth value will be a second-order predicate ranging over some group of statements.
For starters, for any statement p, (p) and ('p' is true) have the same truth value.
So at least in that sense truth is redundant.
To repeat a question talked about before, what is the difference between the cup being on the table and the cup on the table?
Quoting Banno
I think that there are three types of things involved:
1. "the cup is on the table"
2. the cup on the table
3. the cup being on the table
The first is a sentence, the second is an object, and the third is... what? The state of affairs? I think the distinction between 2 and 3 is the most interesting area of discussion.
I'm not sure if this makes sense; but, 3 seems to prescribe a sense of intentionality (mistakenly?) when speaking about the object of interest, the cup, that is, being on the table.
I don't see any difference between 2 & 3.
Interesting that neither is a well-formed statement.
"The cat is on the mat" is not a fact, it is a statement - contra Quoting Sir2u
I can drink from the cup on the table but I can't drink from the cup being on the table (or to put it another way, I can't drink from the fact that the cup is on the table). So there must be a difference between the cup on the table and the cup being on the table.
So for the purposes of my suggested grammar, a fact is not a statement, and we ought reject the idea that a fact has a truth-value.
Sure, but is the cat on the mat a fact? Surely it's more correct to say that the cat on the mat is an animal. Whereas that the cat is on the mat isn't an animal (and nor is it a sentence).
There's clearly a difference between the cat on the mat and that the cat is on the mat (and also "the cat is on the mat"). There's the animal and the state of affairs (and the sentence).
So how does the animal (and the fabric) differ from the state of affairs?
One is an animal, the other a fact?
Sure, so objects are one thing and facts are another (and sentences are a third). We have 1) the cat on the mat, 2) that the cat is on the mat, and 3) "the cat is on the mat". We have 1) the cup on the table, 2) the cup being on the table, and 3) "the cup is on the table".
The distinction between 1) and 2) is the most interesting area of discussion. What is the ontological difference between an object and a state of affairs; between a red cup and a cup being red?
I can understand this. Perhaps if we draw a distinction between sentences and propositions we can say that a fact is a true proposition.
Yes, but only if it obtains to a state of affairs in the world. Do you also see the fallacious circularity in stating that facts are true propositions?
No?
So, to what state of affairs do facts, or a fact, correspond to, in order for it to be a proposition?
EDIT: This is where,
, seems to be true in some observer independent or dependent sense.
I don't know what you mean by this. It's a proposition if it's the meaning of a sentence.
I suppose this is where we are at risk of equivocation. Some people talk about (obtaining) states of affairs as being facts, whereas others talk about (true) propositions as being facts. I suppose it might be simpler if we abandon the term "fact" and just use the terms "(obtaining) state-of-affairs" and "(true) proposition".
Although this still doesn't explain the difference between objects, like a red cup, and states-of-affairs, like a cup being red. Perhaps states-of-affairs are to objects as propositions are to sentences? I don't know.
Yes, but, the issue is with the truth or falsity of the proposition. If it obtains, then it's a fact. That a sentence or proposition is a fact doesn't change the content of the sentence.
Another way to talk about this issue is whether you believe in the correspondence theory of truth, where propositions are facts if they correspond with states of affairs in reality or if you subscribe to a different theory of truth that makes facts representative of an actual state of affairs. In fact, I don't believe there are other theories of truth that incorporate the importance of a proposition being true just based on whether it obtains with a certain state of affairs, thus making the sentence a fact or not.
In my view, the only difference between the two is one of incorporating intentionality into the sentence, thus making it more of a declarative sentence and not the typical descriptivist sentence, seen when trying to obtain a state of affairs.
So, something being red is qualitatively distinct from that something is red. In one case the subject is dissociated from the utterance and in the other, the subject is participating in the content or meaning of the utterance.
A statement is an utterance that tells (truthfully or falsely) about a fact.
A fact is a state-of-affairs, an aspect of the way things are.
