Absolute Presuppositions of Science
I'm starting this discussion as a follow-on from a discussion @J and I had in his thread on reference magnetism.
[Edit for clarification] Change in title—The presuppositions of classical physics. The claims I make in this thread are intended to apply to physics before the advent of relativity and quantum mechanics in 1905.
About four years ago I started a discussion about what R.G. Collingwood called "absolute presuppositions" of pre-1905–pre-quantum mechanics physics. Collingwood wrote that absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality. In that discussion, I, with help from others, listed my understanding of what those presuppositions were:
Some of these are from Collingwood's "An Essay on Metaphysics," some from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and some from my own understanding.
Since then, I have read E.A. Burtt's "The Metaphysics of of Modern Science"–a wonderful book which I strongly recommend. Burtt's book gave a summary of his own position on this subject, with a focus on Isaac Newton's work. Here is a summary from the book of the absolute presuppositions of the medieval scholastic and ancient greek scholars which were preeminent before the 1600s. These are taken from the book, but I have edited and interpreted them.
And here is a summary of the presuppositions developed by Newton and other scientists in the 1600s which supplanted the scholastic view, again, edited and interpreted by me from Burtt's book.
My purpose in starting this discussion is 1) to discuss the specific presuppositions described and 2) to see how other people see these kinds of presuppositions fitting into their own understanding of how the world works.
[Edit for clarification] Change in title—The presuppositions of classical physics. The claims I make in this thread are intended to apply to physics before the advent of relativity and quantum mechanics in 1905.
About four years ago I started a discussion about what R.G. Collingwood called "absolute presuppositions" of pre-1905–pre-quantum mechanics physics. Collingwood wrote that absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality. In that discussion, I, with help from others, listed my understanding of what those presuppositions were:
- [1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.[3] These substances behave in accordance with scientific principles, laws.[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature.[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times.[6] The behaviors of substances are caused.[7] Substances are indestructible, although they can change to something else.[8] The universe is continuous. Between any two points there is at least one other point.[9] Space and time are separate and absolute. [10] Something can not be created from nothing.
Some of these are from Collingwood's "An Essay on Metaphysics," some from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and some from my own understanding.
Since then, I have read E.A. Burtt's "The Metaphysics of of Modern Science"–a wonderful book which I strongly recommend. Burtt's book gave a summary of his own position on this subject, with a focus on Isaac Newton's work. Here is a summary from the book of the absolute presuppositions of the medieval scholastic and ancient greek scholars which were preeminent before the 1600s. These are taken from the book, but I have edited and interpreted them.
- [11] The real world in which man lives is a world of substances possessed of as many ultimate qualities as can be experienced in them.[12] Explanations are provided in terms of forms and final causes of events, both in this world and in the less independent realm of mind.[13] God is regarded as a Supreme Final Cause.[14] Man is placed over against nature in a teleological hierarchy and his mind is thought of in terms of the scholastic faculties–the capacities of the soul.
And here is a summary of the presuppositions developed by Newton and other scientists in the 1600s which supplanted the scholastic view, again, edited and interpreted by me from Burtt's book.
- [15] The real world in which man lives is a world of atoms, equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form. [16] Explanations are provided in terms of the simplest elements–mechanically treatable motions of bodies.[17] God where still believed in, is the First Efficient Cause of the world. [18] The human mind came to be described as a combination of sensations (now reactions) instead of in terms of the scholastic faculties. [19] The relation of the human mind to nature, expressed itself in the popular form of the Cartesian dualism, with an emphasis on primary and secondary qualities, its location of the mind in the brain, and its account of the mechanical genesis of sensation and idea.
My purpose in starting this discussion is 1) to discuss the specific presuppositions described and 2) to see how other people see these kinds of presuppositions fitting into their own understanding of how the world works.
Comments (139)
Energy isn't a substance. It's a physical construct, which means it comes from the analysis of an event.
E = mc^2
yep
I don't think most of these are presuppositions of science.
1. I mean, science is an attempt to understand the universe by humans, so... yeah this one's a presupposition, but a rather agreeable, obvious one. The alternative to trying to understand the universe is not trying, and not trying doesn't seem to have many returns on (non)investment, so we might as well try.
2. Nope, not a presupposition of science in the slightest. Science has access to matter, and thus that naturally makes it easier to find out things about matter than ... things we don't have access to. It's not a presupposition of science, our focus on the physical is just an inevitable consequence of what it means to do science. Plenty of scientists do science just fine while also presupposing physical substances AREN'T the only things that exist. I'm sure some scientists do science well while assuming physical substances don't exist at all (surely some scientists are idealists of some kind).
3. Maybe?? I don't even think this one is - just because science tries to find principles and laws to describe behavior doesn't necessarily mean that in order to do science, one must presuppose substances all behave consistently in according with those principles and laws. I'm not convinced of this one, but I suppose I'm open to a solid agument that science presupposes this.
4. It happens to be the case that a lot of what we know about matter is describable mathematically - the fact that that's the case doesn't require a presupposition that it's a universal truth. I don't think this one counts.
5. Most scientists presuppose this, I think, but I again don't think it's a necessary presupposition. Someone could easily conduct science without that presupposition, right? Like one can imagine certain things we call laws fluctuating over time.
6. Yeah this one's probably fair to call a presupposition, although many scientists I'm sure are very questioning of the very concept of causality itself. So I'm inclined to say a very tentative 'yes, you're right' about this one.
7. Not a presupposition. This is a belief that's a consequence of experience and observation. If human scientists lived in a different universe where we experienced and observed very different things, we could easily have a science that has substances which are destructable. Come to think of it... don't matter and antimatter destroy each other? I give this one a 0/10, big fat NO on that being a presupposition.
8. Not a presupposition. Not even a universal belief among scientists.
9. Definitely a big fat no on this one. Separate? Have you literally never heard of spacetime?
10. Not a presupposition. At best, it's a similar situation to 7 - a belief that arose from experience and observation. Different observations could have yielded a different scientific belief.
Yes, science, not scientists. And, as I noted in an edit for clarification, I mean physics in particular. And yes, a discussion of the presuppositions of physics does make sense.
Quoting flannel jesus
I don't agree.
Quoting flannel jesus
Agreed.
Quoting flannel jesus
And that's the whole point of an absolute presupposition. The question isn't whether it's true or false, it's whether it's necessary in order for the enterprise of physics to proceed. You couldn't do physics as it existed in 1900 without something you can measure, i.e. physical substances.
Quoting flannel jesus
All a principle or law is is a generalization of a regularity in the results of observations and measurements. In order for science to be useful, you have to be able to abstract a general feature of behavior. Otherwise, all you can do is talk about specific instances of phenomena. Again--It's something you can't do physics without.
Quoting flannel jesus
I didn't say it was a universal truth or true at all, only that you have to assume, act as if, it's true in order to do physics as it was done in 1900.
Quoting flannel jesus
I think you've answered your own point. It's not necessary I guess, but physicists do presuppose it. It's the background against which any variation from expected results is measured. You claim physics can be conducted without this presupposition. Can you give me an example of how that would work?
Quoting flannel jesus
That's true. I question the value of the concept of causality myself. But mainstream physics did not question it prior to 1900.
