Ukraine Crisis
The situation in Ukraine is becoming more dire by the minute. NATO is implying Russia is planning to invade Ukraine, whereas Russia denies this. Russia claims it will not allow Ukraine to enter NATO, as this would effectively put a hostile military alliance - NATO - right at the borders of Russia.
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
Comments (18084)
The theory is pretty straightforward.
1. Russia invades, threatening Kyiv to force negotiations, while occupying the most strategically relevant areas in the south (land bridge to Crimea).
2. Negotiations fail, so Russia switches gear for prolonged war. The Russian army was overstretched and pulled back its lines to something more stable. This was mistakenly perceived (or deceptively marketed?) as a "Ukrainian offensive", which it clearly wasn't.
3. With the prospect of prolonged war and having to take parts of Ukraine by force, Russia's primary concern becomes the prevention of an insurgency. This means it will seek to pacify areas it occupies before conquering more territory - the 'bite-sized chunks' approach. This could take months, or even years.
4. Meanwhile local tactical battles are fought, with the primary goal of degrading the Ukrainian fighting capabilities.
Some other points:
- Neither Ukraine nor Russia has carried out large-scale offensives since the start of the invasion.
- It's debatable whether the territory lost by Russia was meaningful. Some argument has to be put forward as to why these areas would be strategically relevant. The fact that the Russians gave up most of that territory without a fight implies the opposite. Movement patterns of the Russian forces across the areas of northern Ukraine also do not imply the intent to hold for prolonged periods of time. You can still view these patterns on sites like https://liveuamap.com.
You dishonestly chopped out “from somebody accusing me of handwaving” again. I wasn’t the one who started accusing others of “vacuously handwaving”. Baden accused me of “vacuously handwaving” in the first place. And you backed him up. So I retorted: it’s on you both to give the example first, then you may challenge opponents to reciprocate. But you didn’t, so there is nothing on me to reciprocate.
Quoting Isaac
Sir, would you kindly provide pertinent evidence which I was asking here: [I]“Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of ‘the western world under US leadership’’s policies? All right. Quote your preferred expert’s report concluding as much. Or prove it yourself”[/I]?
Quoting Isaac
Because I was accused of “vacuous handwaving” by Baden but I offered arguments that he or whoever else is interested can address. There is nothing in the accusations of “copious words” or “inordinate length of your posts” that contradicts the fact that I provided arguments. And if my arguments are vacuous handwaving I want to see who isn’t handwaving here when talking about geopolitics and morality.
Quoting Isaac
You lost track of what I was talking about. When I asked [I]“What is “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” supposed to mean?”[/I]. You answered: [I] Including them in the calculation about what course of action we ought morally support[/I]. I abundantly and repeatedly argued against an “accounting model“ (not only against you), and I didn’t receive any compelling counter-argument, mostly just cheap dismissals like “inordinate length”, “copious words“. As I summarised previously: [I]“there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations”[/I], that’s why cheap accusations of “vacuous handwaving” can be as cheaply retorted. In other words, “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” can be done, and it’s done, even without giving an exact and reliable estimate of the moral/geopolitical costs of certain policies (e.g. in the military context, how can one exactly estimate “morale” and “morale difference” in opposing armies when the war is ongoing? But morale is relevant in the conflict as much as affected by losses, among other factors). And if that’s true for experts, it is even more so for avg dudes.
Quoting Isaac
Because as long as human beings do not work out their moral/political differences and can’t tolerate each other, nor can avoid each other, then they will likely fight each other, as it happens in Ukraine.
The fact that human beings fail to work out differences is not necessarily a failure in rationality: i.e. opponents can overall be both rational, or both irrational, or one rational and the other irrational. 2 chess players can rationally move in compliance with basic rules and with sensible strategies, yet have opposing endgames. In a war between Russia and the West, it’s a rational move for Russia to run anti-West propaganda the most effectively they can, and for the West to run anti-Russia propaganda the most effectively they can. If it is rational for Russia to react to Western provocations, it is rational for the West to constrain potential competitors. If it is rational for Russia to threat nuclear escalation, it is rational for the West to not show panic. And the examination can go on, toward more general assumptions (e.g. the rationality of wars) or toward more specific assumptions (e.g. the rationality of supporting Ukraine the way the US did so far).
Concerning claims such as “the matter is undertermined“ and “we choose which argument to believe”, what is the argument? How do these claims support Baden’s accusation of “vacuously handwaving” against me? And if one chooses to believe in arguments, then why is there any need for arguments at all? One can choose to believe any claim without arguments.
If we are rational we can’t choose to believe fallacious arguments or arguments grounded on premises we find implausible. As long as there are reliable and shared epistemic rules to establish what premises are plausible and what arguments are fallacious we can converge in our assessments about statements and arguments. And if one fails them then this would be an unintentional rational failure, not a choice. If two arguments reach opposite conclusions from equally plausible premises, then one suspends judgement, not choose which argument is right.
“Choosing to believe an argument” happens when we do not engage in rational examination of our certain arguments on their own merits either because we can’t as when we trust experts or because we do not want to as when we indulge in wishful thinking.
Quoting Isaac
First of all, the examples I offered weren’t meant to be an exhaustive list (that’s why I put “etc.”), and the examples you suggested are nothing worth the qualification of “not traditional”. Most certainly, I didn’t mean to exclude “public image” among the leverages of power struggles, I argued about reputational costs in the international arena on several occasions. But the main argument is still the same: also good reputation needs to be capitalised by elites if it serves to win power struggles (that’s particularly evident when ideologies are involved like when we talk about the Roman Empire converting to Christianity or the end of slavery in American Civil War or Putin allying with the Orthodox Church). And the fight between Western democracies and authoritarian anti-West regimes is matter of reputation as well.
Second, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” fall in the domain of propaganda for public consumption with related risks of hypocrisy or exploitation (like any “panem et circenses” of the past). Power struggles can boost propaganda wars as in this war where Russia (along with China) is expressly challenging the Western world order, the Western notion of human rights, sovereignty, international laws, US leadership. So those kinds of appeals may work for diplomatic compromises as much as to nurture propaganda wars (like when the Russians accuse the West of using Ukrainians as “cannon fodder”). And precisely because propaganda wars as much as economic and military wars can be threatened that they can be the content of a diplomatic pressure, as prospected by Western analysts when talking about military defeating Russia, but offering Putin something he could claim as a “victory” for his internal propaganda.
Third, most importantly, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” do not necessarily offset imbalance on other leverages of power. That’s the diplomatic lesson given by Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: the power with greatest economic/coercive resources will impose its will over the much smaller power and the diplomatic argument would simply be like “if you want to survive, surrender to our dominance” from the former to the latter. For the same reason, also the allusion of “willingness to avoid mutual destruction” presupposes power to destruct each other e.g. in the form of nuclear arsenals. BTW the US, while leading “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, was running the risk of a mutual destruction situation and it didn’t screw up. It even promoted denuclearisation. So maybe the US too is not doomed to screw up after all.
Quoting Isaac
Maybe “the populace” drives progress and holds the greatest coercive power, but I still see elites in power practically everywhere, since states have been formed. And whenever the populace revolted, even when if that contributed to regime change, they just put new elites in power, sometimes as bad if not worse than the elites they revolted against.
Can you kindly provide examples of goods “fairly traded on trust” between countries, sir?
Quoting Isaac
A part from the fact that fear of social unrest is what turns many political elites to be authoritarian and suppress “human rights”. Indeed what would be the point of being authoritarian if the populace is spontaneously submissive?
Anyways I didn’t talk about the genesis of “human rights laws”, I talked about their enforcement. And to enforce laws one needs the monopoly of coercive power (if not in theory, in practice). But the tragedy in “international law” (differently from national laws) is that there is no superior coercive power, so states have to ensure the means of their own security. You must know all that because you champion Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.
Quoting Isaac
So now we do not need international laws anymore nor armies (yet Ceau?escu’s communist regime precipitated when his army turned against him, so I’m not sure it’s a good example), workers are enough (should we assume that the Romanian workers very happy after the fall of Ceau?escu, democracy and wealth spreading all around, no more corrupted elites, human rights raining everywhere?). Where are the workers revolting against Putin, Xi Jin Ping, Kim Jong-un, Ebrahim Raissi? What are they waiting for?
Besides, are you suggesting Western workers or populace should make a revolution against Western governments? Start a civil war against “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”? If not, why not? After all given the following superlatives and bold expressions of anonymous outrage, populace and workers of the globe should mass revolt against the US all at once yesterday, shouldn't they? What was slavery in the US, absolute monarchy in France, Russia, China or Iran compared to what the US is doing to the entire earth at an unimaginable scale?!
[I]“The western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII by an incredibly large margin, having positively ruined dozens of countries.”
“the one that causes most death and misery”
“We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism”
“the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.”
“Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale). Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism, far from being in some different and worse category, and is far less destructive for the reasons Isaac has outlined in some detail (mainly as it's regional and not global)”[/I]
Quoting Isaac
Where on earth did I write that “a thing doesn't have precedent it can't happen”? You persistently lose track of what I’m arguing, or don’t understand it and make random objections. What I argued is that concentration of power leverages (economic, coercive, ideological, etc.) is a common trait of political entities we live in, namely states, and such concentration of power is required to enforce rules over wide enough territories and population. This is true from the earliest historical formation of states, it’s constitutive of them, that’s why there is no precedent. Acknowledging that there are no precedents, it’s relevant to investigate the reasons behind such phenomenon. The examples you are bringing up do not question my assumption, they confirm it in the most evident way: there was no homosexual, women, slavery revolutions led by the oppressed ones for their emancipation (“revolution” as in “French revolution”, “Russian revolution”, “Chinese revolution“, “Iranian revolution”) in any major state constituting the Western world. But there were homosexuals, women, blacks which allied with some pre-existing elite political power in a battle against other political competitors. It is claimed by some that none of such social changes ended exploitation and discrimination for blacks, women, workers. Exploitation and discrimination just evolved in new forms, to some, more tolerable, to others, still intolerable, or widened into something catastrophic if not apocalyptic (e.g. “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, “the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale”, “Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)”). The point is that if one day there will be a decoupling of “industries” and “politics” the concentration of leverages of power will come in some other form (which doesn’t mean you or the populace or the workers will like it better). An example is the emergence of powerful elites leading the technological revolution of information which are competing with elites dominating more traditional technologies. As I already argued, competing moral or ideological movements require power to win over competitors (practical rationality demands it), so typically either they harvest economic/coercive power within them (which often leads to the emergence of a new powerful elites) or they rely and ally with on pre-existing power to succeed.
The end of the American hegemony in favour of authoritarian regimes won’t change that, I don’t even see how this could be a first step in that direction. The void of American hegemony will more likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe more than ever. And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control following social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).
Quoting Isaac
It’s a very romantic and populist view of progress. It overlooks the role of the masses in social regress (how many revolutions - including the communist ones, which didn’t happen in capitalist societies contrary to Marxist predictions - ended up in bloody dictatorships, because populace and workers can turn out to be shitty human beings as those who exploit them), the role of pre-existing elites which promoted social progress to win over political competition, the role of technological inventions (which didn’t come from the populace or the workers) in altering power relations favouring social progress.
“Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US” may have significantly contributed to many events: triplication of the World population, peace/ greater wellbeing/cultural emancipation in Europe, technological progress, rise of competing powers (like China and Russia), not just destruction of “the ecosystems we require for survival” or its destruction on a “unimaginable scale” (whatever that means). But even acknowledging the latter won’t be much of a help in conceiving a realistic strategy to fix the world. The point is still the same: enforcing policies on a global scale effectively and stably is possible only if there is enough economic/coercive power (which I doubt the US/the West still have, if they ever had it). But such power doesn’t come for free (i.e. not all humanity will benefit from it, no possible cynical abuses or nasty unintentional consequences can be systematically prevented) nor without consensus (e.g. by being the perceived as the lesser evil wrt realistic alternatives). The point is that no long term goal policies (whatever they are) can be ensured if there isn’t enough economic/coercive power to support it, so no economic/coercive power will be likely spent by political elites to pursue such policies if that is perceived as just loss of power for themselves and/or for serving their base. Conclusion: until humanity can’t self-govern by itself (how?) and will rely on politicians to do what they are incapable or unwilling to spontaneously do by themselves, then the politicians will reason in terms of power to govern people for the good or the bad (including an unimaginable scale of human or environmental damage) with the populace’s or workers’ consensus as long as this is perceived to be the lesser evil.
Quoting boethius
First, power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense. And most certainly they do not need to be grounded on your understanding of “moral justification” (which I find questionable for reasons I argued a while ago). Power struggles can simply raise from security concerns that transcend specific ideologies. And the intervention of the West in Ukraine is meant to frustrate threats from powerful anti-West competitors, independently from the question of who are the good guys or the bad guys. On the other side, your “morally justified” policies (whatever they are) would need massive concentration of coercive and economic power to be enforced on an international scale. So until you show me compelling evidences to support the idea that Russia or China (as US power competitors) or Europeans have means and will to enforce an ecologist program on a global scale more effectively than what the US can do, I’ll keep believing yours is just wishful thinking.
Second, if “Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism” is reiterating the idea of the provocations from NATO enlargement or the US/Western intervention in the Middle East or in ex-Yugoslavia, then the argument would sound more compelling if it wasn’t for the entire history of Russia until Putin and the memories it left or the impression it leaves in neighbouring countries like Ukraine.
Third, that “our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)” is debatable. In some relevant sense there must be a very significant difference in standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities otherwise people would have more incentives to migrate from the West to China, Russia, Iran than the other way around. Even Russian, Chinese and Iranian political/economic/ideological elites’ kids enjoy studying and living in the West more than the other way around. And your claim would sound hypocritical if said by a Westerner who still prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in Russia, China or Iran.
Russia withdrew from the Kyiv and Sunny axes. It left Kharkiv retreating past Kupiansk because of a general rout in which it turned over warehouses full of munitions and hundreds of vehicles. It withdrew from Kherson City and the general environs, but only after a grinding offensive had finally broken through Russian lines and made holding anything on the far side of the river untenable.
I mean, they legally declared land taken in both counter offensives part of Russia and put up billboards around the city that said: "here forever," lol.
Sure.
I don't see how that would be incompatible with the theory I've put forward.
I wouldn't even grant this. Market equilibrium is an emergent phenomenon; no one state and certainly no small group of people is "in control" of global production decisions. Pollution is an example of a negative externality. While liberal democracies have put regulations into place to reduce such negative externalities within their borders and done much to raise the living/working standards of their populations, this has often just resulted in the working class of the West being exported to countries without these protections.
Obviously, it was not in the US's strategic interests to move so much of its production to China. Nor was it a good strategic move to become so heavily dependent on Taiwan for microchip production. It's not even clear that this shift was good for the economic wellbeing of the average American. The shift occurred because firms that moved overseas could outcompete firms that did not due to lower prices; no one had to plan to make this happen. To be sure, Clinton and W. Bush era policymakers did seem to believe that rising wealth in China would cause the state to liberalize, but the offshoring trend only accelerated as policy makers soured on this concept.
And we see the exact same patterns of consumption in China as it becomes wealthier that we saw in liberal states, even though, Deng's major reforms notwithstanding, it is very much still a communist country in key respects (state control of large corporations, the government's ability to freeze financial exchanges at will, etc.). Meat consumption is surging for example.
The Chinese state, which in many ways can exert more control on domestic production that Western states (see: the Covid lockdowns), has still been unable to stop the country's sliding food self-sufficiency rate. In 2000, China had a food self-sufficiency rate above the US's today, 93.6%. That has plunged to 65.8%. This isn't because China lost the ability to produce as much food; it's because labor got more expensive as the country grew wealthier (changing opportunity costs for workers) and Chinese food became relatively more expensive compared to exports (also rising incomes increasing demand for limited domestic meat production). Chinese farms responded by cutting production, or switching to producing meat with foreign feed, and net imports increased. This is despite a powerful state actively working against this trend. No one was "deciding" anything here, it's just the logic of the dynamical system.
Exactly. The problem with global warming and ocean acidification is that it is a global collective action problem. Every state has an incentive to cheat because even the largest emitters still represent a small share of the global total. Adding to the problem is that some states are far more susceptible to climate risks than others. Current international institutions lack any teeth for enforcement.
Every state would be better off if all states agreed to do more to tackle the issue, although some would benefit more than others since they are more at risk. However, every state also has an incentive to cheat. Within states, politicians also have an incentive to get their states to shirk their responsibilities so that their constituents can realize the benefits of doing so. What is needed for climate change, the problem of powerful transnational corporations, global inequality, and migration is some sort of regional/global governance mechanism with enforcement power akin to the EU or the US federal government. That is, a system that keep particularity for local governance, but which has authority on global issues.
I am not optimistic that such a system will evolve without a crisis. Such a system needs coercive powers, but it also needs to offer members significant benefits. Military alliances that allow members to achieve a "peace dividend," what you've seen in Europe, is one way to do that. However, I think that bringing lower income states into such an organization probably requires aid budgets to grow to a size around the same scale as defense budgets, something that is currently unthinkable unfortunately.
Sure, they gave up on the quick victory plan. That doesn't mean they never expected it to work. A lot appears to have hinged on bribes and the expectation that areas would be handed over by collaborators, as in Kherson.
This doesn't explain continued offensive operations against Bakhmut. If the goal is to sit back and consolidate gains, why keep attacking? The Vuhledar offensive, widely panned as a catastrophe by Russian milbloggers and resulting in the sacking of officers, resulted in the loss of 13 BTGs worth of tank compliments and plenty else aside. That isn't "sitting back and consolidating." Not to mention that Russian state media has definitely tried to play up what small gains it has made as the result of a "renewed offensive."
4. Meanwhile local tactical battles are fought, with the primary goal of degrading the Ukrainian fighting capabilities.
[/quote]
This is inconsistent with continued Russian offensive operations. For example, by all accounts, Ukrainian losses were proportionally much higher when they were forced to attack entrenched defenders in Kherson. But Russia isn't sitting back and waiting for Ukraine to attack entrenched positions, they have been attacking in a number of areas.
Given the shortage of armored vehicles and of well-motivated, well-trained troops on both sides, I would consider regiment-scale operations (3,000-5,000 soldiers) to constitute major efforts. At time's both sides have put together division sized offensives, but they have been the exception. Leaked estimates for Russian losses at Bakhmut are the equivalent of 3-5 US divisions, which constitutes a major offensive anywhere, even if the losses were disproportionately low-quality, under equipped Wagner forces.
If their goal is to hold all of Kherson Oblast, which they annexed, then it is not debatable that losing their foothold across the river is a major setback.
Doctrine seems to be falling back to a focus on division level operations. I think this makes increasing sense given the larger role drones and UGVs will play in the future. These require more infrastructure to support.
Autonomous 60-81mm mortars that can be mounted on IFVs, UGV 105mm field guns, autonomous support drones, etc. all give smaller units more organic firepower, but they do so at the cost of a larger logistical footprint.
You can see this in the new US divisional structure, with the Robot Combat Vehicle Company attached to each ABCT. RCVs will also be broken out into light/medium/heavy akin to the divisional structure, in terms of equipment, except now divisions are penetration or armored (heavy reinforced or heavy), light, airborne, or air assault. So, "medium" sticks around as a classification in some respects, but the old medium level division (Stryker) is gone.
There are myriad possibilities for why they continue to pressure the Ukrainian lines.
Securing local tactical advantages, degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability, pressuring the Ukrainian forces to keep them off balance and unable to recuperate, etc.
Since they've been at it for several months, my impression is that whatever it is, they probably believe it's working in their favor.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No, I think it is definitely consistent.
That they do not intend to take large amounts of territory does not mean there aren't many other purposes those offensive operations might have, some of which I already listed.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's probably because the Ukrainian forces lack any offensive capabilities, and if the Russians had any intention of further degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability they would have to bring the fight to them.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's besides the point.
In my view, we haven't seen any large-scale offensives intent on taking large amounts of territory since the initial invasion.
No one is questioning that there is intense fighting going on around Bakhmut. The question is what purpose that fighting serves, and the capture of territory to me seems an unlikely explanation.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Some point needs to be made as to its strategic relevance weighed against the cost of holding it. We can make guesses towards the former, but for the latter we simply lack all relevant information.
However we can use the Russian actions to make an educated guess and my view is that the Russians leaving Kherson voluntarily points towards it neither being particularly stragetically relevant, nor the Russians being willing to pay a high cost for holding it.
It's only within the last 100 years that humans believed species could even go extinct, so what is happening previously unimaginable.
However, if you want to argue climate change isn't happening, species loss isn't happening for this and a bunch of other reasons as well, or this environmental destruction, to the extent you agree it's happening, won't be extremely bad, better to argue that in the climate change thread.
For this thread, I'm sure you can appreciate that someone who concludes the environment has been grossly mismanaged and the US primarily responsible, won't assign much moral superiority to US foreign policy.
Of course, the debate remains, even in your basic framework of "US good", as to whether the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order" without any benefit to Ukrainians.
As well, even assuming it's true that it's morally justified to sacrifice Ukrainians (or let them sacrifice themselves for Western purposes), if the war is actually harming Russia and benefiting the US.
As yet, no pro-US policy proponent here has answer the question of how many Ukrainian lives are worthwhile to sacrifice to accomplish what objectives.
Likewise, if Russia survives sanctions, as they seem to be doing, and stabilise the front, which they seem to be doing, and continue their arms manufacturing, which they seem to be doing, how exactly does this war harm Russia's geopolitical standing, compared to increasing power and influence and put them in a position to strike deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example?
Now, if Russia is gaining power and but China even moreso, for all the reasons we've discussed and you seem to agree with, ok, sure, maybe Russia's relative power vis-a-vis China is decreased, but if this China led block that includes Russia, in whatever influence you want to assign them, is on the whole increasing in power, how is this good for the US?
Just repeating that US is good and Russia is bad doesn't resolve any of these questions.
Quoting neomac
In philosophy, which to remind you we're on a philosophy forum, any decision reflects the moral reasoning and values of the person making the decision.
If you're doing something to increase your wealth and power, such as building an empire, then empire building would be the justification for the action in such a moral system.
You are obviously a proponent of US foreign policy with regard to this Ukraine war, if your justification is that it's good for US empire then that's your justification.
To say "power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense" is to say they may not make sense for a moral system that is not about gaining as much power as possible, which is to be expected.
You seem to assume I'm asking you to justify things beyond your own justification for things, which is not what I'm asking. I'm asking for your justification, it's not more complicated than a power struggle and you happen to be on one side by virtue of birth, had you been born Russian you'd be on the other side, then you can simply state so.
Something that is worthwhile to note is that in any city the Russians held and then left, mostly the pro-Russian population would immigrate to Russia.
According to this UNHCR data sheet (https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine), some 2 874 806 Ukrainians have refugee status in Russia.
Since a big part of the value of territory is the people living on that territory, causing these population movements is an equally important method of imperialism as territory, of which the West is equal partner in, nabbing some 5 million Ukrainian refugees to help bolster EU GDP.
If there's something specific I haven't adressed please state it plainly, because your posts aren't always easy to decipher.
Quoting jorndoe
Just state plainly what you would like me to address.
I skipped over the bit about Kremlin propaganda, because obviously I'm not going to try and decipher the 'true' meanings behind Kremlin propaganda.
If there are more points hidden in there, you'll have to state them more clearly.
To be clear, I'm not going to read through several articles to try and figure out what point you're trying to make.
I’m neither arguing that “climate change isn’t happening” nor that “won't be extremely bad”. I’m questioning your way of assigning responsibility and its implications.
Quoting boethius
I already argued against this miscaracterization of my views.
- my basic framework of "US good” as opposed to your basic framework “Russia good”, “Iran good”, “China good”, “North Korea good”?
- the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order” as opposed to “the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is killing,raping,deporting,destroying Ukrainians for Russia anti-West order?
- "without any benefit to Ukrainians" as opposed to “without any benefit to Russians”?
I questioned the assumption that the West “is sacrificing” the Ukrainians.
Quoting boethius
I can’t answer such a question if I don’t know how I am supposed to do the math or if it makes sense. Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: [I]”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.”[/I] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?
Quoting boethius
It has already harmed Russian’s political standing:
- Reputational costs: e.g. Russian military standing didn’t impress on the battlefield
- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries
- Economic costs: e.g. economic decoupling between Russia and the West
It’s Russia which increased power and influence, or it’s Iran and Saudi Arabia that increased power and influence over Russia?
Quoting boethius
What might be the lesser evil for the US is to break a Western-lead globalization which was benefiting more EU, Russia and China than the US. And re-compact the West in a logic of political, economic, security blocks as in the Cold War. But this attempt may fail not necessarily because of Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia have significantly increased power and influence. But because of EU, in particular Germany and France ,are fed up with the US. Or because of a domestic internal crisis in the US.
Quoting boethius
We discussed that already. I’m not a “proponent of US foreign policy”. One thing is to try to make sense of what the US is doing, another is to decide what do about it. As far as I am personally concerned, independently from what the US does, I can only say as much: I’m a person who prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in authoritarian regimes like Russia, China or Iran. Therefore I’m inclined to see as a threat an increase of power and aggressiveness of such authoritarian regimes at the expense of the West. If the West can and wants to do something against such threat, then I would welcome it. And since I’m aware of how messy and dirty human history is, I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil.
Ok, well good to know we agree on the scientific facts.
You also seem to agree the US is the world's super power and global hegemon ... and not merely today but, most critically, in the 1990's after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the rise of China US was even more top dog than it is now, and it's that decade that was the most critical for setting climate and environmental policy.
Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results?
Quoting neomac
I'm not mischaracterising your views, I'm literally asking questions that you keep deflecting from. That the questions are uncomfortable for you and you prefer not to answer them simply emphasises the incompleteness at best, and inconsistencies at worst, in your position.
You should not have a problem answering the question of how many Ukrainian lives you'd be willing to sacrifice to achieve what. And, for the sake of argument, let's just say you're able to decide the number and the goals. This would be the start of defining your position.
Would you be willing to sacrifice a million Ukrainians on the battlefield and still lose, a more-or-less fight to the death scenario, as the principle is more important than the result?
Do you find it acceptable the losses since Russia's offer last spring (assuming the offer was genuine: give-up claim to Crimea, independent Donbas) in the event the lines do not change further?
Would the losses since the Russian's offer be worth it in the event Ukraine outright loses?
Finally, to achieve the goal of removing Russia further from Ukraine, both including and excluding Crimea, how many losses would you (if you had to choose) be worthwhile?
If you want to discuss, don't deflect further with "Ukrainians want to fight it's not my decision, the West is just supplying arms", but engage in the argument and put yourself in the position of choosing the number of lives for the given scenario. Certainly you'd be willing to sacrifice 1 Ukrainian to achieve complete removal of Russia from Ukraine if it was both possible and your decision to make (I'd make the same decision; one life for the complete end of the war? no hesitation, will obviously save many more lives than the war continuing), so just keep increasing the number from there until you either reach a zone where you start to be uncomfortable (100 000, 200 000, 500 000) or then never become uncomfortable and inform us every single Ukrainian life is worth sacrificing to remove Russia from Ukraine.
And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making.
For example, I think we'd agree the North Korean government is a terrible dystopian tyranny and if there was some easy way to topple the current government and put in a new one (even just our normal Western track record of how these things go is still likely far better than the current North Korean government). We could get rid of the tyrant, bring some brand of freedom to North Koreans, generations of benefits. So why don't we? Because the evaluated cost is too high. No one's willing to risk Seoul being nuked to free the North Koreans and likely so many North Koreans would die in such a war that the argument that we're helping them is tenuous at best.
Quoting neomac
Then you have no place in policy discussion about warfare, because that's what it's about.
An example of this sort of math is that when the allies cracked enigma in WWII for that to be useful they needed to ensure the Nazi's did not figure out they figured it out.
Therefore, they did the math and calculated how many U-boat attacks they need to let happen in order for the Nazi's to not get too suspicious.
Quoting neomac
Certainly Russia's reputation is decreased in the West ... but is it really true world wide? Vis-a-vis China, India, most developing nations? Certainly not enough for these nations to stop trading with Russia.
Quoting neomac
Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia? Does any of that actually matter in the current geopolitical "power struggle" as you put it?
Quoting neomac
That's how political blocks work. If you are in a geopolitical power struggle with the West, then being economically tied to the West exposes you to coercion (the whole point of the sanctions). Sure, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and obviously China and India) have more influence with Russia, but there's no evidence right now these parties are seeking to harm Russia through those economic ties and influence, whereas that's very clearly the West, and in particular the US', stated policy since decades (containment, no "peer competitors" can rise in any region etc.).
In short, I'm not at all convinced the war has increased Western power and influence in the world and decreased Russia's. If you want to point out China's power and influence has increased even more than these parties, I'd agree, but I don't see how that's good imperial stewardship on the US's part.
Quoting neomac
The primary reason Germany and France would be fed up with the US is that the US creates this mess in Ukraine and then also blows up European infrastructure.
But, otherwise, I agree that the US' main competitor in this conflict is the EU and the possibility of the Euro emerging as a "peer competitor" to the USD.
Quoting neomac
It's difficult to interpret this as something other than being a proponent of US foreign policy.
But if you really want to believe yourself to be some impartial observer, then we can discuss on that basis. If that's true you should have even less problem answering questions of what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what, as you can be more objective in evaluating the costs and the benefits.
The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge).
Quoting boethius
Who would?
Quoting boethius
Who would?
Quoting boethius
Why would they?
Quoting boethius
Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)?
Quoting boethius
Give the example and tell me what’s the number you start feeling uncomfortable with.
[quote="boethius;801854”]And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making.[/quote]
Your questions are all heavily framed to hint an obvious answer.
But I’m questioning the framing for the following reasons:
1 - Context: as the Multivac would answer, [I]“insufficient data for meaningful answer.”[/i] (cit.). Am I the president of Ukraine or some avg non-Ukrainian dude? What does “lose” mean? Just lose a battle or the war, and what does losing the war implies? What principle are we talking about? The principle of of being free to buy a second mobile phone or the principle of keeping the nation free from subjugation, exploitation, or genocide? What does “at all cost” mean? Context is always much richer of relevant details, constraints and uncertainties that are relevant for decision making, than your framed & simplistic hypothetical scenarios may suggest. Besides many assessments can be done only a posteriori, if done in advance they may be speculations as plausible as others, even if they turned out to be the best approximation to reality, later on.
2 - “Morale” vs “moral”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. “Morale” is a psychological condition. It has to do with motivation, emotional resilience, discipline, "having the guts". It’s unreasonable to expect/require that an avg dude not directly involved in the war has the “morale” or can empathise with the “morale” of those involved in the war. It’s unreasonable to expect/require that ordinary individuals have the “morale” of trained and leading political/military/decision-maker figures (it’s not by chance that division of labor and labor specialization exist also in the political and military context).
“Moral” has to do with reasons to act in a certain way. One may have “morale” to pursue “immoral goals“ and one may not have the “morale” to pursue “moral goals“. The result of your psychological test may be good to assess “morale” or capacity of empathising with involved parties’ morale (I even doubt that because we are talking about hypothetical scenarios), but it doesn’t equate to a moral assessment of the reasons behind a war.
3 - “Military” vs “geo/political”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. A geo/political strategy doesn’t coincide with a military strategy. Military strategies are way more constrained than geopolitical strategies, and also subordinated to geopolitical strategies. "War is the continuation of policy with other means" (cit.). I’m obviously very much interested in military arguments from experts, and military analysis about how much the Ukrainians can afford to sacrifice as a function of military objectives. And I do not mean to discount them at all, but they are one aspect of a geopolitical strategy. An example is the Bakhmut battle, which is said by many military analysts to be of little strategic importance to justify the heavy losses on both sides, yet it has now gained great political importance (for its reputational costs? For the morale of all supporters within and outside Ukraine?).
Conclusion: I don’t answer your questions not because I’m emotionally uncomfortable, but because I’m intellectually uncomfortable to answer heavily framed questions for which I can't provide a meaningful answer (even if I was tempted to answer them exactly the way you would answer them). I’m interested to argue about morality and geopolitics, not about morale and military.
Quoting boethius
I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. As I argued in other occasions, I think all these points need to be addressed to make sense of the impact of a policy:
1. Values: saving lives may not be all that matters. Freedoms and welfare count too.
2. Present vs future: saving life or standard of life now as compared to saving future lives and standard of life.
3. Actual vs counterfactual: saving life or standard of life by actually doing X vs saving life or standard of life by counterfactually doing Y
4. Strategy: the relative risk&payoff of a strategy (relative to other players’ strategy) is more relevant than its absolute risk&payoff of that strategy.
5. Bounded rationality/morality: all relevant actors have a limited cognitive resources to process consequences of different strategies, and will to respond adequately to moral imperatives. The cumulative effects of all these limits introduce imponderable constraints in all policies.
6. Matrix of competitive/cooperative strategies: every individual and group of individuals is immersed in a multi-dimensional matrix of cooperative and competitive games which are totally a-priori uncoordinated (precisely because coordination is the more or less stable result of how these games are actually played)
7. History: historical legacies (power relations, bad habits, bad memories, historical debts) from past generations hunt current generations despite their current dispositions.
8. Decision process: how much the decision is concentrated in the hands of few and hierarchical the chain of command.
But I don’t see how all such points can neatly fit into a reliable mathematical formula that gives anybody the best moral guidance in quantifiable terms (like a body count) easily computable by anybody. To have something quantifiable one needs to give for granted lots of shared assumptions on a computable set of variables. In other words, as far as I’m concerned, it’s IMPOSSIBLE to calculate and execute an optimal strategy in practical sense, and a certain degree of fault-tolerance for mistakes and even big mistakes may be required because nobody can prove to be able to do better just “in theory”. For that reason, I’m skeptical about responsibility attributions which do not take into account such predicament, but instead look for a convenient scapegoat to blame for man-made world catastrophes.
In any case, if I do not have place in policy discussion about warfare in moral terms WITH YOU because that’s what it’s about TO YOU, why do you keep addressing my comments?
Quoting boethius
OK, give me a historical example of hundred of thousands of innocent civilians killed were morally worth the cost, because my suspect is that you are NOT doing any math. You are simply convinced that there is no historical example of wars with massive casualties also among innocent civilians that was morally worth fighting. But if that is the case, you are offering an argument against wars (defensive and offensive), not against this war, and independently from who started it or provoked it.
Quoting boethius
Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point.
Quoting boethius
The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends.
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have increased their influence in the Middle East (e.g. Syria), Central Asia (e.g. Armenia vs Azerbaijan), and Africa (e.g. Sudan) at the expense of Russia.
China looks still interested to keep relations with the EU and to protract the Ukrainian war at the expense of the US, but not to the point of escalate it and be heavily dragged into the Ukrainian war by Russia. So if the EU (more precisely France and Germany) find a way to mediate between China and the US, that too might be bad for Russia too.
Quoting boethius
Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).
Quoting boethius
I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!).
“A proponent of US foreign policy” to me means being engaged in political propaganda as an activist or a politician to support the US in general or in this war. I’m neither. I’m not here to fix the world. To solicit people in this thread to press our politicians to support more the US in Ukraine or to express my moral outrage against those who oppose the US in Ukraine or to spread memes boosting “morale” for one party against the other. That’s not what I’m doing. That’s the kind of activity you and your sidekicks are doing.
I’m here just for the fun of re-ordering my beliefs and assumptions in a more rationally compelling format, while challenging other interlocutors to do the same.
Finally, to repeat it once more, I can try to answer only questions that at least make sense to me: e.g. asking what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what doesn’t “feel reasonable” to me. And it's symptomatic that you didn't answer it either.
Russia smuggling Ukrainian grain to help pay for Putin's war
[sup]— Michael Biesecker, Sarah El Deeb, Beatrice Dupuy · AP News · Oct 3, 2022[/sup]
Larger Wheat Harvest in Ukraine Than Expected
[sup]— NASA · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
Exclusive: Crimea showers Syria with wheat, Ukraine cries foul
[sup]— Jonathan Saul, Maha El Dahan, Maya Gebeily, Nigel Hunt, Pavel Polityuk, Frank Jack Daniel · Reuters · Dec 19, 2022[/sup]
Yeah, thieves grabbed more than land. For some reason, I'd (personally) prefer the "breadbasket" under Kyiv than the Kremlin, regardless of what Ukraine is the "breadbasket" of. Poor assessment on my part?
The Kremlin wants ‘real men’ to prove themselves by joining the fight in Ukraine
[sup]— Yuliya Talmazan · NBC News · Apr 22, 2023[/sup]
Defending, defender? How about attacking and attacker? Or be "real men" like Navalny or Kara-Murza?
Anyway, hard to assess whether these moves are telling of the situation. Running low on mercs?
What an offensively ignorant comment. Acting as if we were allocating ownership like an interview board assessing candidates.
There is a cost to keeping it in the hands of Kyiv. This is the cost...
The question, which everyone here is so studiously avoiding, is not "who would we prefer in control of wheat production", nor "whose flag would we prefer over parliament", nor "which group would we prefer consulted over the future of the region". It's not about our preferences - anyone with a modicum of intelligence and decency can see that Russia are worse than Ukraine - it's about whether the chance of achieving those preferences by use of conventional land war is worth the cost.
Can you answer that? Your preference for having wheat production in the hands of Ukraine rather than Russia - Is it worth the cost of a protracted land war? Do the benefits actually outweigh the harms? Is there a less harmful route to the same ends?
It's a pathetic indictment of the level of intellectual discussion that this thread keeps getting dragged back round to the sort of debate a three-year-old might have about who's the bad guy.
As the US is increasingly tied down by the war in Ukraine on one hand, and the geopolitical rivalry with China on the other, the chance of dormant conflicts starting to re-emerge elsewhere in the world is going to significantly increase.
It seems Sudan could possibly be the first instance of this happening - a country rich in natural resources like crude oil, gold and uranium, and one that has been plagued by ethnic conflict for many decades.
That's a difficult calculation, and no one can be sure of the numbers that lie in the future. But given the particular history of Ukraine under Soviet rule, I can understand any Ukrainian's calculation that a few million dead is a price well worth paying. And if that was my history and someone was offering me some arms, I wouldn't be questioning their motives before accepting the offers.
Nonetheless. Throwing our hands in the air and pretending there's no cost to consider isn't an option.
Quoting unenlightened
Funny how when justifying war, evidence from 1930 suddenly becomes relevant, but when talking about the state of the Far-Right in Ukraine, apparently 2014 is too far in the past to be relevant.
We have, as I've repeatedly mentioned, a direct, relevant and current example of Russian occupation. Crimea has been occupied by Russia for eight years. It's part of Ukraine.
It's telling that to justify a position you're having to draw in evidence from a completely different government in a completely different era and ignore the direct evidence of this exact government going exactly the thing we're discussing barely a few years ago.
Do the Russians have good reason to fear German military involvement in Poland? Afterall, I'm sure they all remember Stalingrad.
It's borderline racist to claim that because people in the past who just happen to be from the same country committed some atrocity, their decedents are likely to do the same. Imagine if I tried to claim some justification for Brexit on the grounds of the Germans having been Nazis.
Quoting unenlightened
Yes. But I'm not talking to Ukrainians. I'm talking to Westerners. What is it with this bizarre trend toward the absolution of all moral duty into "whatever the Ukrainians want"? It's morally bankrupt.
Donbas ? Russia in 2014: 35% :up:, 65% :down: [sup](May 12, 2020)[/sup]
Donbas ? Russia in 2015: 19% :up: [sup](Feb 5, 2015)[/sup]
Donbas ? Russia in 2021: 25% :up: [sup](Apr 16, 2021)[/sup]
Donbas + Crimea ? Russia in 2022: 77% :down: [sup](May 24, 2022)[/sup]
Donbas + Crimea ? Russia in 2022: 87% :down: [sup](Aug 23, 2022; Sep 15, 2022; Sep 16, 2022)[/sup]
Zaporizhzhia + Kherson ? Russia in 2022: 30% :up:, 30% :down: [sup](Aug 5, 2022; Aug 5, 2022; Sep 1, 2022)[/sup]
? Sep 2-11, 2022
There are of course a lot more details than this brief summary. Who was polled exactly, who polled, where when, circumstances, methods, etc.
Feel free to add some, if nothing else just to get an overall impression of what's (been) going on.
, well go tell them to stop fighting then. Shoo, off you go. Then what?
(I guess we can re-repeat some cruft that apparently hasn't sunk in?)
Well, I was actually thinking of lobbying my politicians to stop drip feeding them weapons, stop discouraging negotiations, stop promoting the approach with propaganda and censorship...
But you know, I'm sure your 'shoo' idea is really good, I'll certainly give it some serious consideration.
Nah, your questions aren't necessarily others' questions, except in your head. There are potential concerns that may or may not have eluded you, say, suggested by
Latest on the Ukraine war: Russia warns grain deal in peril
[sup]— Yuliya Talmazan · Reuters · Apr 24, 2023[/sup]
... And after tomorrow, with the regressing ? autocracy (apparently (self-)perceived as inviolable)?
[sub]Political freedom in Russia
[sup]— European Council on Foreign Relations · 2016[/sup]
A Tear for Mother Russia’s Children – A Study of Democratic Deficit, Human Rights Violations and Militarism within the Russian Federation [around 28 ±]
[sup]— Mark O'Doherty · 2017[/sup]
Freedom in the World
[sup]— Freedom House · 2018[/sup]
Why Putin Is Not Okay
[sup]— Tyler Roylance · Freedom House · Jul 11, 2018[/sup]
Do not call Ukraine invasion a ‘war’, Russia tells media, schools [just for the follow-up ? below]
[sup]— Al Jazeera · Mar 2, 2022[/sup]
Russia has reasserted state control over the country's major media companies
[sup]— Steve Inskeep, Charles Maynes · NPR · Mar 7, 2022[/sup]
Putin signs expanded anti-LGBTQ laws in Russia, in latest crackdown on rights
[sup]— Ivana Kottasová, Anna Chernova, Clare Sebastian, Uliana Pavlova, Rob Picheta · CNN · Dec 5, 2022[/sup]
Putin declares ‘war’ – aloud – forsaking his special euphemistic operation [?]
[sup]— Mary Ilyushina · The Washington Post · Dec 22, 2022[/sup]
Russia crosses new lines in crackdown on Putin's enemies
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Guy Faulconbridge, Philippa Fletcher · Reuters · Apr 21, 2023[/sup]
(can't be bothered with (or to repeat) more, though parts of the considerations)[/sub]
, goodie, a do'er; what about support of, or something against, the autocracy? Either way, the Ukrainians said no.
Yep. So... Do they justify the cost of war? Same question. It's no good just listing a load of bad stuff and not weighing it in any way against the cost of the course of action you're advocating.
Quoting jorndoe
What's with this obsession with what 'The Ukrainians' say? It's our decision to send weapons, our decision to support propaganda efforts, our decision to supply intelligence, our decision to avoid and block negotiations... these are all our decisions.
Stop hiding under the skirts of what 'The Ukrainians' say and have the balls to make up your own fucking mind.
Quoting just above
Moldova goes the same way, down the Kremlin drain. Others? (South Korea to hand the keys over to Kim Jong-un if under ? threat?) I'm guessing Navalny and Kara-Murza (along with whoever else) would be disappointed, and there are apparently a few Ukrainians with similar (and non-irredentist) sentiments, contrary to Putin's preparatory efforts.
The continuing attacks continue to spread hate and degrade chances of diplomacy.
Putin has chosen, the Ukrainians have chosen, the UN voted, and a somewhat impressive amount of others have chosen (repeatedly).
Whatever others don't or do, matter as well. Looks like your thing (numbers game?) will have them all wrong, except it happens to be more or less what just one of them wants, denying the rest, abandoning the defenders, leaving the "then what?" hanging.
Putin + compadres declared "the West" an enemy (or the enemy, don't forget the prep moves). ? We've seen the regress (reeee-peatedly), shamming with consequences, anti-democracy, whatever. They rolled their brainwashing/re-enculturation machine out; exposed, didn't flinch. They threatened to the left and right including ?. The imperfect though at least trying Ukrainians won't be part thereof, refused.
Should an invading force (like what the Ukrainians are facing) try to take over around here, then I'd likely put up a fight of some sort (goes for both places I call home), though it'd be an annoying disruption of my daily goings-and-doings. I'd have a hard time flirting with complicity to such a takeover attempt, the downslope of not standing up to such bulging of the dehumanizing rule and land grabbing aggressor, leaving it to subsequent generations. But to each their own. Go lobbying (not that it matters but I'd welcome it, I think).
You (also) missed the part before the Ukrainians part:
Quoting just above
This does not in anyway even contradict the my statement:
Quoting boethius
Everything you said doesn't comment on who's most responsible for the result of a policy. Sure, the most influent party does not control events, but they would still be most responsible. If all the nation-states together push for this policy (to do nothing about environmental catastrophe) the most influent party would still be the most responsible.
The idea that environmentalism is a US policy to begin with is truly remarkable, but we could continue that discussion in the climate change thread.
Quoting neomac
The question is not who would, the question is "would you?"
You can answer no. Now, I'm pretty sure many members of the Nazi community in Ukraine would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians.
Quoting neomac
Deflection, deflection, deflection, as soon as it's "what cost is reasonable" it's somehow all of a sudden a ephemeral netherworld of philosophical speculation we can hardly even scratch the surface of.
I don't think the scenario of removing Russia from Ukraine is feasible, so this question is more relevant to people who think it is feasible, who support the Western policy that explicitly has this as the goal.
However, I have no problem answering these sorts of questions on the premise it was feasible.
I'd be willing to sacrifice 30 000 troops if that would achieve removing Russia from Ukraine entirely and completely end the war that way. Beyond 30 000 I would start to be uncomfortable that the cost is worth the outcome and would believe it is better to give up territory to preserve lives and end the war that way.
However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods.
In the real world, an attempt to remove Russia entirely from Ukraine by force I would expect would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and not succeed, and, even if it did, would not result in peace but the war would still be on.
I'd also expect Russia to deploy nuclear weapons effectively, if such a campaign were to start to succeed, bringing an end to the campaign and getting more people killed for the foolishness of Ukrainian and Western leaders.
Quoting neomac
Obviously, negotiating a resolution based on the accepting the Russian's offered terms before the war, the main one being not joining NATO (which is only useful to join before the war ... not after the war), is my first choice.
However, if I was in Ukrainian government and was advising negotiation and the war breaks out anyways because no one listens to me, I'd be comfortable with a few thousand losses to arrest the initial Russian invasion and stabilise lines. This is a reasonable objective due to the logistics of invasion.
There is some value in "national pride" and contract soldiers sign up to do this particular duty, so it is, to an extent, part of the social contract. Of course, the point of arresting the initial invasion, of a larger force that cannot be defeated in any reasonable analysis (there is no scenario where Ukraine marches on Moscow), is to create negotiation leverage by demonstrating the capacity and will to fight.
The larger force can very likely win, true at massive losses to your own side but nevertheless substantial losses to the invading force as well, that represents both military and political risks of all kinds. There are big incentives to reach a resolution even if the larger force can likely win by brute force.
Losses beyond this I would be uncomfortable with. The negotiation position does not get better and simply gets worse the more the war continues. A resolution after a few days has the big advantage to the invading force that the cost has been very low, therefore they do not need to gain much for it to be a win for the domestic population. The higher the cost paid, the more the stronger party requires compensation for the cost, not less.
Of course, I don't like the Nazi's in Ukraine but they can be dealt with in another way; it's not reasonable to get ten's of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people killed and traumatise and displace millions simply because some Nazi's would die too.
Had the negotiation at the start of the war succeeded, and 2000 to 3000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, I'd be satisfied with the result and military performance and it a reasonable cost in lives to negotiate independence and a lasting peace for the rest of Ukraine.
What you want to achieve militarily and politically in this sort of situation is stable lines by falling back, inflict cost but preserve forces, rely on logistics stabilising lines anyways, and then negotiating the best possible deal with the leverage one has.
If the deal isn't "what is desirable" as the least influent party in the situation, that's just how politics goes sometimes.
Quoting neomac
Your analysis made no sense and I'll ignore it, does not support your conclusion, and your conclusion is false anyways.
These are not heavily framed question, it is the business of war to sacrifice lives to achieve military outcomes by force. You cannot speak of outcomes without also speaking of the lives reasonably sacrificed to achieve those outcomes. That's what war planning and the consideration of war is about: we are wiling for these people to die to achieve these objectives. That's what sending soldiers to die is premised on: that it is a reasonable sacrifice and the people making the decisions are comfortable with the expected results.
Can unexpected things happen and more people die than is reasonable? Yes. That is called a mistake, disaster, catastrophe. Why? Because more people died than is reasonable to achieve insufficient objectives.
However, to start the analysis an idea of what amount of lives is worthwhile to spend to achieve what must be posited.
Quoting neomac
Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what you are talking about.
However, if you're interested in assumptions, the assumption of commanding soldiers to fight in a war is that there is something that can be achieved militarily and the cost in lives is reasonable. The implication of war is people die.
If there is a way to avoid more people dying through talk that is preferable. Sometimes it is not possible, the Nazi's could not be talked out of their mission and neither the Japanese, insofar as there was the slightest hope of victory. However, the Russian-Ukraine war is far closer to a border dispute than a campaign of world or hemispherical conquest, there is no pathway to outright victory (except Russia employing nuclear weapons, which they are unlikely to do) and so talk is the only viable pathway to peace and will happen sooner or later.
Quoting neomac
You made the claim Finland joining NATO is some big geopolitical strategic loss to Russia, I pointed out it doesn't really change anything ... and now you say I should ask Russia about it?
The difference with Ukraine compared to Finland is that there is an important Naval base in Crimea, there are lot's of Russian speakers in Ukraine, Ukraine is a former soviet republic, and there is first and foremost an economic conflict over Ukraine (spheres of influence of the major powers).
Finland was never part of the Soviet Union, was squarely part of "the West" and never part of Russia's sphere of influence. There is no conflict between the West and Russia over Finland.
This conflict is the US wanting to expand it's imperial influence in Ukraine and diminish Russia's imperial influence, made the bold move of orchestrating a coup to replace a legitimate leader willing to compromise with Russia (i.e. not insane and in power because many Ukrainians did, maybe still do, support compromise with Russia over conflict and warfare).
There are two empires sorting out the question of who indeed does have more influence over what happens in Ukraine at the end of the day.
Neither empire has a moral case.
Quoting neomac
That's because actual evidence exists in the present and only speculation exists about the future.
To conclude one speculation is better than another, turns out requires evidence in the present to support.
Quoting neomac
This seems accurate.
Quoting neomac
This literally means:
Quoting neomac
If you are supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so, but "let them fight".
If you are starting to doubt if the lives this policy costs are worthwhile to spend, then "preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude the idea that Western intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death.
The West has managed to develop "woke warmongering" somehow.
Not-supplying-arms would be a micro-aggression against the mythical representation of the oppressed Ukrainian: all further discussion is taboo.
More of the same.
Yes, we get that Russia is bad, that invading places is bad. The question is what we do about it, not whether it's bad or not.
Yes, this really is the pinnacle of media psy-ops - to make war-mongering, not only acceptable, but actually to have people advocating peaceful methods of conflict resolution seem as though they're the oppressors...
As I believe I've mentioned before - does anyone know what happened to Cambridge Analytica? A company credited with altering the course of no fewer than three national elections, as well as countless smaller influences... then suddenly they're out of the picture and apparently no-one else has taken up the reins? I find that hard to believe.
It's like someone invents a super weapon which changes the fortunes of any war, they go bankrupt and no-one else even bothers to pick up the patent.
The Cambridge Analytic methodology worked. It's not hard to copy. I'd be very surprised in no-one was doing so.
Quoting The interaction of bots and humans in discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war
One could speculate that if there is a massive AI based bot influence campaign to promote Western policy, people with that bias want to hear more of it but then also experience cognitive dissonance when they encounter human criticism of the bot-generated-narrative, then people go back to the bots to maintain their perception.
We could also speculate that if your basic bias is being promoted all over the place by bots (whether you perceive / suspect them as bots or not) you feel no need to create content, whereas if your view is not represented by bots then there's more motivation to get a minority view out there.
Really interesting article, thanks.
I think it's interesting how the influencing mechanisms can be handled by bots, like its not really about being convinced so much as a simple numbers game, like 'how many of my type think X' if the numbers seem big enough, then thinking X becomes the policy.
There was an article about the Russian bots and influencers (which I'll dig out) which looked at who was influenced. By and large, people already in that camp.
I see a lot of beliefs like membership badges, believing X is your proof that you belong to group Y. Since no-one is in charge, everyone is looking to everyone else to see what beliefs are part of the membership criteria at any given time. As each is looking to the other, mistakes get magnified in unpredictable ways, like a massive game of Chinese whispers.
So we end up with some really odd beliefs. Usually these are then 'pruned' by contact with reality.
I think what's happening with social media is that beliefs can spread faster, bots can propagate them (but crucially they do so without error), and reality can be distorted to seem as if beliefs which are unsustainable can be held.
Evidently the belief in the new Novorossiya isn't at the ground level the same as in the propaganda. This was happening already before February 24th of last year, actually. The People's Republics weren't the most pleasant, organized and secure places to live in.
Because of the war in Donbas?
He hasn't been overly logical to this point, though.
The rich, often obese, post-white, post-christian mega-mono-culture represents little more than 15% of the Earth's human population. During the last 300-400 years, the core of this 15% was Western European and more lately North American. They have enjoyed total hegemony over the rest of the world. They created and control all the worlds global institutions. Any country that has refused to bend the knee to its demands has been destroyed, humiliated, impoverished, bombed, bought and sold. This is the genealogy of the current mega-mono-culture that still dominates our world today.
When you live you entire life within a mono-culture you cannot help but to acquire ways of thinking, attitudes, beliefs, narratives that are unexamined. When that mono-culture enjoys unparalleled supremacy over successive generations its citizens will inevitably acquire an unconscious hubris. No matter how hard they may try to be impartial, how hard they try to consider counter-narratives, the language and ideas they inherited are already infected by its cultural-genealogy. To a western mind the range of political concepts such as justice, democracy, freedom, rights, capitalism... all arrive confined within very narrow narratives. As the formation of any nation-state by necessity requires a mythology for it to sustain its identity, it follows that each citizen is infected by that mythology.
So the Ukraine war is not about Russia invading or annexing land from a neighbour. This narrative can only be sustained by the presence of an unconscious genealogy of hubris. The ingrained blindness enables Western Media to entirely memory hole the Minsk agreements; frame all human-rights abuses as committed only by Russians; portray Zelensky is the heroic leader of the French Resistance and Putin as something inhuman.
In reality the war is about Russia refusing to bend the knee to the hegemon. We already know that when you refuse to bend the knee the mega-mono-culture is coming to destroy you by any means necessary. So the interesting question is really not the war on the ground but what is Russia's plan to avoid its own destruction?
The obvious Answer is that Russia is determined to win overwhelming support from 85% of earths nations that are not part of mega-mono-culture. The primary calculus for the Kremlin is that the conduct of the war in the Ukraine does not alienate potential allies and especially China. To defend yourself against the mega-mono-culture you need lots of resources and lots of allies to buttress yourself against the inevitable series of measures designed to destroy you. With 20% of the world's land mass, Russia has all the resources it needs. So all that Russia really needs is Allies and China.
How successful has Russia been in acquiring those allies? Well, the successive sanctions proposed by the mega-mono-culture have not acquired majority support in a series of UN votes, with the majority of countries abstaining and more recently a growing number openly coming out opposed to the proposals. We have also witnessed a growing number of countries receiving a good dressing down by the Mono-culture for being too friendly with Russia or insufficiently supportive of the Ukraine.
Given the strength of Russias economy and its continuing resilience against the mother-load of sanctions deployed, it is apparent that Russia has acquired sufficient allies to help mitigate the damage that was intended.
The Thucydides Trap
Thucydides Trap is a term popularized by American political scientist Graham T. Allison to describe a tendency towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power as a regional or international hegemon. This theory suggests that China is the emergent power and the United States led mono-culture is the waning power.
From this perspective, the newly developed special relationship between China and Russia is perhaps the most significant story of the last 14 months - or perhaps the last 300 years. The ostracisation and sanctions against Russia have forced Russia to seek out China. The economic advantages this offers to China can not be over stated.
China's industrial capacity is already larger than the USA and the EU combined. Now, thanks to the sanctions against Russia, China has special access to 20% of the worlds resources at below market price. In other words, No one can hope to compete with such an input price advantage together with the economies of scale China already enjoys. Little wonder both Japan and South Korea are increasingly trying to wiggle around the Russian Sanctions and have obtained various exemptions - they can see the writing on the wall.
This narrative only works if it’s going to something better. The rebel alliance banding together to defend various forms of authoritarianism isn’t that.
Of course, I wouldn't say most Western leaders are anti-authoritarian either, but their brand of authoritarianism in the name of liberalism doesn't go down well in most of the world, who respond mostly with "why not just be authoritarian in the name of authoritarianism; what's with all the extra steps? And also we really hate gays. What's with the gay loving? You're gay, is that it, gay!"
I didn’t mean to contradict your claim. I meant to question:
1 - the strength of your accusation: “the most responsible“ is wrt what the US could have done, not wrt what was desirable, they might be very much different. Since that statement doesn’t make any such discrimination, from that sentence we don’t know what more specific facts the US can be legitimately accused of.
2 - its possible implications (e.g. that we should oppose the US leadership). Maybe the US has made big mistakes, that doesn’t exclude that such big mistakes might not be enough good reason to justify opposing the US leadership by the Westerners. It depends on what the viable alternatives are, including other forms of compensation. Even at the national state level, there are no democratic regimes immune from corruption or bad policies, that doesn’t mean one is ready to give up on democracy and move to ISIS theocracy just to give it a try.
Quoting boethius
I didn’t claim it’s a “US policy” but one of the most direct and self-conscious products of the US-led world.
Quoting boethius
What bothers me in your questions is that they are done in a void of realistic assumptions about human motivations. Given the current war, I doubt that there are Ukrainian Nazis willing to fight to death and promote this attitude among Ukrainians by mere principles or ideological indoctrination. Fighting to death to most ordinary people as well as for indoctrinated people may likely be motivated by traumatising experiences of personal loss and collective memories of oppression and abuses, so these feelings are not rooted in any specific ideology. They are very personal like personal feuds with related sunk costs. For that reason I do not have the pretentiousness of either empathising with or dismissing such feelings. They are part of the human fabric, so instead of repressing them or being judgemental about them, it might be profitable to channel them toward greater goals (for Ukrainians, independent Ukraine from Russia, for the Westerners, contained Russian imperialism).
Said that, until the one in power to take presidential decisions is Zelensky, he has to respond for Ukrainian policies in this war, not the Nazi community. Zelensky must care about the Ukrainians’ views on the war at large, not about fringe movements. At least, this is what I must assume if I believe Ukraine is a sovereign state, which I do. In any case, I have no evidence supporting the claim that Zelensky or Ukrainians [I]“would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians”[/I].
Quoting boethius
If you talk about “reasonable cost” I would like to understand what the reasoning is, other than your/my gut feelings. If we are talking military, I guess that for a military resistance one needs to take into account really many factors among them the rate of Ukrainian vs Russian people that can be enough trained, equipped and deployed on the battlefield, and their morale. I don’t have the actual figures available to decision makers, nor the military expertise to do the math, nor an insider sense of their morale. I guess neither Russians nor Ukrainians would fight literally to the last man, but they keep their military calculations secret for obvious reasons (e.g. the rule of 1/3 defensive vs offensive doesn’t seem to support an offensive action on either side given the overall deployed manpower on the ground, but depending on given circumstances and other asymmetric advantages this ratio maybe less relevant). I can just guess that they will keep fighting until the ratio in manpower and equipment between opponents supports the idea that there are still decisive moves to be made on the weakest defensive points of the opposing side. Otherwise the war will likely stall, even if there is no declared truce or peace. There is no need to have an anti-American bias to acknowledge that the military situation for the Ukrainians is ugly and chances to regain territories [I]manu miltari[/I] are not encouraging. There is no need to have an anti-Russian bias either to acknowledge that Ukrainians might keep fighting as the Afghans kept fighting against foreign occupation, the Palestinians keep fighting and the Kurds who never even had an acknowledged state for their own. For generations. Do you think Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds would be impressed by your “reasonable cost“ line of argument to fight their wars? It’s precisely the frightening idea that “reasonable cost“ for the Russians might be significantly higher than the Westerners could tolerate, that Russian morale is stronger than the Western morale what needs to be countered. That’s the blackmailing trap the Russians, pardon, I meant you, are “proposing” and “recommending” people to fall in. What the Ukrainians are teaching the Westerners, it’s precisely what “morale” it takes to fight for one’s freedom against genocidal authoritarian regimes like Russia.
Quoting boethius
Why 30k ? Why not 3k? Or 300k? And why would it be relevant to anybody that you start feeling uncomfortable at 30k? If one starts feeling uncomfortable only at 60k or hundred times more, what are you going to do about it?
Quoting boethius
Putting these 2 arguments together reinforces the Western concern that Putin is testing a military plan that can be replicated by himself and other potential emulators again: Putin will occupy territories with whatever excuse good for pro-Russian propaganda against neighbouring countries and then threat tactic nukes if there is a serious chance to suffer a decisive conventional military defeat.
That in turn may reinforce the Western motivation to support Ukraine to prevent Russia (and its possible emulators) from being encouraged to replicate the same strategy elsewhere. How? If an outright and full victory is not possible on the battlefield, nor by diplomatic means, then bogging down the Russian military involvement in Ukraine as long and as costly as possible to Russia without escalation measures may be an effective strategy. But that has its costs, obviously. Especially for the Ukrainians.
Quoting boethius.
But the threat of war won’t be over even after peace. For example, Russia may still want to get Odessa once it has restored its military capacity or start somewhere else encouraged by a too favourable peace deal. And find other economic and political ways to bully Ukraine, to corrupt its politicians or oligarchs.
[quote="boethius;803060”]The higher the cost paid, the more the stronger party requires compensation for the cost, not less.[/quote]
That might be true also for a weaker but indomitable party.
Quoting boethius
But I can’t ignore that all three accusations lack arguments to support them.
Quoting boethius
Sure, but that’s not on me to establish. Politicians and military leaders/experts are there to do the job.
At best I can reason over their arguments, and suspend/withdraw my reliance on them if I find their arguments enough questionable. I’ve read elsewhere many if not all of your arguments (like Ukraine won’t be able to regain its territories from 2014, or Russia might use tactical nukes if there is a risk it will lose territories, or the lack of the Western commitment to Ukrainian victory, the peace deal refused by the West). But again I’m more interested to discuss geopolitical and moral implications/assumptions than to discuss the actual status of the Ukrainian military and morale. For the latter I mostly limit myself to get input from more reliable sources.
Quoting boethius
Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what I was talking about.
Quoting boethius
The other assumption is that I’m not a commanding soldier. So I’ll let other people more credited and qualified than I am to express their competent views on military matters. The war has also geopolitical implications like the rise of the Ukrainian nation against their genocide by the Russians.
Quoting boethius
Again I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand. You asked me “Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia?” as if invading Russia is the only strategic concern for Russia. That is questionable. The Ukrainian case is there to prove it.
Quoting boethius
If that’s the case then invading Russia is not the most realistic security and strategic problem that Russian imperialism has to face. Notice that Putin never presented the Western security threat specifically as a threat to the naval base in Crimea (other points were e.g. denazification Ukraine, NATO neutrality, demilitarisation). Besides Russia has Russian minorities in other ex-soviet union countries and accused other neighbouring countries to have nazi regimes. So the problem is not just what Russia did, but what it might do next if the war ends the way Russia wishes. Russia is challenging the West world order so this war must be assessed in that perspective not just as some beef between Russians and Ukrainians over marginal territorial disputes.
That Finland joins NATO is a problem for Russia for at least 3 reasons:
1 - Reputation: Finland doesn’t fear to anger Russia and feels safer within NATO as other countries who joined NATO.
2 - Security: Russia is compelled to react because if NATO enlargement was a downplayed provocation prior to the war in Ukraine by the Westerners, now Finland joining NATO is an overt provocation to Russia. Since NATO border is widening and the NATO control over the Baltic Sea getting stronger Russia must deal with related security threats.
3 - Network: NATO has become more anti-Russian by having countries like Finland and maybe later Sweden within NATO (counterbalancing the weight of other US allies milder against Russia).
Quoting boethius
Talking about “a coup to replace a legitimate leader” is a way to dismiss a popular revolt against an illegitimate leader. If it was the case and Russia had by far the popular support of the Ukrainians, I doubt that Western coups would succeed. Besides Ukrainians have a long history of opposing the Russian rule and have suffered for that a great deal (way more than they are doing now in terms of body counts). Even the entanglement with Nazism (as it happened in Finland) was also due to historical grievances with Russia. There is nothing here that the US propaganda invented.
I don’t know what you take to be a “moral case”. And if no wars in human history are grounded in what you consider “a morale case“, then I would find your moral claim useless. As far as I can tell there are no wars that aren’t morally controversial so when we talk about the morality of war we should take into account that moral controversy management is part of the game, and as far as I am concerned, how differently is played in Western democracies vs non-Western-like authoritarian regimes. So if you prefer the former to the latter then you better ask yourself what “reasonable cost“ is worth to spend to keep it that way.
Quoting boethius
You look more pressed to conclude how the West failed practically on all relevant grounds (military, economically, politically, morally) against Russia, based on a very selective view of the evidences you claim to have. So speculations (like in your hypothetical scenarios) are framed accordingly: Russian wins whatever military strategy pursues (annexed territories consolidation, more land grabbing, tactic nukes, wartime economy, alliances with the Rest), the US loses whatever military strategy pursues (with less engagement Russia wins, with greater engagement escalation to nuclear war, with peace on Russian deal-breaker terms then Russia will result victorious). But if the US is losing whatever it does, you should be glad. The primary/entirely responsible for the human suffering and global environment unimaginable devastation for decades is digging its own grave, isn’t that worth millions of Ukrainian deaths over 8 billions world population and more if one considers the well being of future generations? Why isn’t THAT a reasonable cost?
Quoting boethius
Oh if that’s enough to call me “a proponent of US foreign policy” then you are “a proponent of the Russian foreign policy” since opposition to “supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so” is what Russia propaganda does. Actually I’m tempted to say the same for all your arguments.
“Preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude either the idea that the Western LACK OF intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death like the Ukrainian genocide during the Soviet Union. Worse, it could lead the avg Western life close to the avg Ukrainian life more than the other way around.
Let us rise above our unconscious pre-suppositions and examine more closely the premise that the western mono-culture is less authoritarian than China and Russia i.e. Putin and Xi. After we strip away the platitudes and propaganda what remains is an argument based solely on a more rapid periodical rotation of political leaders.
If the last 3-7 years have proven anything, it is that all political parties throughout western democracies on any substantial matters are globally in lock-step. We saw this with the management of COVID, we saw it with the global financial crisis, the war on terror, we see it with refugee policies, trade agreements, climate change policies and we see it with the war in Ukraine. Diversity no longer applies to substantial policies.
Every single western democracy affords the same advantages to the largest global corporations and in the same way. Where any differences appear it is a matter of style, a rhetorical flourish that may descend into a public trolling fest for our entertainment but is essentially a vacuous form or performance art.
When we label governments or their leaders as authoritarian, we impute that the government or leader heavily restricts citizens rights, and the influence those citizens may have in the political decision making. If this is what we mean, then it is not apparent at all that western democracies are less authoritarian than either China or Russia. Opinion polls may have caused the UK to rotate 4 different prime ministers during the last 3 years but it has led to no substantive change in policy. On all substantive matters, war, economics, health policy et al the western public is not asked but told what to think. The platforms of descent, the politicians with differing views are marginalised.
The citizens of Western Democracies have been quietly disenfranchised. The world's largest corporations together with traditional media and social media now manage the political system. Those corporations manage campaigns and lobbyists to determine policy, and often enough the lobbyists - not the politicians - even write the legislation. The allied media then carefully script the narratives, monitor and adjust the messaging to manufacture sufficient public consent. If politics is meant to be a public debate, a battle of ideas to formulate policies that are for the greater good of the populace then Western Democracies have reached a post-democratic, post-political stage. Here, words like authoritarianism are useful for formulating powerful talking points for the publics consumption but in reality they have devolved into meaningless anachronisms.
It should be clear to us all, that economic prospects not political systems determine whether a government - of whatever constitutional form - tends towards repressing its citizens or deigning to endow them with freedoms. When economic prospects are buoyant those who are in power graciously indulge the public and allow them the appearance of agency. When threats re-appear on the horizon, the chimera of public power is revealed. What follows is always the control narrative, censorship, wars, and policies that serve to protect and sustain those in power. The once sacrosanct civil freedoms that flourished in good times instantly become disposable indulgences.
Because In Western Democracies, the last 50-70 years have been so uniquely prosperous, it is probably impossible for us to appreciate that what is now occurring is a dull reversion to the norm. We enjoyed something very special but we took it for granted and permitted it to become hopelessly corrupted.
It seems "rumors" of a Ukrainian offensive seem to pop up every once in a while, but is there any substance to this?
There's at least a chance that Ukraine has successfully held back an amount of troops, materiel and ammunition to be able to conduct an offensive. I don't think the chance is particularly high, and the chances of this being a form of propaganda/information warfare seems more likely to me.
But even if it's the latter, it would be interesting to think about what the target and goal is of the information campaign.
- Information warfare aimed at the Russians seems unlikely, however the Russians have dug in across pretty much the entire frontline. That fact alone seems to discredit a real threat of a Ukrainian offensive, however it does show the Russians took the initial possibility seriously.
- Propaganda aimed at the western public, to divert the image of a lost war?
- Propaganda aimed at the Ukrainian forces to keep some semblance of hope for victory?
- All of the above?
I would also be interested to hear if anyone here is convinced the Ukrainian offensive is a likely possibility.
https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/the-calm-before-the-storm-waiting-for-ukraines-offensive/
As of yet, no Ukrainian offensive.
Do you (continue to(?)) subscribe to Koffman's position?
Quoting Tzeentch
This is of course referring to the rumored 'spring offensive'. How the war develops further in the future we cannot know.
Some thoughts as to why an imminent Ukrainian offensive seems unlikely:
- the attrition rate at Bakhmut
- the closing window of opportunity while the Russians are occupied at Bakhmut
- the state of Ukrainian air power and air defense
- the lack of Ukrainian armor
- the Russians having dug in all across the frontline
I'm kind of curious what positives someone who believes in an imminent offensive would look at to think it is feasible.
It could be part of a deception campaign. Military deception is a big part of Soviet doctrine, which is what the Ukrainian army mostly runs on. I'm sure the Americans advising the Ukrainians will also seek to leverage whatever advantage they can.
Given the circumstances it is not likely, but I'm inclined to give the idea at least some credit. The Russians seem to have taken it seriously enough to dig in across the entire frontline.
The main thing I'm wondering about is if posters like have some interesting information to share.
, you still didn't proceed with your suggestion:
Quoting above
, especially with the attention they've gotten, it seems like a bad idea. Anything they may do or are doing will be/remain more covert (for the time being at least). Multifront warfare might also be a bad move.
, don't have the articles in front of me, no. They were from back after the leaks, "now we have to reshuffle things", "back to the strategy drawing board", that sort of thing. I suppose it's anyone's guess, time will tell. Could launch some betting/bookmaking, and exchange some money (don't think Bookies or bet365 do that). ;) Commentary on photos and such:
Ukraine could launch its offensive against Russia any moment. Here’s what’s waiting
[sup]— Tim Lister · CNN · Apr 29, 2023[/sup]
Back shortly before the invasion:
Investors Bet Ukraine-Russia War Will Be Averted
[sup]— Anna Hirtenstein · The Wall Street Journal · Feb 11, 2022[/sup]
Ukraine Says Russia Is Preparing to Evacuate Civilians From Occupied Areas of South
[sup]— Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Yurii Shyvala · The New York Times · Apr 8, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine Says Russian Troops Are Evacuating Civilians From Occupied Areas of South
[sup]— Jeffrey Gettleman, Olha Kotiuzhanska · The New York Times · Apr 23, 2023[/sup]
Wagner Group boss tells his mercenaries ‘not to take POWs’
[sup]— The Kyiv Independent · Apr 23, 2023[/sup]
Russian forces ‘forcibly evacuating’ civilians in Kherson, says Ukraine
[sup]— Peter Beaumont · The Guardian · Apr 24, 2023[/sup]
Wagner boss says his forces will not take any more prisoners in Ukraine
[sup]— Agence France Presse via Al Arabiya · Apr 24, 2023[/sup]
Various people think back:
Oral history: Leaders recall dismay, fury on first day of war in Ukraine
[sup]— Peter Finn, Tara McCarty, Susan Doyle et al · Washington Post · Feb 24, 2023[/sup]
Prigozhin threatens to withdraw his mercenaries from Bakhmut if they lack ammunition
[sup]— New Voice of Ukraine via Yahoo · Apr 30, 2023[/sup]
Prigozhin threatened Shoigu to withdraw the militants from Bakhmut in case of lack of ammunition
[sup]— Larisa Golub · Apr 30, 2023[/sup]
(? translation via google)
(I could only find the original interview on Telegram.)
As far as Ukrainian strategy goes, it seems separating east and south (isolating the south) would be worthwhile, assuming it won't be reverted the next day. Then again, that may be what Russian strategists are expecting.
It's fairly tough on a number of parties, including Russia (so peripherally relevant here). Dis/mistrust vectors.
"Kill chain" refers to reconnaissance/observe/collect ? target/analysis ? weaponize ? paralyze enemy ? attack; Hursti thinks paralyzing is a crucial part, for example, to get whatever actors to panic.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-casualties-soldiers-killed-ukraine-counteroffensive-putin-war-rcna82380
If you're Ukraine, don't you think that if you hold out long enough, eventually the Russians will just get sick of it all?
Time is not on Ukraine's side. The Chechens thought they had won for a bit but were crushed eventually.
If the annexations stand, they become 'facts on the ground'.
What's war mongering is the assumption that supplying arms is somehow necessary to the exclusion of peace talks and diplomacy. That declaring things like Ukraine will negotiate only after Russia withdraws, which is just stupid, is some purist being "tough" on Russia etc.
Obviously, you negotiate to get what you want, not after you already get what you want.
A logic that excludes peace is, by definition, mongering for war.
Likewise, simply assuming Ukraine is entitled to arms supplies and it's all "Ukrainian agency" is just cowardly war mongering, such as stating "Ukrainians defend with foreign aid". Ukraine is not entitled to arms supplies, if they didn't manage to navigate their international relations to avoid a war and didn't manage to create with their own taxes and policies a conventional deterrent, that's their business and doesn't morally bind anyone to supporting their war effort; supplying arms is not some moral position (plenty of countries get invaded and the West doesn't supply arms because it's "the moral thing to do"), it is a policy position taken in the West's, particularly the US, (at least perceived) interest to have a prolonged giant war.
If that policy is not in the average Ukrainians interest compared to the Russian's initial offer of autonomous Donbas, neutrality, giving up claim to Crimea, but in the US' interest (that all of a sudden after decades of the US going on about their interest as the explanation of all their policies ... is somehow no longer the case?) then, again, it is war mongering because the US wants a war.
For, without not only the arms but promises that are obvious lies (such as giving Ukraine "whatever it needs" and "for as long as it takes") fighting a long war would not even be possible for Ukraine. Had the truth been told: that Ukraine will be supported insofar as it serves the US, at least perceived in the White House, interest (and enough to also justify twisting the arms of NATO members against the war), maybe that would have been pause for thought for Ukrainians, and even Zelensky.
Ukraine has no friends in this situation, only war mongerers who want war today. The day war in Ukraine is no longer fit for purpose, the narrative will change overnight to: "oh well".
If you disagree, you believe this war is some moral imperative based on absolute values, then all I hear is a lot of talking and not much fighting in your holy war.
I talk because I owe nothing to Ukraine, sworn no oath and have given no promises, and believe in peace and not war, and peace is achieved by talk. If you believe in war and not peace, then you should do war and not talk.
If you are back to being some impartial observer of things without skin in the game and a horse in the race, then observe there are war mongerers on each side, and for now they are the victors.
The narrative of a Ukrainian offensive is that NATO has trained and armed many brigades and this will be a game changer when they arrive at the front and start their assault.
Of course, that's hypothetically possible but seems highly implausible, mostly for the reasons you mention in addition to potentially electronic warfare and glide bombs being a game changer for Russia.
It's also difficult to come up with some way it's even feasible to not only train and equip an entirely new army, but do it with new systems, less people available, less capabilities (in particular AA systems as you note), degraded civilian infrastructure, and somehow be several factors, maybe an entire order of magnitude, more effective than last summer, which is what would be needed to achieve what last summer's offensive did not ... and against hardened lines and more Russian troops.
The only theory that makes a little bit of sense seems to be:
Quoting RogueAI
Which not only as points out is a theory that didn't work for the Chechens, but there's little reason for the Russians to simply get up and leave if losses were indeed a problem, they'd just stop offensive actions, as Ukraine would have the exact same (likely a lot more) problems in doing their own offensives and have zero advantages in a war that transforms into mostly just artillery firing back and forth (as they have significantly less artillery and other standoff munitions).
And that's if statements like a "estimated 100 000 killed or wounded" are even remotely true or just made up for propaganda purposes as they seem to be. For all we know, the estimate is simply assuming Russian losses are similar to Ukrainian losses and the pentagon knows Ukraine has 100 000 killed and wounded in this time frame, so let's just assume it's the same for the Russians.
However, these sorts of "rules of thumb" can be wildly wrong when there's differences in capabilities. Russians have more artillery and more types of artillery, electronic warfare (i.e. drone advantage), and now deployed glide bombs that Ukraine has no AA capabilities to stop, and so on, and their losses could be nothing like Ukrainian losses.
Not to say that's what this US estimate is based on, but it's an example of how you engineer what you want to hear in a bureaucratic setting. In itself, there's nothing wrong with coming up with an estimate based on some given assumptions, so an analyst given this task can carry it out without lying, then you can declare this estimate exists and just omit the part that there's no reason to believe it's true.
I was not agreeing with your analysis of the circumstances but only observing that Ukraine cannot afford to just wait out the present situation if it is to have a chance of stopping the Russians.
You have been saying that resistance is futile since 2/22. We will see.
We are not disagreeing.
I've mentioned a few times that hypothetically NATO has trained and equipped an entire new army, maybe even provided a whole new airforce of F-16s ... or even F-22's and F-35s, whatever it takes "to win".
We agree on both points.
The problems Ukraine is facing in military terms do not mean they cannot be solved. I have difficulty imagining how they could be solved, but that's more an invitation to speculation.
Quoting Paine
I have not said resistance is futile since 2/22.
I made clear I would myself sacrifice a few thousand men to arrest the initial invasion and stabilise the lines.
Continuing to fight beyond that point of maximum leverage (where a smaller force can leverage the damage and chaos it can deal to a larger force, thus motivating a peace to avoid said cost) is simply negative returns on the blood invested in my particular moral system.
Especially as Russia was offering autonomous Donbas (still part of Ukraine from what I understood) which is far better than annexation and the language repression of Russian speakers is not actually a good thing.
We don't go around telling Germans to not speak the "language of the Nazis" or various colonised people to not speak English.
Ending the civil war (that had been going on since 2014) with more autonomy for the separatist region is not exactly some geopolitical world ending result. Pretty banal.
As a Anglo-Canadian, I don't tell Quebeckers not to speak French, and last I heard they're a nation ... inside a country. Which, as an anarchist, I think is the right direction.
However, I never used the words futile. Depends on what you want to achieve. If your moral system is one of maintaining the "rules based world order" and you're willing to sacrifice Ukraine to do that, then maybe it's not futile. Although, even then it seems to me far from clear that Russia will in fact be damaged more than the West when all is said and dead. Situation is complicated.
That's pretty much what the NY Times is saying, that if this coming offensive doesn't work, Ukraine will be under a lot of pressure to end the conflict.
"WASHINGTON — Ukraine is preparing to launch a counteroffensive against Russian forces as early as next month, American officials say, in the face of immense risks: Without a decisive victory, Western support for Ukraine could weaken, and Kyiv could come under increasing pressure to enter serious negotiations to end or freeze the conflict.
"American and NATO allies have supplied Ukraine with extensive artillery and ammunition for the upcoming battle, and officials now say they are hopeful the supplies will last — a change from two months ago when weapons were only trickling in and U.S. officials were worried that the supplies might run out.
"At the same time, 12 Ukrainian combat brigades of about 4,000 soldiers each are expected to be ready at the end of April, according to leaked Pentagon documents that offer a hint of Kyiv’s timetable. The United States and NATO allies are training and supplying nine of those brigades, the documents said.
"Although Ukraine shares few details of its operational plan with American officials, the operation is likely to unfold in the country’s south, including along Ukraine’s coastline on the Sea of Azov, near the Russian-annexed Crimea.
“Everything hinges on this counteroffensive,” said Alexander Vershbow, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and senior NATO official. “Everybody’s hopeful, maybe over-optimistic. But it will determine whether there is going to be a decent outcome for the Ukrainians, in terms of recovering territory on the battlefield and creating much more significant leverage to get some kind of negotiated settlement.”
"While Ukrainian officials have said their goal is to break through dug-in Russian defenses and create a widespread collapse in Russia’s army, American officials have assessed that it is unlikely the offensive will result in a dramatic shift in momentum in Ukraine’s favor.
"Ukraine’s military faces many challenges — one reason that a stalemate remains the most likely outcome. Fighting in Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine this winter has drained ammunition reserves and led to heavy casualties in some experienced units.
"And yet American military officials say it is possible that Ukraine’s army could once again surprise them. They are now armed with European tanks and American armored personnel carriers and have new units trained and equipped by Americans and NATO forces.
"“I’m optimistic that between this year and next year, I think Ukraine will continue to have the momentum with it,” Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace, told reporters during a visit to Washington last week. “I also think we should be realistic. There is not going to be a single magic-wand moment when Russia collapses."
Still the question is open...
This was reported by a collaboration between top investigative journalists in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. It was rigorously verified using a former Navy operative in England and through advanced satellite tracking. With confirmation from navy intelligence officers going over the material, simply concluding "With this evidence it is much more clear who was responsible".
With this, any claim that someone else than Russia committed the act requires a much better foundation of evidence than what has been delivered by these investigative journalists.
This is not very good evidence at all, considering Russian ships regularly go through the Baltic and you have to go through the Danish straits (basically where the explosions happened) to get to and from the Atlantic.
So it's not some unusual thing that Russian ships would be there.
Quoting Christoffer
The US president saying:
Sure, doesn't prove who did it, but declaring you'll "end" something and then that very thing you promised you'd end does get ended, results in two possibilities:
1. You did it, just like you said you would.
2. You're a fucking moron.
Feel free to go with 2, but don't pretend that what people say they're going to do doesn't matter and is not strong evidence.
Color me skeptical.
Besides, it couldn't have been the Russians because we already have US intelligence officials going on record claiming the attack was carried out by a Ukrainian 'group'. :snicker:
Why would the US deliberately be spreading bullshit (obfuscating the investigation) if they weren't trying to cover their tracks?
If you had any interest in looking at the actual evidence, it is not just about ships going about their business. Their investigation is part of a long and large investigation into commercial ships being used for military operations. There are surveillance images of these ships showing heavily armed military personnel with masks to hide their identity so that it's hard to track their origin of operation. There are experts in both military navy as well as commercial shipping that examined the movement of these ships in relation to how they should move according to their function, showing them following US subs and other ships in surveillance moves rather than being used for commercial fishing. All while they turn off their sea traffic trackers at the moment they deviate.
This is just a short sum of the body of evidence they've gone through, but why would you care about that? It's not like you're a person who would actually lift a finger to go through it.
Quoting boethius
Try that in court against the other evidence :rofl:
They also had a long investigation into people in western countries who on the surface are independent journalists who keep releasing pro-Russian concepts and propaganda, only to be proven paid by Russia.
The whole idea behind it being a post-soviet propaganda system that doesn't act on trying to convince Russia to be right, they only need to plant doubt into populations of other nations in order to get them into conflict with each other instead of focusing on Russia. It's the foundation for why Russia wanted Trump to win. Vlad Vexler has gone into those things describing the difference between propaganda before the wall fell and after.
I'd say this thread shows just the same kind of behavior from some. Disregarding any evidence in order to just plant enough doubt. That people still fall for it trying to dismiss pretty convincing evidence is just a tragic reality of it all.
It was their own footage, taken while they are heard asking the photographer: "are they aiming at us? Should we go? Let's go now"
This was WITHIN danish waters, not international waters.
Do you know how long investigations take? They've been conducting this investigation since the explosions, and compared to amateurs, they actually went through A LOT of scrutiny to verify, just like investigative journalists actually do, compared to amateurs with too much time on their hands.
Get real.
Maybe you should actually look into the evidence before conjuring up some scenarios and calling out people to get real.
Quoting Tzeentch
I don't give a fuck about the US, this is an investigation by Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland with support of intel by former UK navy. If you want to discuss what US says and if it is true or not that has nothing to do with the evidence that these investigators found.
But all of this just shows how low the level is in this thread. There's ACTUAL tangible evidence on the table and it's still just who said what and what propaganda is correct in a never-ending circle.
Return with something more tangible after you've looked into the evidence in detail, until then it's just empty words on your part.
This is a bit cute, considering there's no evidence whatsoever presented in any of these reports.
What are you talking about? What reports are you referring to?
What report? I've said that these investigative journalists presented this evidence and it's been a multipart series of one-hour investigative documentaries in collaboration between the top investigative journalists in each nation and then aired on their respective biggest channels. It's then been confirmed and built upon by other news outlets and journalists further building on top of it and all of it has been with utmost care to verification because of the sensitive matter all of this is about. They've even had access to intelligence tools for deep tracking internet services for digging into people spreading propaganda and who's been shown to be paid by the Russian state.
But you say there's no evidence in... some reports? What are you talking about? If you don't care to dig into this yourself then there's nothing to talk about since you will just conclude yourself right by ignoring it.
All of this shows just how stupid this whole thread discussion is. There's actual evidence presented by these journalists, painting a far clearer picture than any fantasies, conjured-up stories, and wild interpretations that get spewed out in this dumpster fire of a thread. Instead of looking into any of it, you just claim to be right because you don't have the evidence served to you, but I question that you would even look at it then.
Here's one of the Russian soldiers on a civilian ship with a turned-off official tracker within Danish waters. These ships have been reported to be conducting surveillance all around the nordic regions and the other ship that was tracked to be at a stand still at the site of the explosions is a vessel with the specific capability of mini-sub underwater operations.
But yeah, there's nothing in this because you say so... give me a fucking break.
I thought you were accusing me of not 'looking into the evidence in detail'.
Where's this evidence?
That's part of the whole body of evidence, it's one image that is able for me to provide since I cannot link the actual episodes because, you know, it's national television spread between all nations. So if you want the evidence, please go check yourself, use VPN, or whatever.
But you know, you won't do that and in your head, that means there isn't any evidence. I've tried to explain this to you, but you ignore it and still go on with "Where's the evidence" like that somehow is a counter to the evidence. That's just pure ignorance and being a dishonest interlocutor. But that's just how this thread seems to work, it doesn't matter if someone points and says, look there's some evidence for you all to take into consideration, it doesn't matter if I try to explain what it was, you just keep ignoring it.
If you want the evidence, go in the direction I pointed towards, or just keep doing this lazy charade, because I cannot provide something you need to actively watch yourself. If you don't want me to install a VPN or try and tune an antenna for you. :shade:
But here you go, I doubt you will care though
https://www.svtplay.se/uppdrag-granskning-skuggkriget
I'm talking about Nord Stream, in case that wasn't clear.
That the Russians are floating around scanning the seabed with civilian vessels is nothing new. Hell, I don't even doubt they could have conducted the Nord Stream sabotage if they had wanted to.
If you've actually watched it through and especially the third episode, then you are just ignoring the fact that the ship in question, the one with underwater operation capabilities was at the location of the explosions, turning off their commercial trackers, stopped, went back to Kaliningrad, turned off normal communication, went back and turned off their trackers again and held positions for a long period of time right at the site just days around the explosions occurred. Verified by both satellite and the former Navy operator separately.
So, we have a ship, built for underwater operations at deep levels, that went to a place, twice, that has no purpose other than being the place where the pipeline is located. While turning off trackers that all commercial ships are required to have on in these waters. While turning off normal communication back to Kaliningrad. While no other ships were reported in the area and no other ships were spotted on the satellite other than this ship around that time. On top of this, it's clear that Russian civilian ships are almost all involved with surveillance everywhere around the Nordic region, spying on everything based on their deviant movement from their commercial purpose, right at times when something else is in the area that would be of interest as intel to Russia. You then have the propaganda strategy of blaming in all directions, then boiling it down to one part, in order to make the appearance that guilt has been cleared up. The same exact propaganda strategy that Russia is using all the time to steer the narrative away from them after they've done something (which according to this thread is pretty obvious they succeed with), as they did after Butcha.
All of this (which is a brief summary of three hours), is also commented on by outside sources that verify the significance of their findings.
But you don't think any of this is significant because of what a half-demented president, vaguely said and you interpreted as an admission of guilt. That is your strong evidence against all of this? :rofl:
Seriously, all of this is enough to have the guilt heavily leaning toward Russia. Of course it isn't a picture of a Russian operative shooting a rocket launcher on the pipeline, but it's way more evidence than any other theory has shown so far (and any wild conspiracy theory in this thread), and dismissing this because you interpret what the president said as "stronger evidence" is just a conspiracy charade, either on purpose or just because brainwashery. I guess this thread really fried some people's brains, good thing I'm not a regular in here anymore.
But then again, I don't think you watched it at all. I just think you try to bullshit your way through this.
All we see are blips on a map and the vaguest of satellite imagery.
Military ships aren't required to use AIS. The US navy sails around without AIS 24/7. Moreover, navies use a special version of AIS that allows them to manipulate the ship ID data.
It would have made a whole lot more sense if while carrying out such a high-risk operation, they would never have turned AIS on, and maintained EMCON throughout the mission. Supposed 'retired UK intelligence officers' aren't the only one's listening in around the Baltic. All of NATO is too.
The idea that the CIA and other intelligence agencies can't produce more than a few blips on a map and the grainiest of satellite imagery is just the type of naivety that would make this theory plausible. Had the Russians been this obvious about it, there wouldn't have been a mystery in the first place.
Moreover, the Russians own the pipeline. They know where it is located and have the capacity to carry out the operation via submarine, completely covertly.
The story doesn't really provide evidence, nor does it add up.
Quoting Christoffer
That much has been clear since the Cold War.
Quoting Christoffer
An overt threat by the US president and Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, both basically outright saying they will blow up the pipeline, is a very strong indication of guilt - yes.
I think it requires an ungodly amount of confirmation bias not to interpret that as such.
The fact that the US threw Ukraine under the bus in a panic move when the Hersh story came out, makes its innocence even less likely.
Quoting Christoffer
Yes I did. I'm just a little less naive.
What planet are you living on?
Saying you're going to do something ... then that thing happening would definitely be used against you in court.
Mafia bosses who say they will whack a guy, who have incentive and means to whack said guy, and then that guy turning up whacked is court admissible evidence.
In itself, is it enough to convict? No. But it's pretty strong evidence.
Definitely "exhibit A: the defendant is recorded as threatening to 'what him'" type evidence.
As for your evidence, being placed at the scene of a crime only matters if it's somewhere you would not normally be. Being placed at your home or at your work ... or in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world (as a ship) "a few days before the crime took place" is extremely weak evidence.
Why wouldn't the Russian ships be there? This narrative is spun like the Danish straights is in the middle of some random place in the pacific.
And speaking of court, if you want to argue on that basis, "who dun it?" we cannot say conclusively based on the available evidence, but what we can know in this "court" you are imagining, is that prosecutors purposefully withholding evidence is a serious procedural violation (mistrial at best) and arguably fraud.
NATO has access to the crime scene ... so why don't we see pictures of the crime scene, reconstruction of the explosive devices, any basic investigatory work at all?
For these claims to be something other than propaganda, the material evidence should be presented.