...or as SEP worded it (more difficultly and maybe problematically, it seems to me), a property of a thing, or a relation among things.
Things are whatever can be referred to.
So facts and statements are things too.
Michael Ossipoff
When I said that, I meant "hypothetical fact" to mean something that's like a fact, except that it's only hypothetically a fact. It isn't necessarily a fact.
The "then" conclusion of an if-then fact is conditional upon another hypothetical fact. (the premise of the if-then fact)
So, just as a convicted "criminal" isn't necessarily a criminal, so a hypothetical "fact" isn't necessarily a fact.
Michael Ossipoff
Regarding 2+2=4 in terms of its usual route of proof, 2+2=4 is only a hypothetical fact, not an inevitable fact. It's conditionally a fact. It's a fact if the additive associative axiom is a fact.
2+2 isn't a state of affairs. I've defined "state of affairs" as "an aspect of the way things are". 2+2 is a thing, an abstract object, but it isn't a way something else is.
The SEP definition that I referred to says that a fact is a property of a thing, or a relation among things.
2+2 is a thing, but it isn't a property of a thing or a relation among things.
That's often or usually regarded as conditionally a fact. It's a fact if a certain number-axiom is true.
That too.
It's a mathematical proposition or the conclusion part of a theorem, and can be regarded as a conditional fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract fact whose "if " premise is the hypothetical fact consisting of the additive associative axiom.
But I'd say that the proposition or theorem is that 2+2=4 if the additive associative axiom is true.
Of course there are other experiential ways to arrive at 2+2=4. ...via direct experience with 4 objects, for example. Of course our experience isn't always formal mathematics.
The following abstract fact in parentheses: (If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4) can be proved. It's an inevitable abstract fact.
Michael Ossipoff
The former is directly perceptible and the latter is not.
I think this is the golden nugget of the thread. If 'fact' is a primitive, as I argued, then you can only demonstrate it's use, or refer to it in purely formal terms. As such, I'd say that 'fact' is epistemologically an unbound variable, where its use is to refer to a proposition obtaining a truth-value from a state-of-affairs.
Yeah, but facts do have ontological value, see;
3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.
Not quite. False is a truth-value. Facts cannot be false(I mean if you're working from a framework where facts are either true statements or propositions). Facts aren't the sort of things that can be true/false on my view, but that's another matter altogether.
I'm not going so far in my definition, but you are correct that it would be hard to see any other truth-value obtained from a state-of-affairs as 'fact'.
A more precise way : 'Fact' is an unbound variable, a pure demonstrative which use is to refer a proposition obtaining a positive truth-value from a state-of-affairs.
I guess I don't see how facts constitute entities (aside from the fact that they are intelligible in themselves) or how they are unique in regards to exemplifying relations or properties. That seems to me to be the case of all objects. Basically, it comes down to saying that facts are epistemological entities, which I guess to me just refers to a primitive.
case 1: Fact vs Opinion
When we say something is a fact with this intent, we are asserting that it is an objective feature of the world, not a subjective matter of opinion. In everyday life this distinction generally works well, and Fact is taken to mean 'a proposition to which almost any [say 99% of...] mature, sane, reasonably intelligent person observing this phenomenon would assent'.
When we try to carry that notion into philosophy we immediately run into trouble, because of dream hypotheses and uncertainty about the existence or meaning of a mind-independent world.
case 2: Fact vs Deduction
Here we take facts as readily observable propositions, and we distinguish those from a deduction made from those facts. For instance, it was a fact that Doctor Watson had a limp and a sun tan (I'm not sure of the 'military bearing' though - that sounds a bit subjective to me), but it was a deduction that he had recently been in Afghanistan.
I find that that use is the only one that is able to properly account for truth in both... terms of truth conditions, and terms of what makes thought, belief, and statements thereof true.