Quoting flannel jesus
The laws of conservation of matter and conservation of energy were fundamental laws of physics in 1900. Since then, we've learned energy and matter are equivalent. Now we have the law of conservation of matter and energy. Physicists didn't know about anti-matter until the late 1920s.
Quoting flannel jesus
I included this because the presupposition that the universe is continuous was included by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. An absolute presupposition doesn't have to be a universal belief.
Quoting flannel jesus
No one had heard of spacetime in 1900.
Quoting flannel jesus
The position that physical substances can not be created from nothing is just the flip side of the laws of conservation of matter and conservation of energy.
That doesn't make it a presupposition though. That just makes it a practical reality. It's a practical reality that we have access to physical objects, can smash them into each other, and so it's a practical reality that if we want to predict the future of the world we live in, we can only do so using the stuff we have access to.
To say physics presupposes all their is is matter, is like saying botany presupposes that all there are are plants. I mean ffs Newton himself wasn't a materialist.
Quoting T Clark
That's not a support of the presupposition claim you made, or an argument against what I said. Yes, you have to suppose perhaps that there are SOME "laws" and so forth, whatever "law" may ontological mean, but you need not pressuppose EVERYTHING is lawful. Maybe I'm misreading your point #3. I think if you want people to accept #3 as a true pressupposition, you're going to have to clearly define what a law is. I can easily see a physicist not believing in "laws" at all, depending on the definition.
Quoting T Clark
I replied to this without realizing you were talking about physics. I'm not sure what I think about it now that the context changed. You'd have to define "law" first.
Quoting T Clark
Okay, well this one's too weak to even argue about then. Not a presupposition of science, apparently merely a common belief of scientists.
Quoting T Clark
The boundaries of this conversation are weird and vague. What makes something a "presupposition of physics"? Is discovering something true, and then writing it in your physics notes, and then it being taught in phyiscs classrooms, a "presupposition"? That's certainly not how I'd use the term. Is every individual thing physcists thought were true supposed to be a "presupposition"? Is that how you're using the word? Yes, physicists thought it was true that matter and energy are conserved. I don't think that's sufficient to call it a "presupposition".
I actually think that's the most important thing here - for you to define exactly what you mean when you call this things presuppositions of science, or physics, or newtonian physics or whatever the boundaries of this conversation are. To me, it means "someone cannot participate in the social endeavour we call Physics without assuming these things to be literally true". But... can't they? I just don't know about that. I think you're overthinking what physics is about. They're just looking at how stuff moves and behaves and trying to figure out the patterns of it, and a bit more ambitiously, hopefully trying to figure out "why", whatever that means. Do you have to assume all that crap is literally true to notice and try to figure out these patterns? I just don't think so.
Energy is a number, not a substance.
The amount of energy is a number, but so is the amount of matter. Energy and matter are just two phases of the same substance like ice, steam, and water.
I think if you look into it further, you'll discover that I'm right. Energy is a scalar number that measures the capacity of a system to do work. There's an awesome Spacetime video in which Dr O'Dowd explains it really well. I've posted that video three times so far on this forum. But you can also discover the information elsewhere. :grin:
I wrote a bunch of stuff about different principles in the OP. This particular one is just a small portion of what I’m interested in here and not a central one. I don’t expect everyone to agree with me on all the presuppositions I identified.
I just thought maybe you'd want to get a correct understanding of the scientific views you're discussing.
You think I’m wrong. I think I’m right. I think I’m probably as good as judge of this as you are. I’m comfortable with my understanding.
Ok. It's odd that you're not even willing to look into it.
The problem with those presuppositions is that denying them, and asserting the opposites doesn't necessarily result in contradiction.
An absolute presupposition is an assumption. You can't really establish whether it's true or false empirically. It's a way of looking at things that allows a particular way of thinking to proceed. In order to do physics as it was done in 1900, you need to observe and measure things. You can't do physics on things you can't see or measure. To overstate the case, in order to do physics you have to be a materialist. So...Yes, that does make it an absolute presupposition.
Quoting flannel jesus
To be nitpicky and clear, it doesn't say all there is is matter, it says all there is is matter and energy. This represents physicalism, materialism. That's all physics as it is generally formulated can study. I'm not saying this is something good. Many people think this kind of physics is limited and misleading.
In like manner, plants and related phenomena are all botany can study.
Quoting flannel jesus
Yes, I think it is. As I wrote previously for the presupposition of physicality, "In order for science to be useful, you have to be able to abstract a general feature of behavior." In 1900, at the broadest scale, that was expressed as physical laws of nature.
Quoting flannel jesus
As I noted, you need to presuppose everything you want to study or explain can be expressed by abstracting general features of reality. One way of doing that is by postulating laws of nature.
Quoting flannel jesus
Here's what I wrote previously.
Quoting T Clark
In order to call something a law of nature, it would have to represent a generalization at the highest level of abstraction.
Quoting flannel jesus
No. It's a presupposition physicists have to make in order to study the physical world in a way that can be called science as it is currently understood.
Quoting flannel jesus
As indicated previously, "absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality." This is what R.G. Collingwood says about them--"[An absolute presupposition] is a thing we take for granted in [our thinking]. We don’t question it. We don’t try to verify it. It isn’t a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted."
Quoting flannel jesus
I recognize you don't agree with my position, which is fine, but if you're not going to take it seriously--and recognize I take it seriously--let's end this discussion now.
Quoting T Clark
I don’t know about the others, but this one has often interested me. This statement seems to capture what I see as the foundational metaphysical assumption of science: that there is an objective reality which humans can understand.
We take science to reveal consistent patterns across observers, but do these patterns tell us about reality itself, or only about the ways humans organize and interpret our experiences?
I have taken the position in the past that objective reality is an absolute presupposition of a materialist ontology. I think that is reflected in the absolute presuppositions of physics I have included.
Quoting Tom Storm
This is a really good way of putting it. I think the two choices you’ve given us above are absolute presuppositions of two different metaphysical approaches which have different understandings of what “reality” means. Either can be useful, depending on the context. We probably need the first in order to do physics. I’m not exactly sure about that.
Pre-20th century, sure, but also post renaissance.
Norton's dome illustrates that 19 century (classical) physics is a-causal, but Norton's dome wasn't known until the 20th century, so I'm inclined to agree with this.
Was this never challenged? It being false is a nice retort to say Zeno's attempts to drive a continuous universe to absurdity.
Your 11-14 seem to require discarding some of the previous presumptions. Less so with 15-19, but still not compatible with 1-10.
Quoting flannel jesusDon't think there was antimatter pre-20th century.
Not coined until 19-something. Not really considered before then, although the block universe was considered, but the time axis was fixed until relativity showed that the geometry wasn't Euclidean.
Quoting frankSort of. Entropy is a measure of energy that has no capacity to do work. Heat for instance cannot do work unless there is a place of less heat to flow into.
Quoting T Clark
The amount of energy is frame dependent. Matter wasn't back then. Nobody suggested that the two were interchangeable. Matter was conserved. I think energy in the universe (which consisted of what? Us and those other light points, the nature of which wasn't understood back then) was conserved. This is no longer the case.