Of course, people could still say it was a setup, doesn't necessarily resolve anything, but the material evidence should be consistent with this story that the explosives were laid a few days before (or then a pretty good explanation of how the Russians faked how long the explosives were there) if that's what NATO is claiming.
No prosecutors (outside a circus court) could ever possibly get away with making a case while not only making zero effort to make their story consistent with the material evidence of the crime scene ... but hiding all the material evidence of the crime scene to boot.
In terms of criminal process, it's just dumb.
NATO has not made a case, they've thrown a bone to the people who want / need to believe it wasn't the Americans ... in a way that increases, rather than decreases, the suspicion it was the Americans to any attentive observer.
Now, if we had seen pictures of the crime scene, catalogue of the materials used, reconstruction of the devices, would it prove conclusively who did it? No. But it would at least be a plausibly good faith investigatory process where we could argue based on actual facts of the actual crime scene.
No, they have verified signatures for a specific ship. Nice strawman try to lower the significance of it.
Quoting Tzeentch
They are required to use them when exiting international waters. That's why Sweden chases out Russians all the time when discovering deviating routes and having them off.
Quoting Tzeentch
There are hundreds of thousands of ships, he used his retirement time to specifically track ships around the Nordic region and mapping behaviors using a specific tracking technique. That is what he is actually doing, what you do there is to guess that Nato is doing exactly the same. So guesswork once again.
Quoting Tzeentch
More guesses and attempts to downplay. Spy satellites that something like CIA uses require specific targets. They are super-advanced with high-resolution resolution, but you can't go back in time and just pull out images from all around the globe and you could do it less for tracking an object if you didn't know its location in the first place.
And then you say "If the Russians had been obvious about it, there wouldn't have been any mystery". That's not in any shape or form a counter-argument to these things, that's like saying "if the murderer had been obvious about it there wouldn't need to be any investigation". What the hell kind of argument is that? :rofl: It's this non-obvious and covert op that perhaps made it hard for advanced surveillance and the CIA to catch them in the first place. Because the surveillance that did spot them was a retired Navy officer who made it a 24/7 hobby to track ships' movements and deviations and then confirmed by one of the most advanced non-military satellite systems around, which, compared to your guesswork about CIAs capabilities for intel, actually do take images frequently. But as a drawback, it can only get the outline of the ship. However, the combination of two separate tracking methods that aren't traditionally used in tandem to confirm things like this, provided a confirmation of the ship's identity and behavior during the attack on the pipeline. It was this unusual combination that helped find this intel because it was a non-standard practice that Russians wouldn't have any intel on.
That you only believe that the CIA should have gotten better intel while trying to strawman the actual findings in order to paint the theory as naive is just so weak as a counterargument that it comes off as a desperate attempt to dismiss everything out of bias to what you already believed before.
Quoting Tzeentch
You don't seem to know how well Sweden tracks Russian subs. A civilian-looking ship using small submarines is more covert than a large sub. And you also totally ignore the fact that there are residue and evidence left after an explosion. If they had used a Russian sub and torpedos it would have shown signs of that kind of attack. You're just pulling ideas out of your ass now without any regard for what the consequence of different strategies would be. To use a ship that is among hundreds of thousands of other ships in the Nordic region is obviously a much more covert and intelligent strategy. The fact that it required non-standard methods to spot the deviations is clearly a sign of that operation being smartly planned.
Quoting Tzeentch
Because of what? You shrugging at the evidence and thinking the CIA "should have" spotted things because they are the all-seeing eye of the universe? You have nothing tangible whatsoever to support any other theory, while this is the best evidence so far. The most plausible culprit is Russia, you can't deny that just because you believe and interpret things about what CIA "should be able to do" and what a half-demented president vaguely said.
Quoting Tzeentch
Except, since the invasion, Russia has expanded this to include all civilian ships, not just a few specific ones. All ships are required to be able to aid in intelligence. You can find info about this if you cared to look up anything.
Quoting Tzeentch
They didn't say they will blow it up. That's something you put together after the fact. As I said, try that in court and people will laugh at you because that's called conjecture and cannot be used in the way you try to.
Quoting Tzeentch
Holy shitballs you are backwards with that. You don't even realize that you use confirmation bias, after the fact to spot this connection. You don't seem to realize that it's precisely confirmation bias that you do with that conjecture. And this thing is your only thing, as well as "CIA should have seen stuff".
How the hell can't you see how weak what you suggest is? You say that the evidence that has been presented is weak and yet you provide the weakest form of "evidence" possible. It's hilarious.
Quoting Tzeentch
No, you are purely biased toward your own belief in this. You have no evidence whatsoever and you call me naive? Get real
Quoting boethius
They didn't say that they were going to blow it up.
Quoting boethius
They didn't say they were going to blow it up. Or whack anything.
Quoting boethius
Actual tracking of Russian operatives connected to the time of the explosion is stronger evidence. What you are doing is conjecture. Get some basic justice knowledge if you want to conclude what is "strong evidence".
The evidence presented in this investigation is also not enough to convict, but it is damn stronger than all of your wild interpretations and conjecture of that speech. You need to prove that the intent wasn't to diplomatically dismantle the pipeline with Germany.
On top of this, you need something else than just that speech. You wouldn't win any court case with just that. The investigation has a lot more evidence to show. If you think that speech is enough against all that, then you're delusional.
Quoting boethius
Uhm... because ongoing investigations do not share such things? There are a number of investigations going on as well. Have you ever heard of investigations sharing evidence in real time? That's a good way for the perps to adjust their stories and prepare for when they're caught. Not a good strategy of justice, which is why such things aren't publically exposed.
And if you don't trust NATO you can check other people investigating. Like, for instance, what I've referred to.
Quoting boethius
I've linked to the series. You can watch it. There's no NATO involved in that investigation.
Quoting boethius
Then look into the investigation then, that I talked about. What's the problem?
Quoting boethius
I think the investigative journalists made a tremendous effort to show a story consistent with their evidence. I don't know what you're referring to.
Quoting boethius
This isn't about NATO, it's about what the collaborative investigative journalists between four nations did to provide tangible evidence of Russia's involvement. It has zero to do with NATO so I don't know what you are babbling about.
Quoting boethius
You can wait for the investigations conducted by others than NATO as well as understand the fact that ongoing investigations don't share evidence (which doesn't mean they hide anything because, you know, that kind of conclusion is called a conspiracy theory). They have no obligation to share this with you in some "good faith" and it is also strategically stupid to release evidence before anything can be concluded. You are not an investigator and you are irrelevant to show evidence to.
However, you have the evidence from these journalists, which is far more conclusive than any bullshit that's been produced by this thread. In here, there's just conjecture and conspiracy theories. There's nothing different between this thread and some deep internet hole with other conspiracy nutjobs. Wild interpretations and confirmation biases.
These journalists have found tangible and clear evidence that points to Russia. It's not strong enough to deductively conclude Russia's guilt, but it's damn well better than any bullshit that's been conjured up by internet amateurs so far.
You are completely delusional.
Placing someone where they would likely be (a busy shipping lane) = weak evidence.
Someone threatening to do something, indeed promising to do it = strong evidence.
Purposefully withholding evidence (such as all the material evidence of a crime scene) while accusing someone of a crime = fraud.
That's not the evidence, maybe you should just shut up and watch it in detail before guessing what it's about. Thinking this is about ships in a busy shipping lane just shows how ignorant you are.
There's no point trying to convince someone like you to do this since you've shown in this thread just how biased you are. Actually, there's a big part of the series dedicated to what you are doing, but you wouldn't know anything about it or would deny it.
The evidence you are talking about is literally ships near the scene of the crime.
Civilian ships, military ships, covert ships. Any kind of ship with any kind of person for any kind of purpose is not surprising to be in a busy shipping lane.
How would Russian civilian, military, covert ships go to and from St. Petersburg and the Atlantic?
Literally right through Danish straights.
Now, in terms of ignorance, you seem to believe:
Quoting Christoffer
There are civilian satellite photography taken every day of the entire earth that you can purchase.
And you think CIA spy satellites would need a "specific target" to track something as large as a ship in critical waters in the heart of NATO ... during a war in the region?
But let's put that aside, because you literally state:
Quoting Christoffer
So, if the investigation hasn't shared all it's evidence, and that's just normal, why would we come to any conclusions?
The problem here is these countries (who have material evidence) coming out with partial evidence without presenting the rest, so we can't see if it even coheres with the material evidence they possess. Presenting partial evidence pointing to one party means absolutely nothing other than trying to shape the narrative for people who want / need to believe it wasn't the Americans (such as giving a plausible basis for European policy makers to continue to be bitches; not that there's any risk of them being something other than bitches, but this way is more comfortable for them compared to considering the possibility the US does not have Europe's interests at heart, but rather their own interests ... surprisingly close to exactly what they keep saying for the last 5 decades to explain nearly all of their policies; as crazy as it sounds, people could just mean what they say sometimes, such as "protecting US interests" means "protecting US interests" and not European interests).
Bad faith at best, fraud at worst (if we're pretending to be in court and 'normy' laws apply to the parties involved).
And isn't Denmark coming out with statements such as:
Doing exactly what you say is incompetent for investigators to do?
Isn't that a ....
Quoting Christoffer
If anything you seem to be criticising the investigation.
What you haven't done is point to any evidence even remotely stronger than the US President publicly declaring his intention to "end" the pipeline.
If you think some stories of ships in the Baltic (where we'd very much expect them to be, including military and covert ships) is somehow stronger evidence, all while chocking up the lack of presenting the material evidence as "a good strategy of justice" but coming to conclusions anyways, that's called: believing what you want to believe.
There's no such thing, except maybe acoustic signatures, which weren't mentioned (and civilians don't have access to). They mention a handful of visual characteristics which we are then to assume are present on the irrecognizable white blotches we see on the satellite imagery.
There are military installations that can passively detect and identify specific sensor emissions, and identifying a set of sensors can create a profile that can match a certain vessel. There are three problems with that, however:
1. This type of equipment is not readily available outside of the military.
2. This is why militaries practice EMCON (emissions control) during operations, especially clandestine ones.
3. This would all have been available information to the various militaries and agencies surveilling the Baltic Sea.
To reiterate, this would have been basic stuff. Literally the first things that would have been done when trying to discover whodunnit - check positioning logs, satellite imagery, and data from the numerous listening installations that line the Baltic coasts.
For this information to just 'pop up' out of nowhere while the US has already pressed the panic button is very hard to believe.
We never get any real insight in the actual data that was used. I wouldn't be surprised if this 'retired UK intelligence officer' was just logging positions on https://www.marinetraffic.com, since it actually passes on the screen at one point in the documentary.
Quoting Christoffer
A secret technique which we never get any insight into, and is somehow unknown to professional militaries who have access to every type of surveillance imaginable?
Again, color me skeptical.
Quoting Christoffer
If you're going to accuse me of "pulling ideas out of my ass" then maybe not display your ignorance so blatantly.
Obviously they wouldn't have to use torpedos. Their submarines can lay mines and launch divers, underwater vessels and drones.
Quoting Christoffer
That's begging the question, isn't it?
How many ships in the Nordic region have the letters "CC-750" on their hulls, hm?
Are you sure conducting underwater sabotage in broad daylight with a submarine tender would classify as "covert and intelligent"?
No, it's about their behavior and their function. Once again, dig into the actual findings instead of continuing this biased charade.
Quoting boethius
Yes, and the deviations are the things that they investigated. As well as the fact that these ships entered Danish waters (not international) with masked armed personnel, deviate from their planned routes and enter restricted areas where they should not be. Sweden has been driving off Russian ships and subs on occations for years, but at the moment it's almost done on a regular basis.
So you don't know what you're talking about.
Quoting boethius
If you had been looking into this, you would have understood that there are thousands if not hundreds of thousands of civilian-marked ships that are used by the Russian military and navy as covert ships around the Nordic region. And if you knew anything about the Baltic region you would know that it is not "the heart of NATO" and has never been up until maybe when Sweden joins NATO, which hasn't happened yet. But the key factor here is that your idea of it being easy to track all ships as you imply is just not correct. This is the foundation for why they probably used such a ship in the first place because there's simply no way for the CIA or NATO to track all ships and if they mask their intent right up until they deviate with a commercial tracker off, they won't be noticed other than by something that tracks an entire region or someone who's dedicated all their time to just looking at deviations. And then there's the fact that there's no war in the Baltic region and ocean. Where do you think the intelligence people are looking the most? Ukraine and the Black Sea of course.
Painting CIA and NATO as an all-seeing eye that has superhuman capabilities of spotting everything everywhere is not a counter-argument to the findings presented. Because these findings were used with unconventional methods. Which may be key to why they spotted it and not any intelligence agency. If Russia knows the tactics and methods of surveillance, they would plan a covert op to hide from it, but not unconventional methods like the ones used in these findings.
Quoting boethius
Because... once again, if you cared to look into these findings that are a result of investigations since the explosions occurred, you would understand that the conclusion is not undisputed guilt towards Russia, but that there's enough evidence here to point at Russia far more than any other perp.
But you don't care, you just conjure up your own conspiracy theory based on official investigations not releasing evidence in an ongoing investigation and some far-fetched interpretation of a half-demented president.
If this was a murder case and you would say: "If the prosecutor isn't releasing the evidence for the public to see, then there has to be some corruption against the accused", no one would judge you as being anything other than another conspiracy nutjob. If the normal practice in criminal investigations is to keep the evidence confidential, then in investigations that revolve around national security and war it would obviously be even more so. To say that this confidentiality is "evidence of guilt" on the investigator's part is just conspiracy theory nonsense.
Quoting boethius
Nations, NATO, or the CIA isn't part of the investigation that has released these findings I'm talking about. If you are this confused about who's doing what and what evidence is where then it's no wonder you're acting like a conspiracy nut.
Quoting boethius
I'm using "court" or normal legal practices as thought examples in order to show just how weak your "evidence" is. The thing is that these new findings that have been released paint the clearest picture yet, it's the most conclusive evidence yet. And you are doing everything you can to dismiss their relevance without even having much of an insight or care for the details. This is the behavior of Russian trolls or of people brainwashed by their propaganda strategy. They show a hilarious example of this with a "people's journalist" who questions everything in the same manner you do, and then they track his history back to being paid by Russia to keep feeding misinformation and disinformation to the public in order to plant doubt. So that even when there are clear hints, through evidence, that Russia is in fact behind the attack, the seed of doubt produces useful idiots who keep spreading this doubt.
Quoting Tzeentch
False, the navy former officer specified the ship identity and the tracker before it was turned off was linked to the exact ship. If you paid attention to the material you would know it wasn't identified by the "white blotches". The "white blotches" were correlated between locations the former officer registered and with the satellite images in order to confirm travel paths. So you are clearly wrong and once again try to strawman their findings.
Quoting Tzeentch
Doesn't matter if they mask themselves among the hundreds of thousands of ships in the area. There's literary a section focused on how they didn't use the satellite system in Tromsö that they used to detect this. And it was the combined tracking between the navy officer and those satellite images that created a map of the ship's travel path. The whole point was that the initial investigators missed it because the satellite system in Tromsö isn't used for investigations. It was the idea of the journalists to use them.
Quoting Tzeentch
It was months of investigation in order to find something conclusive. Compared to your wild speculations, real investigators actually take time to verify to a point where it has substance. That takes time, and that's what investigative journalism is about compared to whatever bullshit clickbait the rest of the journalist world conducts.
It's kind of the opposite of what this thread is, where everyone is just spewing out wild speculations as soon as something happens. It's also that kind of behavior that lock people into biases, so deep that you are unable to do anything but try so very hard to dismiss all of this in every way possible.
Quoting Tzeentch
This shows that you just skimmed through everything.
Quoting Tzeentch
You don't understand why they were able to track in the way they did. The unconventional methods used are not anticipated by Russian covert ops, and not something planned against. Using civilian ships in the way they did is perfect to circumvent intelligence agencies who monitor these areas because of the sheer number of ships in use. Do you think this is the first time in history that civilians were able to spot operations and intel that intelligence agencies missed?
Quoting Tzeentch
My ignorance? I'm pointing to the only fucking tangible evidence that has been publically available and you call me ignorant? Ger real
Quoting Tzeentch
And the Swedish navy is an expert hunter for Russian subs. Do you know how many they've pushed back from our waters over the years? Do you think the presence of our navy is less after the Ukraine invasion? Do you think it's intelligent for Russians to use subs in Swedish waters when our entire sub fleet has been specifically built to counter Russian submarine designs? I guess if you had been the leader of this operation it would have failed spectacularly. Swedish submarines and operating personnel is proven the best in the world since we took out US flagships with ease. What would be the most intelligent way to do this operation then? Disguise as a civilian ship that has the capacity to do fast deep sea minisub missions of course. The Swedish navy is actively looking for Russian subs and military ships, they aren't focused on these civilian ones. The report that there are thousands of these pseudo-civilian ships is big news in the Nordic region, our governments are now initiating actions based on this investigation.
You are just throwing out ideas in an attempt to counter all of this but there's no depth to any of your ideas. Pun intended.
Quoting Tzeentch
How is that begging the question? It's inductive reasoning based on Russia's actual practice with civilian ships right now. And you fail to realize that YOU are the one doing "begging the question". "Biden said this... so that's begging the question of why the explosion happened after it". "NATO is keeping evidence quite, so that's begging the question, what are they hiding". You don't seem to understand what begging the question means.
Quoting Tzeentch
You mean this ship? Because this is the one they tracked
And of course, why would anyone track a ships location pre-explosions? You are suggesting that they should have spotted these ships before the action, but how would they know? How would they know to track this ship? The findings by these journalists were possible because they found a way to track ships in this region post-explosions. The actual intelligence agencies were surprised by their findings. There's been further interviews with counter-intelligence personnel basically being surprised by what the journalists were able to achieve and it's now part of the investigation going forward.
Quoting Tzeentch
This just shows how naive you are about what covert means. It's not a Mission Impossible movie. Real operations use any means necessary to stay covert. In real life, there can be far weirder things like inflatable tanks, which fool intel personnel more than people realize. If you think that going down with a Russian sub into Swedish waters, where Sweden is world-leading at countering Russia, down to the very design of our military naval equipment and conducting the operation at night like some Hollywood movie, is more "covert" than operating within a group of thousands of other ships, only deviating a short time to a location along the pipeline that is located in a place where Russia could spin the blame towards others than if they had done so closer to their shore, and then slip out playing "innocent ship", then you have no idea what covert ops mean.
Once again you are stretching things too thin for your counter-arguments to actually work. What will you think of next I wonder?
That's the narrative.
The actual thing that happened (from what I'm able to tell) is he correlated AIS data with intercepted emissions.
That's both unlikely, and not sufficient for an identification.
Unlikely because military vessels can turn off their AIS at will or tamper with the vessel information - even produce ghost contacts. In addition, one would expect military vessels to practice EMCON while on a covert mission, even moreso because nothing the vessel was supposedly engaged in would require it to make use of military-purpose active sensors that could be used to identify it.
Not sufficient for identification because of the aforementioned, and also for other more practical reasons like passive intercepts being generally unsuited for a precise localization (and thus correlation), especially without triangulation from multiple stations. How exactly did the retired navy officer get his hands on this type of hardware again?
Quoting Christoffer
I think you simply lack the practical knowledge to understand my objections.
Quoting Christoffer
Except that the story goes that they didn't mask themselves.
Apparently they left port with their name plate on display and kept their active sensors on, without apparent reason other than it being very convenient for the story.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Christoffer
What it shows is that I understand how these systems work and what constitutes an actual ship identification, rather than a dramatized collection of circumstantial evidence.
Quoting Christoffer
What exactly was unconventional about the methods? The method is never really explained, but from what I gather they used AIS data, passive intercepts and satellite imagery; that's about as conventional as it gets.
Quoting Christoffer
It sounds like you are confusing territorial waters with Economic Exclusive Zones. To reach Bornholm island there is no need to enter Swedish territorial waters, and Bornholm Island itself is located in the Danish waters. The sabotage was conducted on the border of Danish territorial waters and the Danish/Swedish EEZ border.
If you want to live in a fantasy where Sweden sees all that happens in a noisy, shallow sea like the Baltic, be my guest, I suppose - shows what you know.
Quoting Christoffer
Because NATO and Russia have been practically at war since February 2022. I'd expect western intelligence agencies to keep tabs on literally every Russian vessel they can, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas.
What findings?
You literally just said yourself investigation is "on-going" so they'd be stupid to release any actual evidence that would allow the culprits to get their stories straight.
You can't have it both ways, saying the lack of countries releasing evidence on the one hand is investigators being "smart" and on the other the very same countries releasing "some evidence" that tells you what you want to hear are "findings".
The evidence of Russian ships being in the Baltic is poor even if we assume it's true. Where else would they be?
If it merely establishes that Russia had opportunity to blow up their own pipeline, no one's ever disputed that.
That's the facts. He's a former signals intelligence officer, meaning, he's an expert in the surveillance of radio communications and he was listening in on communication. There's even a section with him analyzing the communication behavior to determine the experience of the person using the radio.
He tracked the vessel to the point of its stated science mission position and then it deviated from its mission to go to the pipeline right at the location of the explosion.
You can speculate all you want, but the capability of the ship and the tracked route confirmed by two sources as well as intercepted communication back all of this up. You don't seem to get that it wasn't a military vessel, it was a civilian science vessel with the military on board, based on the analysis of the communication it had with the mainland. The introduction of him in the documentary shows him directly listening in and you're interpreting him only checking emissions? This is why I doubt you actually have looked into any of this, you are missing points all over the place.
Quoting Tzeentch
I think you lack the unbiased ability to look at these findings correctly. And what practical knowledge? Your ability to interpret a half-demented president?
Quoting Tzeentch
They didn't mask against someone intentionally looking for it in the way they did in this investigation. Because it wasn't normal military practice, as stated by the military and navy if you paid attention.
Quoting Tzeentch
As a science vessel, you know, trying to hide in plain sight. You seem to be very confused as to what actually happened.
Quoting Tzeentch
How these systems work doesn't help if you utilize them for masking yourself. They traveled with a stated mission to a place in the Baltic Ocean to "do research", then went dark and went to the location of the explosion, before returning again.
Tracking a vessel with underwater operation capability, two times deviating to the same location where the explosions happened is not circumstantial evidence, and it's far more proof than any conjectures you draw up about who's responsible. Where's your actual evidence for anyone else?
Quoting Tzeentch
The satellite stations in Tromsö are not used for gathering this kind of information. And yes, they are explained, if you actually watched all of it.
Quoting Tzeentch
It sounds like you don't know how the Nordic nations' navies collaborate in the Baltic Ocean. It doesn't matter if it's right outside the borders. Do you think we have surveillance only within our nation's borders? How do you think we intercept subs before they enter our waters? The case point is that we have technology specific for spotting Russian subs and you suggest it would be better for Russia to use said subs. Not a very intelligent strategy really.
Quoting Tzeentch
Not at all, but you know even less about our Swedish navy and its capabilities. The point is still that operating with a science vessel doing a covert op is far less likely to attract attention than going in with a Russian military submarine. That you think that would be a better strategy just shows how little you know about the conflict events that happen all the time between the Swedish and Russian navies. They're constantly pushing away Russian subs who get too brave thinking they're invisible. It would be the most stupid strategy ever to use a Russian sub for actual operation so close to Sweden, but hey, maybe you live in a fantasy where that is a sound strategy.
Quoting Tzeentch
Explain how you do that practically with hundreds of thousands of Russian ships. First, you keep most intel gathering on military movements in the Baltic sea, then, as a priority, you need to keep track of movements in Ukraine, around the borders of Ukraine, Russia, China, and its borders, since that's a potential conflict as well, not to mention other places in the world like, as a recent example, Sudan. You also need constant surveillance of the Black Sea. After you've positioned all analysts to every priority target you then have hundreds of thousands of ships to keep track of around the Nordic region and need to constantly monitor everyone and their movement in order to spot deviant behavior.
So, I'm asking you to explain how in practice you would allocate these resources to effectively be able to spot the rapid deviant behavior of the specific ship that was pointed out in this investigation.
Because it's rather ironic that after you call it fantasy that Sweden would be able to monitor the entire Baltic Ocean (which is a strawman because that's not what I said), you argue that NATO would be able to cover all of this around the world including all the thousands of ships that this specific ship was a part of. Seriously, you're not very consistent in the capacity anyone has of surveilling ships. According to you, the Swedish navy doesn't see much, and the signal intelligence officer shouldn't be able to gather much, but NATO should see everything all the time, because that is in line with your conspiracy theory about them.
Quoting boethius
The findings by the investigative journalists that were just released. Are you illiterate or just ignorant?
Of course, this is just maskirovka. Everything's running like a well-oiled machine, right stooges?
You seem to claim this is some sort of backup for NATO's claims.
You literally state:
Quoting Christoffer
But if you want to pretend there's some "independent journalism" that is stronger evidence than the lead suspect saying they will do exactly this thing, believe what you want to believe.
That's the whole point of suddenly finding Russian ships are in the Baltic is exactly for people like you who find this a surprising fact.
If you actually lived on the baltic (as I do) it's considerably less surprising.
I did not doubt Russia had opportunity to blow up their own pipelines before. Finding out there are Russian ships "actually in the Baltic, including military ships!!!" is literally zero new information.
Both the US and Russia have opportunity. The only thing worth analysing with the information we have (absent actual material evidence, which even then wouldn't be conclusive considering the means of the two suspects, but at least interesting) is motive and intent.
If you want to argue the US literally declaring their motive and intent on television is weaker than speculations as to Russia's motive, go ahead and make that argument.
If you want to continue to make the case that Russia has ships and Russia's ships sometimes ship through busy shipping lanes, it was not previously in doubt.
Nord stream 2 never got permission to open from the Germans, so it's difficult to see a motive for the Russians blowing it up.
Nord Stream 1 wasn't flowing because of "turbine maintenance" depending on Seimans who sent them to Canada who couldn't send them back to Russia due to sanctions, which the Western media assumed was bullshit.
Which is the central problem behind the idea the Russian's blew up their own pipelines, as there was far less destructive means to shut them down, restrict gas supplies while also keeping the leverage on the table in the future.
Indeed, even if we elaborate the scenario where the Russians wanted to take advantage of the US stating they'd "end" the pipelines (for example to create tensions in NATO), it's difficult to imagine any rational for blowing up both Nord Stream 1 and 2 and so destructively. You could get largely the same result by blowing up only one of four the pipelines, create the same tensions and keep 3 quarters of the leverage.
And not only is there little reason to blow up all the pipelines, but there's degrees of destruction to choose from. There would be little reason to use so much explosives:
Quoting 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, wikipedia
If it was the Russians and they used a measly 100 pounds of explosives to cause repairable leaks, would there really be a risk people find that a non-credible attack?
For the Russians, attacking their own pipelines would be a PR thing, there would be no fundamental motivation to destroy their own stuff in a non-repairable way, so you really need to get to very advanced levels of PR kung fu to come up with a model where the Russians conclude not only is it a good idea to attack all the pipes, but do it so close to Denmark and Sweden (rather than somewhere they could get to and control the crime scene first), and in such a destructive way.
No, what I refer is that navy and military investigators, as well as independent ones who went over what the journalists found agreed that what they found is significant. That is a confirmation of it being important, it doesn't mean this investigation is in any form of alliance with these military officals and investigators. It's like you don't even attempt to understand any of this but just boil everything that is said down to some unintelligent interpretation. It's like speaking to a child.
To make it clear for your mind. These investigators are not working for or with the official investigations that have been conducted both by military, navy and civilian actors. This investigation that I am referring to is its own investigation, looking at sources that the other investigators seemingly didn't use.
Quoting boethius
"lead suspect" is something you have made up. In no way is the US any lead suspect other than through Russian propaganda and people gullible enough to eat that propaganda without a second thought. It's this presumption that makes you acting out bias towards what you already believe, and me only referring to the evidence at hand.
And of course, you ignore to even study the findings that have been presented. You just dismiss it and continue with your narrative of "lead suspect". It is a fundamentally biased and faulty deduction on your part. A normal useful idiot for Russia basically.
Quoting boethius
Only in your faulty deduction. Russian propaganda and methods include creating conflicts between western nations in order to weaken them. It's the foundation for why they interfered in the 2016 election. It wasn't because Trump was an ally or anything like it, it was because he stood for the most chaos inflicted by US on itself and other Western nations. This has already been clearly described by many including people like Vlad Vexler, focusing on the shift from Soviet propaganda before the wall fell to Russian propaganda today.
But you don't seem to be able to understand these motivations, or rather I think you just ignore it because it is problematic for your argument. You are part of the problem that is what Russia want by this type of actions. You are the one who ignore actual evidence and continue to focus on a narrative that you have already decided, downplaying and strawmanning everything that is a threat to your own conclusions and arguments. You have no evidence that is tangible in any form that would be of significance. You have a wildly speculative interpretation of a speech and calling the US "leading suspect" without anything to back that up other than conjecture. The difference here is that I go where the evidence is the strongest, the actual evidence, and I don't conclude Russia to be guilty yet since the evidence so far can only point in that direction. But it is a far stronger direction than these wildly speculative interpretations you are doing and has been doing throughout this thread while ignoring everything that is remotely a threat to your own opinions.
This type of ignoring anything that is a problem for your argument is called Selective Perception Bias and it is the very foundation of everything you write in here. This is why it's hard to take your arguments seriously. They're so obviously flawed with ignorance and bias.
The US blatantly stated it was going to end Nord Stream. It has been trying to change European energy dependency since the Bush administration.
We have almost a day-by-day account of what happened provided by an independent, world-renowned journalist.
The US has been profiting immensely from blowing up the pipeline.
The fact that you believe one has to be brainwashed by Russian propaganda to believe the US is a likely suspect is just rich, and probably points towards an effort of projection on your part.
Yes, that doesn't mean they blew it up, that only means they want to end the use of Russian gas in their allied nations because of how the dependence on it create problems, as we've see when sanctions were drafted. It's also a pretty stupid way to "end it" since it would just be rebuilt. "Ending it" means making sure EU is choosing something else than Russian gas and oil. But you are interpreting that as attacking it. It is nowhere close to any admission of guilt, it is Selective Perception Bias.
Quoting Tzeentch
Day to day of what evidence? What's the tangible and real evidence here, all I see is you having Selective Perception Bias.
Are you saying that Vanessa Beeley is a world-renowned journalist? Is this the kind of person you are using as a source calling her a world-renowned journalist? Are you for real? :rofl:
You mean that the actual top investigative journalists in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are less trustworthy than a proven liar and disinformation blogger?
It's this kind of bullshit that is enough to show how low the level is in terms of rational deduction on your part. It's this kind of things that show why the conclusion that you are just another useful idiot for Russian propaganda is accurate.
Quoting Tzeentch
You are brainwashed because of how you deduce anything in your arguments, using known conspiracy theory bloggers and wild conjecture through Selective Perception Bias. You have nothing tangible to support anything you say, only your biased opinions. It's so intellectually empty.
Excuse me?
Quoting Christoffer
That's quite simply untrue. I support everything I say here with tangible arguments, and most of what is discussed is directly related to my own academic field.
That you don't like what I have to say is completely unrelated.
Vanessa Beeley, it's who you linked to if you had any idea.
Quoting Tzeentch
Your arguments aren't tangible just because you say so and especially since the premises you provide have such a weak footing that they're simply just your subjective opinion based on nothing else than what you believe to be true and then seem to call Vanessa Beeley a world-renowned journalist as if she were in any shape or form more valid than the top investigative journalists that conducted the investigation I referred to.
The fact is still that your conjectures are fundamentally weak against the findings of these journalists. And these findings are in support of Russia being the most likely suspect. In the real world, outside of your fantasies and biases, these findings are so far the strongest there is, and any person able to understand what is and what isn't strong evidence have no problem understanding the significance of this.
I think this thread has fried some people's brains. People are so deeply lacking in the area of understanding biases that it's sometimes impossible to converse with them and this thread is clearly such a place.
... Obviously I was referring to Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh and his nearly day-by-day account of the Nord Stream bombing, directly incriminating the United States. Hersh who, by the way, has a proven track record of bringing US misdeeds to light.
It's rather cute you are trying to dismiss the poster of a YouTube video - as though the poster is in any way relevant - when the video features former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outright admitting their preoccupation with European energy dependency.
You're just making a fool of yourself at this point.
Quoting Christoffer
A bit ironic.
Discussing with you is like shifting through the debris of a vapid soul.
It is not worth my time for something as low stakes as the question of whether Russian ships (civilian, military, covert) are in the Baltic doing what they would normally be doing in peace, and much more-so in war time.
However, since no one is debating at the moment anything remotely important (such as if the cost of the war to Ukraine is worth the benefits so far or then expected benefits in the future and if whether the Western policy to supply is in Ukraine's interest, the West's interest or then just the arms suppliers interest) I will pick apart your delusions for the benefit of the casual follower to this discussion.
Quoting Christoffer
Sure, I have zero problem defending that I am defining the US as the lead suspect.
In any crime, someone who credibly states they intend to do that crime beforehand makes themselves the lead suspect.
You accuse me of ignoring this "important evidence" of some messages or whatever, while completely ignoring a party to this affair literally declaring their intention to end the pipeline.
To make a credible case it was someone else, you need to first explain why this threat by the US was not actually credible and we should dismiss it. For example, perhaps it was a bluff ... or perhaps it wasn't a bluff but the US and Russia were in a race to blow up the pipelines first and Russia just so happened to win that race because they are so competent and crafty.
If it was a bluff, then you're simply agreeing with my position at the start of this discussion with you:
Quoting boethius
For, if it's actually in Russia's interest to blowup the pipeline because they are "masters of perception" a la Soviet:
Quoting Christoffer
Then obviously, if making a bluff to blow up the pipeline plays right into the hands of the "Vlexler" you are a complete fucking moron for making that bluff, as it's literally blown up in your face.
Now, if it wasn't a bluff why didn't the US blow up the pipelines before Russia, or just not get around to it, forcing Russia's hand to blow up their own pipelines?
If you're argument is "Biden's a fucking moron, delusional senile ol' goat that is liable to say whatever comes into his mind on live television and his words should be ignored, just unfortunately in this situation the damage of the president's incompetence is like super high because a lot of people will mistakingly assume US blew up the pipelines because the US president basically said that and the motive is clear" then you have no disagreement from me. Biden being a senile imbecile that was hallucinating when he was talking about "ending" the pipelines and then Russia took advantage of that blunder to cause strife and consternation is as plausible a theory as the US did it.
We are not, in fact, in disagreement. You just don't want to call a spade a spade or then offer some other theory as to what Biden's words meant, why they don't matter, or why did matter but the Russians got to same plan first ... in which case why is it in Russia's favour if the US was planning to do the exact same thing?
By linking to a channel of a known conspiracy theorist and disinformation spreader. I failed to see the obviousness and the fact that you did kind of shows just how bad you are at understanding sources.
Quoting Tzeentch
Where's the evidence? You are still doing what conspiracy theorists do and connect dots by wishful thinking. Where't the actual evidence?
Quoting Tzeentch
You are still unable to understand that this does not equal guilt of the bombing. It's conjecture. You also fail to explain why there's any motive to bomb it. The EU is an ally to the US and after the invasion there's already began a switch away from Russian dependency for energy. Bombing the pipeline while Germany is already dismantling their need for it has no function. Russia however, just as with their propaganda strategies, aims to split the west into conflicts with each other so as to not have a united front against Russia. That's their aim and it's well established. So, what does a bombing of Nordstream at this time? Russia directly pointed blame against Ukraine, then the west, then the US, just as they already do with other propaganda strategies. The intention is to seed doubt so that the west starts to blame each other. And you are among the ones who they play like a fiddle in order to spread this doubt. So, you are the one who's making a fool out of himself. You don't even understand the conspiracy rabbit hole you're stuck in.
Quoting boethius
Oh, the good old debate strategy of dismissing everything saying it's not worth your time... and then just continues to write a long follow up anyway :rofl:
And of course you just ignore everything said and just go back to normal strawmans. It's pathetic actually.
Quoting boethius
Why are you shifting focus? Shifting goal posts is another strategy of dishonest interlocutors. I have no interest in dancing along with these biases and fallacies. I can feel my intelligence taking damage just being around your dishonest writing.
Quoting boethius
Of course, just pick and choose and when the blame comes into question, move goal posts and try to prove it that way.
Quoting boethius
Hindsight bias. You have no evidential link other than conjecture.
Quoting boethius
Strawman. And of course, you ignore to look into it. Your way of ignoring things like this makes you unable to actually do any kind of investigation. That you don't understand that you suffer from Selective Perception Bias like this also moves you into Dunning Kruger territory.
Quoting boethius
Perhaps, perhaps perhaps. Any more dots to connect through conjecture in your water tight accusation towards the US? You would have been laughed out the court room if you had the same level of burden of proof required in there.
Blowing up the pipeline had no purpose for the US when the invasion had already had the effect of moving Germany and Europe away from dependency on Russia. The changeover was already happening so there's no point in bombing a pipeline and hurting allies. Russia, however, have everything to win by the chaos it produces. You are just blaming the US because it rhymes with your personal opinions.
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
What are you talking about? It had the intended effect, you're here playing into exactly what Russia wants to have; the west fractured by gullible people and muddying the waters to the point that when there's even tangible evidence of the act you continue to push for your personal opinions, using every bias and fallacy possible. Russia has everything to win on fracturing the west, it can have the effect of governments stopping shipments of weapons to Ukraine because the people have started to doubt everything. Russia even stated how Europe will "freeze" this last winter, which is an odd thing to say after the explosion. Why isn't the fact they said that equally guilty like the half-demented president quote? Maybe because there's more tangible evidence pointing towards Russia. Things you ignore out of inconvenience for your personal opinion and conspiracy ridden narrative.
Quoting boethius
No, it is that his chaotic mumbling makes it deeply unreliable for interpretation, especially when you do it through hindsight bias and conjecture.
Quoting boethius
I have already described three times now what the possible motives are, but you don't care. Your mind seems to wander through conspiracy-land being both confused and paranoid.
Quoting Tzeentch
Certitude? :brow: Many would like to know what happened regardless, but you claim to know.
Quoting Tzeentch
Why just him? :chin:
Quoting ssu
Means :up: Opportunity :up: They were there (unlike Brian Williams)
Yep (@ssu), no particular proof. Some evidence, though.
@Tzeentch, your apparent certainty is (still) too thin. :down:
I find the thoroughly patronizing attitude towards the Ukrainians...nevermind. They ain't fucking children.
, nice story, sort of. I suppose you'd have the UN being "war-mongers".
You're position is literally:
Quoting Christoffer
Now you're walking back from "much more clear who was responsible" to "conjecture".
Quoting Christoffer
We don't disagree what Russia's motives would be. I literally say:
Quoting boethius
What you fail to do is account for the undisputed fact the US threatened to blow up the pipelines.
If you want to propose an alternate theory, you need to take into account the undisputed facts.
You need to say "I have this theory that it was the Russians that conspired to blow up the pipelines and make it look like the US did it by taking advantage of the fact the US said they would do it, all while totally not being a conspiracy theorist conjecturing about this conspiracy theory I have" (or is it only a "conspiracy theory" if it's not the Russians somehow?).
You do not even have the beginnings of a proposal.
I get it, Western media simply ignores the US president threatening to blow up the pipeline as there's simply no way to fit it into a pleasant narrative: either the US president means what he says, threatened to blow up the pipeline and then did exactly that to maintain the credibility of the US' word ... or then he's a moron that makes empty threats that the opponents of the US can easily take advantage of.
So, because the Western media ignore this obviously pertinent fact you think that's "smart".
Quoting Christoffer
So ... why would the US threaten to blow up pipeline if it serves no purpose?
Even in the realm of conjecture, you're idea should cohere with the known facts.
As I say above, if you're theory is the Russian's did it and Biden is a moron for doing the Russians the favour of making empty threats about the pipeline, I don't have a problem with that theory. Conjecture all you want Russia is the master of strategy and perception and US officials are dunces that have no idea what they are talking about or why.
For, if it was the Russians, the only reason this pipeline thing causes the:
Quoting Christoffer
Is only because the US president threatened to blow up the pipelines in Public.
So, at least start your presentation with "Yes, the US did threaten to 'end' European infrastructure, and that wasn't a good idea to threaten the interests of your own allies, the US should of course respect the sovereignty of Germany to decide for themselves to buy Russian gas or not, which is what this whole war is about supporting sovereignty so just the threat on this infrastructure and deciding things for the Germans, however right the outcome is, already, in itself, is going to cause unneeded tensions between allies ... but even worse! sets the stage for crafty ol' Putin to take advantage of this empty threat and blowup the pipeline himself as everyone will for sure think it was the US considering they threatened, actually more than threatened, promised! to 'end it'."
For someone who does so much mental gymnastics, you're not doing nearly enough to avoid the obvious conclusion which is:
Quoting boethius
Which, again, where is the disagreement?
We both agree both the US and Russia had opportunity to blow up the pipeline.
If it wasn't the US then how do avoid the conclusion that Biden is a fucking moron for threatening to do it before hand ... if it actually benefits Russia in their Soviet style perception mastery?
You are the one conducting conjecture. This is the problem, you seem unable to understand what others write and come off as deeply confused.
Quoting boethius
They didn't threaten that, they said "end it", which can also mean working with Germany to end their dependence on it. The way you interpret it is akin to how conspiracy theories form.
Quoting boethius
Your "theory" doesn't have nearly as much support other than your own conjecture over your own interpretation of something that isn't directly linked.
Quoting boethius
I'm not doing anything other than pointing in the direction of new evidence. It's you who's conjuring up rants through biases and fallacies in order to dismiss all of that because it doesn't fit what you believe.
Quoting boethius
I don't claim to, I have talked about possible motives and pointed at the investigation done by these journalists. My "lack of a theory" does not mean your theory is right, it means that I go where the evidence is and conclude that the most plausible perpetrator is Russia. But you're the one who claims to have the truth on your side based on conjecture.
Quoting boethius
You still go on about this even though that never happened. If you are this confused on how to interpret reality or how to carefully interpret what is happening without adding your own beliefs, then no wonder you write as you do. Because the foundation you present is already flawed, but you formulate entire arguments on that foundation, which makes everything you say break apart.
Quoting boethius
You keep doing it.
Quoting boethius
This is the most blatant attempt at turning the tables. What I pointed to is actual evidence. What you call evidence is a highly speculatory interpretation of a president who actually didn't say specifically what you constantly write he said. It's you who are doing the conjecture, it's you who are conjuring up new ideas of what constitutes evidence. And then you say that I should stick to "known facts"... are you actually delusional? You haven't even gone through the new findings and just dismiss everything and then said something like that... you're fucking hilarious :rofl:
Quoting boethius
Strawman again... seriously, get your medicine or whatever. The problem with your way of making arguments is that you write out what you want the other person's argument to be about, and then you counter-argue it. Instead of that, go where I pointed and look into that material because so long as you ignore that you are making a fool out of yourself.
Quoting boethius
Again... mr one-trick-pony can't do anything else than parrot this thing over and over and over thinking the amount of time you say it, it's gonna be more real than the last. He didn't say it like that, YOU are the one interpreting it this way and then you build an entire conspiracy theory around it sprinkling fallacies and biases all over the place.
Quoting boethius
I'm not gonna dance to your pipe just because it makes it easier for you. :rofl:
Quoting boethius
Stop writing out what you believe others should write just because it makes sense to you. It's lunacy.
Quoting boethius
I'm not playing your games, your foundation for your argument is so fucking speculative and far-fetched as the entire foundation for it and your entire dismissal of many months of investigations by the group of investigative journalists I've pointed to just shows how desperate you are to have things your way. You simply seem unable to comprehend how deep your head is in the sand. You can't will yourself into being right.
Quoting boethius
Why would I agree that the US had the opportunity or reason to? I specifically gave a motivation as to why the US wouldn't, which, as with everything else just wooshes right over your head. Once again you are trying to position the one you debate against into a position you decided by writing what you believe and then try to demand the other to agree with you. Moving the goal posts.
Quoting boethius
You never fucking understand what hindsight bias is, do you? And you never understand that your entire argument is based on what you believe his speech meant. It doesn't matter how many times you say it, it doesn't change the fact that your argument is too weak, it has a tremendously weak foundation and premise. And as long as you ignore the new findings you are just showing everyone how desperate you are for your conjecture to be right, so much so that you try to manipulate your way to it by writing long sections where you try to change other's arguments into what you want them to be. The question is if you do it on purpose or are completely clueless. But you are behaving like the usual stereotypical conspiracy theorist. It's the same attempted tactics, the same inability to understand bias and fallacies, and the same errors in reasoning.
You have the facts presented by the investigative journalists. Dig through it. If not, then you are dishonest in the discussion and only interested in being right. And then you need to understand hindsight bias and understand why your argument is thin as aerogel. Until then, you simply act like a delusional conspiracy theorist.
What story?
At no point did I recount a story.
What I did was outline the key questions a story that it was the Russians would need to at least address to be a minimum credible.
The fact that it's not an easy story to tell is a fact not some counter-story.
Why is it difficult?
First, the Russians not-attacking their own stuff has several advantages:
1. They get to keep their stuff and who knows what use it may have in the future. True, Russia is going "all in" with China, but even then have leverage to potentially be able to sell gas to Germany in the future is still useful even if China remains the main buyer and relations with China are good: every bit of leverage allows increase pressure on the price. Indeed, before the attacks the accusation from the West was Putin was "weaponising" the gas exports. So if this accusation was true ... why wouldn't he continue to do that? Why voluntarily giveu-p a "weapon" in a time of war?
2. Biden "promised" the world he would "end" the pipelines if Russia invaded Ukraine. So, not-attacking the pipelines puts the US in the position of being weak if they don't fulfil their promise ... and if they do, then Russia would get all the benefits is going on about but not only without any of the risks but the added benefit that, if not the general public, non-US NATO intelligence are far more likely to conclude it was the US, if it was actually the US.
Which us to the operational parameters. These attacks were not some casual jaunt through a meadow and "just so happens" a ton of explosives was handy for some spontaneous vandalism.
It's a complex operation and the risks of things going wrong is very real.
So, the story that Russia attacked the pipelines not only needs to completely ignore the leverage some 20 billion dollars of infrastructure that takes decades to build and supplies a resource of fundamental importance (that for the short term benefit of creating intra-NATO suspicions Russia is willing to permanently give up immense leverage in all their international relations for the next decades) but that the Russians would also conclude that Biden literally stating they would "end" the pipelines was not enough to create the aura of suspicion they are seeking, but they need to use enough explosive to guarantee complete destruction of the pipes as well as do it right under NATO's nose on the marine border of Denmark and Sweden ... rather than basically any point between there and Russia.
And control of the crime scene in this sort of operation is always of immense benefit, as there's never any guarantee the operation isn't a complete clusterfuck and there's always a threshold of clusterfuckuppery which is so fucked it can't be spun as "enemy schemes". The divers and / or mini-sub could die or then nearly die and NATO goes out and pulls these corpses / near corpses from the water.
Likewise, in this sort of game, you cannot know your opponents capabilities. What if a US sub shadows the entire Russian operation and then NATO goes and "discovers" these explosives before they blow. There's a real possibility of getting caught red handed in this sort of operation ... unless you do it in waters you control and can easily control the crime scene afterwards as well ... you know, right in the middle of all your sonar and listening devices tracking everything that goes through Denmark (if you're the US) so you can be pretty damn certain no one else is around and also be sure no one goes and checks anything out ... something you couldn't at all guarantee if you were Russia doing the operation right in the middle of the US' backyard.
We're talking about massive operational risks with massive geopolitical implications and risk of embarrassment if anything goes wrong.
So not only does the idea the Russians did it make no sense on pretty much every point but to even entertain the idea we need to just suddenly forget the US is a Naval superpower with all sorts of surveillance capabilities with high motivation to track anything going near and through the Danish straights ... and the whole reason Russia launches subs from the flipping arctic is just paranoia because Russia could just sale right up to Denmark and blow shit up this whole time with the only line of defence some retired Swedish captain on an island with a radio and a hobby or some bullshit along those lines.
And on-top of all the suspension of disbelief to even listen with a straight face to such a story, we also need to believe that anyone pointing out the US president literally "promising" to end the pipeline is somehow a conspiracy theory to discuss what someone says to a journalist on television.
Yes ... so ... why did the US president first threaten to put an end to the pipeline and then when challenged double down and "promised" the world they would bring an end to it and then tripling down with the assurance that they for sure could be able to do it?
What's the motivation to threaten to do something you have no motivation to do?
Additionally, Nord Stream 1 continued to operate and it was the West accusing Russia of purposefully kneecapping the flow and "weaponising" the gas, so if your theory is based on Germany deciding all by themselves to fully cut themselves as permanently as possible from Russian gas, that's not what happened, and therefore no need to "end" the pipelines, and Russia (seeing this permanent refusal of gas supplies from Russia, which no competent analyst of international relations would conclude the policy would be "permanent", if it existed at all, which it didn't as Germany kept on buying whatever came through Nord Stream 1) saw the only value in the pipes remaining to be to blow them up to throw shade on the Americans ... none of that stacks up because at no point did Germany have a policy to disconnect entirely and in as permanent way as possible from Russian gas, and even if Germany did have such a policy no credible analyst would conclude a country announcing something "permanent" to actually be permanent. Things change.
Quoting Christoffer
Really? You really find the following words ambiguous?
Quoting Reuters
Ok, well ... what does he mean then?
Enlighten us.
Calm down. You're crossing a line here.
You do realise you're the one proposing the conspiracy theory that the Russian did in secret (i.e. conspired) to blow up their own pipeline, a crime against property holders in both the EU and Russia.
I'm pointing out the undisputed fact (what the US president said on live television, location of the attacks, minimum bound on how much explosives were used, control of the crime scene, lack of material evidence etc.) your conspiracy theory doesn't even address.
Whereas my position relative these known facts is:
1. Sure, both the US and Russia had the means to carry out such an attack, both have ships that regularly patrol and carry out manoeuvres in the the Baltic and would have reason to be there.
2. I do not deny the intra-NATO tensions that would arise if the pipes blew up and people suspected the US did it.
3. It's totally reasonable to primarily suspect the US considering the US president publicly promised to "end" the pipelines if Russia invaded.
4. So, if it was Russia and they did it because it benefits them ... then obviously it was pretty dumb for the US to basically set themselves up for being an obvious suspect (some would even go so far as to say the party that overtly promised to do the thing that then happened would be the lead suspect in any competent criminal investigation).
5. There's a whole bunch of motivations (decades of economic leverage) we'd need to believe the Russians don't care about, and to such an extreme degree that they don't even mitigate the damage to the pipes ... don't even take advantage of the president's words to carry out a lesser attack and closer to their border in seas they control.
I'm not saying I know what happened. When material evidence of the crime scene is available, even then I don't suspect I'd come to any strong conclusions as people who's job it is to deceive with billions of dollars and / or rubbles at their disposal may very well succeed in deceiving me.
It's you who claims to have knowledge of the conspiracy to the level of confidence:
Quoting Christoffer
You're the one with the conspiracy theory that was "rigorously verified" and makes clear "who was responsible".
I subject your conspiracy theory to critical scrutiny ... and that somehow makes me the conspiracy theorist?
Which, is a label I don't actually mind ... the whole reason we have a long list of laws with the word "conspiracy" in it is because conspiracies do in fact happen and for them to be uncovered someone at some point needs to theorise as to what may have conspired, such as what you are doing vis-a-vis the Nord Stream "sabotage", which, I think is worth mentioning it's being called "sabotage" instead of "terrorism" because not a single brown person has been alleged to be involved in any of the theories proposed so far (Ukraine, Russia, US, Poland ... all white people, so blowing shit up for political pressure is all of a sudden the work of "la di da fancy dancy saboteurs").
Also notable, on the subject of meaning, the sentence "With this evidence it is much more clear who was responsible" could actually mean it's obviously the US that's responsible, for all we know, he doesn't actually say.
I actually miss Olivier5 calling me a Russian agent.
Not only was it comedy gold but of great insight into how people maintain their world view.
And to be fair, I did just liken discussing with to sifting through the debris of a vapid soul, as a retort to being called:
Quoting Christoffer
"Go take your medicine or whatever" is just the banalist of weak sauce at that point in the exchange.
The weakest of sauces.
And at least Olivier5 was discussing the issues of import: was the war justified, is the price worth it, can Ukraine win, is Ukraine winning, what would be a win, etc.
We had different opinions, but it did move the conversation forward on the key issues.
It's never going to be squeaky clean in here but we'll come round with a brush and pan now and then..
Thanks for the work.
Sorry about that. But since Boethius will never stop changing other people's arguments into his random nonsense and then just rant on without ever addressing the counterpoints provided I'd better just leave. I think it's frustratingly low quality to the point you get dragged down by it, and it's impossible to write anything in here without him just bombarding everyone with his nonsense. It's the reason most people have left this discussion.
I'm not going to read any more of your nonsense. You ignore looking at the investigation that I have been talking about and referred to this entire time. And since you ignore all of that there's no point in having any further discussion. If you're just here to rant and ignore whatever counterpoint doesn't fit your narrative, then it's a waste of everyone's time to be a part of such discussions.
Maybe our grandchildren will be able to piece together the different parts.
The most interesting thing is that a part of that documentary series dives into similar types of personalities who, when digging deep into their funding and things like their host sites, show to be actually paid by Russia to just keep spreading doubt by always arguing against even the clearest and logical reasoning. And how this undermines regular journalists to the point some have been getting death threats as a result of gullible people following these actors. It is not unreasonable to actually argue that a forum like this might very well have such actors. It is not outside the realm of possibility seen as how they operate and how many they actually are.
If you have accusations to make, make them Sherlock. Otherwise keep this type of low-brow copium to yourself.
It's just an observation based on facts. These people exist, these people either get other people to believe them by spreading doubt about what is going on, or they are these people spreading doubt. It's part of the disinformation war that Russia is conducting against the West by any means they can do without drawing attention to themselves.
Just look at Russia's latest try at organizing sham protests to keep Ergodan from approving Sweden into Nato.
The people in the images are from protests in Paris and Madrid, but they are working for Russian intelligence. The demonstrations in the background have nothing to do with them or their signs. They're made to provoke Turkey and Ergodan, nothing else. This is part of an investigation done by Dossier Center, SVT, Le Monde, Denmark Radio, Expressen, NRK, Delfi, NDR/WDR, and Süddeutsche Zeitung that has mapped out how Russian intelligence is orchestrating these things around Europe.
One of the key factors for spreaders of disinformation online is the rhetorical tactics they use. If you've seen it in use, it starts to stand out. So, no, I'm not making accusations at all, I'm merely pointing out similarities. And the tragedy that many people fall into this without understanding what they help promoting.
Quoting Christoffer
Who on this forum do you believe 'might very well be' a Russian actor?
Hmm....
Did you read what I wrote? I’m observing a behavior, a rhetoric similar to these tactics. The problem is, as I pointed out, that what’s observed can be either that or someone falling for those tactics. I’m not gonna point fingers because that unknown factor makes it impossible to know without more info. I’m not gonna do like others do and conjure up theories based on nothing but belief. I just point out that these things are wide spread and the likelihood of a forum like this having either of them is pretty high. Or do you think that this event in the world today isn’t actually appearing on people’s doorstep, in both the real world and online?
Quoting Christoffer
Yet here you are, conjuring up theories about people on this forum being 'Russian agents', literally using the words 'pretty high likelihood'.
Perhaps worst of all, you lack the spine to own up to your words.
As you can see, again, you are as always unable to understand the difference between a theory that concludes a deduction, and merely pointing towards facts that exist and probability. It’s this inability to understand what is being written that makes you confused. When I point to facts stated by an investigation, first the one about the Russian ship and then about this, facts presented by rigorous investigation and numerous sources (as I mentioned earlier), but you confuse this with a deductively concluded theory. I have never concluded it being Russia, I have never concluded someone in here being a Russian agent, I have only pointed out factual things that points to a likelihood, a probability. So, either you are unable to understand these differences and just imagine some other text that wasn’t written and then goes into confusion, or you are intentionally changing the concept of the text you are arguing against in order to frame it in another way, often in a strawman fashion. But the fact remains that I’m not concluding anything deductively, I’m talking about probability and facts supporting weighting that probability in a certain direction. And this is the foundational difference in how you look at a problem and how I do it. I look at probability when something is lacking something conclusive, and you form a deductive guesswork for a final conclusion based on very little. You change the argument that someone makes and thereby change the details of that argument and its form, I go by what’s actually said, which when you continue to change how you interpret what is written and use that in your premises, simply makes it dishonest.
Quoting Tzeentch
I lack the spine to conclude some probability as factual truth and not simply as a probability and thereby being careful not to point in specific ways? If that is what constitutes a spine in your world, then I guess you think you have one since conjecture is your game.
If there are Russian influencers on this forum, then that is a pretty serious thing as it is part of a disinformation strategy for planting doubt. And since that is a serious thing, I’m not gonna be as sloppy as you with pointing fingers.
Might be but it'd be virtually impossible to distinguish an effective Russian influencer from a genuine forum member as appearing genuine is what would make them effective. Same would go for the other side, incidentally. So this is probably not going anywhere and can be dropped, I think.
The key thing was to point to the investigation that continues to show an increasing presence of this online and IRL. So it's not really the same "for the other side" as it's a massive disinformation movement by Russian intelligence. And I said it just as you, no one can be singled out because there's nothing conclusive, even if Tzeentch wants to bait me into pointing fingers. It was also sort of an analogy on how evidence for probability is not the same as conclusions by deduction when there's little to nothing functioning as true premises. The point is, I've pointed to investigations that show a probability of something and how that gets twisted into other things by others in this thread and how this can be either two things, deliberate or by influence through those narratives that are being spread. Where this is going is about disinformation strategies and how important sticking to actual evidence, facts, and probability is rather than conjecture, i.e. what is the most probable, not the most wanted conclusion. This has been my point all along and is something that I think is lacking in this thread based on the recent debates.
Would you?
I'm sure some will revel in some of what these folks have to say. :) In chronological order...
The intoxication of war
[sup]— Chris Hedges · Salon · May 7, 2023[/sup]
Focus on the war, not just the battles
[sup]— James M Dubik · The Hill · May 8, 2023[/sup]
Hedges is an award-winning journalist (US); Dubik is a retired lieutenant general and professor (US). Note, the former article is sort of peripherally about the present war; the latter is directly about the war.
Real recruitments of spies happens this way for much more severe actions by the one hired. In the docu series, the journalists actually get footage of a Swedish guy who was in a lot of dept, being recruited by given $3000 in cash envelopes to smuggle autonomous driving tech details out of Volvo where he worked.
I guess when we also have a world in economical turmoil and people get into money problem there’s not that much needed in terms of financial strength to get a lot of people around western nations into seemingly minor actions that doesn’t even have any real crimes attached to them. So while discovered spycraft leads to legal consequences (the Volvo guy has been sentenced, and “diplomat” from Russia is now doing whatever FSB is doing in South Korea), getting normal people into doing things like posing with signs in front of a camera and maintaining a chaotic presence on online forums and social media by spreading doubt and disinformation, is not able to be counteracted in any way but informing of such risks to the public. It’s an effective way to split the Wests support for Ukraine and according to this investigation, it is massive compared to before the invasion. And absolutely important to adress, even if an effective strategy for it is hard to figure out due to no real crimes connected to it.
As an aside, The Americans (IMDb, Wikipedia) is one of those spy shows, collecting intelligence, recruiting, exploiting the vulnerable, seduction/sex, "role-playing", blackmail, assassination, ..., cold war, USSR versus USA, ... Not quite what I'd call realistic through and through, but sort of entertaining.
Russian forces lash out indiscriminately as Ukraine increases military pressure on frontline towns
[sup]— Nick Paton Walsh, Natalie Gallón, Kosta Gak, Peter Rudden, Olga Voitovych · CNN · May 8, 2023[/sup]
Weird. Maybe they have plenty of spare bombs? Something else is going on? Way back when there was talk of a strategy of clearing large strips of land for easier monitoring, then continuously heavily blasting anything dangerous-looking entering. Doesn't look like that here though. Who knows.
Here is a somewhat older interview from February, in which Hersh makes pretty much the same objection I did to the use of open source intelligence (OSINT), namely the fact that it is extremely easy to manipulate:
He said this in response to a different event, but the objection remains the same.
More recently he went on this interivew, and states outright that he believes the Russian move on Kiev was a military feint - a position that I've defended here for quite a while - in addition to sharing some thoughts about the Ukraine intel leak. (Timestamp 35:05).
A shocker to some perhaps, that such opinions can also be held by people other than Russian agents.
A common practice is to exploit weaknesses of any kind. If not financial, then any type of threat of exposure towards something bad that the person has done, like love affairs etc. This is why many working in critical areas of a nation's security infrastructure requires background checks on not only the person working but his/her social surrounding.
Quoting jorndoe
I think the reality is much duller, a better example would be "Slow Horses", pretty funny, but also closer to the dull reality of counterintelligence.
The most notable case in Sweden that was pretty high up was in Säpo, Säkerhetspolisen, our equivalent of CIA/MI5. Just last year, after 6 years of investigation including feeding them bad intel all these years as well as having civilian players on board fooling them, they were finally charged. These were considered hired agents who had been infiltrating Säpo many years ago and worked their way up. They used gadgets like car keys that had hidden USB memory sticks and received payments from Russia over the years. It was one of the most notable cases ever in Sweden and one of the longest specific investigations and counterintelligence operations to date.
Quoting May 8, 2023
Might not be worth it. Who knows how real/honest people would be. I'll just note that I'm confident some would. I.e. some would participate in spreading bullshit/propaganda.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/10/europe/prizoghin-bakhmut-russia-ukraine-losses-intl-cmd/index.html
Yes, unlike some who are extremely confident on the culprit. :smirk:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nel-xVJQuV4&ab_channel=TheInfographicsShow
https://www.dw.com/en/common-threats-bring-japan-south-korea-closer-together/a-65562167
https://www.dw.com/en/amid-tensions-with-china-philippines-gets-bolder/a-65591689
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-wants-more-cooperation-with-aukus-allies-advanced-technologies-2023-05-08/
[sup]— Shane Harris, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Mary Ilyushina · The Washington Post · May 14, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Prigozhin
Wagner head dismisses US paper report that he offered to betray Russian troop positions
[sup]— Brad Heath, Lincoln Feast, Kevin Liffey, Peter Graff · Reuters · May 14, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Prigozhin
Quoting Peskov
He'd be playing a dangerous game. We'll see if he meets an "untimely" end. :) Teixeira is being prosecuted for stealing and leaking the (original) information; I assume it was that leak. Earlier ...
Ukraine says counterattacks effective near Bakhmut, after Wagner chief accuses Russian brigade of fleeing
[sup]— Julia Kesaieva, Tim Lister, Olga Voitovych, Vasco Cotovio, Katharina Krebs, Nic Robertson, AnneClaire Stapleton, Josh Pennington · CNN · May 11, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Prigozhin
A democratic nation like the USA, where the media is uncensored, journalists are protected from imprisonment, elections are beyond reproach, protestors are hailed as heroes and the individual is free to decide what medicine they choose to consume?
I've heard that place is a fiction .
An American asked a Chinaman:
What do you think of our constitution - it's great isn't
The Chinaman responded:
Yes! It is a great document. When do you think it will be implemented?
In the land down under and you?
At least it can actually be expressed.
nothing new: https://www.thedailybeast.com/putin-claimed-his-hypersonic-missiles-were-invincible-then-he-jailed-the-developers
G7 summit: Zelensky accuses some Arab leaders of 'blind eye' to war ahead of Japan trip
[sup]— Tessa Wong, James Gregory · BBC · May 19, 2023[/sup]
Zelensky showcases global leadership in G7, Arab League visits - analysis
[sup]— Seth J Frantzman · The Jerusalem Post · May 20, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine already has overwhelming support worldwide (humanitarian, arms, the UN), but maybe his efforts prove fruitful.
Elsewhere... Map of battles over time. Your mileage may vary. Reportedly, their automated data source usage/assessment is a work in progress
One thing that popped out to me about the last weeks is the barrage of misinformation from both sides. From an apparent Russian "crisis of command" featuring Prigozhin, to the Ukrainians 'pushing the Russians back', mere days before the final push for the city. In hindsight, it all seems phoney to me - attempts at shaping the information landscape or playing the public.
The coming period will be interesting, to see if and where the Russians may continue to push for ground.
My guess is that they will, since there are other Ukrainian cities in precarious positions, like Adviivka. Adviivka is under threat of being encircled, much like Bakhmut was, and has been subjected to Russian attacks for a long time.
There was also the matter of the Patriot - Kinzhal encounter. Very interesting from a military perspective, since they're both modern missile systems.
My guess is the Ukrainian forces received either Patriot PAC-2 or PAC-3 , both of which have been designed with the purpose of ballistic (read: hypersonic) missile defense. Therefore, if this weapon system was able to take down Kinzhal missiles it should come as no surprise. In fact, countering Kinzhal probably was the reason Patriot was shipped to Ukraine.
Typically, when roughly equal missile systems compete, the attacker will seek to saturate the defending missile systems in order to overwhelm it. In this case it seems Kinzhal managed to overwhelm a Patriot battery with some ~six Kinzhal missiles. Five were reportedly shot down. Possibly other types of lower generation missiles were included in this salvo as well, but those are details we cannot access.
All in all, very interesting but not very shocking.
You mean we aren't doing victory laps over the capture of Bakhmut because we aren't "Russia-bellends" but view the war as an immense and easily prevented tragedy?
Or perhaps it's because our analysis is so spot on there's nothing much to add.
What have been my recent points?
1. A Ukrainian offensive would have all the problems (just a lot more because Russia has capabilities Ukraine lacks entirely) as do the Russian offensives. The difference being that Russia can attrit the Ukrainians with artillery and standoff munitions.
2. The latest weapons systems drip fed to Ukraine (aka. Western tanks and Patriot missiles) would fail to deliver any meaningful change on the battlefield and the talk would immediately move on to the next weapons system (aka. the F-16s).
3. Sanctions continue to not collapse the Russian economy or cause some new Russian capitalist revolution.
4. For these and many more reasons (such as Russia heavily fortifying their position for an entire year), it is essentially impossible for Ukraine to remove Russian forces from all the previously held Ukrainian territory, and even trying would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and be unlikely to succeed; in the unlikely event it did succeed the war would still not be over and the tragedy would simply continue into the next chapter.
5. Nuclear blackmail does work, which is what explains NATO not intervening directly or "escalating" with the weapon systems that Ukraine would actually need to win.
6. Diplomatic resolution is the only remotely possible end to this conflict and continued fighting erodes Ukraine's negotiating position rather than strengthens it.
7. The idea sacrificing Ukraine to harm Russia makes the US and/or Europe "safer" is of dubious moral foundation and highly speculative if that's even happening. Historically, winning a war, and in many cases even losing a war, makes a country far stronger militarily, rather than weaker, and there is no evidence this case is an exception.
The only thing to add to this analysis is:
A. That not only has Russia conquered Bakhmut but they've done so with mercenaries.
If the Western narrative is true that Russia uses "waves" of cannon fodder, then that just fixes the other part of the Western narrative that these mercenaries are all psychopathic criminals.
Whereas the truth is Wagner has proven to be efficient and the people upset about prisoners winning freedom by fighting would likely be far more upset about more people they know dying.
A lot of these mercenaries are foreigners, who will continue to signup insofar as Russia is winning.
B. Western equipment has changed nothing and is starting to be destroyed which is a great advertisement for the Russian arms industry, the second major industry in Russia after oil and gas.
To make things even worse, there's interviews with Ukrainian soldiers describing Russian tanks super difficult to deal with and a major reason for retreating from Bakhmut. We can conclude from this that not only has Russia not run out of tanks (actually has more than that 1 tank on parade) but they've become proficient at the combined arms tactics needed to counter anti-tank missiles, other tanks, mines, APC's and so on.
C. If anything is some masterful "soviet" propaganda scheme, it would be Prigozhin's v-blogging adventure. And if not Soviet (presumably if Soviet propaganda methods were so effective they'd still be around), a single tank on parade and some mercenary businessman continuously complaining about ammunition is just lifted directly out of an old book popular among war planners:
I believe even some Western war military academies have copies of this manual.
It will be interesting to see who made the "Kremlin drone strike", but at least the idea of a false flag seems to be very doubtful (and illogical) and what Ilya Ponomarev stated that it would be dissident groups wanting to curtail the victory parade (but not wanting put people in harms way) seems rather plausible.
Now with the attack on a border town in Russia by the "Freedom of Russia Legion", it's obvious that these little groups aren't fake news, even if the actions are limited. But it tells how in a country where protests are forbidden what the next level of opposition will be.
Ukraine can try to distance from the group as much it can, but the March 10th 2022 formed group has been part of the Ukrainian International Legion. Yet it is obvious that Putin has an opposition in his country.
In the long run, it is totally possible for Russia to have it's next civil war (or times of trouble). The myriad of armed groups and actors is already there. In fact, before Putin rose to power, some of the intelligence networks came to blows at each other and it's a real possibility that after Putin the power struggle can be fought with arms.
The frustration is palpable, but it is yours.
Keep it to yourself or express it in a less passive-aggressive way. Don't burden others with your emotion.
Well, I just don't like when countries invade others.
I didn't like it when Bush invaded Iraq or Afghanistan either. Or when Saudi-Arabia attacked Yemen. And Ukraine even didn't have an dictator that attacked it's neighbors like Iraq (which still wasn't a reason to invade it).
But I guess for some this kind of choosing sides is unacceptable.
And who here likes it? Does anybody like invasions or war? Maybe, perhaps, some elements in the military, they are the hammer after all and everything looks like a nail, as the saying goes.
War is a disgusting indictment of barbarism in the 21st century, of which we have not learned enough, given how many there are.
But to suggest that those who disagree with your perspective like Russia or Putin, is misleading at best.
Obviously you didn't get the satire.
The claim the Russians have a masterful "soviet" propaganda scheme machine going was to support the idea not only did Russia blow up their own pipelines but they went the extra several hundred miles to blow them up right on Denmark's border under NATO's nose ... and also used several tons of explosives for additional emphasis.
Quoting Christoffer
And if you don't believe this wild conspiracy theory of Russian and essentially perfect, one may say masterful, covert opps and 5 dimensional propaganda move:
Quoting Christoffer
Then you are the one who:
Quoting Christoffer
Now, as for the single tank on parade. That's just common sense. Had they paraded their whole inventory the same Western talking heads laughing at a single tank would be going on about how insane it is to parade your entire inventory during a war (which it is ... and maybe why the Russians didn't do that).
However, what could actually be staged is Prigozhin's midnight comedy blowout theatre show, and when I point that out suddenly the idea Russia has some propaganda tricks up their sleeve is ludicrous and certainly the Russians couldn't put together a simple plan of telling the enemy what they want to hear so that their own propaganda networks seed your message for you and your enemy basically "trusts" one of your commanders and take everything he says at face value.
And if that's not the case, why is he still alive?
Nothing easier than arranging an "accident" in a war zone. When it started, maybe he had gone rogue or something, but it's been going on for months so at some point it's difficult to interpret people's actions that are on the same team as something other than team work.
Like Russia or Putin?
Well, that I don't think the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th Century. But Putin does.
And obviously through his actions, he is trying to form the empire back. Not perhaps with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, but with traditional imperialism. And I disagree with that.
So what's misleading about that?
That those of us who think it was the West's fault for Russian aggression must agree or like Putin or his government, it doesn't follow at all.
I don't recall anyone here say that they wanted the USSR back, so I don't know why you're bringing it up.
...then I thought you were referring to Russia and Putin.
The solitary antidote to sin and folly lies in the resolute abandonment of censorship. A democracy, poised on the precipice of descent into oligarchy and tyranny, can be salvaged solely through the steadfast rejection of the censor. Since the renaissance, every stride towards human advancement has hinged upon the unrestrained dissemination of thought. Conversely, every regression, genocide, and unspeakable atrocity has sprouted from the seeds of suppression. Absent the heavy veil of censorship, the specters of Hitler and Stalin would wither in obscurity. Neither criminal enterprise nor corruption can thrive sans censorship, for their sustenance emanates from its very shackles. The price exacted for human progress is the ardent tolerance of unpalatable discourse, however offensive, however jarring.
In our era, a solitary tragedy unfolds, wherein we, the unified West, bear the mantle of champions for this notion of free expression. It stands as the bedrock of our triumph, yet we find ourselves mired in the depths of treachery. While we espouse the virtues of tolerance, our shared culture has transmuted into an abhorrent bastion of insufferable intolerance.
Since 1945, the USA has initiated armed conflicts in over 120 countries. If we add to this record the various contrived regime change operations, the funding of separatists, colour revolutions, covert operations and economic sanctions and there is hardly a country in the world that has not directly experienced US aggression.
A generous interpretation might be something like the old idea of the white man's burden. To be fair not every war, uprising or regime change since 1945 can be attributed to US foreign intervention. It is even possible that this bellicose foreign policy has prevented the emergence of other conflicts.
But this now unmentionable narrative overshadows the global zeitgeist. Sadly, since the end of the cold war and the advent of unipolarity this topic is verboten. Our media has become incapable of challenging the official collective western foreign policy, the ensuing absence of critical analysis has so elevated the baseline level of corruption and incompetence that it has now reached a velocity that escapes the gravitational pull of reality. Our entire political class and our culture - across the collective west - is literally, technically and undeniably insane.
The Ukraine war coverage is a succession of choreographed stunts and ghost stories. Russia or Putin's demise is always weeks away. The Russians are short of ammunition. their economy is just about to tank. Any day now, there will be a coup or a spontaneous something. Each successive self serving claim is replaced and memory holed with the fresh promise that this time it really is true.
The non-western world is no longer buying it. They've had it with our compassion for human rights. They've had 70 years of empty rhetoric of democracy and human rights. They see the freedom of the press that Julian Assange enjoys. They've seen one self serving suspect crisis after another evaporate conveniently: wars on drugs, wars on terror, wars on viruses. wars on climate... They are no longer buying it.
Western media has not reported Russian hypersonic Kinzhal missiles destroyed 5 Patriot Systems in Kiev last week or that a Russian Missile destroyed a large cache of depleted Uranium shells sent by the UK to the Ukraine - in Khmelnytsky. They can't even concede that Bakhmut is entirely in Russian hands. Any day now there will be great Ukraine counter-offensive that will crush Russia. Watch out F16s are coming.
For 15 months, we have watched Zelensky and the Ukraine military kick Russian butt. The rest of the is watching something else. They cheer Russia as it deflects and depletes US/NATO military and economic power. 11 rounds of NATO led sanctions have not only failed to hurt the Russian economy, but the signs are that decoupling from the west, reinvesting in its own industry and realigning with the rest of world is elevating Russia towards becoming an economic powerhouse.
No number of successive disastrous economic or military escapades can dampen Western Supremacy. Not only has the recent US humiliation in Afghanistan already been forgotten - the defeat of the US project in Syria is barely acknowledged. Yet, Syria, with Assad still at the helm, has this week been welcomed back into the Arab League. The entire middle east (excluding Israel) is in rapprochement with Iran! - These are historic events.
The non-western world understand the central role that Russian military played in Syria. Russia's decision to intervene in Syria against the USA occurred in 2015 - shortly after the Ukraine Maiden colour revolution. The slow but successful Russian approach deployed in Syria is the same approach now evident in the Ukraine. War is not a board game, but if it is to be compared to a board game, then it is much less the kind of poker game or crab shoot the USA likes to play, and much more the chess game that Russians thrive at.
World War 3 Production and Supply
Our more extravagant profit based, just in time, agile, globally distributed production models work extremely well in meeting consumer demand for Smart Phones. It is perhaps an optimal model when there is peace and co-operation between countries. But it doesn't seem to possess the necessary volume grunt required to win a war.
To state the bleeding obvious - the USA is not the manufacturing powerhouse that helped win WW1 and WW2. That is China. Today, China's manufacturing capacity exceeds that of the US, the UE and japan combined. Yet, the USA chooses to goad China over Taiwan when it is at war with Russia?
Whilst the US remains addicted to bombing countries and running trillion dollar ponzi schemes, China is busying building bridges, dams, and cities all around the world. China capacity to rapidly gear up to produce billions of any kind of goods is unprecedented. Now add to China's manufacturing capacity and population, Russia's resources and military prowess. Russia who since 2015 has revived its soviet military production capacity anticipating just this conflict. The soviets never had focus groups, and so could never satisfy consumer needs. But this vertically integrated command based model arguably does suit the demands of war. It is a model that doesn't suffer from pesky efficiency requirements to deliver shareholder value. No lengthy plans and contract negotiations with disparate globally dispersed suppliers. For both Russia and China there is no profit based war industry bleeding the public purse. Production of tanks, missiles and ammunitions is determined by national needs not profits.
The relative rise of China and the rest of the non-western world is a good thing. The regression of the Western World towards delusion and tyranny is a catastrophe of biblical proportions.
Those familiar with Plato and Aristotle should not be surprised that democracy can become so corrupted. At least we know the cure, even if we aren't quite ready to take our medicine.
.
Quoting May 18, 2023
Quoting yebiga
Here the important issue is Saudi-Arabia and Iran restoring diplomatic ties, thanks to China. But how harmonious these relations still are is questionable, it's more about reducing the possibility of a regional conflict.
Some interesting points he makes:
- Mearsheimer believes the Russians will aim to (eventually) annex a little under 50% of Ukraine, including Odessa and large parts east of the Dnieper river.
- The war has turned out to be a classic war of attrition, that the Russians stand to win due to factors of population and artillery imbalance. Mearsheimer estimates casualty exchange ratios to be roughly 2:1 in favor of the Russians. This is likely a conservative estimate as he also cites sources stating 3:1 or even 4:1 (in favor of the Russians). The 7:1 exchange ratio in favor of the Ukrainians that is regularly cited in news media he considers a bogus claim, considering Russia holds between a 5-10:1 artillery advantage. (Artillery being the primary factor in a war of attrition.)
- In the Q&A Mearsheimer explains the role of the Biden administration in the outbreak of the war, pointing out that Biden was in charge of the Ukraine portfolio when vice-president under Obama, and was notoriously hawkish. He also notes that upon his election Biden likely took this view in relation to Ukraine further, 'doubled down', causing the increase in tensions shortly after his election in 2021.
I personally think 'the Daltons': Biden, Sullivan, Blinken and Nuland, are the individuals who bear the primary responsibility for the outbreak of this conflict. They have been involved in Ukraine (and with each other) and sown the seeds for conflict for over a decade.
I would add to Mearsheimer's second point that it's somewhat clear why the war turned into a war of attrition during this stage. Russia is not looking to take large chunks of territory while the occupied areas are still being pacified, and thus with more or less stationary fronts attrition is the way the Russians can still erode the Ukrainian fighting strength, which they seem to have been successful at.
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661130760978325505
Because of pacification of the held areas, Russia isn't advancing?
How about the simple fact that neither side has the capability for large-scale maneuver warfare as they simply lack the reserves of fully equipped brigades/divisions, to "take large chunks of territory" and hence the only action seen has been in a very limited areas, like in Bakhmut?
How did that Russian winter offensive go? Ah, they got Bakhmut! Well, that's actually not much. It will take time for Russia to transform into a wartime economy, yet likely it will do that. But it doesn't happen instantly. The longer this conflict goes on, the better for Russia.
And what is likely that neither Ukraine will make huge gains as earlier, likely their summer offensive will be quite local operations. The assistance Ukraine has gotten isn't anywhere close what would be needed for create large scale maneuvers and to cut the land bridge to Crimea. If that would happen, then I guess the Ukraine armed forces would have transformed quite a lot. Furthermore, the Dnipro river is quite an obstacle, especially in the time of accurate weapons that can destroy laid bridges.
There are many similarities with this the Iran-Iraq war. The offensives were far in between in that war and it became bogged down too.
Quoting Tzeentch
What the Russians have eroded is the air defence missiles of Ukraine by attacking with cruise missiles and rockets Ukrainian cities. And as those Ukrainian air defence systems have been mainly from Cold War stocks and the factories for additional missiles lie in Russia, Ukraine is urging for fighters and seems that the US obviously has noticed this problem and will start to give those fighters.
Quite a populist remark referring to the elites, but it's noticeable that he's talking about a possibility of similar events as in 1917.
Will relations between Europe/US and Russia ever be normalized while Putin is in control?
True! The non-western world is not a monolithic entity, and you rightly observe, even within the Western NATO bloc, dissension infiltrates the ranks. Nevertheless, there are discernible patterns and tendencies.
The nucleus of the Collective West may be identified as the USA, UK, Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and NZ. Though occasional ripples may emanate from the psyche of Macron, all these nations move in unison with Washington.
Adjacent to them, South Korea and Japan, though resolute adherents of the collective West, grapple with the gravitational pull of geography position, traditions, and economic self-interest, which inexorably draw them closer to the embrace of China and Russia.
Poland, with fervour is anti-Russian, but its more orthodox family and Christian principles do not seamlessly integrate with core contemporary Western thinking. Nonetheless, Poland derives solace from its membership within the EU, providing scant reason to anticipate a serious deviation.
Hungary and Turkey wield the Damocles sword .
Hungary, is a nation that strives to march in step with the collective West, but does not the bear enmity towards Russia. Its resolute commitment to family and Christian traditions mirrors those evident in Poland. Countless attempts by Brussels to undermine the indomitable Orban have come to naught, failing to quell his popularity or his penchant for publicly censuring both NATO and EU policies. Hungary pursues a policy of nonalignment with this anti-Russian crusade, it advocates peace, abjuring further provision of armaments, whilst venturing to explore alternative avenues that foster the expansion of energy imports from Russia.
From Turkey, the enigmatic Svengali Erdogan, dances the intricate web of self-interest, pitting one side against the other. An ill-fitting member of NATO, a restless aspirant to the EU, Turkey straddles both Europe and Asia. Its western edges brush against Europe, its inner core is quintessentially Eastern. Erdogan will gift weapons upon the Ukraine whilst simultaneously inking pipeline and MIR Card contracts and welcoming surging Russian tourism. When Sweden and Finland wish to enter NATO, Turkey asks, "What profits shall I reap?" The Turkish populace harbour resentment for Erdogan's indifferent domestic policies, but they revel in his audacious foreign strutting.
Turkey, is the underbelly of NATO, it is a prize the West can not relinquish, and Erdogan, along with all of Turkey knows it. The seductive call of the BRICs and SCO beckon. If China's Road and Belt project is half successful, Turkey's destiny is pre-ordained but for now it is happy teasing all suitors.
Or all of the above?
No.
I cannot see it happening.
It's like the EU. Remember American commentators have said for decades that the EU will collapse, because the integration doesn't work. Well, the EU surely won't become an European United States, but the fate of UK has really shut the mouths of EU sceptics in member countries and has shown just how important the integration is. The EU won't collapse as member states breaking off from the union has truly damaging effects.
NATO is similar. What people often forget is how important actually Article 1 is, which I've stated here again and again. Just compare NATO with the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) that actually did go to war to liberate Kuwait, but later the countries have been close to going to war with each other and Saudi-Arabia has deployed forces to quell demonstrations in one member country (something what basically the Warsaw Pact actually did). The idea that NATO would be used to put down an uprising in a member country seems quite remote.
And then there are the examples of the failed American treaty organizations, SEATO and CENTO. Their failure simply comes from the fact that these countries didn't have much in common. The security threats of Pakistan and the Phillippines are quite different. There was minimal military integration among the former member states. And then you had the revolutions in Iraq and Iran, which made former allies to become part of the "Axis of evil" in American eyes. In short, the member states didn't view SEATO and CENTO membership as important and were just fine with bilateral agreements with the US.
Hence NATO members can have their disagreements, yet for a country like Hungary to resign from the organization would be as detrimental as the country opting out from the EU. In fact the only country that can wreck NATO is the US itself, if the US under Trump or someone decides to opt out of the treaty. This would simply instantly force to create the defense pact within EU, where Ireland and Austria wouldn't create a problem.
And if the US would severe the Atlantic link, it simply would cease to be a Superpower in the way it is now. Suddenly the US would be listened to in Europe as much as it's allies in the Middle East listen to it.
It's nice to see that you see point of view.
I'm far less optimistic all these geopolitical changes won't end in disaster, but I agree with summary of what is actually happening.
I'm not sure he's arguing NATO will fall apart, such as Hungary or anyone leaving, just pointing out the fact Hungary's position right now is at odds with the US.
As you aptly observe:
Quoting ssu
Which, with failure in Ukraine, it this opting-out of US wars or US sanctions that would be likely to increase.
The defensive aspect of NATO is one thing, which I don't see anyone arguing Russia or China would actually attack NATO anyways.
What is at stake in this war in Ukraine is the imperialistic aspect of NATO, serving US interests. If countries weren't really forced to participate before it doesn't necessarily take much for them to start opting out in larger numbers.
If the US's geopolitical position is significantly eroded by this war then both costs and risks of participating in US intervention increase while benefits decrease.
Worse, as long as the war is "on" (not to mention the tensions in the South China Sea) the US cannot credibly say they will cause much trouble for other countries that get out of line. There is a window in which countries can radically shift geopolitical positions without much fear of being bombed by the US.
But worst of all, the sanctions have not only failed but created a parallel global economy absorbing everyone already under sanction (in particular Iran), but which any country (mostly in Asia but elsewhere too) can leverage in international relations both directly vis-a-vis the US (they "can go elsewhere") as well as in increasing collaboration with foes of the US (aka. China and Russia) knowing US retaliation is significantly blunted.
And this is not in anyway a new idea, but basically sanctions 101:
Quoting Misusing U.S. Sanctions Will Sap Their Power, Blanc, 2017
Or even more prophetic:
Quoting Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, Haas, 1998
Yet not more than 18 months ago, US talking heads would regularly refer to sanctions as "the nuclear option" ... anyone calling them that now?
Likewise, anyone actually believe today that the US may bomb or invade them any moment if they crossed any US foreign policy lines?
Of course, it's possible the large majority of the world stays square in the US sphere of influence because they are so likeable, but if they don't then it definitely seems to me the US has invested their main imperial tools in Ukraine.
And for what? To (maybe) damage Russia enough so that Russia can't bully around neighbouring countries?
Ukraine is the tree in the US' imperial forest, and the way things are going they aren't even happy in their new tree house.
nice nickname lol
It's the nuclear option for neoliberal capitalists as it limits their capability to make profits.
I don't think the war in Ukraine really erodes the position of the US. The fact is that the World cannot just go out with Russian oil and raw materials, and that's the main reason many countries aren't so keen to jump in the US bandwagon: the US won't guarantee them the resources.
What has eroded and will erode the US is position is the absolutely disastrous failure in Afghanistan and the equally catastrophic "War on Terror". Yeah, Americans might have forgotten the WoT, but the countries in the Middle East (and North Africa) have not.
That is the true failure, which has shown clearly to every non-Western ally of the US how untrustworthy and basically treacherous actually the US can be.
The US is in the Middle East in a similar situation UK found itself in the Middle East after WW2, entangled in a quagmire and trying to get out with having only marginal influence on the actors anymore and just hoping to get some weapon contracts. And the regional actors understanding that it isn't similar anymore than before.
It's totally possible for the biggest US Arab ally, Saudi-Arabia, to find itself being a part of the "Axis of evil" or something similar. And here Pakistan shows what kind of passive-aggressive "ally" the US can be ...and how the US can be thwarted and openly challenged. Pakistan aided the Taleban and assisted in the final push to overthrow the formerly US-backed regime. And what did the US do? Nothing, it only wants to desperately to forget it's longest war.
The fact that Israel has kept close ties to Russia during the Syrian civil war and that China arranged the warming of the relations between Saudi-Arabia and Iran simply shows how out of touch the US is now in the Middle East. Very different from the time of the Gulf War when older Bush could form a massive coalition with all the important regional players together (Saudi-Arabia, GCC, Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Morocco etc.) when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
And then there's China and the problem of Taiwan. What the US lacks here is obvious: there isn't anything like NATO in the area, only bilateral agreements with countries that again have not much in common. If China would let's say launch a "special naval operation" towards Taiwan and start inspecting ingoing shipping to Taiwan for weapons, what countries would follow the US? The AUKUS?
In fact, the creation of AUKUS and that doesn't involve Japan, South Korea, the Phillippines and France tells actually a lot.
The US might find itself in a Cuban crisis where it takes the role of Soviet Union to run the blockade without not much help from other countries that want to de-escalate the issue.
Now compared to the above, the Ukraine war, with a motivated Ukraine willing to fight the war and having NATO to work with is quite easy and simple. Hungary and Turkey are simply a result of having so many countries in the pact.
Or for this round of globalization that started in the 1990's...
Indeed as far as I know the expression was introduced by the French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire to express more the fear for the consequences of financial extreme measures like "cutting Russia from SWIFT" to the Western economy itself than to the Russian one.
‘Get out’: Influx of Russians to Georgia stokes old enmities
[sup]— Christian Edwards, Niamh Kennedy, Eve Brennan, Rhea Mogul, Sophie Tanno, Hannah Ritchie, Katya Krebs · CNN · May 26, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Daria Polkina (27, Muscovite)]If I was Georgian, I would also want to be a part of the European Union. The old generation is all about how things used to be. The young generation are about how things could be. They’re like, ‘we want to be part of the European Union – Russians, don’t f*** this up for us.’ [...] I fear that Georgia is a little bit too similar to Russia. I’m afraid it could go either way: It could get better and move forward to the European Union. Or it could get worse and become like Belarus. I really hope that won’t happen.[/quote]
A couple of weeks earlier...
Pro-war nationalists say they are entering Russian politics to counter turmoil
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Andrew Osborn · Reuters · May 12, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Igor Girkin
Mitrokhin opines...
Where Are Russia’s Nationalists in the War Against Ukraine?
[sup]— Nikolay Mitrokhin · Carnegie · Mar 7, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Manuel
The NATO-phobia? It's just bullshit, an excuse. Russia, the largest country in the world, with, say, 140 million people, needs to be enlarged with a fourth or fifth of Ukraine or it's doomed for destruction? :grin: If they manage to assimilate a fifth of Ukraine, then their supposed NATO-phobia remains an excuse, it's open-ended like that. The Nazi thing? Kyiv isn't a Nazi regime. If anything, Putin's Russia has regressed markedly. And the Ukrainians said "No", "Go away", "Get bent", like the UN, repeatedly. Putin's team knows already, so now and then they whine about, well, more or less whole continents. And the US of course (but not China). Anyway, nothing new here, it's been set out already. But, maybe they'll get away with the land grab. If they do, a pertinent question remains: then what?
, well, you have discussion-worthy things to air on all of those, yes? I suppose, to the extent they're related, you could keep it in one fresh post? Hit it! :smile:
The Mitrokhin article is effective in drawing out the differences between the Putin agenda and the focus of right-wing parties elsewhere.
It puts the post-soviet states into a certain light in how they deal with integrating Russian speakers into their systems. The invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the process of change. This activity is different than ethno-centric parties in other places who see themselves pitted against 'liberal' erasure of their special identity.
That's my view, yes. Taking too much territory would greatly increase the risk of an insurgency materializing, which is almost certainly what actors like the United States are trying accomplish in the background.
Quoting ssu
That's compatible with my view. The Russians may not be in a hurry to rebuild their offensive capability if they're not planning on lauching a new offensive in the near future.
It should be noted though, that the Russians have mobilized several hundred thousand men and have an elaborate arms industry, so I think the question of whether Russia is currently capable of lauching a new offensive is somewhat ambiguous.
Quoting ssu
Bakhmut wasn't an offensive, and there haven't been any real offensives since the initial invasion.
Bakhmut was more like a siege. A slow strangulation. Mainly attrition warfare. More than anything it looked opportunistic, taking advantage of weaknesses in the Ukrainian line the Russians took the area around Soledar and Krasna Hora, after which they partially encircled Bakhmut and sent Wagner in to do the dirty work.
Quoting ssu
I'm no expert on the Russian economy, but according to Mearsheimer Russia isn't mobilizing to a war economy.
Quoting ssu
F-16s can't fill the role of ground-based anti-air systems, so I would probably look for a different explanation. Especially since Russia sports one of the most sophisticated AA networks in the world, and the F-16s would have to contend with that.