So are you saying that statements/propositions reflect facts, describe facts, mirror facts, etc? However, the statement itself is not "the fact?" "The fact" itself exists as a state-of-affairs represented by the arrangement of things in reality (at least generally). Moreover, when we say a statement is true, we are specifically referring to what the grammar itself reflects, that is, when we say a statement is true, we are talking about the statement itself.
It seems to me though that the way we use the word fact can be more expansive than you might suggest. Philosophers try to be more exact, and that might be part of the problem. For example, you might say to me, "Mary put the cat on the mat," and I might respond, "That's a fact," and in this case I'm simply responding to your statement, not the philosophers state-of-affairs definition. So what I'm saying is that there are times when we use the term fact, that it's simply a reflection of the statement itself. We see this in courts of law when we consider the statements people put forth as evidence or as statements of truth. So there are times when we use the word fact and the word true as synonyms. It's very difficult to pull oneself away from the philosophers idea of facts, which I believe, doesn't reflect the many uses of the term.
It's difficult to pull oneself away from the definition, as thought the definition is the be all and end all in terms of answering the question "What is a fact?" or "What is truth?" The tendency, for all of us, is to look for the thing, the object (definition or otherwise) that we can point too. I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you, but merely pointing out something important to add to this confusing topic.
1,2 & 3. I do not think you have the essential quality of a fact.
A fact is first and foremost a statement of affairs, claimed to be true. It does not stand alone and relies wholly on the story teller.
Yep. Thats where I started.
Quoting Akanthinos
Quoting Michael
Quoting Sir2u
Quoting Michael
Quoting Michael
Quoting charleton
Quoting Posty McPostface
Quoting Banno
Not quite.
It is to say that correspondence, matching up, and/or correctly reporting on the facts makes statements true.
I'm not sure what about facts is supposed to be simple. Wouldn't you think from the start that pinning down facts is going to be a contentious issue.
I wouldn't say it's only valid in this view, but its probably the view in which the term insert itself the most easily. It's also likely the most common view that is consistent with a naive interpretation of the world.
Meaning is irrevocably important to the very ability to make statements about fact, regardless of whether or not the statement is true/false. When accounting for the necessary and sufficient conditions for true/false statements, when accounting for what true statements require, when accounting for what true statements are existentially contingent upon, we mustn't neglect the necessity of meaning.
All meaning is attributed by virtue of making connections(drawing mental correlations) between signs, symbols, and that which is signified and/or symbolized; respectively. This is not necessarily a one to one type of relationship(like math and other rigid designators), but that's another matter altogether. Suffice it to say that where there is no meaning, there can be no statements(at least not in the sense we're concerned with). When there are no statements, there can be no correspondence between them and what they report upon; the facts.
The statement "the cat is on the mat" is meaningful because we have long since connected it to very specific portions of ongoing events(fact). By the time we get to where we can start talking about all of the different senses of the term "fact", we've long since been drawing mental correlations between the statement and the specific bits of reality it's connected to. Making a statement doesn't make it meaningful.
We can make the statement, and be perfectly understood by another who shares meaning(speaks the same language) by virtue of having drawn similar enough correlations between the statement and the bits of reality that the statement reports upon. We can do this even when the statement isn't true. The statement can be made, understood, and false. The statement "the cat is on the mat" has the exact same content, regardless of whether or not it's true/false; regardless of whether or not it corresponds to fact; regardless of whether or not there is a cat on the mat. It means the same thing. That is because the content of statements doesn't include truth, even if it is true, despite the presupposition of truth.
Truth is not a property of statements. Truth is not contained within statements. Truth is a relationship 'between' true statements and fact that is - in part - facilitated by meaning. It is presupposed within all statements by virtue of statements consisting of mental correlations and correlation presupposing the existence of it's own content. We compare statements with what they're reporting upon as a means of checking for truth. That's precisely what verification/falsification methods are seeking; Correspondence to fact.