As to what energy is, yea, it's something sort of conserved, kind of like momentum, but few suggest that the universe is just matter an momentum.
Quoting flannel jesus
I have to agree with this. It isn't an unstated supposition, but I don't have a lot of examples of non-material things being investigated via the scientific method. Some, but not many.
Quoting T Clark
Dark matter cannot be seen or measured, but it affects stuff that can be measured.
Of course, shift one's language usage a bit and the moon also cannot be seen or measured. All we see is light, presumed to come from this not directly neasurable thing we posit is the moon. So in a way, dark matter is just as measurable as is the moon, known indirectly by something we can measure.
I'm not trying to be contradictory, but only pointing out that any successful investigation of some immaterial (or non-mathematical) phenomena is eligible to be labeled science.
Quoting T ClarkBut it's not objective. It's subjective, and we tend to confine our assumptions to what we observe. The laws is the OP concern this universe, not 'the universe' since there's no evidence that this one is objectively special, only subjectively special since it's the one we observe.
Keeping in mind, I’ve set these up as the absolute presuppositions of classical physics—If it can’t be understood, there’s no point in studying it, so there’s no point in physics.
Quoting noAxioms
The way I’ve set up this issue, the absolute presuppositions I’ve identified represent the basis of physics between about 1600 and 1900–Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein.
Quoting noAxioms
I’m not familiar with this concept. I looked it up briefly, but I’ll have to look at it more thoroughly later.
Quoting noAxioms
I’m sure there were people who didn’t agree with it, but as I noted, absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false. They have or don’t have what Collingwood called “logical efficacy” and what I call “usefulness.”
Quoting noAxioms
As I noted, I put together the list with items one through 10 in a discussion here on the forum about four years ago. Items 11 through 14 represent my interpretation of EA Burtt’s understanding of the absolute presuppositions of scholastic science before 1600. Items 15 through 19 represent my interpretation of his understanding of the absolute presuppositions developed in the 1600s by Newton and others. All in alI I thought they matched reasonably well, although certainly not perfectly.
Quoting noAxioms
Good point. An anachronism.
Quoting noAxioms
Dark matter can be seen indirectly. That’s also true of much of what physics deals with today. Electrons also cannot be seen or measured directly.
Quoting noAxioms
You have provided your own understanding, your own absolute presupposition. As I’ve noted absolute presuppositions are not true or false, they either have logical efficacy or they don’t. That depends on context.
The question that jumps out at me is: are the mathematical laws themselves physical, and, if so, how? I don’t expect an answer to that, as there isn’t one, so far as I know. But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism.
Another question is about your understanding of ‘formal and final causation’. These are of course part of Aristotelian philosophy, generally deprecated after Galileo, but are making something of a comeback in biological sciences. This is because of the somewhat obvious fact that organisms are generally goal-directed in their activities.
Quoting T Clark
Not to pull this back to reference magnetism, but . . . the two approaches could be contrasted and understood without necessarily needing to employ the term "real" or "reality." "What does the the word 'reality' refer to?" is non-substantive. "Can we know anything apart from our own interpreted experiences?" is substantive. Or at least as substantive as such a highly abstract inquiry can be.
Quoting Wayfarer
Excellent. It is, as you say, one of the main reasons to reject physicalism, at least as it's usually understood. I wonder -- if we changed the question to ask, "Can a mathematical law be expressed in purely physical terms?" would that be answerable? Your favorite AI can do this, in one sense: It can spit out whichever law you please. But has it expressed the law?
Quoting Wayfarer
Are you talking about something like Tegmark's mathematical universe? As I understand it, that's an example of an absolute presupposition. Pretty sure Tegmark disagrees. If I remember correctly, he thinks it's an empirical fact based on the so-called "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics."
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't normally talk about these issues in terms of Aristotle's four causes. That's used here because that's how Burtt expressed it. I interpret it as the idea that God created the universe and all existence. Not sure that's right.
Don't be reluctant. That discussion made a big impression on me.
Quoting J
I generally agree with this. I talked about reality because that's the term @Tom Storm used and I think he used it appropriately. It's hard for me to avoid the language we discussed in the reference magnetism thread. I find myself going back and revising my text to eliminate non-essential language that might push the discussion in a non-substantive direction.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting J
I don't understand why this would be true. Maybe I misunderstood what Wayfarer meant when he wrote "are the mathematical laws themselves physical."
That Burtt book is fantastic - a must read to better understand the problems Descartes and his contemporaries were dealing with, including Newton's own shocking demolition of the "mechanical philosophy", aka, classical materialism.
The added context explains why Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant, etc. reacted the way they did.
Quoting T Clark
That's too strong, I think. What we can know about natural laws are through certain mathematical equations, this only means that we understand the mathematical aspects of nature, not other aspects. It's not at all implausible to think there is more to nature than what our equations tell us.
Quoting T Clark
It would make no sense. Would it be impossible? I don't know. Perhaps we have a misleading picture of nothing.
Quoting T Clark
Correct, Cartesian dualism is an extension into commonsense understanding. I don't recall Descartes making the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities. But for a while Locke's picture was quite persuasive.
Great thread by the way.
Nothing so exotic as that. Any mathematical expression of natural laws will serve as an example. F=ma for instance. If you measure the behaviour of matter it will behave according to that formula (within limits). But this relies on precise abstraction, measurement and quantification which are all intellectual acts. We look at the objects through the theory. Physical systems instantiate regularities;
scientific laws articulate those regularities in mathematical form. The laws themselves are not physical objects but ideal structures, grasped through intellectual acts of abstraction and measurement.
To treat laws as physical is to confuse what is described with the means of description.
Which is one of the themes in Burtt’s book. He’s making explicit the implicit metaphysics of modern science.
I absolutely agree, but I was writing my understanding of the absolute presuppositions Newton and all those other guys used. As I interpreted it, Burtt understood that similarly to the way I did.
Quoting Manuel
If I remember correctly, I took that from the critique of pure reason. Would it be impossible? Whether or not it would be, apparently Kant thought it would. Looking back from physics as we see it today, perhaps Kant’s understanding of nothing was limited.
Quoting Manuel
Thanks. I’m having a good time.
I misunderstood what you meant by “are the mathematical laws themselves physical.” Now that you’ve explained, I agree with you.
This has been a very substantive discussion so far. I think the new approach we discussed in the previous thread gets the credit.
I don’t understand why that would be a problem.
That would be cool, but one way or the other, yes, good conversation.
Quoting T Clark
And @Wayfarer can of course elucidate, but I took him to mean that a "law" isn't something made of physical items. You can adopt the thinnest ontology and still not find any numbers or laws among the sub-atomic particles. Or you can accept macro-items -- tables, groups, mereological items -- and still not find any laws. They're not "out there" in the way that the physical world is (or seems to be) out there. This is a challenge to physicalism about all non-physical items, but it's particularly stinging here because mathematical laws are supposed to be basic and explanatory. How does that square with a physicalist conception of what exists?