Mearsheimer speculates that the F-16s are brought in to compensate for the lack of Ukrainian artillery, since (according to Mearsheimer) the Americans have ran out of artillery they can spare.
I was unaware the "nuclear option" was coined by people trying to make it sound negative and something best to avoid. First time I heard it was listening to neo-cons gleefully recommending the "nuclear option" if Russia invaded Ukraine. Definitely adds some additional irony to it.
Quoting ssu
I'm not sure you're agreeing or disagreeing.
It's precisely because of the Russian resources that sanctions haven't worked to isolate Russia. Now, if you want to argue US wasn't omnipotent before and aren't omnipotent now, that's obviously true, no argument. What changes, however, is leverage and negotiating positions.
Prior to the sanctions there was no alternative world financial system and even if countries could survive sanctions (Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Syria) it wasn't like they were doing "great" economically. Sanctions on small countries were an incredibly high cost to disagree with US foreign policy.
So, the US could leverage that in negotiations with other countries. Simply because something is survivable does not mean it isn't something to fear. Maybe not everyone wants to be like North Korea or Iran.
And this included negotiations with Russia. First, it was not a foregone conclusion that Russia was indeed big enough to simply build an alternative "low friction" trading regime with its various partners, in particular China and India (certainly if it was a foregone conclusion the West would have hesitated more). At minimum the prospect represents significant risks. Second, it was obviously not a Russian foreign policy objective to completely cut economic ties with the West ... or they wouldn't have kept building pipelines to said West.
And it is not a case that "oh well, Russia survived sanctions, you win some you lose some" because in cutting off Russia from the Western financial system they have zero incentive to maintain any trade frictions with the other bad boys at the back of the class, and so Russia surviving sanctions basically means everyone can now survive sanctions.
As noted in the analysis I cited, US sanctions (at the time) were far more effective than EU sanctions (a similar sized economy offering broadly comparable technologies) because the US runs the global financial system as a monopoly (at the time). You can only punish trade partners, whether buyers or suppliers, if they have no where else to go. If they do have somewhere else to go ... then they just say "fuck you, I'll go deal with these other people".
This is a profound geopolitical change.
Yes, the US was never and is not now omnipotent, but breaking with the "rules based system" (i.e. US global financial hegemony) was always hypothetically possible, but represented (since WWII) an immense "first mover" cost that prevented enough countries getting together to form an alternative financial block.
The US empire is not one of military conquest but primarily financial. Where both military force and sanctions plays a role in maintaining US empire is in punishing countries that get out of line, but notice that those countries are simply ruined, they are not conquered and re-integrated into the US economic system (a. la. every previous Empire).
Faced with these immense harms, the US can offer many (certainly in the short term, for the ruling elite, as well as long term in some cases) as benefits to not get out of line and do what you're told.
It's a carrot and stick approach.
Quoting ssu
This is also true, and certainly the term eroded is better applied to the Afghanistan mission and in this new war a better term would be "abruptly change".
However, why 20 years in Afghanistan didn't really change anything is that an Empire fighting an insurgency somewhere is pretty normal. The US did not invest significant amounts of complex weapons systems and massive amounts of ammunition in Afghanistan as has been required in Ukraine. All throughout Afghanistan no one doubted the US would and could bomb others, which they did in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere for example.
And of course Afghanistan had zero impact on the global financial system.
Now, if you're thinking only that the US "close friends" won't go anywhere else, that the "NATO won't fall apart" etc. I agree with those positions. What is at stake in this world is the international relations outside "the West".
Relations that, on one level, don't really impact anyone in the West, mostly what's at stake in these countries is if some corporation is going to make slightly more money than they otherwise would. So, from this perspective one could have a "so what" attitude of what happens to US influence in far away places.
However, where things do affect things for actual Westerners is the fate of the USD. No one really knows what will happen to the USD if there emerges a global financial competitor.
Although I think technically true, the arms industry is the second largest in Russia and a significant amount of the Soviet supplies and war production infrastructure significantly limits the need for a full wartime mobilisation in order to fight a much smaller country.
The West has been predicted the Russians will run out of nearly every piece of equipment or munition since essentially the start of the war. Maybe they will run out tomorrow but it seems unlikely.
It is reported Russia is firing much less artillery shells, certainly due to sustainment concerns, but they can compensate that with glide bombs as well as building heavy fortification and mine fields. In other words, the immense artillery expenditure to suppress Ukrainian troop movements, covered building more sustainable defensive and offensive alternatives.
Quoting Tzeentch
The talk of F16's is likely simply to not-talk about the Western tanks failing to save Bakhmut or suddenly launch some grand counter offensive.
Quoting Tzeentch
Planes can only replace artillery with air superiority, otherwise in terms of resources it makes zero sense to risk a 100 000 000 USD plane because artillery shells can't be sourced. Although I agree with a lot of Mearsheimer's points, I don't think this is good speculation.
Indeed, the West talks up F16's for weeks and then come out and manage expectations.
Quoting Aljazeera
Not that some F16s would be useless, they can fire various standoff munitions from a safe distance, but that would simply be replacing some lost capacity and not really changing anything.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsXNJlH-4iM&ab_channel=FranklyFukuyama
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCrZ-FqMyDg&ab_channel=TheInfographicsShow
Prediction: Ukraine is going to make substantial gains.
As pro Ukrainian propaganda goes, that video was pretty depressing. Ukraine has some 2000 new armoured vehicles, hurrah. But Western enthusiasm and supplies are running out, Russia has 400,000 new troops, arms from abroad, hardened defences, and now help from China. Oh, and they're busy in the occupied territories annihilating any trace of a resistant Ukrainian population, and Ukraine have just given away all their troop dispositions in an intelligence loss.
That's going to have to be a completely stunningly impressive counteroffensive.
I listened to the entirely of this interview, and it's mostly them criticising the Biden administration for not committing hard enough to Ukraine, not making "winning an objective" (I believe their exact words), and that Ukraine needs far more advanced weaponry than they have now to "win" such as a large fleet of F16s.
They also repeat a lot useless tropes like Ukrainian soldiers are just smarter than Russian soldiers and even quicker witted than American soldiers in learning new equipment, but fail to realise that even if that were true the Russians don't have to learn new equipment.
But unless I missed something, the interviewer and interviewee do not explain why Ukraine will win but explain the massive escalation in arms supplies necessary to even have a chance, accept fear of Russian nuclear weapons is the reason for the "extra caution" (in their words) but that they feel this caution is baseless and recommend not being cautious.
I hope I am wrong.
Why?
?
Just think what you are saying, @Tzeentch.
Since WW1, it has been obvious that ground based air defence GBAD has a more effective alternative, namely fighter defence, other aircraft. And this is why GBAD has usually played the second fiddle in wars. The machine guns fitted to biplanes then were as potent or actually statistically more potent to shoot down enemy aircraft than artillery pieces on the ground. Nothing has changed since then as this is a matter of simple physics. A missile shot from an aircraft has already speed, doesn't need to climb as high and obviously the pilot with his speedy weapons platform can change places far more quicker than a land based one to get the optimum firing solution.
Then there are the obvious reasons just why the F-16 would be preferable to Ukraine. It's widely used. It has no problem against the Soviet fighters. It isn't as costly and complex as the F-35 and nobody will give their F-35s for Ukraine. And then there is the fact that IF Ukraine wants to be on the offensive, it has to do something to the Russian ground based air defence (GBAD), as you point out below:
Quoting Tzeentch
It already has contended with that: actually both sides don't venture with their aircraft far to the others side.
The F-16 is actually the answer to that. :smile:
One of the F-16's most important mission is SEAD. There are specific Wild Weasel Squadrons with F-16s, hence the F.16 is the best option for Ukraine as it's searching for a stop-gap fighter, not a weapon system that will have it's service delivery to Ukraine in the 2030's or something.
Hence if Ukraine wants cut off the land bridge to Crimea or some other do outstanding stuff, it is extemely difficult and perhaps impossible without denting the Russian GBAD. The are only few MiG-29s now capable of firing HARM missiles with the Ukraine Air Force.
Because the World needs Russian resources. And Russia is now China's gas station. Crucial for Russia, rather important for China.
Quoting boethius
Nope.
The vast majority of countries don't have such natural resources that Russia has. Many countries are quite vulnerable to sanctions. Starting with those countries that cannot feed their populations with their own domestic agricultural production.
Quoting boethius
But notice the "if they do have somewhere else to go". And actually that has been Putin's Russia's biggest problem: It's economy is little and has stagnated. It hasn't been a real alternative as opting to be with Russia and excluding the West is a disastrous choice to make. Hence CIS didn't fly, also because of economic reasons.
In this graph try finding Russia, you will find, but it isn't easy:
Someone could counter with the argument that there's China. Obviously the Chinese hub is the answer? Well, how much of that Chinese GDP comes from trade with the West? A lot. The fact is, even if Brazil, China, India and South Africa among others would favor a multipolar economy system, they do not want to exclude themselves from trading with the West.
Quoting boethius
Except that it did and will cost a huge amount, over two trillion dollars, just in Afghanistan. Fighting a war with your own forces is far more expensive than to give aid and weapons to a country that takes care of the fighting part.
And then there was the Iraq war too and the fight against ISIS in Syria too.
The assistance to Ukraine has been now a perhaps a puny 100 billion when we are talking:
Just to understand how much the US troops fighting a war costs, is that 1 reinforced company, yes company, fighting in Afghanistan for a year was the equivalent of the annual defense budget of Estonia. So even if the above graphs take into account future costs, still nothing is as expensive as the US deploying forces to fight a war on another continent.
In many Western military the salaries take even a larger amount of the defense budget. For example Germany has a similar size of defense budget as France, but it doesn't have a nuclear deterrent or an aircraft carrier and similar capability for operations in other continents. Hence when you deploy a large force of your troops to an operation on the other side of the planet, the costs are simply huge.
This is an inaccurate idea of how air defense works.
Fighters are not efficient at air defense at all.
Consider the amount of resources it would take to keep fighters in the air 24/7 in sufficient numbers to cover all important areas in Ukraine. Multiply that number by three to account for the fact that for every plane in the sky there are two on the ground (repairs/maintenance, refitting/refueling). Couple that with the fact that fighters are able to carry only a handful of anti-air missiles to stop salvos of dozens of Russian missiles/drones.
For the Ukrainians this would be completely unfeasible, even without taking the threat of Russian anti-air into consideration.
Quoting ssu
Also suggesting a somewhat inaccurate idea of how SEAD works.
AGM-88s are no magic bullets. In fact, they're pretty old.
Modern anti-air systems like S-300, S-400, Pantsir, etc. can shoot these missiles down, and it would take absolutely massive volleys to get through a layered defense like what the Russians use. (Not to mention anti-radiation missiles only destroy radar transmitters. To actually destroy an AA installation it would take a lot more).
Again, considering the resources the Ukrainians have, it is rather unlikely their aim is to degrade the Russian air defenses in any serious way.
What SEAD might be able to accomplish for the Ukrainians is to provide temporary defensive cover to accomodate air strikes.
And in line with what Mearsheimer argued, I think this is likely what the Ukrainians plan to do with the F-16s.
You miss the point here.
The point is not that other countries can repeat what Russia has done from scratch, the point is that by completely removing Russia from the Western financial system Russia has both a need to create an alternative system as well as zero incentive (whether from fear or enticement) to cooperate in Western sanction regimes against US foes.
Russia did not opt out of the Western financial system by itself, whether because there was no desire to or perhaps there was desire but it would have been political unfeasible to just nope out of the Western economic system. Why didn't Russia do it before? Because of carrots and sticks the US can brandy about the issue: in other words Russia stayed in the Western financial system because it wanted to for the benefits as well as not wanting to risk what happens if you leave, providing the West, in particular the US, leverage in maintaining their "rules based order".
If we take the usual suspects of the sanctions world -- Iran, North Korean, Cuba, Venezuela -- they are simply not large enough countries to create some alternative economic system, and most countries and most companies would not see a cost-benefit to running foul of the US by violating US sanctions. Of course, random companies and smugglers will pop up to benefit from a little sanctions-arbitrage but such supply lines are unreliable and at a higher cost. Simply because you can get around sanctions doesn't mean it's convenient.
Quoting ssu
Yes, it's exactly that the Chinese hub is the answer.
How the situation has changed with Russia essentially joining this group is that Russia is not only significantly larger (a larger population than all these countries combined) but has the resources, has the leverage, to make an equal if not greater cost-benefit proposal to their trading partners. Russia can effectively say to many countries that: you continue to trade or you're not going to eat. As you note, that's a powerful argument to displease the US in favour of Russian foreign policy.
Does China need to sell us stuff? Or do we need to by Chinese stuff?
Sanctions are presented always as some moral fact-of-the-matter "right thing to do".
But what do sanctions represent? They represent firms making less money because they can't sell their goods and services to certain markets or source the same from said markets.
It's simply not a logic that scales well in the capitalist system. It takes considerable effort to maintain sanctions on small countries, it's simply not possible to go around ordering people to stop trading with a big enough country such as Russia. At some point it's just too costly and countries tell even the "mighty US" to take a hike.
Quoting ssu
It's not a question of countries wanting to "opt out" as some sort of ideological choice.
It's a question of leverage. If you can potentially opt out of something you can drive a harder bargain, even if you don't plan to, compared to having no alternative.
Moreover, sanctions aren't relevant concerning the countries that play nice already with US foreign policy but rather countries that don't, we're talking about countries with some sort of ideological conflict with the US.
Now, even a decade ago a pretty common response would be that history is over, all those "ideological" countries stuck in the past will go away, everything will become liberal democracy serving a platform for a homogenous global capitalist system.
Those days seem long gone and rather things are going in the opposite direction.
As for Russia's economy. As you note yourself at the start of your comment, it's about the resources.
International leverage relations follow the hierarchy of needs: people need food and primary industries (upon which everything else is based) need resources.
If major producing countries simply continue to trade with Russia (especially China and India) and the Russian government and Russian companies have no concern for Western sanctions (why would they), then all currently sanctioned countries can simply "plug into" this Russian based alternative world trading system.
Of course, there's significant overlap with the normal world trading system, but that's exactly why it destroys sanctions generally speaking.
For, whatever you may say of the Russian governance system, dealing with an established Russian firm is going to be a lot more reliable and good for business than dealing with smugglers or fly-by-night companies.
Though everything up to hear you say in your comment is true, I do not think it leads to this conclusion.
Fighters are not good at permanent air defence of a large area for the reasons you cite.
However, a small number of expensive planes can't be risked to conduct air strikes.
We'll see, but my guess is the main reason to be talking about F16 is to try to keep Ukrainian morale and have something else to talk about.
The second reason is to lob missiles as @ssu describes, just it's not so effective at shooting anything down but the idea is to stay at a safe distance and deny Russian air supremacy.
For, the Russians can't risk much their expensive planes either, so as long as Ukraine has planes with missiles that can get into the air and shoot missiles then this is a big risk to Russian fighters.
The F16s don't need to be on permanent patrol, but can scramble in the event there is Russian planes coming over the front lines to bomb stuff, which doesn't happen because Ukraine can shoot missiles at them.
Currently Russia keeps its planes behind the front line because Ukraine still has some AA systems and missiles, the F16s would, at best, keep this status quo (which isn't "good" as Russia can launch plenty of missiles and glide bombs from a safe distance, but it would be a lot worse if they could simply fly anywhere in Ukraine at will).
There is no decisive manoeuvre or single intense battle on the table that could resolve the conflict in Ukraine's favour, in which risking the planes may make sense, so at no point does it make sense to send out F16s to conduct air strikes (other than for propaganda purposes in safe locations or then because the propaganda win is worth the risk for essentially a one off).
As you note, Russia has multi layered advanced AA, SEAD, in addition to their fighters (that have look down radars, which would be where they bring unique AA capability).
The F16's are better than having no planes at all, but everything you explain just emphasises they cannot get near Russian forces and their use is severely limited.
Fighters are an integral and important part of air defense. Naturally you need GBAD starting from securing the airfields of the fighters, but the fact remains that you can fight against enemy aircraft with your own aircraft.
Quoting Tzeentch
You think fighters are (or would be) kept 24/7 in air? How about having them up when you have enemy aircraft up in the air. It's quite rare to have fighter aircraft on CAP 24/7. And in this war, anything with that intensity simply hasn't been seen.
Again there's an obvious limitation to how many sorties aircraft can fly. IAF has had sortie rates of 3 to 4 per day during some of it's wars, yet that's the exception. Modern aircraft need maintenance, the missions have to be planned, etc.
Quoting Tzeentch
Are they now? AGM-88E came into service in the 2010s. AGM-88G is coming to service only now.
Quoting Tzeentch
Which they actually did at the start of the war. :snicker:
Quoting Tzeentch
They have to dent it just where they want to attack. But seems like you have a lot of confidence on Russian armed forces.
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes, that's more like it. Ukraine cannot win air superiority. But it doesn't have to. It only has to get it temporarily for a brief time: when it's forces are on the move and it's own GBAD isn't in place yet.
I don't see why not.
Every use of these F-16s will incur some risk.
One advantage the Ukrainians will have is the intel they are getting from the US and other nations will probably allow them to craft a fairly accurate picture of the Russian AA network and use it to their advantage.
The other proposed roles for the F-16s I don't find so convincing. The Russians barely use their air force over Ukraine, and taking down missiles with fighters is not ideal for the reasons I mentioned.
Are they going to put a 40 million dollar plane into the air to swat a handful of 20,000 dollar Iranian drones, with missiles that each cost a million also?
Maybe they're anticipating a heavier use of air power by the Russians, however again I think planes would not be the logical choice if their intention was defensive use.
Unless they're planning to keep them grounded, which I doubt, I think air strikes and bombing raids is what they plan to use them for. They might take a page out of the Israeli book. They are pretty crafty with their air force as well.
Quoting boethius
I don't remember who it was, but don't the Russians have ~1,000 4th and 5th generation fighters lying around? Why wouldn't they be able to risk those?
Quoting boethius
Depending how they operate, they can.
AA systems may have hundreds of kilometers of range, but the radar horizon is a severely limiting factor when it comes to low-flying targets.
Note that you stated fighters are "a more effective alternative" - something which is simply untrue for the reasons I gave.
Of course fighters can play a role in air defense, in the context of a modern army which also features various forms of ground-based / mobile air defense.
On their own fighters would be terribly inefficient.
Quoting ssu
Without the capacity to keep fighters in the air 'round the clock, the enemy would simply wait for all to be grounded before launching their attack.
Considering these planes would have to be stationed quite far from the frontline, scrambling them only when there are threats in the air also seems unfeasible due to time, fuel and weight constraints.
Quoting ssu
Yes. Because, as I said, it's extremely inefficient. And modern militaries have ground-based systems to ensure such a task doesn't fall squarely on aviation most of the time.
It seems you don't really understand the practical problems of using air planes in a defensive role in the conditions the Ukrainians would be flying under.
Flying at low altitudes is essentially a given due to the threat of Russian anti-air systems. This means flying at decreased speeds (due to higher drag) and thus increased reaction times. It also means lower fuel efficiency.
All of this translates into increased reaction times, low time on station. lighter weapon loadouts, etc.
Quoting ssu
This is not an argument.
First, find out which version the Ukrainians have received. Then, look up what specifications these upgrades altered. Finally, figure out how that relates to my argument, namely that Russian AA can shoot down AGM-88s.
For reference, S-400 has a maximum target velocity of between Mach 8 and Mach 14.
No, it is true. Just look at history: if you have a capable air force that can gain air superiority, then most of the kills will be done in air-to-air combat. Air superiority is the single most important factor in
deciding the outcome of a modern conventional war. And when either side cannot gain air superiority, well, you have a war that likely will go on for a long time. Hence for the Ukrainian air force as it is smaller than the Russian air force, it's first objective is simply just to exist.
Quoting Tzeentch
Exactly. And not having any combat aircraft is a huge disadvantage: even having a small contingent of aircraft that are sheltered and not used are basically a fleet-in-being. As long as they exist, it limits the actions of the other side.
First of all, GBAD cannot gain air superiority above enemy territory. Hence aircraft are crucial in winning an air war. An effective GBAD will result in what basically has happened in Ukraine: the other side simply won't fly in the area where there is the effective GBAD. That's what GBAD can do. But it won't destroy the enemy air force if the enemy doesn't fly. In this war both sides have opted just to use artillery, fire missiles at each other from their own airspace protected by their own GBAD.
Quoting Tzeentch
But you simply can have early warning system and get the jets into the air to intercept them. Even if your air force cannot intercept all enemy air strikes, it's objective is usually to inflict enough losses to the enemy and to sustain itself as an effective force. Air war quickly becomes a war of attrition. With a loss rate of 5% you will quickly run out of serviceable aircraft.
Quoting Tzeentch
Lol. My country's own air force has dealt with this from it's birth and has never assumed to gain air superiority. For some reason, you never saw them flying high during the Cold War, but dashing on treetop level when flying from one place to another.
Quoting Tzeentch
And? Even if the S-400 has a great range, again basic physics comes to play as you remarked to Boethius. The Earth is round and also Ukraine a big country. Hence you can do the math just how this effects target acquisition of radars and their ability to track low flying aircraft.
And about the increased reaction times: GBAD is basically stationary when fighting while an aircraft as an weapons platform is far more quicker, even if it's flying at lower speeds.
Quoting Tzeentch
Well, an air force that isn't enjoying air superiority obviously doesn't fly as it would have it. The aircraft then "loitering on station" would be an extremely rare event. Usually the tactic is quick hit-and-run tactics and trying to survive to the next day. Good historical example is the North Vietnamese Air Force during the Vietnam war. It used far different tactics than the US and ventured only in the end of the war into South Vietnamese airspace. Then the USAF and USN weren't around anymore.
Quoting Tzeentch
Your argument was that the weapon system was old. Well, the Patriot missile was/is a weapon system that started it's life during the 1950's. So something being old, or that older versions are given from the stocks isn't a credible refutation that the system doesn't work or isn't important.
Yes, missiles can be shot down, but that's simply not a counterargument. When my country had the BUK-M1 system, they shot during training in Russia a SCUD missile down. The system is capable of that (and Russia has claimed shooting down missiles with the system), but in order to do that, it obviously has to have the information of an incoming missile and be prepared with it's radar on to get the quick firing solution needed. Hence even if both sides do have the capability to destroy incoming missiles, it doesn't mean that they can do it 100%.
I have made no argument that any weapon system or missile is undefeatable or a war winning tool.
By risk, I mean significantly more risk. Flying anywhere near Russia / the front is going to be significantly more risky than flying along the border of Poland or Romania / inside those countries.
My contention is the F16s will stay far closer to Polish and Romanian air space than Russian.
Quoting Tzeentch
Well 1 million is an exaggeration ... but not by much.
Quoting Wallstreet Journal
Maybe there are cheaper "low altitude" missiles, but I don't see why that would be. Each side winder costs about a third of a million USD.
That being said, probably just flying near them with a jet would cause them to fall out of the sky and certainly cheaper methods either exist or are being developed.
Actually doing so would not, in my opinion, be for the purposes of winning the war but simply testing systems in real world conditions, which is certainly a big factor, generally speaking, to get F16s into the war theatre.
Quoting Tzeentch
This is my core argument about the F16s, that if air defence Ukraine were to completely fail then Russia would gain air supremacy and bomb and strafe freely over all of Ukraine.
The only reason far superior Russian air power hasn't been so decisive is because the Russians have the exact same problem I am describing of not being able to risk expensive planes in attritional warfare.
Compare to the first manoeuvre phase of the war where Russia took large amounts of territory and then Ukraine retook large amounts of territory, you at least "get something" for downed air craft and helicopters. Whether it was needed or then cost effective is another question, but it at least makes sense to risk planes when decisive battles are being fought to take strategic ground.
Obviously Russia didn't like losing aircraft and helicopters, but had they not taken and held the land bridge to Crimea that would have been far more embarrassing.
In an attritional phase of war, risking planes is just not justifiable. The amount of successful sorties you need over the front to justify the loss of an aircraft and pilot is incredibly high and there are far cheaper alternatives such as artillery.
Of course, ideally you can drop bombs from a safe distance from the front, which is now what's happening with the glide bombs.
F16s could, for example, be used to push these planes further back or, at least, keep them from coming closer.
The situation as I see it is that the West simply lacks the appropriate ground based air defence systems because NATO doctrine is air power based and the current situation is something the US never envisioned so doesn't have the systems. As far as I know, the only Western SAM system that has any numbers is the Patriot and it does not manoeuvre and is too expensive to make sense and doesn't have enough numbers anyways.
NATO is a "we're going to come to you and destroy you" kind of force, not a "we're going to sit here on steppe and try to see how long we can be attacked" kind of force.
With depletion of ground based AA missiles, depletion of Migs, the F16s may simply be the only option to prevent Russia from gaining complete air supremacy over Ukraine.
Preventing this is the only thing that makes Ukraines position maintainable and at least slow to erode.
Also, keep in mind that AA doesn't need to be depleted entirely, just enough that risking planes to support large manoeuvres is justifiable.
Quoting Tzeentch
It was the US chief of the joint chiefs of staff that explained F16s aren't a magic solution and there is no way to defeat Russia in the air considering their 1000 comparable planes.
Obviously 10 < 1000; 10 being the billion dollar example in the General's comparison, but whatever Ukraine is going to get will be far from 1000.
As for risking Russias 1000 fighters, Russia obviously can and did and does. The question is one of cost effectiveness.
For example, the value of the land bridge to Crimea can be measured in 10s of billions to hundreds of dollars, long term one could argue trillions of dollars. 10s of billions would be the cost to substitute the canal that supplied Crimea with fresh water, and hundreds of billions would represent all the land, assets and people, and if there's really immense gas reservers, then maybe all this can be tallied up to a trillion or more. Of course, you'd then need to do a levelized net-present value calculation including the cost of the war, sanctions and so on, to get an idea of what it's really worth "right now", but clearly a lot.
Of course it could be argued that it is a net loss, but that doesn't really matter once the war starts and for the purposes of risking planes.
Even Russia's most expensive planes are worth far less than the territory gained, so it makes sense to risk them in that pursuit. Even if the war is an overall negative, you'd still need to mitigate that with conquering as much territory as feasible (taking into consideration the need for pacification and defence and so on).
However, fast forward to the current attritional phase of the war and it simply makes no sense to risk expensive planes and pilots to take a 100 meters of Bakhmut, so we didn't see planes dive bombing and strafing Ukrainian positions.
Where the calculation would change is if Ukrainian both air defence depletes enough and there is a proposed series manoeuvres that can win the war. Now, ok, maybe some aircraft will be lost, but the value of ending the war sooner rather than later is again measures in the tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars.
And from bits and pieces that have been put together about the first days of the war, Russia did mostly succeed in destroying nearly all of Ukraine air defence, hit runways etc. and gained air superiority over most of Ukraine which was essential in taking all the territory in so short a time.
However, then the West supplied large amounts of shoulder launched missiles and started to source Soviet components and systems from other ex-Soviet states to repair / rebuild Ukraine's integrated SEAD system, which then pushed Russian aircraft behind the Russian front line and not only did large offensive manoeuvres end for the Russians but they needed to retreat from large amounts of territory to consolidate their gains.
The small force Russia invaded with only made sense with air superiority as a force multiplier, so Russia needed to call up more troops and dig in over the entire front line. The extent to which they expected this may happen is another question, but this is clearly what did happen.
But what else did we see when the Russians started to dig in and consolidate ground based defences? A constant barrage of missile, drone attacks and constant sorties as close as possible to Ukraine, that have depleted Ukrainian air defence.
The situation is one in which air defence simply makes no sense in an attritional mode. The only time it would make sense to engage in attritional air defence warfare is if you're also attritting the enemies air defence, which is not what's happening.
In the current trajectory, eventually Russia will gain air supremacy.
And this is what the recent pentagon leaks basically say, that Ukraine will be soon fully depleted (by now when the document was written, but obviously Ukraine can ration missiles and be provided more, such as the Patriot to delay depletion), and if Western SAMs aren't a long term solution either, then F16s are really the only option to continue to deny Russia complete air supremacy.
This, in my view, is the mission of the F16s; nothing remotely close to supporting Ukrainian ground forces with strike missions.
Quoting Tzeentch
The Ukrainians would have the same problem as the Russians did in facing man portable missile launchers, but in addition to that the Russians fighters have radar look-down capabilities that could then transmit that information to the SAMs.
Now, it maybe true the Russian fighters would need to take risks to get close enough to these F16 to track them with look-down, but the fact your enemy is also risking a plane immediately justifies risking your own plane in attritional warfare.
The risks are really high, and clearly far higher for the attacking aircraft trying to penetrate enemy SEAD systems and evade enemy fighters, than it is for the defending aircraft largely operating within their safety bubble. This is in the addition to the inherent risk of flying low under high stress.
I really don't see Ukraine flying these F16s anywhere close to Russian airspace.
Keep in mind also that Russia also has air superiority fighters, which we have not seen much of. Some say it's because they don't work, but another explanation is that it simply makes no sense for Russia to risk it's modern / modernised superiority fighters to shoot down Soviet era fighters.
To shoot down F16s is a completely different equation and you would likely see Russia taking far greater risks to shoot them down. Each F16 and pilot would not only represent a large fraction of the Ukrainian air force but it would be a huge propaganda win. If Russia lose some aircraft in the process, as the general notes they have a thousand more.
The mission purpose of S-400 long range missiles are against big and slow targets such as tankers and AWAKS, to keep these as far way from the fight as possible.
However, you could also have the situation where high flying Russian fighters can track low-flying F16, though out of range, so an S-300 or S-400 could then engage with guidance from the Russian fighters.
To what extent this is likely to occur, a capability Russia has even developed, is a different question, but, at least in principle, simply because ground based radar are limited by the horizon does not mean those missiles cannot engage with air-based tracking.
Keep in mind also that high flying supersonic fighters decrease the range of AA systems because they can outrun incoming missiles. I.e. the range of a 100 km missile travelling at mach 5 is reduced to 50km if fired at a target running away at mach 2.5, and this doesn't take into account altitude, counter measures or additional manoeuvres that will all favour the aircraft.
How SAM sites mitigate this is by moving around and simply waiting to turn on when the fighter is easily within range (such as with information provided by radar farther away, that can easily track high flying planes).
How fighters mitigate this is just staying behind their own lines where, presumably, there are no enemy SAM sites that may turn on suddenly.
Quoting ssu
The idea that an air force is a "more effective" method of air defense is untrue, as I explained. It functions as part of an air defense network, and it won't function on its own.
Quoting ssu
All my objections assume early warning.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
This is obvious.
You don't seem to understand that flying low severely limits the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, especially for a nation like Ukraine which is starved for resources.
Quoting ssu
No. My argument was that modern Russian AA like S-300 and S-400 can shoot the AGM-88 down.
Why don't you do your due diligence and figure out what type of AGM-88 the Ukrainians are receiving and how that relates to my argument?
And my point is just why other countries would have zero incentive to trade with the West?
Many countries would be happy if the world trade would be done other currency than dollars. But that simply is something that goes back to older times.
Quoting boethius
Exactly, this was my point and here we agree.
Quoting boethius
First of all, it did prepare for this event to happen when it attacked Ukraine. It only assumed that the response would be similar to what the West had done earlier: impose some sanctions, have a brief cold period and then when the administration changes, it's time again to reset the relationship. Don't you remember this:
Quoting boethius
The answer based on economics would be yes, China needs to sell stuff and yes, we do need Chinese stuff.
But that actually doesn't matter so much.
The reality is that all the importance we give to huge corporations and the ultra-rich and their globalization, when it comes to security matters and war, they are brushed aside. Chinese leadership can possibly decide "Fuck it, we can feed our people, we have enough to make this, let's finish those rebels in Taiwan". And it takes just one aircraft carrier to be sunk for the Americans to wreck globalization, put Chinese nationals into concentration camps and demand that China should be nuked. Remember just what one big successful terrorist attack made them to do.
I think we are quite close to an age that people lived in the 1900's and early 1910's. Many argued that war would be impossible because there was so much globalization.
Quoting boethius
Yet don't underestimate just how large was the effect of the February 24th 2022 attack on Europe. This isn't an embargo made on moral grounds, like was done against South Africa. Especially the Eastern and Northern countries of Europe don't give a rats ass about the profits they are missing because of the sanctions. Finally Russia started a war too large just to ignore.
No really, earlier the Soviet Union was the largest export market for Finland and Finland was the second largest exporter of goods to the Soviet Union after West Germany. And obviously Finland tried to make the relationship to work. No there's basically nothing. So be it. NOBODY in Finland is crying about the lost markets. There is only a discussion that the risks of those investments made to Russia, now lost, should have better understood.
So no, boethius, at some point it isn't "just too costly", when security and the possibly the survival of the country is at stake. Security policy always trumps trade policy.
Yeah, well, and AWACS or a fighter cannot yet act as an fire control radar to a GBAD missile. Not yet, at least. And it doesn't go like "fire in that direction and maybe the missile will find it's target".
Quoting boethius
Or in other words, the effective engagement range of a SAM is far shorter than it's max range.
I think we are just talking of different things. Obviously you need both, but once you have the air force capable of winning air superiority, then you don't need so much GBAD. If you don't have any aircraft, it's far more easier for the enemy to tackle your GBAD.
Quoting Tzeentch
Actually, your argument was this:
Quoting Tzeentch
Ok, first an S-300 or S-400 system is quite useless without it's radars working. Optical tracking (with other SAM systems) is still difficult, especially if you aren't aware of the attacker.
Secondly, it's obvious that other weapons are also used in SEAD. Old iron bombs were used in Vietnam, so even that can work (if one is very careful).
Thirdly, there far more to the battle between GBAD and aircraft than just one or two weapon systems. It's far more of a cat and mouse game. That an anti-radiation missile can be intercepted doesn't refute anything that I've said. And yes, I think that in this subject I do know what I'm actually talking about.
Hence that a missile can be shot down doesn't make it so that only massive volleys will get through this layered defense. You should read about these kind of operations. A great example is Israeli attack on Syria GBAD in the Bekaa Valley during "Peace for Galilee" operation named Operation Mole Cricket 19. The Syrian systems weren't so old in the early 1980's.
Since Ukraine and probably also Russia will not meet that criterium at any point during this conflict, I don't see why this would be relevant.
Quoting ssu
Of course. The key here being that radars can be replaced. To destroy these modern systems it would take a lot more.
Quoting ssu
Unguided bombs versus an S-400?
I pity the pilot who gets that job.
If the Ukrainians were keen on losing their F-16s as fast as possible, they'd use this approach.
Quoting ssu
You're comparing two different eras.
The Syrian air defenses weren't able to engage the anti-radiation missiles fired by the Israelis, because ground-based anti-missile defense wasn't really a thing back then. All their anti-air systems (coming from the '60s, mind you) were built to engage air planes.
Russian air defense can engage incoming missiles, and the AGM-88, even the G variant, falls well within its maximum target velocity.
This is of course a crucial difference.
Obviously there's no incentive to not have trade routes open, the question is the cost extracted by the US to engage with their system.
Countries, basically all countries, want the access to trade but not the cost, so this gives rise to negotiations and trade agreements.
If there's no where else to go, your negotiating position is weak (and sanctions or the threat of sanctions are basically only possible in such conditions, otherwise you're only harming yourself by blocking your own access to markets without that even being all that negative for said countries of those markets), whereas even the hypothetical of somewhere else to go strengthens your negotiating position.
It's not a binary thing and the future has to be "priced in".
For example, a monopoly may start lowering their prices simply due to the existence of an alternative even if that alternative isn't very good or can't possibly scale ... yet. This happens all the time in hardware in order to protect market share, hopefully drive the upstart out of business, and hardware monopolies are accused of this all the time.
In software the solution is to make your product free and make money on advertisement or other added value since a monopoly position is worth more than any revenue at all of selling your product. Why even Windows is free now.
US foreign policy can be viewed as protecting their monopoly on the global trading system.
Now, you may say a competitor arising and putting downward price pressure of what the US charges (not always money ...) for accessing their system is good for most people on the planet and even most Americans.
I would not have problems agreeing with. This change isn't some catastrophe and the US will still be there and much, if not most, of the globe will still be subscribed to Pax Americana, but it is a profound change for all those current subscribers that aren't "loyal fans". Maybe the US will need to offer a advert-free version for example.
I have a meeting starting a few minutes, so I'll respond to the rest of your points later, but I feel we do agree on the fundamentals just have different attitudes towards its meaning.
And, of course, these changes are very new, maybe Russia's alternative economic system grows or falls apart, but that Russia has survived sanctions so far is a major geopolitical change and some countries, I'd say most importantly Iran, are jumping on the prospective benefits of this change.
Well, you can say that also for Russia's main battle tanks, artillery, warships too! Just replace the destroyed ones and train new crews! The problem is replacing them. You simply don't have much to do with just the launchers. Well, you can lob the missiles at Kiev, which they have done.
Quoting Tzeentch
Uhh, actually no.
It's not so simple, actually. The real issue is fire discipline and the ability for the radar operator to know when to shut his radar off. The survival of a SAM unit isn't in it's ability to shoot down missiles, it's simply to understand when to not use the radar, when not to engage when to engage. Move and conceal your SAM's and use them only when the situation favors you. How well are all elements of your air defence commanded and how well do they fight together really matters. Trying to engage at everything, and you will be likely just shooting at decoys, spending your missiles and showing your exact location.
Air defence isn't in real life as it is in computer games. Every aspect of it has to work together, units have to be ready, communication has to work etc. In actual life it's far more difficult.
I've myself tried to track with an optical sight of a French Crotale NG SAM on a F-18 Hornet flying really close. It was totally impossible to catch the fighter jet. You could track it optically and fire if a) you knew exactly where it was coming from and b) it wasn't aware of you and wouldn't be aggressively turning. Hence that you can fire the VT-1 missile without using radar or active infrared (hence no alarms will go on in the aircraft) is positive, but doesn't make it superior. Just like air combat, you simply cannot make straightforward conclusions about how things will go because of some technical aspects. Hence the idea that optimally a missile system can defeat missiles also make them some kind of wonder weapons.
I never said it was simple.
I said the fact that Russian air defense systems being able to take down anti-radiation missiles is a critical difference which your example doesn't account for.
Quoting ssu
Air defense systems have a purpose: to defend critical targets.
When they have to turn off their radars and reposition to dodge incoming missiles, SEAD is effectively Suppressing the system while (assumedly) other air assets are taking advantage of this.
Thus, being able to take down these incoming missiles rather than having to relocate is a big advantage.
I remember reading somewhere that this "predatory pricing", as it's called, was used by the Byzantine empire to hold on to their monopoly in the silk trade (after silk worms had been smuggled from China). So the idea isn't a new one.
Quoting boethius
They don't actually protect so much the system. More like the US takes the system as granted, as something natural and reap the harvest of the dollar being the global currency by spending as recklessly as they can. No, who protect the system are all other Western countries that are OK with current system as holds on.
Hence one has to look at this from a different point of view: Western countries accept the dollar system as it is stable enough. Basically it's similar like with NATO. It's not that the US forces countries to be in the organization, it's that European countries are totally happy to be in NATO. It's their security policy decision, not the US.
The role of the dollar was an result first of the US being the only creditor nation after WW2 ...when other Western countries and Japan had been bombed into rubble. The second act came when the US had spent wildly on the Vietnam war and the great society and Western countries, like West Germany, started to question the link that US dollar had to gold and it's reserves. Nixon promptly ended the last ties of the dollar to gold. The rescuing angel for the dollar (and the US) came in form of the Saudi-Arabia and the petro-dollar. The oil trade being traded in US dollars saved the dollar system.
But indeed things are changing, even without war in Ukraine. The thing is that now China understands clearly that it could face similar sanctions as Russia, that is obvious. Hence it is necessary for China to prepare for this kind of possibility.
It is the end of globalization as we know it. Still, it is just a possible outcome, not something that will definitely happen.
Quoting boethius
I agree and this is important. Even if the dollar based system would collapse, it isn't the end of the World or of the US. It's still the largest economy and when faced with tough decision, it can make them when it has to. Just like the pandemic we went through wasn't, even if you would describe to people before what measures were taken, they wouldn't believe it. Reality isn't a Hollywood catastrophe film epic.
The US simply can go back to it's continent to eat that apple pie, and the huge vacuum will create a whirlwind of local conflicts where regional powers compete for dominance. One could say that this is already happening in the Middle East, like places like Libya. There the opposing sides are backed by countries that all ought to be allies of the US (plus Russia, of course).
Definitely firing missiles blindly in a general direction is unlikely to succeed.
However, sending targeting information from one system to another is not difficult and exists in plenty of forms already.
I do not think sharing the information would be the limiting factor, but rather the range of radar to track targets from look down which will be closely guarded secret.
The wikipedia article on this is barely a page long, but does inform us the technology is from the 60s:
Quoting Lookdown / shootdown
So, presumably this exact problem has been looked at pretty closely by the developers of these systems.
For what it's worth, ChatGPT claims:
However, what we can know is that it's obviously a risk that Russia has such capabilities and they work fine, so will you risk your F16's ... to accomplish what?
Quoting ssu
Yes, but how much is the critical question.
In the situation we are discussing, low flying aircraft, such as to avoid Russian ground based AA missiles, cannot reach much above Mach 1. So this is only reducing the effective range of the missile by 20% and that's assuming the F16 is already flying in the opposite direction.
The fact range of anti-air missile (of any kind) is reduced by your speed running away is an advantage to the Russians in this situation of trying to fly high, look-down and track and maybe send tracking information to said GBAD systems or then maybe just shoot at themselves.
The Sukhoi Su-35 can MiG-29 fly above mach 2 at high altitude and the MiG 25 and 31 close to or exceeding mach 3, though with risk to the engines (still better then being shot down).
Flying away at Mach 3 is reducing the range of a Mach 5 missile by 70%, which is pretty significant.
The purpose of these considerations is that if you want to cover your F16 operations near the front with your own ground based air defence, you may need to get really close to the front, now risking your critical GBAD systems, otherwise you risk a supersonic interception, firing missiles and then easily running away at Mach 3 when your F16 is stuck at barely above mach 1 (ChatGPT claims "While I couldn't find an exact figure for the F-16's maximum speed at low altitudes, it is generally expected to be around Mach 1.2 to Mach 1.4 ").
To make matters worse, at least according to Wikipedia, the:
Quoting MIM-104 Patriot, wikipedia
And,
Quoting AIM-120 AMRAAM, wikipedia
Whereas:
Quoting S-300 missile system
And there's actually the specifications of the missiles and speeds further down the page, for example:
V55K, range 47 km, mach 5.5
5V55R, range 75/90 km, mach 5.5
5V55U, range 150 km, mach 5.8
48N6P-01, 195 km, mach 5.8
Which is a lot faster than a low flying F16.
Of note, the Russian air-air missile is also faster than its American counter-part, "Maximum speed Mach 5 – Mach 6", and, at least according to Wikipedia:
Quoting R-37 (missile)
Maybe US has faster missiles (but will they supply them to Ukraine?), but whatever the speeds involved, I think we agree that flying near Russian airspace is risky and to simply "help" in attritional warfare makes no sense to risk.
Of course, if some decisive battles take place that may end the war one way or another then maybe it would make sense to send in aircraft, but my in the context of my overall position I do not think such battles will take place, and if they do it would be battles that may decisive in Russia's favour, not Ukraine.
Furthermore, all these missiles may explain why Ukraine has lost most of its aircraft and is asking for F16s and sending pilots to train on these aircraft instead of flying existing aircraft in Ukraine.
Well, the problem is that for example the S-400 needs a search radar and a separate target acquisition/engagement radar. Similarly the Patriot system needs also. And yes, they benefit from getting an alert from an AWACS or other advance warning systems. But there's a simple technical problem, which you can see from the following pictures:
This is the target acquisition radar of a Patriot system:
These are the two types of engagement radars that the S-400 Triumph system has:
You do notice that there has to be done some engineering work to get these fit into an aircraft? Or to create such multi-function radars that act both in the search and the targeting mode.
Quoting boethius
(Just a technical note, use acronym SAM, surface to air missile, as with missiles AA stands for air-to-air missiles)
Those high flying Russian fighters have to stay out of the reach of the Ukrainian GBAD also. And obviously those future F-16s, when they come, will be used very cautiously. Yet in any case, the outcome relies on a large variety of factors than just the specs of the weapon systems. The way the weapon systems are used, the way the forces operate are far more important than the technical aspects of a weapon system. The difference come only when you face of far earlier generation weapon systems to newer ones, not with same generation weapons.
Just to give on example:why did we see footage of Bayraktar-drones destroying Russian SAM launchers early in the war and not anymore? The reason is that at start of the war there were so many limitations to SAM use as the Russian aircraft indeed flew over Ukrainian territory, that Bayraktars could have a field day. Then when Russian aircraft weren't flying anymore in Ukrainian territory (or at least, not so much), then the decision to fire on an aircraft was made easy. After all, we ought to remember the unfortunate use of a BUK-M1 shooting down that Malesian plane earlier.
The men and the military itself does matter also. Best example is just how few Abrams tanks were destroyed when operated by the US Army in Iraq and how many similar tanks have been destroyed by the Houthis fighting Saudi-Arabian troops in Yemen.
You don't need to fit these radars into an aircraft, fighters already have radars that can track, they have to be closer than these massive ground based radars but they can be at high altitude and looking down to track low flying targets trying to evade said massive ground based radars.
Quoting ssu
I'm honestly not sure, I've never seen AA to mean air-to-air missile, and if in some technical discussions somewhere that abbreviation is used, the general understanding is standing for Anti-Air, for example:
Quoting Anti-Aircraft Warfare
And refers generally to AA systems. However, I agree SAM is more specific, but to a general audience (such anyone who may be reading this) my assumption is that they would read AA as anti-air. Now I think most English speakers would be familiar with SAM also, but simply saying ground based AA missile seemed to me the clearest way to for the largest audience. But I'm happy to use SAM and people need to look it up if they don't know what it is.
Quoting ssu
Yes, we definitely agree the use of the F16s will be cautious, and there is plenty of airspace hundreds of kilometres out of range of any of the missiles we've been discussing.
The purpose of discussing the technical aspects here is to evaluate the risks involved. What a system can and can't do is the starting point of the risk analysis in trying to plan operations.
The point of developing the the facts that Russian fighters can fly high and look down is simply to establish that "flying low" is not some easy solution to the problem of SAMs.
Taking into consideration the speeds at which high altitude Russian fighters can fly, is to simply give an idea that Russia can potentially chase these low flying F16s at high speeds and maybe willing to risk being shot down themselves to do so, because they underestimated the risk, or because they have more aircraft or because they are confident they can destroy the F16 before being themselves destroyed (or all three). One certainly could not be exactly sure Russians wouldn't take large risks to shoot down your F16 nor be exactly sure what the capabilities of their systems are.
Vis-a-vis the speed of Russian missiles compared the their American counterparts, I completely agree that "The way the weapon systems are used, the way the forces operate is far more important than the technical aspects of a weapon system," but the underlying lesson here is that American weapons have been developed to be effective in the context American war fighting system and we are, in my view, starting to see the limits of what can be picked out of the US system, dropped in Ukraine in an entirely different context than the designers had in mind in making the specifications and the war planners had in mind in deciding how many such systems to order.
Quoting ssu
Completely agree.
Quoting ssu
That's somewhat an oversimplification, as Iraq is flat and the US had overwhelming superior forces and "next generation" technology (in particular night vision) engaging in the open field. The war in Yemen is not so similar.
However, for the air war over Ukraine, Russians have proven proficient and their systems effective and presumably have shot down a significant amount of Ukrainian aircraft.
The F16s can keep Russian jets from flying all over Ukraine as in the first days of the war, but it is mostly a specifications issue: once a Russian jet leaves the cover of its own air defence bubble, F16s, either on patrol or then scrambled, can fire long range missiles at the Russian jet, so the Russian jets stay in their defensive bubbles to avoid that happening.
And if things get really bad with both SAM depletion and Russians able to effectively target F16 airbases in Ukraine, they can always simply be based in a NATO country. In terms of denying Russia air supremacy, they are clearly more useful than not having any planes.
Modern fighter jets shoot other jets and can shoot down cruise missiles. But shooting down artillery rockets is a different thing.
Quoting boethius
And that example just underlines how difficult it is to use both aircraft and GBAD at the same time. The problem of IFF (identification Friend or Foe) is a difficult one. Even today.
Quoting boethius
In many cases you can have the money to buy expensive weapons, but not things like an educated well trained force for their optimal use. And there are many differences, hence we should avoid oversimplifications.
Quoting boethius
Except that everybody assumed that the Ukrainian Air Force and GBAD would be crushed at start of the war and Russia would gain air superiority. Which didn't happen. Likely they are adapting to the situation, yet it hasn't been the greatest success story.
The performance has been mediocre. I think the best thing is that they have understood their limitations and do hold back in using their air force, which hasn't suffered like losses like Russian armored forces. Russians do have the ability to improve their performance, even if the authoritarian culture makes it difficult.
:grimace:
The alignment of German technical capacity with Russia's unlimited reserves of cheap resources has long been feared by USA strategists. This is the Realist perspective, often detailed by Professors of political science like John Mearsheimer, as the guiding principle of US foreign policy for over 100 years.
Having outlived its purpose, the war is now an unnecessary political, economic, and strategic liability. The ostensible goal of defeating Russia or triggering regime change was a long shot. but it was a crucial narrative to lure and secure European support.
As for the war itself, the battle for Bakhmut represented Ukraine's last stand. It is clear that the Ukrainian military had no realistic capacity and/or a genuine objective of defeating or defending itself against Russia. Otherwise, it would not have wasted tens of thousands of soldiers on this one settlement. But Bakhmut was more than that, it was the heart of the Ukraine's defence strategy. Sitting above 120 miles of deep underground salt mine tunnels, Bakhmut offered a defensive advantage that cannot be replaced.
And so the promised great Ukraine offensive will did not come. The Biden administration presses for an offensive it knows will fail. The aftermath of this failure presents the administration the opportunity to abandon the project, claiming what more can we do? It's Afghanistan reloaded.
Notably, both President Zelensky and General Zaluzhnyi, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, are fully aware of the implications behind the administrations fixation. So increasingly we see Zelensky traveling the world, avoiding Kiev, as he plans for life after the war. While General Zaluzhnyi disappears for weeks at a time, randomly posting videos of himself inspecting the front lines and chanting perpetually that he still needs better and more weapons before any offensive can be contemplated.
The loss of men and equipment has left the Ukraine with little offensive capacity. Whilst, Russia continues to relentlessly shell and kill from a distance, preserving its military capacity. The Ukraine has turned to Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine intelligence, Budanov's grand idea is to conduct something akin to a guerrilla marketing war: bizarre and random drone strikes destroying street signs in Moscow paired with lightning hit and run cross border incursions into defenceless Russian villages. Neither of these serve any strategic military purpose, but they do inspire dramatic headlines in the Western media.
One look at the map is enough to see that the above is not true. The Sloviansk/Kramatorsk complex is much bigger than Bakhmut and much better defended, moreover, it cannot be passed without breaching the Pavlohrad/Kramatorsk or Izyum/Sloviansk line. At this time Russians have no realistic option to make significant ground gains in the area.
Moreover, if Bakhmut was Ukraine's 'last stand', then Russian strategy since its taking would be completely absurd: instead of pushing forward, they went back to lick their wounds, squandering any advantage they might have.
[sup]— Kanupriya Kapoor, Olena Harmash, Gerry Doyle, David Holmes · Reuters · Jun 3, 2023[/sup]
Somewhat similar to earlier suggestions.
Objectively ascertaining majority wishes could be difficult, because a number of Russian actors could have entered the areas posing as Ukrainians whenever told so by who/whatever downstream from the Kremlin, thereby "polluting" any votes; this sort of thing would have to be figured out to some reasonable extent.
I'd suggest UN peacekeepers in Donbas and Crimea (also ensuring the airways weren't one-sided), then trying to set up genuine votes.
Anyway, it's technically doable; best done before hatred of the other side settles more severely.
Any takers hereabouts?
Whatever the Kremlin wants, is not likely to be compatible with what the defenders want. By the way, from memory, they mentioned a demilitarised Ukraine some time in the past.
The UN voted a few times prior, but the suggestion of peacekeepers and votes could depart some from that, or at least perhaps bring more of what the parties want out in the open.
Worthwhile? Try? Waste of time? Futile?
The UN General Assembly can vote, but such votings have no actual power. Only Security Council resolutions do.
So until both sides are interested in a truce, these types of proposals should be seen as more political in nature. A way for nations to signal their stance on issues.
What do all parasites want?
[sup]— Gareth Jones · Reuters · May 30, 2023[/sup]
Give it up, Lavrov. Still not working. What will the Kenyans take away?
Russia's Lavrov says Kremlin drone incident was 'hostile act'
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · May 5, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine minister in 'disbelief' at closed Kyiv bomb shelters
[sup]— Dan Peleschuk, Nick Macfie · Reuters · Jun 4, 2023[/sup]
Maybe Lavrov comes from a parallel universe (cf Bondarev). A bit comedic if not for the :fire:.
[sup]— Sabine Siebold, Charlotte Van Campenhout, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 5, 2023[/sup]
Makes it sound like the aid also is part of preparations for Ukraine to join NATO, not just immediate defense.
"Moreover, if Bakhmut was Ukraine's 'last stand', then Russian strategy since its taking would be completely absurd: instead of pushing forward, they went back to lick their wounds, squandering any advantage they might have."
In the absence of overwhelming support from the local population, the occupation of a hostile territory by a military force may be achieved, but sustaining that occupation becomes a formidable challenge. This timeless lesson was vividly reinforced a mere 18 months ago with the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. It is also worth noting that the conquest of enemy territory, while historically significant, was not an essential feature of the cold war. The ramifications of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine extend far beyond its geographical confines, permeating multiple global dimensions of paramount importance.
Merely considering the modest territorial gains Russia has attained on the eastern fringes of Ukraine obscures the profound transformation in Russia's economic prospects. The Eurasian expanse has witnessed a remarkable tapestry of trade alliances and investments involving Russia and its eastern neighbours; colossal joint ventures encompass the expansion of rail and road networks, the escavation of harbours, and the construction of pipelines that span the vast Euro-Asian continent, reaching as far as Vladivostok. Notably, for the first time in history, these initiatives unfold independent of the influence and oversight of either EU member states or the United States.
To put it succinctly, the attempts by the US and the EU countries to isolate Russia from the global community have backfired. Countries from Africa, South America, and the Euro-Asian continent, though often quietly, are progressively and openly challenging the policies dictated by the US and the EU. Western political leaders have revealed a disconcerting disconnect from reality, their inherent hubris rendering them oblivious to their own fallibility. Accustomed to exerting influence and power over others, they believe their actions to be consistently well-intentioned, freedom-loving, compassionate, and just, while perceiving the rest of the world as less developed and impoverished solely due to their divergence from Western ideals.
But every action, including progress itself, begets both positive and negative outcomes. Until a few decades ago, despite the numerous missteps of the Western world, it could be argued that our technological and cultural influence on a global scale propelled humanity towards a brighter future. However, the equilibrium has dramatically shifted. Technological advancements continue unabated, but our cultural fabric has deteriorated into a kind tragicomedy. We find ourselves detached from reality, perhaps a consequence of decades of unprecedented abundance, or perhaps not. What remains indisputable is the hollowness of our democratic systems, values, and institutions, now reduced to theatrical rituals.
Western critics are not celebrating the ascendancy of Russia or China. Rather, they stand astonished at the erosion of Western culture, thought, and ethics. Our actions, not our words, reveal our values. Once, like China today, the West was driven by the pragmatic pursuit of building and progress, guided by an ethical compass oriented toward improving the human condition. Yet, now we speak grandly of these values while our deeds betray them. We prioritize the trivial and the irrational, elevating them to prominence, while crucial matters go unaddressed or unspoken.
We find ourselves indebted to the generations before us for the privileges we enjoy, yet we, like spoiled children, fail to appreciate our inheritance. Our problems—economic, social, health-related, mental health, justice, geopolitical, poverty, inequity, and beyond—are products of our self-indulgence.
If the diagnosis is clear, so too is the remedy.
Russia's actions, whether right or wrong, can be understood within the context of a nation perceiving its security to be under threat. While many non-Western countries strive for a roadmap to peace between Russia and Ukraine, it is the Western world that zealously adds fuel to the conflict, embroiling itself in a precarious dance with a nuclear superpower.
In the process, just as the cause of the destruction of the nordstream pipeline remains a mystery, so have we become an enigma to ourselves, lost within labyrinthine of our lies . Meanwhile, the best of what once defined us languishes forgotten and forsaken in the dark confines at Belmarsh prison, in the once-great city of London.
That is why I will reply to this one shortly: it is equally factually incorrect. Russia's economic prospects are rather bleak. While its output in energy resources in volume is close to pre-war levels, the income from their export is down by 45%. Given that before the war it accounted for almost half of the federal budget, it is a significant loss. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the federal spending is higher by about 30% (due to the costs of this unnecessary war). It is enough to say that Russia's deficit has reach its projected annual value in three months. Russia is not ascending, it is deteriorating. It did not start with the war, but it certainly has accelerated that process.
And the talk of the loss of values in the West is rather hypocritical, given the 'values' of Russia's allies. It is not a coincidence that they are all authoritarian states.
These are an impressive set of numbers for a country about to collapse under the weight of the Empire's unanimous enmity. All the more so when you consider the volume of money sent to prop up Ukraine, the training of their troops for the last 18 months, the elite NATO advisers, the volunteer mercenaries, the most advance detection systems, the equipment and ammunition stores depleted from Western Europe.
But all of that is but a drop in the ocean compared to the creative choreography directed at portraying a heroic Zelensky and an innocent Ukraine valiantly defying and outsmarting those Russian villains who strangely resemble the vilest of humanity as portrayed by Hollywood films for the last 20 years.
Russia's inflation rate is not only only lower, but multiple levels lower than either the USA or the EU: Russia 2.5% USA 5% plus EU 8% plus
https://www.statista.com/statistics/276323/monthly-inflation-rate-in-russia/
GDP growth -2.1% (2022) 0.7% (2023f) 1.3% (2024f)
Russia’s significant trade surplus of over US$ 330 billion. Despite western Ukraine-related sanctions, Russia’s exports surged by nearly 20% in 2022.
Much of the trade surplus is driven by grain exports. Russia produces almost 12% of the world’s wheat, all non-GMO. Total world wheat production for this period is estimated at about 781 million tons.
The combined BRICS-plus Iran output is almost half of global production. That of China (18%), India (13%), and Russia (12%), account for a combined 43% of total world production. Almost half of one of the world’s key food staples is produced by just three BRICS countries.
Food leverage is not in Western hands.
Russia’s overall trade increased by 8.1% in 2022 over 2021, to US$ 850.5 billion equivalent. The bulk of Russia’s exports were energy products, gas and petrol, amounting to about two thirds of all exports, US$ 384 billion equivalent.
This is an almost 43% annual increase despite western sanctions
And it's currency reserves have been restored to pre-war levels.
Having said all that, if I was the Russians I would be very very nervous because, in the immortal words from the opening scene in Patton : "Americans are winners, we hate to lose and love to win" And in this instance winning is going to require something from left field.
Democracies seem decadent, weak, corrupt and verge of collapse to the authoritarian. And, of course, they are also homosexual and are against traditional values, which the authoritarian regimes often declare to be the sole defenders of. It was so in the 1930's and it is so now.
Yes, the official inflation rate is low. The question is, given the current deficit and reserve spending (like 35 bln $ spent from reserves on the National Welfare Fund in January), how long it will last. Similarly, given the situation, any predictions concerning the GDP are rather hypothetical.
Quoting yebiga
In 2021 foodstuff exports accounted for less than 10% of total Russian exports. Compared to income from oil and gas it is pretty negligible. If it has a bigger share now (I cannot find the data), it is not because it is doing so well, but because its other exports fell so much. And the trade surplus in 2022 resulted mostly from ban of imports from the West; exports could not be banned as quickly, as they had to find new suppliers. But now the trend is clearly reversed and Russia is losing both; here is the current graph concerning the trade with the EU:
The fact is that Russia has lost its best customers.
And not just the Russians.
The US empire spanned the whole globe, and it's unlikely the Americans will let it crumble without a fight. The key question is where that fight is going to take place, since it seems the US is already weak to a degree that it cannot fight on all fronts.
In my view, it won't be in Ukraine, since the United States shows no real commitment to a Ukrainian victory. Besides, Ukraine holds no direct strategic value for the United States, and its involvement there has more to do with attempts at hamstringing the Russians, which already seem to have failed.
Then there's the Persian Gulf - the most important geopolitical area to the US, outside of the American mainland. Again, no sign of a reaction from the US while the area completely seems to slip from its grasp, into the hands of its former adversaries and geopolitical rivals. This is perhaps most shocking of all, and way more significant than anything that happens in Ukraine from a geopolitical point of view.
The only place where the American sphere seems more or less intact is the Pacific, and with China being the real peer competitor to the US (not the Russians or the Iranians, etc.), this is where I believe the US will make its stand.
However, in typical fashion the Chinese are biding their time, essentially waiting for the US to weaken further, as it's unable to commit to other threats to its sphere in fear of losing its grasp over the Pacific.
In an ironic twist the Americans' trump card - Taiwan - seems to have turned into its achilles heel, basically requiring constant attention under threat of a Chinese invasion, disallowing them from turning their attention to other flashpoints.
This was a targeted strike designed to wash all the nazi's away.
That graph has the unique attributes of being both correct and irrelevant. Much, if not quite all, Russian resources continue to reach the EU via third party countries. The really significant difference is that the Europeans are paying more for the same resources to pay for the additional layers of middle men and shipping.
But even if that were not the case, the EU and the USA is not the world. It is merely 12% of the world's population. There are new market opportunities for Russia. India is 17% of the world's population. China is another 17% and China has every reason to shift its trading relationship in Russia's favour - as has already happened during this period..
Humans can live without Prada Bags, French Champagne and German Cars. It is more difficult to live without fuel for your transportation systems, very uncomfortable without heating and impossible without food.
The Russian population is barely 2% of the world, but its borders constitute 20% of the world's land mass. Only chronic indolence, corruption, and incompetence can explain why a country possessing this fundamental advantage would be incapable of sustaining a robust economy. Those three attributes have riddled Russia throughout its history. But not only have those riches not gone away but with the advance of technology there are even more unparalleled stretches of previously inaccessible and unexploited territory beckoning.
The popular Western description echoing that Russia is a gas station impersonating a country is entirely a product of envy. And it is the manifestation of this envy, not Ukraine sovereignty, that drives this conflict.
Do you really think that westerners, particularly Americans, envy Russia?
In the absence of a critical media that challenges the policies of the government, the average distracted citizen, in any given land, becomes a vessel of prescribed thoughts. Western perceptions of Russia, tainted by decades of motion pictures portraying Russians as routine villains, infect the collective consciousness. The consistent messaging is of villainous acts—poisonings, bombings, and the like.
What truly matters lies in the minds of decision-makers and influencers in Washington and Brussels—the architects of policy. The leaders of industry, the projected economic indicators for the next 10, 20, or 30 years. The subsequent policies formulated in think tanks, the ensuing fears informing the neo-conservatives policies, and the envy of multinational energy companies who stare begrudgingly across the eurasian steppes.
There is a news report from the year 2015 —where the Secretary of State, then aspiring to the Presidency, Hillary Clinton, publicly bemoans the supposed injustice of Russia's possession of vast untapped resources. While it may be conceivable, it is highly unlikely that someone in her position would spontaneously make such an observation without the guidance of expert assessment.
Agree!
we maybe able to outline the general trends but how this plays out is not clear me. A myriad of unpredictable twists and turns are likely before a new multi-polar world settles down. The one thing we can say for certain is that Fukuyama's End of History is postponed.
America, of course, is thrilled to be fighting this proxy war. But that doesn't make it wrong. For once in America's recent history, it's realpolitik goals and the morality of the situation happen to intersect: helping the Ukrainians is the right thing to do.
The Americans played a principal role in causing this war. They have no moral high ground to speak of.
The really significant difference is that the middle men are pocketing the lion's share of the profits, so Russia is getting paid much less. And it is much less important how big are the countries you are trading with, but whether they have the money. India and China are paying for the resources half of what Russians got from the West - that is the significant difference. Especially that neither India nor China want Russia to get much stronger - they are using the opportunity to squeeze Russia, not to help it.
Quoting yebiga
Is that what you think Russians has imported from the West? Do you realize that not a single modern train junction in Russia (and railway is the backbone of Russian transportation) was built without German technology? Do you realize that not a single oil well works without Swedish, German or American solutions? Did you know that over 70% of Russian civilian aircraft was made in the West and the rest has Western parts, so already part of the fleet had to be cannibalized for spare parts? Even the carmaking industry cannot keep up the (already lowered) production. And these technologies cannot be simply smuggled in or imported through a third country. Without Western engineers they would still be worthless.
Quoting yebiga
The whole tragedy of Russia is caused by this exact thinking. Its rulers still think they are an empire because they have the sq kilometers. But in today's world area is not worth much (ask Canadians) - you are only as strong as your economy is. And Russia's trails behind Italy, this year it has barely made the first ten, but it does not seem it will stay there for long. That is the very source of Russia's resentment - it does not count that much anymore. That is the major reason for its imperialistic tendencies and that is one of the reasons for the war. If you do not believe me, just watch Russian TV (Russian Media Monitor is an excellent source) - they are stating exactly that precisely and straightforwardly. They do not care for the fate of oridinary Russians - they just want their country 'big'.
Quoting yebiga
Funny one! Wait, you are serious? The West is envious of Russia? The West mostly does not care about Russia, it is not significant enough. It is Russia that had a Western complex for a long time. In Tolstoy the nobility were practically bilingual, as they spoke French to each other. They called St Petersburg 'Paris of the North', I do not recall anyone calling Paris 'St Petersburg of the West'... And it has not changed a bit - most Russian oligarchs have houses in the West, Solovyov, the chief defender of the Russian values, cries live over the loss of his Italian villas, his purported children, along with children of Peskov, Shoigu, Lavrov and other 'kids of the Kremlin' are also enjoying their lives in the West. That is why they were so outraged at the restrictions... When the Western elites were banned from going to Sochi, they took it in stride. Envy? I do not think so.
I remember this bothering Streetlight X, the US getting off now because the actions of Putin are so clear obvious.
Present Russia is a prime example of a country where it's leaders are so seduced about it's imagined greatness they will ruin everything absolutely everything.
Yeah, I haven't seen some of the quislings around lately.
Ironically, this describes Washington equally well.
I'd just like to point out how absolutely pivotal a piece of information like this (that has been public knowledge for a while) is to deciphering the actual goings-on vis-à-vis Ukraine.
For many months now I have defended the position (leaning quite often on Mearsheimer's arguments, I will admit) that the Russians never intended to take over all of Ukraine with their initial invasion.
Unless someone wants to argue the 190,000 figure is false, we can essentially dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war. I hope people realise that.
There is no "entire western narrative". There are different narratives. One is yours. There are others though that still differ from the narrative you support or reject.
The plan was to take Kiev, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odessa, possibly Dnipro. If it suceeded, there would be little to no resistance, as the entire government structure would collapse (with Lviv being the only remaining bigger center). Ukrainians would have no choice but to accept peace on very unfavorable terms, most likely with puppet Russian government installed. How exactly does that 'dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war'?
The dismissal happens when I measure your narrative to the 190,000 figure, and conclude that there is no way a 190,000 troops could have achieved the goals you purport the Russians had.
In fact, had the Russians intended to take and hold Kiev, 190,000 troops would barely be able to achieve just that, assuming 60,000 Ukrainian defenders (which is roughly what sources seem to agree on).
And they would have been able to achieve nothing else.
However, we know only ~20,000 Russsian troops participated in the Battle of Kiev.
You see a discrepancy here?
Notice that "the entire Western narrative" that Tzeentch seems to argue against is "Russians intended to take over all of Ukraine with their initial invasion" with 190K troops.
There's a strategic element to it as well, where the West might've been persuaded to the negotiating table upon Kiev being threatened. That's in fact what happened in the early stage of the war, but the US blocked negotiations.
A shame, because back then purportedly a peace agreement lay on the table that kept Ukraine almost entirely intact in terms of territory.
Lol.
That's on another timeline. And at least in the English speaking World there's an example of how to lose your Empire with reasonable dignity and without a revolution.
First you need to have the ability to laugh at your own imperialism. Monty Python showed the way:
I assume the 19th Century Briton wouldn't be amused about this Queen Victoria Handicap skit.
It was not a diversion, it was a botched attack. The Russians did not expect such resistance and their logistics completely failed.
Yes, because it was to be ruled by Ukrainian Quislings preferable to Moscow. And because it was going to be a short war. The main objective has been to get Novorossiya into Russia. That nearly came to be, except the collapse of the Ukrainian army. And the strategic strike into Kyiv was again a great plan on paper. Assuming that Ukrainians wouldn't fight back. But why would they?
How many troops did Putin need to take Crimea? I guess 30 000. And then from the Ukrainian forces over 9000 military defected to Russia, including the head of the Ukrainian Navy, and thousands of other officials also. That obviously makes quite easy for a gambler like Putin to take another roll of the dice.
Besides, you didn't noticed that the people in the Russian Intel responsible for Ukraine prior to the war war were sacked? I wonder why that happened if what happened was all planned.
Sorry. but it can't be put in any other way.
It's pretty obvious that the Russians in terms of territory aimed for south eastern Ukraine. However, admitting as much would mean admitting the Russians may have achieved some sort of victory, which is of course anathema in western media.
I prefer your sense of humor over your interpretation of the facts.
The aims of the 'special operation' were clearly stated by Putin at its beginning. Russia has failed to achieve any of them. Sure, occupying some land may be seen as a consolation prize, but it is rather obvious that was not the actual goal of the campaign.
On 26.02.2022 RIA Novosti (press agency/main Russian propaganda machine) has run an article by Petr Akopov, one of its main propagandist. In it he praises 'the New Order' which Russia has achieved by 'returning Ukraine to Russia'. It seems it was prepared in advance and was supposed to be run when Russia easily takes Ukraine. Of course, that did not happen and the article was quickly withdrawn, however, some sites, like the Wayback Machine, managed to save it. It is worth reading, as it shows quite clearly what Russia wanted to achieve in Ukraine:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220226051154/https://ria.ru/20220226/rossiya-1775162336.html
Something on the same lines:
Quoting Tzeentch
To assume that the fight of Hostomel/Antonov Airport and the whole fight for Kyiv was a distraction is a laughable fantasy. Sorry, but it can't be put in any other way.
- First of all, where do you get the number 20,000? Russian forces deployed to the Kyiv front were about 70 000 and they were confronted by 20,000 Ukrainian army and perhaps 18,000 irregulars. That's still an advantage. With several crack Airborne units committed to the attack and the largest air mobile operation tried to be implemented. Basically you have several armies attacking into the direction of Kyiv.
- Attacking Kyiv and the Kyiv operations area was one of the concentrations of Russian forces pushing into Ukraine. That somehow it wasn't is laughable. Do note that the taking of Kharkiv didn't either happen. Was then that a fake too?
- If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. And have them on the Ukrainian-Belarussian border would have forced to Ukraine to have forces to defend Kyiv. Yet that didn't happen. And when the where withdrawn, these units had suffered high losses.
It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.
31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.
Do you know what you gave as your reference? Just look at what the ISW issue says:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2022!
It's been done the same month! The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! Just started. Quite good intel if you have good insight on the attacking formation in a couple of days.
How about something done perhaps with little more hindsight (from November 2022): RUSI: Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
And this wouldn't be the only reference. I could have several Finnish Military studies saying basically the same issues and other and going deeper in just what these groups of forces consisted. The operational objectives are quite clear and obvious now in hindsight.
And those who are curious just were the "Z" came from (continued RUSI article):
The Southern MD has been seeing most of the fighting in the near history (Russo-Georgian war and earlier the Chechen wars), hence it seems to have been the best Russia MD as it gained it's primary objectives.
What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on").
Anyway, your source provides nothing in the way of troop counts, so I'm not sure what you believe it proves.
Quoting ssu
Sources, or no bueno.
There's a fair amount of critique of the US, coming from the US, documentaries, movies, interviews, whatever. Some were posted in the thread.
Quoting Jabberwock
Might be the other way around? Or is that politically incorrect to say?
Quoting neomac
For some reason, this doesn't really seem that surprising. (Ukrainian Floating Operatives.)
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting ssu
I'm experiencing déjà vu. :)
Wrong. Trying to misrepresent what I said is silly. I said "To assume that the fight of Hostomel/Antonov Airport and the whole fight for Kyiv". Notice the word and.
Besides @Tzeentch, it is you who is referring to a document given two days after the attack to claim how much there were troops of a battle that went at least to April, the next month.
Quoting Tzeentch
Oh right, you don't believe that Russia has experienced any meaningful losses.
Quoting Tzeentch
Why don't you start with your own. Like try to give some credibility to your argument that how RUSI among military observers are wrong when they state "The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv."
Who needs strategic surprise when the target is a weak state that is artificial?
How can a report done in February tell about facts that happened in April? :chin:
Just at first answer that.
Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. And they show just how wrong the Russians were right from the start:
The reason why columns of armour were destroyed is that basically Russians were trying something similar to the US invasion of Iraq or more likely, their most successful military operation post WW2 operation, Operation Danube.
'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.
Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.
The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.
Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.
This is the number engaged on 26th of February, which does not comprise the whole northern force. As you seem to accept Wikipedia as credible, here is the article on the whole northern campaign:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyiv_offensive_(2022)
It gives the number of the Russian troops involved in the northern campaign at 70 thousand (and defenders at less than 40 thousand, half of it irregulars, which seems a bit less than your 60). So your claim is basically that Russia has committed one third of its troops in Ukraine to a 'diversion'.
The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.
That of course doesn't add up.
If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.
One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.
We saw nothing of the sort.
Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.
Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.
As for the massive casualties - Russians were not massacred in the north, their offensive stalled mostly to unexpected resistance and catastrophic logistics. They expected a blitz and failed. They stood in a column for a week, a fine diversionary maneuver... The majority of the troops was not even close to the battle.
A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.
Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.
A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.
Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.
Ok, now you're just trolling.
First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ) a that two of the main groups attacking Kyiv were doing some kind of faint. Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states:
Quoting Tzeentch
Operation Danube didn't see more casualties and intense fighting, but did see large columns of tanks suddenly on the streets of the target Capital after a rapid drive from the border. Great military operation.
Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians.
I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.
But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:
- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.
Quoting ssu
As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.
Quoting ssu
You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.
But obviously Russians DID try to commit more forces, that is why they moved their 60 km column. The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. In a hit-and-run operation such move would make even less sense.
Quoting Tzeentch
In general, columns standing idly without fuel do not engage in intense fighting. They were lucky that Ukrainians were spread so thin that they could not move on them (and that their airforce was suppressed), otherwise they would all be massacred.
Quoting Tzeentch
No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. It is even more absurd if you take the actual order of the battle – beside the 30 BTGs committed in the North there were 15 BTGs in the Kharkiv direction, 4 in Sumy and about 4 as a general reserve for the northern axis. That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive.
And again, the progress of the northern campaign has no indications of a successful hit-and-run attack, it has all indications of a failed effort.
Quoting Tzeentch
So now you are claiming that the 'diversion' at Kiev was meant to reach an agreement where Russia would willingly give up what you claim were its aims in the war, i.e. the territorial gains. That would actually mean its defeat, right?
I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?
Quoting Jabberwock
I'm hypothesizing.
I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.
No, it does not, for the reasons I have already explained and which you are not even trying to engage. Do you believe that getting 15 thousand troops in a column, keeping them immobile for a few days and then withdrawing them was planned?
Quoting Tzeentch
They took some land, but the goals of the war were not achieved. It is a matter of interpretation how much success is that.
Quoting Tzeentch
I have tracked them as they happened. I was just pointing out that the source you have provided contradicts your previous claims.
I think the primary goal of the invasion was safeguarding a land bridge to Crimea. However, neither me nor you know what the actual Russian goals are/were.
Western media have tried hard to spread a narrative that the Russians were essentially hoping to take over all of Ukraine. Of course, given such a narrative it is easy to frame the Russian operations as a massive failure.
However, scholars such as Mearsheimer underline that given the 190,000 troops that participated in the initial invasion, the Russian goals must have been limited. Mearsheimer doesn't rule out the possibility that the operations in the north were meant to threaten (and not capture) either.
Seymour Hersh in one of his interviews states directly Kiev was a feint, and the number of Ukrainian defenders in and around Kiev he puts on 60,000. With that, we arrive at a whopping 180,000 troops necessary to reach a bare minimum of a 3:1 advantage with which the Russian could go on the offensive.
Instead, we see 21,000.
There is literally no way these numbers could be interpreted to support your view.
We could halve the number of Ukrainian defenders to 30,000, and double the Russian troops to 40,000, and we wouldn't come close to numbers with which the Russians could realistically take Kiev.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's perfectly possible for a military operation to have multiple purposes, so I'm not sure where you're getting this idea.
You were already given many clues what their aims might be: Putin's speech, claims of propagandists, the order of the battle etc. You just ignore them. They have committed 40 BTGs out of 100 for what you claim was their primary goal. Militarily that makes zero sense.
Quoting Tzeentch
Your numbers simply don't add up at all. One third of the BTGs were committed to the northern axis, so if it was 20 thousands (with 15 thousands in a single column!), that would make the total invasion force just 60 thousands. On the other hand, if the total force was 190 000 troops, then one third on the northern axis would be 60 thousands, which is about what Wikipedia claims. So which is it?
And I see you conveniently decided not to answer the question: how exactly forming a 60 km immobile column works as a feint? Was it planned or not?
Quoting Tzeentch
Your source claimed that Russians were ready to give up the land bridge to Crimea which you claim was the primary goal of the invasion. That basically means that your source claims that Russians were ready to surrender their primary goals. Why would they need 'threatening Kiev' for that?
That's rather ironic, considering the Russian order of battle included no more than 190,000 troops, making the notion that the Russians had large territorial goals something that can be dismissed outright.
Quoting Jabberwock
We don't know that. That's an assumption that you seem to keep hinging on, so you're questioning your own assumption here, and not mine.
Quoting Jabberwock
How should I know?
The question is irrelevant as to what the Russian goals might've been. Columns will be found during any large-scale military operation. Mistakes will be made and losses will be incurred regardless of the Russian goals. That's inherent to military operations.
Quoting Jabberwock
If you take half a second to think about what you just wrote, you'll understand why this isn't contradictory at all.
Quoting Jabberwock
To negotiate you need bargaining chips. Kind of obvious.
Nobody claims that they had large territorial goals - they were supposed to take the capital and major cities - every move they made confirms that. They counted on the lack of resistance and political inertia of the Ukrainian government, exactly as it was in Crimea.
Quoting Tzeentch
Let me see:
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
You have given the number at least three times. I suppose that if you knew how many BTGs there were in total, you would rather not.
Wikipedia estimates the total number at about 80:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_battle_for_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
Guardian estimated it as 93:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-ukraine-crisis-putin-troops-visual-guide-explainer
The biggest figure I could find is 117 from some Polish analytic group:
https://defence24.com/armed-forces/land-forces/russia-losing-22-battalion-tactical-groups-is-btg-a-myth-or-is-it-truly-effective-in-combat-analysis
So yes, I would say I have a pretty good support for my claim - three quotes from you that the northern axis had 30 BTGs and three independent sources claiming the total was about 100. Your math is totally off.
Quoting Tzeentch
No, you do not find 60 km columns stalled without fuel and resources for days in the enemy territory during any large-scale military operation. And in those which that happened, they were not part of a successful operation, but rather a major disaster. And the question is essential, because so obviously it was a mess-up of such embarassing proportions that it negates any claim of a successfully executed feint. You do not feint an attack by endangering 15 thousand troops... The column was obviously going somewhere – it was supposed to support the blitz and mop up the remaining forces. Except the blitz did not happen, as the campaign stalled. You just choose to ignore the reality of what has actually happened.
Quoting Tzeentch
Lol.
Quoting Tzeentch
You do not need bargaining chips to negotiate your defeat.
Sure. The 21,000 (31 BTGs) figure is pretty solid.
The 190,000 as an upper limit for how many soldiers the Russians field is too.
Those are the numbers I've used.
Your math with how many BTGs the Russians supposedly fielded and what percentage the 31 BTGs participating in the invasion is part of your argument, and not mine. So I'm not sure why you're trying to accuse me of inconsistencies in an argument you are making.
This is strawmanning at its worst.
Quoting Jabberwock
Taking Kiev with the numbers the Russians fielded was unfeasible, no matter how you twist the numbers. That's the reality you're ignoring.
All you have is 21,000 troops marching on Kiev.
Quoting Jabberwock
This is why I told you to look up information about the peace negotiations.
The Russians were bargaining to keep Ukraine out of NATO, and under those circumstances the land bridge to Crimea could be given up.
There's nothing inconsistent about that.
If 31 BTGs = 21 000 is pretty solid, then 1 BTG = is about 670 is also pretty solid. We can learn that, if we use division on those very numbers:
21000/31= 677,41
(The link is supposedly quite reliable).
If 1 BTG is 670 is solid (I round up to avoid fractioning of soldiers), then 100 BTGs (the estimated number of BTGs based on three sources) = 67000 is pretty solid, we know it from the same, reliable source:
100 * 670 = 67000
If your numbers are solid, as you say, then Russians put out in the whole of Ukraine as many people as you say were defenders of Kiev. That would not be even absurd, but simply insane.
On the other hand, if 190000 is your claimed upper limit, then:
190000/100=1900
so one BTG would be 1900 people, not 670. That means that your number is not 'pretty solid', it is completely wrong.
Similarly, if:
1 BTG = 670 people (YOUR CLAIM)
190000 total troops (YOUR CLAIM)
190000 / 670 = 283 - that is how many BTGs Russia should have in the beginning of the invasion according to your 'solid numbers'. I have given three sources which show that was not the case. If you believe that my sources are wrong, give three that claim Russians had nearly 300 BTGs in the Ukraine in the beginning of the conflict.
Of course, I might be wrong, feel free to correct my calculations.
Quoting Tzeentch
Your claim was that the bridge of Crimea was the primary goal of Russia in the war. Now you also claim that in the negotiations Russians would accept Ukraine out of NATO, but it would lose the bridge. Therefore, it would NOT reach your stated primary goal of the war, which is exactly what I wrote. I believe there is a name for not achieving your primary goals in a war and it is not 'victory'.
Anyway, the 190,000 figure is provided by Mearsheimer as the upper limit of troops the Russians deployed at the start of the invasion. I don't think that number is actually being seriously disputed, and I take Mearsheimer quite seriously.
I think it's more llkely there's something lacking in your logic, and not in his.
Quoting Jabberwock
The land bridge with Crimea was Russia's primary goal if negotiations failed. There, are you happy now?
:) Yes, that is a quite reasonable conclusion for BTGs, given that their logistics is pretty basic and they need to rely in their tasks on other forces, such as aviation, heavy artillery, deep support etc., i.e. they are not self-sustaining by any degree. But wait, your whole claim for the 21000 attacking Kiev was supported by the calculation based on that inaccurate assumption... So, again, simple mathematical puzzle: if the indisputed Mearsheimer says it was 190000 troops, other sources say that this force included about 100 BTGs, then what part of the 190000 troops were in the north, if 31 BTGs were involved?
Quoting Tzeentch
So we agree that before the negotiations failed (and even started), i.e. before the beginning of the war, their goals were different. If the goals were different, then the invasion force would seek to achieve a goal different than just grabbing the land bridge. Well, yes, we told you so.
And sure, you can 'win' the war, if you change your goals to those which you have already achieved.
Evil.
Ehm, no.
This was in reply to your claim that 190,000 troops would translate into 283 BTGs.
The confusion lies primarily with you.
Quoting Jabberwock
Taking the land bridge would obviously still be of vital importance, because the negotiations failing was a clear possibility from the start.
So what is the source of the 21 thousand troops in the northern campaign OTHER than multiplying 31 BTGs by about 700? Because that one does not work, as we now know thanks to your illumination that all Russian troops might not have been directly organized in the BTGs. And you have not answered the question: if using 100 BTGs involves use of the indisputable 190 000 troops, then how much troops are involved when 31 BTGs are involved? With your apparent difficulties, let me do the math for you again:
100 BTGs involves 190000 troops: 190000/100 = 1900, therefore 1 BTG involves about 1900 troops
31 BTGs: 31 * 1900 = 58900 = that many troops were involved in the northern campaign
Quoting Tzeentch
'If I lose, my primary goal is...'. Nope, it still does not work that way.
In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? Moved to defend the east? Half go east, half stay to defend if also to be attacked there (north/Kyiv)? Stay put? What difference (if any), would it have made to the south/eastern parts of the invasion?
Each could be tediously analyzed and some implications drawn, while supposing that the Russian generals/strategists were informed/competent or not.
Animated gifs (somewhat large image files, so not going to attach):
• Phase 1, Feb 24 — Apr 7
• Phase 2, Apr 7 — Sep 5
• Phase 3, Sep 5 — Nov 11
That depends on where the Russians would be. With todays means of intelligence you cannot have a large grouping of forces without the enemy being aware of it. If there were no Russians in the north, most of the defending forces around Kiev could be moved south. Especially that Ukrainians do not need to move far - for Russians to go from north to south and the other way round requires going 'around' Ukraine.
There are some indications that the initial invasion was planned as Tzeentch claims: only in the south, in order to get the corridor to Crimea and (possibly) Transnistria, maybe up to Zaporozhnia. The operation in the south was certainly much better prepared and planned. Possibly due to inadequate intelligence at a later stage Putin became convinced that they will be able to take Kiev and depose the authorities, so they tried, with catastrophic results. If they stuck to the plan, the campaign might go much better for Russians, even with the Ukrainian forces relieved from the north. Possibly the international reaction might have been different as well - slicing off the pieces of Ukraine might be viewed differently than an 'all-out' war.
The amount of BTGs involved in Ukraine is entirely part of your argument.
My argument is that we have information showing 21,000 (numbers ranging between 15,000 - 30,000 depending on different reports) troops moved on Kiev. (and 190,000 troops maximum operating in Ukraine at the onset of the invasion).
That's from where I draw my conclusions.
All this math and mental gymnastics you're doing is you not being able to accept that 21,000 troops is all you have to work with and it's woefully insufficient for what you're claiming the Russians intended.
Stop pretending any of what you're spinning here is part of my argument.
This is quite hard to say (too many moving parts to make even an educated guess, in my view), but in a general sense if there had been no significant threat to Kiev, the Ukrainian defense would have been a lot denser, because there would have been less frontline to cover. This is generally seen as being in favor of the defender.
So now its hypotheticals. At least that is promising. :smirk:
Quoting Tzeentch
How about the fact that troops committed to a war aren't just made up, even in Russia, from battalion tactical groups, the maneuver units? Maneuver units are the spearhead of the fighting force, but behind there is all other supporting elements and supply.
Hence you have Armies attacking into Ukraine, which are created from several divisions which in turn form the needed BTCs. Hence it's rather naive talk of how much manpower and then look at size of the BTC. And anyway, as usual, this is totally besides the point.
The fact is that Russian Army and other parts of the armed forces concentrated nearly everything they could to the "special military operation" is totally obvious. The most obvious and irrefutable fact is that they had to perform a mobilization of reserves afterwards, when things didn't go as planned. And so is that two of main axis went after Kyiv and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint.
Understanding that Ukraine put up a fight, understanding the pre-attack intel was horrifically wrong, and above all the attack being got stuck with lots of losses, Russia withdrew it's forces from the Kyiv operations area to reinforce other fronts as a) Ukraine won't follow them to Belarus. This was no feint, what happened was a withdrawal.
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting Tzeentch
One hypothetical (as we are talking about hypotheticals now) would have been that Russia would only have attacked in Donbas and the war wouldn't have been about the de-nazification of Ukraine (regime change).
This clearly would have had an affect of the attack being on a lower escalatory ladder and likely would have produced a far weaker response from the West. If the Russian attack would have confided to the Donbas with the objective to gain all of the area and that landbridge to Ukraine, many could argue that this wouldn't be a major escalation. No attack towards Kyiv and Kharkiv. Above all, no regime change either. Ukraine, as it had done in 2014, would still have had to have reserves to defend it's Capitol from a possible attack. But now as it was an all-out attack on Ukraine with the objective of regime change, this obviously didn't happen.
Putin did have this possibility, but he went Kyiv.
No, we do not have that information. Your flawed argument is that 31 BTGs equal 21000 involved troops, because of your faulty assumptions. If you have information that only 20000-30000 troops were on the Kiev axis, please provide it. Repeating '31 BTGs' is NOT that information, because, as you have finally figured out, BTG basic composition does not comprise the totality of troops involved. So please, provide information that so many troops moved on to Kiev which is NOT '31 BTGs'.
I already have. Direct communications by the Ukrainian General Staff.
If you had anything better you would have provided it by now, so all of this is just posturing.
Come with sources, or spare yourself the effort of replying.
Quoting ssu
Essentially everything we talk about here is hypothetical, because hard facts are not available.
I hope this is nothing new for you.
Quoting ssu
Simply untrue.
Mearsheimer considers the possibility in one of his lectures which I have already linked here. Seymour Hersh states it outright in an interview which I have also linked.
But I suppose these are people without "the slightest understanding of how militaries work." Oddly they are also some of the few that go against the western propaganda narrative.
That's not a coincidence.
Quoting ssu
Even if we would assume everything you write here is true, it does nothing to discredit the feint theory.
No, you have not. The communications by the Ukrainian General Staff DOES NOT give the number of troops, only the number of BTGs. So you DO NOT have a source for your number. You conclude that it was 21000 troops based on your faulty assumptions.
And I have already provided sources: e.g. the Kiev Convoy itself had 15000 troops - and that is just reserve on one salient.
So, again: provide the information that only 20000-30000 troops moved on Kiev.
That, after all, worked to some degree in the original taking of Crimea and the 'independent' Republics.
Quoting Jabberwock
Things would have been very different if the Russians had been able to establish an air bridge to Hostumel/Antonov airport. The Russian paratroopers who survived were sent to trenches in eastern Ukraine. Proof of intention will have to wait until after the war is over and Russians talk about it. But the lack of airborne infantry attempts and their use as ditch diggers since that battle suggests a deep opportunity cost.
As has been demonstrated ad infinitum during these thousands of comments comprising the OP, the idea of a military feint is always linked to a particular theory that Russia was provoked into attacking Ukraine. This runs counter to the idea Russia planned to take the whole of the country under their control through proxies. If one removes that debate from the question, the movement toward Kyiv still was a terrible mistake. If they had advanced into Ukraine from Belarus to establish defensive lines as they did in the east, that would have pinned the forces to the northern front more effectively than joy-riding tanks with no infantry support.
So, the debate is stuck in which way the Russians were stupid in their planning. That is not a very compelling ground upon which to support theories. Hopefully, the war will end soon, and we can get the words from the horse's mouth. Presuming, of course, that the horse has not been shot.
* * *
Quoting ssu
Quoting Tzeentch
Wrong again.
The given link here Mearsheimer SAYS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING LIKE THAT. Nothing. Nowhere in the 1h 33min lecture did he even touch the subject.
@Tzeentch, you have to understand that when you give as reference or say that someone has the same thing in mind, you simply have to have the ability to produce a direct quote or a copy-paste quote that people can see that they really think so. Here, just in case of @Jabberwock's and other counters, the references you point out don't say what you state them saying.
That Mearsheimer says that Russia doesn't want all the territory of Ukraine (which I do agree and have emphasized the Novorossiya part of Ukraine) is simply not the same as saying the two axis of Russian advance into Kyiv were a faint.
Learn how to use references or sources.
That's not the video I meant. By now I have dug up and shared these links so many times I can't be bothered to do so again, since none of you seem to take any of the contents to heart anyway.
If you want the information, it's all there in my posts. You use the forum search function to look them up.
I'm past putting any effort into educating you.
I think that's untrue.
The Russians went into Ukraine being outnumbered, even though military logic would dictate going on the offensive would require a sizable numerical advantage.
This is why the Russians ended up overextended, and retreated from the north in April 2022.