That's a significantly large part of how "fact" works when used to mean the events we find ourselves immersed within; happenings; states of affairs; the way things are/were.
Yes, but the world consists of objects, not things.
And here is the gem I was looking for. Regarding ethics and metaphysics, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one ought to remain silent, as Wittgenstein intended that statement to be understood within that context.
Back to quietism for me.
Where do I lose your confidence?
You and I face each other. You hold up a hand and say "Here is a hand".
What would you make of any incredulity I might offer? That I have bad sight? That I do not understand English?
Quoting creativesoul
There's another distinction you have made. How do things differ from objects?
Sometimes what is posited doesn't require our positing it in order for it to exist, as it is, prior to or discovery. Certain relationships are such things. Truth is a relationship 'between' thought, belief, statements thereof and states of affairs; events; happenings; that which was/is the case; that which has happened or is currently happening; reality; fact; the world; the circumstances we find ourselves within; observed interactions; etc.("fact" from henceforth)
Relationships do not have a spatiotemporal location. Do not take the term between as an indication of such(hence the scarequotes above). Correspondence is a relationship. Relationships do not have precise enough a spatiotemporal location to be sensibly called a 'property' of a statement. Statements have quite precise locations. Relationships do not.
Correspondence with fact happens prior to language. As a result of that, and that alone, we can know that correspondence with fact doesn't always require language. Accompany that with our already knowing that empirical knowledge is accrued and we can further know that thought and belief is accrued. I mean, that's what empirical knowledge consists in/of. True belief is formed and put to further use prior to language.
What's not understood Banno?
No. That would make truth a binary predicate - it isn't.
Using language is second nature to almost every human beings. Within language, the use of terms like 'true' and 'false' is relatively simple, because we rely on well-established parameters to guide us through this usage. But what we do here is, as philosophers, when we question what are 'facts' and how we structure our understanding of them, is locate ourselves somewhat 'outside' of language (even if it is quite literally inescapable). We locate ourselves within 'epistemology' or 'ontology' and try to work out a framework.
But then, I guess anyone is free to deny this distinction, or its possibility, and simply say that we are overcomplicating things. That's an argument from the ages, and I'm sure it's never really convinced any philosopher who was tempted by the ontological or epistemological path.
Holding expectation is possible prior to language.
When my cat comes to me expecting treats as a result of hearing the plastic treat bag rustle, she has recognized the sound. She has long since drawn a mental correlation between the sound and the treats. She expects to be given treats. She hears the sound, and she makes her way to me.
When my cat hears the treats hitting the inside of the glass food bowl, her expectation is much stronger. She has formed meaningful thought and belief about the events she's immersed within. She believes she's about to eat treats.
She has drawn correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or herself(her own mental/emotional state). Those correlations are the origen of meaning. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent qualification(s). <-----------that is the presupposition of correspondence to fact inherent to all thought and belief formation.
Being a binary predicate is existentially contingent upon language. Correspondence with fact is not.
Except Wittgenstein??
Objects have names, and relations between them give meaning. Things are none of those. According to Wittgenstein as I understand him.
Yes, this is nominalism being professed here.
Now you want to shift to something like "Correspondence with fact is what makes beliefs true".
And again I must point out that merely naming the posited relationship between beliefs and facts tells us nothing.
What? Limiting one claim is not equivalent to limiting myself. It is what makes statements true. I didn't say only statements, nor would I
What are you talking about?
A relationship that predates language. That's what correspondence with fact is. Predicates are existentially contingent upon language. It is a construct thereof that names something therein.
Truth is not existentially contingent upon language.
From my understanding of the TLP. The problem of Universal's is omitted by appealing to logical simples which can't be further reduced.
Quoting creativesoul
Single place predicate: "the cat is black". Represented by f(a)
Double place predicate: "The cat is on the mat", setting out a relation of "...is on..." between cat and mat. Represented f(ab).
We say:
"The cat is black" is true.
This has the form of a single-place predicate.