My elaboration of W's point was to compare a statement of a mathematical law produced by, say, an AI program, with the same statement produced by a mathematician. For physicalism to be true, you would have to say that there is no difference between the two instances; they're both just bits of writing, physical marks on paper. They both exist in exactly the same way. To me, that seems very unlikely -- the idea that explanation can really be reduced to an arrangement of ink on paper. (It's the same proposal that thoughts can be reduced to neuronal activity.)
Agreed, see the previous exchange between @Wayfarer and me below.
Quoting T Clark
Really this is one of the central points of E A Burtt's book, although he tends to imply it rather than state it in such bald terms. There's a hidden metaphysical assumption behind the modern idea that the Universe is solely physical.
A good follow up from Burtt is Husserl, Crisis of the European Sciences. That said, it's an extremely dense and detailed book - one of those books to know about if not necessarily read in full. (I outlaid for a copy but have never read the whole thing.) Husserl too sees the pivotal importance of Galileo's 'mathematicization of nature' in modern thought, at the cost of forgetting the subject to whom science is meaningful. The wiki article.
I can't see why one would need to be a metaphysical materialist in order to do science. Scince can only deal with what is given by the senses?that is its methodology.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm not arguing for physicalism but against the idea that it is inherently contradictory. It can be argued that what we think of as laws are simply the ways physical things behave on the macro level based on what is ultimately stochastic at the micro-physical level. That may not constitute a comprehensive or even satisfactory explanation, but it contains no logical contradiction.
The laws may not be timeless principles but evolved habits as Peirce thought.
.
Interesting. I’m not sure I understand how you can have a materialist epistemology but a non-materialist ontology. Can you give me an example of how that might work?
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Janus
I’m not sure this is important, but I’m not sure it’s not either. Burt’s formulation of the mathematical absolute presupposition is different from mine. I wrote "Scientific laws are mathematical in nature." He wrote (with some fiddling by me) "The real world in which man lives is a world of atoms, equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form."
I bolded what seems like an important difference. The characteristics of the phenomena which make up the world are mathematical. The question then becomes whether the mathematical characteristics of the phenomena are physical. I'm not as sure of that as I was when we were discussing the laws of nature, which are not physical.
Science can only deal with what our senses reveal...with what is measurable and quantifiable. There are other less 'hard' areas of enquiry such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, ethology that require thinking in terms of purpose and reasons rather than or as well as mechanical causal models. So I think it depends on what you mean by "epistemology".
A scientist doesn't even need to think of what is being investigated as physical. They can simply "shut up and calculate" or they could think everything is ultimately mind and still do science perfectly as adequately as they do thinking everything is physical.
For the purposes of this discussion, we’re talking physics—CERN, LIGO, dark matter, string theory, superconductivity.
Quoting Janus
Maybe. I’m not sure. I’ve always thought epistemology should be considered part of metaphysics. They’re too intimately connected to be separate.
I’ll put in this Burtt quote again—“The real world in which man lives is a world of atoms, equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form.” So, the world is made up of physical phenomena, but the characteristics of those phenomena are mathematical. Whatever the ding dong that means.
[quote=a"T Clark;1032818"]So, the world is made up of physical phenomena, but the characteristics of those phenomena are mathematical. Whatever the ding dong that means.[/quote]
For something to have mathematical characteristics, it must have a qualitative identity which persists over time. Numeric iteration (differences in degree) implies sameness in kind.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right, numbers pertain to quantity, and the physical pertains to both quality and quantity, difference in degree and difference in kind. If difference in degree is an idea, then so is difference in kind.
Quoting T Clark
I don't think you can talk about "presuppositions" when enquiring into the state of scientific knowledge, which is necessarily based on evidence collected in scientific experimentation. You might talk about the state of scientific knowledge, but science is not based on "suppositions."
Suppositions would only apply to the scientists, and whatever their personal worldview was. And I am sure their worldviews were varied.
Quoting T Clark
"Numbers" related to science are expressed in units, and measure some quantitative property of the object under investigation. It is not correct to refer to "phases" of energy. When we are talking about energy, we talk about "the form of the energy."
These problems with your phraseology notwithstanding -
It's significant you chose the year 1900. Physics was on the verge of a couple of great leaps forward -
in late 1900 - Planck introduced the concept of "quanta" - that energy could be emitted in discrete packages
in 1905 - Einstein's Theory of Relativity merged space and time to spacetime - and measurements of them became relative to an observer's motion and gravity
So, in 1900, Newtonian physics still prevailed. Determinism was the prevailing belief. They lived in a deterministic universe, where the future behavior of systems could be predicted if their initial conditions were known with sufficient accuracy. Energy was viewed as a continuous wave-like phenomenon. Maxwell's electromagnetism provided a nearly complete description of the universe. And they held to the existence of a ubiquitous, rigid, massless medium they called “aether” – and light and electromagnetic waves propagated through it.
Mathematically, an atom is a point. It has a location, a mass, a velocity, a charge, a spin. those are all numbers, no qualitative identity.
It’s not red, beautiful, or hairy.
Quoting Joshs
Sorry, I don’t know what this means.
I disagree. If you believe science is not based on presuppositions, then you are one of those people who think there’s no value in metaphysics.
Metaphysics is not a science.
I disagree. Beyond that, you are talking about semantics not substance.
Quoting Questioner
I picked 1905 because it is my understanding that Einstein’s papers in that year are considered the beginnings of both relativity and quantum mechanics. As I noted in the OP, I wanted to talk about the absolute presuppositions before those events.
Quoting Questioner
How is that relevant to this discussion?
Agreed.
You disagree with the generally accepted use of the words "phase" and 'form" in science?
Quoting T Clark
It describes the state of physics knowledge in 1900.
I disagree that it matters in this discussion.
Quoting Questioner
What does it have to do with the issues on the table? What does it change in the discussion going on? What does it add?
Isn't it the case that all epistemic frameworks rest on metaphysical commitments? Science provides a particularly clear illustration. Scientific inquiry presupposes a mind-independent, law-governed reality and the reliability of our cognitive and instrumental access to it, assumptions that science itself cannot justify without circularity.
Yes. And nicely put.
If you are going to talk science, a basic respect for its terminology is warranted.
Quoting T Clark
Your posts have been ambiguous. The OP asks for the “presuppositions of classical physics” – and when asked if you meant science or the scientists, you answered, “Yes, science, not scientists” – even though presuppositions can only exist in the scientists, and not in a body of substantiated knowledge.
Anyway, I tried to help by giving you some of the substantiated knowledge of physics in 1900 - the framework within which the physicists at the time were working
Quoting Tom Storm
Yes, we are all human.
Quoting Tom Storm
I'm trying to think of one human endeavor that does not ... you can be describing fishing.
The OP made specific reference the state of physics in 1900
Your comments haven’t been helpful or responsive.
That’s a fun line, and I can see why you might lean that way, though it feels a bit slippery. Does science not rely on the assumptions mentioned above? If not, explain how it avoids them.
It's true most human activities, including fishing, implicitly rely on assumptions about the stability of objects, causal patterns, and the reliability of perception. Science goes further by explicitly acknowledging such assumptions and systematically testing them through observation, experimentation, and modeling, thereby building a cumulative knowledge base grounded in these methods. By continually probing the regularities of nature and refining our understanding of the laws that seem to govern reality, science not only relies on metaphysical foundations but also clarifies and extends them, making it a particularly clear illustration of the assumptions underlying all belief. All true in the case of pre-1900 science, I would have thought.