Forming a defensive line in the north and attempting to hold onto both the north and the east was probably unfeasible from the start. Forming a defensive line in the north would have also given away the fact that the Russians had no intention of taking Kiev, which would have severely decreased the strategic impact it might have had.
The feint theory assumes the Russians had a plan going into this, and thus it does not rely on the argument that the Russians were incompetent. That's why I think it is a lot more compelling.
If it was a feint, it was definitely planned. The same is true if it was not.
I don't see the logic of
Quoting Tzeentch
If Russia had started moving towards Kiev in the conservative fashion it advanced upon Kherson, for example, that would have pinned the forces needed for defending the city. I take the point that perhaps there were not enough resources for that to be sustained but Ukraine was not in a position to assume it was a bluff. Instead, the Russians attempted an incredibly risky airborne infantry move.
Leaving the reading of strategic intentions aside, stupid or not, the issue not touched upon in your analysis is that the airborne operation could have worked. A lot of marginal situations broke the Ukrainians way. Your thesis does not make sense of what success might have led to.
I don't see what's conservative about the way the Russians advanced into Kherson. They penetrated quite deeply, and seemed to have encountered very little resistance until they were counter-attacked.
The difference is that Kiev was heavily defended, which should have been entirely expected.
Quoting Paine
Quoting Paine
Quoting Paine
Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea.
The Russian force movements don't seem to imply they were preparing for a months-long battle either. In the north, huge swathes of land were bypassed and never cleared - something which would have been absolutely crucial in preperation for such a thing.
So you have the numbers? Great, can we see them?
That is how they roll. And they made the Ukrainian recapture of that ground very expensive.
Quoting Tzeentch
If they had advanced with solid logistical support instead of rolling the dice, retreat would not have meant a panicked withdrawal from the field. If the airborne operation had been successful, there would have been a Russian presence north of Kiev much longer than the ass grab of their retreat. To this degree, you are pinning a theory upon the goal of the operation to whether it failed or not, leaving no room for its possible success.
I am pretty sure that Russia would now give its left nut to have not gambled so recklessly. As in our argument about this last year, the lack of importance you assign to the airborne infantry is what keeps getting left out of your analysis of numbers of boots on the ground.
"Take that, damn tractor!" :fire: :rage: :death:
Video shows Russia blew up a tractor instead of tank
[sup]— Marshall Ritzel · Associated Press · Jun 8, 2023 · 1m:8s[/sup]
Lame excuse. You simply use the quote key and it's easy...
Besides, in the other videos you have referred to like this video Mearsheimer says himself that the limited objectives that Russia had was to take or threaten Kyiv. Mearsheimers only point has been that the force cannot occupy all Ukraine.
So your wrong.
Radio New Zealand investigates Russia-friendly editing of Ukraine articles
[sup]— Tess McClure, Luke Harding · The Guardian · Jun 9, 2023[/sup]
Ta-daa.
Chotiner: You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
Mearsheimer: No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.
Chotiner: I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.
Mearsheimer: No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?
Chotiner: As opposed to what?
Mearsheimer: As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
Ta-daa.
If anything, the lecture represents a more up-to-date representation of his views.
So I'm not sure what you think you have proven.
Mearsheimer himself tells you that one of the Russian goals was toppling the Ukrainian authorities and installing a puppet goverment, as I told you three days ago:
Quoting Jabberwock
So Mearsheimer expressly disagrees with you that the northern offensive was just meant to distract Ukrainians while Russians take the south. On the contrary, he agrees with me that it was essential for the the plan to install Russian-friendly authorities. Just taking land did not require Ukrainian surrender, toppling the government would.
Untrue.
As I have stated before, he expressly considers it a possibility that the Russians meant to threaten Kiev:
Quoting John J. Mearsheimer
What is untrue? I gave you a specific quote that Mearsheimer believed one of the Russian goals was to install Russian-friendly government, contrary to your claims. In the very quote you now give Mearsheimer says that Russian strategy was to capture or threaten Kiev, so apparently he believes capturing Kiev was viable. You claim that Russians never meant to capture Kiev and never had the means, Mearsheimer obviously disagrees with you.
He used the terms either / or.
Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.
And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry.
Yes, that was another point I wanted to make. A 'threat' is not necessarily a feint. When a bully says 'Give me your money or I will beat you up' it is a threat, but it is not necessarily a FAKE threat. When Americans nuked two Japanese cities, they have threatened Tokyo, but it was not a feint. On the contrary, Japanese surrendered, because the threat was very real.
If Russians have surrounded Kiev and said 'Give up or we will pound the city with artillery until nothing remains', it would be a threat, but it would not be a feint. They did not have to literally capture the whole city for Ukrainians to surrender.
Mearsheimer said that Russians wanted to topple the Ukrainian government. Explain how does that 'dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war'.
And I got you.
Nothing about the two major axis being feints as you declared to Mearsheimer to say.
If you quote somebody saying something, then this person has to say that thing. Nothing something that you can intrepret of being somewhat close or whatever to what you intend.
In fact the limited objectives Mearsheimer said, to take Kyiv or threaten it aren't feints. A feint is a is a maneuver designed to distract or mislead. That is different. You don't engage your best troops, do the most the largest airborne operation of the war, engage in a month long battle, suffer substantial losses, all to make a feint. There's absolutely no logic to it.
The only one calling it a feint is you. Not Mearsheimer and likely not anybody else.
And furthermore, you showed even better how confused you are:
Quoting Jabberwock
And that's what many have said. Yet installing that pro-Russian government, you have to do something about Kyiv. Try to take it, encircle it, perhaps hope that they follow the US proposal of flying to safety to the West. All that needs a military operation that isn't a feint.
So your confusion here is that you totally mix up what are the territorial objectives of Putin (and that's the territories of Novorossiya) and then military operation for installing that pro-Russian government (or the destruction of the rump state of Ukraine).
I guess what has been confirmed is that the modern equipment is in use now.
Yet not sure just how large this counteroffensive will be. The fact is that even if the assistance from the West is significant and is enough for Ukraine to defend from Russian assaults, but to take on Russia's entrenched defenses is another issue. Then you have to have that numerical advantage and superiority at least in the local level, which still is difficult for Ukraine.
It is a war of attrition now.
The same goes with "he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?"
The point is that "threaten" doesn't mean "feint" or "diversion". You are putting into Mearsheimer's mouth something he didn't say to obfuscate what he explicitly said. If you want hard numbers for the Russian troops, I want hard quotes of Mearsheimer's explicitly claiming that Kyiv battle was likely or possibly a diversion or a feint.
Me too.
This is a Philosophy Forum, so we do treat quoting somebody seriously.
I just cannot say "Well, Kant said the same thing too as I" if I really haven't got that exact quote from Kant. People won't take it as not important or as semantics.
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661130760978325505
[1]
"The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation".
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T
Moscow and Kyiv blame each other for disastrous dam collapse in southern Ukraine
[sup]— Susie Blann, Danica Kirka, Edith M Lederer · AP via PBS · Jun 6, 2023[/sup]
Russia opens investigation after Ukraine shells evacuation point, kills pregnant woman
[sup]— TASS · Jun 8, 2023[/sup]
Russia shells Ukrainian city inundated by dam collapse after Zelenskyy visit
[sup]— Vasilisa Stepanenko, Jamey Keaten, Illia Novikov, Joanna Kozlowska, Elise Morton, Yuras Karmanau, Hanna Arhirova, Edith M Lederer · AP · Jun 8, 2023[/sup]
Who blew up the Kakhovka dam? Here are the three theories
[sup]— Brad Dress · The Hill · Jun 11, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine's Zelenskiy: Work has started on international investigation of dam breach
[sup]— Ron Popeski, Marguerita Choy · Reuters · Jun 11, 2023[/sup]
Kherson flooding: Ukraine evacuation boat attacked by Russia, killing three
[sup]— Alys Davies, Paul Adams · BBC · Jun 11, 2023[/sup]
Goodie, let's have some external investigators (just don't get in the way of the defenders moving to kick the invaders out :smile:).
If the ICC finds either to blame, then they'll likely deny.
If Kyiv is found to blame, then they have to answer to those from which they're getting aid (civil, arms).
If the Kremlin is found to blame, then they won't care much.
I remember when the Yugoslav Civil war broke out, EU sent observers to observe "the cease-fire" dressed in white overalls. And then you had television footage of these white overalls running for their lives as they were fired upon.
The most likely culprit is of course Russia as it's totally logical for them to a) make the end of the Dnipro unpassable and b) then withdraw forces from there to plug the Ukrainian counterattack. The only thing now is that after WW2 blowing up dams has been a war crime. But obviously Russia doesn't give a damn. Or a dam.
* * *
Seems that three of the six Leopard 2 mine-clearing tanks that Finland gave to Ukraine have met their end. But in a war of attrition, you spend materiel. The side that is attacking will face losses, if it doesn't have superiority on the battlefield. Yet likely the counterattack will go on for weeks or for months.
[sup]— William Maclean · Reuters · Jun 12, 2023[/sup]
... has been implicitly confirmed by Russians anyway, no secret.
Definite answers about the MH17 tragedy may not be found, just a plausible consensus.
Chechen forces sign contract with Russia after Wagner’s refusal
[sup]— Al Jazeera · Jun 12, 2023[/sup]
Kadyrov's aspirations sort of coming to fruition?
Putin seems to stay silent on the Prigozhin-versus-Shoigu/defence-ministry thing.
Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative:
[tweet]https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1666203439146172419[/tweet]
Quoting World Socialist Website
Militarily, it's not actually clear which side this benefits or hurts more. Ukrainian army wasn't likely to attempt crossing the Dnipro river there, except for amphibious incursions, which the flooding does not affect. For that reason, the Russians didn't have many forces defending the left bank. The flooding destroyed their first lines of defense, which, in theory, would make the crossing easier for the Ukrainians after the waters recede. But the Russians still hold positions on higher ground, which would make a full-scale assault across a half-kilometer wide river very problematic.
Naturally, the Ukrainians had even less cause to fear Russian attacks in this area. Ever since their retreat from the right bank, all that the Russians could do - and continue doing - is conduct chaotic shelling of Kherson and other settlements in the area to terrorize and punish the remaining civilian population. They have no force left to conduct a large-scale assault anywhere, let alone in such a difficult place. Hell, it took them nine months, tons of ammunition and suicidal human wave assaults just to grind down one town of little strategic significance - and that was their only "success story" in half a year of war.
https://hungary.postsen.com/world/194486/Prigozhin-envisions-executions-and-revolution-and-according-to-him-victory-is-not-on-the-side-of-the-Russians.html
Unfortunately I don't have much time for the forum just right now ... but who's ramping up manufacturing to replace this material? Likewise, where will people get replaced from when Ukraine starts to run out of able bodies?
The premise that the war is attritional is almost exactly the same as the premise Ukraine cannot possibly win.
As I pointed out months and months ago, Ukrainian offensives will face all the same problems of Russian offensives (mines and ATGM's make it very difficult to advance) ... just with far less capabilities. Additional capabilities (overwhelming artillery, glide bombs, missiles of various kinds) are why Russia can advance at all.
Even more worryingly for Ukraine, there seems to be plenty of footage of both Russian helicopters and planes engaging vehicles over the front, which indicates Ukraine anti-air capabilities are significantly degraded (basically exactly what the leaked papers described).
To make matters even worse for Ukraine, it continues to fight with significant artillery disadvantage.
There is basically not a single metric in which Ukraine has an advantage that can compensate all the disadvantages (numbers, vehicles, air power, electronic warfare, missiles and anything else).
The Ukrainian offensives makes zero sense and is only happening because it is part of the media narrative that promised there would be an offensive. Lives are being spent basically to just prop up a delusional propaganda version of the world a little while longer.
Quoting World Socialist Website
Those apologetics don't make much sense (to me anyway).
Socialists sort of promoting nationalist authoritatian oppressive degenerative capitalist Kremlin...? :brow:
Maybe they are just proxies.
Even the mainstream Western media has thrown plenty of doubt on what caused the dam to collapse, mainly due to there being literally zero evidence and, more importantly, the Western media has got the memo to stop just repeating everything Ukraine says and start being critical (setting up the, if not resolution, then Western aid pullback).
As for the:
Quoting SophistiCat
Cui bono is literally the first thing any investigator asks themselves when confronted with literally any crime.
Doesn't mean who benefits is who did it, but it's clearly at least worth checking out.
You think a defence attorney has ever said in response to the evidence their client pocketed the insurance money ... "OMG, here we go, prosecutor playing the 'cui bono card', I rest my case."
Russia has long ceased to have any artillery advantage, with missiles it is clearly at a disadvantage - it has spent most of its stocks last year, now it is using mostly current production. Moreover, unlike the Western counterparts, they are too inaccurate to be used very effectively on the frontline. Ukraine still has enough HIMARS and now also Shadow Storms, which it uses quite well (just yesterday they killed Major General Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Field Army, at his headquarters, with an unknown number of his staff).
And the difference in the field is also rather important: all Ukrainians have to do to free Kherson and most of Zaporozhe is to cut the path to the sea - they do not even have to take Mariupol or Berdyansk. That is, they have 90 km to go (out of which they made 20). Sure, the main line will be tougher, there will be mines and defence lines, so losses are expected, but the situation still favors them. As the whole belt is within the range of Ukrainian missiles and some of its artillery, the Russian defence will lack significant depth.
Whether they will have enough momentum to go further into Crimea remains to be seen. Still, it will be their choice, as they will have the initiative. Not to mention that with the land bridge gone and Dzhankoi within missile range Russians will have a rather hard time with keeping Crimea supplied. If Ukraine somehow manage to repeat the attack on the Kerch Bridge, they will have a hard time – it will the reprise of the Kherson blockade, only on a much bigger scale.
EDIT: It seems that Goryachev was killed with a HIMARS strike, which is even worse for Russians, as Ukrainians have more of them and apparently they can strike whatever they want within the land bridge.
This is simply pure invention. We didn't know Russia's stock before before, during nor now.
What we do seem to know is Russia fires significantly more shells than Ukraine. I've not seen that disputed anywhere, except your comment here being the very first time.
Quoting Jabberwock
First, dumb shells can be very accurate even in adverse conditions and pencil and paper calculations. I've seen this done first hand. It's just math and skill (of everyone involved). Self propelled artillery with everything done by computer can be quite reliable and keep in mind that every observed hit is data for recalibrating things.
Second, a large part of the tactical use of artillery is to suppress enemy movement. You have no idea where incoming shells are going to hit, where the next will hit and for how long, and the incapacitating range of these shells can be hundred meters, so infantry take cover and hence don't go anywhere in the meanwhile. Even outside lethal range, small shrapnel pieces can still penetrate the skin causing wounds that slow people down, can get infected and aren't a good thing.
Third, Russia too has guided munitions, but more importantly even Western media admits Russia is dominating the electronic warfare front, downing Ukrainian drones while flying its own. Even if you have guided munitions of whatever sort you need to be able to see what you're firing at.
Quoting Jabberwock
These systems do not cover infantry and breach fortified front lines, they can blowup high value targets, such as the general (one use of US spy satellites and these sorts of expensive missiles).
Of note about this particular general, at least according to Reuters, the source of this news is from a Russian blogger and not confirmed by the Russian military. So who knows, but obviously long range guided missiles can attack such high value targets, but that doesn't actually win any battles.
Quoting Jabberwock
If "all they have to do" is that ... why haven't they done it yet?
What you're talking about could easily cost tens of thousands of lives and still fail.
Worse, even if Ukrainians succeeded in such a manoeuvre it does not result in the situation of just needing to decide whether to invade Crimea or call it a day.
Russia will immediately counter attack to retake the land bridge, cutting North to isolate this exposed salient. It would continue to be fierce fighting and Ukrainians will need to keep this salient supplied to even stand a chance.
It's only if you leave your enemy alone for an entire year that they build up massive multi-layers fortified lines behind a fortified buffer zone and mine fields everywhere. The Russians are unlikely to do that, and would be attacking from both directions to retake the land in question.
... Which Ukrainians in the real world have not even gone through the buffer zone to reach the first fortified line, and you think reaching the sea is basically a done deal?
Quoting Jabberwock
As pointed out above, if Ukraine manages to create a salient it will be under attack from the West and East.
What you're talking about is not some easy task and even if done you'd then need to hold onto this salient that cuts the land bridge requiring significant and continuous supplies.
But we'll obviously see in the coming weeks who's right and who's wrong.
My theory is that Ukraine's offensive has essentially zero chance of succeeding and NATO and the Ukrainians know that.
So why do it anyways?
The militarily prudent thing for Ukraine to have done is do to the Russians strategy of digging in, inflict losses and just retreating whenever defences degrade, conserving forces and vehicles as much as possible. Simply because Russia has more numbers and capabilities obviously does not mean it can easily win, as we've seen in the war so far the defender has significant advantage.
If Ukraine spent lives and equipment more conservatively, it would be clear Russia could not possibly "win" and would be forced to negotiate.
The problem is, Ukraine and NATO has defined Russia "winning" as holding on to any Ukrainian territory whatsoever and Ukraine losing as giving up any territory whatsoever and the only acceptable outcome is removing Russia from the lands formerly known as Ukrainian, including Crimea.
What logically follows from this idea is "holding on" to every inch of territory at incredible cost, such as in Bakhmut, and also continuously promising an offensive that will push Russian forces all the way back to their previous border.
This political posture "plays well" for the Western media, building up the mythology needed to keep the arms flowing, but if it's impossible to deliver on, regardless of the arms that can be pumped in, you end up in this kind of situation of needing an offensive simply to fit the narrative.
This not only wastes significant men and material but will boost Russian morale while lowering Ukrainian morale, and ultimately a narrative that is nonsensical will eventually fall apart lowering Western morale generally speaking. We're already seeing the cracks.
Do we know that it fires significantly more shells than Ukraine now? Can you provide any sources?
As long as Russia had artillery advantage, it pushed forward, because it is essentially the only tactics they have used. Then they stopped. For the last half of the year Russia has attacked a single place: Bakhmut, where Prigozhin, responsible for the attack, complained about the lack of ammo. Some of it was political posturing, of course, but it would not be very credible if it was indisputably false. Not to mention that you do not move 100 m per week if you have indisputable artillery advantage. And you do not run away the moment you capture the city you have been conquering for the last six months.
And HIMARS do not attack artillery units, of course. They attack artillery ammo dumps, which they have been doing since Ukrainians got them. Russians have reacted by dispersing them, but this is of limited efficiency: you still have to gather them to transport them, especially if most of your transport is by train.
Quoting boethius
They have not done that because they were not ready. And yes, it will take tens of thousands of lives and yes, it could still fail. Still, it is the best manuever at this time.
And it will not be 'exposed salient' - if the land bridge falls, then most likely the Kherson oblast falls as well, Russians will not be able to supply the area just from Crimea. Ukrainians would be exposed only on the 80 km section from Vuhledar to Mariupol - the rest would be protected by the very same defence lines which Russians cannot breach for a year. 'Cutting from North' would be essentially repeating attacks around Vuhledar - we know how well those went. And supplies would be no problem - they would still have Zaporozhe behind them, as they do now. It is Russians who are in vulnerable position there - they have 150 km to defend with their backs to the sea and only 80 km of depth.
And I am not saying that Ukrainians will surely suceed - only that they have a reasonable chance. The claim that they have 'zero chance' is rather absurd.
Quoting boethius
Russia would not win in the sense that it would not vasalize Ukraine, but it would still make significant gains - new territories which it would arm and use as a staging ground for another round. Any peace accord for Ukraine would be just Minsk 3.0, i.e. a temporary peace until Russia decides to take another slice. Unfortunately, the war will actually end when the Russian society/authorities decide it is not worth waging.
Quoting boethius
That theory seems to be based mostly on conjecture and not very much on facts. The West has supported Ukraine when it has been retreating for a long time - it certainly did not 'hold on to every inch'. And it is much easier to gather support for a country that is still relentlessly attacked. It is not about what one thinks as winning or losing - Russia must be stopped and the time for it is now - when it is bled and weakened from the year on the offensive and before it has adjusted economically and militarily. It makes no sense to wait until it gets stronger again.
NATO leader says Ukrainians are making progress and advancing against Russian forces
[sup]— Chris Megerian · AP · Jun 12, 2023[/sup]
Former Kremlin Official Says Putin Is Too Afraid to Punish the Wagner Group’s Prigozhin, Even After Public Name Calling
[sup]— Veuer via Dailymotion · Jun 13, 2023 · 1m:12s[/sup]
Blue and yellow flag, Russian dead attest to Ukrainian advance in south
[sup]— Vitalii Hnidyi, Max Hunder, Guy Faulconbridge, Vladimir Soldatkin, Peter Graff, Alex Richardson, Grant McCool, Angus MacSwan, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 13, 2023[/sup]
? Source
(, just FYI, the tankies thing wasn't specifically about the dam)
As the Western countries aren't themselves in war, there isn't a huge "ramping up" of manufacturing. Basically only Poland is making huge investments in armament. Yet Western manufacturers know that if the war ends, then the market immediately shuts down. Hence the increase in production is only marginal.
Quoting boethius
Ukraine isn't running out of able bodies. Do notice that counterattack has been quite local and limited. Ukrainians understand well that this war can go on for a long time. After all, it started in 2014.
Quoting boethius
I wouldn't say it makes zero sense. First of all, to have the initiative in war is extremely important. If you remain passive and don't engage in the enemy, you are handing the Russians the advantage: they can choose where and when to engage.
Furthermore, if you didn't notice, what happened to the Russian "Winter Offensive"?
Actually the Russians were in the same situation as the Ukrainians just few months ago. And that Winter Counteroffensive was forgotten as it didn't go anywhere. Likely what will happen with the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that it will take time. Both sides have their limitations. The simple fact is that the Russian armed forces have suffered severe losses of equipment and trained manpower in the war since February 2022. Such losses will take many years to replace and hence the Russians have to keep a reserve too.
In the age of pin-point accuracy weapons going over it is a difficult issue. Not impossible, but just difficult. For example in WW2, the Germans tried desperately to destroy the bridge over the Rhein at Remagen, but a bridgehead was established over the river. Germans made several attempts to bomb the bridge, if I remember correctly.
Quoting SophistiCat
Lol. Yeah, let's go that cui bono -thinking here. So Ukraine starts it's counteroffensive, but then limits it's possible area of operations by 87 kilometers by blowing the dam, from where then Russians can withdraw forces to fight were the actual counteroffensive now is going on. And what about the 17000 evacuated, the enormous harm done to agriculture and electricity production of 1,4 TW annually? To a country that has as it's objectives to liberate the territory from Russians. That was also preferable to what? That Russia would look bad?
At least the good thing is that now Tucker is giving his bullshit just on Twitter.
If you follow pretty much any source about the war, West or Russia or Qatari or Indian or whatever, the Russians firing significantly more shells at every phase of the war I have never seen even remotely questioned.
Here's a source from the Washington post
Quoting Facing critical ammunition shortage, Ukrainian troops ration shells
Quoting Jabberwock
You need more than an artillery advantage.
Since Bakhmut (which the Russians captured by the way) there has been a "who launches their offensive first" game.
It's to the Russians advantage that Ukraine goes first, for a bunch of reasons that I can explain if you want, so Russia waited them out.
Ukraine definitely would have preferred Russia launch some major offensive and then be on the defensive, but Russia had no media pressure to do so.
Quoting Jabberwock
Absolutely classic arm-chair general analysis.
Crimea is a massive island with a massive naval base and a whole bunch of military bases and can be supplied by both road and ferry and there are already hundred thousand or more troops that would be to the West of any land-bridge cut, troops with plenty of ammunition and supplies already stationed there.
It would take a significant amount of time for supplies to even start to be an issue, so this Ukrainian salient cutting the land bridge would need to hold out from intense well supplied attacks from both sides while itself having significant supply issues, which if you really can't see what they would be I can explain it to you.
For Ukraine to solve those issues would require an absolutely massive force to not only punch through Russian lines and make this salient in the first place but then dig in and hold the entire salient and get supplies in under constant attacks and so on ... in addition to needing to hold all the rest of the lines as well where Russia could counter offensive taking advantage of any weakness.
What you describe is not remotely close to being some easy thing Ukrainians can casually do.
Now, if NATO trained up a 200 000 well equipped army that's ready to enter the fight and do this thing on top of everyone who is already there and have been holding lines more-or-less, then, ok, I would say it's definitely doable with such a force, even without the air cover, and the war is about to get super messy, as it's unclear what the Russians would do.
And, as I've mentioned before, maybe there is some secret island where NATO has built up a 200 000 man force. We can't know for sure, but the only reports I've seen is that NATO trained 35 000 for this offensive operation, which is really just not enough to do what you're talking about.
Of course, we'll soon find out who's right and who's wrong, that's for sure.
Quoting Jabberwock
Spending tens of thousands of lives and still failing would definitely be a complete military catastrophe, and considering that risk you'd need pretty powerful arguments about why it is worth the risk you're talking about, not just stating "it is the best manuever at this time".
Quoting Jabberwock
Leaving out the word qualifying "zero chance" that appears immediately before it is simply dishonest.
What I state is:
Quoting boethius
"Essentially zero chance" means very close to zero.
When this cutting the land bridge manoeuvre had I think some reasonable chance (but still pretty low and would be at extremely high cost) was last year before the Russian mobilisations and building up all these fortifications and mine fields as well as before retreating from Kherson and consolidating the lines (while sanctions were causing serious disruptions etc.).
Why that didn't happen is I think is likely for the exact same problem considering the idea now: what then? If you do cut the land bridge, you need to hold it, and well supplied Russians cutting the salient from both sides would result in a massive encirclement. So, instead Ukraine went with some largely propaganda wins of Kherson and Kharkiv (notice neither lead to cutting the land bridge, and if you wanted to cut the land bridge, even better if there's a bunch of Russians even more cut off in West-Kherson).
Which is the general problem of the Ukrainian idea of "winning" on the battlefield: the only way to actually end the war through solely military means is to invade and conquer Russia. Simply because this war has this strange framework of "Ukraine can't / won't attack Russia proper" doesn't somehow just get rid of the basic dynamic of every previous war that "winning" by military means requires conquering your enemy.
The alternative to conquering your enemy is a negotiated settlement, a forever war ... or ... getting conquered.
Now, people argue a forever war, or as close as can be managed, is good for the West. I'm not convinced this is even true, but what is clearly true is that a forever war that does not result in victory for Ukraine cannot possibly be good for the average Ukrainian. In such circumstances, the longer the war goes on the worse it is for the weaker side, never better, mainly because the stronger side will feel they need more and more compensation for the war going forward. Now, you may say those feelings are unjustified, that's certainly a valid debate on philosophyforum, but the reality is that's what will inform negotiating positions: the more the war goes on, the more Ukrainians need will need to give up in a peace settlement, not less.
This of course creates a classic cycle of a long war where the losing side can't accept the costs since "day x" (where they had the most leverage) has not gained anything and the stronger side feels they need to have more and more to "show for it" to justify the fighting and losses, making it even harder for the weaker side to compromise.
The whole reason for a conventional deterrent against a stronger force is basically "mutually assured pain": it maybe not rational for the weaker side to fight a long war as they'll lose, but it may not be rational either for the stronger side to fight a long war either as it's not cost-beneficial.
Which is a big part of the tragedy here, that Ukraine had a good negotiating position early on in the war, by not capitulating and clearly demonstrating their will to fight. Unfortunately for everyone and their relatives who have died since, a good negotiating position doesn't mean you get what you want. Because Zelensky understands basically nothing about politics, Ukraine not only had a good negotiating position against Russia but also against the EU. Zelensky could have leveraged the EU's desire to keep getting Russian gas to get more from either Russia or the EU in compensation for ending the war and business as usual continuing. For example, Russia has stated multiple times it doesn't have a problem with Ukraine joining the EU, so Zelensky could have leveraged the early good negotiating position to get that EU membership one way or another, investment, all sorts of stuff etc.
Fast forward to today and all that leverage playing the EU and Russia against each other (in the sense they both want things from each other at the time; mainly maintain the oil and gas trade) to get the best possible deal for Ukraine is mostly gone.
Instead, Zelensky listens to the UK and US who are both not part of the EU, surprise, surprise not only have the least interest in the war stopping but plenty of arms-dealing reasons for the war to continue, not to mention different currencies that could use, maybe even need, a weak Euro (what I believe this war is ultimately about). But what did Zelensky get for stopping negotiations and continuing the war? Just more war.
The West keeps saying they'll "do whatever it takes" blah, blah, blah ... but we agree that the goal here is not "Ukraine winning" in any military sense.
Also,
A. it's not "Western manufacturers" who have decided not to ramp up manufacturing and NATO just has to accept that. If NATO wanted it could just order the rounds needed to fight a long war, or provide "cost +" contracts to build the capacity for it ... and if they aren't needed because there was a settlement ... well maybe there's a settlement precisely because the West has demonstrated commitment to a long war!!
B. governments could literally pass a law ordering these companies to produce whatever the government wants.
Quoting ssu
First, my point was that is a risk on the Ukrainian side of attritional warfare. They have less people so they will run out of people first.
Second, we don't see Ukraine's "million man army" in the field or anything close to that and I would put good money on that being because they ran out of able bodies, explaining expanding to 60 as well as require women to register for the draft too.
I can speak from experience, and I think you as well, it's not easy being a soldier. It's really very tough and a lot of people simply can't handle it mentally or physically and that includes people who "looked good on paper". A lot of people are not only ineffective soldiers but instead a liability on the battlefield: unreliable, unpredictable and down right dangerous (and this includes professional soldiers ... just a lot less compared to drafting large swaths of the population with basically not filter).
There's a reason young and fit men have been the "go to" source of front line soldiers throughout history, and if you look at this pool of men it's not all that much in a population such as Ukraine when you factor in modern sensibilities and we don't have societies anymore 100% dedicated to warfare that throw babies of cliffs to prove their toughness or similar hazing rituals.
Warfare is also a lot more complicated nowadays than standing in a phalanx and I would also say a lot more terrifying.
Furthermore, as we've discussed plenty, armour and air defence really is essential for any offensive manoeuvres and these systems require training which requires time, the extent people can "learn on the job" in the front lines I think is extremely limited in considering assault capabilities. People can learn how to dig and stand in a trench and fire in the general direction of the enemy as well as fire shoulder launched missiles; which is why when that was the most successful phase of the war when such tactics were relevant (and therefore Ukraine had the highest leverage).
As I mentioned when it was happening in the first weeks of the invasion, ATGM's and stingers and the like are really great for arresting Russian advances and inflicting serious damage, but cannot possibly be the basis of any offensive manoeuvres (so Ukraine cannot "win" on that basis and should negotiate; the West decided instead to pretend that was feasible but eventually accept the obvious military reality and supply tanks, but too little too late in my opinion, but had they been early worm on that ... maybe Russia blows up massive Western tank columns with tactical nukes, so we'll just pretend people can just run around with ATGM's and win a conventional war).
This is exactly my thesis: that Ukraine offensives have the same problems as Russian offensives ... just worse as they have less capabilities (less planes, less helicopters, less air defence, less tanks and so on).
Going on failed offensives is not "initiative":
Quoting ssu
This is a false dichotomy. The choice is not between being passive and undertaking a major offensive that suffers significant losses. While defending you can do plenty of things such as launch small counter offensives and so on that have a positive cost-benefit. By not wasting your forces you constantly threaten to engage them anywhere along the front line as well as have them available (because they are not dead or destroyed) to reinforce lines where it is suitable to defend (i.e. not a few building left in Bakhmut but somewhere else that's more suitable or defence).
With such a strategy Ukraine can single (or explicitly say) that they can't defeat the Russians, but the Russians can't defeat them either, so it's better to accept our perfectly reasonable offer (which is the problem, Zelensky does not want to offer anything Russia might accept, seek concessions from either Russia or the EU or even the United States to compensate what he gives Russia to end the conflict).
How you give the Russians the option to simply defeat you is by wasting your forces in undertaking fools errands and no longer having the reserves necessary to maintain a defence on a 1000 km front or prevent the Russians from encircling the capital successfully this time and so on.
It's reported Ukraine has lost 4 MiGs in this offensive so far and also could be easily 6-18 months to actually have any F16s in Ukraine ... so that's a pretty significant loss of air capabilities that could have been used to keep things together until said F16s arise. Now, fog of war, who knows anything, but the point is if you want your offensive to have a good chance of success then you committing your planes you may need to do.
The war has not been so intense since 2014.
That there was 8 years of a low intensity civil war "supported" by Russia is not any basis to say the current intensity of warfare can last 8 years.
At some point things will start to fall apart, and it's difficult to bet against the far larger and stronger side with far more kinds of capabilities.
Probably why talk of a "frozen conflict" has ramped up in the West, the alternative to one side winning or a negotiated settlement is just each side being unable to carry out large offensives and things just stay like that.
However, I'm unsure if this would even be stable in this case, mainly due to the drones allowing attritional warfare to continue at great distances. This is very much a new thing in the history of warfare and may prevent a large no-mans land forming which each side hesitates to cross and firing artillery randomly back and forth is basically guess work and mainly just a reminder of what would happen if large infantry formations did enter no mans land.
Here is what one of Wagner commanders had to say about that yesterday (start with 'They have a lot of ammo!'). You do have to read between the lines a bit (it is, after all, the state propaganda program), but his words cannot be in any way interpreted 'We have plenty of ammo and they do not'.
Quoting boethius
I am just an armchair analyst, but it goes against any manual of strategy I have read in my armchair. When your enemy's offensive culminates, you take over the initiative. You do not wait for him to regroup, get stronger and gain the initiative again.
Quoting boethius
Of course it is, what did you expect on a philosophy forum? Am I to understand yours is not? Which military academy have you graduated from?
Quoting boethius
Crimea is supplied from the north (the main route) and by the Kerch bridge. For the military supplies trains constitute an ovewhelming majority, I am surprised you did not know that. Road is by far secondary. Ferries...? Mmm... no.
If the land bridge is cut off, majority of its supplies will be provided by two very long, rather vulnerable tracks. Sure, maybe they have enough supplies to hold off, I cannot know that. But that is of secondary importance, as I do not think that this offensive even covers Crimea. I suppose the most realistic plan is to make Russians withdraw to the Perekop Isthmus. And that seems quite doable.
And yes, I admit, I do not see where exactly Ukrainians would have supply issues. Let us suppose they take the slice from Vuhledar to Vasilyvka - where exactly and how would Russians cut their supply lines from the north of Zaporozhe?
The obvious difference is that the only actually exposed section would be 80 km south of Vuhledar. Russians have proven completely unable to cross Ukrainian lines south of Donetsk, even though they have tried very hard. They cannot take Marinka for a year, why should we assume they suddenly could?
Quoting boethius
Even with the qualification it is still quite absurd. And I have serious doubts that we are even looking at the same map... If they take the land bridge, they are exposed from 80 km on the East; even if we assume the 80 km on the West, they still would have unobstructed support from the heartland on the line of at least 120 km. How is that 'encirclement'?
And they did not take the land bridge because the West did not supply enough weapons earlier, that is all.
Quoting boethius
As I wrote, what you propose is basically Minsk 3.0. We know exactly how Minsk 1.0 and Minsk 2.0 have ended, so it is not a great surprise that Ukraine was not that willing to take another chance. There is absolutely no reason to think that Russia would uphold its part of the deal and plenty of reasons to think it would not. But maybe you can explain it – what exactly would stop Russia from taking another shot in 5, 10 years?
The only way to actually end the war is to remove Russia's potential and will to fight. Ukraine understands this and so does the West. Note that US and UK might be the largest donors in absolute terms, but in relative terms they are far behind: relatively the most was given by the Baltics and the Eastern Europe. They are very willing to help Ukraine to neutralize Russia, because they understand very well what happens if it does not.
Actually, Mearsheimer argues that Putin was deeply committed to making Minsk work. (51:27)
And we know from recent revelations by former French President François Hollande and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that it was NATO who chose to treat the Minsk Accords as a temporary armistice during which Ukraine could be armed and prepared for further war.
I would add that high-profile former officials leaking sensitive information like this is neither an accident nor is it a coincidence. They see what the United States has done in Ukraine, and they disagree with it.
So I'm afraid you've got this one completely backwards.
We know from Girkin exactly how committed Russians were to peace. Why should we not believe him?
They publish articles about the Ukraine war under the heading "US-NATO Conflict with Russia over Ukraine" That's quality journalism for you :roll: Their parroting of Russian official narrative is tactical, sort of like the Iran-Russia alliance in this war. Anything that can be used to poke the Big Satan in the eye will do.
These socialists' only concern is "the struggle," and they are indiscriminate about methods. Being truthful is not the objective; being correct - politically correct, in the older, unironic sense - is what it's all about.
[sup]— AP · Jun 14, 2023[/sup]
I'm sure those cooks are guilty of...something. Maybe even worse than Navalny.
https://fas.gov.ru/news/32622
Russian forces ‘highly likely’ behind attack on Ukrainian dam, international law investigation says
[sup]— Amanda Macias · CNBC · Jun 16 2023[/sup]
'Highly likely' Russia behind Ukraine dam collapse, international experts say
[sup]— Anthony Deutsch, Philippa Fletcher · Reuters · Jun 16 2023[/sup]
Some investigation participants:
• GRC, ICC, MJT
• Murdoch, Khan
Funding spans the US, EU, UK.
Russian officials say Black Sea grain deal can't be extended
[sup]— Gareth Jones, Mark Trevelyan, Nick Macfie · Reuters · Jun 16, 2023[/sup]
Uhm It's just the Kremlin standing in the way of the ships transporting food.
Matviyenko Putin Lavrov (maybe Ushakov?) apparently roam an alternate world.
Imagine, for the sake of argument, that the Kremlin controlled all of Ukraine('s grain + fertilizer + processing + transport).
With rubbish like the above coming out of the Kremlin, anything goes (including tactical hostage-holding).
Can always claim to try something else, and if it doesn't work out, blame everyone else.
Regardless, they may get away with it, though one could hope not.
Photos: Flood Damage After the Destruction of Ukraine’s Kakhovka Dam
[sup]— Alan Taylor · The Atlantic · Jun 12, 2023[/sup]
Unclear if reservoir water from breached dam can still be pumped to Zaporizhzhia, IAEA says
[sup]— Francois Murphy, Frances Kerry · Reuters · Jun 16, 2023[/sup]
Rescuers are braving snipers and racing time to ferry Ukrainians out of Russian-occupied flood zones
[sup]— Samya Kullab, Evgeniy Maloletka, Sam Mcneil · AP · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
Ukrainians rescued from Russian-held flood zones in Kherson
[sup]— Billal Rahman · The Independent · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
Outside a flooded Ukrainian city, specialists warily sweep the ground for hidden bombs
[sup]— Murray Brewster · CBC · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
Mess :/ At least there are some international teams around
• Russia bombs Ukraine throughout (more or less ongoingly)
• the international community repeatedly condemns the invasion and helps Ukraine
• Ukraine defends
• Russia annexes a fifth or so of Ukraine (altogether)
• others do not supply Ukraine with longer-ranging missiles
• Ukraine develops its own long-range missile (Jun 2023) allegedly
• Kyiv in talks with Western weapons makers about setting up production in Ukraine (Jun 2023)
• (...)
The invaders seem to have (had) some interest in nuclear facilities, Chernobyl, Zaporizhzhia. Maybe, as part of a longer-term strategy, they wanted to make it difficult for Ukraine to develop nuclear weaponry. External parties/countries aren't likely to supply Ukraine with some such. Though, if Kyiv had nuclear weaponry at its disposal, then the Kremlin would have to rethink.
The kinds of stories that perpetuate hate and lead to increased violence ...
She thought she was unshockable, then two castrated Ukrainian soldiers arrived (via archive)
[sup]— Christina Lamb reports from the Donetsk oblast · The Sunday Times · Jun 17 2023[/sup]
These good folk hit a few snags along the way ...
Ukraine updates: African leaders kick off peace mission
[sup]— various via DW · Jun 15, 2023[/sup]
On Ukraine-Russia trip, South African leader’s delegation stuck at Polish airport over arms permits
[sup]— Mogomotsi Magome, Vanessa Gera, Gerald Imray · AP · Jun 16, 2023[/sup]
African leaders greeted with explosions over Kyiv on peace mission to Ukraine
[sup]— Sarah Dean, Olga Voitovych, Nimi Princewill, Niamh Kennedy · CNN · Jun 16, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine tells African mission no peace talks with Russia before withdrawal
[sup]— Reuters via CNBC · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
Putin meets with African leaders as Russia confirms nukes in Belarus
[sup]— Giorgio Leali · POLITICO · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
Putin lectures African leaders seeking to mediate in Ukraine
[sup]— Kevin Liffey, Andrew Heavens, Andrew Cawthorne · Reuters · Jun 17, 2023[/sup]
... But the efforts are commendable, more please, even though it doesn't seem like more will come of it.
The unfortunate view that some leaders have is that the war goal is about "Ukraine not losing", but not "Russia losing". And before someone comments that Russia losing is absurd as if that would mean Ukrainian tanks in the Red Square, I would again refer to history: Russia losing like in the Russo-Japanese war, the Polish-Soviet war or in the first Chechen war. Or in WW1.
Quoting jorndoe
Something that the Ukrainians can be bitter about.
The Russians have a narrative about the war and their narrative is different to our narrative! It's narratives and turtles all the way down. But the Russian Turtle is offical, whereas ours is organic and trans-renewable.
Thus we are not witnessing an "NATO-US Conflict with Russia over Ukraine" what we are really witnessing is the opening gambit of an unprovoked Russian Imperialist expansion. Any other interpretation is an example of the kind of propaganda that Putin's bots propagated during the 2016 Presidential Election.
We in the West are motivated solely by the truth, our love for freedom and human rights.
Greetings from Julian Assange - HMP Belmarsh London UK
Exactly.
The real problem here is that Russia has no other identity as a state than an imperial one.
Russia is not a nation state. And it fears, or it's leadership fears, that it cannot have any other identity than the imperial one, that it has to be tightly centralized or otherwise it would somehow face utter doom. If it eases with the centralized control, it will break up. If it would be more multicultural or give more autonomy to the regions, it would break up. Or so the Russian thinking of the present elite goes. Hence Russia totally failed in creating a Russian version of the British Commonwealth with CIS. Hence now tries to use military might.
And what is worse is that the leader of Russia thinks that the dissolution of the Empire, when the Soviet Union collapsed, is somehow repairable. That the whole collapse was an unfortunate mistake, something totally repairable and recoverable. Hence the talk about the "artificiality" of Ukraine as a nation. And now the talk of "Novorossiya" and how Crimea is part of Russia, something quite similar to 19th Century Imperialism.
This just makes Russia walk steadfastly towards a disaster. Just as the supporters of the last Czar argued that the solution was for the Czar to hold on to his power given by divine right and not give one inch to the heretic liberal "Western" reforms, because autocracy of the Czar made the Russia Empire so great, so are the same movements now restarted and preach of the greatness of Russia.
Reads p0m0'ish. I'm guessing the Bakhmutians beg to differ.
Motyl opines:
Putin’s ‘Big Lie’ Might Be a Scheme to Exit the Ukraine War
[sup]— Alexander Motyl · 19FortyFive · Jun 19, 2023[/sup]
One might hope, but it runs contrary to their "new reality", so far anyway. Peskov's utterings are odd, though.
Quoting Maxim Ivanov (WION · May 30, 2023)
Meanwhile, there have been some rumors on the street that Russian extremists are (ever) on the move (has come up prior in the thread); they want to assimilate Ukraine.
Russia’s shifting far right: the war party
[sup]— Oleg Ignatov · Lowy Institute · Apr 5, 2023[/sup]
Russian ultranationalists think Putin's response to the Moscow drone attacks and border raids shows he's 'out of touch with reality'
[sup]— Chris Panella · Business Insider · Jun 1, 2023[/sup]
Not sure how much to put into this stuff, though it's clear enough that there are extremists that the Kremlin has not "censored" away (selective application). Medvedev's crazy public outbursts don't help; he doesn't seem into exiting either, but maybe he just parrots whatever (he thinks) Putin wants.
Imperial Russia?
Despite recently closing hundreds of bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US still maintains nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories abroad.
Here is a list* of the countries bombed and/or invaded by the United States from the end of the Second World War to 2020:
Afghanistan 1998, 2001-
Bosnia 1994, 1995
Cambodia 1969-70
China 1945-46
Congo 1964
Cuba 1959-1961
El Salvador 1980s
Korea 1950-53
Guatemala 1954, 1960, 1967-69
Indonesia 1958 Laos 1964-73
Grenada 1983
Iraq 1991-2000s, 2015-
Iran 1987
Korea 1950-53
Kuwait 1991
Lebanon 1983, 1984
Libya 1986, 2011-
Nicaragua 1980s
Pakistan 2003, 2006- Palestine 2010
Panama 1989
Peru 1965
Somalia 1993, 2007-08, 2010-
Sudan 1998
Syria 2014-
Vietnam 1961-73
Yemen 2002, 2009-
Yugoslavia 1999
Note that these countries represent roughly one-third of the people on earth.
Behold the scores of military coups and color revolutions, the manipulations of elections, where senior figures of the United States openly reveled in their memoirs, boasting of their achievements in Iran, Pakistan, Bolivia, Guatemala... Or witness the economic sanctions that swiftly follow whenever some impoverished nation dares to nationalize its infrastructure.
With the disintegration of the USSR, the compassionate American Empire no longer deigns to offer a rational pretext for the annihilation of nations. Amateur scriptwriters conjure up fairy stories of chemical attacks, yellow-cake deliveries, and terror cells.
Karl Rove, in his succinct elucidation to the esteemed New Yorker Magazine back in 2004, unveiled the truth: "We are now an empire, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you study that reality—judiciously, I might add—we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study as well, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors...and all of you will be left to just study what we do."
Our record stands as testimony. Even to this day, the United States maintains an extrajudicial penal facility in Guantanamo Bay. Openly celebrated is the fact that the enemy combatants held there are exempt from the protections of the Geneva Convention. For those with the fortitude, perusing the Wikileaks files on Guantanamo Bay will lay bare the depth of depravity to which those acting on our behalf have sunk. History shall not be kind. It takes an extraordinary level of projection and self-delusion to believe that the villain isn't the figure in the mirror, but rather someone "out there" who might begin emulating your example.
The development and sustenance of the standard of living we have come to expect in the Western World demanded toil and intelligence, but let us not forget that it has been built upon a foundation of organized pillage, exploitation, and the perpetual impoverishment of the rest of the globe. Whatever flaws or ambitions Russia may possess, they are but a low-level, monotonous hum in comparison. And what sin does Russia truly bear, other than its resistance to Western attempts at exploitation? What is Putin's sin, except for his refusal to let mad oligarchs infiltrate politics, unlike our own, who have entirely subverted and corrupted our democratic institutions?
As for Ukraine, the vast majority of Westerners would not have been able to locate it on a map prior to the war. Just as most of us cannot pinpoint Sudan, Liberia, or the myriad warring African countries. Even now, when a Ukrainian soldier falls in a forest, he makes no sound. The reason the war in Ukraine persists is solely due to Washington's intervention. It was Washington who scuttled a drafted peace agreement that had been initially agreed upon by both Russia and Ukraine back in March 2022. Cease the flow of Western weaponry and money, and the conflict will dissipate within a week.
Who can discern the cause of our collective psychopathy? Perhaps it is the overabundance of social media, prescription drugs, something lurking in our sustenance, or the fluoride within our water... All I know is that we have become incapable of engaging in rational discourse. Decency is jettisoned when the prevailing narrative is challenged. It is met with outrage, hysteria, shunning, witch hunts, ad hominem attacks, or the hollow invocation of emotional platitudes—anything but a reasoned exchange.
This pattern of behavior first emerged in response to Trump's electoral triumph. Yet, it has transcended the Orange Man: we witnessed it in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, it pervaded the BLM movement, the # metoo movement, the reaction to Jordan Peterson's ascent to prominence, and the condemnation of those who refused COVID vaccines. It instinctively emerges when anyone dares to question climate change or suggests that Putin, too, may possess human qualities or that Russia may be gaining ground.
To resolve complex issues, one must honestly identify and analyze obstacles and problems as they arise. It is impossible to emerge victorious in war or overcome any peer competitor if one is incapable of acknowledging uncomfortable truths. We have become what the USSR was, what the Ottoman Empire became, what every empire inevitably devolves into—ossified! Like those lost empires, we too are trading on the mythology of past glories. Sadly, the world has changed, the myths have lost their lustre. Our ardour for Freedom and Human Rights have gone the way of Jesus - empty unfashionable platitudes. The Empire now wears no clothes. The world should rejoice but for the fact that this Weekend at Bernie's Administration could well decide to take the whole world down with it.
Quoting yebiga
My impression is that Trump's election, who ran directly against the neocon establishment, caused said political elite to press the panic button, and ramp up the propaganda.
Propaganda slowly drives people mad. It's literally the manipulating behavior of a psychopath, but applied on a societal scale. Lying, gaslighting, different kinds of blackmail, etc.
Regular people just aren't equipped to deal with that kind of malevolence.
They will subconciously realize something is wrong - they get nervous, anxious, frustrated, etc. - but the propaganda machine accounts for that as well by readily presenting scapegoats upon which those emotions can be projected.
And this is only one arm of the propaganda machine.
The other arm involves whipping people up into a self-righteous frenzy in pursuit of goals set by the political elite. These are essentially appeals to people's sense of moral superiority, seeking to bind their ideology directly to people's ego. Once the ideology is bound to their sense of self, they cannot leave the ideology without cutting off a part of themselves. This is why every discussion with such people turns hostile; they are in psychological survival mode. Losing means having to cut off a part of their ego.
Note the eerie similarity to the methods of nazism and communism; the assigning of scapegoats and the appeal to moral superiority.
I think there is a lot to this. People have to sense in their bones that their own government is gaslighting them - it's been over 20 years now of relentless fabrication. We must censor our own lying eyes and ears.
Consciously confronting and acknowledging these doubts and perceptions is - as you say - hard for people. Their entire world will shatter and something of themselves will die.
When I visited the Eastern Bloc back in the 1980s, People en masse understood that everything official and everything on TV and Radio was all a crock. People dealt with it by never talking about politics. They talked about anything and everything else. At work and amongst officials they would echo the official line. Only with the very closest of friends might they have a candid political discussion but they would have the TV volume up, the curtains drawn before they would whisper to each other.
More than a hint of this kafkaesque atmosphere threatened to become normalised during the Pandemic restrictions where sinister heavy handed policing, censorship on social media and 24/7 fear porn.
And I think many Americans or Westerners simply don't understand this. They just assume that Russia is in many ways just like their own country.
Quoting yebiga
The British have fought with a lot more people of the World than Americans, actually. So the I guess the US isn't yet the baddest of them all. Leave that to the English. At least historically. :smirk:
Quoting yebiga
You'll be there when the US invades a NATO country that is trying to leave NATO.
But for the while, the US isn't there yet.
He wanted an adventure. He ended up in Ukraine’s most brutal war zone
[sup]— Christopher Miller · Financial Times · Feb 16, 2023[/sup]
? Anton, Christopher (author), Igor
The Kremlin is on a roll
In latest crackdown on critics, Russia declares World Wide Fund for Nature ‘undesirable’
[sup]— AP · Feb 21, 2023[/sup]
, did you ever get to whipping up a fresh thread on that stuff?
(I didn't notice if you did anyway. But please keep the p0m0 at a tolerable level. :smile:)
May 18, 2023, May 24, 2023, May 26, 2023
Yeah, hence the multiple/repeated nationalist appeals from their political top (plus some that include those "sibling" Ukrainians), their public "advertising", and the lenience towards nationalist extremists, contrary to somewhat more moderate voices/critiques getting the hammer. Some has come up prior in the thread, though there's likely more to it. The Ukrainians said "No" and the world by and large ack'd.
I have to disagree here. Russians comprise almost 80% of the FR's population. The second largest nationality group is Tatars, which comprise 3% of the population, but they are spread over a large area. There are relatively few republics where one nationality (other than Russian) is predominant, mostly in Caucasus. This is a result of USRR policies: there were deportations, forced 'russification', repressions etc. specifically so that the central authority could not be challenged. For the same reason they were made completely dependent economically on Moscow. But this is not the only reason: in some areas the population is so sparse that they have to be sustained with significant external support.
For those reasons any major break-up is rather unrealistic. Sure, if the center gets weak enough, there might be a few break-away republics (especially if their neighbors will have interest in them), but it would not change much geopolitically. Most of those who wanted to leave, did so in 1991.
West needs strategy to tie Ukraine aid to corruption progress, thinktank says
[sup]— Patrick Wintour · The Guardian · Jun 20, 2023[/sup]
EU says Ukraine is making progress with reforms and on track to membership talks
[sup]— AP · Jun 22, 2023[/sup]
Let's note down accountabilities of the invader while we're at it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgZ3dqAAOa8
(unfortunately, I could not find a version with English captions)
In short, he claims Russians are losing badly in Zaporozhzhia, claims that Ukrainians did not shell civilians in Donetsk since 2014 and did not plan to attack LPR and DPR with NATO forces and that corrupt Ministry of Defence officials practically duped Putin into starting the war...
Is he believeable? No, of course not - like everyone else, he has political agenda. However, it should be noted that if an ordinary Russian said those things, he would be arrested and tried rather quickly. The fact that Prigozhin practically negates all the official reasons for the war (in one of earlier videos he said he did not see any 'Nazis' in Ukraine) and walks free, means that either he is already so powerful that he cannot be touched, or that he is preparing ground for some kind of an exit strategy for Putin in the time-proven tradition ('tzar good, boyars bad'), in which MoD (i.e. Shoigu and Gerasimov) are the scapegoats, Putin somehow saves his faces and everyone pretends that they had actually no beef with Ukrainians...
Russian mercenary boss says Moscow's war in Ukraine based on lies
[sup]— Andrew Osborn · Reuters · Feb 23, 2023[/sup]
Wagner chief accuses Moscow of lying to public about Ukraine
[sup]— Pjotr Sauer · The Guardian · Feb 23, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Prigozhin
Sort of echoed by some Russian soldiers (even if somewhat questionable) ...
Demoralised Russian soldiers tell of anger at being ‘duped’ into war
[sup]— Luke Harding · The Guardian · Mar 4, 2022[/sup]
Dmitry Mishov, Russian airman who defected, gives BBC interview
[sup]— Ilya Barabanov, Kateryna Khinkulova · BBC · Jun 12, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Dmitry Mishov]I am a military officer, my duty is to protect my country from aggression. I don't have to become an accomplice in a crime. No one explained to us why this war started, why we had to attack Ukrainians and destroy their cities? In the military no one believes the authorities. They can see what is really happening. They are not some civilians in front of the telly. The military do not believe official reports, because they are simply not true.[/quote]
Putin might be in too deep. An exit would be :up: though.
"Russia investigates Wagner chief for ‘armed mutiny’ after call for attack on military"
Prigozhin has made accusations before.
Quoting Prigozhin (Jun 23, 2023)
I don't have a sense of what is going on beyond what emerges from time to time. Just observing parts that don't fit with other parts.
[quote=Rudolf G Adam]Strengthening Ukraine is not tantamount to weakening Russia. The tsarist and Soviet past cannot be defined by Moscow alone. It is a past shared with other countries, whose perceptions differ greatly from those of the Kremlin. If Russia wants safe and stable borders, it should offer the same to its neighbors.[/quote]
Russia and a return to Soviet-style central planning
[sup]— Michael Marder · The Japan Times · Jan 15, 2023[/sup]
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-attempted-coup-mercenaries-wagner-rebellion-rcna90921#rcrd14601
Whatever the outcome of this, there goes any chance of a peace deal. Ukraine is going to assume that if they just hold on long enough and keep attritting Russian forces, they'll win. And this rebellion by the head of Wagner will convince hawks in America and Europe (and a lot of the public) that arms should continue to be sent to Ukraine.
Quite the opposite. Russia can sign peace, just as made peace with Japan (during the Russo-Japanese war), with Germany (WW1) or Poland (Polish-Soviet war).
Why is it so hard to understand that this one of those disastrous wars Russia has started that has lead to internal strife and humiliation? Putin has been a disaster for Russia.
Russia is more closer to civil war and break up than ever. And even if Putin can contain the situation, the unstability of Russia should be evident to all.
Quoting David Otto
Quoting CBS · May 16, 2023
They have a good lot of re$ource$. Doesn't mean they can stride in and hang Shoigu of course. :)
Before this all blew up, I did find myself asking: how were the overwhelming majority of Russia specialists so surprised by how poorly Russia's military functioned? Why did the scale of the rot elude them? The Afghan National Army style ranks of ghost soldiers and ghost vehicles who only exist on paper to funnel payments, the sold off fuel, the broken down vehicles abandoned a day into a major invasion? Virtually no one expected it.
Why not? We're told Putin's regime is essentially the fusion of organized crime with the elements of the former KGB. Journalists claim to have uncovered vast money b laundering operations for Putin and his inner circle. Why wouldn't the rot spread downwards?
Basically, why should we be shocked to learn that Putin's rule was as hollowed out as the military?
One should recall that neither the February nor October Revolutions were primarily mass uprisings. To be sure, there were riots precipitating action in February, but the removal of the Tsar was a palace coup and the rise of the Bolsheviks was accomplished by a small cadre of armed partisans (smaller than Wagner) and the total apathy of the population. It wasn't the might of the Bolsheviks that won, but that the conscript army and even much of the officer corps initially had no interest in defending the government.
Wagner represents an existential threat only to the degree that the main bulk of the military will be unwilling to fight them. If Russia really is largely mobilizing just a small cadre of loyalist, reliable "special forces," to deal with them, then that shows a lack of faith in the military. You can't do an urban assault against veterans of a Verdun-like battle without either destroying the city of taking huge losses. If they jump to shelling their own city, I doubt it goes well for morale to say the least. So they are in a pickle, because the Russian military is in no place to lay siege to even a Ukrainian city the size of Rostov, against a force the size of Wagner, let alone doing it quickly with tight ROE, no indiscriminate use of force, and no logistics set up.
Wasn't the reliance on a private army a telling sign? Isn't arresting anti-war and dissident activists/protestors and then sending them to the front to gain leadership experience and a chance to b radicalize your army almost always a bad idea?
Then again, no one saw the USSR's collapse coming until it happened. Not that this spells collapse, but you can't argue it's a good sign for Putin.
Don't you know? It's a CIA/State Dept/NATO coup! They are omnipresent and all-powerful. Nothing in the world happens but through their agency and intent. Nothing important, anyway.
Quoting ssu
He literally used the words "stab in the back" in his televised speech (and following him - a lineup of loyal politicians, including Chechen strongman Kadyrov, who had allied with Prigozhine on occasion).
That was one mistake they did not repeat this time around. Reportedly, when Wagner and then MoD were recruiting fighters from prisons, political prisoners were strictly excluded.
I think there may have been an impression that Ukraine wouldn't fight back, and that the US might ignore the event as Obama ignored their seizure of the Crimea. Maybe he just wasn't expecting Biden's resolve.
Also, Putin has historically been able to shore up his power by military ventures. He benefits from a quagmire as much as he would a victory, just in terms of eliminating any hint of democracy in Russia.
Yes, but they punished protestors by conscripting them to the front, so it seems the lesson wasn't totally learned
Not so much this time though. His plane left Moscow and neither he or Medvedev have done a public video to counter rumors they have fled the capitol the way Zelensky or many other leaders have done in similar instances in the past.
Also, Lukashenko, who I assume is in a good place to know the security situation, appears to have fled Belarus. His private plane shot off to Turkey over night.
And, it doesn't look good. The pictures of the barricades around Moscow are all manned by Rosgvardiya, Putin's internal strong arm. But these guys are police, for keeping order and getting dissidents. They lack heavy arms.
They were used for the initial invasion of Ukraine and disintegrated on contact with a military force with tanks and IFVs. All they have is trucks and small arms. They're also used to acting with impunity, being the self serving muscle. They're morale is suspect.
The only large scale desertions in the war I am aware of is from the Rosgvardiya taking losses, then packing up and going home against orders. We know of at least some of these because there were 700+ court cases over these, probably a way to try to sure up their discipline. Maybe the military forces are elsewhere, but these guys are unlikely to slow down the advance, especially if it is picking up regular army forces on the way as they claim.
Do you mean Prigozhin is going to make it all the way to Moscow and take over?
Seems that is the plan. I figured they would stay in Rostov but they are already halfway there and have only faced resistance from the air. This hasn't slowed them yet and there appears to be footage of several aircraft being downed by their AA while presumably trying to attack.
The barricades being thrown up around Moscow seem to suggest they think it is a possibility. At full speed, a frontal advance party is about 6 hours away (by slow IFV speeds), so it's not exactly far. And having municipal busses parked to block the roads would suggest better options aren't available.
The whole military is on the front and can't really pack up and leave without letting Ukraine advance. Plus, ground commanders might want to see how this shakes out from afar while they have a plausible reason to do nothing.
Luka apparently fleeing is in a way more escalatory because Belarus has had a much stronger dissident movement and a much weaker military. I imagine this must seem like a golden opportunity there. But if something happens there, it hits Putin's credibility hard. Even if he fixes the current crisis, he can't conceivably "liberate" Ukraine and Belarus at the same time.
https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1672583840337100800?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet
At the moment the other side is making strong denunciations, but they'll need something a bit more persuasive to stop Wagner group marching straight into Moscow and mopping up the very small looking defending force.
https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-06-24-23/index.html
What security forces are these, I wonder, are they a match for experienced front line troops with a grudge?
Holy shit! Is this good or bad?
From the pics it looks like all Rosgvardiya; essentially police. Outside of parking vehicles on the road they seem to have been unwilling to engage so far.
In other news, the Belarusian opposition fighting in Ukraine, who are by far and away the largest volunteer force involved in the war, released a national address telling Belarusian soldiers not to carry out orders to support the regime and to ignore the Russian "civil war," and focus on their oaths to Belarus. They claim that they will be arriving with the coordinated support of elements of the Belarusian military itself and will be deposing the current leadership (whose dictator appears to have fled the country already).
Like I said, even if Putin can contain Wagner within a week or two, that might be enough time to bring Lukashenko's dictatorship crashing down, and it's hard to see how Russia continues the war with Ukraine at that point. I suppose they could do a larger scale mobilization, both conscription and economic mobilization, but that just seems like it would fan the still smoldering coals of revolt.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLA3nNS8i8g
There is also to consider that minorities, who gets a very low level of services from the Russian state, have been massively disproportionately hit by the conscription to date and have been increasingly vocal in criticism of the state. Leaders there, of factions not in power, could certain use this as an opportunity to push for independence. Then first mover collective action problem being solved allows for a lot more decisive moves to be made at a lower cost. Sort of "of everyone does it, they can't stop us all."
The Far East is increasingly less economically dependent on Russia. Russia needs it for resource extraction, but the people there, like the peoples of Central Asia, increasingly see China as a better model of rule and as a partner who can offer far more (e.g., Belt and Road). Tajikistan's leader said something to the effect of "I want to be a Deng, not a Putin."
In the run up to the Ukraine invasion all of the "Stan" nations had unprecedented unrest, and this, along with the revolt in Belarus, likely helped motivate the invasion. Putin saw Central Asia as being pulled out of Russia's orbit, into China's, and needed to make it look like a stronger partner. Leaders or would be leaders in autonomous regions have some reason to think they would do better as independent states that are clients of China than as part of Russia and if Russia can't stop a Wagner convoy to Moscow can they really stop minorities from driving home with their weapons and declaring independence?
But Beijing might see a bigger prize in playing kingmaker for the next Russian leader and try to hold that sort of thing back. Independence is probably a last ditch option to invoke if a liberal democratic regime looks to be winning in Russia (a liberal Russia that is part of the EU and/or NATO with a huge land border with China is a strategic nightmare for them).
The Russian Far East had just 20,000 Chinese nationals living in it in 2000. As China took over resource extraction this rose to 700,000 by 2014, about 12% of the population of that huge area. The Russians then asked China to stop publishing figures on this due to nationalist backlash about Chinese "colonization." Russia, but Chinese investment has kept growing, spiking with sanctions as other nation's nationals left in droves. Chinese nationals might be more like 15-20% of the population now.
The population of the Far East is also not majority Russian, the largest ethnicities are those indigenous to the region, followed by ethnic Mongolians, and another large contingent is minorities of the western half of the empire (Ukrainians, Jews, Chechens, etc.) whose ancestors were forcibly deported there by the Russian state. The former two of these are arguably culturally a good deal closer to China than Russia.
Which is all to say that something in Belarus could radically shift things and seems likely, but that there might be follow on revolts. Hell, maybe it will be good for long term world peace if Xi can trumpet some expansion in the north and accept that as his glory instead of going for Taiwan. China does still occasionally claim Russian land up there and they have had a history of annexing land from former Soviet states since the dissolution of the USSR (doing it to all their neighbors on a few occasions).
Unclear. Prig ruling Russia as a warlord is in some ways potentially scarier than Putin, but doesn't seem like a likely final outcome even if Putin is killed by his guards or something dramatic like that.
Still, he might exert significantly more control over events for awhile, and he has generally been more hardline on "mobilizing," to win the war. That said, it seems that could just be posturing to court nationalists. His statements indicate a willingness to end the war, especially his painting it as the work of recalcitrant oligarchs.
Best case is a quick deposing of Putin and some sort of unity government and the withdrawal of Russia to at least the 2014 borders (although they recently lost land they've held since 2014). The problem though is that Ukraine will want to keep pushing while nationalists don't want to lose the Donbas or especially Crimea. Ukrainian attacks might help to unify the country around these, although it could also weaken the nationalists as they sink their efforts in holding Ukrainian land without the support of the whole Russian state.
Worst case is some sort of large defection to Wagner, but not enough to stop the MOD from still retaining their own army. Then you have a civil war, which isn't in anyone's interest, likely not even Ukraine's, at least not compared to a peaceful resolution. Given all the fault lines in Russian leadership, ambitions, grievances, etc. it seems like such a war might quickly degenerate into a multifaction struggle, like their last civil war. Wars with more factions tend to last longer because negotiation is harder with 6 parties than two, let alone 30+.
If that happens, who knows? Hell, it's unclear if it would even end with one unified Russia rather than multiple states in a stalemate. Plus there is the issue of their nuclear arsenal. A Russian MOD plane was allowed to take off with a transponder on and fly through Ukrainian air space earlier; I imagine that is about securing the weapons. Hopefully they have the good sense to destroy them if they look to be in risk of being taken. Hell, if I was in charge of them and saw a real civil war opening, I'd certainly give the order to dynamite them, nothing good could come from their use as leverage.
Putin: “ Sorry Shoigu, take one for the team. ” :death:
The Russian bombing of Ukraine out of Rostov is reportedly still going on, or at least continued after Wagner took over. I don't think Prigozhin is particularly into leaving the Ukrainians alone. Nasty piece of work.
Quoting Oleksandr Tarnavskyi (Jun 24, 2023)
Maybe the Belgorod attackers will surface again.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
:gasp: :fire:
Prigozhin apparently wants:
• to hang Shoigu and Gerasimov
• roughly unrestricted access to the resources of the Defence Ministry or otherwise full support
• for the Armed Forces to "carry their weight"
But has also ...
• called out dis/mal/misinformation coming out of Moscow / the Kremlin, contradicting them
• elicited a number of responses, including threatening, from the Russian top
• apparently exposed weaknesses in Putin's Russia
Prigozhin: “ Our special operation will just take a couple days. ” :D
I guess he was just blowing smoke
Au contraire, his best bet now might be to jump out one.
They say he struck some sort of deal with Putin. Moscow was close to defenseless, so Prigozhin appears to be in charge now.
Putin is weakened but what he needed most was time. Now he's got that, I presume he'll try to shore things up and pretend whatever deal he signed never happened.
That was some crazy shit, though, right?
On that we fully agree. :grin:
[sup]— Andrew Osborn · Reuters · Jun 24, 2023[/sup]
Those two should get a room.
Odd how Prigozhin apparently was piss?d with the army leaders, but went about it by being threatening to lots more. And the 180° turns. (Is the Kremlin dependent on Wagner for the war?) Maybe more will come out.
Yeah, although he faces a tough choice. He needs to empower competent leaders to turn the war around and stop the problems that led to this, but any such competent, ambitious leaders just saw that having just a division or two at their command would be enough to send the leadership fleeing as they grab Moscow.
I mean, the whole reason he propped up a rival second army in the first place was fear of the military moving against his FSB oriented government. If this prompts a move to put someone more capable into control of the MoD, that's its own sort of risk (particularly if they are charismatic, but then good leaders often are charismatic.) It's not hard to see how this might have played out if someone else marched on Moscow with more loyal forces with an army of "veteran heros and citizens," rather than prisoners.
The flip side is that putting someone competent in charge and empowering them could also help Russia win some objectives worth celebrating and also save Putin.
EDIT: Just as I wrote the above, I saw the videos of crowds in Rostov greeting Prigozhin leaving in his car like a hero... Nothing will be the same.
Agreed. We don't know what is going on but so much brinkmanship doesn't fit with the monolithic information control Putin has relied upon up to now.
Well, he's had centuries of help. Serfs, the vast majority of the population, didn't get their freedom until around the time the US ended slavery and they were still paying back the debt of their "purchase" from the nobility in 1917.
The February Revolution was precipitated over riots over living conditions, but the removal of the Tsar was a palace coup. The October Revolution was a small cadre, one that could easily have been overwhelmed if people were willing to fight, getting control essentially with essentially a shrug. The "people," didn't drive to revolts the way the sans-culottes did in France during multiple revolts, the Egyptians in 2011, etc. Not that incredibly vicious struggles didn't start later, but at first it was a big "meh."
---
Surprised the shit out of me. I figured the Rubicon had already been crossed, no going back.
The bulk of Wagner abandoning the effort for amnesty or routing if there was stiff resistance seemed entirely possible, but not a deal.
It would not surprise me if the Wagner commander's assessment of their odds of even breaching the defenses of the hastily assembled, poorly equiped forces in Moscow was that it was unlikely. IDK how many soldiers Wagner still has, how many came on the march, and how many had any stomach for a fight, but it wouldn't surprise me if that number was quite low. Plus they lack any logistics for their heavy equipment.
That said, they absolutely could have held out in Rostov forever, or Moscow if they made it into the city. Russia's PGM shortage and their AA would make bombing impossible without leveling the city and Russia doesn't have the forces to take a million + city in urban fighting anywhere, let alone to spare. I figured he would sit tight in Rostov and hold the threat of ending the war over Putin.
When the column kept moving with limited air strikes I actually started to think maybe he had coordinated with parts of the military to launch the coup, but it seems like their air force is just spent.
Exactly, I was just assuming he might have allies in the MOD who he knew would jump in if he made it that far and that was part of the decision-making process.
I imagine the whole, "if only the wonderful Tsar knew what the recalcitrant bowyers were doing," schtick around Putin would vanish pretty much instantly if it ever looked like he was about to lose power. It honestly feels like a parody sometimes.
The mantra of the spineless putin sycophant
Quoting neomac
Rebel Russian mercenaries halt advance on Moscow, Kremlin says fighters to face no charges
Oh, the exquisite irony.
Yes and you predicted all that, obviously. But kept silent to better enjoy the exquisite irony right? Now the explanation pls. Everything must be connected to land bridges, right?
What next, pundits?
Plans within plans, man. It's like Dune over there.
The coup was stoppable…but likely would have ruined Rostov and weakened Russia internally even more. Putin and his chef avoided that debacle, but this showed the internal weakness of Russia.
Basically now coup plots are possible… when people depicted as traitors can just return to their barracks and the leader can go to a friendly neighbour country.
This is the beginning of the end for Putin, I’d say.
I don't see what troops would have attacked Rostov, and I even less see how such an attack would have stopped the tanks rolling into red square and offing Putin.
Military coups do not usually end in a negotiated settlement before any blood is spilt. I can only guess that they are keeping Putin on as a puppet leader for a while, but he is no longer in charge. It certainly looked as though he was caught with his trousers round his ankles and no one to wipe his arse for him.
Supposing he wanted (or had been part of) a coup, he might have gone about it much the same way though.
A "bull in a china shop"? A "concealed coup"? (plenty room for conspiracy theories here)
Putin "the spy" comes through as significantly more calculating than Prigozhin "the warlord-chef".
Either way, a bunch of consequential things has been said by Prigozhin and Moscow. Wagner allegedly downed three choppers. A fuel depot was blown up to slow down the convoy.
Going to take some bending to make it look favorable for the Kremlin.
Prigozhin: "I'll be back."
Wagner troops occupied a HQ in Rostov. Hence if forces would have been deployed against the Wagner forces, the likely place of combat would have been Rostov. Now the Wagnerites withdrew from there (with applauding civilians on the streets).
There already seems to have taken place one brief incident in Voronez before the deal was struck. Hence this was a very close call.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/i/status/1672195411598008324[/tweet]
https://twitter.com/i/status/1672195411598008324
What happens next in your view?
Could there be an inkling of truth in some of what he's describing?
This is so difficult question not even the wisest could answer given past events that happened so far in regard to Ukraine war.
I think stalemate is inevitable followed by some events to replace Putin peacefully.
I don't believe Ukraine will regain lost territories and all that Putin is likely to do is to maintain current position and exhaust Ukrainians militarily to force them to negotiation table.
Isn't he also a member of the Oligarch class he's talking about?
Prigozhin doesn't look sane enough to control a nuclear arsenal.
He can't even control his own emotions.
Of course, he is ”loyal” to czar Putin. But his intentions should be clear…when he just wants to ”talk” to the military leadership.
Oh sure, I'm just asking questions in part to better understand the situation.
There's a silver casing to every thug...?
? source
Would the (heavily armed) convoy be enough to confront his foes? Short-term I'm guessing yes, longer-term no, possibly depending on participation. Reportedly, Kadyrov's forces were useless in Rostov.
What could Prigozhin/Wagner hope to accomplish, though? Force changes in leadership of the Defence Ministry, and go on about business as usual? Letting frustrations boil over, maybe Prigozhin thought so, with a show of force, if his various allegations could be shown true. If recognized, there'd be some (wide-ranging) implications for all to see, including for the war. But, some things have steered towards "business as usual", with charges dropped, mercenaries invited to join the Russian forces, whatever.
Has this at all penetrated Russia’s native propaganda front? There seem to be cracks that aren’t easily painted over.
The convoy allegedly downed a handful of choppers + a plane, earlier threatening to do that sort of thing if attacked. A fuel depot was blown up to slow the convoy down. Another country doing something like that could have resulted in a declaration of war, depending. What does a Mil 35 chopper cost anyway? An Ilyushin 22 plane? (For that matter, what about a gang killing 20?)
Here's a picture from Sunday of "a barrier" blocking a street leading to Red Square. I don't know... It just doesn't look like an adequate barrier to block a determined skate boarder, let alone the Wagner Group. Were they so confident the barrier wasn't needed or was this the best they could do on short notice?
I only ask because to whatever extent the Russian people are duped or not duped by state propaganda, I assume they know this whole thing happened. That seems significant.
How do commentators here compare the January 6 insurrection in the US capitol building with Prigozhin's coup attempt (if that's what it was)? Granted, Prigozhin and the Wagner Group had a lot more hardware than the Proud Boys could dream of, but in both cases, an attack on the center of power occurred.
According to Peter Turchin, [End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration] the USA is about due for a period of social disintegration. "The lessons of world history are clear, Turchin argues: When the equilibrium between ruling elites and the majority tips too far in favor of elites, political instability is all but inevitable. As income inequality surges and prosperity flows disproportionately into the hands of the elites, the common people suffer."
I don't know whether Russia as it is currently constituted is eligible for the kind of severe instability of which Turchin writes. The two episodes of past US instability climaxed in the Civil War, and then in the Great Depression. We are, he thinks, heading for a third crisis period.
The USSR collapsed 32 years ago. Has Russia inherited or developed enough new internal conflicts to tear itself apart? There are obviously significant conflicts, but are they sufficient for Prigozhin's coup to trigger an implosion. One thing Russia seems to be sharing with the USA is "the wealth pump" whereby the elites get richer and working people are immiserated.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Marina Ovsyannikova (Mar 2022)
? source
FYI, here are two different feeds on the Wagner move, with analyses, commentaries, summaries and such along the way:
I'd say you're comparing kids playing cowboys and Indians with a proper re-enactment of the October revolution.
———————————————————————————————
My guess is that Putin fled to Belarus, and that made the storming of Moscow unproductive of a quick regime change. But it looks like Prigozhin comes out more popular and stronger, and there will be a slower change. Putin may not come back to Moscow. Once you've been chased out of the Kremlin, there's no way to look like the strong man that Russia admires.
Humiliate those in power, I guess. The establishment was already trying to contain him and Wagner. And do notice the enthusiastic response he got in Rostov. The deal he got shows how weak Putin’s hand was: Putin might have been worried about forces joining Prigozhin. Not so remote possibility.
It’s been said that Putin fled to St Petersburgh. Of course it’s a rumour. History will be written later.
Prigozhin would do well not to trust Vladimir & Company, including Lukashenko, with his life. He's likely to be dead meat sooner rather than later. I wouldn't expect too much kindness were I a Wagner soldier, either. Charges dismissed? Probably not. I'm pretty sure the empire will strike back, as soon as they get their act together.
All of my Moscow agents retired, so I don't have any inside information. But my guess is that Russia will not have regime change this week, or next.
I take American right wing militia types seriously. They are quite capable of causing real damage, and have done so at various times and places.
Fair enough, you're a lot closer to them than I.
Our Russia predictions differ, but we agree that one or the other will have to go and fairly quick-smart.
Russia says China backs its efforts to stabilize the country after mercenary rebellion
[sup]— Simina Mistreanu · AP · Jun 25, 2023[/sup]
Public appearances ... good for morale ...
Russian defence minister appears for first time since Wagner mutiny
[sup]— Gerry Doyle · Reuters · Jun 26, 2023[/sup]
They might want to step lightly here, though. Many regular soldiers heartily agree with the grievances voiced by Prigozhin and definitely prefer him to the MoD brass. They did not join the rebellion, as he probably has hoped, but that does not mean they are all happy.
Also it should be noted that Russians do view Wagnerites as heroes, so persecuting them would be rather unpopular. I would rather expect dispersing the units and forcing them to join the regular forces.
Or the US occupied NATO countries back in 1945 and never left. After the war, Western Europe embraced US leadership, economic support, and military presence. It was a bargain that served them well but would ultimately compromise their sovereignty. Western Europe enjoyed benevolent servitude for half a century. Following the fall of the USSR, hubris would soon replace US scruples.
Washington no longer resembles anything like the Bartlett Administration from West Wing. It really never did. But West Wing is the image that we love to portray of Washington to ourselves. And when that myth jars against reality, then of course some Frank Underwood type must have temporarily usurped power. With just a little help from our media we quickly memory hole the jarring truth and reanimate the warm glow of Bartlett's Camelot.
https://tass.com/society/1638327
Team reality did predict it:
Quoting boethius
And I was in the middle of doing some basic research, writing up an analysis of why this latest chapter may too be staged ... take a break, and I wake up and the coup has ended ...
Why we would have reason to believe it was staged, is:
First, Prigozhin is very clear what he is doing is not a coup and the elected president is great ... so this is literally the first coup in history against subordinates of the head of government. So what could possibly be the plan if it's not staged? "March of freedom" to Moscow and then somehow get the Ministry of Defence job and run the war.
Second, the "coup" started literally 1000 km from Moscow. Rule number #1 of couping is get things done fast, "fait accomplie" as soon as possible and immediately seize both the key people and symbols of power. If this was some actual coup attempt, a part of his men would have sprung into action in Moscow, then heavy weapons
Third, Prigozhin has bee continuously criticising the whole officer corp, especially all the top brass, of Russia for months now, he's not in command of any significant number of troops (required for a coup) nor had any backing from any actual high ranking officer. There is literally zero conditions required to successfully stage a coup ... which Prigozhin is clear he's not even doing.
Fourth, Prigozhin only ever talks shit when Russia is winning and troops will be in high moral. Things escalated the last weeks of Bakhmut when it was certainly a foregone conclusion that Ukraine could not possibly hold on to a dozen or so buildings. So, whatever moral downer Prigozhin shit talking may actually caused, is more than compensated by actual victory on the battlefield in taking Bakhmut. It is the perfect timing for some venting of genuine negative emotions that citizens can then project onto Prigozhin: True patriot and son of Mother Russia. Likewise, this "coup" only happens after Ukraine publicly pauses their offensive, and no first day or then during the offensive where this sort of shit disturbing would provide maximum leverage or then (if a genuine coup) a minimum of Russian troops could be diverted to confront him (as the front lines must be adequately manned to prevent a Ukrainian breakthrough, and, moreover, a "coup" in Russia may supercharge the assaults).
So what is he doing. The narrative now is that it was indeed a show, but to simply negotiate more money. Now, it would in principle be possible (but highly unlikely) for going rogue to be a negotiation tactic. I'm going to skip over all the numerous reasons why that really does not seem to be the case, to get to the main one which is that the resolution is Prigozhin going to Belarus, which means absolutely nothing in terms of Prigozhin personal security. Now, if Prigozhin attained free passage to some actual neutral country that guaranteed his safety, like UAE or something, a place that was not a vassal state to Russia, where it would cause a diplomatic incident for Russia to be killing people there, and he could live with some plausible basis to believe he could enjoy his millions and millions, or even billions, he's cashed away so far and then extorted even more out of Russia with his little stunt, ok, that would be one thing. But he's literally going next door to Russia to a country with hundred thousand or more Russian troops where the leader of said country is literally a Russian Colonel somehow.
So, if it's not staged, then Prigozhin literally agreed to go somewhere where he would be killed, giving up all his leverage ... to be immediately killed as soon as he gets to Belarus or even along the way. He could be killed and then just never spoken of again, Belarus doesn't ever investigate and just never talks about him again.
The only rational situation where Prigozhin would do this sort of stunt is if he believed he was about to be assassinated anyways and he had nothing to lose, but in that case he'd negotiate leaving Russia's sphere of influence ... not accept just hopping over to Belarus and calling it square.
It's absolutely ridiculous as some sort of genuine rational plan on Prigozhin's part. There's also zero reason to believe he was about to be assassinated. He took Bakhmut, then was chilling in the rear, the worst (for him) that was being discussed is just the Russian MoD taking more control of Wagner. If Prigozhin talking shit and posting it to the internet was a problem, he would have been killed months ago in an "artillery strike - hero of the father land".
Now, I'm not saying things can't get so fucked up that this sort of fake coup happens by genuine surprise in some high stakes everyone is extorting everyone shit show.
However, a group of people that tie nearly everything they don't like happening in the media to "Soviet propaganda" should definitely be considering this as one case that may actually be this Soviet "nothing makes sense, everything is true and false" legendary propaganda move.
For the most part, these allegations of Soviet propaganda prowess bringing Trump to power through a network of international Marxist (who no one can name as working on behalf of the Soviet Union) and normalising gay and trans identity to break down the family unit and erode the military ethos and so on, is completely insane.
However, this whole Prigozhin saga is literally exactly what these alleged propaganda techniques would look like if they were to be actually used.
To what purpose?
Certainly there are costs of Prigozhin's shit talking ... but even then it's a controlled outlet of people's real emotions, so that's literally not even Soviet but simply standard propaganda methodology.
As for the benefits, to make a long story short, Prigozhin's antics are basically best described as "narrative spiking". You have Western spin doctors carefully crafting their cool aid, and everyone in the West (well, at least main stream media) is just standing around drinking it pleasantly, everything it good, everything is fine. Then, Prigozhin rides into the party on a Harley Davidson and a leather jacket and cracks two bottles of vodka and just drops them right into the cool aid like he doesn't even care. Suddenly everyone is getting drunk Prigozhin sauce, the calm and orderly party, more of a get together really, turns into a rowdy frat blowout with people losing their fucking minds about some coup happening or some shit. Everyone is suddenly a giddy Joe Rogan rambling on about their pet theories, as deep into things without having the slightest clue of what you're talking about as you can possibly get.
Why would you want to do this?
It's the only way for Russia to impact Western narrative and disrupt the medicine of the Western spin doctors. A "coup" in Russia was obviously not part of any plan in the West and it's then really difficult to blend back in these events into whatever the next version of reality and talking points are supposed to be.
To make matters worse, since these unexpected events in some ways go along with parts of the Western narrative (that Russia governance is incompetent and about to collapse ... any day now) all the foot soldiers of the Western narrative machine roll with it. These people still have jobs of reporting the news, and this is clearly news worthy and they are forced to report on things without there being time for a narrative consensus of the people who matter to be formed. Certainly sounds good to present things as a real coup in Russia and Putin is weak and so on, so Western journalists need to say something and so extend the existing narrative in a logical way to include these events.
Measures are certainly extreme, but this coup happens literally the day after both Ukraine and senators in the US rapidly escalate the talk of nuclear events in Ukraine and Nuclear retaliation for any nuclear events in Ukraine, that would obviously be Russia's doing by definition.
If you're Putin or anyone in Russian governance, intelligence or the military planning ... this is really alarming talk, by a side that just made a movie trailer for an offensive that has not made any gains remotely close to "cutting the land bridge", and arguably no actual gains at all.
... So, what's even more newsworthy than all this nuclear talk and would disrupt any actual plan, political or operational, nuke wise? A literal coup in Russia might do the trick. Basically throwing out a wild card in a tricky situation to at least disrupt your opponents plans.
Whether Russian analysts and decision makers were genuinely concerned of this nuclear narrative or not, or viewed it as sabre rattling, I don't know, but it's certainly something people would pay attention to.
However, there's also other benefits for such an event and reasons to stage it. Ukrainians and the West just went on an emotional rollercoaster of all their dreams suddenly coming true and then ... nada. Likewise, ordinary Russians were just faced with the anxiety and abyss of real chaos and then immediately relieved and comforted with the warm cloak of order and familiarity.
Which is literally the exact definition of this mythical Soviet propaganda system, which as an explainer for the entire liberal progressive movement has scant evidence, nor does it seem even possible for Soviet agents to be orchestrating the "left" since several decades right under the Western intelligence and media system's nose, but if you take this Soviet propaganda hypothesis and actually lay it out and ask what would fit this methodology, this whole Prigozhin saga is an exact match and clearly feasible and with direct communication between Prigozhin and Putin and Putin and everyone else of importance, there is clearly the organisational opportunity to pull it off, the scope is limited enough to be some actual feasible plan, "no blood was spilled".
The coup was always stoppable if it was just Wagner (and a fraction of Wagner at that). It's just that it was quite unclear if it was stoppable before they marched into central Moscow, or at least caused serious damage in the outskirts.
4,000 men with no logistical support could be beaten, especially as defections would become increasingly likely if pardons were offered while no sign of a larger rebellion emerged. But they could also tank the war effort in Ukraine and cause an incredible amount of damage. The Wagner column was about the size of the garrison in Mariupol, and they caused Russia a very hard time even with half of them retreating and extremely loose rules of engagement from the air. You can't really retake your own city that same way.
My guess would be that Prigozhin hoped more people would bandwagon aboard, since dissatisfaction with Shoigu is apparently widespread in the military. He's an outsider for one, and, as the war continues to go poorly, the military is upset that it remains subservient to the FSB and other former KGB elements, even as it grows in power and ability to challenge their dominance in the state (60+% of Putin's ministers have some prior tie to the intelligence services.)
Notably, after a reshuffle coup over removing Shoigu, there has been no show of unity, a video of Shoigu and Putin together, etc. No strong sign to show the coup demands weren't met. All they have released is a video of what looks like stock footage with no sound. Even Russian milbloggers are skeptical. It's a tough position because Putin can't remove Shoigu without looking weak, but then the military is also likely clamouring for his dismissal considering the absolute shit show to date. Notably for public opinion, Wagner left cheered as heros and MoD forces moved in to jeers and cat calls.
If Shoigu goes and Prigozhin keeps some meaningful part of Wagner for his "duties" in Belarus, then the reshuffle coup is successful, and the best predictor of a coup in political science, bar none, is a previously successful coup.
I imagine they will try to MacArthur Shoigu, keep him in the title but strip all power, but he sort of has to go along for that to work.
Well kudos for that! It did all look theatrical at times for sure, but shooting your own helicopters down is a bit extravagant unless Prigozhin suddenly turns up in the West telling stories to intelligence agencies or some such. Or am I missing something?
Well, first of all, maybe it is just a shit show. My main point is that people who say masterful Russian propaganda methods exercised through the West's own technology platforms under NSA surveillance got Trump elected should certainly at least consider the possibility these events as staged for propaganda purposes.
Not that I'm saying you personally say Russia got Trump elected, or even played a contributing roll (rather than the 2 billion of free airtime the Western media provided Trump), just that my basic point is in that context.
That being said, if it is staged the critical problem is selling it to Western media. You need to give to get. Prigozhin needs to "go the distance", at least shit talking wise, so that this is reported as a full blown coup, rather than Prigozhin just clowning around and looking stupid. Response of Western media could be ... yeah ... right, I'll believe it when there's actual fighting going on.
So, how do you sell it? Talk is cheap, so you first would want to say things that really seem "coup like", such as Ukraine never intended to attack Russia, the generals are traitors etc. ... of course you don't want to trigger an actual coup, so you also say you 100% support the elected president and you're not even doing a coup but just a "march for peace".
Then, yeah, maybe down a few helicopters. Did this even happen? Who knows. And if it did happen, could also just be staged as helicopters can be remotely controlled, shot down, or then fire fake missiles (i.e. missiles without warheads) and then set off a harmless fireworks from the helicopter and "go down". All this is happening inside Russia, so events can be 100% controlled. However, I haven't even seen any footage of these alleged helicopter engagements.
The video that supposedly proves Wagner came under attack is just a camera jogging through a forest, no sounds of battle whatsoever, with a guy just saying they came under attack.
Now, they keep on saying the "mutiny" was bloodless ... so at least the Russian narrative is no one died at all. So that doesn't even seem compatible with helicopters being downed, or then the pilots weren't harmed. The Russian narrative doesn't even make any sense on this point.
However, the whole point of an operation like this, if it's staged, is that it's so zany that it's impossible to tell. Sure, zany shit happens all the time. Take Trump's run for president, or Hunter Biden's laptop or then the character arch of Saddam Hussein. Really crazy shit does happen that genuinely doesn't seem scripted and is just driven by zany characters doing wild shit. Maybe Prigozhin's Russia's version of Trump and Ye, just 100% riffing it all the time.
What is the truth when it comes to the cloak and dagger doings of intelligence agencies and their associates, I view as best to keep an open mind, maybe it will become clear later or never. But as a matter of principle, I feel it's wise to assume people's who's job is to deceive you ... may actually succeed in doing so from time to time.
Well it looked unstoppable from my armchair. But then it stopped. I think I'll shut up now for a bit and see what happens next.
Quoting boethius
Yeah, and people whose job is to inform you honestly, too, I fear.
"Look, we made this model of a horse extra big, so you can't drag it into your city, so don't even try, even though we put wheels on it to make you try. And we've given up and gone home anyway, honest."
“Initially Putin said the charges will be dropped but that seems to be on the table again,” Hawkins said. “A lot will depend on the Kremlin’s response to his statement, and how that relationship will develop if there will be one at all.”
“[Prigozhin] said the whole incident was simply a demonstration of the weak spots of the Russian security forces, a demonstration of how – according to him – Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine could have gone if given to the hands of the most professional fighting force in the world.”
But how exactly that would look like is hard to say, Hawkins said.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/6/26/russia-ukraine-live-news-shoigu-meets-troops-after-wagner-mutiny
Apparently this was meant as a kind of wake up call to the Kremlin. Strange way to do so...
Quoting unenlightened
Things are still in motion, and of what has happened so far a lot remains unclear, and a lot will probably remain hidden from view in the foreseeable future. But from what I can see, it was neither of these extremes. Comparison with the January 6 riots in Washington is inapt, but if there is anything in common between these events, it is that neither of them was an attempted coup, strictly speaking. Trump's rioters hardly had any definite plan, but their actions amounted to trying to force the hand of Congress, rather than to literally overthrow the government and install Trump.