Do you agree that logical simples were rejected in PI?
Things are logical simples, whatever that means if anything at all. Or 'things' manifest another way, is what Wittgenstein meant when asserting that 'logic takes care of itself'.
Quoting Banno
I have yet to find a passage in the Investigations that even addresses logical simples. It's been a while since I've read it, or even from cover to cover without some external reference. If you happen to find a passage that addresses the logical simples professed in the TLP, I'd appreciate that piece of the puzzle I'm trying to find between Wittgenstein's evolution in thought between the two works.
I might be at the limits of my language and world, or any more and nonsense will manifest.
So what is ?48 about?
Well, yeah, I guess. Depending on the reading. I know of no other philosopher who spent so much effort building an ontology just to show that ontologies shouldn't be built.
I'd call it meaning as use, and agreement. If anything it smells of pragmatism, a lot!
It doesn't negate the notion of logical simples; but, attempts to show that they aren't necessary for agreement between individuals about the use of names for things. Yet, those things are important when talking about language at the risk of climbing that ladder and then throwing it away, not strictly referring to meaning as use or language in practice, as I understand it. See:
Quoting Wittgenstein, PI, 48.
The closest you will get is the T-sentence, and that sets out an equivalence.
Quoting Wittgenstein, PI, 49.
Yeah, here's 2.0121:
Quoting Wittgestein, TLP, 2.0121
Same thing being said in the PI 48&49, no?
That's not how I understand it, and I am not alone.
See, for example,
http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/investigations/section2/page/2/
Quoting Banno
And yet... you began doing it. What still lies between your twice saying that is my answer.
Grown-up?
Sigh.
If you could refer me to some other works, as the link seems more like handwaving than a serious philosophical critique of logical atomism.
Care to tell me what my goal is?
X-)
Quoting Banno
The cart before the horse. Meaningful thought and belief does not require metacognition. The rules you've invoked do. What makes you think that those rules are an appropriate thing to use as a means for setting out what they, themselves, require?
Those are belief statements(assuming sincerity). "Is true" becomes and/or is redundant as a result of precisely what I'm setting out Banno. "Is true" is not truth.
True thought and belief is prior to language, thus prior to predicate logic. If true belief is not existentially contingent upon predicate logic, then neither is truth. Truth is what makes belief true. If truth is not existentially contingent upon language then we can get it wrong. If predicate logic says something about truth that conflicts with it being prior to language, then predicate logic is wrong.
About what? Like, how I wish Adolf Reinach hadn't died so young, and should've been the 1880-ish intellectual to come to proeminence out of the german intellectual world?
Sometimes what is posited doesn't require our positing it in order for it to exist, as it is, prior to or discovery. Certain relationships are such things. Truth is a relationship 'between' thought, belief, statements thereof and states of affairs; events; happenings; that which was/is the case; that which has happened or is currently happening; reality; fact; the world; the circumstances we find ourselves within; observed interactions; etc.("fact" from henceforth)
Correspondence with fact happens prior to language. As a result of that, and that alone, we can know that correspondence with fact doesn't always require language. Accompany that with our already knowing that empirical knowledge is accrued and we can further know that thought and belief is accrued. I mean, that's what empirical knowledge consists in/of. True belief is formed and put to further use prior to language.
That addresses what you done by virtue of invoking the rules of predicate logic. It shows that truth doesn't require metacognition. Predicate logic does. Truth doesn't require predicate logic.
All else above applies to your earlier mischaracterization of what I've been doing here. I'm a bit disappointed.
When my cat comes to me expecting treats as a result of hearing the plastic treat bag rustle, she has recognized the sound. She has long since drawn a mental correlation between the sound and the treats. She expects to be given treats. She hears the sound, and she makes her way to me.
When my cat hears the treats hitting the inside of the glass food bowl, her expectation is much stronger. She has formed meaningful thought and belief about the events she's immersed within. She believes she's about to eat treats.