Red is a qualitative category , and so is color. I can perform a quantitative measurement of whether a color is red, by working within the qualitative category of color. I can quantitatively determine the hue, brightness or saturation of the red color by utilizing the qualitative categories of redness, hue, brightness and saturation.
Location, mass, velocity, change and spin are all qualities. Differences of degree within these qualitative wholes are quantitative. If I am trying to teach someone what one of these qualities means, I don’t simply present a set of numeric values. I offer a qualitative definition. What’s the difference between the meaning of 50 yards, 50 lbs, 50 mph and 50 Coulombs? That’s a qualitative distinction. If I want to teach someone how to measure quantitive increments pertaining to one of these qualities, then I introduce a technique of quantitative measurement adapted to the qualitative nature of the category I am measuring.
Quoting T Clark
When we count increments, we are counting increments of something. The something must remain identical over the course of the count, otherwise we would have to start the count over again every time this something morphs into something else. For instance, we can measure spatial displacement of a moving thing. If the thing which is moving suddenly disappears, dissolves or evaporates, then the something we were counting increments of has lost its qualitative identity as this spatially self-identical point. If we are measuring temperature, then the quality whose behavior we are calculating must remain identical as ‘temperature’ over the course of the iteration and not suddenly morph into color or sound.
Here’s what Burtt has to say about primary and secondary characteristics.
Yes, for sure - and in fact true of all of science still today ... from the systemic inquiry of the ancient Greeks, to the introduction of controlled experiments in the Islamic Golden Age, and then to Roger Bacon’s championing of empirical evidence over pure logic, culminating in the scientific revolution of the 17th century – notably with the first formal explanation of the scientific method (inductive reasoning – specific observations > generalization) by Francis Bacon
So, one “presupposition” underlying all science – still today - is that it is a way to accumulate knowledge – that science is a process, conducted according to the rigor of the scientific method – which begins with observation and questioning, then in any one experiment narrowing the scope to hypothesize about and then test the cause-and-effect relationship between two variables – the independent variable (manipulated by the experimenter) and the dependent variable (dependent on changes in the independent variable) – (all other variables that might affect the outcome are controlled) – then collecting measurements/observations and then making a conclusion that either accepts or rejects the original hypothesis based on the evidence collected.
It was not clear if the OP was looking for “presuppositions” that only applied to pre-1900 physics
If energy were merely a numerical value, it would have no effect. There are several forms of energy, and some forms of energy can transition into a different form of energy.
I explicitly stated that was the case in the OP and elsewhere
If Science is based on the presuppositions which can be either true or false, then it is unable to provide useful knowledge. It then relegates to superstition or guess work, hence it needs help of Metaphysics? - hence the reason Kant wrote CPR.
Plus the title of the OP "absolute" sounds not what it says, if the founding presuppositions are "not absolute".
Your understanding of metaphysics is different from mine.
That is interesting. What is my understanding of Metaphysics? And what is yours?
That's a very long story which I have discussed in many threads in the past. I don't want to go into it in detail here, but here's a brief summary from a previous thread:
Quoting T Clark
I think I agree with Colingwood on his concept of Metaphysics. Then there emerges questions. Is Metaphysics a part of Science? Or Is Science a part of Metaphysics? Or Metaphysics is Science? Or Science is Metaphysics?
Sure but interestingly there are different views on the scientific method.
Susan Haack (a philsophy of science and epistemology stalwart) takes the position that there is no single, special “Scientific Method” that sharply distinguishes science from other forms of inquiry. In her paper Six Signs of Scientism Haack writes there is "no mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all and only scientists, and explaining the successes of the sciences." Essentially science shares its approaches to reasoning with everyday inquiry. What distinguishes science is not a unique method but the more rigorous, systematic, and socially organized application of ordinary evidential standards such as responsiveness to evidence, logical consistency, and openness to criticism.
To oversimplify—metaphysics is the owner’s manual for science.
The presuppositions supposedly set out how the world must be in order for us to do science. The transcendental argument at play, for at least some of these presupposition, is along the following lines: we are able to understand such-and-such; the only way that we are able to understand such-and-such is if the universe were so-and-so; therefore the universe must be so-and-so.
So for example our understanding the universe implies that the universe is understandable.
But some appear instead to set out how we ought go about the business of doing science. Rather than telling us how things must be they tell us what to do. So "[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature" might be understood as saying that that the Universe follows mathematical principles or telling us to use mathematics in constructing our laws; while "[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times" might tell us that the universe is globally consistent, or to apply the same principles everywhere.
Which of the presuppositions are ontological, others are methodological? Can we even make such a distinction?
We don't know for sure that "[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy" is true. Should we make such an unjustified presumption? Perhaps what this is, is not a truth about how things are so much as an instruction as to what sort of explanations one should look for.
There's potential to mistake methodological injunctions for ontological presumptions. We might at least be clear as to which is which. But might we not also do science if we followed these methodological rules:
[1] Presume that the universe is ordered and understandable.
[2] Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy.
[3] Explain things by constructing scientific principles, laws.
[4] Construct those laws using mathematics.
[5] Construct Laws that apply throughout the universe and at all times.
[6] Presume that behaviors of substances are caused.
[7] Presume that substances are indestructible.
[8] Presume continuous mathematics.
[9] Treat space and time as separate and absolute.
[10] Presume that substance can not be created from nothing.
Then we would not be making presumptions as to how things are, but choosing what sort of explanations we prefer. But this treats them as voluntary, whereas Collingwood treats them as ineluctable within an epoch. Perhaps Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions are mere heuristics.
That’s not a presupposition, it’s a definition.
Quoting Tom Storm
I think that’s right, but it misses the point. In order to say you’re following the scientific method, you have to follow procedures that are rigorous, formal, documented, validated, and replicated. Could those same standards be applied to non-scientific thinking? Of course. Science isn’t the only way to know things or the only good way to know things, but when it’s done right, it is a good way to know things. Isn’t that good enough?
I feel that Metaphysics must investigate the presuppositions for their truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable, and then present them to Scientific inquiries as the preliminary foundation for their embarking the researches and experiments and coming to establishing Scientific laws and principles, and further hypothesis on the subject of their inquiries.
For that reason, Metaphysics is the central and critical part of Science. Science must not accept what is listed as "absolute presuppositions" without critical analysis and investigation into them before finding out on their truth and validities.
I think you’re making the point that Haack argues: there is nothing intrinsic to the scientific method that other disciplines cannot also employ. We sometimes fetishize science, which can lead to scientistic worldviews: the belief that only science can deliver truth to human beings. This is a foundational presupposition of old-school physicalists. I thought it worth tabling given the discussion.
Well put.
Quoting Banno
Good point. This is something I’ve wrestled with. I used to say epistemology should be considered part of metaphysics. I mostly stopped saying that because it just caused fruitless arguments, which isn’t to say it doesn’t still make sense to me.
Quoting Banno
Collingwood and I say yes, although saying it’s unjustified might not make sense considering an absolute presupposition is neither true nor false. It just has what Collingwood causes “logical efficacy.” It helps us get stuff done.