Prigozhin's mutiny was clearly well planned (US intelligence now say that they saw Wagner's preparations days in advance, and that is believable). But it seems that he was also aiming to force change within the system, rather than to overthrow Putin. Prigozhin may be a loose cannon, but he is not insane. Most likely, he sought to renegotiate the terms of whatever informal agreement he had with Putin, improve his standing, replace military leadership with whom he had been feuding. Such a feudalistic power play on the part of a warlord is not that out of place in today's Russia.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yeah, that's my take too. Prigozhin was probably gambling on receiving support from parts of the military, but he miscalculated.
You can see how 'relieved and comforted' people are on Russian TV... On Solovyov's show Bezrukov is complaining about the weak and impotent government. 'This couldn't happen in a strong country!' he says (on Solovyov's!). Margarita just looks stunned... Half of milbloggers are calling for blood... On RIA's forums very few people are 'comforted', most are frightened and confused. The most often asked question is: why nobody seeks to punish someone who shot down a dozen of Russian airmen?
Again: a person initiating an action that Putin explicitly called on TV 'treason' just walks free, with personal safety guaranteed by Putin (as reported by Peskov), greeted by crowds. Is that a show of order, a source of comfort? I disagree.
I would say that both Prigozhin and Putin lost much too much for it to be staged.
EDIT: Just an excerpt from Putin's speech:
[i]I repeat: any internal mutiny is a deadly threat to our state, to us as a nation. It’s a blow against Russia, against our people. And our actions to defend the fatherland from such a threat will be brutal.
Anyone who consciously went on the path of betrayal, who prepared the armed mutiny, went on the path of blackmail and terrorist actions, will be punished inevitably. They will answer before the law and our people.[/i]
None of that happened.
For sure it will remain confusing. However, the fright will dissipate with everything going back to normal/
But for any normal person, they will definitely be relieved and comforted by the coup ending suddenly. One day it's the return to the 90s, tanks gonna be firing at government buildings and so on, bracing for total chaos, collapse of government, and a civil war in Russia ... but also nothing makes sense and it's not a coup and a march for peace, and then the next day it's just completely over, "settled", bloodless.
Quoting Jabberwock
As I mentioned, you need to give to get. Coup has to be "sold".
Reasons the negatives can be mitigated are, for instance, confidence in victory on the battlefield.
However, the costs only make sense to consider in the context of the benefits.
The whole Western media is now talking about this coup and how weak Putin and Russia is ... what they aren't talking about anymore is the imminent nuclear attack in Ukraine by Russia nor needing to get more heavy weapons to Ukraine as Russian resistance has been "fierce". Zelensky is out of the news, and all we're talking about is Russian internal politics and how bad a Russian civil war could get.
However, it's difficult to complete such an analysis because we don't have all the secret information available to intelligence agencies. Maybe this was a high stakes reaction to information of some other intelligence agency engaging in some high stakes action (which may or may not be actually true), such as pre-blaming Russia for a nuclear attack and then going and spreading some nuclear material and blaming it on Russia.
Or, then just classic mad man theory as well as classic controlled opposition.
And my basic point is not to "prove" it was staged, just that it's certainly possible (and possible for reasons we may not have any information access about), but most of all, a group that ascribes enough elaborate propaganda power to Russia as to fix elections in the United States should certainly conclude from that belief that pretty much anything happening in Russia could be some sophisticated propaganda plot.
That's the point I want to emphasise the most, the belief that Russian intelligence can significantly influence US elections through US technology companies under US government regulation and NSA supervision is not compatible with the complete denial Russian intelligence can't come up with this whole Prigozhin character arch for reasons we may even be too unsophisticated to even imagine. If Russia can control events, and perception of events, in the US, they certainly can do it even better in Russia.
And this criticism is mainly towards Western media that harped on about Russia influencing US elections for years, compromat on Trump etc. and then turn around and take all these antics (since months and months and months) by Prigozhin at face value.
That aspect makes me wonder if Prigozhin had been communicating with parts of Putin's regime and other oligarchs who may have extended tentative support if he achieved a certain level of success. The sudden abandonment of the project could have come from being notified that the support was being withdrawn. Palace intrigue combined with Mafia gang dynamics.
Having to shoot down Russian aircraft cannot be what Prigozhin was hoping for.
I don't understand why their military was pitted against itself to begin with. Was that on purpose to keep the military from taking over? Or what?
- Putin claims Russia would have put down 'armed rebellion'
- Russia President Addresses nation and warns against 'internal mutiny' in wake of Wagner insurrection
- Wagner boss calls march on Moscow 'protest' and not attempt to overthrow Putin
- Analysis: Yevegeny Prigozhin over-reached and lost
- Analysis: The West must now consider possibility of a Russian political collapse
- Purin power threatened: John Bolton advises not to 'underestimate' Putin
- Analysis: Despite an abrupt about-face, Prigozhin deeply humiliated Kremlin
- The next shoe to drop in Russia
- China throws support behind 'strategic partner' Russia
- Biden says the US and its allies had nothing to with Wagner's rebellion
Now, why Putin et. al. would want these kinds of headlines is to skip over the basic advantages of taking the initiative in forming headlines. Putin is in the news and the whole world wants to know what he has to say about these recent events, and who's not in the news: Zelensky asking for more weapons, or Graham and Blumenthal talking about their resolution to put Ukraine under the US nuclear umbrella, nor celebration or rationalisation of Ukraine taking a few villages in their offensive, nor any events in Ukraine at all.
Boethius and Tzeentch haven't made much sense to the rest of us since the war began. We're not really expecting that to change.
There's plenty of benefits we can analyse.
My point about benefits we are too unsophisticated to even know is in the context of people think Russian intelligence plaid a vital roll in getting Trump elected. If you ascribe that much power to Russian intelligence they are literally capable of anything. Literally anything happening in the entire world could be Russian intelligence.
However, I don't ascribe to that theory, so, yes, I would agree with you that we should be able to make some sense of things if its staged.
The basic benefit of whole Prigozhin thing is just getting your message in the Western news to begin with. Prigozhin sorts of "hacks into" the Western narrative machine. Of course, how is that possible? It's only possibly by telling things the Western media wants to hear. It's quite extraordinary, a Russian military commander (or whatever you want to call Prigozhin) starts to be basically a trusted source of what is happening on the front line.
If you want your enemy to believe something false for either tactical or strategic value ... well you just have Prigozhin mix it into his diatribes. For example, if you want your enemy to double down in Bakhmut, have Prigozhin say there's heavy losses and artillery is running out and so on. The consequences of a single false belief can be quite extensive and costly.
Likewise, want to frustrate the Ukrainian-Neocon narrative to get Ukraine more heavy weapons, maybe stage a coup and seem weak.
For, one asymmetry in this war is that Russia does not need to import any weapons, but Ukraine does, and (as has been demonstrated since the war started) actually getting heavy weapons into Ukraine can be a long and complicated diplomatic process.
Me too.
Prigozhin doesn't strike me as the type who would march on the Kremlin armed with nothing but the power of hope and a handful of troops.
The timing for a coup also seems illogical, since the Ukrainian offensive had just stalled after achieving very little.
My sense is that unless we get more information, this episode will be best judged by the effects it has on the battlefield.
If Ukraine suddenly starts winning on the battlefield, there is genuine chaos in the Russian camp.
If things stay pretty much the same, it was probably a fluke blown out of proportion by the media.
If the Russians launch a new offensive, it was probably a psy-op.
Quoting frank
Unless 'the rest of you' stop hitting the hopium, I don't expect that to change either.
Well, give it a go.
Why would the entire Russian military and intelligence structure of Russia tolerate Prigozhin criticising them for months and months, "embarrassing them", lowering troop and citizen moral, and so on? Why would Putin tolerate it? Why would Russian intelligence (that has plenty control over the internet in Russia) allow Prigozhin to just post his dissenting videos completely impromptu?
How does Prigozhin do his "march for peace" for 800km without running into any road blocks or obstacles of any kind. Why would Prigozhin the "mutineer" be safe in Belarus and accept such a deal in order to get away with the fruits of extorting and embarrassing the Kremlin, the military, the intelligence structures?
You really think Prigozhin is just this powerful? Allowed to amass this unchecked power ... that's 100% dependent on the Russian military structure for ammo and supplies?
You really think the best explanation is that Prigozhin has just massive balls and (at least expects) to just waltz out of Russia into Belarus carrying his sacks of gold under his massive nuts?
Nobody really knows right now what Prigozhin was really thinking, he says it was a protest of kinds. But is that the actual reason?
Maybe what you say is right, but then why stay in Belarus? Might take some time to figure out what was going on.
Maybe. Or maybe he did receive support? The air assets brought against Wagner were not considerable, rotary wing craft held at low levels. It would be interesting to see which branch the pilots were with. Gerasimov hasn't been seen or heard since the rebellion. Shoigu has only been seen in a bit of stock footage type shots that could have been from any time. Putin also hasn't been visible.
After Putin goes on TV and specifically references 1917, then allows the rebel leader and the rebels to carry off their military gear to Belarus, no punishment, you'd think he'd at least try to do some show of strength thing where he is seen with Shoigu, showing that he hadn't folded to Wagner's demands. But that hasn't happened, allowing room for people to speculate that he did have to capitulate on command of the MoD.
But even if that was the case, why wouldn't he reverse course after the crisis was averted to show he hadn't capitulated?
It's pure speculation, but I get the feeling that this might have been the last straw for the military leadership and that they may be dictating ultimatums at this point.
The thing is, a lot of these guys are quite nationalist, and they also have a sunk cost with the war. They absolutely do not want chaos behind the lines, Wagner taking Moscow, etc., because they want to win, but they also want more control over operations, more independence, more freedom to promote leaders based on merit, and freedom to go after anyone whose corruption is hurting the war effort, even if they are part of the top FSB-dominant clique.
Pure speculation, but if we start seeing guys who could formerly act with impunity getting arrested and leadership shifts, that would be my suspicion of why. This would be a bad thing for Ukraine (more competent and possibly hard line leadership), although it could also precipitate another crisis, as empowering the military means taking power from those who are used to having it.
Yes, you seem pretty hung up on that argument, but it does not follow. As in our previous discussions, you seem to treat the issue in a restrictively binary way – either Russian intelligence can orchestrate the whole US elections or it is helpless. That is, of course, a false dilemma.
Quoting boethius
Putin taking an enormous hit to his reputation (again: he literally promised Prigozhin, the traitor, harsh punishment and utterly failed to deliver) for the price of being in the news for three days (because that is how Western media works) is beyond absurd. But OK, let us see the news: Poland has promised 'thousands of assault rifles and millions of ammo', Denmark has announced that it will speed up its plane replacements two years ahead just to give Ukraine F16s earlier, Australia will provide 70 million military package, US has announced that it will announce tomorrow another 500 million package, Bulgaria (!) has approved a military aid package of unknown value, foreign ministers of EU states approved an increase of 3.5 BILLION euros for military assistance for Ukraine. These are news FROM TODAY. Is that the 'frustrated narrative' of military aid? It does not look that frustrated to me...
Quoting boethius
Kremlin has tolerated Prigozhin for months, because he was extremely useful for the war effort, at least until Bakhmut. After Wagner was decimated in Bakhmut and many contracts expired, its military force became to wane. For MoD it was a signal that it might take control of it or at least pacify it, for Prigozhin it was the last call to stay relevant. But, more importantly, Prigozhin is (or was till Friday) idolized by all pro-war Russians: his troops were most efficient, did not flinch from most difficult tasks, actually made the effort (unlike Tik-Tok troops). Solovyov was his buddy, Peskov's son was thrilled to 'serve' under him, milbloggers loved him... He was all that the MoD brass was not. In short, he was a morale booster, the military man Russians always wanted. You do not just whack someone like that because he said some harsh things (which were still rather mild compared to, say, Girkin).
Agreed. My comment is pure speculation.
As Wagner is moved to Belarus, it seems NATO is not taking chances.
Wagner wasn't military. They weren't even legal (an "illegal armed group" is how Russian law qualifies such formations). As for what purpose they served, originally they were a semi-secret pro-government mercenary group that functioned somewhat like old-time privateers. They operated mostly in Africa, enriching themselves with deniable help and blessing of the Kremlin. They saw action in Ukraine in 2014 and later in Syria.
When Russia invaded Ukraine last year, Wagner was not there originally; Prigozhin's relationship with the military top brass was already poor at that time. But, shrewd businessman that he was, he quickly got on the action, and following the failure of blyatzkrieg, Putin must have appreciated any help he could get. Wagner's mercenaries, boosted by tens of thousands of expendable convicts recruited directly from prison camps, proved to be the most effective assault troops (which says much about the state of the Russian military).
That convict element seems very important to the mix to me. I think of those videos where Progozhin is shown telling them (more or less): "Make no mistake, if you back out of this deal, I will kill you myself."
Well this last offensive has been mentioned a few times, notably by Col. Macgregor, who has been pretty good in his predictions so far.
So it's not a surprise that NATO is also on the reaction, because if there is no big push from either side this summer, then we are in for an extremely long and ever more dangerous stalemate.
It's going to be a rather tense couple of months...
This is not what I've stated. I've stated the belief that Russian intelligence can orchestrate the US elections is incompatible with the belief that all these strange events with Prigozhin cannot possibly be staged but must be exactly what the Western media would wish to be true about them.
It is not a false dilemma. If Russia didn't engineer the outcome of Trump's election, then maybe it's still very capable, just not that capable.
Quoting Jabberwock
For sure it's absurd. However, if you do actually want to stage the coup then this is one thing you just have to accept, that "strongly worded" statements go back and forth during the "coup", so there's buy in, and then everything is just walked back.
Sure, in some ways there's negatives for Putin's reputation, but if he remains in power and the Ukraine war and economy goes well there's no long term damage, and maybe later they're all like "aha, it was all just an intelligence operation, many Russian lives were saved by getting the West to believe whatever Prigozhin would tell them".
Also, keep in mind that Putin's reputation doesn't matter much in the West, he's already literally Hitler over here, and where it does matter is vis-a-vis other authoritarians, and these conversations are private, so he could just tell them it was all planned (whether it was or not). Point being, negative reputation in Western media may not really matter and how other authoritarians view things maybe very different (what likely matters most to other authoritarians is simply who is winning on the battlefield).
Quoting Jabberwock
But you don't need Prigozhin for that. You can just arrest him and replace him or even just pass a law nationalising Wagner at any time. There is zero evidence Prigozhin is some sort of brilliant military commander ... his curriculum vitae is going to prison and then running a hot dog stand and then fancy restaurants. There is zero military benefits Prigozhin provides that some other commander / businessman can't equally provide, maybe better.
As for the risks, someone going "off script" and is totally out of control and may do anything at anytime, bad for moral, etc. is impossible to justify tolerating during a war. You really think Putin and the ministry of defensc and intelligence and all the generals will sit around drawing up plans that can be "disrupted" by Prigozhin at any time? It makes zero sense.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, zero problem: "died in an artillery strike, hero of the nation".
You're argument is basically Prigozhin had the leverage and importance to have every higher-up in the military and Putin himself worried what he might do or say, worried about the power he's continued to be allowed to accumulate. Maybe that's true, but I find it a far longer stretch of the imagination than what is non-sensical theatrics is just that: theatre.
Putin's reputation in the West is completely irrelevant; for him his reputation at home is essential. The propaganda monolith is very sensitive to any detractions, Putin appearing weak before Russians (and that is exactly what has happened, as evidenced by Russian TV, forums and blogs) for him is potentially fatal. He has shown that he can be challenged with impunity - there is nothing worse for an authoritarian figure.
Not to mention that you have failed to show how exactly 'Russian lives have been saved'. Nothing of the kind happened and in two days nobody will remember the coup, as the military packages are getting bigger and bigger.
Quoting boethius
That is demonstrably false. Prigozhin alone has assembled a military force that appears to be decidedly better than the rest of the Russian forces. The whole point is that Shoigu and Gerasimov's troops could not equal Wagner even with theoretically bigger resources. If he was that easy to replace, then all Russian soldiers should equal Wagnerites. They pretty obviously do not.
Quoting boethius
Again - they had little choice as Wagner was indispensable. Besides Prigozhin was not going off script for most of the war – only when he started to hint at his ambitions they decided to pacify him by sending Wagner to Bakhmut.
Quoting boethius
No imagination is needed, because we do know that he had the leverage: the war would go much worse without Wagner. If that happened, Putin would have much bigger problems than Prigozhin. If they had the choice between allowing his ambitions to grow and losing an important part of the front, it was not much of a choice at all.
Prigozhin directly contradicted Putin on the old NATO-phobia. Nay, NATO wasn't really a reason for the invasion. The official line on the line. Though, Prigozhin laid this on people lying to Putin. And about other things. (Prigozhin doesn't come through as a patient fellow, by the way.)
So, what the heck is Putin going to do with that? He might have looked at the chessboard, looked again (a sociopathic look), and figured he'd effectively run with Shoigu.
I'm guessing the Club of Angry Patriots would run with Prigozhin — there are overlaps. (By the way, they're not outlawed in Putin's Russia despite being extremists critical of the Kremlin.)
I see. It's just all really strange.
Well good we agree his reputation in the West is irrelevant, and I assume you agree with my point of reputation vis-a-vis other authoritarians.
As for domestic reputation, I agree with your general framework, but this (in my view) simply supports that the events were staged as it is precisely these drawbacks that are mitigated.
In my experience, the biggest difference between planned (whether overt or covert) and unplanned events is the presence of risk mitigation. When things happen by surprise and you just need to deal with them, there's generally no time to carefully mitigate minor risks. A quick example is a device that finds itself in a hostile environment compared to a device designed for a hostile environment.
In this case, Prigozhin mitigates his remarks about Putin to such an extent it's difficult to call this a coup (as originally advertised) at all and it's now being referred to a mutiny or rebellion ... but mutiny or rebellion to do what?
Putin himself was not openly challenged, Prigozhin clarifies during his escapade that Putin is the duly elected head of government, and it's not a coup but a "march for justice".
Instead of Putin being actually challenged, he plays more the "godfather" role of mediating and resolving disputes between subordinates, all of which pay homage to him.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, definitely, if no one will remember the coup and it will be just forgotten, then all the costs you point out don't matter. Just like the US pulling out of Afghanistan and leaving their "friends" high and dry, and having people fall off planes and so forth definitely seemed like a "reputation hit" at the time but no one remembers or cares now. The Western narrative has become a mix of out of sight and out of mind as well as Afghanis just didn't fight for their freedom hard enough, US tried its best but you get what you deserve.
However, my point was that if it is an intelligence operation and somehow these negatives consequences you point out become relevant (costs outweigh the gains) they could just come out and say it was an intelligence operation to fool the West / Ukrainians and that saved lives somehow (whether it is true or not).
Most costs and risks are not static, there's ways to mitigate them by some action in the future. Something we have already seen; if it was planned then the problem would arise of how make people 100% believe there's a coup and a "point of no return" has been reached and there will be fighting between Wagner and regular forces ... but then unwind it afterwards. It's a problem, but if you think creatively you may come up with the idea of having Belarus broker a deal and Prigozhin will go hang out there and that's the resolution to the legal crisis. It still doesn't make much sense, but it makes more sense than someone internal to Russia brokering a deal and Prigozhin staying in Russia.
And think about it, why would Lukashenko spontaneously intervene in Russian internal affairs? If this was an "open challenge" to Putin and Putin wants these mutineers dead, it makes absolutely zero sense for Lukashenko to call Prigozhin like this was some high school level drama.
Quoting Jabberwock
This is just pure delusion. 25 000 troops without any supply lines or airforce or satellite intelligence and so on, are not going to defeat a million troops with supply lines and all the hardware and gadgets. Russian regular forces could continuously carpet bomb Wagner positions. Additionally, not all Wagner troops joined the "rebellion", those that didn't have the opportunity now to just join Russian regular forces. So we don't even know how much troops we're talking about.
There's also zero evidence that each Wagner fighter is literally match for 10 or even a 100 Russian regular forces, even if equipment and supply lines where equal. Pretty much a ludicrous claim. To make matters even worse, since the "coup" started 1000km from Moscow (if this was a real coup) Wagner would need to break through fortified positions, and Russian troops need only surround them and continuously fire artillery, rockets, missiles and continuously carpet bomb the entire area.
Your statement here is so foolish and disconnected to any military reality that it's difficult to even contain in the minds eye for the purposes of critical scrutiny.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's not how any military or intelligence operation works or even business works. Someone who goes off script and is unpredictable and a loose cannon is a serious problem, as you don't know what they're going to do and how much damage they can cause, wittingly or not. It doesn't matter how fast you are at putting up drywall if you're likely to burn down the entire project.
And any organisation (government, business, non-profit, and even more so military and intelligence agencies) are extremely sensitive to what information is made public. It would not matter how good a developer or executive you are at Google if you start randomly talking to the press and causing PR problems (no single person could possibly produce enough value to offset all the time required to deal with and mitigate problematic talking to the press, in addition to not knowing what the person would say next). Likewise, whenever intelligence information is leaked (and not on purpose) the idea that the leaker was otherwise good at their job and maybe still "worth it" doesn't come into the equation.
Prigozhin is not essential to Wagner continuing to operate essentially exactly the same.
Equating Wagner with Prigozhin is just false and there would be zero reason to keep him around if he was causing problems, you just get rid of him (by an "accident" or just arrest him on sedition or make a executive order or pass a law nationalising his "private military organisation") and problem solved.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, Prigozhin does not equal Wagner, you can easily have Wagner without Prigozhin and there is zero evidence that Prigozhin's experience in prison and hotdog stands and fancy restaurants has made him some military strategist so brilliant that he is simply irreplaceable and the war cannot be fought without him. Likely he's not involved in the tactical decisions at all (but leaves that to military professionals).
Wagner is just one of the "private militaries" that exist within Russia. There are actually a large number of "volunteer," forces that are not integrated into the MoD structure and are under the control of quasi-military leadership. Wagner and the Kadyrovite Chechens are the most visible of these in the West, in part due to significant efforts to market themselves online, but far from the only ones. Wagner itself had some other armed groups (ironically, explicitly neo-Nazi ones) folded into it prior to the war for example.
Wagner had, however, grown into the most potent such force due to its ability to recruit from prisons and then its willingness to carry out costly frontal attacks that the military balked at despite apparently heavy pressure from Putin and his clique.
Having your own military group is a weird sort of credibility thing in Russia. Strelkov's cred, while waning fast, comes from his prior control over independent forces in the Donbas for example. Some of these are the result of prior political crises in Russia. Minority leaders essentially rule as warlord vassals of Putin, the prime example being Kadyrov. These groups are less threatening because they don't pull support from the Russian majority, unlike Wagner.
While most groups are small compared to Wagner, which was at times 10-20% of Russian combat forces in Ukraine, they add up. The MoD was talking about bringing 20,000 in as contract troops by 7/1 and another 25,000 by August, essentially filling out an entire corps equivalent, which would be a significant share of combat forces. A significant number of these would be assigned to an army based out in the Far East, which is where they tend to be from.
You also have groups active in the Donbass since 2014, foreign groups (small but they add up), South Ossetians (apparently just took horrific losses plugging a gap in the defensive line), the DNR, LPR, etc. Just the MoD, Kadyrovites, Wagner, LPR, and DNR meant 5 independent armies in the war- it being such a shit show is sort of explained by this.
True, but Wagner could recruit from prisons only because the Russian state allowed that to legally happen, precisely for the purposes of having prisoners dying on the front lines rather than regular troops.
The whole point of mercenaries is they are more expendable and the civilian population is less affected if they die.
Which fit in this strategy of attrition during the last phase of the war, as well as mitigated the disruption of the sanctions (limit "normal people" dying while people are also dealing with sanctions, and so reduce overall discontentment and disruption; i.e. avoid mobilising as much as possible people actually needed for the economy to function properly).
While Ukrainians have been fighting with regular Ukrainians this past half a year, Russia has mostly been fighting with these mercenaries.
In parallel to this phase of keeping the fighting focus in Bakhmut and primarily using mercenaries, the missile campaign has aimed to attrit Ukrainian air defences.
This all makes a lot of sense if during this time the Russian population has hardened its support for the war (due to things like Ukrainian intelligence assassinating people in Russia, suppression of dissent, and so on), the mobilisation and training of reserves can complete, Ukrainian air defence is effectively depleted, continuous artillery attrition over the whole front, and the next phase of the war Russia will have high moral, civilian support and air and artillery superiority.
Not to say Russia achieved all these things, just what I think is clearly what they aimed to accomplish these last 6 months.
Any large scale manoeuvres require huge amounts of troops, so not feasible with only mercenaries, but this last attritional phase of the war does make sense to use mercenaries as much as possible to limit the effect of casualties on the civilian population.
Not that this basic strategy of using mercenaries explains the "rebellion", but just why Wagner has been such a focus since last six months.
If this current and next phase of the war involve large scale engagements (such as Ukrainian attacks at multiple points along the front and any large scale offensives the Russians may do) then mercenaries are of less relevant. It also makes sense to distribute the experience gained in Bakhmut throughout the whole of the military. Which again, doesn't really explain the coup, but does explain why Russian MoD would offer Wagner forces that "didn't rebel" to sign regular military contracts.
And that is exactly why there are good reasons to think it was not staged: the most damaging for Putin was his speech: if he waited for the situation to clear up, the damage to his domestic reputation would be much less and the effects would be more or less the same. Even the same speech but less conclusive and with more doublespeak, which is his specialty, would be better: specifically threatening Prigozhin and not delivering made him take the biggest blow.
The same goes for the 'defence', which was simply hilarious. If it was staged, they could just prepare some reserve force for the defense of the capital city: that would be as convincing, as, you know, countries at war tend to have their capital cities defended, so it would not be very surprising. Instead they have been caught with their pants down. Are you saying they wanted to be comically convincing?
And I have already given reasons why Prigozhin did not challenge Putin (initially, because then HE DID, the fact that you conveniently omit): he did not want to overthrow him, just force to share some power with him, while Putin could still save face. But Putin chose confrontational language and in result could not prevent losing face when he could not deliver (which could be easily avoided if it was staged).
Quoting boethius
The operation had obvious costs and no visible gains for them. Now you are just saying that it might have gains if they said that it does... that does not even make sense.
Quoting boethius
After talks in Rostov Prigozhin refused to communicate with MoD/Kremlin directly. Lukashenko was their last channel of contact.
Quoting boethius
You misunderstood that completely. I did not say that Wagner could take out all other Russian forces, I have pointed out that Wagner is a much better force than any comparable Russian command. That is an objective fact confirmed by their war records: Wagner troops perform much better than other Russian troops. Thus your claim that anyone could replace Prigozhin is demonstrably false: those who organize and command other troops do it much worse than Prigozhin. If that did not make any difference, then the troops would not be any different.
Again, that is obviously false. As I have already wrote, if that was the case, then all Russian troops would be at similar level. Quite obviously they are not. Wagner is the most effective Russian unit by a large margin. Are you saying that it is not Prigozhin's merit and just pure coincidence?
Quoting boethius
So you are basically saying that anyone can run a successful PMC and anyone can be a successful commander. Seriously?
Exactly: the countries embraced it.
But those who fell under Russian rule didn’t, as is obvious.
If you have problems in seeing the obvious difference, it’s your problem. The only one embracing Russia’s military presence is a Belarussian dictator who needs those troops to hold on to power.
Yeah, maybe shooting down helicopters is just a form of protest.
Well, Yeltsin needed only to climb on an IFV and give a speech. And then all those milloin of troops (then, actually million) and their official leaders couldn’t do anything.
The most dangerous issue for Putin was the reaction of the man in the street in Rostov applauding the Wagner troops. Yet Prigozhin found himself alone, so he naturally goes with the whimsical ludicrous lie of this just being a ”protest”.
CSIS doesn't seem to think his intention was a coup.
26:55 - They seem to actually confirm my idea.
"The organizers of the rebellion, despite the loss of adequacy, could not fail to understand this. They understood everything, including that they committed crimes, that they divided and weakened the country, which is now facing a huge external threat, unprecedented pressure from outside". (1m21)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/vidtranslator/status/1673416062262730753[/tweet]
If even Batka openly shows his lack of respect, then Putin's cunning subterfuge worked: everyone thinks he is weak.
Has Russia ever had an actual coup? I can't think of one.
Katrina Doxsee isn’t CSIS. And then everything said before and after doesn’t at all give your impression.
And then there is whar Putin has said about this. It was Putin that referred this to 1917.
Now the Wagner coup might have been planned as in 1991 that the leader isn’t deposed (just stays at his summer place), hence it might have been a surprise for Prigozhin how Putin responded. Now Putin is thanking the (loyal) troops of succeeding in avoiding a civil war. A moment of silence was given to the killied helicopter pilots.
Putin: "It's not a war. It's a special military operation."
Prigozhin: "It's not a coup. It's a special military disagreement."
Anyway, whether staged or not, a coup attempt or not, Putin could use the events to enact more draconian laws, tighten control, perhaps start another draft, disperse blame or otherwise muddle the waters, whatever useful for his chess game.
Be sure not to watch the whole thing, because you may just have to face the fact that she's not the only one who puts it forward and they all seem to agree.
This endless cope upon being faced with unwelcome information is getting rather tiresome.
Prigozhin isn't a politician with a constituency and has zero official command of anything that would be important for a coup, such as a military district or in charge of an intelligence agency.
There's zero evidence that Prigozhin has any backers in any position of power at all (except for Putin who he was on personal speaking terms with up to a week before this coup occurred).
Literally zero of the conditions that are necessary for an actual coup existed here.
Prigozhin makes no call for action, is clear he is not challenging Putin himself, of anyone and has zero demands (other than to "talk" with the top brass). And because he has literally zero answers to normal coup questions, he starts calling it a "march for justice" to simply form the narrative without answering any of those questions. Finally, it was simply an "armed protest".
Most importantly, Prigozhin isn't going anywhere remotely neutral and out of Putin's reach. So now that the coup is ended, Wagner effectively disbanded, if Putin was actually so embarrassed and shown to be weak etc. would he just have Prigozhin and any other ring leader killed over night.
If he kidnapped high ranking people and then negotiated a billion dollars and safe passage to some neutral country that guarantees his safety ... ok, it would at least look like some high stakes extortion and I'd consider it at least plausible that maybe Prigozhin thought he was about to be murdered anyways and this stunt of threatening chaos behind the lines was his best bet of saving his own skin. But he's going to Belarus ... where the leader is a Russian colonel and is covered with FSB and Russian military personnel. It's pretty much the same as going to any Russian province; in anyway that matters exactly the same as negotiating with Kardiyov and then going to Chechnya to live in peace and quiet while Putin "fumes" about this embarrassing insubordination.
Quoting neomac
It totally does matter if it was a real coup or fake.
You outline the costs, which I agree with. Definitely is a PR issue for Putin, but that it's some sort of PR catastrophe is an outrageous exaggeration. He was challenged by Wagner, but still in power and Wagner is now being disbanded, and bunch of other key people made videos pledging their support for Putin and asking Prigozhin to stand down and so on. Everyone that actually matters immediately backed Putin which made pretty clear there wasn't going to be a coup now nor any time in the future. The events show that in terms of Russias internal politics everyone that matters backed Putin, and Prigozhin arguably doesn't matter at all in any real internal politics sense: he's not a politician, he's not military, he's no a government official -- he's a business man.
However, more important that evaluating exactly what the costs actually are of this event to Putin and the Kremlin, speaking of costs at all only matters if you comparing them to the benefits.
So, one benefit mentioned above is the large show of support of everyone else that matters in Russia.
However, there are several other potential benefits. the coup triggers large scale Ukrainian assaults on Russian lines. If Russia is trying to win a war of attrition, then this is exactly what Russia wants. If the "mutiny" didn't actually change any Russian readiness on the front, then triggering the Ukrainians to attack is more easy attrition (far easier than Russia attacking the Ukrainians).
There's all this recent talk of Russia blowing up a nuclear power plant or otherwise causing a nuclear event of some kind. If the Kremlin knows that's not what their planning, then the reason for such rhetoric is potentially a false flag. If Putin is now "weak" and not really in control, then it's difficult to pin any nuclear events on Putin. Indeed, even puts the Kremlin in the position to double bluff, do exactly what the Ukrainians are future-accusing them of already doing, then say it was just more "rogue" military elements.
Then there's just classic madman theory, which Putin and all the old guard will remember how effective that was when the US did it to the Soviet Union. No one in the West actually wants Russia to fall apart and nuclear weapons and material to get dispersed to random war lords and the blackmarket, in addition to even more inflation if Russian exports were to actually stop entirely, and so on, so making it seem that could possibly happen encourages Western support to Ukraine to be cautious and hesitant.
And, the beauty of madman theory is that even if your opponent think it's likely fake, just madman theory ... there's still that chance that it's not.
In addition to all these, there's the classic benefit of a fake coup in sussing out any potential collaborators and evaluating the loyalty of the command structure based on what people do, say, react etc. So, sure, maybe some PR costs to the coup happening, but if you can then purge everyone who maybe an actual threat then the benefits can more than outweigh the costs.
Finally, as I've explained in previous posts, there's the advantage of disrupting your enemies narrative and plans, making them improvise on false premises and make mistakes.
Especially considering:
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course, as @Tzeentch points out, how things play out will give us a lot more information. If Prigozhin suddenly has some new role in Belarus that would seem pretty incompatible with him also being a treacherous mutineer that brought Russia to the brink of civil war and showed Putin to be weak and disoriented, then it may seem a lot more plausible that he has a role to play and it's all theatre. If he's dead tomorrow, we may draw other conclusions.
Likewise, if Ukrainians exhaust more equipment and material and the temporary moral boost of their dreams coming true of Russia falling apart is followed by even lower moral of that not happening, and Russia starts their own offensives that rapidly take ground, it may certainly seem like the coup "just so happened" to have positive effects on the battle field, on the coup indeed will be forgotten and Russian moral will be high on the drug of victory.
Lastly, if Putin's power is even more consolidated than before, maybe the coup wasn't a "negative" for him after all.
Of course, maybe none of that happens and there's an even bigger coup tomorrow.
So we'll see.
Has it disbanded?
Quoting boethius
So why on Earth the weak timid response then from Putin and the references to 1917 and civil war? How many Russian politicians backed Putin when Wagner was marching toward Moscow? I myself don’t know that, so it’s an important question.
You seem to have the attitude of ”Everything is fine, there’s nothing to see, the Russian leadership has everything in control” as it obviously hasn’t got everything in control. Then when Wagner is truly disbanded and Prigozhin dead or in jail, then things are ”under control”.
And if the objective of Prigozhin was to capture the military leadeship (as WSJ writes), it is absolutely hilarious to deny that this wasn’t a coup attempt, because they weren’t going for Putin. Such mutiny is more dangerous than just soldiers protesting and not following orders (which usually defines a mutiny).
:100: :up:
Quoting ssu
Particularly puzzling is how it happened that Wagner was allowed to cross the border and capture a million+ city hosting Southern Military District headquarters (by far the biggest prize in the entire campaign :rofl:) when Russian security agencies were aware of their plans (as both Western and Russian sources claim)?
Quoting WSJ
The feint worked.
Why would there be troops defending a city deep in Russia when Ukrainians are nowhere near Rostov? Air Defence unit perhaps could be found there, but they aren’t equipped to fight infantry. Thousands of Wagner mercenaries could take quite easily the Military HQ. Besides, immediately Prigozhin made it clear they wouldn’t interfere with the staff running the war in Ukraine. They didn’t start either to defend their buildings. Moscow was different.
Above all, this is an armed forces in a bad condition and not fully controlled. What comes to mind is Corazon Aquino’s Phillipines (1986-1992) where there were multiple military coups against her Presidency and how the military was punished for these: they weren’t. Hence not punishing mutinies or coups simply shows the leadership hasn’t got firm control over it’s armed forces. Once when a strong President was elected, Fidel Ramos, the former armed forces commander, the coups/mutinies stopped.
Of course Russia is different, but what Putin has done is that he has created competing militaries in the system: the Army, the National Guard etc. and then even private mercenary formations like Wagner (which isn’t the only one). and let’s not forget that Wagner has worked closely with the GRU and other intelligence services. Fine if it works, but when it doesn’t /hasn’t, Putin is in the terrible fix he is now in. And he can blame himself for all of this.
As Russia teetered, the elite trembled, and some private jets left (news feed version)
As Russia teetered, the elite trembled, and some private jets left (article version)
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Darya Korsunskaya, Gleb Stolyarov, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 28, 2023[/sup]
Ongoing murder-mayhem in Ukraine ...
Russia blows up packed Ukraine restaurant, killing kids, as Putin shows war still on after Wagner mutiny
[sup]— Ian Lee, Justine Redman, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Jun 28, 2023[/sup]
Heads rolling on the Kremlin's account.
Hmm... Did Lukashenko blabber...?
Russia-Ukraine war live: Putin wanted to ‘wipe out’ Prigozhin during Wagner mutiny, says Belarus president
[sup]— Andy Gregory, Arpan Rai · The Independent · Jun 28, 2023[/sup]
Because it's a critical command-and-control center? And yet it was taken with hardly a shot fired, and two generals, including a deputy Minister of Defense, apparently taken hostage. More to the point, the Russians supposedly had advance warning about the mutiny. How could they be caught with their pants down like that?
Compare and contrast with the successful defense of Mykolaev in the first days of the invasion. It was organized with very little advance warning and mostly local defenders.
Clearly, there was a lack of will here, if not outright collusion with the mutineers.
[sup]— DW · Jun 28, 2023 · 2m:1s[/sup]
Ukraine says it caught a sleeper agent who sent video of a crowded restaurant to Russia before a deadly missile strike blew it apart
[sup]— Jake Epstein · Business Insider · Jun 28, 2023[/sup]
If they're that quick and trigger-happy, someone should try sending them photos of military installations in Rostov or something.
Ukraine-Russia war latest: General Armageddon 'detained in crackdown on Wagner mutineers'
[sup]— The Telegraph · Jun 29, 2023[/sup]
Russian general Surovikin was sympathetic towards Wagner rebellion -US officials
[sup]— Reuters via The Jerusalem Post · Jun 29, 2023[/sup]
Andrei Yudin dismissed, Sergey Surovikin taken in?
Quoting SophistiCat
Surovikin was with Prigozhin in Syria and the two worked well together. Hence Surovikin is in jail. What is very likely true is that Prigozhin had at least people that understood him, which made him do his ”march” in the first place.
Then we shouldn’t forget that literally the vast majority of Russian army’s ground forces are engaged in Ukraine. For example, there are very few trioops on our border with Russia.
Putin’s purges are a natural outcome of the events. Needless to say how detrimental this whole episode is for the Russian military leadership, who should work as a team.
What is good for Ukrainians is that good generals are now out of the game and one of the most effective formations (Wagner) combat capability is now questionable.
Better than causing trouble for others anyway.
Someone should set up a GoFundMe, "Wagner for Minsk" or something; they're guns for hire, right?
Might even spur the Belarusian freedom fighters on, though they're hardly aligned with Wagner, it would be like a tripartite clash.
Belarus leader welcomes Wagner forces but others in the country see them as a threat
[sup]— Jari Tanner · AP · Jun 29, 2023[/sup]
If the Belarusian opposition hires Wagner to get rid of Batka, it will not be...
Main talking points:
- Were Western politicians aware of the risk of conflict in Ukraine?
- Was Ukraine's ascension into NATO really planned?
- Russian and German viewpoints.
After all Sweden is the other example of how NATO is an international defence pact and not simply the extension (rubber stamp) of US policy. If it’s hard for Sweden, it surely is for Ukraine.
Besides, in the next NATO summit we can observe if Sweden finally gets in and Ukraine gets the path to NATO. (When there is kind of cessation of hostilities)
Actually Putin’s weakness can change things.
NATO isn’t the rubber stamp of US policy as you think.
And Sweden and Finland would not have joined (or tried to join) NATO if not for Feb 24th invasion.
Russia attacked Ukraine to annex territory, not to offset NATO enlargement, because it didn’t have to attack Ukraine for that not to happen. NATO enlargement is for Russia here as is spreading democracy is in US foreign interventions. A rosy reason for aggression (as if it would have been for self defense).
Russia provided that show of force the same year NATO proclaimed its intention to incorporate Ukraine and Georgia. So I guess it's not that 'simple'.
Quoting SophistiCat
There's no evidence that the Russians intended to absorb or subjugate Ukraine.
Since 2008 the Russians have argued for a neutral Ukraine, and even as recently as March/April 2022, during the peace talks which the United States shut down, a neutral Ukraine was still on the table.
That talks before Feb 24th show this quite obviously. It wouldn’t have been Hungary, it would also have been Germany. Just as a decade earlier the Wikileaks papers told how US official saw ”a lot of work” to be done then with Germany. Well, that field of work existed prior to the full invasion also.
It is that simple.
You seem to have forgotten that in the meantime Russia took part of Ukraine (Crimea) by force, breaking the Budapest Memorandum. Have it not occurred to you that annexing a teritory of another country somewhat lowers the possibility of that country remaining neutral to you?
Russia reducing its presence at nuclear plant, says Ukraine
[sup]— Luke Harding · The Guardian · Jun 30, 2023[/sup]
The Kremlin does have a thing with radioactives.
Comments in brief:
More Russians Questioning Putin After Wagner Revolt
[sup]— Veuer via NBC · Jun 30, 2023 · 1m:11s[/sup]
Maybe the blogger should ask whether the Ukrainians really are "our enemies". (Or were at least.) Speak up. The Kremlin is Russia's. Russia ain't Putin's.
‘Yevgeny Prigozhin will never be discussed again’: Russian media to erase all traces of mutinous warlord
[sup]— Andrew Roth · The Guardian · Jul 1, 2023[/sup]
Russia's top diplomat Lavrov sees no reason to extend Black Sea grain deal (news version)
Russia's top diplomat Lavrov sees no reason to extend Black Sea grain deal (article version)
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Michelle Nichols, Andrew Osborn, Grant McCool · Reuters · Jun 30, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Lavrov
If they can and are willing to send the food free of charge, then I'm confident no one will stop them. Free to go ahead. :up:
OK, as food exports go, there was a bit of commotion a few months back, but Poland Hungary Slovakia aren't likely to get in the way here. (WSJ · Sep 17, 2022, Al Jazeera · Apr 19, 2023.) :)
As mentioned, it's just the Kremlin standing in the way of the Ukrainian food shipments. Without Crimea, they might have less capability to do so, yet likely retain those food shipments (free of charge or not).
The (sort of) ultimatum put forth by the Kremlin seems to list two options:
Quoting Reuters · Jun 30, 2023
Russia signals end to Black Sea grain deal in July if demands not met
[sup]— EURACTIV and Reuters · May 26, 2023[/sup]
The ("outrageous") sanctions were put in place due to the (outrageous) invasion, hence of (other) relevance.
Also goes well through what a coup is (which has been debated here) and also gives a good description of the actual combat that took place.
Here is how people focused on security concerns reason over "intentions":
During his annual review of Russia's foreign policy January 22-23 (ref B), Foreign Minister Lavrov stressed that Russia had to view continued eastward expansion of NATO, particularly to Ukraine and Georgia, as a potential military threat. While Russia might believe statements from the West that NATO was not directed against Russia, when one looked at recent military activities in NATO countries (establishment of U.S. forward operating locations, etc. they had to be evaluated not by stated intentions but by potential.
Security concerns can be triggered by potential not just by "intentions" (BTW among Mearsheimer's offensive realism tenets there are "States can never be certain of the intentions of other states" and "States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism). History, ambitions, military capability, economic leverage and aggressive attitude of Russia especially under Putin inside and outside Russia were enough to trigger security concerns.
Talking about intentions (the initial march toward Kiev's intentions, Putin's intentions, Prigozhin's mutiny intentions) is not all that matters. Also the US intentions were to spread democracy in the rest of the World.
Moscow says 700,000 children from Ukraine conflict zones now in Russia
[sup]— Lidia Kelly, Michael Perry · Reuters · Jul 3, 2023[/sup]
The Children Russia Kidnapped [sup](cache)[/sup]
[sup]— Lauren Wolfe · The Atlantic · Jul 1, 2023[/sup]
Ulyanovsk and Krasnoyarsk (different regions) have a new political candidate:
"Merchant of Death" Viktor Bout, Russian arms dealer freed in swap for Brittney Griner, is running for office
[sup]— Haley Ott, Caitlin Yilek · CBS · Jul 3, 2023[/sup]
Quoting The Legal vs. the Illegal Arms Trade (Harvey Morris · New York Times · Apr 6, 2012)
Maybe he has a point there.
America’s leading ‘realist’ keeps getting Russia wrong
[sup]— Alexander J Motyl · The Hill · Jul 4, 2023[/sup]
Homemade or imported - France and Germany have different strategies on air defence systems
[sup]— euronews · Jun 29, 2023 · 2m[/sup]
Neutral Switzerland and Austria will join European air defense project
[sup]— AP · Jul 4, 2023[/sup]
Proceeding from the UN [sup]Mar 2014, Feb 2022, Mar 2022, Mar 2022, Apr 2022, Oct 2022, Nov 2022, Feb 2023[/sup] ...
If Ukraine declares a no-fly-zone in their airspace (except for whatever they approve), then it's more or less settled, although there aren't any "higher authorities" to enforce that. Others may acknowledge or otherwise follow suit (like neighbors, the EU, NATO, the UN).
Sticking strictly to Ukrainian airspace, maybe it's time to take an enforced no-fly-zone seriously, bring it up seriously among those capable of doing so? Keep the Ukrainian skies (and just those) clear of uncleared attackers invaders bombers rockets, destruction from above?
What remains is risk assessment, implementation details, whatever. As far as I can tell, the only deterrent has been fear of what the Kremlin might do (risk assessment). We've now seen a year's worth of what the invader does, and the UN + the international community have spoken (repeatedly). Implementation details could likely be discussed for a long while, e.g. what if someone launches a surface-to-air missile against an enforcing plane? What say you? Forget it? Worthwhile taking up among the capable? ...?
‘It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network
[sup]— Jason Burke · The Guardian · Jul 6, 2023[/sup]
Putin Wants Fealty, and He’s Found It in Africa
[sup]— Roger Cohen · The New York Times · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
No longer quite a "nonstate actor".
But if Putin really wants to create a wasteland…
Since the beginning of this, I'm more confused about what's going on over there. Is this going to be like a hundred years war where eventually nobody remembers how it started?
Xi Jinping warned Vladimir Putin against nuclear attack in Ukraine
[sup]— Max Seddon, James Kynge, John Paul Rathbone, Felicia Schwartz, Joe Leahy, Nian Liu · Financial Times · Jul 5, 2023[/sup]
Kremlin: We can't confirm report that China's Xi warned Putin against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Andrew Osborn · Reuters · Jul 5, 2023[/sup]
He-said-she-said :D
‘You can never become a Westerner:’ China’s top diplomat urges Japan and South Korea to align with Beijing and ‘revitalize Asia’
[sup]— Nectar Gan · CNN · Jul 5, 2023 (some comments by Joel Atkinson)[/sup]
Don’t try to be like Westerners – China’s top diplomat
[sup]— RT · Jul 5, 2023[/sup]
China dismisses criticism of top diplomat’s comments appearing to push for race-based alliance
[sup]— AP · Jul 5, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Wang Yi
Don't Yi's comments carry some implicit admissions/implications?
Not sure why Koreans and Japanese would want to "become Westerners" (they should feel free to do whatever, join the Uyghurs or talk democracy if that's their thing).
There are other reasons at play.
Apologies for the side-track.
Insurgencies and other low level conflicts can endure for centuries. Like just how long have the muslims in the Phillipines, the Moros, fought against occupiers? It has been the Spanish, the Americans, the Japanese (briefly) and now the Phillipines government who have fought against them. Hopefully now peace could prevail.
It’s an interesting issue, but perhaps on another thread about US-Chinese tensions.
Hope we don’t have a thread like ”The war in Taiwan” in the future.
I think this mutiny hasn’t reached it’s conclusion yet.
Before the mutiny the ruble was decreasing in value, but somewhat slowly; after the 24th the traders have decided they no longer want to have rubles... Devaluation of 10% against dollar, yuan and euro in two weeks is quite telling - the confidence does not seem to be inspired.
[sup]— Dasha Litvinova · AP · Jun 27, 2023[/sup]
, a bit has been said (and speculated)
Prigozhin’s public support remains significant despite Russian propaganda efforts, polls show.
[sup]— Anatoly Kurmanaev, Julian Barnes · The New York Times · Jul 3, 2023[/sup]
? plausible
Wigs, guns and a giant sledgehammer: Russian media attacks mercenary chief over lavish home
[sup]— Yuliya Talmazan · NBC · Jul 6, 2023[/sup]
? plausible (no mention of Putin + palace on Russian state TV? :grin:)
Lukashenko Says Prigozhin Is in Russia, Not Belarus
[sup]— Valerie Hopkins, Anatoly Kurmanaev, Ivan Nechepurenko, Eric Schmitt, Paul Sonne · The New York Times · Jul 7, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Peskov
? Peskov not really all that believable
No one from Wagner has visited barracks offered by Belarus, ministry adviser says
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Kevin Liffey, Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · Jul 7, 2023[/sup]
? plausible enough (what's up, mercs in the wind, where, back in Bakhmut?)
Prigozhin’s fate remains unclear and it signals more trouble in Russia
[sup]— Jill Dougherty · CNN · Jul 7, 2023[/sup]
? Dougherty opines / offers analysis
:chin:
[i]
After long days of silence following the 'march on Moscow' on June 24, the founder of the Wagner militia Yevgeny Prigozhin reappears on social media with a vitriolic post against Russian state media, quoted by Novaya Gazeta.
"Reading the newspapers, hearing the stories on TV, makes me feel very bad, the TV bastards, who yesterday admired the Wagner boys, are now pouring all kinds of poison...
Remember TV bastards that it wasn't your children who fought in our ranks, it wasn't your children who died, but you bastards are making audiences with stories like this."
[/i]
https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/07/08/prigozhin-ricompare-sui-social-e-attacca-i-media-russi_f4295770-f72b-490d-ad8e-eadabc5ee6b8.html?utm_source=hootsuite&utm_medium=&utm_term=&utm_content=&utm_campaign=
[sup]— Andrius Sytas, Sabine Siebold, John Irish, William Maclean · Reuters · Jul 8, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Edvard Rynkun, 67]If Lithuania was alone, I would feel differently.[/quote]
[quote=Elena Tarasevic, 55]If not for the NATO membership, things here could already be same as in Ukraine.[/quote]
Seems unlikely that the Kremlin or Minsk cares much about NATO military presence, it's not like NATO is going to attack. Kaliningrad looks like a nice appetizer, though. :yum: j/k
Well, maybe democracy and all that isn't worth putting up a fight for? (Such a sentiment would certainly please dictators, theocrats, and such, to which the Ukrainians said "No" by the way.) What's in putting up a fight, though? Here it included things and moral concerns that can take a good while to mull over by a large number of mullets...err mullers:
US to send cluster munitions banned by over 100 nations to Ukraine after months of debate
[sup]— Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky, Jeremy Herb, Radina Gigova · CNN · Jul 8, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine says it won't use cluster bombs in Russia
[sup]— Olena Harmash, Vladimir Soldatkin, Ros Russell, Mark Potter · Reuters · Jul 8, 2023[/sup]
Use of cluster munitions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
All of this wouldn’t have been possible without Putin.
Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt
[sup]— Mari Saito, Tom Balmforth, Sergiy Karazy, Anna Dabrowska, John Shiffman, Phil Stewart, Polina Nikolskaya, Maria Tsvetkova, Anton Zverev, Christian Lowe, David Gauthier-Villars, Stephen Grey, Reade Levinson, Eleanor Whalley, Milan Pavicic, Daria Shamonova, Janet McBride · Reuters · Jul 11, 2023[/sup]
At a glance, it doesn't seem all that likely. Then again... Either way, Wagner could apparently have acquired materials from Voronezh-45 had they wanted.
Treisman opines:
Opinion: Welcome to the ‘looking-glass’ world of Putin’s Russia
[sup]— Daniel Treisman · CNN · Jul 10, 2023[/sup]
More "alternate world" type stuff (like Jun 16, 2023, Mar 4, 2023).
Quoting Dmitry Medvedev · Jul 11, 2023
• nah, the Kremlin's invasion + bombery + all that brought wars closer, Ukraine told you "No", the UN likewise — leave Ukraine alone
• nah, Ukraine ain't ruled by a Nazi regime (actually, the regressing Kremlin is worse)
• Use of cluster munitions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Give it up already.
[sup]— David A Andelman · CNN · Jul 6, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Lord Varys
Quoting unenlightened
‘Resting,’ fired, believed dead: Russia’s missing generals reveal cracks in faltering military
[sup]— Tim Lister, Anna Chernova · CNN · Jul 13, 2023[/sup]
Surovikin — alleged Prigozhin supporter, whereabouts unknown, "on leave"?
Tsokov — RIP
Popov — airs complaints similar to Prigozhin's (Mishov), fired
Firing experienced commanders doesn't seem like a good idea. Might be smarter to take the noise as feedback? Anyway, who knows what's going on. Fear of mutiny, defection, public image? Whatever the case, there's additional evidence of Prigozhin's misgivings.
The last months have been marked by the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive. That offensive seems to have now concluded, with the result being what many had already expected - minor gains for Ukraine, but no real strategic impact as they were unable to pierce Russian defensive lines.
My sense is that this offensive was a failure in all ways but one. The one upside being that this offensive can be used for a long time to come as proof that Ukraine is still capable of launching offensives, and therefore is not yet defeated on the battlefield.
The veracity of such a view is questionable, considering the offensive was essentially a complete failure, but nonetheless it may function as a source of hopium for those who prefer not to face the facts, which seems to describe most of the western political top.
My prediction is that Russia will take over the initiative once Ukraine's offensive has completely halted, and once again will start offensive operations as we have seen in the past.
Depending the degree to which Ukraine's offensive has exhausted Ukrainian reserve capacity, the Russians may push for territory more aggressively than in the past, or if resistance remains fierce might opt for a more Bakhmut-style approach of grinding attritional warfare with artillery and other types of indirect strikes.
Mearsheimer seems quite confident that the Russians still intend to push for large amounts of extra territory, so there's a prediction we can come back to to test Mearsheimer's views in the future.
NATO's response in the Vilnius Summit has been quite telling - basically a clear 'no' with regards to NATO membership for Ukraine as long as the war continues, which suggests heavily that NATO is not looking to get more military involved than it already is.
As I predicted in this thread a long time ago, without direct NATO involvement Ukraine will continue to lose more and more as time goes on. It simply lacks the military capacity.
Lastly, the Prigozhin episode has been quite interesting. It's still hard to tell what exactly went on, but a few weeks back I noted it's probably best evaluated by the effect it has on the battlefield. From what I can tell, so far there have been little to no effects, and things developed pretty much how one would expect.
My sense therefore is that it probably was a rather fool-hardly attempt by Prigozhin to protest against the top military brass, and subsequently this was oversold by the media in the hopes that it would weaken Putin, which it probably has in some ways, but not enough to have an impact on the war from what I'm able to tell.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
Why do you think so?
Quoting Tzeentch
NATO members (and whoever else) are indirectly involved (no declaration of war / combatants). Why "heavily" though?
Quoting Tzeentch
Plausible enough, yet makes Prigozhin appear dumber than a fairly successful entrepreneur. Is he that out of touch? Does it stack up?
There have been reports of the Russians pushing for territory in the north. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians haven't reported any territorial gains for about a week or so. That to me is a pretty good indicator that the Ukrainian offensive has likely concluded, and the Russians might be looking to retake the initiative.
The Russians probably wouldn't go on the attack if they believed the Ukrainians may still have capacity left.
Quoting jorndoe
Biden stated Ukraine couldn't join NATO while still at war with Russia, obviously fearing what would happen if Ukraine invoked Art 5. and dragged all of NATO into the war, potentially triggering WWIII.
This is a big deal, because it basically puts the power in Russia's hands. As long as Russia continues the war, Ukraine can't join NATO, and NATO won't be getting directly militarily involved.
All of this was of course already implied, but when Biden says it publicly it means it's basically official NATO policy now. It's a harsh blow to Ukraine, because as I've argued earlier, their chances in this war are extremely slim without direct NATO involvement.
Quoting jorndoe
I don't know. Much is still unclear and earlier I stated I would judge the episode by its effects on the battlefield, which haven't been noticable, so for now I'll settle on it having been an accidental fluke.
You conjectures are as good as the following:
1. "the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive"will start late in summer to prevent Russia from doing the counteroffensive in rainy season, for now the Ukrainian tactic is just attrition along the line to prepare the right spot to drill.
2. The Russians probably would push in the north to weaken Ukrainians' capacity for their offensive in the south.
Quoting Tzeentch
That is, you have declared the Kherson offensive as failed (and Ukraine as losing the war) a bit prematurely, haven't you?
No, I think those were both bang on the money, and the current situation reflects that.
What? You still consider the offensive in which Russians lost Kherson (the only oblast center they managed to take) as failed?
Odd that you jump on this but not the wall-to-wall assessments of Russia's supposed immanent failure, incompetence, and collapse we've had since last year, none of which have yet materialised.
Nice justification for the continued weapons marketing campaign though, but I'm sure that's just coincidence.
I was just pointing out that his track record of prediciting offensive failures was not that good.
Quoting Isaac
Russians have invaded Ukraine, Ukraine needs weapons to defend itself. What 'marketing campaign' are you talking about?
The offensive I referred to took place well before the Russians left Kherson. And it failed.
It's pretty obvious that Ukraine lacked the offensive capability to wrench Kherson from the Russians in an actual battle like the one we saw at Bakhmut.
They timed their 'offensive' when the Russians were pulling back to fix their overextended lines, and of course the western media propaganda spun this into a 'successful offensive'.
Pure nonsense.
No. You were selecting to do so to someone predicting the failure of Ukrainian offensives, but ignoring anyone predicting the failure of Russian action. Given the overwhelming quantity of posts here doing the latter and very few posts doing the former, it's hard to see how that could be without aim.
Quoting Jabberwock
Only if it has more chance of winning that defence than it does of being destroyed by it. Otherwise to provide weapons (alone) is monstrous.
Quoting Jabberwock
See above. Convincing people that Ukraine has a chance of 'winning' is the main method by which continued drip-feed sales of weapons are justified (making the arms manufacturers an unrivalled fortune). Since Ukraine is actually being destroyed (economically, but also literally), it takes quite the major advertising effort to keep this illusion up. Hence the massive social media campaign, of which your posts (wittingly or not) form part.
The aim of the campaign was to take Kherson and Kherson was taken. It is not that hard, is it?
If Ukraine lacked the capability to take Kherson, then Russians had no reason to leave it. Russian had 'overextended lines' precisely because Ukrainians have depleted their resources in the ongoing campaign. In simpler terms, Ukrainians made it so that Russians could no longer hold Kherson.
Yes. Tzeentch, in his own words, taken to 'to evaluate the balance of power in the conflict'. It was worth pointing out that he might not be the best person to do it.
Quoting Isaac
I agree.
Quoting Isaac
Russians were stopped, thanks to which Kiev and Lviv do not look like Mariupol. What gives you the reason to think that without weapons Ukraine would be less destroyed?
Assuming you are good at keeping stats.
They evidently weren't. Last I checked they were still bombing the crap out of Ukraine. I don't call that stopped. Imparting motive is a very easy way of declaring victory. Here...
"I've totally trounced you in this this little exchange because you wanted me to stop posting and I haven't. So you lose"
See how easy it is to declare victory simply by imparting some motive on your opponent which you've carefully selected to show just that.
Treat the Russians as if they wanted to occupy Ukraine and sure, they've been stopped. Treat them as if they wanted to destroy Ukraine, to render it militarily neutered, then in what way have they been stopped? They're cracking on with that objective virtually unhindered. Every new billion in debt Ukraine gets to fund its defence is a step nearer that goal.
Quoting Jabberwock
Because I don't see anything in his history to give reason to believe the Putin would have just carpet bombed Ukraine for sport. He's clearly an oligarch, everything he's done thus far had been in the pursuit of money and power. Physically destroying Ukraine gets him neither unless Ukraine is a threat, either financially, politically, or militarily.
Yes. Assuming that.
A very simplistic way of imagining things.
There's not really much point in debating. If you want to believe the propaganda spins and keep puffing the hopium, have at it.
I think if you were honest with yourself, you'd realize that the longer people cling to idle hope, the more people needlessly die and the more devastation is inflicted upon Ukraine.
Their ability to bomb Ukraine has decreased quite dramatically, in part thanks to the weapons supplied, so yes, there is definitely improvement there. It is your claim that Ukraine would be less destroyed if the weapons were not supplied, so it is on you to provide a realistic and likely scenario how would that happen.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I treat the Russians as if they wanted to occupy Ukraine, because I have no reason to think 'Putin would have just carpet bombed Ukraine for sport', him being an oligarch and all.
And you overlook the fact that Russia has neutered itself militarily even more. According to estimates, Ukraine has now more tanks than Russia (and more modern), its disadvantage in artillery has largely decreased etc. So I would not count that as Russia's success either.
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so after all we agree that he did try to conquer Ukraine. However, as it is obvious from most of the campaign, with any reasonable resistance Russians are incapable of gaining ground without destroying it completely, so they would do just that.
We have two proposed scenarios: mine that Ukrainians have led a campaign of attrition due to which Russians had to leave Kherson and yours, in which Ukrainians have led a failed campaign and then by pure coincidence weeks later Russians have just packed up and left the only major city they have captured and which they have just days before annexed into Russia.
If you were honest with yourself, you would know which scenario is more likely.
Has it? In what way?
Quoting Jabberwock
Negotiate and provide concessions, or seek more powerful alliances willing to fight alongside and use them as leverage.
If an enemy throws stones, throwing stones back is not a viable strategy if they have more stones.
Quoting Jabberwock
That just doesn't make any sense. Simply being an oligarch isn't in the least bit sufficient to justify a theory that he'll want to militarily occupy any neighbouring country. It's ridiculous. The vast majority of the world's oligarchs do not behave that way.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't 'overlook' it. I disagree with it. Tanks are not the be all and end all of military power and they're about the only major hardware that's capturable, so of course they're going to be used as the measure if that's the story you want to tell. What about artillery? What about air support? What about nuclear weapons?
Quoting Jabberwock
It isn't obvious at all since you have no counterfactual against which to compare it.
Those were blocked by the US simply to save Washington's ego. Flipping Ukraine pro-western has been a decades-long project of the Neocon foreign policy blob, under leadership of chief blob Nuland.
How many thousands of lives and billions in damages is Washington's ego worth?
How many thousands of lives and billions in damages is defeating Washington's ego worth?
The decline isn't just in tanks though. The sortie and fire mission rates have plunged too, which are fairly easy to verify from satalites, allowing that when either side accidentally shells its own positions it's not always easy to sort out the attribution.
Having taken what the UA thought was inappropriately high losses the UA appears to have given up on a maneuver warfare breakthrough and is focusing on attrition of artillery, likely in the hopes that a low morale force will rout without superior fire power. This has at least been more successful than the maneuver warfare ops.
On another note, the sortie rate on the few surviving Ukrainian MiGs is absolutely ridiculously high. I saw a picture and they look like Frankenstein monsters. I suppose this is what happens when you have plenty of mechanics but no planes.
In every way. It is suffcient to compare the number of missiles launched in September and October. Artillery attacks are also much more limited (Count Timothy mentions that).
Quoting Isaac
'More powerful alliances' would be difficult to obtain, given that the West is not willing to die for Ukraine. And Ukraine already did concessions - it let Russia have Crimea, then it conceded to Minsk Accords. It did not work that well.
Quoting Isaac
Depleting military resources of the enemy does not help in resolving military conflicts? I was pretty sure that is exactly how most of them were resolved.
Quoting Isaac
Well, the theory that 'everything he's done' is motivated by him being an oligarch was yours... So him being an oligarch is not sufficient to explain his motivations after all?
Quoting Isaac
I see Count Timothy already responded to that.
Quoting Isaac
Beside the very initial phase of the invasion, where in some places Ukrainian defense was very weak or non-existent, all other Russian territorial gains involved vast destruction of the places they took: it was the case in Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk, Marinka, Sievierodonetsk, Soledar and Bakhmut. So yes, I think it is quite reasonable to believe that if they decided to take other Ukrainian cities, the result would be the same.
If there are people here who are predicting imminent major successes in line with this paper reality, speak up please.
Not the best translation, "working," in particular should generally be "operating," instead.
Verified by major outlets later: https://www.npr.org/2023/07/14/1187644890/russian-general-fired-for-being-critical
This is the same event, aliases are sort of a common thing, Strelkov is Girkin, people go by their patronimials sometimes, etc.
One interesting thing is how the tone of Pro-War Russian bloggers has shifted re: the "musical chairs," shifting of Russian commanders on the ground. In general, early in the war it seemed like efforts to pin blame on relived commanders was quite successful, with charges being brought against a few for having maintained Afghan National Army style "ghost soldiers," and "ghost vehicles." These are essentially people or things that only exist on paper and then funds and materials for them can be embezzled, the materials sold off, etc. Pro-War folks seemed pretty accepting of the shake ups.
I think that makes sense; bad performance suggests bad leadership. But now it seems that these are increasingly being taken in a more negative light.
Also not surprising considering what happened with the last guy who began complaining about a lack of shells :rofl: . Although a behind doors rant and a stream of social media videos pouring out an avalanche of invective and gay slurs against the head of the MoD and the chief flag officer are, IMHO, kind of different beasts lol.
BTW, the memes that out of the Prigozhin meltdowns are pretty hilarious. As are the pictures of his "assets" that got turned over to him, which have a bunch of bricks of white powder next to all the fire arms (including a gold plated handgun), stacks of roubles and USD, and gold bars. If you put it in a movie people would say it is too on the nose.
Here is the Warhammer and Lord of the Rings versions.
Not really. They've had millions of people leave, which is a drag on the economy, continued missile attacks act as a check on investment, and they are facing multiple huge ecological disasters from damage to critical infrastructure during the war.
Their air defenses seem to be holding up better than the prior leaks suggested, particularly re: longer range missiles, but their SHORAD is obviously quite limited. Their initial offensive push stalled, and they had to switch tactics, because they were unable to keep the skies clear ahead of advances.
They also still have less artillery and fewer fire missions, even if they do seem to be winning to war of attrition re: artillery due to better counter battery radars, PGMs, and longer range artillery. The artillery numbers for both sides are likely lower than stated because rear area losses are less likely to be photographed and they've likely worn out a great many pieces. I've always thought one of, if not the best things that the West could do is simply stand up large scale shell and gun production until Ukraine has a 3-5:1 advantage. That is what is needed to advance against prepared defenses without air support.
The Ukrainian air force is also extremely depleted and there is simply no way for them to maintain the sortie rate of their remaining fighters. If they aren't shot down they are going to crash from over use.
The F-16, which appears to be on the way, fixes some of these issues because there is a huge supply of them, but they will face attrition and will be very constrained in what they can do because Russian air defenses are still plenty strong to play defense. Certainly, they will be very helpful, but it's also not like they can operate in the ground attack role in most instances because SEAD can only be achieved for short windows by firing off HARMs at any radar signature.
Modern attack helicopters might be the next thing they receive, but these won't be fully effective until SHORAD assets get attrited down, something that isn't happening because there isn't anything in the sky to waste MANPADS on.
The only good news is that they are getting closer to parity on vehicles, which means a 50/50 loss ratio during offensive operations doesn't necessarily doom an attrition based offense. That and the absolute shit show that is Russian politics.
They obviously lack an effective command structure and are still reliant on sprawling geographic commands and brigade level organization. This is partly because of their absolutely insane logistical challenges, the result of using a ton of different equipment from different countries. Thus, you have a brigade that used just Czech equipment, etc. to make that easier. But by most accounts they have a very hard time doing complex operations, especially offensive ops, because artillery brigades aren't working organically with other elements.
IDK, the middle of a war is not the time to do a reorg, but this obviously shows the limits of brigade centric doctrine (and even more so the limits of Russian battalion tactical groups). It's sort of a lesson on the advisability of moving away from division centric thinking, which I think comes from taking the wrong lessons from the GWOT, which was not a peer conflict. Ukraine really needs a way to pull off coordinated corps level ops and there is a very long road to that.
The inability of either side to conduct successful large ops is a weird thing. Communications equipment has come a very long way since 1950 and it should make this easier.
In China's initial spectacularly successful offensive against US led UN forces they were coordinating operations between two field armies of 6 and 3 corps each, each corps comprising 3 divisions and ancillary attached supports. They conducted complex and highly effective maneuver operations against a UN force with a huge firepower advantage using, incredibly, using largely just small arms and mortars and almost entirely man hauled supply lines.
Obviously MacArthur being an absolutely atrocious commander was a determining factor in how badly the UN forces fared, but it still required excellent coordination by the Chinese, who could not use aerial reconnaissance either. I mean, the Chinese offensive was, IMO, the worst out and out rout the US military has experienced in its entire history by a solid margin.
Maybe it is that surveillance and recon have advanced more relative to comms and this makes large ops harder? And obviously China had been at war non-stop for almost half a century then, so they also had an extremely veteran force.
Not that many. This isn't some unknown quantity we might as well toss a coin over.
We know how many are dying as a result of this war, we know with some certainty that it will be a long process even if Ukraine can ever win. It's definitely in the hundreds of thousands of lives, and the billions of damages. No doubt there.
We also know quite well how many more are dying in Russia because of their more authoritarian direction than in Ukraine. We know how many more die on Russia's borders with it's militarism is not restrained. It's in the low thousands of lives and the low millions in damages.
It's not to the penny accounting, but it's just dishonest to present it as if we just don't know. We do know. We can see how many have died in the occupation of Crimea, we have a very good idea of what appeasement brings, and we have a very good idea of the costs of war, and of the likely length of time those costs are going to have to be endured for.
This isn't a calculation anyone would be making blind. A decision has been made to cost at least tenfold as many lives and a thousandfold as much economic indebtedness simply in order to profit from the chaos.
Right. Thanks for the numbers. So in about 17 months we've had nearly 100,000 dead, 6.3 million refugees, $143 billion in damage, wheat and fertiliser production almost causing the starvation of another 10-15 million... and what have we got. Ukraine are nearly half way to wearing down Russian ability to cause more damage.
So after another 100,000 dead and nearly $300 billion in debt they maybe equalise...?
No one?
Surprised?
makes a good point here:
Quoting Isaac
Since so many of you are happily contributing to said ad campaign, isn't there anyone among you who believes enough in this theoretical chance of winning to make a prediction of the how/when of Ukrainian success?
It appears not, and that is no surprise, but it does beg the question what it is exactly that those people are doing here.
Entertaining a notion for sport?
There's something rather icky about that, and it doesn't suggest any kind of confidence in one's views either.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Tzeentch
You dudes think to make a point just by caricaturing opponents' views.
That's intellectually abhorrent. You are campaigning against your own intellectual decency.
And you are quite good at that. Hands up.
The problem is not what we know but what we can infer from it.
Quoting Isaac
Then how many exactly? Tell me exactly how you made the calculation.
Coming from you, that's rich. :rofl:
Uh huh... Something like...
Quoting neomac
... would be an example of caricaturing your opponent's views, yes. I'll be sure to try and avoid that kind of thing in future.
Funny how this has only just occurred to you after nearly 500 pages of having every single opposing view caricatured as Putin-loving, Putinistas, Russiophiles etc... but it's good that you're on top of it now.
Quoting neomac
I just did.
Who exactly wrote that Ukrainians must fight? I certainly did not. However, if they do want to fight and risk their lives against the agression, I believe they should be helped as much as possible. I do hope they win, but I am far from certain that they will.
No dude, that's not a caricature at all. Quote a claim of yours that contradicts it.
It should be pretty easy for you to do it, since mine is a very general claim.
Who is primarily to blame for starting the war ?
Who is primarily to blame for continuing the war ?
Who is primarily to blame for food crisis related to the war?
Who is primarily to blame for NATO policies toward the war?
Who is primarily to blame for the misinformation we get on the war?
You didn't lose a single occasion to blame American media, American political elites, American military-industrial-finacial complex. Where is the caricature? Maybe you are a caricature.
You even had your sidekick claiming
[i]We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism (however "soft" you want to call it -- being smothered by a pillow can have the exact same end result as being stabbed in the chest).
Now, if you want to argue that the Soviet Union, China and India weren't and aren't any better and would have done equally bad or worse things (and did and do their best to help destroy the planet as second and third fiddles) had they been the dominant super power and setting the terms of world trade, I'd have no problem agreeing to that.
But the reality is that the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.
Unsustainability literally equates to destruction, that's what it means: destroying the ecosystems we require for survival, not to mention a host of other species.
And global unsustainability has been a Western choice, championed by the US and supported by their vassals. The policies for sustainability are pretty easy and known since the 60s (public transport, renewable energy, less meat eating, sustainable fishing, strict care what chemicals are allowed in the environment and how much, and farming in ways compatible with biodiversity and soil protection) and since the 60s the policies critical to sustainability could have been easily implemented to create a smooth transition.[/i] (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/801709)
Quoting Isaac
If you think I caricatured your views, quote exactly where. This time you failed.
Quoting Isaac
Quote where you did it.
It's laughing the guy who is so desperately in need to score a point that he wishes his opponents to answer a ridiculously framed challenge like "If there are people here who are predicting imminent major successes in line with this paper reality, speak up please." and even insisting on it.
...doesn't chime with...
Quoting Jabberwock
You agree above that it is "monstrous" to provide weapons (alone) to a country that doesn't have more chance of winning that defence than it does of being destroyed by it.
Yet here, you say you're "far from certain" they'll win, yet you think supplying arms is the right thing to do.
Which is it?
You know what a caricature is, right? It doesn't just mean 'got wrong'.
'Far from certain' is even further from 'no chance of winning'. Besides, as we have already discussed, Ukrainians already succeeded in stopping the progress of invasion and then significantly reversing it. They have also significantly limited the offensive capacities of Russians, so the chance of destruction of Ukraine is already much lower. All that would not be possible without the Western support.
"Using its own data, the ISW has calculated that Ukrainian forces have recaptured about 253 square kilometres of territory since the start of the counter-offensive on 4 June which, it says, is about the same amount of territory as Russian forces have captured in the past six months."
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682
I have no idea why you call it a caricature then. In what way what I wrote distorts your claims? When I'm accusing you and others to make a caricature of my views I'm referring to what you got wrong about my views and yet you need to make a point against my views. I don't need to distort your views to question them. You do.
Besides I'm still waiting for your math:
Quoting neomac
Scarcely a month into the war Russia was speaking of denazification of Ukraine and on the offensive, so your argument that it was Washington’s ego that blocked peace talks is hilarious. (Or actually, very typical to you…)
Here's what Jeffrey Sachs had to say, based on his direct contact with the diplomats involved:
The Russians and the Ukrainians were ready for peace. The US wasn't, because they feared how it would reflect back on them in the eyes of the Chinese.
And on what terms were they (the Russians) negotiating with the neonazis they were meant to denazify back then?
Apart from the anti-US stance where everything revolves around the US, the reality looks a bit different:
In fact, things like the mess that the Russian army is in after the Prigozhin debacle and their inability to go on the offensive can lead to peace talks/armstice in the future.
And you know better than Jeffrey Sachs because...?
To say the least, because anybody can listen to what Naftali Bennett ACTUALLY said: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK9tLDeWBzs&t=10774s
Nafatali Bennett's claim is not about why "Then, one day, the Ukrainians [stopped the negotiations]."
but about why his mediation at the beginning of the war was stopped.
And you know better than Jeffrey Sachs because...?
And you know better than Naftali Bennett because...?
I'm not claiming either he or you are factually wrong though, am I?
I'm taking issue with @ssu's response which frames his opinion as being what "really" happened, and what "in fact..." is the case.
Jeffrey Sachs is neither an idiot, nor a liar, so clearly there is room for more than one legitimate interpretation of the facts.
I'm quite happy to accept more than one legitimate interpretation and have only ever asked for reasons why people prefer one over the other. My dispute here is entirely over this utterly ludicrous sense of self-righteous aggrandisement that seems to promote this attitude that there's only one obviously 'true' theory and all others must be deliberately misleading for some insinuated goal.
No no, I'm claiming that I am RIGHT and you are WRONG AND DISHONEST. I don't need to believe that Jeffrey Sucks is an idiot or a liar, I'm claiming that what Naftali Bennett ACTUALLY said in the interview IS NOT TALKING ABOUT "Then, one day, the Ukrainians [stopped the negotiations]." as SSU was objecting to but about his mediation being stopped.
Quoting Isaac
And I'm happy to call your interpretation WRONG AND DISHONEST whenever I believe it's the case.
Are you playing dumb? You reported the claim "Then, one day, the Ukrainians [stopped the negotiations]." which then cited Naftali Bennett in support of it which is what SSU was questioning with his comment. I gave you the link to the youtube video (here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK9tLDeWBzs&t=10774s). Listen to the interview, Naftali Bennett IS NOT TALKING ABOUT "Then, one day, the Ukrainians [stopped the negotiations]." but about his mediation being stopped (quite interesting what he also says later). Focus on what I'm actually objecting to you not on what you wish I objected to you.
Jeffrey Sachs from the very beginning of the conflict blamed it on the US and claimed that the only reason for the war is the NATO expansion. Also, he strongly advised for 'territory for peace' scheme even before the talks collapsed. That might influence his interpretation of later events.
And...?
I'm not sure what point you're trying to make.
If an intelligent, well informed person thought from the very beginning of the conflict the US were to blame, then it's plausible that indeed from very beginning of the conflict the US were to blame. Unless you've got something which makes you smarter or better informed than Jeffrey Sachs, then you have to accept his position as plausible.
Likewise, if an intelligent, well informed person thought the only reason for the war is the NATO expansion, then it's plausible that indeed the only reason for the war is the NATO expansion. Unless you've got something which makes you smarter or better informed than Jeffrey Sachs, then you have to accept his position as plausible.
So given those two plausible positions, how does being consistent with them make a third position suspect?
You're basically arguing that is suspicious when people's theories are consistent.
"Gerasimov and Shoigu should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens and surrender of Russian territories to the enemy. And this was intentional, just like the murder of Russian citizens and genocide."
(from the neo-nazi Utkin with exquisite ironic feinting love)
Why is thinking the US are to blame a 'strong' view, but thinking they are not to blame not? Views are surely either more or less well thought out and evidenced. Since you're not claiming to be either smarter than, nor better informed than Jeffrey Sachs, you can't raise a justified criticism of either.
What about that view makes it 'stronger' than, say, the view of David Frum?
EDIT: I have previously quoted that it was Putin that renounced NATO, as it was not clear from the fragment I have seen, in fact it was Zelensky.
And the reality is that the war has gone forward from Feb-March 2022 and so has the situation on the ground. Hence then to take the stance that early on ”the US stopped the peace negitiations” is basically pro-Russian propaganda because a lot has happened after and I just showed there’s a lot more to this question than just what discussiions mr Sachs has had. Things like Russia annexing even more land to itself from Ukraine was very important here.
And furthermore, you or Tzeentch have not answered my question on just what terms would have then Russia negotiated a peace deal when it was still engaged in the battle of Kyiv, advancing in the south and Russians were jubilantly showing the ”Z”-sign for supporting the war.
I thnk there’s a lot of good answers here of just why it is odd to cling on to these kind of fringe ideas about why the war is still going on.
People have their reasons for believing things that seem really weird to the rest of us.
Possibly :lol:
And if we would be discussing war that was in Afghanistan or the war still continuing in Yemen etc, suddenly we would have a lot to agree with.
Of course. :up:
Right. So you're back so claiming that if people's theories are consistent that's grounds for suspicion.
Quoting Jabberwock
Can you cite where he says he reported him inaccurately?
(Let's speed this section up. No. You can't cite where he says he reported him somewhat inaccurately because he don't think he did. You do. You have difference of opinion on the matter. Citing your own opinion isn't evidence against someone else's is it?)
Quoting ssu
What do you mean "actually"? I haven't said he isn't any of those things.
Quoting ssu
Seriously, if you're just going to preface everything you say with "the reality...2 there's little point in discussing anything with you. You're' not the fucking Oracle of Delphi, you haven't got God-like insight into 'reality'. People disagree. If you're not prepared to accept disagreement, then what the fuck are you doing on a discussion site? Start a blog.
Why don't they sneak in and attach bombs to the columns? Boom!
No, I am claiming that if people are biased (and Sachs clearly is), then we should not treat their reports as 'independent', as Tzeentch claimed.
Quoting Isaac
Now you are just confused... I did not say that he said that he reported him inaccurately, I wrote that he reported him inaccurately. He said that Bennet said that the US stopped it, which is not what Bennett said.
What an ignorant thing to say.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's exactly what he said:
The level of intellectual dishonesty here is truly astonishing.
Or perhaps you're all experiencing the first stage of grief?
Clearly, how? What evidence do you have of his bias?
Quoting Jabberwock
In your opinion.
Christ! what is happening to people. Are you really so egotistical that you cannot even conceive of the idea of being wrong? Is everything you happen to think just a 'fact' to you?
What an unimpressive rhetorical flourish, devoid of any substance. You do have a tendency to do that, when you run out of arguments.
Quoting Tzeentch
'They blocked it' and 'The US blocked it' are not exactly the same, are they? Especially when Bennett says that Johnson was the agressive one, Scholz and Macron 'pragmatic' ones and Biden a bit of both.
Chirst, these people.
His previous declarations and articles, such as this one.
Quoting Isaac
Of course, in my opinion. Just like everything you write is 'in your opinion'. Yet you do not prepend each and every post of yours with those words, why?
Perhaps the sneaking in part isn’t so easy?
My guess is that the missiles or rockets they use simply don’t pack the punch to demolish such large structures. Yes, it would need demolition charges at precise points to get part of the bridge to splash into the water.
What about them is biased? I can't believe I'm having to explain this to grown adults, but simply saying things you don't agree with isn't bias.
Quoting Jabberwock
Right. So are you smarter or better informed than Jeffrey Sachs. Which is it? What makes you think your personal opinion on a matter you're not even qualified in makes a person you've never met "clearly" biased?
You do realise how ridiculous you sound here, wading into the complexities of international negotiations as if you've got a better grasp of the situation than someone who actually spoke directly to sources involved in it.
Ahhh!!! The deep insightful wisdom of Jeffrey Sachs, Mearsheimer & co.
We are not worthy!
UN asks Putin to extend Black Sea grain deal in return for SWIFT access, sources say
[sup]— Michelle Nichols, Kanishka Singh, Mark Heinrich, Diane Craft · Reuters · Jul 12, 2023[/sup]
Russian Agricultural Bank may be connected to SWIFT for payments under grain deal — source
[sup]— TASS · Jul 13, 2023[/sup]
Russia halts participation in Black Sea grain deal: Kremlin
[sup]— Al Jazeera · Jul 17, 2023[/sup]
Russia says decision not to extend Black Sea grain deal is final
[sup]— Patrick Wintour, Shaun Walker · The Guardian · Jul 17, 2023[/sup]
UN EU UK officials pointed out the hostage-holding-alike politicization of the situation by the Kremlin.
(Don't know about others, but I expected a deal of sorts to come through like it had in the past.)
The bias, IN MY OPINION, is shown in how he presents only those facts that suit his theory. I do not think it is the best place to dissect the whole article, I will point out the biggest ommisions:
1. First he ignores the fact that Russia maintains agressive and divisive policy toward all of former USSR republics that try to leave its sphere of influence, such as Moldova (which is not seeking NATO membership, as its neutrality is included in its constitution) in exactly same way, by stirring up unrest among the Russian minorities and sending troops to 'protect' the breakaway enclaves. It does it exactly the same way whether the former republic seeks membership in NATO or not - it is Russia's way of keeping them in its sphere of influence.
2. It goes back to the promises of non-expansion of NATO in 1991, completely ignoring the fact that since then Russia and NATO have established several cooperation frameworks - the latest in 2002 (with Putin), which ended in a joint declaration and establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. Somehow, Putin in his address seems quite satisfied with the results and prospects of the cooperation - five years after the supposed promise was broken and during the period when the Baltics were actively seeking NATO membership. He does not demand stopping further expansion, in fact, he does not even mention it, which is quite curious, given that the Membership Action Plans were established for the Baltic States in 1999 and their invitation to NATO was imminent. The Council worked even when Shevardnadze declared the intention of Georgia to join NATO in November 2002. So it seems that in 2002 Putin could not care less about the old promise of 1991. Sachs conveniently does not mention any of that. Nor does he mention the Budapest Memorandum, which seems to carry a bit more weight than an informal promise to Gorbachev.
3. He claims that 'During 2010-2013, Yanukovych pushed neutrality, in line with Ukrainian public opinion'. That is simply not true - Yanukovych was obliged by the popular vote and by his promises to seek integration with the EU (European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement). He reneged on that promise and decided to seek closer ties with Russia. That was what sparked the protests, not the US scheming. The 'scheming' was the nervous reaction, as the US was clearly caught off the guard. Sachs writes 'weeks before the violent overthrow', which sounds ominous if you do not add that it was months after the protests have started. He also writes that the US installed a Russophobic regime in Ukraine... However, he forgot to mention that the 'regime' meanwhile has lost the elections (considered to be fair by OSCE), as Zelensky had more popular support in the east of Ukraine.
4. One of his most telling omissions is the quote from Arestovich: 'that our price for joining NATO is a big war with Russia'. He forgot to add that in the next sentence Arestovich adds: 'And if we don't join NATO, it is gonna be Russian takeover within 10-12 years'. It does change the meaning a bit, does it not, when it is not the choice between war and peace, as Sachs maintains, but war and war?
5. He writes: 'After Yanukovych’s overthrow, the war broke out in the Donbas, while Russia claimed Crimea'. While technically true, again it is the omissions that count. Russia has invaded Crimea unprovoked, breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and the Budapest Memorandum (which Sachs, conveniently, of course does not mention). It had also nothing to do with NATO. 'The war broke out' is also rather misleading, considering that the revolt was organized by Russians under the leadership of Girkin. Sachs does not mention any of that, which is not surprising, given that in 2014 the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO were rather dim.
That is just a sample... So yes, IT IS MY OPINION that the article shows he is biased.
Quoting Isaac
No, I do not claim that I am smarter or better informed, I am just pointing out that I have good reasons for MY OPINION that he is clearly biased.
Quoting Isaac
Well, if he quotes them directly and then it turns out they said something else, there must be a reason for that. Either his grasp is not that strong after all, maybe he is biased or maybe it is something else. MY OPINION IS it is the bias, based on the reasons I gave above. What is your theory?
And assuming that Bennett's account is reliable: https://theintercept.com/2022/03/23/ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations-israel/ (BTW one key issue in the negotiation was REGIME CHANGE IN KYIV)
None of this should be controversial— except that it gets heard as “Putin is blameless.”
Is Russia willing? What kinds of concessions/demands do they have?
Incidentally perhaps, now the same for the grain thing.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have grown increasingly distrustful, hateful. (PTSD?)
Depends on who you ask. According to the US, Russia shows no interest in negotiating, despite what Putin has publicly stated. Others say the US hasn’t seriously engaged in negotiations.
My own opinion leans towards the US not being very serious. They have too strong an interest in continuing this war.
Of course, Trump recently mentioned that he could solve this issue in “one day” by threatening to give Ukraine “a lot” and by telling Zelensky to “stop it.” So I guess there’s hope.
Yeah, the U.S. definitely wants to bleed Russia dry, however, China could step into the void and be a peace-maker. I suspect both sides are too far apart for negotiation to work right now, sunken cost fallacy and all that.
I think you’re right. Incidentally, the oft-referenced dissenter John Mearsheimer is equally pessimistic:
They need James Bond to snorkel over there and blow that shit up.
Or get to Berdiansk.
Weighing blame...?
Quoting Mikie
More than one topic I guess. The military-industrial complex (not just US, by the way), politics (like democracy versus authoritarianism), all that.
Quoting RogueAI
Don't know exactly. Some estimates have been reported, didn't look good. Maybe other transport routes can be devised. (Or maybe the freighters can be protected by the Chinese navy. :wink:)
Yes. I tend to weigh the contributions of the country I live in more heavily— as is should be for anyone of rational age.
Quoting jorndoe
:up:
Have you been to Ukraine? No
Have you spoken to the negotiators? No
Have you seen the documents involved? No
Were you there at the time of any of the relevant events? No
So give up this stupid pretence that you're not relying on sources too. This is all about trust in sources for us. None of us are dealing with first hand information. None of us are even dealing with second hand analysis of raw materials. We're all of us dealing with third hand filtered, selected and interpreted analysis of data, and all annalists have agendas.
Being flippant about acknowledging sources doesn't help you sound more sensible.
For others there’s a multitude of various people to quote or refer to, but for a few here there’s Sachs & Mearsheimer, perhaps Scott Ritter etc and not much else.
So perhaps we are not worthy.
And maintaining a strong 'sphere of influence' is a perfectly rational response to having that sphere threatened. If someone threatens to steal my car, I'm going to chain up my bike too in case I need it. I'm not here even promoting this a s a reason. I'm showing how you can't use the consistency of someone's theory to indicate bias. Just because Sach's theory makes sense in one particular frame, it doesn't indicate bias.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, he doesn't ignore it, he just doesn't share your view of the significance of such absences. He is of the view that uncertainties in agreements are not going to be poked at until and unless they become a risk. Putin had no particular reason to keep banging on about NATO expansion until it reached the tipping point with the risk of Ukraine. Once more. Your opinion about what is relevant is not an indicator of bias, it's just the means by which parties disagree. Relevance is not a 'fact' like gravity, or historical events, it's an opinion.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yanukovych promised a "balanced policy, which will protect our national interests both on our eastern border – I mean with Russia – and of course with the European Union".
Quoting Jabberwock
Sach's point is not about the other factors. He's not an historian, he's not writing a textbook account. He's criticising the US, so what matters is what shouldn't have happened, particularly from the point of view of Russia. It's not relevant if the protests were 99% instigated by popular feeling because Russia would have no complaint against a major foreign power in that case. What matters to Sach's argument is the 1% (or whatever) that is down to a foreign power interfering. Focus is not bias, it's how arguments are presented. If I say "It's raining so I'm going to take my umbrella" you don't accuse me of bias because I haven't mentioned that I have hands, and that's one on the most important aspects of carrying an umbrella. It's just not relevant to my argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. again Sach's point isn't how hard it was for Ukraine trapped between a rock and a hard place, In a different article for a different purpose, maybe he could have waxed lyrical about what a difficult choice they faced. His point in using that quote was that people were aware joining NATO would lead to war. The fact that not doing so might lead to something else undesirable is irrelevant, Sach's isn't criticising the decision, he's criticising the lie that no-one thought NATO involvement would aggravate Russia.
Quoting Jabberwock
Now you're getting ridiculous. 'Unprovoked' and 'nothing to do with' are the very questions at hand. As I've mentioned before bias doesn't mean 'disagrees with me'.
Quoting Jabberwock
You don't. You have good reasons to disagree with him (including about which facts are most relevant). That's not the same thing. Not everyone you disagree with is biased.
You miss the point. Sachs' thesis is that if not for 'agressive NATO push by the US', everything would be peaceful. That is simply ahistorical - Russia agressively sought to maintain its sphere of influence whether NATO was involved or not. That is, most attempts of the former republics to leave that sphere were met with agression. Surely you can see the difference between 'Russia uses force to keep the former republics in its sphere' and 'US did it'.
Quoting Isaac
But that is exactly what bias is - accepting only those facts that support your thesis and rejecting all other facts as irrelevant.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, and he reneged on that promise AGAINST the public opinion, not in line with it, contrary to what Sachs says.
Quoting Isaac
Your example makes no sense, as the rain is the major factor in having the umbrella, not the 1% factor. If I take my umbrella and the reasons are 99% because it is raining and 1% because I think I look good with it, writing 'he took the umbrella because he looks good with it' is not 'focus', it is bias, if not to say dishonesty. Presenting ONLY those facts that support your thesis and ignoring the outweighing facts that significantly question it is not 'focus'. Neither is presenting a small contributing factor as a cause for some events. A reader not familiar with the events would have a very distorted view of them if he read Sachs' article.