She has drawn correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or herself(her own mental/emotional state). Those correlations are the origen of meaning. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent qualification(s). <-----------that is the presupposition of correspondence to fact inherent to all thought and belief formation.
What do the rules of predicate logic have to do with that which predates language itself?
No secondary sources apart from Max Blacks interpretation of the TLP. Send me a link to what you have in mind and I'll give it a good reading. Thanks.
Oh, come on, be a sport. You asked me a question without specifying what it was about. What do you want me to tell you about?
We most likely agree on much when it concerns statements. As you know, statements are statements of thought and belief. Because true belief is prior to language so too is truth, for truth is what makes statements of thought and belief true. My position differs in the main from your own in that regard. Truth is a relationship; correspondence with fact. So, being true requires what I set out earlier. There must be something happening and a way to take account of that. Fact on the one hand, with meaningful thought and belief on the other. That suffices.
Thought and belief are prior to language. Arguing for that could seem difficult, perhaps impossible for some. It certainly doesn't work with a position that holds i that all belief has propositional content, ii that neglects to draw the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, or iii that works from the ambiguous claim that we cannot get beneath or beyond language.
Regarding the last bit above, we do not need to get beyond or beneath language in order to become aware of things that exist as they are prior to our discovery and/or becoming aware of them. True belief is one such thing, as is false belief. Unless you've changed your position, I think we still agree that cats can have true belief.
I say that that is because their mental correlations correspond to fact. When my cat hears the sound of food hitting her glass bowl, she draws a correlation between that sound and getting food. She has been making that connection for a very long time. It took a few times of her watching me poor the food and hearing the sound. She recognizes and/or attributes causality. She knows that food makes a certain sound when it hits her bowl. As a result of holding that thought enough, she now clearly believes that there will be food in her bowl after hearing it.
She, just like us(at first), employs truth unknowingly by virtue of presupposing it. She, just like us(at first), attributes meaning unknowingly. She, just like us, is connected directly to the world by virtue of doing so.
You hold that Jack has true belief, right?
Right?
Either there is true belief without truth, or truth is not existentially contingent upon language.
We're both grown-ups.
I don't think the Wittgensteinian angle Banno's flying the flag for would deny this, in fact Wittgenstein's way of looking at things almost relies on there being pre-verbal foundations to thought, that would be part of the idea of a "way of life." There are some things we just do naturally, there are what you might call "motions of the mind" that don't necessarily use words.
But the point would be: could your cat communicate to other cats that treats are on the way?
You see so far, those internal "motions of the mind" are idiosyncratic to each creature, bespoke internal symbolisms. In human beings, that might mean that when I hear the word "tree" it triggers a vague coloured tree image, like an impressionist painting, whereas when you hear the word "tree" a particular sharply defined tree that's an archetypal or prototype tree occurs to you, but in monochrome, for another person a simplified tree schema, for another person, a particular memory of a tree from their childhood, etc.
But the variance of these things means that what's important about words and communication, and therefore thought to the extent that it's shareable, can't be reliant on those internal pre-verbal motions, there's no logic to them, so they all "cancel out" (same as with Wittgenstein's beetle example); what's important for logic, thought and language, is the shared habits of shuffling symbols around in particular ways in particular contexts. That's the thing that crosses the abyss between man and man, that's the thing that allows communication - those shared habits. That's what makes it so that we understand each other even though our internal imagery, etc., might be quite different.
Mind you, I also suspect that if a lion could talk, we could use Davidson's radical interpretation to work out what it wanted. 8-)
You blasphemer you.
Regarding that, has there been any progress between the coherentist view of truth and the correspondence theory?
I'm on the fence.
Quoting Posty McPostface
I'm not the right person to ask unfortunately.
Why?
Of course. At least, I think so...