Quoting Banno
As I noted just previously, I don’t have a final answer for this. I’m still working on it. What are your thoughts?
Quoting Banno
That’s not how I understand what Collingwood said. This is from his essay on metaphysics:
Collingwood doesn’t want to specify what absolute presuppositions people in a particular period have to apply. He wants to figure out which ones they actually did use.
Your understanding of metaphysics is different from Collingwood’s and mine. Or at least my understanding of Collingwood’s understanding.
Quoting Corvus
This is not how I see it.
Agreed. When I say “science” I think of searching for knowledge following rigorous standards— more rigorous than most of our everyday thinking. Science is important, so its rigor is important. There are certainly other things where such rigor is required, but that doesn’t mean science isn’t something special.
Quoting Tom Storm
Sure, but I’ll say it again. Just because some guys have screwed up and sold a highfalutin version, that doesn’t mean science isn’t something special.
Cheers. I don't have such a strong grasp of Collingwood, so please set me to rights. You know I'm going to be critical here.
There's an obvious and it seems to me insurmountable difficulty in saying that these presuppositions are neither true nor false. The result is that we cannot use them in our arguments.
So if @Wayfarer or someone comes along and says that there is also in the universe a spirit of some sort, it will do no good to retort with "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" unless we add that it is true. Telling him that "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" is neither true nor false says exactly nothing, and adds nothing to the discussion.
But telling him that as an issue of method, we are only going to look at physical substance, and just see how far that will take us - that would work.
Further, directives, unlike assertions, do not have a truth value. They are not true or false, but followed or dismissed.
So if we look at the presuppositions as directives, they serve to rule out certain sorts of explanations without engaging in a discussion of metaphysical truth.
Yes! That will show us that we have a clear and distinct idea of 4% of the Universe.
Yes! Much better than having a vague and indistinct idea of 100% of the universe.
But there is nothing stopping us from having another discussion, using different methodologies. We could call those discussions Aesthetics or Ethics.
The method here might be to reverse the direction of fit, so that rather than making assertions bout how things are, we seek instead to make assertions about how we would have them be.
We might for instance suppose that there ought be something like fairness or justice in the universe, and so act as to bring such things about.
And do this without denying that for the purposes of describing, the universe consists of physical substance. Since within that physical substance we might build fairness. So for the purposes of doing, we might act fairly.
So let’s look at it from the other direction. Collingwood and I say an absolute presupposition doesn’t have to be true, it has to be logically efficacious. But it goes further than that. Anything that can be demonstrated empirically can’t be an absolute presupposition. For example, how do you go about demonstrating the universe is made up of only physical substances—matter and energy. Describe the experiment you would use. Do you think @Wayfarer would agree.
Exactly.
We can't.
See Confirmable and influential metaphysics. That the universe is made up of only physical substances might be falsified by presenting a ghost - perhaps @Wayfarer thinks this is what he is doing - but not demonstrated. No matter were we look for non-physical substances, they may be hiding somewhere else, or undetectable by our present equipment... And this is a result of the logical structure of "the universe is made up of only physical substances".
But if we instead chose to look only for explanations in terms of pysical substance, then there's no need for such a demonstration.
And we can keep in mind that this is a methodological choice, so that if it happens that we come across something that does not appear to be physical substance, we can either reject the chosen method or we can look for further explanation.
I don't know how to understand "it has to be logically efficacious" unless somehow A implies B; but this means that if A is true, then B must be true. How does Collingwood get being "logically efficacious" without truth functions? Ans so, how can something that is neither truth nor false be logically efficacious?
Ok - then Collingwood is not telling us what to do.
It is what Banno thinks that Wayfarer thinks he is doing, which he is not doing, but which conviction no amount of patient explanation will ever suffice to overturn.
Anyway - going back to Collingwood - I've only read bits and pieces here and there, but the feeling I get is that Collingwood was a philosopher for whom I have considerably more sympathy than Glibert Ryle, who replaced him upon the former's early death. There's a rather good magazine article on this topic which I've pointed to previously.
Other than that, Collngwood's ideas are a precursor to later philosophy of science e.g. Kuhn and Polanyi, in particular, although with Collngwood's background in archeology, he took a more historical approach to the topic. He has a much broader view of philosophy than did Ryle or Ayer, who were contemporaries. He tended towards idealism but resisted being characterised as such.
That's all I have on Collingwood.
//ps// Oh, and that his critique is very similar to that of A N Whitehead's Science and the Modern World.//
The absolute presuppositions listed in the OP are all metaphysical statements deeply contentious in nature, nothing to do with or provable by Science itself.
As I pointed out previously, if they were denied, and opposites were claimed, it wouldn't be necessarily untrue.
You need to explain, how the contentious metaphysical statements can be claimed as "absolute presuppositions" in science, and what benefits they would bring into science.
This point is not about understanding Collingwood's or your understanding of Collingwood. It is about a general rational inquiry on the issue.
Yes. Commitment to an ontology limits the kinds of questions we can ask.
Quoting Banno
This is the issue I’m struggling with. Is there a difference between a methodological and an ontological absolute presupposition. My intuition is telling me no, but I don’t think I have good arguments for that yet.
Quoting Banno
I’ll take a swing at this, although I am on a bit of thin ice. If I am a physicalist, if I believe that all there is in the world is physical substances, that will guide me to look for answers in the physical world and to, perhaps, ignore subjective phenomena. We have found that approach to be pretty effective over the last few hundred years although we have also sometimes worried about its shortcomings.
Perhaps this is right. Or perhaps what you have had to say is not so coherent as you suppose?
We'd be better off talking about the ideas of these folk, rather than their personalities.
I think there is, but in terms of what we do with each rather than what they say. So Someone like @Wayfarer is quite right to point out that those who insist that the world consists of only physical substance have not made their case. But he might be mistaken if he thinks it wrong to set up a game in which we look only for physical explanations, just to see what happens. He'd then be like someone who insists on moving the bishop along a column instead of a diagonal. Yes, he can do that, but it's not what we set out to do.
Quoting T Clark
A good explanation. It's a bit like setting up the domain of discourse to only include the physical, and sticking to that rule. What we ought keep in mind is that setting up the domain of discourse is making a choice as to what we include and exclude.
I've mixed my metaphors here. Sorry.
If I had believed that the criticisms you offered had truly understood what was being proposed, I might be inclined to so believe. But, no.
Meanwhile I've downloaded Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics and am pleased to report that it is quite an easy read, written in an admirably clear and brief style. How's this for a pungent analogy:
[quote=R G Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Pp22-23]In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging upside-down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them.[/quote]
This, in the context of explaining what he means by the presuppositions of thinking.
I htink we've answered this objection:
Quoting Corvus
...Collingwood is not saying these presuppositions are true, but that they underpin the method that was, historically, adopted. Further, if we instead of treating them as metaphysical truths treat them as methodological prescriptions, their truth is irrelevant.
Agreed—none of them are provable. But keep in mind that neither Burtt nor I claim the absolute presuppositions in the list are correct or the best ones to use. We only say they are the ones that have been used by physicists between about 1600 and 1905.