Quoting Isaac
No, Sachs explicit point is that if the US did not seek agressively Ukraine's NATO membership, there would be no war. Arestovich says just the opposite in the very quote he provides.
Quoting Isaac
The fact that not joining NATO would LEAD TO WAR ANYWAY is irrelevant to Sachs' main thesis: 'The key to peace in Ukraine is through negotiations based on Ukraine’s neutrality and NATO non-enlargement'? Do you realize how absurd you sound now? It is not 'focus', it is knowing omission of the facts that directly negate his thesis.
Quoting Isaac
But the very issue is that Sachs does not 'disagree' with the facts, he just ignores them or knowingly omits them. He does not say 'Arestovich believes that the war would still occur, but I disagree with him for such and such reasons'. He pretends he never said that.
If a drunk driver drastically exceeded a speed limit in a pouring rain and hit a pedestrian, and the local newspaper run an article 'An accident caused by rain', you would not say that the reporting was 'focused' on some facts or that the 'relevance of facts is just an opinion'. You would call it out.
No it isn't. If it were it would be ridiculous and Jeffrey Sachs is a well respected academic, named one of the "500 Most Influential People in the Field of Foreign Policy" by the World Affairs Councils of America. Does he sound like the sort of person who is likely to propose a ridiculous theory that a complete layman such as yourself is able to spot the flaws in?
Seriously. Which is more likely; you've misunderstood the argument, or one of the most influential people in the world, in the field of foreign policy has made a ridiculous argument?
Quoting Jabberwock
No. Nobody in the world simply includes 'all the facts there are' in every thesis. That's absurd. Every person selects the facts they consider relevant. You disagree with Sachs about which facts are relevant. And again, in such a disagreement, who is most likely to be right, given Sachs's qualifications?
Quoting Jabberwock
Sachs does not make the argument that reneging on the promise of neutrality was inline with public opinion.
Quoting Jabberwock
The argument is that Russia reacted to foreign interference. Local protest is not foreign interference, so it has no bearing on that argument. It's just some other thing that's also true. Theses do not routinely list all other things that also happen to be true.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, he doesn't. He describes Russian takeover. In the context of pro-Russian policies that does not necessarily mean war. Notwithstanding that interpretation, nothing in that makes it untrue that the US's actions provoked this war, which is Sachs's argument.
In what form of ethics is, say, murder condoned on the grounds that "someone else was going to murder them later anyway". Sachs is making the argument that the US provoked this war and could have not. What else Russia might have done in 10 years is irrelevant to that argument. It is possible that US actions could also help (or hinder) the chances of this 'takeover'.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. Sachs obviously disagrees with the certainty of Arestovych's prediction (which is about takeover, not necessarily war). Something he is perfectly qualified to do being an expert in foreign affairs. A judgment you are not qualified to make being no such expert. As a partisan political adviser, it is entirely appropriate that Sachs filter what he says. If you're looking for biased sources, the chief political adviser from one of the parties in the conflict is about as good as you'll get.
And whilst we're on the subject of bias... Where exactly does Arestovych say "war" either way, as you repeatedly misquote him doing?
Quoting Jabberwock
Selecting part of a quote is not 'pretending he never said' the rest of it. You're being absurd. One does not have to repeat entire conversations verbatim to avoid bias. The only reason you know all this is because Sachs cites the whole fucking interview. In whst crazy world is providing a direct link to the entire interview "pretending he never said that"?
You and he disagree as to what is relevant. As above, when you disagree about foreign policy with one of the most influential figures in the world on the subject, who is most likely to be right?
---
But let's says Sachs is biased. He's selectively ignored facts which don't match his theory.
You're not engaged in primary research. So from where do you get your information? Are you confident that an equal assessment of your chosen sources is going to show them revealing all facts (even those which work against their arguments)?
Let's have an example of an unbiased source you use and see where they treat data that doesn't match their theory.
Your arguments from authority have a certain flaw: Sachs is a respected academic, but only a tiny minority of foreign policy experts agree with him on this issue. Curiously, he happens to be in very small minorities on a host of issues, including some of his theories in economics.
There is a open letter directed to Sachs, signed by three hundred academics (some of them, I assume, smart and informed; possibly, some of them smarter and better informed than Sachs?). They do not seem to have a problem with his 'interpretations', or 'focus', but point out what seem to be the factual inacuraccies in his theories - some of them are related to the points I have raised, some are not.
Quoting Isaac
If the 99% of cause of the overthrow is the popular rising and 1% is US scheming, then considering the 99% is irrelevant is not just a matter of opinion.
Quoting Isaac
That is why it is intellectually dishonest.
'He was living peacefully for forty years, but then the police shot him'.
'But you forgot to mention that after those forty years he began to attack his neighbors with an axe'.
'I was choosing facts that I considered relevant'.
Quoting Isaac
It cannot be known if Russia reacted to foreign interference, if there were also local protests predating that interference and having much more causal weight than that interference. So yes, it definitely has bearing on that argument, as Russia could have reacted to local protests, not to interference. That is why presenting a minor factor and describing it as a cause while omitting a major factor which might also be a cause is biased.
Quoting Isaac
That is an excellent example! Sachs' argument looks exactly like that: 'He murdered him! He gave him a poisonous injection!' But when it is pointed out that, in fact, the person was terminally ill, in great pain, agreed to it and it was perfectly legally conducted euthanasia, the objection is: 'These facts are not relevant! We focus only on the murder!' Yes, that was perfect, thank you.
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so the authority is suddenly not as important as bias, is it? Because you have to admit that Arestovych is much better informed in the matters than Sachs, the economist, right? And sure, Sachs can disagree with him. However, providing a quote that completely changes the meaning of what he said is something different.
And what else do you imagine the 'takeover' to be, as Ukrainians seemingly decided they will no longer be partitioned by Russia piece by piece? After all, the war never ceased, as Sachs claims.
Quoting Isaac
The fact that he provided the link does not change the fact that he selected a part of a quote so that it distorts its meaning to support his view which would not be supported by the whole quote. There is a Wiki on such behavior.
Quoting Isaac
No, I am not confident of that, on the contrary. I would believe that a completely unbiased source is rather hard to find. That is why I try to get information from various, possibly opposing sources, which are likely to present different facts. For example, the letter of three hundred given above gives some facts. Does it give all the facts? No. Is it biased? Of course it is. Does it give, together with Sachs' article, a better view of the issues discussed? Yes. Are the two sources sufficient to get the whole picture? Unlikely, but still those two are better than just one of them.
:fire:
Why no popcorn emoji?
Beware the jabberwock my son...
You could say the US is at fault because they talked the Ukrainians into giving up their nuclear weapons after the Cold War. If they had nukes, this wouldn't be happening.
I was reading an article that said Europeans are presently becoming more hawkish about Russia than the US is, which is probably as it should be. Putin is their problem more than an American one, right?
Which Europeans? Germans, French and Italians - yes, the spell of the inexplicable infatuation with Russia seems to lift. Austrians are hopeless, Brits are unpredictable. The Dutch are obviously vengeful.
Eastern Europeans, of course, had the doubtful pleasure of interacting with Russia for the past few centuries, so they are aware of the 'problem'. They scrambled to be in NATO, against the objections of the West, as they were painfully aware that sooner or later Russia will turn to them again.
Isn't Germany basically the leader? Excuse my ignorance.
Quoting Jabberwock
Why are they vengeful?
Quoting Jabberwock
So this is something I don't quite understand. Has Russia always sort of been "hollowed out" as a kleptocracy? Is this the way their culture is normally? Or is this an aberration?
Excellent. We're getting into the meat of it. I'll try not to disappoint. In what way is it a flaw? Your claim is that Sachs is biased, right? Presumably not randomly biased, but rather biased according to his cultural group ideology etc. So we've established that it is possible for academics to be biased and when they are it's likely to be ideological. So what have the three hundred academics done with their data that makes them more likely to be right, just because there are three hundred of them? Three hundred and one pairs of eyes have seen the raw data. Three hundred and one ideologically biased brains have processed it. And three hundred have come out one way, one the other. What how does their three-hundred-ness connect to the way the world really is such that they are more likely to right by virtue of being three hundred.
Surely they're more likely to be simply in a more popular ideology. Looked at the popular way, the facts seem like this, looked at the less popular way, the facts seem like that. Popularity of ideology doesn't seem to have any hook into reality to make the more popular theory more likely to be right.
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility.
Quoting Jabberwock
He's not even assessing the relative causes. He's demonstrating that foreign interference was one of them.
Quoting Jabberwock
Not really, no. He'll have a very specific window. But that's not the point. He's a political advisor. He's going to be very, very biased. It's literally his job.
Quoting Jabberwock
It doesn't change anything. Sachs provided it in support of the argument that people knew NATO involvement would lead to war, and it demonstrates that without any change in meaning. That is exactly what Arestovych meant by it. You seem to be having great trouble with the notion of providing support related the points being made in an argument. Have you ever written a thesis?
Quoting Jabberwock
Coups, election interference, propaganda, territorial grabs (such as Crimea), stoking insurrection. Arestovych pretty much lists them.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that he was "pretending he never said it". Providing the link in which he said it, is not pretending he never said it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Then why are you suggesting we dismiss Sachs?
I don't claim any expertise on the thread topic, but is there a reason to think that the 'wisdom of crowds' doesn't merit serious consideration here?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom_of_the_crowd
So we should assume that all those academics, including Sachs, are biased? OK, that is all that I have claimed.
Quoting Isaac
No, of course not, that is logically incorrect, which I have already pointed out. If there were two factors present (unrest and foreign intervention), ANY of those factors could be the sole cause (as well as their combination). It could be both, it could be just the intervention, it could be just the unrest (i.e. without the foreign intervention Russia might as well react). For his theory to work he would have to explain why he believes Russia would NOT intervene if it was just the unrest. But he has no such explanation, that is why he conveniently omits the other factor.
Quoting Isaac
No, he is not. All he does is he demonstrates that foreign interference might be one of them, as he has no way to conclude that Russians would not intervene without it, just as a reaction to the unrest. Foreign intervention might be a cause, but it did not have to be. Omitting the other factor allows him to argue the causal link, especially before a reader who does not know any better.
Quoting Isaac
A political advisor and an intelligence officer who spent most of his professional life on Ukrainian issues is worse informed on the issues of Ukrainian and Russian politics than Sachs, who occasionally dabbles in it? Now you are just being absurd.
Quoting Isaac
No, Sachs' argument is that NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war. If both NATO involvement and NATO non-involvement led to war, then his argument would be pretty meaningless. That is the point you are seemingly missing. Have you ever had a course in logic?
Quoting Isaac
He lists them in the linked interview? At which point? And why think that Ukrainians would fall for any of that? The very point he is making is that the mistake of Crimea would not be repeated, which is exactly what happened.
Quoting Isaac
Ignoring it in his argumentation is 'pretending he never said it'.
Quoting Isaac
I am not. I was pointing out to Tzeentch that describing him as 'independent people' giving an account of negotiations (rather inaccurately, it turned out), is rather misleading, given his bias.
Amusingly, in his article from 2014, he naturally blames the Russian annexation of Crimea on the US and the West in general... However, the reasons cited are completely different: violations of international law in Serbia, Lybia, Syria and Afghanistan. Let that sink in: in 2014 Jeffrey Sachs did not even mention expansion of NATO as a cause for Russian annexation of Crimea. Coincidentally, Russians did not mention it at that time either, it became an issue some time later (when Ukraine actively sought the membership, according to the resolution of its parliament). But it must be just a coincident, a renown scholar would not be parroting Kreml's propaganda... would he?
Opinion: With their leader still missing, who will control Wagner forces in Africa?
[sup]— Joyce M Davis · CNN · Jul 18, 2023[/sup]
Wagner mercs have reportedly (AP, BBC) camped up in Belarus, maybe in the range of 600 so far.
Their forces in Africa can't quite become Russian army just like that, at least I don't think they can, yet the Kremlin likely wants to maintain that presence.
Either way, they'll be wanting a fat paycheck.
I've some sympathy with the idea, but here's my few issues with it;
Firstly, it assumes errors are the result of noise and I don't buy that in general. errors are the result, largely, of methodological failings which themselves are the result of foundational commitments, paradigms, which don't work. Usually, the stats simply churn out the answer, we don't exactly 'do the math' ourselves, so if the answer's wrong, it's the experimental design that's mistaken. In short, failings are usually ideological or paradigmatic.
Secondly, I think it assumes calculation is random - ie set 100 people calculating the answer and they'll all get it right bar the noise of error. But this isn't how expertise works. The reason we consult experts is that some people are better than others at some field of calculation (better informed, more insightful, whatever). So it's simply an outcome of this that the majority will be more likely minorly wrong. They sit in the middle of the Gaussian distribution. It's the minority who'll be either spectacularly wrong, or have it uniquely right (either being at the worst end - just about good enough to qualify) or the best end (genius in their field).
Thirdly, it ignores the countering effect of conformity bias. You'll be aware perhaps of Asch (and his detractors), who first demonstrated the effects of conformity on answer confidence. Whether it be social group pressures, or simple economic ones (job prospects), people are less likely to stick their necks out on a result which looks heterodox than they are to underplay radical differences in exchange for the safety in numbers of saying the same thing most others are.
So. To bring this back to topic (though the broader subject is way more interesting). Consider the responses here to pro-american posts. Pretty much universally accepted as the 'intelligent, balanced and steady' position to hold. Why? Because everyone else holds it. It's self-fulfilling in that sense. To hold an alternative is to be radical, naive (and other far less pleasant labels). So if you're an expert and you've had a good long think about all the data you have, and it comes out (as data usually does) somewhat on the fence, which way are you going to be more inclined to jump? Which way keeps you your job, the respect of your colleagues? All ambiguity is going to be resolved in favour of positions which conform and that adds up over time to a pretty much entrenched conformist and very popular position.
Add to that the effect of media and institutional bias, both of which are heavily influenced (if not completely controlled) by economic forces which have no particular interest in the 'right' answer, but do have a strong interest in the answer which best serves their interests. No one here has conducted a poll of all foreign policy experts. We gauge popular support by what we read and what we read is controlled by institutions who have a vested interest in a particular viewpoint seeming most popular.
I clearly isn't, and anyone can read the evidence to that effect. You've singled out Sachs as being biased because he doesn't support your preferred narrative and have not even mentioned the bias in any of the sources used in pro-american posts. Even at the end of this very post to which I'm responding you start some sarcastic diatribe about Sachs of which there's no equivalent for other academics. It is undeniable that you're claiming something of Sachs that you are not claiming of more pro-american academics
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course he does. He's talking about Russian security in international affairs. His whole argument is about how they have something to fear from NATO and the larger players. A little popular unrest in a neighbouring country is clearly not that. Again, you might disagree, but there's no need to disparage him. It smacks of a lack of confidence in your own ideas that you can't just disagree, you have to impute dishonesty into anyone with a different opinion.
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course not. Do your preferred authorities have more than 'might be'? These are theories of international politics. They're not amenable to that level of proof. Sachs is working on the very reasonable and well established principle that global powers are more concerned about the intervention of others massive global powers than they are about a bit of political unrest next door.
Does he prove that? No. Does anyone prove the opposite? Also no.
Quoting Jabberwock
What do mean "a reader who does not know any better"? A reader who doesn't know that other possible causes exist? Is Sachs's article making an appearance in the country's playgroups? Who, above the age of five, is going to be reading that article thinking that no other possible causes could even exist?
And again, you're requiring a standard of these sources that you do not demand of the pro-american ones. You've not raised any issues throughout your involvement in this thread with any of the sources others have used to promote the American position, despite the fact that none of these sources spend any time pointing out all the potential counter-evidence to their positions either.
Quoting Jabberwock
Try reading what I wrote and then have another shot at responding.
Quoting Jabberwock
No it isn't.
Read more carefully before launching into ad hominem denunciation.
Quoting Jabberwock
The interviewer asks him "So, on balance, which is better" (referring to the NATO-provoked war or Russian takeover - the "crossroads"), and he answers "of course, a big war with Russia".
On what grounds could that answer possibly make sense if both options were "a big war with Russia"? He treats " a big war with Russia " as only one of the options, the 'preferable' one.
Quoting Jabberwock
Don't be daft. I don't pretend people never said all the things I don't directly quote them as saying. Your post contains selected quotes from mine. Are you pretending I never said all the rest?
Quoting Jabberwock
So? What kind of bizarre argument is that. "If it's a reason in 2022 it has to have been one in 2014"? That doesn't make any sense. Sachs explains the rising importance of NATO enlargement.
I have singled out Sachs because he was presented as supposedly 'independent' witness of the events. This is simply not true, given his visible bias towards blaming the US for everything, not only as far as Ukraine is concerned. And it turned out that I was right - his reporting was inaccurate, as Bennett did not say what he claimed he did.
Quoting Isaac
I have already explained why I considered this to be dishonest: the US did not instigate the protests and had minimal influence on the course of the events. It is the disproportion of causes that makes the argument dishonest: had he described the actual scale of the protests, his argument would be extremely weak. And it is a bit peculiar to describe Euromaidan as a 'little unrest' - are you even familiar with the events?
Quoting Isaac
A reader who is not familiar with the disproportion of the causes might get the impression that the US scheming was a major factor, therefore the cause of the Russian reaction. A reader familiar with the proportions of the causes would find the theory rather unlikely. That is why omitting the major factor and focusing on the minor one is intellectually dishonest, it presents a skewed perspective of the events.
Quoting Isaac
No, I do not demand anything, in fact, I have already conceded that other sources might be equally biased. I was pointing out that Sachs is visibly biased so we should be cautious treating him as an 'independent' reporter of the negotiations. That is all that I wrote and I stand by that.
Quoting Isaac
You answered 'No' to my question whether Arestovych is better informed on the issues than Sachs. Is there more than one way to read that?
Quoting Isaac
So explain how 'NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war' is different than 'NATO enlargement is at the center of this war' AND 'the war could have been avoided'.
Quoting Isaac
But you wrote 'Arestovych pretty much lists them'. So, actually, he pretty much does not list them?
Quoting Isaac
Well, ACTUALLY he says: 'a big war with Russia and joining NATO after victory with Russia', so it makes perfect sense that the alternative he would not prefer would be a war with Russia and Russian takeover.
Quoting Isaac
Why not, if you are? The bottom line is that he did quote him out of context, even if he provided the link.
Quoting Isaac
No, it does not have to be, but it significantly weakens the argument. As you might remember, I wrote:
to which you have responded:
However, Sachs from 2014 partially agrees with me: the invasion of Crimea had nothing to do with NATO, he also stresses the importance of the Budapest Memorandum. He believes, of course, that it was 'provoked', but gives completely different reasons. That weakens his argument significantly. I must remind you that he wrote specifically:
So this war, which, by Sachs' own words, continues from 2014, was not provoked by NATO expansion, because Sachs' article from 2014 about the causes of Russian invasion does not even mention it. Correct?
He is independent. He represents neither Ukraine, nor Russia, nor America. 'Independent' doesn't mean 'not having an opinion one way or the other'.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes he did. @Tzeentch has already corrected you on that.
Quoting Jabberwock
His argument is that foreign agencies got involved. It would only be weakened if foreign agencies hadn't got involved. His argument is not about proportion.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't think Sachs can be held accountable for the stupidity of some potential readers. The argument is not about proportion, never even mentions proportion and does not rely on it. If people are stupid enough to nonetheless think proportion has anything to do with it, I don't see why that's Sachs's problem.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. After you were pressed to. You volunteered Sachs's bias. That is, you are biased in which sources you voluntarily point out the bias of.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. By continuing to read the rest of the paragraph. This from the person complaining about taking quotes out of context. Stop pretending I didn't say anything else!
Quoting Jabberwock
I bolded the words, I'm not sure what more I can do. If you can't understand the difference between this war and any war, I think it'll take more than a forum post to help out.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yeah, right. And in what way does that interpretation makes sense? What is the difference between the two scenarios in that sense?
Quoting Jabberwock
So you can read minds now?
Quoting Jabberwock
...in your opinion. Sach's obviously thought the context was fine. It was to support the proposition that Ukrainian leaders knew NATO membership would provoke Russia into war and the quote supports that. What else he said is irrelevant to supporting that proposition. We don't, in adding quotes, typically list all the other things people said that might be of interest.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. 'This war', and 'the occupation of Crimea' are two different things. At best one is a stage within the other. Also Sach's 2014 article is not really about causes, but rather lamenting the breakdown of international law. In it he says...
This is his only allusion to causes at all, and it clearly states that Russia acted because of a perceived need to keep in great powers in balance. It certainly doesn't contradict anything he says in the later article.
Feel free to chime in. What is your analysis of Sach's argument in the article being discussed?
Sure, he is independent and biased.
Quoting Isaac
Lol. No, he did not.
Quoting Isaac
Don't be daft. Of course the foreign interference would have to be significant to name it as the cause of Russian reaction. It was not.
Quoting Isaac
The argument is about causality. The US involvement, while present, was negligible, so it is very unlikely to cause the Russian reaction. Readers who know no better (like those who are under impression that Euromaidan was a 'little unrest') would put much more weight to his argument due to that omission.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, of course I am biased! Guilty as charged. Your desperate attemps at tu-quoqing the argument are quite amusing, I must say.
Quoting Isaac
Sorry for that. Do we agree then that Arestovych is better informed on Ukrainian issues than Sachs?
Quoting Isaac
If you insist that Sachs' argument was that this war could be avoided by precipitating another one, so be it. I am not sure he would agree, though.
Quoting Isaac
Is that a serious question? Well, the described outcomes would be somewhat different.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, if we accept your view that Sachs in his argument by saying 'preventing this war' means 'preventing this particular war, even if it leads to a different one'. I would say that view is peculiar, but it is my opinion.
Quoting Isaac
That might be your opinion, but we are talking about Sachs' view. And he states it explicitly: THIS war started with the Yanukovych overthow, NOT in 2022, so the occupation of Crimea is part of the same conflict. The NATO expansion could not be the cause of the 2022 war, because the war DID NOT START THEN, according to Sachs. But it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. So which war was the expansion of NATO cause of, according to Sachs?
So @Tzeentch was not wrong to call him 'independent' then. And your labelling him as 'biased' was not an act of dispassionate information-sharing, but one of partisan rhetoric. Rather than addressing the arguments, you just smear the source.
Quoting Jabberwock
Here
Quoting Tzeentch
I've underlined the relevant words. "They blocked it (they including the US)", "Yes"
Quoting Jabberwock
Now you're claiming 'significance' as fact. There is no fact of the matter as to how 'significant' the interference was. Expert opinion varies. Disagreeing with you is not bias.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again. Sachs disagrees. Disagreement is not bias.
Quoting Jabberwock
Right. so the more interesting question which we should have been discussing from the start is "why?". Given two competing narratives, why are you biased in favour of one? What is it that appeals to you about it?
And please don't start the whole charade again about it being the more accurate, or you having carried out some 4D-chess-level analysis of the data... You've read some articles and decided to trust one side. I'm genuinely interested in why.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, within that frame (not necessarily about Russia's intentions, for example, he has no more a read on Putin than Sachs does). My point was that what he knows and what he says are going to be two different things because it's his job to present the facts in a way that promotes Ukraine (particularity his political movement within it). He may know a lot, but what we have is the subset of all he knows which he chooses to say.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've just been through that. The article wasn't about the causes at all and where he does allude to them he talks about NATO's actions in Kosovo and Libya, how Russia cited them as reasons for it's actions in Crimea, and the talks about Russia's goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. All of that is completely consistent with the idea the NATO expansion (increase in it's power in the region) motivated Russian actions. Sachs may have changed his mind, it's possible, but if so, this article doesn't show it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Damned if he does, damned if he doesn't...
"Have a consistent theory throughout? Obvious sign of bias - proves he's wedded to one ideological position"
"Have an inconsistent position over time? Obvious sign of bias - proves he changes his views to suit his ideological position"
Is anything not a sign of bias for you?
Again, I was pointing out that his reporting might be biased, and I was write.
Quoting Isaac
Lol. That is exactly biased reporting: Bennett says it is what a joint decision of the Western countries and Sachs reports it as 'The US did it'. It significantly changes the meaning of what he said.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, there is a fact of the matter as to how significant the interference was, as anyone familiar with the events is aware of.
Quoting Isaac
Because people are biased in general and the views they hold tend to sway their perception of other information they acquire. We tend to confirm our views rather than challenge them. It takes much more arguments to change one's view than to confirm it.
Quoting Isaac
Of course, I do not question his partisanship. However, I would still put more weight on his expertise as opposed to Sachs.
Quoting Isaac
The article lists many transgressions of the US which might have influenced Russia's decision of the invasion. It would be inexplicable to omit it, if Sachs thought then that NATO expansion was the central one of such transgressions.
As it seems this discussion goes on without a particular direction, I propose you respond and then we let others dicuss the actual topic of the thread.
Whether you were right or not is the matter under discussion, it can't be brought in as evidence for the case.
Quoting Jabberwock
It does. It uses him as a source in an argument. I don't understand what you're finding so difficult about this concept of using what people say as support for arguments. I think you've got the whole concept confused. Quotes are not used in the vein of '...and so-and-so agrees with my thesis', they are used to provide support to particular aspects despite the possibility that the person cited might disagree with the final thesis. Sachs's thesis is that the US blocked the peace talks. Bennett's quote supports that thesis by naming the US as one of the parties he recognised as doing so. The whole thesis is not carried by that support, one needs to include also concepts about US influence over Europe, the particular relationships regarding this issue, the balance of leverage in those negotiations. But a clear witness that the party you accuse did indeed do what you claim is good support for your thesis. It's not bias to include it and it's not bias to omit other things that source might also believe.
Quoting Jabberwock
Sachs is familiar with the events and doesn't think so. So that disproves your theory right of the box. A lot of your arguments purporting to show Sachs is biased rely on you already believing Sachs is biased. This one is a case in point.
"Sachs is biased, he overplays the significance of the US involvement in Euromaidan"
"How so"
"Well everyone knows the involvement was only minor"
"Sachs disagrees"
"Yes, but Sachs is biased"
> return to the start
Quoting Jabberwock
I was asking about why you made your choice. Why the pro-American side?
Quoting Jabberwock
Why? You've just admitted he's partisan. Why would you put more weight on the words of someone you admit is partisan? You said...
Quoting Jabberwock
... does that not apply to Arestovych? Why not advocate the same degree of caution?
Quoting Jabberwock
He didn't omit it, but the article was about International Law. It's right there in the title "Ukraine and the Crisis of International Law". So why would he list transgressions that were not violations of international law in an article about violations of international law?
Why?
In your little story of Sachs the partisan, why is he doing this? He's a very intelligent man (I hope we can all at least agree on that, won several awards for his work in economics and international relations). So what's his game plan here? Write a few articles with such glaringly obvious mistakes that ordinary people on an internet forum can spot them (not to mention the three hundred academics), trash his career, lose his credibility, and have no-one believe him anyway because the mistakes were so obvious - all of which someone of his intelligence could easily have foreseen (he's written hundreds of theses and reports in this time). For what? To what end?
Which is most likely?
One of the world's foremost campaigners for democracy, international law and sustainable development suddenly decided one day to campaign for Russia (and to do so so badly that even layman could see the errors), giving up all he's worked on for the last few decades...
Or, you've misunderstood.
Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was still in the process of emerging from the medieval organisation of society. The liberation of the serfs only began in 1861, and was not complete at the beginning of the revolution. So about 500 years of social change in Europe since around 1400 or so, has been compressed in Russia into a single century. They may have missed some of the nuances of the development of the social contract, the enlightenment, the reformation, the development of universal education, the industrial revolution etc, etc, in the rush to catch up.
Quoting frank
Germany is possibly the most powerful (depending on the metrics), but not to the extent it can dictate anything - it usually comes down to (informal) coalitions of EU countries with specific interests (some decisions can be easily vetoed, it is not just a majority). It also should be noted that its internal politics are somewhat complicated, to some (fully unknown) extent due to the Rusian influences, especially among Greens, but it pertains to most parties (Gerhard Schröder, former SPD Chancellor, was employed by Russians just after he resigned from the post). In general, in European politics the interaction between internal and external politics is so dynamic that it is quite unpredictable.
Quoting frank
In 2014 Russians took down over Donbas a Malaysian passenger plane with 283 passengers and 15 crew on board. Nobody was punished for that, Russia just produced a stream of various lies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17
Quoting frank
That is a long topic, gave a good introduction. I will just add that while the USRR was in some aspects discontinuation of the Tsarist Russia and the post-Soviet Russia is in some aspects discontinuation of the USSR, imperialism is not one of them. On the contrary, Russians tried to establish a strong dominance over the republics and countries of the Soviet bloc (with the exception of Yeltsin). If you want to read up on that, look up the term 'Near Abroad'.
That makes sense. Probably especially in times of stress, they would tend to go back to what's always worked?
Thanks! :up:
https://shron2.chtyvo.org.ua/Zbirnyk_statei/Canadian_American_Studies_Holodomor.pdf?PHPSESSID=p93mf86aasbafa5snpbs922m02
My father would have been a student in 1933, and if I were a Ukrainian and my father had whispered this story at all, I would not be very keen now, to negotiate away an inch of sovereignty.
The attack on Odessa's grain facility is a further reminder.
Cool, thank you!
Which just about explains most of why we're here. Fucking xenophobic, racist claptrap like that. Everyone who carried out the Holodomor is dead. Russians haven't genetically inherited a likelihood to commit war crimes, they're not all warped by racial tendencies toward atrocity, there's no magic line from Rostov to Kursk east of which everyone is a monster.
It's material conditions which breed monsters and support for them, not flags.
So your hypothetical Ukrainian would be foolish to think his 'sovereignty' is going to do jack shit to prevent another Holodomor. Ukraine could be Russia in six months, as could we all. The colour of your flag doesn't stop it, your refusal to dehumanise your fellow man is what does it, refusal to buy the idea that one group are lesser than another and don't belong, denial of the pernicious idea that borders and countries and flags, and 'sovereignty' are more important than the people those ideas are supposed to serve.
And for some reason countries that have left the Russian sphere of influence (such as the Baltics) 'could be Russia', but curiously that has not happened yet, while those countries that remain in that sphere (like Belarus and Kazakhstan) could be like Switzerland, yet somehow are quite similar to Russia or are getting there instead. So I would say in this specific case sovereignty does play a role.
Of course they haven't. Of course there is no magic line. But there is a social inheritance that is expressed for example in nationalism, and ethnic identification, because people have memories and some have been known to hold grudges.
Quoting Isaac
Respect dude. But not much.
You are being unpleasant and silly, again. I expressed some sympathy for, and possible explanation of, the reluctance of Ukrainians to negotiate. I certainly think that mass killing is not unthinkable to the current Russian regime.
I read that the Russian military is building prisons to detain and torture Ukrainians. It's insane.
Possibly, but one cannot have one's cake and eat it here. Ukrainians have a very strong history of right-wing nationalism with it's associated racism and criminality (still the region's main black market arms centre). But we really want to say that Ukraine have changed. We don't need to worry any more about right-wing nationalism, that was way back on 2008 - who remembers that? We don't need to worry about the massive human rights abuses, they were all the way back in the 90s. So where now is the idea that we need be wary of inherited national cultures? Abandoned when it's inconvenient to the narrative. When I said Ukraine could be Russia, it's as true of Ukraine as it is anywhere. There's no safety in sovereignty if we hold to the notion of historical cultural inheritance, the historical culture of Ukraine is nothing to feel good about.
Quoting unenlightened
Exactly. Negotiation is how we stop this God awful bloodbath. Sympathy for those who oppose it, especially by invoking xenophobic tropes, should be handled with reservation. Yours was your only post for pages. It's not as if, after pages of pushing for humanitarian-focused solution, you just happened to mention in passing that there's a history here.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's right. A single populist election is all it takes. Sovereignty is no defence against that. And driving a country into the ground economically is a sure fire way to push in the direction of making that more likely.
What possible defence against the sort of autocratic nightmare that Russia is in do you think an utterly destroyed, massively indebted, weapon-flooded and resentful Ukraine is going to be against populism just because it's got the right colour flag over the Duma?
For anyone wanting to educate themselves about what sovereignty really means, some words from Yuliya Yurchenko, researcher in political economy, on debt.
On how debt has been used by creditors to keep Ukraine dependent and poor...
On EU integration...
But of course flag-waiving jingoists don't care about actual sovereignty.
No, it is not, it takes a bit more than that.
And seemingly you missed the whole point of my post: at this particular time those under Russian influence have it worse than those without it, even if they are under the terrible boot of the EU. That is why Ukrainians are trying to get out. Possibly, EU might change into Russia in half a year and the other way round and that would turn out to be a mistake, but that does not seem to concern them that much. Maybe because the probability of that happening seems to be rather low.
You say negotiation, others say appeasement. Peace in our time can mean a God awful bloodbath in someone else's time.
Quoting Isaac
Well the thread moves fast, so you can be forgiven for missing my response earlier today on the same page about Russian history, which a couple of people mentioned in a somewhat positive tone. But even if you had been right in your facts, that is flimsy evidence on which to base an accusation of racism and xenophobia. But never mind, I'm sure I have prejudices and ignorance to spare.
OK, what?
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't see what any of that has to do with a war over sovereignty. As if war was the only way to decide on leaders...
Quoting unenlightened
I'm aware of what others say. I've had it 'said' at me at some length. It might be nice to hear what you say, and why you might say it?
Quoting unenlightened
The racism and xenophobia were your hypothetical Ukrainian's failings. The failure to condemn them, yours.
Well I have to say it is not always nice to hear what you say
As far as I know there have been no cases of well established democracies turning into full-blown autocracies in half a year. But I might be wrong here, can you give some such examples?
Quoting Isaac
Sovereignty gives Ukrainians a chance to be not-Russia. Sure, they might have squander that chance, especially if the West abandons them, they can turn into an awful copy of Russia. Still, they would have that chance. On the other hand, at this time, giving up sovereignty to Russia practically deprives them of a chance to be a democratic, well-governed, prosperous country. Sovereignty for Ukrainians is a way to better their lives, not an end in itself.
Ukraine is not a well established democracy and Russia is not a full-blown autocracy. There are several independent measures of human development, in every single one Ukraine is not far from Russia.
Quoting Jabberwock
Is there some reason you're treating years of bloody war and destruction as if it were a minor additional consideration to weigh in?
Well, it turns out...
Quoting unenlightened
This reasoning just unintentionally shows how either limited the knowledge of the person using this argument or that the person suffer of some kind of inferiority complex because the simple fact is that politics, international relations and conflicts actually aren’t some quantum physics people don’t understand. We can discuss the opinions, the viewpoints themselves quite easily.
I do not believe that the distinction between a full-blown autocracy and a full-blown kleptocracy is that important in case of Russia. The point is that Ukraine wants to be less like Russia.
Quoting Isaac
It is not my consideration to make, it is what Ukrainians have decided.
We evidently can't. You preface everything you say with "in reality..." as if you alone had access to the truth, and everyone who disagrees with you is either a supporter of a war criminal, or uniformed, or some.other insult to their intelligence. So no... Apparently we cannot discuss the viewpoints and opinions quite easily. It's proving to be virtually impossible to just have a discussion about the opinions and viewpoints, largely because of your refusal to accept the validity of anyone's but your own.
So. The argument you were supposed to be countering was about how far Ukraine might be from Russian-style authoritarianism. The answer is, not far. The question wasn't about recent direction of travel.
Quoting Jabberwock
Then why were you presenting an argument at all? It's a bit disingenuous to present an argument and then when your reasoning is challenged claim its not your decision anyway.
What difference doesn't make to the argument that the Ukrainians have decided? If the Ukrainians decided to kill everyone of Russian descent would you have nothing to say on the matter because "it is what Ukrainians have decided"?
- Now the war is over one year old and much has happened then. That was my point.
- And you haven’t answered that what was the likelyhood of Russia to negotiate a peace when it was still wanting to denazify Ukraine, when it was still engaged in the battle of Kyiv and war enthusiasm was very high?
- What would have been the peace deal then?
Please answer these questions and we are on the right track.
No, as I have already explained. Sovereignty for Ukraine is a way to steer away from Russian-style authoritarianism.
Quoting Isaac
I was explaining why Ukrainians fight for sovereignty - to get away from Russkiy mir. Nobody else but them is able to decide whether it is worth the war and destruction, because they will suffer through it. It is a value judgement they had to make, because it concerns themselves. Apparently, you would rather deprive them of that choice, as you know better what is good for them.
Quoting Isaac
The difference is that they decided about themselves, so your example is silly.
I get your point. It's a valid one. Holding a different one doesn't make one uniformed, biased, nor a putin-supporter. We all want an end to this war we just have a difference of opinion as to how.
Quoting ssu
I don't know, it's not my area of expertise. Obviously people better informed than me thought it possible so that's good enough for me to consider it a reasonable option. Obviously, if possible, its the better one.
Quoting ssu
On the table, I believe, was a neutral Donbas, and, non-NATO Ukraine. Russia believes it has a right to a 'sphere of influence' in the region. Had nuclear disarmament and general demilitarization of international relations been successful, had the power of international law been respected and strengthened, we might might well have been able to tell them where to stick their beleif. But it wasn't, so we can't. Instead we have to deal realistically with the fact that a very powerful actor in the region wants something. If we outright deny it, they will try to take it by force.
We either meet that force (by some substantial margin), or we negotiate a deal where they get a bit of what they want and we get less risk of war.
What we don't want, literally the worst outcome, is a drip feed of weapons designed to keep the two sides just about even so that neither side is incentivised to negotiate since both sides think they might win and everybody loses - except those who make money out of war, which is the point.
Russia to deem Ukraine-bound ships 'potential carriers of military cargo' from Wednesday eve
[sup]— Felix Light, Peter Graff · The Reuters · Jul 19, 2023[/sup]
Evidently, it's not just Ukraine (and a couple of other hotspots) that has (and/or might get) a Kremlin problem. Doing this to try forcing their demands, you have to wonder what's next.
The upshot of all of this being that it's likely this situation will be at a stalemate for a long while, with Ukraine harrying the enemy for small gains on the ground and Russia regularly destroying civilian targets with air-power. A glimmer of hope is that the Russian economy contracts so badly that even the poor brainwashed citizens of that country begin to chafe under the boot, although even that is a long way from open rebellion.
War does not equal sovereignty. War equals massive indebtedness, economic collapse, and often an accompanying risk of increases in extremist politics, particularly nationalism. You read my quotes from Yuliya Yurchenko? If you're concerned about sovereignty and steering away from authoritarianism, the best route is one which promotes economic independence, equality, and respect for everyone in your community. War is just about the worst course of action.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nonsense. We're all just people. There are rich Ukrainians who'll not suffer a scratch from war and there are poor Yemenis who'll more likely suffer painfully slow deaths from hunger the longer it continues. There's powerful arms manufacturers and their investors who'll benefit from a protracted war, there's the Russian conscripts and their families. There's the children and grandchildren of the current Ukrainians who were never asked if they wanted their future sold out to Black Rock. and there's the rest of the world who might take umbrage at the prospect of being wiped of the face of the earth by the ensuing nuclear war.
I realise it's like rule one in your playbook (when cornered say it's up to the Ukrainians), but it's just isn't.
Notwithstanding that, the question is about whether we continue to supply weapons, whether we write off debt, whether we push for negotiations (or block them), whether we offer Russia elements it wants (elements to do with us, not Ukraine). These are all decisions for Western powers (and so presumably Western electorates) to make. Why are we obliged to simply follow the Ukrainians on any of those decisions?
Yes, I agree to a point. The only way out of this situation is regime change (and accompanying material condition change) for the people currently under Putin's rule. I don't think history is on your side thinking economic contraction will do it. Can you think of many examples where extreme poverty has lead to populations electing less authoritarian leaders?
If removing the leader of a country and replacing him with a more egalitarian one is the only "glimmer of hope" (and I agree it is), then why are thousands dying to prevent that leader from occupying land? Why not save the thousands of lives, give him the land, then pursue (with the billions invested currently in war) replacing him with a better leader so that no one cares which side of the border they're on?
I'll answer my own question. That strategy prioritises people's well-being over profit.
You mean, to appease Putin?
Is there something unclear about "save the thousands of lives" that's causing uncertainty about my motive?
If so, don’t agree. Putin cannot be rewarded for his crimes.
What? I've no idea what you're talking about.
At what cost? Why is punishment more important than the strategy which saves most lives? And what's wrong with the ICC? And what about being deposed isn't punishment?
I'll answer my own question. That strategy prioritises people's well-being over profit.
I'm hoping he is overthrown. I don't for one minute expect a democratic revolution in Russia, but there may be powerful actors who recognise the futility of Putin's isolationism and the ruin he has brought to his people, and who in the event of regime change, would be prepared to negotiate a withdrawal in return for the lifting of sanctions. Faint hope, I know.
Why? If life under Putin is so awful, why would those under him be less likely to oppose his rule just because he got more land? It doesn't make sense. In fact the opposite would seem to be more likely as the new total population of Russia would be shifted slightly more in the direction of openly opposing Putin's rule. One only need look at the strength of opposition in Russian occupied territories. They hate him (and with good reason). How would bringing these areas officially under Russian rule make the newly expanded population less likely to revolt?
And Putin is still accused of war crimes. He still faces international condemnation. There's way more effective sanctions we can place on his leadership than denying him land. And most of those don't costs thousands of lives just to have the hope of doing.
I just find it truly bizarre that in a world of democratic institutions who've successfully fought for years to expand the reach of Human Rights to some of the most difficult areas in the world, all of a sudden the only way we can think of to oppose aggression is with more aggression.
Typical of the hawks; if you've got a problem "bomb it".
And what is it about "we support every single opposition movement in your country and make your leadership virtually impossible to carry out on the world stage, until you're finally deposed, then we arrest you for war crimes" that isn't a punishment?
When we punish criminals we typically don't focus mainly on taking their stuff off them.
Punishment is not the issue. we can punish in a number of ways. but Black Rock stand to profit massively if those fertile lands remain in Ukrainian hands, and not if they become Russian. So tell me @Wayfarer, you're the CEO of Black Rock, you stand to make millions from the reconstruction of Donbas if it's Ukrainian, you stand to make nothing if it's Russian. You own controlling shares in most media outlets. Which solution are you going to push for?
That's why the public narrative is all about stuff, not punishment. We don't care if Putin's punished or not. We don't care who dies, or how many suffer. We just want the stuff he wants. We want the benefits of investing in Ukraine, not let Putin have them.
Then I'm confused by your metric of probability. You said...
Quoting Wayfarer
So why is Ukrainian victory likely, but democratic overthrow not?
Why do you have such faith in military power but so little in people?
The democratic institutions had to fight Hitler in WWII. The costs were of course appalling beyond all imagining, but the alternative would have been worse. Nobody wants this war to continue, and nobody wanted it to start, except for Vladimir Putin, sorrounded by cronies and yes-men who fed his delusions of grandeur.
Anyway, I've made my point and will hand the thread back to the regulars.
Well, when the Ukrainians tried that (by driving toward closer integration with the EU) their president for some reason made a 180-turn and opted for closer integration with authoritarian Russia, which does not support those ideals, against public support. And we all know how it ended. And which countries in Russia's sphere of influence are democratic and economically independent? Those who are somewhat driving towards democracy (like Moldova and Armenia, earlier Georgia) just happen to have the same problems with Russian-inspired destabilization as Ukraine. Do you think that is a coincidence? Belarussians wanted democracy, how exactly that ended? With Wagner involved in presidential elections, isn't that right? With FSB allegedly preventing a 'coup'? We have every reason to think that Russia would thwart every effort to establish a full democracy in a country of its influence.
Quoting Isaac
Are you seriously suggesting that Yemenis are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? Are you seriously suggesting YOU are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? Please, do describe how. And as for Ukrainians, they massively support their defensive war, rich or not.
Quoting Isaac
Because it is right to let them choose the path they want to take. And when we do not support them, then we are exactly 'offering Russia elements' that have very much to do with Ukraine, not with us. We let Russia decide Ukraine's fate, just because it is stronger.
Well you've no counterfactual by which to show that, so it's irrelevant to the argument. There's no world in which we didn't fight Hitler militarily but instead concentrated on popular opposition to his rule in any country he took over. So you've no way of knowing which method would have been quicker or had fewer lives lost. I surely don't need to tell one so well-versed as yourself in philosophical traditions (particularly religious ones) that there are many arguments in favour of pacifism and they didn't all just collapse with the advent of WWII.
So? Can we not fight that? Why are we suddenly disarmed of any means of resistance other than full-scale land war? Just look at the history of the overthrow of oppressive regimes and tell me how many were achieved through popular protest movements vs how many had to rely on military invasions. In fact, I'll save you the trouble - it's virtually all of them vs virtually none of them.
The idea that the only way to promote the freedom of the people of Donbas is to fight a bloody and destructive war to keep them under Ukrainian rule is ridiculous and ahistorical. Extraction from the yoke of tyranny has almost universally been won by the people, not governments invading each other.
For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions.
Option one will undeniably cause less bloodshed and has a better overall outcome for humanity. On the downside, it might not work.
Option two will definitely cause masses more bloodshed, may trigger a wider conflict, even a possible nuclear one, and has two possible routes to failure (Ukraine simply cannot shift Russia, or the toll of the war stymies Ukraine's progress away from tyranny).
So what is it about option two that's so attractive for you?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. Your incredulity is not an argument. 50 million face starvation if grain and fertiliser exports continue to be disrupted, the total death toll in Ukraine stands at about 100,000. And I also talked about the children of the Ukrainians currently supporting war, did anyone ask them what future they want?
Quoting Jabberwock
Did I mention me?
Quoting Jabberwock
That's the matter in question. Begging the question seems to be an occupational hazard for you.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia are asking for elements which involve us, that's the point (matters such as membership of NATO, trade deals, political involvement, military collaboration...)
Quoting Jabberwock
Do you seriously have that bad an understanding of what a negotiation is? Thank God you're not a diplomat.
None of the oppressive regimes were overthrown by military action? Hmm, let me think: the American Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the Greek War, the Irish War, the Indonesian War, the Algerian War, the Russian Civil War, the Afghanistan War. Funny how many of them have 'war' in the name? And remind me, was the Hitler's regime overthrown by a popular protest? Because I do vaguely remember some foreign soldiers were involved... Mussolini? Rings a bell? Did Saddam Hussein resign after peaceful protests? Gaddafi? Sorry, I do not have all day.
Quoting Isaac
Unless you noticed, Ukrainians are also people. And they are doing exactly that: defending themselves from getting under the yoke of tyranny. Your idea that it is somehow best to get under the yoke of tyranny and then just peacefully overthrow it is ahistorical: tyrannies have a strange habits of being quite resistant to change. It could be due to their tendencies to crush any opposition with brutal force, I guess.
Quoting Isaac
This is a false alternative. Did the Baltics have to free all of the USSR to get independence? No, they did not - they seized the opportunity when Russia was unable to intervene (well, it did, but it was too weak to do it effectively).
The first option - 'fighting to free all Russia' is so unlikely that it is absurd - overthrow of the Communism took 50 years and happened mostly due to economic failure of the Soviet system. Tell me, how successful is the West in overthrowing the regime in Belarus? Not very, I would say? Why think that in Russia the result would be different? Giving up the whole Ukraine (because that is the option you really propose) would most likely mean condemning them to the yoke of tyranny for many decades to come.
The second option is not needed: the point is to weaken Putin militarily, economically and politically to the point where he will no longer be able to oppose integration of Ukraine into democractic structures and alliances. Possibly, it might not even require freeing the whole occupied territory.
Quoting Isaac
Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world hunger crisis. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate it, right?
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so Ukrainians have no right to decide the future of their children, but you have the right to decide the future of Ukrainians. Right.
Quoting Isaac
Well, you feel you have the right to decide the fate of Ukrainians, because of the war, and disagreed that it is their decision to make, even though they are most affected by it. Why?
Quoting Isaac
What is the matter in question? You do want to decide for Ukrainians in matters that mostly concern Ukrainians. Where exactly I am begging the question?
Quoting Isaac
You seem to have a naive conviction that giving in to demands of a bully at the slightest show of his force will stop him exactly where he is. That is ahistorical as well. 'I bring you peace', said Chamberlain. Guess what? He did not.
You would renounce Ukraine's NATO membership, if Russia demanded it under the threat of war, is that correct? Well, what if Russia demanded all the occupied territories, under the threat of war? You would give it that to them as well (or force Ukrainians to do it). What if they demanded Odessa, historically Russian city, under the threat of war? Sure, why not. Corridor to Transnistria, vital for Russian interests? Of course. The question is: what in Ukraine you would NOT give under the threat of war?
Quoting Isaac
Oh, I have a quite good idea what negotiations are. Negotiations were involved in the Budapest Memorandum, quite a lot of them. Oops. And what about Minsk 1? Oh, how they negotiated, the guarantees they gave! Ouch. Wait, there was also Minsk 2! They negotiated there as well, so all the resolutions must have been final and dutifully observed by both sides, right? Right?
The issue is that you propose to give Russia anything to avoid war. Is that a strong negotiating position, in your opinion?
I didn't mention anything about non-violence. I said military action. Action by the military. How many oppressive regimes were overthrown by one countries military invading territory held by another? Compare that to those overthrown by the actual population within that region (violently or not). Especially true if you set that as the motive (we had no intention, for example, of regime change in Nazi Germany, the intention was defence).
Quoting Jabberwock
Seriously? Have you seen the images from the war? What in those does not seem to you like brutal force? You act as if the option of removing the Russians by land war was some kind of trivial paperwork exercise. Both options face brutal resistance. We're talking about historically which option has had the least. If you want to make the case that open war generally is met with less brutal force than popular uprising then be my guest, I'm all ears.
Quoting Jabberwock
What a stupid thing to say. You're basically saying that Russia is screwed, condemned to be forever under tyranny. That's ridiculous, of course it isn't.
Quoting Jabberwock
How successful have Ukraine been at removing Russia militarily? Not very I'd say? If you only look at one side of an equation it's going to be impossible to draw an relative conclusions. We're comparing two options here, It's no good just dismissing one because it's unlikely. What matters is whether it's more likely than the other.
Quoting Jabberwock
Don't tell me what I really propose. If you want to discuss ideas with some imaginary opponent go start a fucking blog. This is a discussion forum, for people to discuss ideas with other real people, not to make up what they think.
Quoting Jabberwock
Funny that, because we hear over and over in this very thread how it is wrong to bring up Ukraine's right-wing nationalism of the early 2000s because "things are so different now". You've cited Ukraine's path to freedom yourself (despite it being on a par with Russia only a few years ago). Now, all of a sudden it's somehow impossible for any Russian-controlled regions to follow the same path?
But let's say we do. Again, you're only comparing one side. What do the next decades hold for Ukrainians after another year of destructive war? A rosy utopia of freedom and prosperity? Their infrastructure is destroyed, they are entirely beholden to Western corporations and they have lost millions of citizens. What alternative future are you comparing this decades of tyranny to?
Quoting Jabberwock
What kind of a counter argument is that? Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world campaign for freedom. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Yemenis give up their lives to support it, right?
Quoting Jabberwock
Who said the Ukrainians had no right? We are all part of humanity and we're all responsible for each other in our part. When did that get wrong. I must have missed the memo were we all turned into nationalists.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've just given my reasons. The war affects more than just Ukrainians and my governments are taking actions one way or the other and it's my duty as a citizen to hold them to account. That means that I must judge their actions based on the outcomes I think are right. Hiding behind someone else's decision won't cut it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Whether "it is right to let them choose the path they want to take"? I don't see any argument from you why holding a Ukrainian passport makes one magically the only entity whose interests need to be considered by our governments when deciding how to respond to this crisis.
Quoting Jabberwock
Where exactly have I advocated giving in?
Quoting Jabberwock
That depends entirely on the likely consequences. If the aim isn't to protect human well-being, then what the hell is it? If concessions cause less damage to human well-being than war, then we ought choose concessions. If they cause more, we ought choose war. What other consideration would you have us include?
Quoting Jabberwock
So because some negotiations fail the whole concept is thrown out?
Quoting Jabberwock
Where have I proposed that?
Let's make this simple. Here's a report from the OHCHR, whom I hope we can agree are pretty independant. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Crimea2014_2017_EN.pdf
It details the Human Rights abuses in Russian occupied Crimea (occupied for eight years). It lists hundreds of 'disappearances' dozens of extrajudicial killings and a litany of freedoms lost.
The death rate in the Ukraine war currently stands at about 100 civilians and about 700 soldiers per week.
Ukraine turned from a path of corrupted oligarchy and right-wing nationalism to one of more freedom and European integration within just over a decade.
So it is clear that Russian-occupied territories (even the whole of Russia) can turn from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies within a decade (unless we're siding with the racist trope that Russians are somehow just worse people than Ukrainians).
It is also clear that a decade of Russian occupation leads to the deaths of dozens (perhaps hundreds if we include a generous allowance for unrecorded deaths), plus restrictions on freedoms (such as the freedom of association), and some thousands in refugee and asylum seekers.
It is also clear that even another six months of war will cause deaths in the tens of thousands, refugees in the hundreds of thousands, is already restricting freedoms (such as press freedom, freedom of movement and freedom of association), and result in billions in debt and damages. Not to mention the very real risk of millions facing starvation because of the disruption to grain and fertiliser harvests, and the risk of nuclear war.
So can you (or anyone) explain to me why they consider the most humanitarian option to be pursuing war to avoid occupation?
And if such an option is not the most humanitarian one (just the one that the Ukrainians have chosen) then can anyone explain why we should support our governments in supporting the lesser humanitarian option?
"Giving in to Russia's territorial grabs will lead to more deaths in the long run."
We gave in to Russia's territorial grab in Crimea. It didn't. For 'in the long run' to mean much longer than a decade or so (Crimea has been occupied for eight years), we'd have to have an argument for why Russia cannot do what Ukraine did in ten years. There's no such argument that isn't pretty overtly racist.
"Giving in to Russia's territorial grabs will embolden other dictators so we have to include their actions in the consequent death toll"
Fine. We're facing off against nearly a thousand deaths a week. Plus potentially millions more from the disruption. Which other emboldened dictators would anyone like to include the death rate from. I doubt they'll even register a difference.
"Putin must be punished"
Good. The ICC plans to prosecute him for war crimes. His own generals seem more than a little murderous in intent, and his people (especially in the occupied regions) are not universally happy with him either. He's a pariah on the western world stage and has his foreign assets frozen. I very much doubt 'not getting Donbas' is particularly high on his list of punishment he fears right now.
"It's not our choice to make"
It is. I'm asking about our support for our government's actions in supporting one option over another. It is our choice. We can lobby our governments to provide more military aid to enable war, or we can lobby them to use their global influence to push for Ukraine to negotiate and cede territory if necessary. Our governments are acting right now, absolving us of responsibility isn't an option.
"We have to uphold international law"
Yes (Americans should take note). Nothing in international law specifies the response beyond investigation by the ICC and eventual prosecution. There is no legal requirement to resist invasion, nor to provide aid to those doing so. We do not have to uphold "what we reckon international law ought to be".
"People are willing to die for freedom"
The issue is not freedom vs non-freedom. It is war vs political resistance as a method of ensuring it. It's good that people are willing to risk their lives for other people's freedom. It's not quite so good that people are willing to risk other people's lives for their freedom. War tends to involve the latter. Political resistance the former.
Any more?
There is no reason to limit the examples to invasion of one country by another, given that Ukraine does not and never planned to invade Russia. Why bring it up then? And Ukrainians have no intention to change the regime either, their intention is defence against the regime. If Russia did not try to subdue them and meddle in their affairs, they would not care what regime they have. So yes, I believe all the examples where people defended themselves against a regime still apply, wether those people were formally organized into military units or not.
Quoting Isaac
It is you who suggests that overthrowing Russian regime by peaceful methods would be somewhat trivial if we let Russia to install that regime in the first place. That is simply absurd and ahistorical, as I have pointed out. I am making a case that defending against the regime BEFORE it is installed has more chance of success than afterwards, before the region is turned into a police state, as those are not that easy to overthrow as you believe them to be.
Quoting Isaac
Forever, no, for a very long time, yes. At least as long as in Belarus, possibly as long as in the USSR. Why think it would be faster?
Quoting Isaac
How successful was Ukraine in not submitting the whole country under the Russian regime? I would say very. Putin wanted to take over the country and he did not, Ukrainians stopped him militarily. I would count it as a success. So yes, Ukraine was much more successful in opposing a regime militarily then the peaceful opposition in Belarus.
Quoting Isaac
When I have asked you specifically what concessions you would not make in the face of war, you wrote a whole paragraph to avoid that question. Unless you answer straight which Russian demands would need to be rejected, even under the threat of force, I am justified to assume that you would give up the whole Ukraine. If that misrepresents your view, give a straight answer: where is the limit.
Quoting Isaac
Have you missed all that I wrote? Russia is actively thwarting all attempts of democratizing of former republics, if it can, and it is quite open about it to discourage others. What is so hard about it to understand?
Quoting Isaac
I am comparing the Baltics and Belarus. Sure, a lot depends on how much Ukraine will be helped on its road to democracy, but I have no reason to believe that with the right support it cannot be like a bigger, more resourceful Lithuania. I would say the other option is Belarus in the best case, but I am afraid it could be much worse, given how often 'deukrainization' is mentioned by the propaganda.
Quoting Isaac
I have donated to several Ukrainian funds. But you do demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate the hunger crisis, right?
Quoting Isaac
Your governments are taking actions that enable Ukrainians to make the choice whether their freedom is worth fighting for militarily or not. I believe they should have that possibility, because the issue concerns mostly them - they will feel the consequences. You believe that it is better to create a situation where they cannot make that choice. In other words, you want to make that choice for them.
Quoting Isaac
Ukrainians can choose their future only if they have outside help. Without that help, their future is decided by Russia. You want to deprive them of that help, so yes, I think you want to deprive them of that right.
Quoting Isaac
If you don't see it, then you did not read my three last posts. People who are most affected by the consequences of certain actions should have the most say about choices concerning those actions. That is usually how it works.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
That is a lot of words written to completely avoid the question. I have asked you a series of very specific options, consider the likely consequences and then answer.
I understand your views, but you must also understand they are not shared by most people. Americans thought that it is worth risking their lives in exchange for freedom, so did Haitans, Greeks, the Irish, Algerians, Afghans, Russians, Poles, the French... I would say the list is rather long. Of course, it is better to throw off the yoke of tyranny by peaceful methods, but history teaches us that such opportunities are somewhat rare. Usually it involves death, violence and destruction. Yet people think it is worth it. I understand you disagree, but maybe let those directly involved decide.
Not to mention that given your reasoning, we should give in to all terrorists: after all, they always threat with more damage than would happen if their demands are not met. Do you have any idea why we are not doing that?
Quoting Isaac
No, the concept works very well in the right conditions. However, the situation did not change sufficiently for them to occur.
Quoting Isaac
You insist that we make concessions, while refusing to specify where concessions must stop. Unless you do that, it is most reasonable to assume that you are willing to accept all concessions.
The simple answer is: it is not the most humanitarian option. The American Revolution was not the most humanitarian option: most likely Brits would have directly killed less Americans than died in the Revolution. This possibly concerns many if not most fights and wars for freedom. What you fail to understand is that there are some things that people are willing to risk their lives for or even knowingly die for.
Because they are planning to invade Russian held territory. The legal paperwork doesn't change how many people die, nor how successful/necessary the operation is likely to be.
Quoting Jabberwock
No I'm comparing the two options. I haven't declared either to be trivial, nor have I ignored either. It is the act of ignoring one to only look at the other that I'm disputing.
Quoting Jabberwock
Simple. Ukraine did it. So did several other states (as you only recently pointed out). If Ukraine can do it, why not Russia?
Quoting Jabberwock
This is disputed.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nonsense. I don't have the data to make such a decision. I do have the data to show the current options are heavily in favour of occupation. Other potential demands would have to be weighed on their merits, but since there are no other demands right now, I can't see the point.
Quoting Jabberwock
So was Ukraine. The people threw that shackle off.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've donated to several famine funds. But you do demand that Yemenis give up their lives to promote freedom in Ukraine, right? Where is this line of argument supposed to go?
Quoting Jabberwock
Where have I said that I don't think we ought help Ukraine? The argument is about which methods we should be willing to support, not about whether we offer any support at all.
Quoting Jabberwock
OK, so in what way are we consulting the people in Yemen whose lives are put at risk by disruption to grain exports? You're not advocating a 'most effected, most choice' option, you're advocating a 'do everything the Ukrainians ask' option. Given the enormous death toll, I'd say ordinary Russian conscripts were pretty much the most affected (they seem to be being killed in higher numbers), so where are we considering them?
Quoting Jabberwock
I'll add it to the list. But also, specific to Ukraine. It's just a narrative that they're 'fighting for freedom'. You've no idea why they're fighting. We know a good deal are fighting out of nationalist sentiment, a good number from hatred of Russia, many for revenge. There's little evidence of a strong single unifying 'cause'.
Then Washington invaded British-held Boston. There you go, military invasion overthrows the regime! Should I look up all the others? The bottom line still is, people have risked their lives for freedom throughout the history. Coming up with made-up criteria will not change it.
Quoting Isaac
And I have explained why I think that option is very unlikely.
Quoting Isaac
Ukraine lost its independence in 1921 and gained it again in 1991. How is this an example of 'simple' or 'faster'?
Quoting Isaac
You had no problems of presenting demands and likelihood of their fulfillment when you have described the hypothetical peace negotiations, but now you have no data. You can assess that the current options are heavily in favour of partial occupation, but somehow are unable to assess the options in favour (or not) of complete occupation. Curious.
Quoting Isaac
The people threw that shackle off after 50 years when the USSR was economically collapsing and could not intervene, like it did in 1968 in Czechoslovakia or almost did in 1980 in Poland. So yes, the people did it, but the situation was quite favorable.
Quoting Isaac
I see, you donated. But if you sold all your possessions, leaving just the bare minimum, you would save even more Yemenis. That would be THE MOST HUMANITARIAN OPTION, would it be not? Yemenis give up their lives so that we can have smartphones, computers, and watch Netflix, that does not bother you that much? Somehow you do not feel obliged to relinquish all your comforts and do not demand that from all the people you know? Only Ukrainians should give up their freedom?
Quoting Isaac
You would prefer to force Ukrainians to go under Russian occupation and then somehow help them in other ways. Does that misrepresent your views in any way?
Quoting Isaac
As long as you have a smartphone, leave the Yemeni out of this. Until we give up our comforts for them, we should not not expect Ukrainians to give up their freedom.
I am advocating that Ukrainians be able to decide in matters most related to them, exactly as I wrote. I would be extremely happy if Russian conscripts could decide for themselves, however, the West has little means to enable that choice. In the case of Ukrainians, we can.
And i still feel the need to ask: do you believe we should always meet the demands of terrorists, if it is the most humanitarian option?
Yaay a suggestion, though it could use (or needs) some fleshing out.
By the way ...
Quoting Isaac
Is this related to the "border/country free world" thing from earlier in the thread?
We could sit down with Putin and just have a heart to heart. I think he might come around.
Again, that metric is not the issue. The method is.
Quoting Jabberwock
No you haven't. You said it's because the regime would oppose it. All autocratic regimes oppose resistance. Why are Russians uniquely unable to win out against that?
Quoting Jabberwock
As late as 2008, Ukraine was in roughly the same position as Russia on indices of freedom, corruption and human development. Whatever progress it's made relative to Russia, it has done in the last few years. I get your nationalist tendency to think the colour of the flag is the marker of independence, but most of the world have moved on from colonialism and consider more complex measures of human freedom than whether they like the flag.
I know the world's media would have us believe Ukraine are the world's most noble beaten down underdogs, but they're not. Until recently they were a hotbed of far-right nationalism, corruption, human rights abuses and black market arms trading. The people revolted against that. They did so over only a few years. There is no reason at all why Russians cannot do the same, they are coming from almost exactly the same position on indices of freedom.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, because you've given me no options. The offers and possibilities are real here. Occupation, neutrality, NATO membership... these are real negotiation points. You're asking me to measure hypothetical ones. I don't have the data on hypothetical demands. If you give me a real demand you think Putin might make, I'll do my best to find some figures to use.
Quoting Jabberwock
See above, this is just wrong. The move from corruption to freedom is recent. Your obsession with the USSR being the cause of all oppression is not reflected in the data I'm afraid. The Ukrainian government did a perfectly good job of oppressing its own people up until very recently
Quoting Jabberwock
This argument doesn't make any sense at all. I'm asking you why you choose to support the Ukrainians. Why do you choose to support your government spending billions on their war and not on protecting the Yemeni. It has nothing to do with what I'm asking Ukrainians, I'm not talking to a Ukrainian, I'm talking to you. Why do you choose to support Ukrainian freedom over and above Yemeni food supply?
Your government has a limited pot of money, why are you happy for them to spend it securing Ukrainian freedom at the expense of Yemeni food security.
Quoting Jabberwock
I'm not forcing anything? Are you forcing people to starve because you're not actively helping them? Are you forcing people to live without shelter because you're not providing a home? Are you currently forcing Afghan women to live under the oppressive Taliban regime?
No. I'm responding to the situation Russia has put them in, in the context of all the other crises the world is facing.
Quoting Jabberwock
I have a Fairphone, but that's not the point. The point is that we face a choice as to which crisis we ask our governments to prioritise. I want a balance, you want Ukrainian freedom above all else. I'm asking why.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. I know what you're advocating, I'm asking why. If giving Ukraine that option is bought at the expense of Yemeni food security, Ukrainian children's future, dead Russian conscripts, risk of nuclear war... Why are you advocating it? What is it about giving Ukrainians the options they want that trumps those other concerns for you?
Yes. Borders cause wars. It is not noble or ethical to support their instatement or protection. It is the quality of the governments on either side that matters, not the location of the division between them. Where there is oppression, we should strive to reduce it, not move it to the other side of an arbitrary line.
That's what's being advocated here. That we support the expending of thousands of lives, not in reducing oppression, but in moving it. Putting it back within the borders of Russia where, presumably, it belongs...?
What government are you assuming to be Jabberwock's?
Oh, I don't want to excessively personalise, so I don't suppose it matters. I'm treating them as a generic interlocutor, so assuming vaguely Western. If not then maybe no lobbying is needed, it sounds that way from the responses.
I assume (perhaps wrongly) that a wider audience are reading and would find an intimately specific conversation about individual actions quite boring...?
It would be interesting to get the perspective of a Brazilian, or an Ethiopian, or better yet a Russian, but none seem to be here (commenting at least).
Your alternative was 'popular protest movements vs how many had to rely on military invasions'. I did not expect you to take it so literal, if you do, then the alternative is obviously false - most commonly opressive regimes were overthrown neither by popular protests nor by military invasions (which Ukrainian defense, by the way, still is not), but by wars and revolutions. You wrote 'just look at the history of the overthrow of oppressive regimes' and I did exactly that - most of them were overthrown through death and violence, not by peaceful protests.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, all autocratic regimes oppose resistance and they often last quite long, so there would be nothing unique about that. Do I have to list all the lengths of autocratic rules to make that point?
Quoting Isaac
Let us check that out... The Economist Democracy Index in 2008 for Russia was 4.48, while compared to 6.94 for Ukraine, with full democracies starting at about 8. RSF Freedom of Press - Ukraine 19.25, Russia - 47 (the lower score, the greater freedom). Human Freedom index for 2008 - Ukraine 76, Russia 111 (less is better). Freedom in the World 2013 (no earlier issues) - Ukraine 4, Russia 6 (1 - best, 7 - worst). Polity IV State Fragility 2009 - Ukraine 6, Russia 8. They only indices they were comparable in was corruption. So what you wrote is simply false. Ukraine has began to improve democratically from the moment it has thrown the Kremlin yoke off. Yes, it went slower than in some other republics, yes, there were some regresses, but that is precisely because Russian influences were there much stronger than in the Baltics. The flag has nothing to do with it, it is a matter of Russian dominance.
Quoting Isaac
No. It seems you simply do not know the history of Ukraine. People revolted in 2004, not 'a few years' back. And they did not revolt against autocratic regime (Kuchma did not even run in the elections), but against rampant corruption and electoral fraud. That was four years before 2008, when you believe Ukraine was still authoritarian. Not to mention that your objection undermines your own argument: if Ukraine was autocratic from 1931 till 'a few years back', then it would be even longer, so it cannot be an example of fast rejection of authoritarian rule, can it?
Quoting Isaac
No, it was not, as I have pointed out above. It was slow, gradual, with many regresses, but it is certainly not recent. Moreover, most deficiencies in the democratic processes in Ukraine were related to bitter infighting between the different fractions and corruption, not to autocracy. In general from 2000 Ukraine has been described as a 'hybrid regime', i.e. one with some deficiencies and abuses (like rigged elections), but different from authoritarian rule, like Russia. They are not comparable.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I have given you a list of specific options, you just evaded it. Let us assume that we give Putin all the territories he has now, Ukraine renounces NATO, peace is reached and in three years Putin comes back with the army and asks for the rest of the lands which are now officially annexed to Russia as enshrined in the constitution. Should Ukraine concede or not?
Quoting Isaac
I choose to support Ukrainians, because they were attacked by Russians as they were striving for freedom. But I also believe that conceding to Putin's demands will only encourage him, making the whole Europe less secure.
Quoting Isaac
Fair enough. You are not forcing them. Let me rephrase that, then: you would prefer to deny them military help, so they fall under the Russian regime, and then help them somehow. Is that correct?
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so we no longer strive for THE MOST HUMANITARIAN OPTION, but a balance. Last year's number of dead Yemeni (when the grain deal was in force) was acceptable, but with the deliveries stopped it would be too much.
Yes, I would rather help Ukrainians, possibly because I know more Ukrainians than Yemeni. But also because I believe Putin must be stopped.
Quoting Isaac
I do not think it is at the expense of Ukrainian's children future, on the contrary. It is specifically for their future, so they do not have to do 'peaceful protests' in a police state. As I said, I am closer to Ukrainians than Yemeni, the risk of nuclear war is rather small. As for Russian conscripts, you have just argued that they can peacefully revolt any time they want, so why that should be a problem?
And I notice that again you decided to skip the question about the terrorists: well, that is my concern, too - if you concede to a bully, sooner or later you have to concede again, unless you reach a boundary. Unfortunately, due to your evasions, I still do not know how much you are willing to concede under a threat of force. You get indignant when I suggest you would concede everything, but I am not sure why - you postulate the most humanitarian option and giving everything up to avoid violence IS the most humanitarian option.
All I really wanted to know.
Should have asked, would save us some time.
OK, this goes well beyond any particular troubles in the world, and (I think) also answers
Quoting jorndoe
i.e. such a "border/country free world" would go towards
Quoting Isaac
except doesn't answer how such a world might/would come about.
EDIT: more explicit
Odesa, other Ukrainian port cities bombarded by Russia for 3rd consecutive night
[sup]— Samya Kullab · AP via PBS · Jul 19, 2023[/sup]
Ruining grain export and "retaliation" all in one?
Russia bombards Ukraine ports, threatens ships, jolting world grain markets
[sup]— Viktoria Lakezina, Vitalii Hnidyi, Peter Graff, Angus MacSwan · Reuters via MSN · Jul 20, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Oleh Kiper]The aggressor is deliberately hitting the port infrastructure - administrative and residential buildings nearby were damaged, also the consulate of the People's Republic of China.[/quote]
Russian attacks kill one in north Ukraine, hit grain terminals in south
[sup]— Anna Pruchnicka, Kim Coghill, Timothy Heritage · Reuters · Jul 21, 2023[/sup]
Not sure how, say, China can justify supporting this crap.
Interestingly, he did not say recently anything different from what he was saying for the last year and a half. Putin's grip on power seems to be slipping if he starts to see bloggers as a threat.
Igor No-mates, it seems.
Can anyone semi-informed imagine who might replace Putin, and what policy changes would result? Or am I only dreaming?
Really? Because a minute ago, when it better suited your narrative...
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Funny how the solidity of Putin's grip on power seems to change depending on the purposes the argument is being put to.
Encourage more war - "Putin is weakening and could be overthrown any minute, just a few more bombs and we'll be there."
Encourage political action instead of war - "Putin is strong, it would take many decades to overthrow him"
Do get dizzy at all?
Yes, tyrannies have a tendency to last quite long, unless significant impulses affect it. I would say that a bloody, unsuccessful war, with more than 100k dead and collapsing economy COULD be that impulse, don't you think? Especially that we know from history (those who know it) that such lost wars do tend to influence rulers quite negatively. What you you proposed, on the other hand, that is handing Putin Ukraine and giving him concessions would mean that he won the war. I would say that would be a regime-strengthening factor, don't you think?
And if you expect that Putin's rule will end with Russians gathering, holding hands in a circle and establishing a democracy in a week (which is your preferred method of getting rid of regimes, even though it did not happen that often in history), then you are even more naive and oblivious to the reality of Russian politics than your previous posts have shown.
Putin's end will not be peaceful and it will definitely not be pretty, in case you did not notice, Prigozhin was bringing to Moscow not a draft of a new democractic constitution, but tanks. I do not expect that Putin's end will be succeeded by a democracy, definitely not in a short term. I do not even think that Russian society is capable of a violent revolution at this time (which in regimes happens more often) - they have been trained to be politically apathetic for decades.
I rather expect that after Putin the next regime will be equally autocratic - only much weaker, which would make it uncapable of maintaining the war effort.
How convenient. The one thing that can end these otherwise impossible to shift tyrannies just so happens to be the one thing that is the solution you prefer anyway because of your personal allegiances.
What an entirely unbiased and rational pure coincidence!
You expect me to apologize that facts confirm my arguments and not yours?
No, it is not a coincidence, it is a process well known from history. The facts are that Putin's rule for over 20 years has been practically unchallenged by any peaceful protests (the only bigger one was the Bolotnaya Square, which was dealt with rather swiftly) and after a year and a half of unsuccessful, bloody war he already had to bargain away from an armed coup. Yes, that is very unfortunate that regimes tend to weaken much more through blood and violence than by peaceful processes, but the history teaches us that is the way it is. We can accept it and act accordingly (like the West does now) or we can ignore history, concede everything to regimes and just hope that they somehow stumble and fall down on their own.
Ah well, if I'd known The Facts™ were involved, I'd have stayed schtum.
I have given you two specific facts:
1. Putin's rule has been practically unchallenged by peaceful protests for twenty years.
2. The events of the Ukrainian war have weakened Putin's regime.
Which do you believe is false and why?
I'm afraid you aren't succeeding.
I have the impression that you are trying to paint Jabberwock as a bigot, which seems the sort of thing you deplore about woke cancel culture.
No. The sort of thing I hate about woke cancel culture is the assumption that everyone on the less popular side of a political position must be acting out of stupidity, or malice (the same assumption you've just made). That differences of opinion can no longer be the result of differences in value, or differences in analysis - but rather some nefarious objective to undermine The Truth™ which everyone apparently knows.
That is exactly the pattern being repeated here. Intelligent, well-informed people have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict, but we can't just discuss the merits of each approach, those differing from the mainstream have to uniformed, biased, Putin-supporters, they must be informed of what is "in reality..." the case, or educated about "the facts...". It's a lame attempt to disguise ideological commitments (which we could talk about) behind the pretence that The Facts™ just so happen to lead directly to the conclusion they favour, and no ideology need enter into it.
It's bollocks. The Facts are literally everything that's ever happened, and selecting two of those things and claiming that they (rather than ideological preferences) lead to some conclusion about strategy is disingenuous at best.
's argument is absurd - as if producing two facts is sufficient to argue a complex case of geopolitical strategy in which many experts in the field disagree. It deserved nothing more than it got in response. If anyone wants to actually try and make the case that Putin could not be deposed by popular uprising, but very likely would be by losing a war, then that would be an interesting case to read, but...
Quoting Jabberwock
... isn't one. It's an argument that Putin has not yet been deposed by popular uprising, and might be weakening by losing a war.
But the argument above is not sufficient to hold ground as support for the position that alternatives to war are not viable. Supporting that position requires the stronger argument made above, and the facts very clearly do not support that stronger argument, only the weaker one.
This should not be difficult stuff, and were this a discussion about some uncontroversial matter, no-one of reasonable intelligence would have the slightest trouble telling the difference.
Perhaps, an attempt to make this more clear. The conflict between the idealist and the realist is not an equal one, it's asymmetric in terms of evidence. This is because the idealist argument is "we all want the world to be like X and actions a, b, and c can get us there", but the realist argument is not "we all want the world to be like ~X and actions d, e, and f can get us there", it is ""we too want the world to be like X but actions a, b, and c unfortunately cannot get us there, nothing can - we have to accept the lesser {not quite}X".
That's how these arguments are set.
Those arguing for continued war are not arguing "Yeah, war! Let's have more of that!" They are arguing that we unfortunately, reluctantly must have war, it's our only option. They'd love nothing better than a world without war, but their hands are tied and reality is such that it cannot be avoided.
Those arguing for non-war options are not arguing the opposite (that they'd love to have a war, but unfortunately our hands are tied and we just cannot). They are arguing that there is a way, that we can resolve conflicts without war, that we can oppose tyranny without having to first move it about the globe by way of border wars.
So the evidence required for each of these positions is different.
The first argument needs to show that war cannot be avoided, in other words, it needs to prove a negative - that no other way works.
The second argument has no such burden, we don't need to prove that war cannot work because no one wants war anyway. War is what we reluctantly accept when all other options are closed. so we don't have to prove a negative, we only have to disprove the opposition's attempts to do so. We only have to show that they've not sufficiently made their case that war is the only option.
What's happening here is an attempt to perversely change this around. To assume we want war and require those opposing it to prove that it won't work. That's a pretty inhumane position to have arrived at.
Or racist xenophobes.
Yes. Or racist xenophobes. I expect they have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict too, but I've no interest in arguing with those. Likewise the terminally stupid, the uncaring, the insane... There are lots of categories of people who might have an opinion about how to resolve this conflict against whom I've no wish to argue, whose opinions I've no wish to hear.
We used to exclude those types of people from debate on the grounds of a lack of qualification, or of not meeting the basic requirements of civil society.
Now it seems, the measure of exclusion is likelihood of disagreeing on the very topic supposedly being discussed.
And that's progressive, apparently.
It would be absurd to argue that no-one is racist, or a xenophobe, or biased, or ill-informed... This is not about the possibility of any alternative opinion being one of those things. It's about the reasonableness of the criteria used to to judge that.
Jeffry Sachs is clearly not ill-informed. It would be ridiculous to suggest he is. He's clearly not malicious (he's spent his academic career fighting poverty). so it's unreasonable to suggest he is.
Your hypothetical Ukrainian espousing the idea that modern Russians have somehow inherited the evils of their forebears is xenophobic. It's literally the definition of the word - imputing on a nation some inherited 'characteristic', simply by virtue of origin. And Ukraine (alongside many of the nations in that region) is notorious for the strength of it's right-wing nationalism, particularly in the armed forces.
To put the implication that Jeffrey Sachs et al. are uninformed and uncaring on a par with the suggestion that an hypothetical Ukrainian repeating xenophobic tropes is, in fact, a xenophobe is nonsense.
The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. Of course they're not. It's an argument about what we ought take as reasonable grounds to take an opinion seriously.
But you sure like calling them out, o fair-minded one!
Yes. That's right.
Quoting Isaac
What argument?The rest of us call it ad hominem fallacy.
Is it ad hominem to take a medical professor's opinion about vaccine safety more seriously in discussion than the 16 year-old Proud Boy?
Of course not.
We take into consideration matters like qualification, basic social ethics, and intelligence (a minimum threshold of). These are not ad hominem, they're just reasonable entry requirements for discussion. Here, speaking English is one, for example.
I wasn't expecting that I'd have to actually repeat the arguments as to why one might not want to include racists and xenophobes in a discussion about how to settle international conflict.
If you want the full argument it was made in 1721...
And here is the inconsistency I see in your posting: you are very free with these negative labels, but there is no good reason ever to address them to your interlocutors on the boards, rather you should point them out to the mods so that they can be remove the people we don't want to waste time talking to and the sensible fair-minded decent people can discuss freely.
But instead, you use these sorts of epithets on a regular basis in an attempt to undermine people you do continue to engage with. And then bang on hypocritically about respect.
No. Neither have I. Which is why I...
Quoting unenlightened
I have no reason to invoke the mods. The only person I've accused of anything except error is your completely hypothetical Ukrainian who isn't (I assume) under the mods' jurisdiction.
Quoting unenlightened
Do I?
And yet...
Quoting unenlightened
...I've had no moderation requests. And here you are, engaging. If my gross application of such epithets is so egregious and persistent, then why are you still engaging rather than taking your own advice?
No, that is not true, it is as ahistorical as most of your other claims. The simplest example is the one I have already given you: the liberation wars. People do not start liberation wars when 'all other options are closed' - obviously there is always the option to remain under the oppression - but when the war is considered to be a better alternative. Nobody finds that blameworthy - few beside the most staunch pacifists claim that they should choose the oppresion over the war. Your position seems to be to avoid war at all cost, including oppression. I understand it, but you are a in a tiny minority of people who support this. Thus it is simply incorrect to assume that all who discuss the subject here share that position, which you do above.
But even if that was true, which it is not, the conlusion is still false. For both sides the burden of proof is exactly the same – to show that the expected results of the proposed course of action are more likely than not. Without that it does not matter at all whether the solution would be preferred by both sides, because if it is not likely to happen, it makes no difference.
If an idealist proposes that we reach global disarmament by destroying all our weapons and waiting as all others do exactly the same, it is not the realist's burden to show that it is not possible in principle (because it is) or that it is not the preferred course of action, but only that such a course of action is very unlikely to produce the expected result and quite likely to produce other quite adverse effects (like being attacked by those who held onto their weapons).
So no, 'the slighest chance' of good results is not sufficient to propose a course of action, if there is a quite big chance that the results might not be that good.
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so we can discuss facts after all. So please, do present the facts that show that the peaceful deposition of Putin by way of popular protest is likely. That is all I ask. Because so far your track record is somewhat unimpressive: you have argued for an alternative between 'peaceful protests and military invasion', but that alternative is false and ahistorical. On the other hand, examining whether more regimes fell down by violence or by peaceful opposition shows that the first is definitely more likely. You had no answer to that.
You also have claimed that Ukraine in recent years went from autocracy to democracy quickly and by way of popular protests - that is also an ahistorical claim, which shows a rather significant lack of knowledge of the history of the country we are here discussing. You have given as a support democracy metrics, which, it turned out, were quite different than what you have claimed.
I gave you two facts, but I can give quite a few more. For some of them one has to go back to the times of tzars, when, at the time where Western civic societies were being established, Russians were still under absolutistic rule. The period of relative freedoms after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the Ditcatorship of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's verchushka. After that were fifty years of the authoritarian party's rule, with a very short period of relative relaxation under Yeltsin; then Putin came and strengthened the rule again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of democracy and very little of grass-root civil activity. This is aggravated by the rampant corruption, which necessarily weakens all the state institutions. It should also be noted that the geographical setup also plays a role – many remote regions are unsustainable without external help, so they were and are heavily dependent on the center. For example, independent Yakutia (Sakha) might sound nice to some, but is rather unrealistic - in spite of vast resources it would be unable to develop without significant external support. That forces heavily centralized structure of the government. This makes the greatest difference between Russia and current regions/republics and some former republics – for Baltics, for example, the oppression was clearly foreign - they did not need Moscow for anything, they could perfectly manage on their own (which they did). For remote regions it is quite different. This is somewhat related to another fact that hinders a popular uprising - significant differences in the standards of living. Those whose voice would be better heard and influential, Muscovites, have it much better than the rest of the country and they are quite aware of that - they have a lot to lose. On the other hand protests in remote areas would be simply unheard. Popular uprising needs unity, which would be difficult to reach.
This does not mean that Russians are unable to reach democracy, I sincerely hope that they do, but that process would be rather long and necessarily full of upheavals. It cannot be seriously considered as a solution for a conflict that is happening right now.
This is just a sample of facts, I can give you quite a few more. However, the issue I see is that you tend not to engage with facts, you simply ignore them. You do not seem to be even interested in the history of the region. You somehow believe that it is sufficient to claim 'But it could happen!'. That is not a position based on factually supported assessment of likely course of events, that is wishful thinking. Yet you demand that such position, in which you specifically reject the burden of proof, be given exactly the same merit as other views.
So yes, please, do present your detailed account of your assessment based on facts from the situation and history of the region, particularly Russia, that peaceful deposition of the regime leading to democratic changes that would prevent Russia from encroaching on Ukrainian freedom is likely in relatively short term. I will treat that position with the respect it deserves.
And pacifists usually have some sort of otherworldly faith. The nasty, belligerent pacifist doesn't exist.
I'll save cluttering the thread with arguments written elsewhere. The arguments against historicism are discussed here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14472/why-should-we-talk-about-the-history-of-ideas
You've presented a series of facts which, alone, do not demonstrate anything but your interpretation of what actually happened in one instance. What actually happened in one instance is neither a delimiter nor predictive of what will/could happen in another instance. It would be like me claiming that tall people are likely to hit you on the grounds that a tall person once hit me.
Historical facts are always already interpreted. They don't stand on their own.
For example...
Quoting Jabberwock
Measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective. When Ukraine (or Russia) started being an autocracy and when it stopped are not raw historical facts (which would be things like election methods, political arrest rates, etc). You've already interpreted historical facts in line with your preferred narrative and are attempting to pass off the interpretation as fact.
We're not dealing with facts, we're dealing with your preferred story, based on facts. I can't argue against it because it's a perfectly valid story. Nor have I any need to to support my argument.
You, however, to support an argument that war is necessary, have to show that alternatives are impossible (or highly improbable). That can't be shown by simply pointing to one plausible interpretation of events. An argument that war is necessary has to show that other interpretations are all implausible. You have to show that it is impossible to be of the opinion that Ukraine turned from a state similar to Russia's current one, to their current one in a few years. You haven't shown that, you've shown that it is possible to interpret events in such a way as to suggest not. But no one is arguing that is is not possible to do that. I'm arguing it is not necessary to do that. Do you understand the difference?
Nothing you've presented even addresses the argument that it is not necessary to interpret historical events in such a way as to support the notion that war is necessary to bring about freedom. You've shown it's plausible to think the opposite, not that it's implausible to think anything else.
No, I did not present my views based on one instance. I have quoted many events from the history that support the view I propose. Unlike you.
Quoting Isaac
It was you yourself that proposed democracy indices as a measure of democracy. I understand your dismay that you did so without actually checking them and it turned out they actually do not support your view, but it is silly now to discredit them.
But sure, it is one interpretation of events, be free to present those events that support your interpretation. Till now you have flatly refused to do that.
Quoting Isaac
And I am not asking for it, I am asking you to argue for your preferred story, based on facts. I suspect, based on the discussion so far, that the reason you refuse to do so is that you do not know any.
Yes, you do. You demand from your government that it takes a specific course of action instead of the course of action it is taking. To argue for that you have to present an argument that the specific course of action you propose is more likely to have the preferred result than the course taken by them. It is not enough to claim that it is just possible that the preferred result might occur.
Quoting Isaac
No, all I have to do is support an argument that war is more likely to produce the preferred results than other courses of action and I did just that. We have to act based on what we consider to be likely, not possible. Until you actually present an argument (based on facts) that peaceful revolt in Russia is likely, then that is the only assessment of likelihood we have.
Quoting Isaac
I have already explained which historical events support my argument that peaceful revolution in Russia at this time is unlikely. Sure, it is possible to interpret historical events otherwise, but it is possible to interpret historical events in ANY way. It is possible to interpret historical events in such a way that supports the notion that the Moon landing did not happen. Would you demand that this position was treated equally as the one that says that it did? There are people arguing on the Internet that the ancient Rome did not exist. Does that position deserve the exact same merit as the opposite one?
I argue against your view, because it is not a perfectly valid story. I argue against it, because it is an invalid one, for which I gave my reasons. Saying 'Oh, I can argue that Ukraine's transition was fast and recent, because I can interpret the facts that way!' has the exact same weight as 'Oh, I can argue that the Moon landing did not happen because I can interpret the facts that way!' Actually, it has less weight, because the Moon landing conspiracists at least share their interpretations of the facts that led them to that conclusion, which you refuse to do.
The bottom line is that we have a reason to believe that the taken course of action is likely to produce the effects we expect (as you wrote yourself, it is a perfectly valid story). On the other hand, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that the course of action you propose is likely to produce the desired effects, beside your claim that your interpretation of events (which you refuse to share) tells you so.
I would let the readers decide how that should inform our demands concerning the course of action.
I was referring to your potted history of the USSR. The number of 'instances' you divide this into was not the relvan6part of that paragraph. The relevant part was that it is interpreted.
Quoting Jabberwock
Are you seriously claiming that there exists not a single case of tyranny being overthrown by non-military? Because if not, then my case is already made. If we both agree that such cases exist then that is my argument. It is possible, therefore we ought strive for it. That case is undermined only by two counterarguments; a) it is not even possible, or b) we ought not strive for it. You've argued neither.
Quoting Jabberwock
I proposed no such thing. I proposed "measures of human development", please respond to what I've written, not what you'd like me to have written.
An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119.
Quoting Jabberwock
O will do so if you claim that there are no instances at all in history, or that it is impossible. Otherwise we already agree on the facts of my case. We disagree about the conclusion.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
I presume we'd all rather avoid war. Therefore I only have to argue that it is possible to do so.
If I wanted to kill Putin, dropping 10 nuclear bombs on Moscow would be sure to do it. So is all I need to do to prove that increased likelihood of achieving the outcome? Of course not. We want to kill Putin, but we want to do so in the least harmful way (in terms of collateral damage). If you prefer we could set the outcome to be 'freedom for the people of Ukraine with minimum loss of freedom to others'. But under that metric, war has a high(ish) chance of securing freedom, but with massive losses, supporting revolution has a lower chance of securing freedom, but with minimal losses. So which wins?
Probability of success is not a sufficient metric, unless your 'preferred results' is wide enough to include avoiding undesirable collateral effects, in which case, you haven't made your case because you've only included 'freedom for Ukraine' as your result. I sincerely hope my government have more concerns than the freedom of Ukrainians.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, they don't. Look, I'll try and give an example from your post above...
"... at the time where Western decadent societies were being established, Russians were still under equally despotic rule (monarchs and bourgeois factory owners are identical). The period of relative chaos after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the paternal care of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's dedicated verchushka. After that were fifty years of the steady party's rule, with a very short period of descent into capitalism under Yeltsin; then Putin came and fortunately strengthened the rule for the people again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of decadence and are one of the few countries to overthrow the rule of bourgeois oligarchs, so they can do it again."
... I've not changed any of the facts at all. Just written it from a different perspective. You've not 'explained' anything. You've just told me what your preferred frame is.
Quoting Jabberwock
You've not given a single reason why my story is invalid. Presenting an alternative one isn't an argument that mine is invalid. You have to show that I can't think what I think (and remain coherent), not merely that there's an alternative which is also coherent.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, it doesn't because I can show how it is virtually impossible to believe the moon landings were fake and remain coherent - the number of people who would need to be involved is inconsistent with the number of people who have been shown to be involved with any other conspiracy. It's not complicated. As I've shown above, you giving your preferred account of Russian history is not the same category of fact at all. It's really, really simple - do experts actually think the moon landings were faked? No. Do experts actually think war will be worse for Ukraine than occupation? Yes. That's literally all you need to do to determine which positions are off the 'crazy' end and which are to be taken seriously.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not that simple if one course of action is going to lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, we don't simple compare on likelihood of success, unless success includes the minimisation of collateral effects, in which case you haven't made your argument at all since you've not included that metric.
? observations moreso than narrative (e.g. to proceed from)
Warring — the Kremlin invades + bombs Ukraine
Response — multinational political and defense action
[sup](the "bombs" part includes food export by the way, "warring" party can make peace break out anytime, without much fear of invasion at that; the "response" part isn't exclusive-either-or like so, also repeated UN and Ukraine terms)[/sup]
Yes, Ukraine has been wrestling to shed the regressing shadow of the dominant neighbor for a bit. Some progress has been made, and more pending (barring PTSD).