Does Jack, your cat, believe that he has true beliefs? I would say that that is not possible for Jack. He does not possess the complexity of thought and belief that only language allows. Believing that one has true belief requires language, for it requires isolating one's own mental ongoings. We do that with the terms "mental ongoings", "thought", "belief", "emotion", etc.
Interesting point to make, but I find it irrelevant, and based upon dubious presupposition. It presupposes either that common language is necessary for true belief, or that communicating one's own thought and belief is necessary for forming and/or holding it.
So, Banno presupposes that thinking about one's own thought and belief is necessary for having and/or forming true belief. It's not. You presuppose that being able to communicate one's own thought and belief is necessary for forming and/or holding true belief. It's not.
Language is necessary for both of those. Language is not necessary for drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. Drawing correlations counts as thought and belief.
If we were able to understand that the lion spoke, them by that vey fact we understand that she and we share something...
Hm. The point is perhaps too subtle. Jack can have a true belief; Jack cannot believe that he has a true belief. Doing so requires that he have access to language.
I've been trying to make that clear to you for a while now...
Where you take note of the differences, I note the similarity. Mental correlations.
The point I'm making is that if true belief is prior to language, then so too is truth. If Jack can have true belief, then it cannot be true by virtue of any other notion of truth aside from the correspondence that I argue for. That is not to deny the other senses of the term. Rather, it's to show that all senses aside from correspondence are existentially contingent upon presupposing correspondence.
That's odd, because not only do I agree, I'm arguing for the same assertion/conclusion.
So we agree that in order for Jack to believe that he has true belief, he has to have the capability that only complex language can allow. He has to be able to think about his own thought and belief.
Agree?
No, it isn't.
We understand another as a direct result of drawing the same or similar enough correlations between language use, what's being talked about, and/or ourselves.
I'm not even saying that what you're setting out is wrong.
Logic is a non-starter. Logic aims to take account of thought and belief. Language does as well. Get thought and belief right, and both logic and language will be better off.
So, Jack has true belief but he cannot believe that has has true belief, for he has no language. Language is necessary for thinking about one's own thought and belief. It does not follow that language is necessary for true belief.
Jack has true belief without language. True belief does not require truth, or truth does not require language.
Language games are not fixed. They can change, mingle and disappear to be replaced by novel games. Talking to lions would be a novel game.
Definitely - this is what Witty's account of learning emphasizes. But this is the problem with speaking of 'commensurability': the language of commensuribility bothers me because it's so binary: "X is or is not commensurate with Y". But the fluidity of language games and the dynamism of linguistic practice abjures such black and white vocabulary. I honestly think sometimes a ton of philosophers of language would hang their head in shame if they simply learnt another language other than English. To anyone who is bi or multi-lingual, I think the question 'are those languages commensurate?' would really come off as a dumb question, a question to which answers would be 'not even wrong'.
The whole effort of learning, of inhabiting a life of language, of embodied practices of language-use is abstracted away in a bloodless manner where languages are treated as just so many idealizations able to be mapped upon one other painlessly. But then I think literally everything interesting in language happens precisely in the 'in between' of the transform.
I think I will start a thread inspired by this discussion, although it's been percolating in me for a while now.
I don't follow this - idealist has far too many connotations for it to be clear.
I was considering a thread on the analogy between Lorentz transformations and Davidson's radical interpretation...
Heaven forbid that I should fall for such a thing! Save me!
I'm wondering.
Yeah but the similarities (as well as the differences) are inaccessible to us, all we have that we can share is the shared patterns of symbol use.
IOW it doesn't matter that when I hear "tree" I have a different internal "brain writing" (or whatever one might call it) than you, all that matters is that we use "tree" the same way.
That shared language use is what sets us into right relation with the world (with the way the world really is) and with each other at the same time, because the objectively similar language use lives in the same realm ("out there") as the way the world really is.
That shared de facto objectivity (the objectivity of the patterns of use being out there in the world right alongside the way the world really is) then reflexively gives the "correct" meaning to our variable/similar internal "brain writing" calculi, internal imagery, etc.