Quoting Corvus
I’ll say this again— for Collingwood metaphysics is the study of the absolute presuppositions that people actually used for particular purposes. What Burtt put in his book is something similar. It’s not what should be, it’s what he, a renowned, historian and philosopher of science, determined to be the case. If you want to disagree with him, that’s fine. I found his ideas interesting and convincing.
Quoting Corvus
Let’s be clear. I wrote the OP. In it, I laid out my intended point for this discussion. If you want something different, have at it, but don’t tell me what I need to do.
Ok. I'll bow to the true Scotsman. Those who disagree with you have not truly understood.
I haven't said that, either. I will deal with any cogent disagreements, but not those which betray a failure to grasp the point at issue. (If you would like to take this up again in the thread in which it started, please do. It is still active.)
In formal logic, there is a difference between the domain of discourse - the a's, b's and c's that make up the content being discussed - and the logical connectives - the ^'s, ?'s and =.
In physics, the content, the a's, b's and c's, are all of them physical. The connectives, including the mathematics, are not physical.
No presumption is made that 4+4=8 is physical.
I like this metaphor.
Quoting Banno
Agreed. Beyond that, just because you and I might agree that absolute presuppositions are not true or false, most people probably think they are. If that happens, their understanding of how the world works could be rigid and biased.
Quoting Banno
This discussion has been great for me. There’s a bunch of things that have been bubbling around on the back burner that got brought out in the open. That has been really helpful.
Not in formal logic. But surely the many fervent disagreements sorrounding the ontological status of numbers and scientific laws indicate that there is an issue there, beyond the strictures of formal logic. Specifically, the question of, if everything is indeed reducible to the physical, what of the nature of the mathematical reasoning that underpins physics? Why did Eugene Wigner's essay on The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences become such a celebrated essay in modern philosophy of physics?
It simply depends on what you call a "thing". It's pretty clear that thinking one can apply F=ma to 7+1=8 and find the mass of = is a category mistake.
These are different games. As if you had complained that a checkmate beats a royal flush.
That some folk make such errors does not imply they have a point.
If reality is wholly physical, why is it necessarily and lawfully answerable to non-physical mathematical reasoning, and why does that reasoning carry binding normative force?
From Collingwood's perspective, there is an absolute presupposition:
That reality is mathematically intelligible in a binding, law-governed way.
But physics cannot justify that presupposition. Formal logic cannot adjudicate it. Calling it a “different game” does not remove its necessity.
There is only a contradiction because you don’t accept the possibility that mental processes can be understood in terms of physical, chemical, biological, and neurological processes. You and I agree that reductionist physicalist explanations for many phenomena are limiting and misleading. You just take it significantly further than I do.
Formally, there is a difference between the domain and the formation rules, and how each is used. The language is about the items in the domain, the rules for that language are not the subject of that language.
When a physicist looks for explanations in terms of physical substances, they don't presume that those explanations have mass.
You and I agree that physicalism, at the extreme, is erroneous - that maths does not have mass. We agree that this shows science to be incomplete. You try to explain this by supposing that there must be some other substance, some spirit, to go along with the physical. That brings in all the problems of dualism.
My response is less forthright - I am just pointing out that maths is something we do, rather than some sort of substance. Mathematics is a practice, a framework of reasoning, not a thing with substance.
No doubt this is another example of not truly understanding you.
(Can I point out how much I appreciate your putting up with my crap? Thanks for the replies. )
Yep - sort of.
A coin (remember coins? It's how we used to do money) is just a bit of alloy, but it takes on a special role in some of our games. There is a physical description and a financial description, and perhaps never the twain.
No, I think we're operating in different registers. What you're saying is quite true about domains of discourse. But I'm extending that to a further argument about epistemology and about the inherent contradictions of physicalism.
Quoting T Clark
I’m not denying that acts of reasoning are reliably correlated with physical, biological, and neurological processes. I’m denying that logical relations themselves—validity, necessity, entailment—can be reduced to physical causation. Actually it's very much the kind of point that Collingwood is pressing in his Essay on Metaphysics. And, for that matter, to attempt to reduce normative argument to physical causation would require invoking the very normativity that the argument seeks to explain! Whenever you engage in reasoned inference - because of x, then y - you are appealing only to the relations of ideas, not to anything physical as such.
Epistemology just is a domain of discourse.
You couldn't complete the formalising of your argument, and I think that's because there is a mismatch between your four presumptions and your conclusion. They are in different domains.
Re-arranged:
Quoting Wayfarer
That's not unlike someone complaining about being given a fifty dollar note cut in half instead of twenty five dollars. I don't think Clarky disagrees - I certainly don't. I agree.
But I don't think we need ghosts to explain the difference.
(indeed, I don't think physics can be reduced to physical causation... but that's another topic...)
I didn’t mean what I said as criticism and I don’t discuss my relationship with my children in neurological terms. The message I get from Collingwood is that you choose your metaphysical and epistemological tools based on the specific work you’re trying to complete. I can be a physicalist when I want to do cognitive science and an idealist when I want to go out to lunch with my kids.
I've been rethinking this exchange between us. I think I jumped on it to quickly.
Quoting T Clark
Yes, investigating absolute presuppositions is a worthwhile exercise. That's what we are doing here in this thread and what happens all the time on the forum. @Wayfarer is a strong voice for a non-physicalist approach. I tend to be somewhere in the middle, seeing the value of both physicalist and non-physicalist approaches. There are many others here I would call committed physicalists.
The difference for me is that the standard that gets applied is not "truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable", it's usefulness--The fruitfulness of the work that is performed under it's banner.
[quote=Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics]There will also be something which I call pseudo-metaphysics. This will be a kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth and falsehood. Pseudo-metaphysics will ask such questions as this, where AP stands for any absolute presupposition: Is AP true? Upon what evidence is AP accepted? How can we demonstrate AP? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't?[/quote]
Now, I generally question the veracity of '[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy'. So, in so doing, am I engaging in pseudo-metaphysics? I'm pretty sure that's how @Banno would see it.
Here is where I think Collingwood has helped me clarify what I am (and am not) doing. His point about metaphysics is that it is not primarily concerned with being qua being, in the traditional sense. Rather, each school of physical science operates against a background of absolute presuppositions that shape what counts as an admissible question or explanation within that science. 'Practical metaphysics', if you like, or even 'phenomenology of culture'.
Crucially, the effectiveness of such presuppositions does not depend on their being true—or even believed to be true—but simply on their being assumed. For that reason, trying to settle which scientific or metaphysical framework is “fundamentally right or wrong” by arguing for or against the truth of its presuppositions is misguided. What metaphysics can do, instead, is identify those presuppositions and examine the conundrums that arise when they are asked to do more work than they can sustain.
And that leads on to Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi, who come along after Collingwood, with their 'paradigms' and 'tacit knowledge'. They're covering similar territory albeit from different perspectives.
In any case, I acknowledge that my habitual antagonism to philosophical materialism is probably a little misplaced in this context, given that I now have a better grasp of what Collingwood was up to. It's been a valuable learning experience.
Yep.
"Close the door"
Is "Close the door" true? Upon what evidence is "Close the door" accepted? How can we demonstrate "Close the door"? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't?