Incidentally, there are some peripherals related to varying extents, e.g. Sweden, Armenia-Azerbaijan, North Korea, Germany, Poland.
? much already brought up earlier
Nothing further regarding this earlier comment?
I was referring to the facts concerning overthrowing various regimes and how it affects the likelihood of assessment of success in this case.
Quoting Isaac
No, your case is not already made, because you are supposed to argue that what the course of action you propose is likely to provide the desired effects. Arguing that it is merely possible is not enough.
Quoting Isaac
If we are tracking transition from autocracy to democracy, then we should consider indices that do just that.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, I agree that is possible, I just argue that we have no reason to believe it is likely. If you are happy with that conclusion, the discussion is settled.
Quoting Isaac
No, you have to argue that your proposed course of action is likely to achieve that goal. I think all would agree that it would be great if we could summon aliens by singing hippie songs so that they brought us global peace with no victims at all. It is impossible to argue that this effect is NOT possible. Yet this idea is useless as the proposed course of action.
Quoting Isaac
The former, because the chance of achieving the latter is low due to the circumstances I have described.
It is not the only metric, but it is the most important one. Great effects could be achieved by taking very risky actions, but we do not do them precisely for the reason that they would most likely fail. Yes, the predicted outcomes offset the probabilities, but only to a small degree.
Quoting Isaac
It is not hard to notice that this interpretation is as coherent as the perspective that the Moon landing is fake. I understand that you are desperate to show that all perspectives are equal, but the simple truth is they are not.
Quoting Isaac
Your story is invalid because it does not cohere with the generally accepted view of historical processes. Sure, you might argue that those in turn are invalid, but that requires in turn even more arguments.
Quoting Isaac
But that is not the argument you are making. Do experts believe that quick and peaceful revolution in Russia leading to its democractization is likely? If you know them, just present their arguments. Because so far you have claimed you are exempt from making the argument at all.
Quoting Isaac
But so far we have nothing to compare, because you have failed to present the argument (I mercifully refrain to consider the 'decadence frame' as one).
Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny?
Quoting Jabberwock
We're not. We're talking about freedom. Freedom is a lot more than just democracy.
Quoting Jabberwock
What goal? 'Avoid war'? Are you seriously arguing that 'continue war' is more likely to avoid war than 'stop war'?
Quoting Jabberwock
So ignoring completely all collateral damage? I suppose the Iraq war was OK by you too then?
Quoting Jabberwock
Really? How small. Smaller than 10?
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Ah! The Generally Accepted View™. Owned by the same company as The Facts™ if I recall correctly.
Is there a citation you could share for The Generally Accepted View™, it would sure resolve decades of disagreement between Marxist historians and Western scholars.
Quoting Jabberwock
Who said quick? Measuring against the current death rate in the war and the Russian occupation of Crimea, they've got decades and would still come out on top. Are you arguing that not a single expert in the world thinks Russia could improve a few points (all Ukraine has done) in the next decade or so?
Quoting Jabberwock
Done so already, but again...
According to the Human Freedom Index, Ukraine, just before the Maidan Revolution ranked 134. Russia, at last measure ranked 119.
It is therefore possible for a country to (through non-military action) bring itself to the level of freedom Ukraine now enjoys from the level of freedom Russia now suffers in the space of eight years.
Eight years is also the time over which Russia has occupied Crimea with some few hundred deaths and similar restrictions of freedom currently active in Ukraine (and imposed by Ukraine in Donbas before this latest invasion)
Therefore it is plausible to believe that a country can get from Russia-now to Ukraine-now (in terms of freedom) in the space of eight years, suffering only the death and humanitarian toll seen in Russian-occupied Crimea.
These are all historical facts (the human freedom measures, the deaths and humanitarian situation in occupied Crimea). They can be used to support a narrative - one of popular struggle against oppression, anti-war.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not about possibility and necessity. It's about "more likely".
Depends on the framing. As I said above...
Quoting Isaac
...if you want to put it in terms of likelihood.
Sure, if your sole concern is the ability of Ukrainians to vote in an unimpeded election then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal.
No, 'greater than zero' is not enough, you have to provide argument that your proposed course of action is likely to succeed. If you had a plan that would provide us with global peace without any violence, but the chance of success was 1%, and the 99% was that the world would be plunged into tyranny, then nobody would pursue that course of action, even though the goal was so lofty.
Quoting Isaac
in this case it is a distinction without a difference. Neither Ukraine was authoritarian a few years ago, nor did it undergo any fast processes over the last few years.
Quoting Isaac
No, I am arguing that you have failed to provide an argument that your proposed course of action would likely bring the result of avoiding war. If that goal is unlikely to be achieved, we should pursue other goals - those which we are likely to achieve.
Quoting Isaac
No, because it failed to provide any positive results and was not likely to provide them from the start.
Quoting Isaac
If you enjoy the company of Moon-landing denialists, it is your choice, but do not demand that your views be treated as a reasonable alternative.
Quoting Isaac
Oh, so the alternative is now thousands of deaths or decades of oppression. Think of the children, you said? If so, then it is even more understandable why Ukrainians would prefer the former. And again you are saying what is possible, not what is likely.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, it is possible! If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.
But Russia does not have any of that. On the other hand, it has strict control of information (last somewhat independent press outlets were closed last year, it has massive blocking of Internet sites, Roskomnadzor, etc.), tight control of any social activities (organizations, foundations, etc.), stiff penalties for any form of protest, politically controlled judicial system. Could all those differences (beside those already mentioned by me before) affect the expected outcome? I say they would. Your argument just ignores all those differences and claims that we should expect a similar outcome, because they had a similar SINGLE metrics eight years ago (even if many other were different). And you demand to be treated seriously.
Quoting Isaac
No, they are not, you have specifically excluded 'human freedom measures' from 'facts' - 'measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective'. You cannot have it both ways.
That alternative sounds foolish after so candidly claiming:
Quoting Isaac
ANY government (ESPECIALLY AS AUTHORITARIAN AS RUSSIA !) can VERY EASILY claim foreign interference for any fucking peaceful protest (see the protests in Iran for more than 20 years).
Quoting Isaac
Dude, focus. The point is not if I want to put it in terms of likelihood. But that you wanted to put it as well (framing or not framing). So if you talk about "more likely" events, others can do the same and challenge you accordingly. Framing interlocutors' views as a matter of possibility or impossibility constitutes a strawman argument. Repeatedly soliciting interlocutors to frame their arguments as a matter of taking position for or against possibilities is intellectually cringe.
Quoting Isaac
If your sole concern is "freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead", then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal?!
Of course it is, if your only other choice has zero chance of success, then you take the one that has slightly above zero. Your plan has zero chance of achieving the 'desired effect'.
Quoting Jabberwock
They would if the alternative had 0% chance of success and 100% chance that the world would be plunged into tyranny. Again, if you want to talk about probabilities, then you're comparing options and their consequences.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've cited the data. It ranked lower than Russia in the Human Freedom Index. It now ranks higher. It made progress from lower to higher in eight years. That's all that's needed to show Russia can do the same.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nor have you. In fact your proposed course of action 100% guarantees war. So neither of our options are distinguished by a guarantee to avoid war. I'm suggesting war could be avoided by not resisting (militarily) when tyrants attempt to occupy territory but instead focus on removing the tyrant from power so that it doesn't matter much which country owns what. You're suggesting we use war to contain tyrants in the country they're in and by losing said war, weaken their rule. As far as 'avoiding war', your strategy literally cites it as a tool, so it will 100% not avoid war. My strategy might avoid war. In that one simple metric 'avoiding war', it's clear that even if my strategy had only 0.000001% chance of working it's better than yours which has 0% chance of avoiding war seeing as it involves war.
This is, of course, a good reason not to use stupidly simplistic metrics like 'avoid war' or 'secure voting rights', but rather take a more holistic approach which tries to maximise human well-being throughout the reach of our consequences.
Quoting Jabberwock
It removed a dictator. How's that not positive? Again, pick a naively simplistic metric and you can make anything sound like a success. That's why intelligent people avoid naively simplistic metrics of success. Even our governments have more goals in mind than simply 'free the Ukrainians' when they determine policy, they balance that goal against others to come up with a strategy which meets most.
Quoting Jabberwock
Oppression only works because most people prefer it to death. If most people preferred death to oppression then they would all resist it until dead and the oppressor would have no population left to oppress. If an oppressor puts a gun to your head and says "jump", you jump, because you prefer that to just saying "no" and getting shot. It's an absolute fact of human nature that we marginally prefer oppression to death because there's a chance of getting out of oppression. Crimea has been under Russian oppression for eight years. Why has the entire population not simply killed themselves to escape the oppression? Because they'd prefer to live, and hope.
It's not as if the Ukrainians have these two stark choices. Ukraine outside of Russia is hardly a bed of roses and with crippling debt and a destroyed economy, it'll be much worse. The human rights record of Ukrainian-occupied Donbas is practically identical to that of Russian-occupied Crimea. You might have bought into the propagandist fantasy that Ukraine was some beacon of democratic light before the invasion, but the evidence shows otherwise.
The choice faced (in the frame you've used above) is thousands more dead vs slightly worse levels of freedom).
Quoting Jabberwock
The Human Freedom Index includes measures of
Quoting https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2021
... as do most indices. Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan. The factors you cite are already taken account of. Ukraine came from a situation where it was worse than Russia in all of those measures put together, to one where it was better than Russia, in eight years.
Quoting Jabberwock
I haven't excluded the measures, I've said that the categorisation is subjective. A measure of autonomy is objective (how many parties are on the ballot paper - for example), it is then subjective to say that fewer than two = 'autocracy'. An objective measure of democracy might be how many non-state-owned press outlets there are, a subjective judgement would be that more than five = 'democracy'. It is to avoid this very kind of subjective judgement that the indices of human freedom rank countries according the scores rather than simply divide them into two arbitrary camps. This really should be basic stuff. Objective - 'the probability is 72.5%'; subjective 'the probability is high'. Objective - 'there are six people in that car'; subjective - 'there are too many people in that car'. The human freedom indices are simply measures of factors usually associated with freedom (a subjective element), but the numbers are objective (if you trust their sources), categorising those numbers is subjective ('autocracy'/'democracy') ranking them isn't (119 is smaller than 134, that's not an opinion).
Not if the expected likely consequences are worse than if you did not take that action.
Quoting Isaac
But if the alternative did not strive for global peace, but also did not likely plunge the world into tyranny, they would not. Yes, I completely agree - we should compare options and their consequences. The issue is that you refuse to compare the consequences, e.g. you refuse to consider the consequences of making concessions toward force.
Quoting Isaac
No, it did not.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I completely agree! We should abandon the discussion of consequences based on a single metric, like the body count, and consider the overall consequences.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, that is why Ukrainian would not choose to fight, if it meant that they would all die. On the other hand, there are quite a few examples from history where people preferred the risk of death (i.e. that some of them die), if it meant that it would remove the oppression. On the other hand, if people believed that oppression is better than risk of death, like you do, then there would be no armed rebellions at all. As you are unable to delineate the boundaries of concessions, we can assume that in all provided cases of liberation wars and revolutions you would argue for leaving the oppression as the better option (because your only metrics is the death count). As I wrote, I understand it, but you would be at odds with all those people who decided themselves they prefer to fight.
Of course, if I mischaracterise your views, please correct me - tell me when the armed fight with oppression would be preferable. Just do not hide behind 'This is not my view, but I will not tell you what it is'.
Quoting Isaac
Ukraine outside of Russia is not a bed of roses, but it is better than Russia. I have already discussed some prominent differences. And your evidence does not show what you say it shows.
And now again we come to the part when you refuse to consider the consequences of your proposed actions, which makes the discussion difficult. You propose one concession and happily pronounce that it would avoid war. However, the obvious consequence of that would be that quite shortly we would be in the exact same situation, with the exact same choices. If you want to discuss the consequences, let us do that.
Quoting Isaac
Was it? Let us examine the evidence, the single source you so cherish?
2013 (BEFORE Maidan): Ukraine: total score 7.06, Russia: total score: 6.35. Oh, so just one year before Maidan Ukraine WAS NOT WORSE by the single metrics you provided as evidence. And it was not worse for all the years up to 2008, the first scored year. As it seems to be a habit in our discussion, the evidence actually proves that you are wrong.
But let us examine the source you respect so much. What so terrible happened in 2014 that Ukraine somehow slipped into being an authoritarian regime? Let us examine the data for 2014:
Rule of law: Ukraine scores better
Movement: Ukraine scores better
Religion: Ukraine scores better
Association, assembly, civil society: Ukraine scores better (by a wide margin)
Expression and information: Ukraine scores much better
Relationships: the same (both countries have top score)
And that leaves us with a single point where Ukraine does score worse:
Security and safety
This comprises of two subitems:
Homicide: Ukraine scores better by a wide margin
Disappearances, conflicts, terrorism: yes, here Ukraine scores much worse than Russia and much worse than the year before
So what has happened? Two things: Maidan happened and a rebellion organized by Russia happened. Yes, that might affect the perception of security in the country, could it not?
So now it is quite clear: you have hand-picked a SINGLE DATA POINT in a SINGLE YEAR, where Ukraine has trailed in the metrics behind Russia and which is Russia's fault as evidence that Ukraine was worse as far as freedom was concerned a few years ago. But according to the same source it is completely false: in the years before and after according to your own source Ukraine has been in all aspects of freedom since 2008, i.e. the first year the source gives the data for.
But wait a minute... You wrote: 'An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119'. But the very source you have provided says something else: Ukraine 114 (score 6.57), Russia 123 (score 6.24).
Did you really think I would not look at the data?
in your place I would take this as an opportunity to admit that you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about and bow out of the discussion. But of course, we can have a few more.
Quoting Isaac
It was neither 119 nor 134. That's not an opinion.
Gods! It's like talking to five year olds.
I'll try and go through this one more time, really slowly.
I'm showing how a country can rise up from where Russia is now in terms of human freedom, to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. To do that I'm showing that Ukraine has gone from below where Russia is now, to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years (the length of time for which Russia has occupied Crimea).
I know this is really complicated, but stay with me.
I've picked the time period of eight years because it is a time period over which we know the death and damage from occupation by Russia, right? Any other time period would be questionable because you might say that Russia would do more damage over that timeframe. It's a means of establishing a measure of damage by Russia from occupation that we don't have to speculate on.
Eight years ago from now is 2015. I assume you can keep up with the basic maths.
So I'm comparing Ukraine in 2015 to Russia now.
Ukraine in 2015 was ranked 134 (score 5.84) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2021-01/human-freedom-index-2018.csv
Russia in 2022 (latest published report) was ranked 119 (score 6.01) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf
When you've had a crack at understanding that, maybe try a little more respect for your interlocutors.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
So explain to me why you previously wanted to completely ignore the consequences of continued war on Yemen, or future generations, or those at risk from escalation?
Quoting Jabberwock
If you want to continue to argue against an imaginary opponent, start a blog. If not, read what I've actually written and respond to that.
Quoting Jabberwock
When the likely gains outweigh the likely harms - including collateral damage. That is rarely an international land war. It is often a national rebellion (even an armed one).
Quoting Jabberwock
That's what I've been attempting to do, but you refuse to consider anyone who isn't Ukrainian.
Ukraine score in 2015: 6.34
Russia now: 6.01
Can YOU keep up with the basic math? Or do you prefer to keep digging?
You know those bits in blue? They're links so you can check the actual data I'm using. You know, rather than pick your own data...
As if the difference between 6.34 and 6.01 somehow was even relevant to the argument on a scale of 1-10.
And now, visibly embarassed, you try to save the argument saying that .33 is irrelevant to the argument... If that is so, then so would be the difference of .38 between Ukraine in 2015 and now - but the whole point of using that datapoint was to show 'evidence' for the remarkable growth that Ukraine has made in a few years? Time and again, your own evidence disproves what you claim.
Not to mention that the score from 2020 for Russia is not that relevant either, given the changes that have occurred since. I could give you a long list of those, but I will not. Do you know why? Because you are not interested in facts. I have given you plenty of facts from the history of both countries and from the currect situation. Sure, I suppose it could be done better, I am not a historian. But I should not even bother, because you do not engage with facts. You ridicule them, because you have no facts on your side. You have based your whole argument on a handpicked data point and it turned out you are not even that good with handpicking data. That is exactly the level of Moon landing discussion, and yet you are indignant that it is not treated as a legitimate alternative view. It simply is not. You try to discuss things you have no idea about.
Given that your whole argument based on a single datapoint has crumbled, we are back to what I wrote - we have no reason to believe that the peaceful rebellion you propose in Russia will likely occur. I fully expect you to pull out another single random fact and just run with it, like you did above, with complete ignorance of the actual, quite complex situation in the region. I think nobody will blame me if I choose not to bother, I believe I have already contributed to this discussion quite enough.
It's quite simple (though you seem to be having trouble with (4))
1. Open the CSV linked.
2. Go to line 316 - '2015 Ukraine'.
3. Read off column G 'hf-rank'.
4. Avoid then picking your own data from somewhere other than the link provided to show something different.
Do they?
Quoting Jabberwock
Not something I've ever mentioned.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, not a claim I've ever contested.
The claims I've made are in the posts I've written. Not your head.
I'll repeat for clarity. In eight years (the time over which Russia occupied Crimea), Ukraine has gone from where Russia is now on the Human Freedom Index, to it's current state. Therefore Russia is capable, over the same time period, of the same improvement.
That is the claim. Nothing else you might want to make up about autocracy, or press freedom, or the state of affairs in 1991...
That claim is supported by the data showing that Ukraine eight years ago were in a very similar ranking to where Russia is now.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, try to restrict yourself to claims I've actually made. The extent to which the move was 'remarkable' is not a part of the argument. What is relevant is the difference between Ukraine and Russia (the two options available).
Quoting Jabberwock
The claim is based on a comparison of the damage done by Russian occupation. The only dataset we have of Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory in recent history is Crimea. They occupied Crimea for eight years. I picked the data from eight years ago. The data choice matches the claim. It's a relatively simple principle (or at least, I thought it was simple - my measure for what's 'simple' here may have to change).
Quoting Jabberwock
Because they'd all be speculative in effect as we don't have comparable datasets? No. I doubt that's the reason.
Odd claim though, seeing as your own data you've provided above shows a steady overall increase in the index score until 2018 whereafter the small drop is not even matched by the world ranking, which improves.
But do please provide 'the facts' which show conclusively that the last two years instigated policies which interrupted 20 years of minimal change in overall score.
In the link you have provided: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf
there is no data for 2015, but there are data for 2014 and for 2016: Ukraine has the score 6.50 and 6.69:
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the data for the year in between would be somewhere between that. And other publications on the site confirm exactly that: the link from 2021 shows Ukraine's score as 6.34, as shown above. Why the same site gives different scores for the same country for the same year? I do not know, it could be that they have changed the methodology in the meantime and rescored all the raw data accordingly to reflect that or maybe they just have no idea how to handle data and they just randomly put any number they want in various places. I do not know and I do not care - either way the .csv from 2018 cannot be compared to the publications from 2021 and 2022, if the concern the same results. I have mercifully not mentioned that before, but even if there was no such discrepancy, comparing rankings from different years is simply wrong - rankings are relative, so they heavily depend on the movements of other countries.
Your desperate attempt at distraction does not change the fact that the very source you have provided gives recent data and past data IN THE SAME TABLE. Claiming that the table does not say what it says because there is also another table is beyond silly, at best it discredits the very source you provide (but rather shows that you have zero understanding of their methodology).
Quoting Isaac
It is the claim now, but it was not before. Maybe I will repeat your claim, for clarity:
Quoting Isaac
That is simply false: the Ukraine did not turn from corrupted oligarchy to a free democracy within a decade, so not it is not clear at all that Russia can do that, no matter how much you try to water down that claim.
Your claim was also that:
Quoting Isaac
But it is false as well. It was not worse then and it was not worse then as compared to today's Russia. Whenever you try to rely on facts, it turns out that what you write is false, because you do not know the facts.
But let us deal with your current, drastically watered down claim:
So Russia can move from the state it is now to the state where Ukraine had a temporary decrease caused by an armed rebellion instigated by Russia, with thousands of dead, dispossed, with elections blocked by the rebels etc. That is you propose that Russia move from the oppression it is under now... to the state caused by the oppression it also caused? How does that make even sense?
Before the rebellion Ukraine had scores above 7.0, that is in the middle between the current Russia and the current Spain - it was much better than Russia was then and much better than Russia is now. Before Russia has started troubles, Ukrainians were not nearly as oppressed as Russians are now, as your own source shows. So no, Ukraine did not go 'from where Russia is now', because it was never there (since 1991). It mostly improved a single indicator because it the effects of the armed rebellion caused by its neighbor were less pronounced. It had nothing to do with popular movement and it had nothing to do with fighting opression. The changes in Ukraine have nothing to do with anything what you propose.
Quoting Isaac
Well, your argument was that it is clear that countries can go from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies in a decade. Is it still so clear?
Ukraine was much better in all indices from Russia since 2000, with the temporary drop due to the rebellion. Given that Russia did not have an armed rebellion caused by its neighbor, it is rather unlikely it will improve in the simillar way. So how the improvement of Ukraine in a single metric - security - is an indictator of what might have happen in Russia?
Quoting Isaac
Sure: censorship laws, freedom of movement laws, laws on companies, laws on gay 'propaganda'. These are just formal measures, as important are changes which are nor formally sanctioned, like treatment of protesters, activities of Roskomnadzor, closing publications under false pretences, etc. Here, more facts you can ignore.
That's not the link I provided for the data in question, and it's completely dishonest to present it as such.
Quoting Jabberwock
... so just speculate instead, eh? Then assume your speculation is enough to accuse those who disagree with you of dishonesty in the same post as you blatantly lie about the source I provided.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. Rankings are there exactly so we can compare because, for example, the global economic situation affects all countries' scores, as will things like Covid restrictions and the global security situation with regards to terrorist threat and instability. Rankings avoids this. It also avoid weighting on scores because the scores are measured out of ten regardless.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes it did. You re-interpreted my subjective terms so I clarified. All this in in the thread, you're not going to get anywhere pretending it didn't happen.
Quoting Jabberwock
... Is not fact. You can't keep bringing in conclusions you approve of as if they countered a position I'm explaining. I don't believe the things you do. Of course your position is coherent, you've selected the beliefs which make it so. But seeing that one of your beliefs doesn't for into my narrative doesn't show us anything except that its not your narrative. We knew that.
Quoting Jabberwock
It doesn't. Probably one of the main reasons why I didn't say it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Ukraine's low score was the result of...
Taxation; payroll, government payments
Legal freedom; courts, enforcement, judiciary, police, protection
Economic freedom; growth, inflation control, regulatory compliance
Political freedom; party composition
Identity; overall
Rule of Law; criminal, disappearances, homicide
Apart from the disappearances and homicide (which the Amnesty International report from the time makes clear have been about equal on both sides), how are the others caused by Russia?
Quoting Jabberwock
Fine, we can use a different time period if you don't like 2015-2023. How about 2000-2008? Ukraine went from (using your own table seeing as you have some technical troubles opening links) 6.25 to 7.08 an increase of 0.83. The same increase would get Russia from its current 6.01 to 6.84, roughly where Ukraine is now (6.68).
Are you now going to say that that time period also had a whole load of special factors which we have to dismiss? I'm beginning to see a trend. Is it now your own links that aren't working?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. As above. If Russia currently is a corrupted oligarchy (6.01) and Ukraine is a free democracy (at 6.68), then it is clear from pretty much any time period you care to pick that the improvements required to get from one to the other are achievable within about a decade. Hell, Cabo Verde did it, with no war, no Russians, and no Soviets for a thousand miles. People can bring about improvements in their own freedoms without the military having to bomb the place first.
Quoting Jabberwock
Since 2020? What laws have been put in place then and how are you measuring their likely impact on the Human Freedom Index? Were all the changes you mention put in place after 2020 (6.01) but no similar changes made before 2006 (the last time Russia were near 6.01)? Did Putin have a break from oppressive policy instigation between 2006 and 2020? Was he on holiday?
The sum total of Putin's oppressive policies from 2006 have had virtually no impact on the score. Are you wanting to argue the the policies since 2020, are so awful, even compared to those in the entire period from 2006, that they'll push the score significantly lower to render all comparison with 2020 useless.
You're desperate to prove that hundreds of thousands of dead are a necessary price to pay.
I just can't get my head around that.
So we are supposed to ignore it and pretend it that the other data are not there?
Quoting Isaac
Well, using data from two different sources if you have the relevant data in a single table in a document you have linked does look a bit suspicious, wouldn't you say? Especially if it is just the single outlier that is supposed to confirm your conclusions. But OK, I will give you the benefit of the doubt.
Quoting Isaac
You do not even understand the issue. If Ukraine had the exact same score, but in the period of six years ten countries would fall behind it because people there lost their freedom, then Ukraine would automatically improve in the ranking. Is that evidence of its improvement? No.
Quoting Isaac
Are you using a different source again? I cannot even find such categories in the 2022 document.
The fact is that the sudden drop in Ukraine's score between 2012 and 2014 is mostly caused by the drop in the single indicator, i.e. disapperances, conflicts and terrorism. If you have any other interpretation of the facts that explains that, please do.
Quoting Isaac
No, in 2000-2008 Ukraine also did not went from 'corrupt oligarchy' to 'free democracy', as was your claim. The data shows a constant process of improvement that has lasted at least two decades, but that is only because there are no data from before 2000. That is, nothing about the data supports your claim that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in a decade.
And no, we do not have to dismiss factors, only you do. I say we have to take all the factors into consideration, which you consistently refuse to do, by focusing on a single indicator from a single source. I have already explained what factors were, in my opinion, instrumental in the fact that the progress of the two countries was different. You have just ignored them. You are free to engage them at any time, just scroll a few posts back.
Quoting Isaac
I have already listed the laws, do you want every single act listed? I am not 'measuring' them, I present my opinion that e.g. strict tightening of censorship laws that put you in jail for 16 years MIGHT have some impact on the freedoms of those involved. If you believe that it would not affect the score, maybe it is a problem with the scoring system.
Quoting Isaac
So you say that your source does not actually reflect the increasing oppressiveness of the Russian regime? I might agree with that. For example, Russia keeps scoring a full 10.0 in the relationship category, when from 2013 it has been introducing increasingly suppressive legislation against LGBT communities. So yes, your single source does not seem particularly good in describing the level of opression in Russia, thanks for pointing that out. Maybe we should use more facts than just a single indicator then? Maybe supporting your whole argument with a single fact is not the best possible methodology? What do you think?
No, but spending four posts trying to imply I've made some kind of mistake or act of deception is not just 'admitting it's there', is it?
Quoting Jabberwock
I didn't have the relevant data in a single table, I had the CSV from 2018 anyway but had to look up the 2022 report. I can't think why the numbers are different, but it doesn't matter because even the figures you've used show the same. Ukraine went from 119 (where Russia is now). So the argument - that in eight years Ukraine has come from where Russia is now - is unaffected. This whole thing has been a massive diversion to avoid that argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. If the other ten countries fell behind because of global reasons (like economic recessions), and yet Ukraine didn't, then it clearly had some compensatory improvements. That's why they show rankings. It's not perfect, but pretending it doesn't show anything is just ridiculous. Besides, I used scores, not rankings, from 2000-2008 and you won't accept that result either, so this whole 'ranking' issue has just been yet another deflection to avoid the argument. Whatever I use, you're going to fish out some hurriedly made-up reason to dismiss it. First it's there being another table, then it's the particular year (2015), then it's using rankings not scores, then it's the definition of 'autocracy'... you're clearly clutching at straws.
Quoting Jabberwock
Same source because I'm referring (as you know full well I have been since the very fist time I mentioned it) to the 2018 document for Ukraine's 2015 score. In it, it breaks down the scores. I compared the relevant one to Russia's 2020 (latest). Not all categories are in both sets, but most are. The ones I've listed are the ones for which Ukraine scored lower than Russia (the reasons for it's lower ranking). Disappearances and homicides weren't even that big an effect. The corrupt judiciary caused as much of an effect on the score - but I suppose you'll claim that was the Russian's too.
Quoting Jabberwock
Then either Ukraine is not a democracy (at 6.68) or Russia is not an oligarchy (at 6.01), because that is the scale of improvement Ukraine made in that timescale. The names are irrelevant (as you already know - another deflection). The point is about freedom.
Quoting Jabberwock
... so long as it's Russia. Ignore the others.
Quoting Jabberwock
I haven't ignored them. They're in the Human Freedom Index. The end result is a net improvement of some 0.6-0.8 points (you know that thing you're claiming you do about taking into account all the factors). It's you who wants to ignore some of those and focus only on the one which Russia caused.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, only the ones instigated after 2020, the period you claim Russia has deteriorated so much as to render the 6.01 score no longer relevant. Any laws before then will show their effects in previous scores, so are irrelevant to that claim.
Quoting Jabberwock
It might. The blacklist was instigated in 2012, the circumvention ban in 2017. Both will also have severely restricted freedoms, but in grand total, had minimal effect on the overall score. You're arguing that post 2020 such draconian laws were put in place as to render the 6.01 score completely redundant.
Also the law you mention is a wartime law regarding mention of Ukraine war atrocities etc. Shall we include Ukraine's wartime censorship in the metric?
Quoting Jabberwock
Ah! When the evidence doesn't support your theory, the evidence must be wrong. I thought we'd pretty much reached the bottom of the barrel, but...
Your claim was that it went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years. Do you still support that claim?
Quoting Isaac
I just ask how the evidence that you have provided supports your original claim (that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years). Obviously you cannot do that, therefore we are reduced to arguing about decimal differences in a single datapoint in a single source. If that change in points was indicative of your claims, then we would have to assume that from 2013 to 2014 Ukraine went from democracy to oligarchy, which of course it did not. One specific indicator has changed (through no fault of Ukrainian authorities) that has badly affected the overall score. That is the peril of using a single datapoint for your argument.
Quoting Isaac
Well, I am using the 2022 table and it shows that the biggest change from 2012 to 2014 was in the category I have named. The other one was religion. In other words, Ukraine went from 7.04 in 2012 to 6.50 in 2014 mostly due to a single indicator. Yet you insist that the single score is the sufficient indicator of political oppression in the country.
Quoting Isaac
Of course it is not, I have already wrote about it two days ago, it is considered a hybrid regime. It had a good start, but it still has quite a long way to go.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, you still are ignoring them, if you consider the single indicator from a single source as sufficient evidence for your claims. According to the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' index, Russia went ten points down since 2015, but so did Ukraine. Does it mean that they both went from democracy to oligarchy? No, it does not, it means that some particular indicators which were given arbitrary weights went one way or another. Why should your single datapoint carry more weight than mine?
Quoting Isaac
All the measures I have described were introduced after 2020.
Quoting Isaac
No, I have argued that the score might be affected which would throw off your maths. And yes, draconian laws were introducted after 2020.
Quoting Isaac
No, I am just pointing out that arguing from a single datapoint is not a good way for argumentation. I have just given you a single datapoint that totally negates your argument. Are you convinced by that?
Yes, but you quibbled over the meaning of 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' so I went for just the actual index scores to create what I thought would be a more objectively measurable claim. It's less subjective to say that Ukraine went from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. What we call 'Russia-now' and 'Ukraine-now' is not relevant - I went for 'oligarchy' and 'democracy'. I could have gone for 'authoritarian' and 'less-authoritarian' It doesn't matter because the point was relative (Russia to Ukraine) not absolute (one category or another). If the territory is ceded to Russia, it will become Russia-like. If it is won back, it will become Ukraine-like, We're comparing those two, so the metric is how long it takes to go from Russia-like to Ukraine-like.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've already indicated that it was more than a single indicator. Also, the same level of progress was made 2000-2008, the 'disappearances' issue didn't even register then. I'm not using a single metric, you are. I'm trying to include all the measures that have changed, you keep ignoring the ones that don't suit you and focussing only on the ones you can blame on Russia.
Quoting Jabberwock
Then I suggest you actually look at the data I've provided to support my argument rather than this pointless distraction that the data you're looking at doesn't. If my data is at fault, find fault with it. "some other data says something else" is not a fault unless your data is somehow more authoritative than mine.
Quoting Jabberwock
Provide the Freedom house figures then. I'm happy to look at both. What progress does Freedom House have Ukraine making in their best eight year period, and where does it put Russia in it's latest score?
As to why my datapoint should carry more weight than yours... You're the one arguing my position is completely wrong. I'm not arguing yours is, I just disagree with it. I've no reason to claim my datapoint is more authoritative than your. My claim is merely that it is a legitimate source.
Quoting Jabberwock
Only a substantial change would alter the maths. A few points leaves things the same.
Quoting Jabberwock
And none were introduced from 2006 to 2020? The point is not whether they are draconian, but whether they are draconian enough to significantly alter the score. For that they'd have to be something outside the range of anything introduced in all of the recorded history of Russia in this index.
And, as I've said, wartime measures can't count otherwise we'd have to make the same adjustments for Ukraine (seeing as this is a comparative exercise). Ukraine have also instigated some very draconian laws in the midst of war. My argument is only about getting from Russia-as-it-is-now to Ukraine-as-it-is-now, so if we include wartime measures, then Russia-as-it-is-now gets worse, but so does Ukraine-as-it-is-now so the distance between them is not only affected by Russia's move.
Quoting Jul 22, 2023
The protests were also about some of the elements those numbers are derived from.
They're more independent now, as the two countries have gone in different directions, despite the Kremlin's attempts otherwise, but they share much past, politics, overlapping culture, whatever it all is.
The Ukrainians somehow managed to create a momentum of change, which Putin + team ain't too happy about (irredentism has also come up).
There was a time, maybe three or so decades ago, when Russia seemed to head in a better direction, but that ended. :/ And now ...
Quoting Jul 22, 2023
Putin + team probably wouldn't be too happy about Belarus changing towards democracy, transparency, and all that (perhaps even seeking NATO membership :gasp:), either.
Just scrolled by ... :D
Absolutely. But that works both ways. Why do you think...
Quoting jorndoe
...? Because movement in a pro-freedom direction makes his grip weaker.
Sure, Ukraine's 2015-2023 progress has definitely been in large part bought by throwing off some of the shackles of Russia, but if Putin's fears are even half justified, we can expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door.
Sure, if Ukraine was to fare well free from the Kremlin, and Russians observe, then that might help free the Kremlin from Putinistas. Asked earlier (I gave it some thought, but figured someone better informed might take it up):
Quoting unenlightened
Another neighbor, Finland, doesn't seem to have had much impact against Putin, though. Why is that?
The issue I am pointing out is that first you make very specific claims and support it with a rather unspecific indicator of freedom, which is actually comprised of many indicators. You believe that it is general measure of 'authoritarianism', but it is clearly not - the changes between 2000-2008 and 2012-2014 even though similar numerically, concerned different areas. The change from 2012-2014 concerned mostly one specific area, yet it significantly affected Ukrainian score. If the HFI is the single metrics of authoritarianism, then we must conclude that from 2012-2014 Ukraine underwent sudden change from 'less-authoritarianism' to 'authoritarianism'. But that is false, so the HFI is not the universal metrics of authoritarianism, contrary to your claims.
Quoting Isaac
Data that do not fit your claims are 'pointless distraction'? We should only look at your data when examining your claim and disregard data that say something else? Why?
Quoting Isaac
Here you are: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/All_data_FIW_2013-2023.xlsx
Quoting Isaac
If the tool you have provided does not indicate changes caused by draconian oppression, then it is not a good indicator of oppression, right? Why do you want it then to use it for that purpose?
Quoting Isaac
OK, so we skip the wartime data.
Quoting Isaac
The point is there would not be a free and prospering Ukraine next door, because you would have given it away to Putin.
Because only the nearest abroad counts. Russians do not see Finns (or the Baltics) as 'people like them', so they do not care much whether they are free and how. Free and prosperous Ukraine, on the other hand, especially in the EU, would show Russians (and other former republics) that yes, positive change is possible for them. Successful Ukraine in EU would be a mortal threat for Putin's regime, that is why he is determined to stop it by any means, including war. All the other causes are secondary.
The claim was not specific, and in context that should have been obvious. You read it that way simply to have something to bite. It's the equivalent of pointing out a spelling mistake. Read the context, and if you're not sure, ask, rather than go on a massive diversion assuming your interpretation, even when you've been specifically told otherwise.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. Treating them as if they proved some kind of deception or error is the pointless distraction. The data is interesting itself, but doesn't actually change anything. I used your preferred dataset to show the same thing.
Quoting Jabberwock
Kind of like...
Quoting Jabberwock
...? But no. I used your preferred tables and showed they support the same conclusion. Something I note you've studiously avoided mentioning.
Quoting Jabberwock
Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.
The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion?
Quoting Jabberwock
It does indicate changes caused by draconian oppression. That it doesn't come up with the results you want isn't a flaw. I don't know if you're familiar with the way evidence works, but you're supposed to look to the evidence to check your theory. You're not supposed to use your theory to check the evidence.
Quoting Jabberwock
I'm aware of what your point is. I'm trying to move the conversation to a place where you actually begin to support it with anything like an argument.
The point is, as I have repeated for a long time now, that you base your whole argument on a single metrics, which you admit is quite prone to variation due to subjective weights assigned to particular indicators. In other words, you believe that the single indicator precisely describes the state of affairs in the region. I have provided you with four other indicators, you have never engaged with them.
Quoting Isaac
Presenting a source that contradicts your argument has no weight on that argument? Are you serious?
No, no single datapoint is 'the best', that is the point... No single source of evidence, especially indices which have subjective weights, is sufficient to support an argument. It does not mean that we can just pick and choose the data as we want and say that this argument is as good as any other. We ahve to compound ALL the data, your source, Freedom House, The Economist, Polity etc. and any other source available. We also need to consider facts both from the history and from the current state of affairs that could influence our assessment. You flatly refuse to do that, claiming that your single metrics 'includes everything'. No, it does not, as quite a few other sources indicate something else.
Quoting Isaac
This is their chart for Russia: it has moved from 5.57 in 2000 to 6.16 in 2018. By your claims, it means that Russia has moved from an authoritarian rule under Yeltsin to a 'less-authoritarianism' under Putin. That is, under Putin the Russian government became less authoritarian. is that correct?
Quoting Isaac
No need to move anywhere, just ask: by your own words free and prosperous Ukraine is a grave threat to his regime. We know that he is willing to go to war to defend against threats, so it is reasonable that he would keep threatening war until there was no chance of free and prosperous Ukraine. As you are claiming that avoiding the war is better than letting people get under oppression, you would advocate letting him subjugate the whole of Ukraine if it meant war could be avoided. We also know that he is interested in Ukrainian territories and is willing to risk war to get them, therefore we can assume that he might want more Ukrainian territories. Again, you would rather give away Ukrainian territories to avoid war, therefore you would advocate giving away further parts of Ukraine, until it run out of parts.
Considering Prigozhin seems still alive and seems to have even met with Putin in person, I find it really difficult to believe this was a genuine coup attempt.
Quoting ssu
It's effectively disbanded, ordered to either join the regular military, go to Belarus or go home.
Now, if "the spirit of Wagner endures" in Belarus; sure, seems it will, but it has been effectively disbanded as far as the coup is concerned.
Quoting ssu
Maybe because it is theatre.
Why would Putin require an overwhelming show of strength if the coup is fake?
Now, if it is fake the purpose was clearly to get "buy in" with fake war of words and fake airplane and helicopter shoot downs (which are pretty easy to fake, especially if you control the whole environment).
However, we agree these details of who was backing who are obviously important for the analysis.
Quoting ssu
I've made it clear I am not trying to "prove" it was fake,.
What you say is possible.
The answer to "why didn't FSB know about this ... oh, they did know about this ... and it was such an easy operation to penetrate that UK intelligence knew about it too ... ok, why didn't FSB just go arrest or kill Prigozhin the day before?"
Can just be Putin is so weak the FSB knows and does nothing about people plotting coups.
And, generally, the answer to every question would be "Putin's weak" in the case the coup was real but then aborted ... well too weak to punish the coup plotters and mutineers and intelligence that did nothing, but still strong enough to survive the coup.
And the answer to every question if the coup is fake is that it's just theatre and they are all working together.
They need to make Putin look weak to sell the coup, so they are willing to pay that price for the benefits (or perceived benefits) of staging the coup. They may simply have shows of strength planned to repair Putin's reputation or then may do nothing on the basis it doesn't matter or then "real strength" can stay quiet and is in fact more intimidating that way.
What we can agree on is that the whole series of events doesn't make a whole lot of sense and has lot's of discrepancies that would any theory would need to account for.
"The coup is real" will account for those discrepancies with Putin is weak, Prigozhin was just trying to get a better deal basically by threatening chaos and could do this because Putin is weak and /or maybe there was a pathway to a real coup (army and civilians spontaneously backing him) but that didn't work so Prigozhin cut his losses and cut a deal.
The "coup is fake" is going to explain any discrepancies as necessary to sell the coup.
Of course, whenever there are confusing events the idea it was all orchestrated neatly fits the data and has an inherent intellectual attraction. However, that the situation simply was really confusing fits the data too, there's just by definition no neat cause and effect chains that can be created.
So, in this light, the strongest evidence it was fake is
1. The timing: Prigozhin launches his coup (or "armed protest") right after Ukraine announces a delay in their offensive. There is therefore minimum risk to Russian frontline forces (no large ongoing battles threatening a break through), which therefore minimises Prigozhin leverage. Likewise, that the coup is resolved so quickly again minimises actual military risk, as it takes more than 24hrs for Ukraine to plan, launch, advance and start applying real pressure of a breakthrough. The coup timing turns out to be perfect in triggering Ukrainians to renew their offensive while, "just so happens", minimising the actual military risk.
2. The resolution: Prigozhin agrees to go to Belarus. No one in their right mind who actually just embarrassed Putin and Russia's military and intelligence agencies on the world stage would accept going to Belarus in a deal. So, in the theory that Prigozhin was just "negotiating" or then "cutting losses" in a real failed coup after failing to build the momentum, the rational deal would be to try to get to a legitimately neutral country.
The supporting evidence that supports this key evidence would be:
a. The coup starts 1000km away from Moscow without any coup elements whatsoever within Moscow. If you were plotting a classic coup you would have elements in Moscow to kill or take some symbolic buildings, or just cause general chaos.
b. As far as I know there is no combat footage of this coup that isn't easily faked. For example, planes can be easily controlled by remote control, so if you wanted to get Western media buy-in that it's a real coup then downing a plane seems pretty cheap.
c. The military plan makes zero sense. We're supposed to believe that Prigozhin is some mastermind military commander but also just launches a coup without any possibility of military success.
e. Prigozhin not only gives interviews (at least one), overjoyed, after the coup has already ended and he's leaving in an SUV but also makes cryptic remarks that moral has been boosted, it was all part of the plan, brilliant strategy of some guy ... rather than fearing for his life that he's just embarrassed Putin and Putin will certainly want him dead.
f. Ukraine does attack so if that was the goal (which if you are Russia you definitely want Ukraine to attack to be able to capitalise on all your defensive investments) then that goal is achieved. Not only does Ukraine renew its offensive but there has been no evidence of any decrease in Readiness of the Russian side as one would expect in the event of a real coup.
This is your problem, you are talking in complete abstractions of what's preferable.
Neither @Isaac nor the whole of the UK where he lives, or me and the country where I live, or NATO or the whole of the EU, has a choice in front of us of "giving away further parts of Ukraine".
We do not own or control it to begin with.
You are trying to turn a false choice that does not exist into simply justifying the current Western policy of pouring arms into Ukraine.
The first choice of @Isaac and myself and other non-Ukrainians (insofar as he affects the policy of their country) is are we willing to send soldiers into Ukraine to defend it against Russia?
Now, the UK, where I live in Scandinavia, the whole of NATO, EU, not to mention other countries, have repeatedly and unequivocally made clear the position that we aren't going to be sending our soldiers into Ukraine to defend shit.
Why? Well, Ukraine is not an ally, never has been, and Ukraine (according to all these countries that have not sent soldiers) is not worth defending.
That is the policy.
Do we wish that Ukraine was free and prosperous? sure, why not?
But we aren't willing to send any of soldiers to go make that happen by force, which is the key point.
Now, seen as everyone agrees Ukraine is not worth spilling their own countries blood to defend (at least anyone who actually affects policy), the key question is whether the policy of sending arms instead is a morally justifiable in lieux of our cowardice or then a smart geopolitical move to cynically use Ukrainians to harm Russia, and if the whole of Ukraine needs to be sacrificed to do so that's just "gainz" on the geopolitical chess board.
For, you're missing the other alternative in your "free vs oppression" choice which is "they dead".
Even with pouring in arms (at a drip feed pace, only introducing the next weapons system when all the previous systems fail in their promise), Ukraine may not be able to win this war.
Is it morally justifiable to send them on a fools errand that results in them dying in huge numbers based on a series of false promises (i.e. lies and manipulation) that we're going to "do whatever it takes" and "provide whatever they need"?
If that's not morally justifiable, then you need some theory of victory that actually leads to your free and prosperous Ukraine (that also takes into account that elections have been cancelled).
You cannot structure an argument as "I prefer A and therefore support any violence that is claimed to achieve A ... someday".
He was advocating refusing military help to Ukraine which would most likely result in Ukraine's loss of further lands and quite likely its independence. I think it is pretty much 'giving away further parts of Ukraine'.
Quoting boethius
I do not need a theory, because it has already happened: Ukraine already IS more free than it would be if it was subjugated by Russia, which would likely happen if the help was denied. And I am not sure why you are treating Ukrainians as fools who do not know better. Why would they be 'manipulated' about the Western help, if the West in the beginning of the war flatly refused to supply them with tanks, planes and long-range artillery? They have made the choice to defend their independence (i.e. to risk death) BEFORE any Western help was promised, in fact, the West was quite resigned that they will lose the war quickly. Americans offered evacuation of Zelensky's government in the first days of the war, which might have precipitated the general capitulation, how is that consistent with the claim that they somehow 'made' Ukrainians to fight? We decided that we do not want to fight, Ukrainians have decided that they do - all they ask for is help.
Woot woot! Go Ukraine!!!
The usual intellectually miserable tactic of framing opponents’ views. Apparently, on matter of facts we can’t prove anything, if we happen to believe anything is because of Western propaganda, what they believe is clearly not propaganda though (even if, on the other side, all narratives are claimed to be all plausible interpretations), on matter of moral we are either coward or cynical (is that yet another interpretation? or The Facts™?).
It is totally different.
There is no moral imperative to supply arms.
And don't move the goal posts from "free and prosperous" to "independent".
Quoting Jabberwock
Really? Is "no further elections" your definition of freedom?
Notice also that your "I don't need a theory of victory" is a theory of victory: that Ukraine is "winning", at least in the freedom sense so far, and your theory here is that it will continue to be this free and prosperous if the status quo of arms shipments is maintained.
But that's not in anyway guaranteed. Even if I were to accept that Ukraine is "more free" so far, that doesn't somehow imply it will continue to be even the current level of freedom compared to losing the war.
Notice also that you simply ignore all not-free Ukrainians in the process so far because they are dead.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's called "war optimism".
Here's an example:
Quoting Jabberwock
How'd that "best manuever at this time" turn out?
Quoting Jabberwock
So you agree we're manipulating them with false promises?
... Just that it's ok manipulation because they know we're manipulating?
Quoting Jabberwock
"They" meaning all of Ukraine?
"Risk death" as in commit to fight and be wiling to die regardless of the chances of victory?
What does your comment have to do with my comment?
Are you disputing the fact that other Western countries, and also all the other countries, have not sent their soldiers into Ukraine?
Or are you arguing sending arms to Ukraine is brave? That's what a "brave" country would do, send arms instead of their own soldiers.
Feel free to have at it: You / the Western legacy media / NATO says Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative to uphold ... just not without sending themselves or their own soldiers. If Ukrainian sovereignty is so important, why is it not worth risking our own soldiers lives to see it preserved?
You guys work yourselves up into a righteous moral frenzy about Ukrainian sovereignty, and then when I mention the option of raising the flag, beating the drums, rolling the fully upgraded tanks, sending in the troops, and ask why that doesn't follow from your moral position the answer is always:
1. Oh, it's Ukrainians who want to fight, not us:
Quoting Jabberwock
So, ok, it's not our issue, why do we care again?
If we don't want to fight, why do we want to send arms? What's this moral theory about sending arms regardless of the consequences sending arms has is the moral thing to do? Feel free to explain.
2. How dare you ask us to explain ourselves!!!
Quoting neomac
Ok, well, un-frame it for me.
In what moral theory is there a cause not worth risking much of anything yourself but is like "totally so important"? Worth sending arms ... but not too many arms!!!
Quoting Jabberwock
There's this delicate balance right in the middle of sending the "just right" bowl of arms that seems to aim for maximising Ukrainian dead, but at the same time it's presented as some obvious idea and anyone who's critical is "helping the enemy" who we're not actually at war with.
Absolutely nothing is obvious about this idea and every time the consequences are brought up, instead of accepting the consequences as a consequence of this idea suddenly the West isn't moral agents at all and it's Ukrainians doing all the fighting and choosing and it's their choice and we aren't to question that choice no matter how irrational it seems, but somehow sending arms isn't our choice but just obvious thing to do.
We care about Ukrainian sovereignty, but not enough to die for it. Sending weapons has the advantage of us not dying. Ukrainians, on the other hand, do want to die for Ukrainian sovereignty, possibly because it is their own sovereignty. I would say it is rather uncomplicated.
Quoting boethius
I would say the amount of arms sent is not a result of deliberate anything (I would rather say too little deliberation is involved), but it is the woeful result of the state of Western politics, which is ruled strictly by popularity, therefore politicians instead of making up their minds try to please everyone, so that we have the exact situation of 'helping the effort, but not too much'. If the support for the effort was greater in the West (like it is e.g. in the Baltics, former Eastern Bloc countries and Finland), then the war would be long over with.
Quoting boethius
OK, let us bring up the expected consequences of not helping Ukrainians at all. I tried to bring it up with Isaac, but to no avail.
Ok, thanks for just spelling out the obvious nature of the position, that the West's position is that Ukrainian sovereignty is not worth dying for (to us), and not deflecting with accusations of "framing" or whatever or then jumping over this important premise directly to:
Quoting Jabberwock
Now, if free and prosperous Ukraine still had elections, maybe you could plausibly say the policies are what "Ukrainians" want.
Likewise, if men were allowed to leave the country and weren't forced into fighting, maybe you could say they "want" to fight, because they aren't leaving.
But, please explain the simple answers to these issues, as it's all uncomplicated to you.
Likewise, let's assume you are correct and "Ukraine wants to fight", and lets say we (the arms suppliers) know Ukraine will lose the war at immense cost, death and suffering.
Should we still send arms even if we knew Ukraine is very likely to lose anyways?
Because you also say in your uncomplicated world view that you don't need a theory of victory, so is Ukraine losing at the cost of a million Ukrainian lives worthwhile?
Quoting Jabberwock
You sweet summer child, like a leaf blown along the winds of hope without a care in the world.
Honestly seems nice to be that naive, but let us continue for the sake of argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
Ok, well, if this "woeful" state of Western politics results in Ukraine losing the war at a massive cost of lives and suffering, are you saying the "woeful" support was justified nonetheless, or are you actually against the current policy, preferring sending no arms rather than insufficient support (which may not be achievable at all with only arms shipments but may require sending actual soldiers)?
Quoting Jabberwock
Extremely doubtful, unless you're talking sending in troops, which, as you note:
Quoting Jabberwock
So I assume you aren't.
But, we agree that the support isn't at the level of the former Eastern block, Baltics and Finland so seems a moot point.
Quoting Jabberwock
We've gone through the alternative many, many times with previous interlocutors. I haven't read all the posts since my haitus here so I'm going to assume @Isaac did in fact answer you sufficiently, or then just dealing with your continuous deflection, but I can summarise the alternative:
First, not-helping Ukraine at all other than humanitarian aid the West can arguably be said to provide universally (or then makes an honest attempt, such as Médecins Sans Frontières) isn't a moral catastrophe. There's plenty of wars all over the place, not to mention those in which the West is the aggressor, in which we do not "help".
So not helping Ukraine would be the less hypocritical, and therefore more honest and more moral position.
Nevertheless, the alternative to arms shipments is diplomacy based on the honest position that we're not willing to die for this cause and there's zero evidence sending arms to Ukraine will result in a better outcome for Ukraine or anyone else (that the only hopium-light reason to do so is a cynical expenditure of Ukrainian bodies, "fight to the last Ukrainian", for debatable, and arguably counter-productive, geopolitical ambitions), but we (the West, and in particular Europe) may have things both Russia and Ukraine want that can help end the conflict.
Of course negotiating a resolution to the conflict requires both compromise and risk.
So, if you're opposed to either compromise or any risk (obviously only diplomatically and not the risk of warfare which you are perfectly content with) on principle then we should debate that first.
You seem to take it for granted that Ukrainians continuing to fight "to victory" (while also not requiring a theory of victory of how that happens) is the only reasonable option.
Are you against a negotiated resolution?
I'm not sure who "we" is supposed to be here. Ukraine opted to ignore Western advice on committing to a maneuver warfare-centric offensive and instead focus on attrition, particularly of Russian artillery systems. They considered the losses they would sustain in a more rapid push to be unacceptable, and wanted to focus more on destroying Russian resources that could be used for future offensives.
This seems totally rational to me. The West and Ukraine have different priorities. Ukraine is far more than "halfway" in reducing Russia's supply of artillery systems, and given Russian morale issues, it seems unlikely that they could conduct a significant offensive without a large artillery advantage.
In any event, given Russia just had a rebellion and Putin is going on air to warn about collapse and civil war, admitting that he is in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis Prigozhin in the press, it seems possible that Russia is more than halfway to a defeat. In attrition warfare, you don't win in a linear fashion. One side gets exhausted and then collapses.
Big picture, it's hard to see how this war has improved Russia's security situation. They are going to end up with Finland and Sweden in NATO, very likely Ukraine in NATO, and Georgia is significantly more likely now too. Moldova also looks more likely than before, or might at least join the EU. China has gained tremendous leverage over them and has made huge strides in pulling the Central Asian states into its orbit.
Moreover, Russia has reneged on its defense export deals around the world and the war has been an absolutely abysmal advertisement for Russian hardware. China sits ready to fill the void, with the T-96 and T-99 being superior vehicles that can be produced far quicker, and a true LO fifth gen multi-role, carrier capable fighter on the way out with export models likely to follow. They even got Pakistan to pivot away from the US and go for the J-10 as well by offering to help them with indigenous production of the JF-17. Point being, China is very likely to replace Russia as the main arms exporter that isn't US aligned and without exports Russia cannot afford anywhere near the same R&D efforts. This was going to happen anyhow, but they've sped it up very quickly, as previously China's focus on high end air defense, MRLS, and its navy meant they weren't as interested in the export market since they didn't want capabilities leaking on AD/MD, and they were also making stuff outside most nation's price points, e.g. nuclear subs, war ships, carrier-focused ballistic missiles, ABM, etc. (combat drone aside, which they do dominate sales of).
Mearsheimer is good when he sticks to a small scale. It's his attempts at big picture theorizing that really go off the rails. I appreciate that you have to "go big" to move the ball along on theory, even if it means getting a lot wrong, but the problems in "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'" Offensive Realism are such that I think it's worth questioning if it was worth publishing. It makes the realist camp in IR look like a caricature, and got basically every prediction about the post-Cold War era wrong.
But it's instructive on how he sees the world. I recall Hal Brand's comments on Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Israel Lobby," at a conference being" "a fairly banal account of how foreign lobbying works that is spiced up by some antisemitism," which is about right IMO. In my experience, I haven't seen anything to suggest Israel's efforts are particularly more successful than say, Saudi ones, and of course similar books have been written about the Saudis, Russia etc.
Point being, you don't even have to assume he is biased, because either way he is just frequently wrong.
Yes, but there are other costs to giving Putin what he wants, e.g. an increased risk of Russian aggression in the future. Forcing Russia to burn through its entire Cold War stock of hardware and ammunition greatly reduces their ability to wage future wars. Even at current wartime production levels it will take Russia well over a decade to put together anything like the force they initially invaded with, likely far longer.
Yes, of course, not all of them. When we use the collective nouns, we rarely mean every one of thing represented. Still, the support for the defensive war seems to be high, around 70-80%, of course it is higher in those places less affected by the war, so yes, I would say that in the general sense in which we typically use such phrases, they want to fight. Everyone reporting on the war, including Russians, acknowledge high morale of Ukrainian troops, desertions seem to be rare, so it does not seem that most of them are forced to fight.
Quoting boethius
The issue I think I have already mentioned in this thread, possibly even in discussion with you, is that many people are somehow hang up on the issue of 'winning' or 'losing'. That is rather unrealistic and makes the discussion rather difficult, as everything depends then on the 'theory of winning', as you say, which is necessarily rather vague. I do not expect neither Ukraine nor Russia to 'win' the war in any reasonable sense. I believe it rather unlikely that Ukraine will get back all the territories and I believe Russia will not succeed in subjugating the whole of Ukraine, which I would say were the main goals for both sides.
Thus it is difficult to answer your question in principle, without defining what would be considered 'losing'. I would say that if we knew beforehand that they would very likely not gain anything and lose many Ukrainians, then we should refrain from it. I do not know though why they would do so, if they knew they were certain to lose?
Quoting boethius
That is hilarious from someone who believes in a solution negotiated with Putin.
Quoting boethius
No, I am against the current policy, preferring much stronger support. And I am not sure what you mean by 'unachievable'. Was the current level of support insufficient for taking back Kherson? Because I am pretty certain that it still did happen. Did Ukraine win back 10% of its territory or not? So it seems the support was sufficient for that, was it not? I would say quite a lot has been achieved, but of course with greater support Ukraine could achieve much more.
Quoting boethius
You have written a lot of words, but I do not see described any of the actual consequences, beside that you would feel morally superior.
I am not taking it for granted, as I wrote, I doubt Ukraine will 'win' the war in the sense you insist on, but I do believe that it is capable of achieving some more goals before the conflict ceases.
And I am not against a negotiated resolution, in fact I fully expect that this particular war will end with one, as surely none of the sides is able to force the other to complete capitulation. I just do not believe that a negotiated resolution before the war or during the war before we started helping Ukrainians would provide any benefit beside postponing the conflict a bit, because it would certainly not resolve it. But sure, please describe what solution you have in mind and why you think it would fare any better than Khasavyurt, Minsk 1 or Minsk 2.
There's nothing to 'engage' with. Yes. There are other metrics which show things in a different light. What exactly is it you want me to do about that? Carry out some phoney 'rational synthesis' which somehow determines the Truth of the matter (despite experts in the field being unable to decide), and no doubt suspiciously resembles the position I held in the first place? I'm about 25 years past that kind of naivety.
Quoting Jabberwock
Oh. Turns out yes.
Why did Freedom House not do that then? They have the staff, they have the expertise. Why are they leaving it to us laymen? If The Economist has data that needs accounting, then what's stopping Freedom House from including it?
The reason these sources differ is because they differ in opinion as to what's relevant, how important each issue is, and what it all means put together. There's no resolving those differences. Finding some kind of 'mean average' doesn't get you closer to the truth, it's not done by vote and it's neither does splitting the difference.
Quoting Jabberwock
You already know it isn't because I've already explained three times how to interpret my use of the term, since you refuse to listen, I can't see the value in doing so a fourth time.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yep.
Quoting Jabberwock
Pretty much, yes. But as @boethius has pointed out, that option is not the one we're considering right now.
Quoting Jabberwock
True also.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. That's right.
You seem to think you've reached some kind of conclusion.
I think that course of action protects the most people's well-being. I've asked if you disagree and your answer was pretty much that you don't really care about the well-being of non-Ukrainians because you don't know any, so I don't see much we can discuss further.
I certainly did not expect you to ignore all the data that contradict your thesis.
Quoting Isaac
Assessing more data does not get you closer to truth than carefully selecting just the one that confirms your thesis? Because that is how you have selected it in the first place, right? You base your whole theory on an outlier (you do know what an outlier is, don't you?) and try to convince me it is valid methodology? I wonder why all those people are wasting time doing metaanalyses, if you can just pick out the result of this one study that you like best!
Quoting Isaac
OK, so let us stick just to relative terms, exactly as you want. Considering that Russia's score in 2000 was 5.57 and it moved to 6.16 in 2008, i.e. (improvement of 0.59), and Ukraine made the progress of 0.83 from 2000 to 2008, which was the period you mentioned, then we have to conclude that both made about the same progress in those respective periods?
Quoting Isaac
If yep, then Putin would still attack Ukraine if it had prospects for being free and prosperous, no matter whether it was in NATO or not. Conceding NATO membership would not stop the war, if Ukraine was to be free and prosperous, it would still be attacked.
Quoting Isaac
So if we conceded the whole Ukraine to Putin, as you propose, we could not 'expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door', as there would be no free and prospering Ukraine next door. It pretty much would diminish the likelihood of the successful Russian revolt, would it not?
Quoting Isaac
And you seem to care about well being of non-Ukrainians only if Ukraine can be blamed for its decrease, otherwise you are content with 'balance', as you wrote. If you sold your Fairphone and donated the whole amount to charity, you would protect well-being of even more people, most likely save a few lives. But you do not do that, you do not choose the course of action that protects most people's well-being, you prefer the course of action that protects some people's well-being AND lets you keep your Fairphone. You keep your Fairphone even if it means that more people would die, but object that Ukrainians want to keep their freedom, if it means more people would die.
As you probably know, my view is that the Russians were provoked into invading Ukraine.
If they are provoked similarly in the future, and conventional means are no longer available, they will likely react more extremely; possibly with nuclear weapons. Remember the Cuba Crisis.
Further, if the purpose of western intervention was to send a message, who is listening? Independently-minded countries like the BRICS don't buy the narrative of an unprovoked invasion, and they have all refused to side with the US over this issue.
Meanwhile, the US has its hands tied in Ukraine trying to protect a two-decade investment which it will probably end up losing in the end. The US is losing influence all over the world, the Persian Gulf being a prime example. China is the laughing third.
This strategy has been a disaster.
Uh huh.
At best they've managed to avoid outright condemnation, but even that has failed. South Africa told Putin not to come to the BRICS summit as they would be forced to arrest him for war crimes. ???? ????? ?? ?????? ????????
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark A. Milley Hold Press Conference Following Virtual Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting
[sup]— U.S. Department of Defense · Jul 18, 2023[/sup]
Inside a secret bunker, hear what soldier noticed about Russian soldiers
[sup]— Alex Marquardt · CNN · Jul 20, 2023 · 3m:28s[/sup]
Lots of soldiers in the Crimea area, rumors will have them gathering north of Kyiv as well.
Reportedly there are a few heavily mined Russian lines by now, perhaps put up when Wagner mercs (and newbies) were being sent to Bakhmut.
Might be worth noting how many defensive arms Ukraine has received, e.g. to take down kamikaze drones, etc. There's been much tiptoeing around Putin's Russia (hence they walk all over things like the grain stuff). Maybe the capable should start seriously talking about implementing a no-fly zone in Ukrainian airspace, iff the Ukrainian government wishes it.
Sending F-16s to Ukraine in fight against Russia would take 'months and months': Blinken
[sup]— Tal Axelrod · ABC · Jul 23, 2023[/sup]
A Russian fighter jet fired flares at a US drone over Syria and damaged it, the US military says
[sup]— Lolita C Baldor, Tara Copp · AP · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
Then (if their government says so), any missiles violating that, warrants taking out the source of launch. Much like whatever other nation, here implemented by whatever coalition agreeing to help Ukraine. Once the Ukrainian skies are better cleared of offenders, civilians will be safer, the situation different, and more assessments warranted. That is, no tiptoeing inside Ukrainian airspace (if they want it so). If nothing else, that seems reasonable (to me).
That should be obvious by now. If it isn't obvious to you yet, ask yourself why the international sanctions against Russia failed.
It's also worth noting the countries who abstained from voting: China and India for example - the countries with the largest populations on the planet, each one seperately being larger than all NATO countries combined.
A generic rhetorical device, nothing more. As in "what do we have here?"
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You talk like you don't know what bombs do. Ukraine is 'using up' Russian artillery at the expense of its own citizen's lives. It's like being shot in that arm and claiming a victory because I'm 'using up' your bullets. I'd rather you kept your bullets and I not get shot, as any sane person would.
I don't care how many artillery Russia has. I care about their propensity to use them on innocent people. Disarmament is a good way to de-plenish stocks, hospitals isn't.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
It really didn't.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
As I said above...
Quoting Isaac
Putin's grip on power seems remarkably fickle to you people. The slightest military blip and his head's on the block, but apparently no amount of political or popular uprising is going to harm so much as an eyebrow.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
What makes you say that? Everything I've been reading from NATO members seems to indicate the opposite.
But sure. Russia's security situation has been weakened. So? The question was an ethical one, not a geopolitical one. Is the outcome worth the cost? Is war the only route?
You say Mearsheimer...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
... and I think you're broadly right there. But what exactly did he get wrong? He got wrong the power of peaceful disarmament, trade having more force than militarism, globalisation effects on diffusing military great power conflicts...
(that and the ongoing uni-polarity of US dominance, but he didn't so much get that wrong as simply have a theory that only applied in its absence)
In other words he made exactly the same mistake being made here - to assume military solutions just trump every other solution, and that great powers only respond to military force.
You mean like...
Quoting Jabberwock
... where you dismiss the entire, well-respected, Human Freedom Index because it doesn't show the descent of Russia that you think it ought to?
As I asked before, if not dismiss them, what do you want me to do with them? Average them? Believe the exact centre? Add up all the experts they each used and divide by the total? Subtract the number I first thought of? What exactly do you think one should do with this other conflicting data?
People disagree. Experts disagree. I don't know what it is about you people that makes you think you alone can carry out some kind super-level of meta-analysis but the very experts you're citing for some reason didn't bother.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. That's right. Unless you can give me a compelling (or any) mechanism whereby that occurs.
The truth is the way the world is. The experts at Cato have had their best shot at modelling the truth using their Human Freedom Index. The experts at Freedom House have taken their best shot using their own index.
Now. How do I make a better shot by putting the two together? Why is the average of the two more accurate a model than either one. And if it is, why didn't either team of experts just do that? What mechanism links the averaging process to the way the world is?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, if that's what the index shows (though 0.83 is quite a bit bigger than 0.59 and I prefer rankings for the reasons I've given). Your incredulity doesn't constitute an argument. You're implying doing exactly what you accuse me of doing, picking your index to match your theory. You already decided (theory) that Russia's descent into draconian tyranny must impact human freedom more than Ukraine's economic and judicial corruption, so you're now only prepared to believe evidence which agrees with that theory. Your implication that Cato's measure is suspicious is based entirely on the fact that it doesn't match your theory.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's not what you asked. You said "threaten". Opposing nations threaten war, that's how the balance of power is maintained. The key is to threaten back an equal measure. As I said before, if there was a strong unified global community committed to international law which Ukraine could be a part of, then this situation would never have happened. We're here because there's no such community and rather than being protected Ukraine was dangled like bait on a line.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've nowhere proposed we do that. You asked a hypothetical. It's not the decision we have before us. But for the sake of your hypothetical situation...
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, that's right. If, in your hypothetical, we had to relinquish all of Ukraine to Russia, the number of free and prosperous neighbours would be less and so their effect less.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's always about balance. Hundreds of thousands of lives, millions more at risk, for the sake of a few decimal place improvements on the human freedom measure is not balance, it's insanity.
As I wrote I do not dismiss it, I just point out the possible shortcomings (like you did with Freedom Hourse) and point out that it should be considered together with other sources and not in isolation.
Quoting Isaac
First of all, I want you to think. If one source confirms your conclusions and many others do not, maybe that is not a correct conclusion after all? You want to process only preselected data that support your conclusion and ignore all others. That is a classic example of confirmation bias or more generally, cherry picking:
Quoting Wikipedia
That is exactly what you do. Intentionally.
And please tell me, how your vaunted index is arrived at? Experts at Cato gather all individual indices and then... average them? THE HORROR! Don't they know that averaging does not bring you the truth?!
Quoting Isaac
I am just pointing out that using that one source preselected to confirm your view might not be the best methodology and therefore not the best support for your argument.
Quoting Isaac
If I argue that the global temperatures do not rise from year to year and carefully select data for only those places where it does not and ignore all others, are my conclusions as valid as the conclusion from the study where all data are considered and the results are just the opposite?
If I have a theory that the local population is dissatisfied with the city government and select those five opinions from the poll that confirm my theory and ignore 95 people who are satisfied, is my view equally supported as those who consider all opinions and conclude just the opposite?
If I claim that each plane travel is a terrible risk and include in my statistics only the crashes, ignoring all the safe travels, am I telling the truth?
If I read a single book on history (or just a single index on history), are my conclusions equally as valid as the person's who has read a bit more than that?
I am astonished that i even have to explain this.
Quoting Isaac
People at Cato have their preferences, biases and make their own mistakes. Experts at Freedom House have their preferences, biases and make their own mistakes. Many other experts do as well. So yes, getting all their opinions together does equal out those issues and provides better general view than cherry-picking the data.
I do recommend you read the whole article on that fallacy of yours. Actually, at this point, I believe reading any source on the issues you discuss would be beneficial for you.
Quoting Isaac
And your theory is that economic and judicial corruption has an equal or greater impact? The issue with that theory is that you did not even bother to check your single source. Ukraine's indicators for the rule of law and for economy just about level out for the whole period from 2000 to 2018 (Ukrainians have a bit more judicial freedom and Russians a bit more economic one). So no, Ukrainians in general were not more opressed economically and judicially according to your single source and the descent into draconian tyranny is still unaccounted for.
You were writing about 'democracy', when that did not work you wrote about 'authoritarianism', when that collapsed you moved to 'general freedom', when even that did not work, we are at 'economic and judicial corruption', where you are wrong about the latter part. So now your argument is reduced to 'Putin's regime is likely to fall due to popular uprising, because Cato's experts have shown that during some period Russian's economic freedom has improved, even though it descended into draconian tyranny'. For some reason, I do not find that argument convicing, maybe others do.
Quoting Isaac
You said 'yep' when I wrote that Putin is willing to go to war to defend against perceived threats and you agree that he sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a threat. The conclusion must be that he would go to war for that reason. Not to mention that you are willing to make concessions based on threats alone, not to 'threaten back'.
And it happens so that there is a strong unified global community committed to protection of its members which Ukraine could be a part of. You do not want it to be there, because Putin objects. Why think Putin would not object to the community you describe?
Quoting Isaac
Yes, in our hypothetical situation you would give Putin the whole Ukraine. Given your view that he sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a threat, it is very likely that he would ask for it. So the course of action you proposed (give in to Putin's demands if he threatens war) is very likely to bring about the effect I am writing about: subjugation of the whole Ukraine with no prospect of it being free and prosperous.
Quoting Isaac
But given that this hypothetical is quite likely on your proposed course of action, it seems this course of action would make the peaceful rebellion against Putin less likely.
Quoting Isaac
Well, for you people being jailed, beaten up, poisoned, shot and deprived of basic democratic freedoms is a few decimal places on your precious index. People actually involved might have a bit different opinion on that.
Then what do you do with it? How has it affected your theory, what did you change about your belief in the light of it, and why?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. So you said. I'm asking how. What is this 'taking together' you think you're doing? Half way between the two? Biggest wins? What are you actually doing when you're 'taking together'?
Quoting Jabberwock
No. That's not the situation here (nor your other examples). None of the indices are data. They are conclusions based on data. All groups had access to the same data. They disagree about the relative importance, value and meaning.
Importance, value and meaning are not facts to include in data harvesting, they're opinions one either is persuaded by or not.
I am astonished that I even have to explain this.
Quoting Jabberwock
How? Explain what you think happens. Cato make mistakes. Freedom House make mistakes. You put them together, then what? The mistakes magically pop out? What happens to the mistakes when you look at both reports? You see the differences. How do you know which ones are mistakes/biases? Majority rules? Magic bias detector?
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not unaccounted for. Cato have come up with a unified score. The fact that you don't like their methodology because it doesn't come up with the score you think it ought to is not a point against it.
I am astonished that I even have to explain this.
Quoting Jabberwock
If I'm willing to shoot deer that enter my garden, and a deer enters my garden, does that mean I'm going to shoot it, or meraly that I'm willing to shoot it?
I am astonished that I even have to explain this.
Quoting Jabberwock
Possibly. I'm not sure what that's got to do with my mention of "strong unified global community committed to international law which Ukraine could be a part of".
Quoting Jabberwock
If he was some kind of robot with only a single factor to take into account in any decision, perhaps. But he isn't, he's an oligarch balancing several dozen objectives of which eliminating a free and prosperous Ukraine is only one.
People rarely act in accordance with a single objective.
I am astonished that I even have to explain this.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. Indeed it would. Still trying to make an argument by looking only at one side I see?
Quoting Jabberwock
They might. But since neither you nor I are, I'm not sure what difference that makes to this discussions. I'm sure someone in Yemen looking at their desperately hungry child might have a difference of opinion too.
I have considered it in view of your argument that peaceful regime change in Russia is likely. It does not show it - at best it shows that some indices of freedom are prone to quicker changes than others, but in both directions. It does not say which change is more likely than the other. Also, as I have pointed out, it seems to have significant shortcomings, as portraying Russia, with its anti-gay laws, as exactly as great in the same-sex relaltionships as the Netherlands, which have same-sex unions and robust anti-discrimination laws or not indicating the introduction of authoritarian rule during Putin.
On the other hand, many other sources that I have also considered in my assessment (unlike you) do influence my view on the probability of popular uprising in Russia, based on those many sources I conclude that it is unlikely.
Quoting Isaac
I consider all the facts known to me and draw conclusions from them. Like everyone else, I surely apply some bias, based on my previous opinions, but at least I try to challenge them. You consider only one fact, sorry, an opinion, that suits your conclusion and, not unexpectedly, confirms that your conclusion was right.
Quoting Isaac
So cherry-picking an opinion is somehow better than cherry-picking data? I really do not think so.
Quoting Isaac
You have not read the article on your fallacy, have you?
Quoting Isaac
If the indicator does not reflect the introduction of an oppressive regime and is supposed to be your evidence for the likelihood to overthrow an oppresive regime, then yes, it is unaccounted for. The indicator (or should I say, the opinion) does not show what you say it does.
Quoting Isaac
It means that you are likely to shoot the deer: there are two factors that make it more likely than not, unless we know other facts.
Quoting Isaac
Because the distinction makes no difference: it will still put Ukraine outside of Putin's sphere of influence, so most likely he would react by waging a war.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, human mind is inscrutable, however, often we have to make predictions concerning other people's behavior. Unless you have good reasons why he would not, those two premises (with which you agree with) tell us that he would likely do that.
Quoting Isaac
Well, all the other side has is a fallacious argument based on cherry-picked data, sorry, a cherry-picked opinion, that does not even support the conclusion, because it makes improvement of freedoms as likely as their worsening.
If the other side comes up with an proper argument with proper evidence, I will be happy to consider it.
Quoting Isaac
The difference is that we have no right to demand they make that sacrifice from the comfort of our homes.
... instigated + ordered by the Kremlin. Do we have an insane government on our hands? :/
I guess, say, Litvinenko = a decimal point. (= rhetorical ramble)
How will the border/country-free world come about anyway?
Quoting unenlightened
Quoting Jul 23, 2023
Some news briefs:
The Olenivka incident...
UN says Ukrainian POWs in Donetsk not killed by rocket, as Russia claimed
[sup]— Reuters · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
"Need more meat"...?
Russian lawmakers extend age limit for compulsory military draft
[sup]— AP · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
Another one bites the dust...
Russia declares independent TV channel 'undesirable,' banning it from country
[sup]— AP via ABC · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
I get it now. When I look at sources and conclude that one or more seem better than the others, I'm cherry picking opinions to match my theory. When you look at sources you're carrying out some next level rational analysis that for some reason the experts at each of the agencies concerned aren't even capable of, and the fact that the ones you choose just happen to support the theory you've been promoting all along is complete coincidence.
Does it explain that in your Wikipedia article?
Quoting Jabberwock
Good. So Ukraine being free and prosperous doesn't mean that Putin will invade it, it means he has a reason to invade it which he will weigh with all his other reasons to act or not. And yet...
Quoting Jabberwock
...? Most likely? Where are you getting your probabilities from? All we've established is that it might well be one of his motivating factors. You've not even mentioned any others, let alone assigned any probabilities to them.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't think you understand how probability works. If I have a 2% chance of invading if it's sunny and a 3% chance of invading if it's a Wednesday, it doesn't mean I'm definitely going to invade on a sunny Wednesday just because those are the only two motivating factors we have. Putin might well be inclined to invade if Ukraine is free and prosperous. He may well be inclined to threaten invasion if he's already got some territory from the last threat. But since we've no data at all on how strong either of those motivating forces are, we've equally no data at all on how likely such an action becomes when both are present.
Quoting Jabberwock
But we do have a right to demand the Yemeni's make their sacrifice?
Sure. And yes, without a doubt.
The question is what we do about it. It's no good tutting.
Except you did not do what you now say you do. You have given one source (cherry-picked after your ahistorical claim that Ukraine turned around in a decade turned out indefensibie). You have also not mentioned that you consider this source better than others and why, you have flatly refused to look at other sources. I look at all sources - in case you did not notice, for the last two days we are talking about YOUR evidence. I assess the counterevidence and discuss what is its relevance to the argument presented and how methods used might affect the conclusions. In other words, I engage with the counterevidence. You claim that you do not even have to look a the counterevidence. See the difference?
Quoting Isaac
Maybe you should read it? Who knows, maybe it would even help you to avoid your fallacies?
Quoting Isaac
Are you saying that we have no reason to believe Putin threatening a war due to his perceived threat is likely to do that? If that is so, then he was not provoked into war by promises of Ukraine in NATO? Then nobody provoked the war, because nobody could know it was likely.
Quoting Isaac
So 'willing to go to war', with which you have agreed, is now 2% chance? Quite impressive backtracking.
But if it is so, then nobody could predict that Putin would invade Ukraine because of NATO. He was willing to, but given that it was just 2% chance, everyone can be excused for thinking he would not.
Quoting Isaac
We do not, so we do not.
Analysis: Russia's Danube attacks tighten noose on Ukraine's grain sector
[sup]— Max Hunder, Jonathan Saul, Olena Harmash, Sybille de La Hamaide, Tom Balmforth, William Maclean · Reuters · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
Anger grows in Ukraine’s port city of Odesa after Russian bombardment hits beloved historic sites
[sup]— Hanna Arhirova, Lori Hinnant · AP · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
Hate and talks usually don't mix well. :/ The Kremlin isn't into talks anyway, just reciting demands.
Going to take some efforts to trust the Kremlin (with much of anything). The current folks anyway.
You seem to know an awful lot about my reading habits. Are you stalking me?
Quoting Jabberwock
Indeed; what can 'scape the eye Of God, all-seeing, or deceive His heart.
Quoting Jabberwock
'Likely', 'most likely'. Any idea as to the difference?
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't think its actually possible for anyone to have misunderstood that more, well done.
Quoting Jabberwock
So the US are sending 75 billion to Yemen too? Good news.
Quoting Isaac
No Sudan Somalia CAR Afghanistan ...? :/
There isn't one. You made an absurd comment somehow implying that you know exactly what I've read and what I haven't (despite the fact that the evidence to the contrary is on this very thread), then went on to proselytise about how you manage some kind of next level meta analysis of "all sources" which even the experts at Cato and Freedom House are incapable of, and expected anyone to believe that you arrive, by this at what just so happens to be the theory you prefer anyway.
Then you pretended that "most likely" and "likely" were the same thing, despite the fact that when comparing options they are literally the only difference we'd ever be talking about.
Then you catastrophically misunderstood an example explaining probability for an estimate of Putin's invasion chances.
Then you chuck in some throwaway comment that doesn't even make sense suggesting that somehow our payments to Ukraine are inevitable, yet paying Yemen would be a choice we don't have to make, apparently because I have a phone...
I gave it the response it deserved.
Quoting jorndoe
Exactly. We make a choice. A Ukrainian's freedom to vote is apparently more important that Afghan's freedom from starvation. Anyone who can ethically sustain that, feel free to lay it out. Apparently it's because @Jabberwock knows the Ukrainians better, but I'm not sure I really understood that argument... probably too next-level for my addled brain.
Google knows where we're heading: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.optivelox.radmeter&hl=en_US&pli=1
The shortly to be needed shopping and tableware ap You will need the geiger tube detector as well, as the comments point out. This is pure paranoia of course.
I need no other support. I'm defending against your accusation that the position has no support. One set of support disproves that claim.
Quoting Jabberwock
There's no 'vastness' to the counter evidence other than in your mind. Some people disagree. I'd fully expect they do. My claim was not 'Russia can escape it's current state within eight years and nobody disagrees'
The simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years. It is also a fact that Russian occupation results in orders of magnitude fewer deaths and constraints than war.
Therefore, if the goal is Ukraine's current level of freedom, it is reasonable to believe that the least damaging route is to avoid war, but instead focus on the longer, but less damaging route of removing tyranny entirely.
Your absurd descent into truly execrable epistemology and speculation about my reading history, has failed to cover the fact that you've not provided a shred of evidence contradicting that claim.
And no "some other people think otherwise" does not contradict that claim, not even if your Delphic wisdom determines they're the ones telling The Truth™.
No, cherry-picked support does not disprove anything, which you would know if you read that article. An argument based on a single cherry-picked point of support is fallacious and that is how it should be and will be treated.
Quoting Isaac
I have described many factors from the history of both Ukraine and Russia that make me believe what you propose is unlikely. Unlike me, you have not engaged with any of them. This is simply confirmation bias. You engage ONLY with the evidence that supports your claim.
Quoting Isaac
The simple fact is that capability of some countries to move on the HFI by a certain amount has nothing to do with the likelihood of freeing of the whole of Russia from tyranny, which was your argument. Ironically, I have demonstrated that Russia was able to improve its index while succumbing to the said tyranny.
Quoting Isaac
I would say I gave you more than a shred, for example:
So you are simply not telling the truth when you say that I have not provided a shred of evidence. You simply dismissed it by saying that your cherry-picked evidence trumps all that I wrote. That much is clear: you do not engage with evidence. And saying that I do not provide it is a lie, pure and simple.
I was ready to provide more, I still am, but why should I, if you refuse to engage with it?
And tell me, you do not believe that the HFI contradicts my claim that the peaceful fall of regime in Russia is unlikely. How can it then support the opposite thesis?
Of course it does. If the accusation is "there's no evidence for X" then cherry-picked evidence disproves that claim. There has to exist evidence for X in order that I can cherry pick it, it therefore disproves the claim that there is no evidence in favour of X.
Quoting Jabberwock
It isn't. Just because some Wikipedia article says so, doesn't render it fact. There are multiple competing theories of epistemology. Googling a fallacy doesn't prove anything. If think you have a case, make it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Good. You go ahead and believe that then. That you believe something to be the case is not an argument that it is, in fact, the case.
Quoting Jabberwock
What would constitute 'engaging' with them? You keep throwing in this term, but it's so nebulous. If I read them, decide they're not meaningful, is that 'engagement'? What do want as a sign of engagement (short of just agreeing)? I don't believe those factors make it sufficiently unlikely - I am unconvinced. What more is there to say?
Quoting Jabberwock
I believe only the evidence that supports my claim (is sufficiently weighty). But that's obvious. It's why I believe my claim. The same is true of you. All the evidence that supports your claim you believe is weighty enough, all the evidence which opposes it you don't. That's why you believe your claim.
You seem to think that there's some kind of number-crunching or mental kung-fu that can be done with all this competing theory, that you've carried out and I haven't, yet you can't actually describe what it is. You can list things that we agree are the case all day long, but nothing in that listing is going to magically spew out a theory that we're all then compelled to believe. The facts underdetermine the theory - a point that seems stubbornly impossible to drive home here for some reason.
Quoting Jabberwock
It does. The HFI is as good a measure of 'tyranny' as any. Short of you getting out your tyranny-o-meter, what could you possibly bring to bear to dispute that. I get that you don't like it, that for you tyranny is mostly about voting and political opposition, but for others, there's tyranny in lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity... I agree with the weighting the HFI has applied. You don't. There isn't an answer to that, there isn't some way we can stare more at the data and the right opinion pops out.
Quoting Jabberwock
What do you think you've provided evidence for? That Russia might not overthrow tyranny in eight years? Sure. But that's not the claim, the claim was that it will not. Or your later claim that it is more likely to not. Nothing you've provided has any probability assigned to it. It all simply might be the case.
All you've done is listed a load of facts and then said "see, they all add up to my theory". But facts don't just magically add up to theories, it's just a list of facts. They might seem to you to add up, but they don't seem to me to do so (not with the same degree of certainty). That difference is not resolvable - you can't just say "well, they ought to". Facts underdetermine theories.
Quoting Jabberwock
Facts underdetermine theories. If you're having trouble with the notion, I'm sure I can dig out a Wikipedia article for your edification.
Hey you got it right this time! Good for you.
I've been practising.
Quoting Unloading Wagner · Jul 19, 2023
NATO says it's boosting Black Sea surveillance, condemns Russian grain deal exit
[sup]— Andrew Gray, Ron Popeski, William Maclean · Reuters · Jul 26, 2023[/sup]
Ukrainian port cities are "the latest casualities in this senseless, brutal war", ASG Khiari tells Security Council in briefing on Ukraine
[sup]— Mohamed Khaled Khiari · UN · Jul 26, 2023[/sup]
UN official says latest Russian attacks on Ukraine ‘signal a calamitous turn’
[sup]— Tara Suter, AP · The Hill · Jul 26, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Mohamed Khaled Khiari (UN)
Maybe they are "insane".
, it's not just about "freedom to vote". (= rhetoramble (again))
Quoting boethius
As far as I’m concerned, you (and others) keep arguing based on background assumptions (on morality, propaganda, geopolitics, etc.) that I do not share at all, and keep challenging me based on your background assumptions, even after I explicitly questioned them. One of MY assumptions is that in an anarchic environment constituted by many nation states, there are 2 constitutive shared rules: pursue national interest, do not aggress acknowledged sovereign states first. The first is a domestic politics engagement between governments and its citizens. The second is a foreign politics engagement between states. There is absolutely nothing intrinsically immoral, coward or cynical in the Western decision to send weapons and not soldiers in Ukraine IF this serves Western national interests, and even if this is NOT in Ukraine’s best national interest, because Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative AT BEST of the Ukrainian government. So no, I do not believe at all that Ukraine is "totally so important” or “Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative to uphold” as if this is Western top priority, Ukraine is instrumental to the Western national interest (the European security, as Zelensky puts it) as much as the West is instrumental to the Ukrainian national interest (Zelensky’s moral imperative is Ukraine’s national interest, not European national interests). But the Western support doesn’t need to end up being some sort of cynical exploitation (as the “Ukrainians as cannon fodder” accusation suggests), even in case of significant power or costs imbalance, because again harnessing foreign consensus, allies and partners can also be part of power struggle strategies.
Oh my, you still have not read the article, which clearly explains why this approach is incorrect. Errare humanum est, in errore perservare stultum.
Quoting Isaac
I have been warned, now I realize why.
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Cherry-Picking
https://listoffallacies.com/cherry-picking/
http://ds-wordpress.haverford.edu/psych2015/projects/chapter/cherry-picking-data/
https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/11526726
Quoting Isaac
I believe something based on as many facts as I have been able to gather, you believe something based on a single fact that you have picked because you believed that before you picked that fact. If you believe both views are equally valid, good for you.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I truly believe you do not know what it means to engage with counterevidence.
Quoting Isaac
You believe a single piece of evidence against all other evidence that says otherwise, i.e. an outlier (you still do not know what that is), because you have picked it out based on your beliefs. You actively and persistently avoid learning any facts that might challenge your view, and you do not examine your belief in view of the counterevidence.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, if you take 'tyranny' to mean whatever else than is usually meant by that, then anything can be a measure of tyranny. For example, if you take 'tyranny' to be the amount of rainfall, then all you need to measure it are weather charts. Because there are different theories of epistemology.
Quoting Isaac
If past facts are irrelevant for probabilities, then anything really might come up. Why should we avoid war then? Past wars cannot inform us if there will be victims, simply that it might be the case. That is your reasoning, right?
Quoting Isaac
But you do not have facts. If all the evidence I have provided is just 'some other people think otherwise', as you say, then your evidence is also just 'some other people think otherwise', which, as you say, cannot support or counter any claim. So neither theory has sufficient support, we have no reason to believe any of them is true.
The problem here is that your priming bias makes the argument you have seen seem more strong than the arguments you read here. So confirmation bias leads you to see the supporting evidence for that as leading more strongly to that conclusion.
Your belief bias gets in the way of a dispassionate assessment of the logic in the counterarguments and your overconfidence in your ability to assess those arguments logically, leads to several non-sequitur arguments.
As your anchoring bias sets you up to see your preferred indices as centre points from which to measure deviation, you use framing to shore up the evidence in favour of your preferred theories.
Treating 'tyranny' and 'democracy' as if they were non-scalar terms is a suppressed correlative, something is not removed from either camp simply by relative position, and repeatedly arguing against that tighter definition you now have rather than those I'm using is a straw man.
Your assumption that historical conditions must, simply by existing cause the current states is an historical fallacy, and reliance on it results in retrospective determinism, and as a result the majority of your assessment of Russia's current state from it's historical roots is just post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Your repeated insistence that I 'enagage with' only one source despite having no information on how many sources I have read is an attempt at proof by assertion, not to mention the Bulverism.
---
Finally, using Wikipedia to make your arguments for you is an appeal to authority.
You must have realized by now how full of sophistry, incoherence and self-defeating conclusions his arguments are. Many of the points you have raised are similar to the ones me and others have raised against his arguments. The problem is however deeper because it is rooted into the meaning of words and in concepts (like argument, bias, likelihood), he thinks he scores points by messing with words and concepts until he simply becomes unintelligible. That's why I have no pity for him.
So: is using a single outlier to support your argument is a fallacy or not?
Quoting Isaac
Of course, I have already acknowledged that:
Quoting Jabberwock
But as I have pointed out, it is easier to overcome one's confirmation bias by seeking many sources, both confirming and countering his thesis.
Quoting Isaac
That is the exact opposite of what I was doing. I have proposed to review as many indices as possible, including yours, with no particular weights attached to any of them, so there would be no anchoring and no preferential treatment whatsoever. You object to that because you realize that putting them all together would indicate your source is an outlier. How exactly is that framing?
Quoting Isaac
I have explicitly demonstrated that the HFI might be a positive correlative to 'tyranny': for Russia the HFI increased together with its tyranny. However, your argument requires that the correlation be negative. Having realized that, you try to redefine 'tyranny' as 'lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity', but that is not what is generally meant by the term. And surely it was not your meaning when you have initially used the term, which is rather clear when we substitute 'tyranny' in your original argument with that meaning:
Quoting Isaac
How does that work? It does not - if people in Russia are more free economically and have more personal opportunities AND there is still an authoritarian regime that is likely to impose its rule mlilitarily on its neighbors, that does not resolve the Ukrainian conflict in any way.
Quoting Isaac
No, it is not my assumption that it must happen, my argument is that it is more likely to happen than not. I am not arguing for historical determinism, but for historical probabilism. If you reject historical probabilism, then you cannot argue that the US provoked the war: if history is wholly undetermined and future inscrutable, then nobody could predict any course of events, therefore they are blameless.
Quoting Isaac
Maybe you have read many sources, but you engage with only one.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, of course it is. Not all appeals to authority are fallacious. After all, citing HFI is also an appeal to authority.
So, still no. A small point for the effort, maybe.
There ought to be a fallacy for treating a joke as if it were an argument - argumentum a gravitate perhaps...
Seriously, you're going to get a lot more out of this conversation if you drop the pretence that you're playing teacher, it just makes you sound silly.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. I've already explained that...
Quoting Isaac
Was there something there you didn't understand?