That said, of course because of evolution, there is a lot that's going on in our brains that's probably similar, or analogous, just as it is with animals. But it doesn't have to be for communication to work; and we can also sharpen up the precision of our communication to some aribtrary degree, quite regardless of the differences.
That's just not true on it's face. Everyday facts show otherwise.
The position you're arguing for uses the notion of mental ongoings being inaccessible as a premiss. Methodologically speaking, it's similar to claiming water isn't accessible while using it to make cookies, or claiming that X and Y are different and we have no access to either.
Thought and belief are quite accessible.
Quoting gurugeorge
Animals cannot tell us what's going on inside their minds. In order to do that, there must be shared meaning, a common language. I think we agree on that. That's also what Banno is saying, I think. It quite simply does not follow that i) non and/or pre-linguistic creatures do not form and hold thought and belief, or that ii) we cannot acquire knowledge of what non and/or pre-linguistic thought and belief consists of.
Do you hold that language allows us to become aware of things that are not existentially contingent upon language?
Is all thought and belief existentially contingent upon language?
This clearly becomes about what thought and belief consists in/of... the content. Most academics hold that all thought and belief has propositional content. I reject that view for many reasons. It works from the dubious presupposition that statements of thought and belief are equivalent to thought and belief. It also fails to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.
Does someone know well enough what a fact is if they can use it in everyday life?
To me the difference between riding a bicycle and talking about a bicycle comes to mind. To use the word fact in a non-philosopical way is to ride the bike without falling off.
But then a philosopher gets off the bicycle and puts on his philosophizing hat and finds that no finite arrangement of words is the perfect explanation of what a fact is. A fact becomes mysterious and elusive. And maybe there is something mysterious and elusive in our being able to ride that bike. And yet it's a fact that we ride that bike all the time.
To talk about what a fact really --to get off the bike when it comes to the particular word 'fact' --seems to require that we keep on not-knowingly riding that bike when it comes to all the other words that we use to figure out what a 'fact' is.
It seems that a kind of ignorance makes explicit knowledge possible (or just pursuable?) in the first place. An active not-knowing (or an automatic or unconscious knowing) looks like the rule rather than the exception here. The we that looks is big and dark as we focus on the tiny point of light.
I imagine objections
"it is a fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris"
"It is a fact that Peano Arithmetic, if consistent, has undecidable propositions"
"It is a fact that nothing with positive mass can travel at the speed of light"
But in all of these cases the objection merely consists in re-affirming a statement, as if the statement by itself isn't up to the job somehow.
Doesn't this imply that talk of 'facts' merely consists in speech acts that attempt to enforce a normative behavioural response on behalf of the listener by declaring scepticism to be [I]illegal[/I]?
in other words, isn't the following a fact?
"Facts are true [I]de jure[/I], but are not true [I]de facto[/I]"
Or maybe they don't.
"Fire is always hot"
Which is another way of saying
"It is a fact that fire is hot"
But don't these two statements only mean
"Don't put your hand into the fire!" and other heat-related normative speech acts???
Why should the meaning of the laws of science be any different from this???
In other words:
Why should we believe in a De jure - De facto distinction????
Doesn't collapsing this distinction circumvent Hume's problem of Induction???
I can't refer to a single author, but my intuition would be that if a coherentist wanted to use 'facts' as a term, he would do so in a heuristic manner to establish a frame of comparison between his and other systems of beliefs held by other agents. By stating x or y as a fact, you emphasize the need for attention to that specific part of your propositional language. That way, it may become easier and easier to ascertain that two different belief systems are incompatible.
Perhaps, also, 'facts' would simply denote those propositions taken to provide the most validity to the structure of beliefs? That might be a bit too foundational.
Are facts the sort of things that can be true? If so, must they be in order to be a fact?
Are facts the sort of things that make statements true?
Are facts just true statements?