These questions are infelicitous.
Same for "Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy".
Thanks.
I don’t think so. If you were asking whether or not, it’s true, perhaps. But you don’t have to do that in order to reject it. You can just say it doesn’t work. It’s not the right approach to take here.
Beyond that, I don’t think Collingwood was taking a position on what absolute presuppositions were the best in particular situations.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, I think that’s right. I’m gonna put this from Collingwood in again. I’m pretty sure I posted it earlier in this thread. It really clarified things for me. I think it shows that an absolute preposition is nothing exotic or mystical. It’s something straightforward that we deal with every day.
[quote="T Clark;1032677"Ithem--"[An absolute presupposition] is a thing we take for granted in [our thinking]. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it. It isn't a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted." [/quote]
Where is the need for any metaphysics (in the traditional sense) or even in the Collingwood sense (of absolute presuppositions)?
Science and Metaphysics are the subjects which pursue truth. If the absolute presuppositions has nothing to do with truth and drawing the borders of the subjects, then what nature of usefulness and frutfulness could they expect to have from the presuppositions?
Clearly, I disagree, although many people feel is you do.
I don’t see it that way. Science looks for knowledge—not the same as truth. And as Collingwood wrote:
Knowledge sounds too subjective and loose. Science is a rigorous subject which pursues verified truth on reality and universe. My knowledge on Astronomy is rudimentary. I wouldn't say it has much to do with Science.
But I know that some Scientists want to find out the truth if there are planets with life and civilization like ours out there somewhere in the space or in another galaxy.
Quoting Corvus
You haven't answered my main question to you yet.
Are you saying astronomy isn’t science? We’ve had discussion here before about what’s included in science and what isn’t. They’re never very fruitful.
Quoting Corvus
That’s true. This thread is about identifying the absolute presuppositions of pre-1905 modern science, not justifying the value of metaphysics. If you want to start a new thread on that, I will participate.
No, that wasn't what I was saying at all. I said that in order to hint you that knowledge of something can be subjective - not much to do with Science. Knowledge can be private. It is justified belief. Science wouldn't want to pursue it, if it were a rigorous Science.
Sure, so I thought we could discuss on the meaningfulness of "absolute presuppositions" in critical way. The content of the absolute presuppositions seem very much metaphysical in nature anyway.
As I indicated, I don’t think this is the correct threat for that discussion. If you want to start a new one, I will participate.
The OP's purpose seems to be discussing how we see these kinds of presuppositions fitting to our own understanding of how the world works.
Quoting T Clark
It seems to be much relevant to the OP, and help understand the topic better, if we were to discuss the meaningfulness of the absolute presuppositions, and how they relate to, and support Science.
I don't see a point starting a new OP for it. It would be redundant and there wouldn't be much new material in it.
I am not interested in participating in a discussion on this at the moment.
OK, fair enough.
Quoting Corvus
I agree with T Clark that science is the search for knowledge?for knowing how things work?and not for truth. This is so because scientific theories cannot be proven to be true, and even whether they can be definitively falsified is apparently a matter of debate among philosophers of science. By "theory" I am not referring to observational posits. If I say "all swans are white" that can be falsified by discovering one swan of a different colour. If I say "there are black swans" that can be verified by discovering one black swan.
So, it seems we can say that the observation of nature is concerned with what appears to be the case, and that could count as a search for truth. With complex theories like relativity, and QT, it seems to be more about a search for what works. We cannot directly observe the warping of spacetime or the collapse of the wave-function, and it seems that what is the case, or truth, is relevant only to what can be confirmed or dis-confirmed by direct observation or mathematics and logic.
If we understand science to be simply involved in coming to understand how things seem to work, then what would you cite as being a necessary presupposition underpinning that investigation?
I know how to ride a bike. My knowledge on how to ride bike has increased since I bought a new bike. Is my knowledge on the bike a Science? Surely not. Knowledge can be objective and also subjective. But knowledge is not something Science or Metaphysics pursues.
Science seeks more than knowledge. It seeks verified truths and laws on the operations and nature of the universe.
Relativity gives us a more accurate method for predicting or plotting trajectories and positions than Newtonian mechanics, so is it then more true? Can we equate accuracy and truth? Does truth come in degrees like accuracy?
Ok. Good reply.
Of course it assumes that the observational knowledge is separable from the hypotheses and theories. But using a thermometer involves applying a theory of heat, and using a telescope involves applying a theory of light.
Hence the Duhem–Quine thesis, that "the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses".
And the ensuing demise of naive scientific methodology to the myth of the given.
is it just a theory of heat or light, or is using what we know works like using a ruler to measure? I mean a thermometer works reliably as attested by experience regardless of whether we believe heat is the agitation of molecules and a telescope works to make objects appear closer regardless of whether we think light consists of particles or waves.
Does it? Try setting that out. Sometimes it's 22ºC by the thermometer and feels cold; sometimes, too hot. The water freezes at about 0ºC, but only more or less - and boils at a bit under 100ºC....
And all these have theoretical explanations...
Are we to say the thermometer works because experience certifies it, or are we only interpreting our experience so as to show that the thermometer works?
:wink:
What you argued was that observational knowledge was true, but that theoretical knowledge might be dubious.
What you pointed out , in agreement with my post, is that our observations are justified by theory.
1) The litmus paper turned red, when immersed into acid.
This is a knowledge from an observation. But after many experiments and tests, Science will use inductive reasoning from 1), to draw a universally true statement or law, which says,
2) Acid turns litmus red.
That is what Science pursues, not the 1), which is just a general knowledge from observations.
The OP doesn't want to discuss this topic further, so I am out from this thread. Thank you.
No. I said I don’t want to discuss it further now. I didn’t say I minded if someone else does.
Although I appreciate your thoughtfulness.
Thank you for your appreciation. :)
A telescope is based on the observation that lenses magnify the view of objects and is not reliant on a theory of optics. Even if the theory of optics came first and the actual telescope second, our knowing that telescopes magnify the appearance of objects does not rely on an understanding of the theory of optics.
Our observations of the behavior of animals, plants and nature in general does not rely on theories. Aboriginal peoples understood nature very well without need of scientific theories.
Yeah, it does. In order to determine that something has expanded on heating, we have to compare it to something else, and assuming that the something else has remained unchanged. Nor was it wrong for Martin Horký and Francesco Sizzi to ask if telescopes distorted the images of Saturn and Jupiter. The acceptance of these observations came along with the development of the theory of optics. Aboriginal people embed their understanding of the world in stories in order to make sense of them, in much the same way as Aristotle and Newton. Calling one set of stories "theory" and the other "myth" is pretty arbitrary.
The Duhem–Quine thesis stands. Observations are embedded in our overall understanding of how things work.
Also the Aboriginal understanding of the the land and behavior of animals did not rely on their stories. The stories are like theories that attempt to explain why what has been observed is as it is.
You're just layering theory on top of theory here. And thinking that the indigenous understanding of the land is separable from what they say about the land is absurd.
Why are you so wed to this idea - that observations are somehow inviolably non- theoretical? Intuitive realism? Anti-relativism or fear of epistemic circularity? Habit?