Quoting Jabberwock
Is it? How? You keep falling back on these lazy clichés as if they were self-evident. I don't think it is easier to overcome one's confirmation bias by seeking many sources, both confirming and countering one's thesis. I think overcoming confirmation bias has far more to do with social roles, confidence, and the payoff from doing so. It has very little to do with quantity of sources, as 'quantity' here is difficult to pin down and is easily dismissed as confirmation bias itself (as well as group think, conformity bias etc.). It might be that a volume of opinion with something detached like mathematics would be persuasive, but not with politics, economics, sociology... These are far more likely to reflect popular or less popular idealogical positions.
People have ideological biases and mostly these run in dominant and alternative (or fringe) paradigms, if you follow a more fringe paradigm it's self-evident that there's going to be a majority who assess data differently, seeing that isn't going to change your paradigm. For example, supporters of a Marxist interpretation of history are not persuaded by the fact that most historians do not view things that way, they expect that to be the case as part of their analysis.
Quoting Jabberwock
For a start we've looked only at two indices in detail, that's not 'as many as possible', not even close, but putting that aside, the anchoring is implied in what you expect to see. You already have Russia as descending into something, your frame of reference, so the quality of any assessment in anchored to that metric, things either deviate from it (and so require justification), or they do not (and therefore require no justification). Likewise your 'framing' of human freedom means that deviations are what require justification, but adherences do not.
Quoting Jabberwock
It is...
Quoting https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tyranny
So 'framing' this as a misuse of 'tyranny' (notwithstanding the fact that I only mentioned tyranny a few times), is a straw man. There are two definitions given by the dictionary, you have chosen the one which provides you with a means to an easy counter argument rather than use the one that was intended. It's literally the definition of straw-manning.
Quoting Jabberwock
Firstly, blame is about mens rea, not actus reus, so predictability isn't important. But I'm quite content with probabilism., it's just that you've not given any probabilities, you've just slung together a load of facts and said "see, these make it more probable". I don't see. I'm unconvinced that those facts lead to the probabilities you suggest and you've not presented anything at all to argue that they do. Their mere existence as facts is not sufficient.
If you say "the defendant was most likely to have stolen the bag - he was tall and wore a hat" it's not an argument. You have to show how being tall and wearing a hat affect the likelihood of the defendant stealing the bag.
You've provided lots of facts about Russia's past but you've not provided any argument to show that they have the effect on the probability of this movement in the direction of human freedom that you're claiming they do.
Quoting Jabberwock
And yet you still cannot tell me what 'engaging' is...
I understand it quite well, but my accusation is not that 'there's no evidence for X', but that the evidence is cherry-picked. So joyously acknowledging that yes, your data is cherry-picked, does not address the fallacy in any way.
Quoting Isaac
I have already wrote that: by challenging your view by reflecting on it from a different point of view.
Quoting What is Confirmation Bias and How to Reduce it?
Quoting How to spot confirmation bias and keep it from fueling snap judgments and limiting your worldview
5 Ways to Overcome Confirmation Bias
Quoting Isaac
You have flatly refused to look at other evidence. Could that be the reason for why we were looking just at one? Anchoring cannot be 'implied', if we are looking at several indices without rejecting any of them beforehand. 'Let us look at all the indices and average them' is not 'anchoring'. And 'human freedom' is too broad, as many ways in which human freedom is increased does nothing to resolve the actual conflict (which is caused by very specific violations of human freedom). If someone objects to slavery and someone proposes to significantly increase religious freedom of the slaves then yes, it would be a nice improvement of their index, but it would still not address the problem, i.e. slavery.
Quoting Isaac
Your claim that the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny requires a rather specific understanding of the term, which you have then tried to water down. The tyranny (i.e. the authoritarian regime) in Russia must be abolished, because it has specific properties that are the source of the conflict (like the fear that successful neighbors might instigate movements dangerous to the regime), so improving the plight of Russians in other areas has little to do with the resolution of the conflict. The question is not 'Can we make Russians happier?' but 'Can we make Russians stop subjugating other countries?' The HFI says that the first is possible (not even likely), but it says nothing about the second question.
Quoting Isaac
I have given you the facts, how you assess their influence on the probability is up to you. If you do not see how tight control of any form of protests might influence the probability of peaceful protests, so be it. If you do not see how the lack of grass-root activity traditions might influence people self-organization, what can I say. If you do not see how brutal suppression of opposition obstructs rising of figures around which the popular protests could concentrate around, there is nothing more I can do. I cannot do the thinking for you.
What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy. Throwing a Wikipedia article at it isn't an argument. How has my data selection process lead to my conclusion being less sound in a way that yours isn't? You've not given me any mechanism connecting these data selection processes with the truth.
Quoting Jabberwock
'Challenging' it? 'Reflecting' on it? These are just amorphous terms that don't have any distinct meaning. What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it?
Quoting Jabberwock
You have no reason at all to believe I've not looked at any other evidence, and in fact the most cursory glance back through this very thread would have shown that assumption to be wrong, but it's not your interest to actually get that assessment right, is it?
Quoting Jabberwock
... he says, going on to produce a textbook example of anchoring...
Quoting Jabberwock
... I can only assume that was deliberate?
Quoting Jabberwock
And I made such a ridiculous claim where, exactly?
Quoting Jabberwock
... and goes on to provide a further text book example of framing. Perfect.
Quoting Jabberwock
Have you ever written an argument? Have any of your teachers ever given you high grades for your 'list of facts' with the conclusion 'put them together however you want, that's up to you'? I presume you've at least had education past the level at which you're taught how to construct arguments. If you want to present an argument that your facts lead to a high probability, you must make that case (and do so persuasively). It's not 'list the facts and then roll your eyes if others don't reach the same conclusion you did' That's what persuasive arguments are for - to get others to see what you see connecting the facts to the conclusion.
I have given your four articles about the fallacy you commit. You either understand them or not. If not, then nothing can be done about it, as they are pretty clear.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, it seems all terms are amorphous to you.
Quoting Isaac
Well, even if you had a glance, you have refused to talk about it, which is about the same.
Quoting Isaac
Here you go:
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
That is hilarious coming from you.
I counted on your intelligence, did not expect that I have to spell it all out for you.
We’re going to need that Ukraine no-fly zone after all
[sup]— Andreas Umland · The Hill · Jul 27, 2023[/sup]
mentioning
• food production + export
• nuclear facilities
• civilian infra, bombings of noncombatants
• reconstruction
while restricting no-flight to those that are unmanned (unauthorized).
Going half the way?
Some of this stuff has come up in the thread before.
Odd then that none of your other arguments have simply been conducted by vague reference to Wikipedia articles. I gave you 15 articles about the fallacies and bias you committed. Was that sufficient for you to be persuaded? Or did you feel there was some room for me to have been wrong about the application of any of those to your case?
Quoting Jabberwock
Many are, yes. that's why I ask for clarity. Is that odd behaviour to you? To ask for clarity when faced with ambiguous terms.
Quoting Jabberwock
I really don't see how. Did you talk about all the evidence opposing your theories? If I look back over the thread, will I find all the theories you've proposed about the war accompanied by a short statement about all the counter-evidence that there is on the matter and how you rejected it?
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Isaac
In what way is that the same as...
Quoting Jabberwock
...? The first gives two choices, the second asserts that there's only one.
Quoting Jabberwock
So your measure of intelligence is the degree to which people agree with you? Sling a load of facts together which seem to you to reach a particular conclusion and then if other people see it, they must be intelligent too. If they don't, then the only option is that they must not be very intelligent. After all, it couldn't possibly be because you're wrong, could it now? It couldn't possibly be that the way things seem to you to be is not necessarily the way things actually are?
Yes, that is why I took a lot of time to point them out - I carefully examined each charge of fallacy and explained why it might and why it might not apply to my arguments (to which you implied I should not do that because it was supposed to be a joke). You have just asserted that your cherry picking does not constitute fallacy, without explaining why it would not. That is the difference.
Quoting Isaac
No, you do not ask for clarity, you dismiss terms based on their supposed lack of clarity. You argue about tyranny and then refuse to argue about tyranny, shifting the goalposts several more times in the process.
Quoting Isaac
I have talked extensively about the only piece of evidence presented by you and I am ready to talk about any other you would be willing to present (but you are not willing). You refuse to talk about evidence presented by me. That is the difference.
Quoting Isaac
Given that you explicitly reject the second choice (i.e. continuing the war), then you are committed to the first one, which is, I remind you:
Quoting Isaac
Later you added that the preferred method should be peaceful protests.
That is NOT the same as: 'leave them there and allow their HFI to improve a bit'. The latter does not entail the former and does not increase its probability. Therefore the argument 'freeing the whole of Russia by peaceful protests is likely, because it is possible to improve country's HFI several decimal points in ten years' fails, because there is no direct causal link between the two, which I have demonstrated by showing that Russia's HFI increased exactly as the conflict in Ukraine deepened. Improving the HFI (even if likely, which your evidence does not show, because it can move both ways) does nothing to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. Yet we had to spend a week discussing it.
Quoting Isaac
No, if I was wrong, it would be pointed out to me that the facts have no relation to my argument, just like I did with the HFI above. But sure, if you want it spelled out point by point, we can do that. It will take some time though.
I believe that having a tight state control over protests, social gathering and social organization in general has a negative effect on probability of regime overthrow by peaceful protests, because all budding protests are dispersed immediately, often brutally, and their leaders are quickly taken out by the unfair judicial process, so the protests cannot gain momentum. Do you disagree?
[sup]— Edith M Lederer · AP · Jul 27, 2023[/sup]
Speaking of angry: Jul 25, 2023.
Isolated Putin tries to shore up African support as Kremlin seethes over poor summit turnout
[sup]— Radina Gigova, Anna Chernova, Sophie Tanno, Nimi Princewill · CNN · Jul 27, 2023[/sup]
Didn't go all that well the last time either: Jun 18, 2023.
Accumulating "alternate world" type stuff? (Jul 11, 2023, Jun 16, 2023, Mar 4, 2023)
Putin woos African leaders at a summit in Russia with promises of expanding trade and other ties
[sup]— Vladimir Isachenkov, Cara Anna · AP · Jul 28, 2023[/sup]
Happy about free grain. Need more.
That you think it acceptable practice to just throw out accusations without any basis given and then expect them to stand unless sufficiently rebutted is not something I'd be particularly advertising, if I were in your shoes, but...
My use of the HFI is not cherry-picking because, as I have pointed out, the decision about which factors to include and which to weigh is a political one, not a scientific one. There's no 'right' answer, there's no rational calculation we can apply to determine which are the 'right' data points to pick and which ought to have what weight. We make a political choice as to what kind of thing we think constitutes human freedom. Cherry-picking does not apply to making political choices about value judgements, it applies to the selection of a subset of data from a wider pool of data of the same type. It applies to picking a subset from a wider set which ought to be included, not from a wider set for which there are reasons for exclusion.
If I were to pick temperature records (as your article uses) from a wider pool of temperature records, that would be cherry-picking seeing as my decision to correlate temperature already implies that any measure of temperature ought be included. If I, on the other hand, decide to use income-equality as a measure of development rather than GDP, that is not cherry-picking, it is making a value judgement as to what best indicates 'development'.
That said, I should not have to rebut a claim that is made without basis. It is reasonable to expect that if such a claim is made, it is accompanied by an explanation of how it applies first. Hence my sarcastic response (which you unfortunately took seriously - I though the self-defeating reference to argument form authority at the end would have made it obvious, but...)
Quoting Jabberwock
Then what is...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
... all of which are requests for clarity, none of which you've answered.
The point of all this is that your application of rational deductive practices to these historical, political and social facts is inappropriate, they are not data points on a graph to which we can apply some statistical analyses. Trust me, I've spent 20 years in research in social science, it can't be done.
Quoting Jabberwock
That wasn't the accusation though was it? It's not about 'willingness' You accused me of not engaging with the counter-evidence on the basis that I hadn't spoken about it. Have you spoken about the counter-evidence to all your theories here? No. So your accusation is unfounded. We do not typically present all the counter-evidence for our theories, we support them, and expect others to counter them.
I've supported my theory about Russian-occupied Donbas's ability to achieve Ukraine-like levels of freedom within eight years, using an index which I believe shows that.
You've countered by presenting other indices which use other measures of freedom and place different weightings on those which crossover.
I disagree with the weightings and choices those other indices have made. My disagreement is a political one, I don't think they focus on the measures of freedom that are important. That's a value judgement, and making it is neither cherry-picking, nor 'ignoring' counter-evidence.
Quoting Jabberwock
I am. Which is very much not the same as declaring it to be a requirement. Thinking that we ought to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner is not the same as declaring it to be a requirement that we go to the Italian restaurant for dinner.
Quoting Jabberwock
Who said it would? Again, you're 're-framing' the argument. The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). The counter to that is usually that it would cause more harm than good. I countered that by pointing to the relative harms in occupied Crimea and the possibilities of reaching Ukraine-like levels of freedom in Russia-occupied Donbas over that period by means other than invading it. I didn't think it was that complicated an argument, but it's clearly been caught up in the "every argument that's not 'MORE WAR!' must be wrong" trope that seems to apply to the Ukraine situation.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, I don't disagree. There's a difference between a negative effect and a sufficient negative effect. Political oppression is not the only factor to consider. To dispute the case (that Ukraine-like levels of freedom are possible to achieve in eight years), you need to show why you believe that these negative factors are sufficient to make that unlikely, not merely that they work in that direction.
That's why I've used indices. They take multiple factors into account, which means that we don't have to rely on untestable predictions about how strong the effect of one or two factors might be.
I have described very specifically why your support is inappropriate and have quoted the Wikipedia article only after you have shown that you simply do not understand what the issue is about. So 'the basis' was given several times and in detail.
Quoting Isaac
There is nothing political about including several indices as opposed to one. Especially given the single one given is an outlier.
Quoting Isaac
It is cherry picking because you have selected an outlier indicator that does not reflect too well the actual issue relevant to the discussion. You have switch talk about changing regime (which is specifically required for the improvement of the situation, as you have yourself admitted) to talk about nebulous freedoms and insisted that improvement in the latter somehow impact the probability of the former.
Quoting Isaac
But it is you who reduced in the discussion complex political and social processes to a single HFI index and argued that it is sufficient to support your very specific argument about probability of peaceful regime change in Russia. The conclusions you draw from the possibility (not probability) of HFI do not impact that probability.
Quoting Isaac
No, i have accussed you of not engaging with counterevidence I have spoken about.
Quoting Isaac
People in Crimea reaching higher HFI did not stop Putin from starting the other war, therefore it is not unreasonable to conclude that leaving people in Donbas to reach higher HFI will not stop Putin from starting another war for Kharkiv, Odessa or Kiev itself. Thus proposing a solution that somewhat possibly (NOT LIKELY, POSSIBLY) improves freedoms in Donbas has absolutely no impact on the resolution of the conflict itself. If you are content with a solution that does absolutely nothing to resolve the conflict, so be it, but then it means (given your alternative) that the only other option to actually end the conflict is war, as you have failed to propose a peaceful path for resolving the conflict.
Quoting Isaac
If we have two choices: to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner or starve, and we reject starving, then there is no other option but to go to the Italian restaurant.
Quoting Isaac
So your solution is to cede territory and hope that the conflict MIGHT end. Putin was peacefully given Crimea and it did not stop the conflict, on the contrary, he made new demands. Why think ceding Donbas would be different?
You said it was cherry-picking and fleeced a quote from Wikipedia. That's not 'describing specifically'.
Quoting Jabberwock
You haven't 'included' several indices any more than I have. You've decided that you agree with the weightings in one and disagree with those in another.
Quoting Jabberwock
It isn't, and repeatedly saying it is is an argument from assertion (seeing as you're so keen on your fallacies). There are only two indices in the world which make a claim to cover human freedom as a whole (rather than specific elements like economy, press, or democracy). Those are Freedom House and Cato. That does not make Cato's an 'outlier'.
Quoting Jabberwock
Then you should have no trouble quoting my doing so.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, you could quote me doing so if that we're the case.
Quoting Jabberwock
Correct. It may surprise you to hear this, but it, takes more than one single factor to stop war. I suspect that's why I've never made such a ridiculous claim as that improvement on the HFI prevents war.
Quoting Jabberwock
And I've asked you what 'engaging' would constitute in, but since you refuse to answer I can't see how I can defend that particular accusation.
Quoting Jabberwock
I mean... Just read that again and if it still makes any kind of sense on a second read, I don't know if I can help...
"If a strategy I advocate doesn't prevent the conflict, then that proves the only thing that will is war"? Seriously?
Quoting Jabberwock
Negotiations. Compromise.
Quoting Jabberwock
So? What has that bizarre invented counterfactual have to do with your claim that I claimed any course of action was a requirement?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, in part. As I've said, your incredulity isn't an argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. It clearly takes more than just ceding territory.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"?
No, I have explained for many posts before that relying on a single datapoint out of many is incorrect. I have talked about it over and over. You did not reject it, but were seemingly unaware what the problem is. I brought in the Wikipedia article as it explains in detail what the problem exactly is about. Have you read it?
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I did:
Quoting Jabberwock
They all show that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not nearly as comparable as HFI would have us believe. Note that I further discussed them in the context of your proposed peaceful regime change (which you seemingly no longer advocate for), not your later, different argument about 'freedoms in Donbas'.
Quoting Isaac
The whole issue with the argument seems to be that you switched from 'we have two options, peaceful regime change in the WHOLE OF RUSSIA and war' to 'freedom in Donbass can improve'. I do not contest tthe latter, I just point out that it has little to do with the causes of war, which your proposed course of action was supposed to avoid.
Do you still believe these (i.e. peaceful regime change in Russia and war) are the two alternatives we have? Do you believe they are exclusive and exhaustive? Because now you are arguing something different.
Quoting Isaac
I have already responded: it would require to discuss it and reexamine your argument in view of it, just like i did with your evidence.
Quoting Isaac
No, it does not prove it, it just means that the strategy you advocate likely does not prevent the war, just delays it. That is, the strategy you advocate likely leads to war, just sometime later and with several negative consequences. What good is it then?
Quoting Isaac
That is a method toward solution, not a solution. It tells me nothing about how the conflict would be resolved.
Quoting Isaac
If you write 'there are two options', you typically mean that the options are reasonably exhaustive and exclusive. If there are more options to avoid the war, why not mention them?
Quoting Isaac
And your credulity is not an argument either, as we still have no reason to think that this course of events is likely. On the other hand, we have a strong reason - i.e. previous Putin's conduct - to believe it is unlikely. That means that your proposed solution is not likely to resolve the conflict, i.e. it would likely just delay the war and not prevent it, while still bringing about negative consequences (i.e. oppression of Ukrainians, strenghening Putin's positions, etc.).
Quoting Isaac
You wrote specifically:
Quoting Isaac
So that is what I go by. If your proposed solution to end the conflict involves other factors, it would be better to include them in the means of ending the conflict.
So, again, what is your proposed solution to resolve the conflict?
Quoting Isaac
Sorry, I missed this one: again this evidence was used to argue that a peaceful regime change in Russia is likely, which was your argument (once), not to dispute that it is possible to improve HFI a few decimal points.
And I've explained how it isn't always the case, which is how we have a discussion because you're not the fucking teacher, and though this will blow your mind, it is actually possible that you're wrong.
Quoting Jabberwock
I cited from the fucking article in the last post. What did you think I'd done? Lucky guess?
As to your 'other indices'...
Quoting Jabberwock
Is a measure of democracy, not freedom. I've clearly explained, even citing an expert in Eastern European economics why the two were not comparable. You ignored that.
Quoting Jabberwock
Is even more specific, hardly covering freedom and certainly having nothing to do with regime change which you claimed to believe was the argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
Is Cato's own index anyway, and for a year that we're not even discussing. And Cato's index from a different year is not a source conflicting Cato's index from the year in question.
Quoting Jabberwock
Is again specifically about democratic institutions and is again, from a year we're not even discussing.
Leaving us with...
Quoting Jabberwock
... from the wrong year.
My argument is that Ukraine moved, in the last eight years, in terms of freedom from tyranny (as defined by the dictionary definition I gave before), the same distance as it would take to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now.
You've provided a load of indices from years that I'm not even talking about using measures that I'm not even talking about and claimed they disprove the claim.
Quoting Jabberwock
They don't. They are from the wrong years and focus on highly specific sets of data except one (the Freedom in the World - except it's still from the wrong year).
Quoting Jabberwock
Then provide me with the quotes where I have made such claims. I'm not going to argue for claims you'd like me to have made. I will defend claims I've actually made.
Quoting Jabberwock
And what evidence do you have that I haven't done so, other than the fact that I still don't agree?
Quoting Jabberwock
Nonsense. Just because a strategy doesn't address the mechanism by which conflict is ended it doesn't mean it leads to war. And besides, we're comparing it to your strategy which actually is war, so what does it not ending war have to do with any meaningful comparison. Your strategy doesn't end war, nor prevent future wars either.
Quoting Jabberwock
Neither does "keep chucking arms at it".
Quoting Jabberwock
Read what I've written. The full context was...
Quoting Isaac
I've bolded the relevant context to assist your reading comprehension.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's not a reason, it's throwing a loose and undefined general comment at it in lieu of any real argument.
Quoting Jabberwock
Except that you skipped over the words 'negotiaion, and...' to create a ridiculous straw man.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, if it was my argument, you could quote me arguing it.
You have literally went from:
Quoting Isaac
to:
Because that is how you have decided to define authoritarianism/tyranny based on the HFI index. The problem is that authoritarianism as it is usually meant:
Quoting Wikipedia
is at the center of the issue here - the political system in Russia both fuels the Russian imperialism and depends on it. Thus, free Ukraine is a dangerous threat to it which is one of the causes of the conflict.
On the other hand, 'authoritarianism' as you define it now, i.e. the range of specific HFI values, has very little to do with that issue, as you can have a nice HFI in Crimea and still attack your neighbors, because your regime is authoritarian in the first sense. So yes, if you frame the argument in terms of general freedom indices, you might not be cherry-picking, however, your argument stops being relevant to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine.
Quoting Isaac
The obvious issue is that your current interpretation of 'tyranny' has very little to do with the causes and resolutions of the actual conflict in Ukraine. So sure, Russia could improve HFI by a few points in a few years, the issue is that it might still be very eager to attack Ukraine because of its authoritarian regime. How can we know it? Because Russia actually did improve a few points in HFI before it attacked Ukraine. So yes, I completely concede the argument that Russia can improve its HFI index in a few years, the issue is that it might have no bearing whatsoever on the war in Ukraine, its causes and ways to stop it.
Quoting Isaac
You give the quote yourself down below.
Quoting Isaac
So on my strategy war is certain, on yours likely. Mine has the advantage of accepting the war on more advantageous terms, yours does not (because it involves ceding territories, which can be used as a staging ground for future wars, exactly as Crimea and Donbas were used).
Quoting Isaac
Are you saying that wars do not resolve conflicts? Do you want a list again?
Quoting Isaac
Yes, with the context there are still two options listed. Do you believe those are the only two possible or the two most possible options?
Quoting Isaac
So the fact that Putin has already attacked Ukraine and annexed its territory, then threatened it with a war and started it does not give us any indication to what his possible decisions might be? Do you believe human behavior is completely unpredictable?
Quoting Isaac
OK, so your argument is 'negotiate and cede Donbas and then the conflict might end'. I am afraid you must be a bit more specific before the chances of that happening might be assessed.
So, again, what is your proposed peaceful solution to the conflict in Ukraine?
I'm not defining it any differently. Read the quotes I provided earlier, they explain how the "strong central power" your Wikipedia article names need not be a government. The World Bank, the IMF, Black Rock... these all act as "strong central powers" which is why economic freedom is equally important when considering freedom from authoritarianism.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. You can be defeated in a land war and still attack your neighbours. Being able to attack neighbours is not a factor which differentiates our two approaches.
As Samuel Charap recently pointed out in Foreign Affairs...
Pushing Russia back does not end war, it changes the location of the front line.
Quoting Jabberwock
I disagree. As above, if one is merely moving a front line then it is of crucial importance to the advisability of that strategy that one can be sure of making improvements to the lives of those on your side of that line which are commensurate with the cost to them of that action.
As such measuring of the likely improvement is of paramount relevance to the strategy choice.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia is staging ground for future wars. In this current war, forces entered from Russia and Belarus. They did not need Crimea.
Notwithstanding that, the whole argument I'm making is that ceding territories is not that much of a disadvantage. Ukraine was no picnic before the war, especially in Donbas. Ukrainian national pride might be damaged by ceding territory, but I don't give a fuck about Ukrainian national pride.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, I'm saying wars don't avoid war.
Are you saying negotiations don't resolve conflicts?
Quoting Jabberwock
What these...
Quoting Isaac
...? Yes. I'd say either leave them there or don't leave them there pretty much exhausts the options.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, you keep dialing back from 'most likely', or 'likely' to just 'any indication' (the Motte-and-bailey fallacy - for your collection). Yes, Putin's past decisions give us information about his future ones. No, citing a single past decision is not sufficient to support an argument that a future one is likely. Not without acknowledging and ruling out competing factors.
Quoting Jabberwock
Personally I think negotiations over independence for Donbas and an unallied Ukraine might have done it last year.
Now I think the best we can hope for is an armistice based on the current front line, some assurances of Ukraine's security (perhaps from Europe), maybe reparation payments from Russia, lifting of sanctions, perhaps trade deals to assist Ukraine in lost output from Russian occupied territory...
Then, meantime, focusing on building Russia into something better so that it's less likely to break the armistice over time.
What's yours?
This redefinition has even less to do with the conflict in Ukraine.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, if the war is short and indecisive. Then the conflict will still not be resolved.
Quoting Isaac
Destroying Russian's potential to wage war prevents it from further attacks for a longer time. If Russia is too weak to attack again, then Ukraine may join NATO which will prevent Russia's attack for much longer. The conflict is still unresolved, but Russia is unable to resolve it militarily.
Quoting Isaac
However, this is not about moving a front line, but joining by Ukraine the economic and military community which will put it outside of Russia's reach for a long time. This, incidentally, would also bring about significant increase in its HFI.
Quoting Isaac
That is absurdly false. Taking the southern coast would not be possible, if Ukrainians held Crimea and Donbas.
Quoting Isaac
But this is still irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict.
Quoting Isaac
You do not understand the difference between 'conflict' and 'war'? Because it is pretty crucial to thte discussion.
And no, I am not saying negotiations do not resolve conflicts, they do. However, they do not seem to work that well in this particular conflict.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, if you omit part of your own quote, then that exhausts the options. The issue is that just 'leaving them there', unlike 'leaving them there and causing a regime change', does not resolve anything, and in particular, it does not stop the war.
Quoting Isaac
It was not a single decision even in my quote, in reality there were even more such decisions. So yes, unless the competing factors are given, it should be treated as likely. So I am waiting for the competing factors. What are they?
Quoting Isaac
That is it? Your personal opinion in lieu of any real argument? Let me think, how the argument might go: 'Putin promised he will not hurt Ukraine, but then he did. Ukraine (and the West) gave him what he wanted, then he promised again he will not hurt Ukraine. But then he did again. And then he threatened Ukraine again... But if he is given all the new things he NOW wants, then he will leave Ukraine in peace'. Is that your reasoning? I must remind you that you believe that free and prosperous Ukraine is seen by Putin as a mortal threat, which giving him Donbas and NATO promise would not alleviate in any way. That is, Putin would have Donbas and Ukraine's (promised) neutrality and one of the sources of the conflict, i.e. the mortal threat, would still be there. Why exactly Putin would stop at this particular point? Let us see the factors.
Quoting Isaac
Lol. Assurances of Ukraine's security from Europe? How about that: Western countries agree to defend Ukraine if it is attacked and call it 'Article 5'? That would not be a threat at all, unlike NATO? As Bennett said, such 'guarantees' are not worth much. Not to mention that free and prosperous Ukraine would still be a problem for Putin? Why would he not seek to resolve it militarily?
Quoting Isaac
I have described it above: decreasing Russia's military potential to the degree where it is no longer capable of preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO and EU, which is the only 'assurance' it can get. Hopefully this results in Ukraine getting back its lands, but it is far from certain.
Quoting Isaac
Having the conflict and the killing halt somehow obviously would be a good thing. And it's now obvious that Russia doesn't have the ability to destroy the Ukrainian military, hence some kind of settlement between both sides has to be reached by both sides. Yet this depends on the military situation. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely a political settlement of a war depends on the military situation on the ground.
And let's remember that in the first month of the war the stalemate of the current wasn't at all so obvious. The Russian southern forces (the famous "Z") had made and were making significant gains and things around Kyiv and other places didn't look yet so bad as the battle of Kyiv was still going on. And we know that the Ukrainian leadership didn't falter then and Zelenskyi didn't fly away from Ukraine. In these kind of situation it's difficult to see the reasons just why a settled peace would have been possible.
Quoting Isaac
Please give a reference to this or the source. What does neutral Donbas mean? Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in what kind of state towards Russia and Ukraine?
And do notice that both Republics are now part of Russia and Russia has annexed even more oblasts from Ukraine. I would think that anybody declaring that there was a chance for a political settlement of the war after one month of fighting in this war likely wants to shine his own image (as likely the person saying this would be linked to the negotiations).
The real possible interlocutor would be China in this case, but it doesn't feel the urge to commit everything to find a solution.
If the term "coup" is too much, then use the word mutiny. Yet I'm not so convinced about the disbandment of the Wagner group as you are. Just yesterday Prigozhin met a representative from the Central African Republic in St. Petersbugh at the Russia-Africa summit. Wagner provides the regime of CAR crucial support and has I think gold mines there, which brings a lot of income to Prigozhin/Wagner.
The mutiny wasn't a fake, those aircraft were shot down and their crew did die. The mutiny happened and this was not some "4D chess" on behalf of Putin.
What happened was basically a revolt of a separate military faction that a weak central leadership could only negotiate with. Having the aspirations of taking prisoner the highest military leadership of the country and even driving to the capital makes some of us use the term "coup attempt" as this goes far beyond of simply not following orders (which itself done by a larger military group is called a mutiny). And the mutineer can now meet crucial people to him at a high level summit. It is as bad as it sounds.
Yeah, that's the thing.
I think of this whole thing as giving the lie to the libertarian (or anarcho-capitalist) worldview that trade and commerce and markets are natural and self-sustaining. They're not. They must be enabled by institutions that keep the peace and enforce property rights. If they are not, some warlord will just take your grain and sell it as his own, or just blockade your ports so you can't sell it, or bomb them into rubble.
In this case, since the warlord wants your land permanently -- your future grain and the ports through which it can be traded -- there's an additional incentive for him to interrupt your trade, because denying you income degrades your ability to fight him off.
You can see a different sort of invasion in Louisiana. There's reason to think the petrochemical industry actually sought out communities that were not only low-tax and pro-business, but with high levels of religiosity and low levels of education. They know what the threats to their business model are and what factors are predictive of a community that will let them do what they want. So Louisiana got some jobs, but nobody told these people they would never again be able to fish or swim in the waters they grew up around, that their land and water would be poisoned forever and their way of life gone, that they would start getting sick. But to this day, Louisianans stand up for the petrochemical companies because they brought jobs.
We are not forced to choose between these two different sorts of warlords; the answer to both is robust government. Government that does not allow force of arms to dictate terms and does not allow private interest to destroy our common inheritance for its own gain. The United States should have been able to stop the exploitation of Louisiana, but it didn't because of regulatory capture. There is no world government to stop Russia just taking Crimea and attempting to take the rest of Ukraine, but even if there were, who's to say it would have? Government failed in Louisiana and might have failed there too.
It's all so depressing, men with power who want more, men with money who want more. The sheer narrowmindedness and shortsightedness of these avatars of destruction is breathtaking. All to rule over a smoking ruin. So long as you have more than anyone else, even if there's almost nothing left.
The irony here is that the thing Mearsheimer got right (in the 1990's) was that Russia would attack Ukraine if Ukraine would give up it's nuclear deterrence. :smirk:
Mearsheimer's real weakness is that he doesn't care about domestic politics at all. He has openly acknowledged this in his talks and really goes on with the focus on his theory. Yet foreign & security policy isn't only a game between the Great Powers where all moves are made to thwart the opposing Great Power. Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine have a lot to do with Putin's own domestic politics and views on just what is (or should) Russia be, irrelevant of there being a NATO or not.
This may be hard for Americans to understand, as their foreign establishment (sometimes called "The Blob") is quite separated from domestic politics and can really engage the World with one focus mind: earlier to fight the Soviet Union and communism during the Cold War and later engage in a War on Terror after 9/11. In that kind of environment (where foreign policy means little to the average citizen) a Mearsheimeresque approach can be how some genuinely approach the World. Yet if the question would be if Texas should be part of the US or not, part of Mexico or should be an independent country, a lot of Americans would have an opinion on that irrelevant of what Mexico or China does.
But anyway, Mearsheimer is picked up as "an alternative" voice and likely has his niché audience in this which gives him speaking opportunities and income. In a way he then comes out as an motivational speaker, just like Peter Zeihan is for a crowd of Americans who want to hear that their country is still the best and others have even larger problems.
I think it's a matter of population density. If it's a few people transporting silk from China to Egypt in 1000 BC, they probably won't meet anybody on the trip. As the density increases, merchants can pay warlords for protection, or in the case of Islam, religion is merchant law and all the merchants have armies. Once the merchant class takes over the world, they can offload the cost of protecting their trade to society in general. So it's never been that societies create governments and that makes trade possible. It's the other way around. Where there is trade, there are roads and communication. Communication gives rise to innovation as good ideas come together. I'm just saying it's a rose with thorns, not just a big thorn, though that might be the way it seems sometimes.
That's a plausible story. I guess I would still say it's an innovation that by and large you no longer need to bring armed guards with you to the marketplace because there are police to take over that role for everyone, buyers and sellers alike. Yes, there's a cost savings there for merchants but protection also for you on your way home with your bag of turnips, which means you can make purchases without fear some big guy will just take it from you. A system of ordered liberty such as this has the potential to benefit everyone, not just the merchants.
The longer Ukraine continue their attempt to regain the lost territories, the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom and is directed by a central power. It's definitionally authoritarianism. So if Ukraine are avoiding Russian authoritarianism, it's extremely relevant that their method could lead to an equal authoritarianism from a different source.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nor will it if the war is long...
A study from the CSIS, using data from 1946 to 2021 found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”
Your notion that there might now be a short decisive war is... what's your term... ahistorical.
But no doubt history now suddenly loses it's relevance. No doubt this war becomes the special case.
Quoting Jabberwock
And how do you propose to do that? Charap again...
From where are you getting this idea that Ukraine could somehow wipe out Russia's military capability?
Quoting Jabberwock
What makes you think Ukraine will be allowed into NATO with the war still simmering? If NATO countries were willing to go to war with Russia, why not now?
Quoting Jabberwock
According to whom? And why is it only the southern coast relevant now?
Quoting Jabberwock
It's highly relevant, as I've explained dozens of times now. War is devastating, it needs to win very high gains to be worth it. Measuring the likely gains is absolutely crucial. It's practically psychopathic to suggest that war is a good option regardless of the gains.
Quoting Jabberwock
It resolves a lot for the people currently being shot at and shelled which will no longer be. It literally stops the war, Ukraine are currently on the offensive. It might not, of course, resolve the conflict, but it will, right now, stop the war.
Quoting Jabberwock
You're seriously assuming that there are no other factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action other than whether Ukraine is free and democratic? If not, then why are you asking me for them? Explain why you've discarded them, your argument is incomplete otherwise.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
I'm not interested in discussing the details of this. The suggestions I've made are those that have been made by experts in the field with far more knowledge and experience than I have, or you. Unlike a truly remarkable number of people here, I don't see myself as qualified to make these kinds of judgements because I don't have sufficient expertise in the area. I choose those theories which seem to best fit my world-view. What I'm interested in here is why you are so certain of your beliefs here that you're so casually willing to assume all other theories are nonsense, to be laughed off. It just makes you look stupid, I can't think why so many seem to think it a good play.
Quoting Jabberwock
Lol! That's it! How's that gonna work? Ukraine gonna take all of Russia's nuclear warheads! Ha! What a stupid idea! Rotfl!
Let us check then the one sufficient indicator of human freedom there is: the Human Freedom Index. How those poor Eastern European countries opressed by the IMF (which practically financed their transition) and the free market practices of the EU are faring? Hmm, strange: Poland 7.66 (with the top 8.30), Estonia 8.73, Lithuania 8.34, Czech Republic 8.33. You will not believe it, but the HFI says they are much less authoritanian than Russia!
Quoting Isaac
I did not say it will be short and decisive.
Quoting Isaac
I did not say 'wipe out', I said: lower to disable its potential to attack Ukraine. Rocket attacks on the cities are nasty, but they have little to no military significance. They might hinder formal acceptance into NATO, but they will not be able to stop Ukraine's militarization and informal integration.
Quoting Isaac
While the war is simmering, it will not be formally accepted, it will just be armed and informally integrated, like Sweden. There will be no security guarantees, just military assistance. The point is that Russia must be too weak to stop it.
Quoting Isaac
The gain is over 2.00 HFI increase on the average for the future Ukraine in NATO and EU. That should trump all, right?
Quoting Isaac
That is not 'just leaving them there', that already assumes successful negotiation of ceasefire with Putin on unknown terms. And not resolving the conflict at this point leaves him with enough potential to start trouble again soon.
Quoting Isaac
No, I assume that there are exactly as many factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action that would prevent it as there are factors that would convince him to do it. You are not discarding JUST the latter, are you? So, as the ungiven factors even themselves out, we are left with the given factors, which say he would likely attack.
Quoting Isaac
I am not assuming your theory is nonsense, I am just pointing out it is unsupported by you. If you are not interested in discussing support for your theory, why are you interested in discussing it at all?
Quoting Isaac
Yes, of course, exactly like Latvia did, when it joined NATO. Why ask?
So sorry to hear that. Hope you're recovered now.
Quoting ssu
Agreed. Neither side can win this and negotiation is inevitable. Ukraine must weigh any gains it might make at the negotiating table from it's military position against the losses that obtaining that position might entail. The US and Europe must do the same regarding their support, but with the additional concern of the losses in their economies and wider humanitarian concerns.
Quoting ssu
Difficult may be, but as I said...
Quoting Isaac
... so any difficulty is on our part understanding the factors those experts took into account, not a judgement of the likelihood. My guess there would be considering a different theory about Putin's motives, the way in which Putin interprets a satisfactory 'sphere of influence' will determine what negotiation positions people think might have proven sufficient.
Of course we can bemoan that he ever obtained that much leverage, but that ship's sailed now.
Quoting ssu
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-end-ukraine-war-four-conditions-1685492
Quoting ssu
I'm not sure what that's supposed to indicate. Russia were offering a deal they thought they might be an opening to getting stuff they wanted. It wasn't a shopping list.
Quoting ssu
Yes, China's involvement I think would be incredibly useful.
Yeah. I think this is what gets in the way of people accepting Mearsheimer-like realism, they've been fed the bullshit of self-regulation such that it seems impossible to find ourselves in a situation where we might have to do what one of the warlords says because he's got more guns. there's a sense that there simply must be some balancing side of the equation, some internal motivating set of factors which prevent this kind of thing. But there isn't. Russia has enough weapons to threaten absolute devastation if they don't get what they want, and there's nothing we can do about that foundational position. The US is the most free-market country there is yet it commits to more wars than any other nation on earth. Far from politics by other means, war is business by other means. It's just another tool which will be reached for by businesses competing in the open market for profit. The moment it is more profitable to lobby for war, that is what they will do. In Russia, the businesses are, of course, directly in charge of government so there's no need to even lobby.
International policing would be an ideal, but at the moment, it could only be an agreement between governments and the power of the industry lobbies would ensure any such thing were entirely toothless.
The thing with government (strong or otherwise) is that it too is just a tool. It's an amalgamation of power which means it can get jobs done that individuals couldn't do, but what matters is who's wielding it. Here, of course, we have two choices; the most powerful, or the most numerous. The first group have default control (kings, landowners, corporations), for the second group to have any say requires that they speak in collectives, which requires solidarity, which requires organising.
The final nail in the coffin of any hope we had of 'the people' wielding that power was the almost complete buyout of the press and campaign groups. Without any organising capability, people are just people, shaking our fists at the sky.
Have any of their countries had their infrastructure wiped out and over a hundred billion debt racked up by war? No. Even the IMF can only lend people the money they ask for. It cannot create debt out of thin air. That's why war is so popular, it makes a good load of debt.
Quoting Jabberwock
Right. So if no peace deal is reached, history tells us the war will drag on for decades. So remind me again how that helps the people of Ukraine? Remind me how decades of war gets them any more freedom, any more 'sovereignty'. Just your wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will run out of artillery first?
Quoting Jabberwock
On what basis? The economy is already tanking https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-drags-europes-economy-succumbs-crisis-2022-08-23/. What grounds do you have for believing this level of militarisation can be sustained for another ten years?
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, on what grounds? This is just pie in the sky wishful thinking at the moment. How is the west going to sustain this level of militarisation for decades when it can't even keep out of recession after just two years?
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. Again, history shows that strong ceasefire negotiations work https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/virginia-page-fortna-peace-time-ceasefire-agreements-and-the-durability-of-peace-princeton-university-press-5500-hbk-isbn-0691115117-1895-pbk-isbn-0691115125/7EA4C90743959B060B9C319E6F9C6EAD
It also shows, as above, that continued war doesn't.
Quoting Jabberwock
What exactly?
Quoting Jabberwock
Because I'm darkly fascinated by this new trend for absolute certainty in the mainstream opinion. Ukraine, Covid, ... both shared this odd feature that even though solidly qualified experts in the respective fields disagreed, the lay populace were utterly convinced that only one side were right and the other were little short of murderers. I'm exploring that.
Link didn't work, but I guess I found what four terms were talked about.
Well, if then Mr Peskov as the spokesperson indicated that Ukraine should acknowledge Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, now those two "independent" states have joined Russia and are an "integral" part of Russia. And not only these two are now officially part of Russia, but also Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasta. Hence my argument that the situation had changed quite much from what Peskov had suggested.
That's what it means.
And then is the really big issue of what actually the demilitarization of Ukraine would have meant in reality and in what situation this would have put Ukraine. Because it's quite a stretch to think with Ukraine demilitarized Russia would leave things there.
Just like the Baltic States, Soviet Union didn't demand annexation right from the start, it only demanded military bases and got them in September - October 1939 from the Baltic States. Only in June 1940 Stalin gave ultimatums to the Baltic States and annexed the countries in August 1940.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not so optimistic for this to happen. China will win little with it: perhaps by being an active diplomat in the war, this would work to normalize the relations with European countries and China as the action obviously would warm the now cool relations. But the US wouldn't budge.
And likely China doesn't want to be viewed in Russia (or by Putin) as giving a "Dolchstoss", stab in the back, at Russia in it's moment of danger. The only thing actually that China has done is that it has declared it won't tolerate the use of nuclear weapons. At least that's positive.
Absolutely. It's got way worse. What was on the table at the time was fairly mild in the circumstances - knowing the West weren't going to seriously commit to Ukraine's defense at the outset. It's like the police always say to mugging victims "just give them your handbag, it's not worth your life". It doesn't somehow become less sensible advice at different scales. International legal action is the way to deal with criminal acts of invasion, not utterly devastating your country to somehow 'teach them a lesson'.
A good deal was scuppered and that's on the heads of all involved. Now the choice is decades of war or an armistice which is definitely going to leave all Russian-occupied territory as it is. At least for the foreseeable future.
Quoting ssu
Yes, let's hope that carries some weight.
Russian investigators call children as witnesses against their mother accused of discrediting army
[sup]— AP · Jul 29, 2023[/sup]
For that matter, is there a law against discussing/criticizing those war censorship laws?
Presumably they can't be used to enforce themselves.
Quoting unenlightened
There are a few marginally better/worse in terms of democracy and transparency. Someone like Yashin might well give democracy a chance. Putin has consolidated a number of power positions, making such moves challenging, though.
The Economist has a "City liveability index"; Kyiv dropped close to the bottom in Mar 2023:
There seems to be a recognizable geographical distribution:
Quoting Isaac
Have you tried climate? Abortion? ... ? Some here considered little short of potential genociders? :gasp:
(hm "absolute certainty", more rhetoramble?)
The Ukraine war isn't quite as amenable to scientific inquiry anyway.
Climate is less interesting because experts don't really disagree. Sure one or two obviously paid off ones might take their 20 pieces from the oil companies, but no one is in much doubt about their motives.
Abortion does seem to be genuinely split (two sides at each other's throats) but over what they agree are value judgments - women's right vs sanctity of life (proto-life). Not really an issue in which there is any agreed expertise.
Covid and Ukraine are different. Experts with no vested interests and no clear ulterior motives, genuinely disagree as to the appropriate strategy with (seemingly) the same broad objectives in mind - general humanitarian goods.
Yet one side wants to claim possession of the absolute truth and accuse the other of being something beyond merely being wrong; usually lying, or spreading 'disinformation', or being uninformed, even (we've had it right here) in the pay of Russia... for both issues, wierdly.
It's like right at the beginning of the Covid stuff, Facebook censored the British Medical Journal (one of the top medical journals in the world)... For disinformation! How did we get to a place where Facebook are seen to have access to a Truth about medicine that the British Medical Journal apparently don't? Anyway... Off topic. That's where my interest is.
That's a nice analogy, so what's wrong with it?
Lack of international law.
The US don't even recognise the jurisdiction of the very court it's popular press are in such a lather about Putin having violated.
They're now sending cluster bombs, to much popular cheering, internationally banned in most countries.
The invasion of Iraq, Kosovo, Libya... All verging on war crimes.
I won't go on, I'm sure you know all this, though others seem to perilously short memories.
Basically, we need an international law that is, well, international. That means it constrains the US and Europe too. Then the sanctions of that law need to be something we can realistically put in place without committing the very crime we're punishing (most countries have banned capital punishment for a reason).
But that too is stymied because those sanctions would be financial and no one wants to create systems which are robust enough to do that (the quick buck, non robust ones simply earn more).
Quoting Isaac
After the communism Eastern European countries were in a rather poor state, with rather poor infrastructures, inefficient, seriously outdated industry, etc. Then they were in significant debt from the IMF (with significant part of it relieved) and they had 'imposed' pecuniary free market restrictions. It did not limit their freedom, their freedom (i.e. HFI) soared.
Quoting Isaac
Well, at least we see Russia is running out of artillery, although slowly. What you propose is wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will leave Ukraine alone if we give them more and more, even though it has no reason to do so.
Quoting Isaac
It needs to be sustained at the level higher than Russia, which hurts economically much more.
Quoting Isaac
It does not, as noted above.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, I have already said that strong ceasefire negotiations work. What is required for that, however, is some sort of conflict resolution. That is why I have asked how exactly negotiations at this point would resolve the conflict. You cannot answer that question.
Quoting Isaac
You cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would prevent Putin from starting the war. If that is so, I can cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would push Putin to war.
Quoting Isaac
Good luck. Just do not expect that an argument that you are unwilling to support will get any serious consideration.
Certainly. What I had in mind before talking about government.
But I was also thinking about the other side.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not sure "teaching them a lesson" is the only other possible goal in refusing. I think there are times when people acknowledge that you might be able to take what you want from them, but you're going to have to take it, they're not going to give it to you just on the threat that you'll take it.
Think of the inquisition or other uses of torture. Of course resistance is irrational, on a first reading, but so is altruism. For torture to be efficient as a means of controlling a population, it has to be used sparingly. You don't want to have to torture everyone individually to secure compliance. So if a population could sustain a strategy of not complying, they raise the cost of control for the would-be boss, and that's rational, even if you can't be sure you're raising the cost enough to deter him.
It did. It just did so less than the relief from communist dictatorship improved it.
Quoting Jabberwock
What dataset are you using, the HFI started in 2013 with data going back from their previous methodology to 2008. The countries you're mentioning were last under communist rule in the late 20th century?
Quoting Jabberwock
Not to any meaningful extent. what matters is their ability to replenish, and as the historical data I've presented shows, that ability is usually sufficient to maintain war for decades. That Russia will be the exception for some reason is wishful thinking.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not wild and unsubstantiated. I've provided you with the evidence of armistices working.
Notwithstanding that, your two suggestions here make no sense together. If Russia are going to run out of artillery first, then they must know that. If they know that, then they know they're going to lose, therefore they have good reason to accept terms.
You can't have it both ways. Ukraine can't have an excellent chance of winning a war, depleting Russia's armoury to almost redundancy, and threatening Putin's grip on power... and also claim Russia has no reason at all to accept terms. Either continued war is an existential risk for Russia or it isn't.
Quoting Jabberwock
It doesn't.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-inflation-024-first-nine-days-2023-2023-01-11/
https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russian-consumer-inflation-drops-below-4-target-first-time-year-2023-04-12/
https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/01/europe-inflation-rate-takes-positive-turn-dropping-to-61
Where are you getting your figures from?
Quoting Jabberwock
Ceasefires are conflict resolution. Read the paper.
Quoting Jabberwock
I'm not the one suggesting your opinion is nonsense, remember? I think your opinion is perfectly valid. I'm defending the claim that mine isn't.
Quoting Jabberwock
Serious consideration isn't a priority, nor would I expect it on the basis of argument (been there).
Yeah. That, I expect, is why the police don't offer the same advice to threat of rape, for example. Some things are not worth a struggle, but others are.
It's why I think it's so important to have a realistic idea of what Ukraine and Russia are like comparatively, and why the media effort is so strong to erase Ukraine's less rosy aspects. Life for the people in Donbas and Crimea was no picnic before the Russian invasion and the fair share of the cause was Ukraine's. It's reflected in the Amnesty reports in the region, and it's reflected in the split in the population when polled, or when voting.
One of the things I think is mistaken here (quite unpleasantly so) is that the horror of war, particularly war with Russia, is contrasted with sovereignty, and those two are not opposites. Ukraine's sovereignty is like the handbag. It's not worth fighting for (not with the absolute human devastation of war). It's just a flag.
Ukrainian's freedom... that might be worth sacrificing a generation for, that's not just a handbag. But fighting for freedom is not a matter of changing borders, it's a matter of changing systems, and even then not just exchanging one form of exploitation for another.
It's that process that I'm trying to separate out from the act of war. War, even at its best and most noble, is nowadays merely pushing tyranny around the globe, penning it in here and there. It's not actually dealing with it. Dealing with it requires a populace to have more power than the authority exploiting them. That doesn't need war, it needs solidarity.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Absolutely. Exactly what I'm talking about here. Given the state of affairs in East Ukraine prior to the invasion, swapping leaders isn't going to make an awful lot of difference - it's why I gave the example of Crimea, which did exactly that - we can read what difference it made. Not much. What will make a lot of difference is the kind of resistance you're talking about. That can be against a corrupt and pecuniary Ukrainian government, or against a corrupt and repressive Russian one.
And I'm not, in that, suggesting those two states of affairs are equal. I'm suggesting they're not 100,000 dead soldier's worth of different.
So in fact their freedom increased?
Quoting Isaac
And now their HFI is quite high, much higher than Russia's. Thus is it reasonable to assume that if Ukraine stopped being 'just like Russia', as you claim it is now, and was more like them, HFI of its citizens would significantly improve.
Quoting Isaac
It would be sufficient to maintain a simmering conflict, as you wrote, not for a full-scale war effort which it is taking now.
Quoting Isaac
Armistice is cessation of hostilities. In itself it does nothing to resolve any conflict. It is usually a precondition to a peaceful conflict resolution, but it is not a conflict resolution in itself.
Quoting Isaac
That is why I did not write that Russia is 'going to lose' and I also did not write that 'Ukraine has an excellent chance of winning the war', as I have ackhowledged that the hostilities might simmer for a long time. The conflict would be resolved by getting Russia to a point when Ukraine will be able to integrate with the West without Russia preventing it.
Quoting Isaac
Without addressing all the particular reasons for why this is not likely in this particular case, it is still wild and unsubstantiated. We had Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, so there are no reasons to think Minsk 3 (or whatever you call it) would fare any better.
Quoting Isaac
You do realize that Russia is an authoritarian country, therefore its statistics might not be completely truthful, to put it mildly? You know that Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, so it is not entirely transparent, right? That is why its official inflation figure might not be completely trustworthy and it might be reasonable to turn e.g. to basket-based indices, such as Romir. Hanke from Hopkins gives an even higher rate, but it is clearly an outlier, so it should be treated as such. There are several such indicators, I think they average at about 25%, I will gather some more. Interestingly, even CBR reports that the perceived inflation is ten points higher than the official one.
The point is that the actual inflation rate in Russia is rather difficult to estimate. It certainly is not reasonable to treat the official indicator as a sufficient single indicator of Russia's economy (why am I feeling deja vu?).
Still, there are a few indicators that Russia cannot hide or fake, like trade deficit, or exports income, because they need to mirror the data of other countries. For example, before the war half of Russia's budgetary income was premium from the exports of natural resources. Now Russia's resource exports value fell by over one third, so Russia's budget deficit achieved the projected yearly value in three months - it will be rather difficult make up for that... Russia's official current account dropped drastically, even if we assume it has not been 'prettified'. Also the ruble exchange rate defense is not going too well, Nabullina pretty much said that it cannot continue forever.
In general, getting even an approximate view of Russian economy is not easy. However, if you take many indicators into consideration (I can provide more), it does not look too well.
Quoting Isaac
No, they are not. They might be a precondition to a conflict resolution, but they in themselves do not resolve anything.
Quoting Isaac
I do not suggest that your opinion is nonsense, only that it is unsupported. You have not provided any support for the view that it is ilkely that Putin would refrain from hostilities. Citing assumed unknown factors is not support. I did provide support for the view that it is unlikely.
Quoting Isaac
OK, so we have no reason to think that the conflict resolution in Ukraine by peaceful methods would be likely.
But the police themselves confront. overwhelm and arrest muggers, and do risk their lives. Otherwise they would have no authority to give any advice. And even the police do not advise giving up your home, your children and your neighbours to the muggers. On the contrary, they ask people to come forward and help them.
I must say I find the consequentialist moral argument completely opaque. We cannot know the consequences of our acts in advance, nor the counterfactual consequences of alternative acts with hindsight. Gandhi suggested that Hitler could have been stopped by non-violent means but even he admitted it would have been difficult and costly.
[quote=Jesus]But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. [/quote]Matthew 5:39.
The policy of non-resistance has the highest authority:— but expect to get crucified.
[quote=Jesus]If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me.[/quote]Matthew 16:24.
It would have been nice for the Western leadership to figure this out before investing trillions into Chinese high end production facilities and granting them trillions in technology transfers.
Fo example, China told Boeing and Airbus that they'd have to do technology transfers in order to have access to the cheap Chinese labor market. And what do you know? China's aviation industry has since grown by leaps and bounds and they now have a parastatial competitor airliner production firm coming out, while the J-15 shows a marked improvement on the Su-33, the J-10 shows an upgrade over older block F-16s/the abandoned Lavi, and China is now the second country producing fifth generation stealth fighters and has its own version of the B-21, the H-20 due out. Funny how that synergy between private incentives to chase higher profit margins despite being oligopolies already and an authoritarian regime building up its military power works out...
On the bright side, we're not alone. I have Egyptians tell me they think "made in China," is probably stamped on the bottom of the Pyramids by now.
This view is arguably true for autocracies where one person is able to weld a tremendous amount of decision power. But when it comes to things like the American oil market the problem is in some ways worse. The structures in place counter any one person's attempt to make reforms. A CEO or board president who attempts socially minded reforms will just see themselves replaced. Any one company that attempts to reform will simply lose market share, and others will exploit the opportunities they do not.
I think there has long been two problems in economics. The first is to think that markets are magical. That the "invisible hand," is something unique to economics, not simply a good description of complex dynamical systems that have feedback loops and equilibrium points. This has led to a fear of regulation based on the fear that it will "kill the magic," when in fact the same sort of argument against intervention from complexity would apply equally well to medicine or ecosystems.
The other problem is a faliure to see that the invisible hand supersedes the decision-making of individuals and may cause as many negative outcomes as positive ones. Individual leadership is replaced by a group mind. However, this group mind is not highly evolved at the outset. It isn't self-conscious and reflective, it's more a "lizard brain," driven to pick up new traits by selection pressures, grinding its way towards survival goals.
This is why removing "bad people," and putting "good people," in doesn't fix systemic issues in more complex organizations. The organization's have their own priorities and are adapted to their own survival. And, if you think group minds are a metaphysically dodgy concept, you can always just take it as a metaphor.
The state is so important because it is (one of) the most evolved systems out there, but even moreso because its survival needs line up with those of its citizens in the way a corporations' won't. A state will tend to evolve systems that promote the welfare of its citizens for the same reason that bodies will tend to evolve capacities that meet the needs of their cells (although this doesn't stop things like cancer from existing in particular instances).
That's sort of the dynamical systems take on what Hegel lays out in the Philosophy of Right, and I think it's a very good insight in the big picture, even if his details end up wrong.
Yes.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, that's right. Russian HFI is low, so not being like Russia raise the HFI. I don't think that's in dispute. You've not provided the data you were using for your claims that their HFI soared.
Quoting Jabberwock
So?
Quoting Jabberwock
Right. But how? You've not provided a mechanism. How does Ukraine get Russia to a point where is will give up all the territory it has gained, but somehow not run into exactly the same supply problems Russia faces? And all this without racking up so massive a debt that it will never get it's sovereignty back? And at no point provoking Russia into using nuclear weapons? And all this somehow without Russia realising that capability (otherwise Russia would have good reason to negotiate now)?
Quoting Jabberwock
What reasons? Do you think all armistices only came on the back of serious of amazingly successful previous agreements? Minsk agreements were crap, so we do better. It's not a difficult concept to get your head around. There's loads of expert opinion online about why the Mins agreements failed, if you're interested. As there is on why negotiations might succeed. It's really daft to try and learn this stuff from me. Look it up, you have the internet.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia's balance of trade https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/balance-of-trade
The US's https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia exports (rising) https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports
US exports (falling) https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/exports
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia current account https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/current-account
US current account https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account
Quoting Jabberwock
The Ruble https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/currency
The Dollar https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/currency
Quoting Jabberwock
...and the equivalent rate for the US/Europe would be...? Of course, you don't have one because the aim is simply to give an alarming rate fo Russia and leave it there.
Russia Core Consumer Prices https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/core-consumer-prices
US Core Consumer Prices https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/core-consumer-prices
Yes. We engineer the system so that the police (backed up by the army if necessary) have the greater power. They have guns, we don't.
That's why an assessment of the power balance is important. Pluck isn't sufficient.
Quoting unenlightened
Yes (as I mentioned to Srap above).
That's why an assessment of what is at stake is so important. Comparing Donbas under Ukraine to Crimea under Russia, the answer seems to be not much.
Quoting unenlightened
Fair enough. So the alternative is...?
Quoting unenlightened
It seems as if there's an epidemic of imagination loss going around. Is open war the only alternative to non-resistance?
If course not. I think the whole world should bow down to the majesty of the US military due to the realization that nonviolent resistance is key.
No, there is passive resistance and underground resistance, and argument and demonstrative protest, and a thousand variations thereof, from labour strike to hunger strike and from assassination attempt to the whole repertoire of terrorism. Who's for a march on Moscow?
When they were communist states, they were more like Russia, so when they stopped, their HFI would increase (if it was assessed then).
Quoting Isaac
I think it is quite possible that Russia will not give up all the territories it has gained and Ukraine will not be able to get them back. As I said, the main point is depleting Russia's potential to the point when it is no longer capable of threatening Ukraine.
And why would Putin use nuclear weapons? Free Ukraine might be a mortal threat in the future, using nukes would end his regime definitely and rather quickly.
Quoting Isaac
Well, obviously the concept is difficult enough to get your head around that so far you have given no indication HOW are we supposed to 'do better'. And you are making the claim, so I am asking you to support it. 'Read the Internet' is a rather poor way of discussing things. Again, if you are not interested in the discussion, why maintain it?
Russia trade to GDP ratio for 2021 - 52.17%
US trade to GDP ratio - 23.12%
Lol. Month to month, yes. Click year to year, or compare 2021 with the first half of 2023.
Again, the U.S. does not depend as heavily on trade
Quoting Isaac
Yes, dollar has somewhat weakened, while ruble weakened much more compared to the dollar. That is, ruble has weakened even more than shown on the chart.
Quoting Isaac
There are several PPP indices for Europe and US (e.g. OECD), they use somewhat different methodology, so the results are scattered. OECD does not do Russia, however, as it stopped revealing its data. Maybe it was doing so well that it did not want to embarass other countries.
Besides, as Holy Guru Mearsheimer spoke, in the international arena anarchy reigns: “It simply means that there is no centralized authority, no night watchman or ultimate arbiter, that stands above states and protects them.” So states have to protect themselves against bullies.
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/regional-global-powers-decry-nigers-coup-countrys-future-101846403
Quoting Isaac
I share your gut-level disbelief in borders -- though I'm sure your disbelief is better grounded -- but I suspect this skepticism is a luxury. The sovereignty of my nation is not in question. For some, achieving sovereignty is the necessary first step to securing freedom.
Here's one thing about your position that puzzles me: you argue that war is the worst option because of the loss of life and destruction it entails, and military defeat plus political resistance is a better option. Let's grant that. Why do you also think there's little to choose between being under Putin's boot and the IMF? Surely there's more room to maneuver against an enemy that puts you in debt than one that assassinates or imprisons you.
Louisiana wasn't bombed into submission. Corporate assassination is exceptionally rare. (Karen Silkwood?) There may have been actual corruption among regulators and inspectors, I don't know, but often even that is unnecessary. It would have been difficult to organize against the petrochemical industry or to hold government's feet to the fire, perhaps as difficult as organizing against Putin, but no one would be risking their life or their freedom by speaking at a meeting or going to a rally. With the right resources and effective oversight from the federal level, Louisiana might have gotten the jobs without the cancer and environmental destruction. The key would be for other communities to make the same demands, else the jobs will just go there instead. (Although geography is leverage and ports matter; this whole war is about ports.)
Something unites all those things that sets them apart from war;
1) they kill fewer people.
2) they make less profit.
3) the mainstream left have decided that (1) and (2) are suddenly irrelevant compared to war uniquely in the case of Ukraine.
'Cos it's always the previous war that was wrong, never the current one.
Yes. That's just saying the same thing I said. Communism isn't good for the HFI score. How does that relate to a comparison of modern Russia (not communist) and modern Ukraine (not a Baltic State). And why are we speculating on these unavailable data sources when we have available ones with which to make the comparison?
Quoting Jabberwock
So it's 'leave them there' in both scenarios then. All that talk of sovereignty and freedom was a waste, you're expecting ten more years of occupation anyway.
So the debate is around how best to neutralise the Russian threat. Political instability and isolation, negotiations, agreements... Or use up all their bombs by cunningly giving them Ukrainian hospitals to fire at until they run out...
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, I can't think why you'd be asking me. If you think the people concerned about the risk of nuclear escalation are wrong then I suggest you take it up with them. If you don't, then why on earth are you asking me as if there wasn't a good set of reasons?
This notion that a bunch of laymen can somehow 'thrash out' the data and come up with answers that have defied the people whose job it is to do exactly that is absolutely dumbfounding.
Quoting Jabberwock
You're not asking me to support it, if you wanted support you would have read the relevant expert opinion already.
You're using mock astonishment as a rhetorical device to imply that there isn't any support, despite knowing full well there is. I'm not playing that game.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
...are certainly all other measures of economic stability. Now...where did I put that article about cherry-picking...
Certainly, and I didn't mean to suggest otherwise. But that observation will strike American libertarian conservatives as being at odds with this:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
They see the state as an institution bent on preserving and increasing its own power.
The state does have power, and corporations are mindful of this fact, hence their continual efforts to capture the state. This is @Isaac's "it's just a tool" view.
But I would say the state is one sector of the entire political system, and fights over the use of state power don't end once the votes in elections are counted, but continue within government. So I see government as, in part, a battlefield, where interests vie with one another, and even though money wields tremendous influence in these contests, it is not the source of the power in play and cannot completely control the process. Even Amazon gets sued. Even Microsoft gets regulated. There is always a chance of government rising to the occasion, if pushed hard enough the right way.
Absolutely. Faith in a solution and realism about one are two different matters. In some respects I think that makes the West's response here even worse. We can realistically expect Ukrainians to feel the need to establish sovereignty, if they have none. It's because we have the luxury of scepticism that we ought to be providing cooler-headed council.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Mainly because of the data I have available for comparison. I'm using OHCHR data and Amnesty International reports relating to Donbas and Crimea; and the HFI from Cato Institute. They don't seem to show an awful lot of difference between Ukrainian governance and Russian occupation. There is a difference, no doubt about it, but it's not Norway vs Sudan, it's more Nigeria vs Ethiopia. So the first issue is the scale of the improvement to people's lives if Ukraine wins back sovereignty, I just don't think it'll be that substantial, not enough to justify the cost.
Secondly, I'm looking at countries like Greece which have suffered greatly under the ECB rules, and places like Latvia which have suffered from pecuniary IMF and global reconstruction efforts. Ukraine will be in this position already, even deeper the more it commits to a war it can't afford.
You're right that none of this economic pressure amounts to direct threats to life, but life expectancy reduction due to poverty kills more people than any authoritarian regime could ever muster. It might be hard to fight the police. It's even harder to fight heart disease.
Russia has not offered UN World Food Programme free grain
[sup]— Michelle Nichols, Doina Chiacu, Leslie Adler · Reuters · Jul 28, 2023[/sup]
Russian missile attacks leave few options for Ukrainian farmers looking to export grain
[sup]— Hanna Arhirova, Volodymyr Yurchuk, Courtney Bonnell · AP · Jul 30, 2023[/sup]
(FYI, Agroprosperis' homepage is in Ukrainian; there's a bit of information on wikipedia and elsewhere)
As if on cue, the Kremlin unveiled naval expansion St Petersburg.
Regress. :/ The Kremlin is increasingly hard to excuse here.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
We have lots more to go by (Putin's Russia itself, Chechnya, Georgia, trajectories and moves, regress and improvement), but I guess this stuff has already come up a few times in the thread. The Ukrainians (and the UN) said "No". The Kremlin might well have worsened life for Russians (at large), except, perhaps, for the Putinistas.
Kim Jong Un delivers an ultimatum to South Korea (including via whatever representatives): we'll be taking over the Gyeonggi and Gangwon provinces and everything north thereof, as per the map you received. In case of any non-compliance, we start nuking. Non-negotiable.
[sup](The exact areas somewhat arbitrarily chosen. Surely an example of insanity at the helm, however unrealistic the scenario may be. There are some 50 million people in South Korea, a fifth of them in Seoul.)[/sup]
What to do?
1. Quick, pre-emptive strike.
2. Everyone on full readiness, anti-air systems, everything, pronto.
3. Broadcast surrender. Border guards (and others) stand down.
4. Don't do anything. Perhaps hope it's an organized hoax.
Quoting Kang Sun Nam (via The Hill · Jul 20, 2023)
I'll go with 2. Maybe I should have made it into a poll. Nah.
Okay, that is roughly where I thought you were.
People think driving is safer than flying, simply because they give too much weight to their perception of control, or at least to the chance of having control. (I can at least try to avoid a collision, but if my plane is going down I just sit there doing nothing until I die.)
Maybe there's a similar mistake here: under an authoritarian regime, you have no freedom, no opportunity to control your fate; if you're poor but free, at least there's a chance you can do something. People do across the board refuse to believe that great, impersonal, historical forces affect them, so they reject the idea that poverty would be as deadly for them as a bullet.
Yeah, I think that's it. That plus...narratives. We understand the story of being oppressed directly because we can relate (we think we can), we've all been told to do stuff we don't want to do, we've all been to school.
For myself, and most people I've spoken to who've been to the poorest nations (which isn't many) we just don't know how to come to terms with the absolute poverty there. I don't know if you've ever been to some of the poorest countries, but it's just truly shocking in a way that we don't seem to have stories for. The Ukrainians fighting the bad guys to win back their freedom is just so much easier to come to terms with (even for the Ukrainians I suspect) than the 7 million people that die every year because we don't have stringent enough air pollution laws.
Anti-natalism fulfils the first two better than any other policy.
But I think perhaps one might better distinguish first violent from non-violent, and individual from national responses.
That's quite good. I think my point was actually a little garbled, but another way to say it might be that we have a prejudice in favor of situations where we perceive ourselves as free to act, or, better, that we filter out predictions that we interpret as curtailing our freedom to act. Such situations are just unacceptable.
--- I'm struggling with getting this right because you could imagine this realizing as a preference for political oppression over poverty -- at least you can fight the bastards but how do you fight being hungry. So it is a matter of narrative, that if the story begins "Suppose you have no freedom," that one's automatically binned. (The most appalling gulf war anthem, "Proud to be an American" or whatever it's called features the peculiar line "Where at least I know I'm free." At least? Seems like a lot of injustice is being allowed in by that little "at least".)
Maybe you're right that we prefer the one we think we understand to the one we're clueless about.
But I still think there's some prejudice for perceived agency, and maybe it's just that people think "poverty doesn't take my freedom" because they don't understand it.
If you want to convince someone that flying is safer than driving, one of the things you will have to say is, "Yes, you will take action, but your actions will not save you, your actions may in fact be what kills you." That's a tough sell. Action is our whole thing.
This was the problem with COVID lockdown orders, telling people that the best thing they could do was do nothing, don't go to work, don't go to school, don't shop, don't go to the movies. --- I don't want to relitigate the wisdom or necessity of lockdowns, but the deep resistance some people felt, the revulsion for having their freedom curtailed, was accompanied by this message that they had much less agency than they wanted to believe, that if they went about their regular lives they would get sick and make others sick and it would just happen, not up to you, not a matter of choice.
Because we know current score for Russia, Ukraine and, say, Belarus, and we know current scores for countries which are no longer in Russian sphere of influence. The difference in HFI is rather significant, which might motivate Ukrainians to leave it.
Quoting Isaac
The difference is that at least some of the area might be deoccupied (and some already were), while your 'leaving them' would likely end in occupation of the whole Ukraine (and we have no idea when it might end).
Quoting Isaac
The issue is that non-violent means, negotiations and agreement were already tried and they did not work.
Quoting Isaac
I am asking you, because it is you who mentioned that possibility. And, for the third time, if you do not want to discuss the topic, then I am not sure why you do.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I am asking you support your claims, which is quite reasonable to do. What is astonishing is that you do have that special expert opinion and you refuse to share it. And 'look it up yourself' is exactly the game, as old as the Internet itself.
Quoting Isaac
So you believe trade deficit is equally hurtful for major exporters and minor exporters? You believe month to month is a better indicator of export rise than year to year or 5Y to 5Y? Or are you just embarrased you read the exchange rate chart backwards?
True, but they weren't intended as targets, more measures.
Quoting unenlightened
OK. But level of violence matters right? I mean I'm all in favour of the fact the governments need to be scared of their populace, there needs to at least be a credible threat of violence, but some bottles and bricks usually does the job. There's a very wide gap between a Molotov cocktail and a fleet of Hellfire-laden drones.
Though both are violent, I think the Molotov cocktail is closer to Gandhi than it is to the Hellfire.
As far as individual and national responses, in most cases, a national response is a request (demand in Ukraine's case) for individuals to act. Seeing it otherwise is how wars are sanitised. The national authority moves wooden pieces around on the map. The individual has his leg blown to bloody shreds by a land mine.
Yeah, I think that's right. It's a good way to express it. I think they system is designed to produce actions that minimise surprise, so everything is couched in terms action, that makes stories in which the action is determinate easier to model.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I don't think the two are opposed. We don't really understand lack of agency because it's not something we tend to make narratives for, because our narrative explain, predict and produce action.
But here there's obviously other elements at play. It's not so hard to see how poverty is more of a threat than political oppression, not is it so hard to see how not having enough money to pay for healthcare is as completely out of your control as having a riot policeman block your protest route. It's not intuitive perhaps, it's not our preferred narrative, but it's not out of reach either.
So we're looking for political and social reasons why people are so resistant to the idea in this instance. And when looking for political reasons, it makes sense to start with the group who make most money out of the situation. Here, that's arms traders and the 'reconstruction' industries, much as it was in Iraq.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Ha! feels like that would be a walk in the park now compared to vitriol on this thread.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Yeah, I think that's true. One of the triggers for anxiety disorders is loss of agency (you see a disproportionate amount centred around invisible things like germs, where there's no simple ability to identify the threat and remove it). Part of rejecting agency-less narratives might be a defence mechanism against that. Sometimes I think people with anxiety disorders have just admitted a truth that the rest of us are too scared to admit.
Yes, we already agree that being less Russia-like yields an improvement on the HFI, I'm not sure why you're going down this path at all. No one is confused as to why Ukraine wants to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence.
The discussion is about the price it is worth paying relative to the likely degree of success in that venture. Ukraine will unlikely get as far as the Baltic states because it will have crippling debts which are themselves authoritarian, far more in debt than the Baltic states ever were, they have mega-companies like Black Rock involved now which was simply not an issue in the late 20th century, the power of these multinationals to control policy is exponentially higher than it was then, they're entering a fractured Europe in runaway recession cycles desperate for cheap labour and manufacturing facilities, and they're starting from a position of being a lot more Russia-like in the first place. Add to that a strong right-wing nationalist sentiment, the region's biggest black market in illegal arms recently flooded with untraceable weapons, virtually zero intact infrastructure, and some of the most important exports in the world up for grabs for whoever controls that economy...
Oh, and most of those Baltic states rank higher on the HFI than the US. So we should keep Ukraine out of the US's sphere of influence too, yes?
Quoting Jabberwock
'Might' and 'Likely' are doing all the work there. some area's might be de-occupied, or more areas might be occupied. It might result in the whole of Ukraine being occupied, but might not. all you're expressing is that there's uncertainty. It doesn't support your argument.
As I've said before, these arguments are asymmetric because no one wants war. therefore to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance, to argue for war you have to show there's no reasonable alternative. they don't have an equal burden of proof because war is utterly horrific and we avoid it at all costs, anyone advocating it needs to show that those other options are ruled out. I don't need to show that war wouldn't work to advocate peaceful resolution, because it's what we'd prefer anyway.
Quoting Jabberwock
So never again? That's it for negotiations the world over now? It's just war? Funny how "we tried negotiations" get trotted out in defence of warmongering, but "we tried war" never does.
I've already provided you with the historical assessment. War has not worked. It has not yielded victory in the timescale which is usually decisive.
Quoting Jabberwock
I believe that there exist a wide range of indicators of economic strength, some of which I've cited. there's a reason why sites like tradingeconomics offer those metrics. Russian exports are picking up. that's indicative of a recovery. It was you who mentioned trade deficit. I've cited the figures we actually have that are closest to the measure you said were indicative of Russia's economic state, that's why they're directly underneath quotes from you. those are the measures you picked. If you now want to back track because you don't like the results, then pick some others.
Depends on what part. What, if anything, can/should be done is less clear.
Poland had a substantial debt to the Western countries and then to IMF which was to large extent cancelled and restructured and yet it has much higher HFI than Russia. But if you belive that IMF cripples freddom, could you provide specific data how the IMF impacts the HFI?
Also, your whole thesis was that HFI can turn around just like that in a few years and we do not have to look at the internal factors at all, as shifts in the single chart are sufficient to support that thesis. So your claim was that Ukraine under Russian oppresion could easily increase its HFI in a relatively short period of time. When I have pointed out the internal factors in Russia, such as political oppression, which might prevent that, you simply dismissed them. And now you are saying Ukraine cannot improve its HFI, citing economic oppression AND internal factors, which are suddenly important.
Are you even serious?
Quoting Isaac
So the countries in the US sphere of influence are perfectly capable of reaching HFIs so high that they outperform even the US... How does constitute an argument that Ukraine should not join them? I think you need to work on that argument a bit.
Quoting Isaac
My support is that for the last year Russia has made very minor gains, while Ukraine had major gains. Ukraine has liberated half of the territory that Russia grabbed since 2022.
Quoting Isaac
I completely agree. To argue for peace you have to show there is a reasonable chance for an alternative. The very issue is that you refuse to do so.
Quoting Isaac
No, just crap negotiations are over, which you yourself acknowledge Minsk 1 and 2 were. As you said, we would have to do better. I do not how we are supposed to do that. You know, but will not tell.
Quoting Isaac
On the chart you have provided Russian exports are 'picking up' month to month, which means that they might have a good sale or two in one month (especially if the previous one was rather poor), but it is not indicator of recovery for the longer run. If you look at the 1Y, 5Y or 10Y graph, it always has smaller ups and downs (for every country), which is not indicative of the long-term trend. Yes, I might sound like a teacher now, but it is REALLY basic stuff. So I do like the results, that is why I gave them - they confirm what I wrote. I did not realize someone might have a problem with reading them though.
The fact is that Russian exports are overall lower than before the war and last year. This (and the trade deficit) is very impactful for the country which had 50% of its budget income financed directly from the said exports AND the country which had budget expenses increased by 40% since last year. Comparing that to the US is comparing apples and oranges. But sure, I might be wrong, if you can explain how the country that has apparently income at least 25% lower and expenses 40% higher year to year (or in any reasonable longer period) is doing great, I am all ears. You can also explain how a country that depends on the imports for a significant portion of its war effort can finance increased military spending when its currency is tumbling down. You might also tell me why Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, if it is doing well.
Again, I'm not the best person to learn this from, there are far better resources online, unless you seriously think there isn't even an argument in that respect, then a few online resources aren't going to help.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quite serious yes. The former were historical figures, the net result of which were already included in the summary data, the latter are predictions about future effects, they obviously require consideration of factors.
If you want to bring in estimates for Russian occupied Donbas over the next 10 years, you'll have to explain why you're rejecting the data from Russian occupied Crimea, which provides what would seem to be an almost perfect data set for that prediction.
Quoting Jabberwock
You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing?
I though this thread had reached a peak of US bootlicking sycophancy, but turns out there's whole new levels I hadn't expected.
Quoting Jabberwock
I assume the experts considering the situation have probably taken that into account. But if you think not... I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at [email protected], I suggest you drop him a line and let him know he's missed something. I'm sure he'll be very grateful.
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course I refuse to do it. I also refuse to argue in favour of the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. I refuse to argue for my own pet theory of economics, or some idea I had about how the digestive system of the bat might work... I'm not qualified to do so. I do, however, have preferred experts I turn to, and I'm more than happy to talk about and defend my choices there (something we're all experts on), I'm happy to talk about the ideology that guides those choices, even the epistemological commitments which frame that choice. What I'm not prepared to do is pretend that me pitting what my sources say against you paraphrasing what your sources say is going to actually yield anything other than two shoddy summaries of writing which is freely available in full, unadulterated form online.
Quoting Jabberwock
I've linked the article on the factors which lead to strong armistices. That you didn't read it is not something I'm equipped to help with.
Quoting Jabberwock
And? The 5yr graph shows a small drop to 2018 levels after what was an unprecedented high. The drop id less than that experienced by the US for example late 2020. So where's this economic collapse you're suggesting?
Quoting Jabberwock
As above. They're no lower than 2018 - it's on the chart. You know people can see these charts, right?
Quoting Jabberwock
Gods! Why the fuck would I explain, I'm not an economist. You may consider yourself to be some kind of genius polymath able to wrangle with the greatest in economics, international relations, history, military strategy, and foreign affairs, but I'm afraid you've picked the wrong interlocutor for your Walter Mitty moment. Here's the articles - https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/07/russias-economy-is-back-on-its-feet and https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/23/russias-economy-can-withstand-a-long-war-but-not-a-more-intense-one ... As if you don't know how to use a search engine.
I begin to see a pattern.
Quoting Isaac
No. You have made an argument that it is perfectly possible, if not likely, that occupied Ukraine will be able to increase HFI and you have repeatedly claimed that the HFI variations are absolutely sufficient to make that argument and that any external factors (such as the political situation in Russia) may be promptly dismissed.
Now you are making an argument that post-war Ukraine will NOT be able to increase its HFI, completely disregarding your previous argument and basing that prediction solely on the external factors.
Tu sum up: using just HFI is good, when it supports your argument, but should be disregarded, when it does not. On the other hand, external factors are irrelevant when they do not support your argument and essential when they do. Pretty interesting way of argumentation.
Quoting Isaac
No, I am just pointing out that the US influence does not seem to limit other countries' freedom. On the other hand, those who buy the theory of the U.S. oppression, must admit that Americans' oppression seems to make those countries less oppressed than Americans are themselves. Curious.
Quoting Isaac
No, i think experts considering the situation have taken different factors into account, that is why they have different opinions on the subject. I also assume that the Ukrainian command has taken into consideration even more factors, possibly even those not known to experts, when they started their counteroffensive. They could be wrong in their predictions, of course, but I doubt they were less informed than Charap.
Quoting Isaac
You have no qualms whatsoever criticizing one particular course of action, often describing it as inhumane and gladly taking a position of moral superiority, but when asked about the supposed existing reasonable alternative, you clam up. You are happy to talk about the ideology that guides choices, but only of others. You want to talk about epistemological commitments, but not yours.
Quoting Isaac
I am not fond of creating an account to download a single article, besides the article from 2005 can apply to the current situation only in rather general terms. With those I have already agreed - yes, ceasefires can and do sometimes work. I still do not see what possible terms could be proposed to overcome this particular conflict, and you and your secret experts did nothing to help me.
Quoting Isaac
The trend is downward and all the factors that precipitated it are still in force, so it is reasonable to expect it will maintain that direction.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, and the spending is much higher, by 40%.
Quoting Isaac
No, I am no genius and my levels of understanding of economics, international relations, history, military strategy and foreign affairs are much lower than those of the greatest. However, I am not discussing with them, but with you, and here the proportions seem to be a bit different. And yes, it does seem that your way of shaping beliefs is just googling and running away with the first source you agree with, I just am not sure it is advisable methodology. Especially when the source you did google (i.e. the Economist) says such things about Russian economy:
which you do not seem to agree with. I cannot read the whole article you linked, as it is behind a paywall, but the very title says:
which is about what I was saying... Have you just read half of the title? Maybe google another one?
Probably need a driver's license for those things. :D
"According to Russia's Duma Defense Committee ..."
Vladimir Putin Putting Together Network of Private Armies All Over Russia
[sup]— Veuer via Dailymotion · Jul 31, 2023 · 1m:12s[/sup]
... Hmm.
The recent bombings on the Russian side of the border, including Moscow, seem unlikely to have much direct impact on the war. Though, after a year of bombing destruction killing throughout the Ukrainian side ("Sitting ducks with some repellent"), maybe it shouldn't come as a surprise. They're not using gear supplied directly by NATO members, and are reportedly working with Rheinmetall, Baykar, and others to set up production in Ukraine. Ukraine ? Moscow is a fair distance (say, ? 850 km). Were the drones launched closer by? What were they (e.g. "homemade", snagged Iranian drones, something else)?
Elon Musk refused Ukraine's request for Starlink that would help it attack Russian ships with exploding sea drones, report says
[sup]— Sinéad Baker · Business Insider · Jul 31, 2023[/sup]
Good.
Quoting Jabberwock
They are not external. They are in the HFI measurements.
Quoting Jabberwock
Degree of indebtedness is an external factor, as is predatory contracting by monopolies. Those are not already measured by the HFI, but rather are theorised to be potential causes of those measures.
For example, political arrests is a measure, IMF control might cause a measure to change (or not). One is already measured, the other isn't.
Quoting Jabberwock
All you have is the sum total, it doesn't tell you which factors pushed in which direction, only what the end result of those factors put together was.
Given that the US cannot even achieve a high HFI itself, it's unlikely that US influence was a positive factor.
Given, further, what we know about US's predatory trade, privatisation, and monopolising practices, it's most likely to have be a negative factor, simply overcome by more positive ones (such as the very profitable new trading opportunities opened up by no longer being in the soviet bloc).
Quoting Jabberwock
Really? So you genuinely think Samual Charap, in researching his position for RAND just didn't think of looking to see what gains Ukraine had made when assessing how likely he considered further gains to be. Slipped his mind, perhaps? Again, if you think you've come up with some important factors to consider that he's missed he'd be delighted to hear from you, It's his job, after all, to make accurate predictions about these things. You'd be saving him face.
Quoting Jabberwock
No doubt, but having different political objectives means that a) we've no way of deriving their data from their subsequent actions, and b) they wouldn't tell us the truth unless it suited those objectives to do so.
So as a source for how well Ukraine are likely to do, Ukrainian generals are worse than useless.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's right. We all are equals when it comes to discussing morality, there's no body of expertise to call on, it's a good topic for lay discussion.
Quoting Jabberwock
Exactly. If you seriously think there's no alternative then I can't help you. You can't expect to conduct a conversation on a topic like this one so woefully ill-informed. So read a little around the topic first. Having done that you will have become aware of the alternative opinions. Once aware of them, there's no need for me to point them out, simply say why you don't find their position convincing. Don't let's go through this rhetorical charade first.
If you know what the alternative opinions are, then address them directly. If you don't then I suggest you read more widely before engaging in such a complex topic as this with such strong views as you espouse.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nope, more than happy to answer any questions or challenges regarding my ideology or epistemological commitments. Fire away.
Quoting Jabberwock
The article I provided was a review of the book, I thought you might be able to access that. I'm not a miracle worker, I cannot provide both sources and somehow also give you academic access to them. I'm no fan of the way academic papers restrict viewing access to institutions, but that's the situation we are in. If you can't access the sources I use and don't trust me to summarize them accurately we are at an impasse.
This is the review summary, in lieu of mine...
It's quite clear on the matter. But I'm not going to be drawn into this make-believe notion that this is about weighing the evidence, I already regret the five minutes it took me to find and format those quotes from the PDF, as if evidence was going to have any effect.
Quoting Jabberwock
As it is with both the US and Europe. This is a comparative exercise. But again, if you don't think it's a reasonable conclusion take it up with the experts who conclude it, don't argue with me about it, I didn't work this stuff out myself by pouring over source economic data, why the hell would I when there are experts who are much better informed than I am who do that for me?
-
Quoting Jabberwock
It's the opposite of what you are saying. You said...
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
We agreed that history tells us that wars of this nature are likely to persists for decades (a 'long' war), the kind of war the article says "Russia's economy can withstand". That's why I cited the article.
Your argument was that HFI can move significantly and positively without consideration of any particular factors (as they could be offset by other factors), therefore we are unable to predict whether it will not bounce when Ukraine is occupied by Russia. Do you retract that argument?
Quoting Isaac
The bottom line, however, is that the countries in the US sphere of influence are much less oppressed, according to the HFI, therefore we should expect that Ukraine will also be much less oppressed, when it joints them. There is no point citing debts, trade etc., because they are already included in the HFI. All the negative factors will be overcome by the greater positive factors, also included in the HFI.
Quoting Isaac
I think you have pushed the expectations on conducting the conversation on this topic woefully ill-informed quite significantly.
I must remind you that you wrote that 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'. You did not, on the contrary, you specifically refuse to do so. Saying 'look it up on the Internet' is not 'showing the alternative' under any reasonable interpretation. And given your tendency to drag in any googled random piece of information to support your claims, it would be somewhat odd if you knew the alternative and refused to share it for mysterious reasons. Thus the quite reasonable conclusion is that you do not know any such alternative, which is additionally supported by the fact you have entered this discussion claiming that you do not have to provide it. At least I have managed to change your mind on that, success, yay.
Quoting Isaac
But I agree with your source! Yes, those are quite strong factors to achieve peace. The issue I see is that you have not given any explanation how those factors could be applied in this particular case (and failed to provide sources that do). For example, the first point mentioned is withdrawal beyond the status quo ante. Which of your experts says Russia is likely to peacefully withdraw beyond pre-2014 borders, leaving Crimea, Donbas and all other annexed oblasts which are supposedly now part of Russia according to its constitution?
Quoting Isaac
My experts say that the US is spending 0.50% of its annual budget on military help for Ukraine (0.25% for other help). That exact same amount constitutes 15% of the Russian annual budget. My experts say that it is a greater burden for Russia. Do your experts disagree?
Quoting Isaac
The Economist says Russia will be able to maintain a conflict of much lower intensity and I said that it will be able to maintain a simmering conflict. How is that opposlte?
Quoting Isaac
Yes, and I have already argued that low-intensity (i.e. simmering) conflict will not allow Russia to prevent Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence.
No. It wasn't. Please, if you're going to continue to try this "you argued that..." line of discussion (which frankly I'd rather you didn't), at least use the quote function to dispute what I've actually said, not what you'd like me to have said.
If you don't understand an aspect of my argument, then ask. Ask sarcastically if you like, but simply asserting I said something and then arguing against it isn't a discussion, I might as well not be here you can just do both parts.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not going to 'join them'. The 'them' you're referring to are 'countries recently freed from Soviet restrictions on trade and governance, entering a buoyant European economy with functioning, if underinvested infrastructure and a few billion in debts'. That is not the group Ukraine are proposing to join.
Quoting Jabberwock
That a qualified expert in the field thinks peaceful solutions are possible is an argument in favour of peaceful solutions. It is, in fact, just about the strongest argument possible here, and not one I should even be engaged in among the relatively well informed.
You've stretched out to like ten pages of posts what should have taken half a paragraph. "Yes, its possible that peaceful negotiations might work because clearly some experts consider that to be the case... Here's why I think we shouldn't pursue that option nonetheless..." That's the discussion we should have been having. Not this truly bizarre exchange where you half pretend there's no expert disagreement, then half pretend there is, but your spectacular mental kung fu can work out who's right, if only some complete layman could summarise the argument for you.
Quoting Jabberwock
This despite me citing those sources...?
Quoting Jabberwock
None. That criteria is unlikely to be met. Fortna is not suggesting that every single criteria need be met. Status quo ante bellum solutions are usually cited as plausible in cases of mutually disputed territory, so as Fortna puts it "neither side loses". This is clearly not an option here, but as is clear from the thesis, it's not that all factors need be present.
But again, this paper is cited, by Anatol Lieven at Quincy, if I recall correctly. If you think its inappropriate, then take it up with him. I'm just letting you know what the arguments are, since you asked. If you think you have the grasp and experience in this field to take them down, then you crack on, but I'm not the man you need to be going after.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. I cited what my expert said.
As I've pointed out before, your error appears to be looking at only one side and concluding what is actually a relative account from there.
Quoting Jabberwock
Because your argument is about how Russia's economy will be damaged more than the West's such that it will be unable to keep up the artillery supply that the West could. If you're now saying that Russia's economy will survive a low intensity simmering war, then you have no grounds for your argument that...
Quoting Jabberwock
...as that argument was based on deteriorating Russia's military capability which in turn was based on collapsing it's economy. This is all quite clearly detailed in the thread if you read back a few posts...
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
If, as you now agree, the war is likely to simmer for a long time, and, as you now agree, the Russian economy can quite easily sustain such a war, then on what grounds are you now supporting an argument that continued war will deplete Russia's military capabilities quicker than Ukraine's?
That was your claim:
Quoting Isaac
Additionally, you have flatly refused to consider aspects of the current Russian situation that would counter that claim, arguing that they are irrelevant, because HFI includes everything. Is that correct?
Quoting Isaac
You have claimed that Ukraine was like Russia, because they had similar HFI, specifically refusing to consider their obvious differences, different paths they have taken and their history in general. You have specifically claimed that all you need for your prediction are HFI shifts. In that case, I can ignore the differences between the EE countries and current Ukraine and make the exact same prediction based on the exact same support: the simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where the EE countries are now in the space of sixteen years.
Quoting Isaac
Which qualified expert and what exact solution he proposes? It would not take ten pages if each request for support of your claim (which you admit now you need) was not met by 'I do not have to give you anything but HFI' and 'I know, but I will not tell'.
Quoting Isaac
Your source from 2005 does not contain proposals concerning the situation in 2022 or 2023. I have already agreed that ceasefire based on strong foundations is a great idea. The fact that it is theoretically possible says nothing about how it is applicable to the situation at hand.
But imagine your luck! I did find what Fortna (and other notable experts) think about the current situation! So there you have it, your own source, the renowned expert, on the current situation in Ukraine in the article titled 'The prospects for a negotiated peace in Ukraine are bleak'. So even assuming she still thinks negotiations work, she has many reasons to believe (and she lists them in detail, it is worth a read) why they do not apply to this particular situation.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, but it seems to be pretty important in this case. Most of the other criteria were part of the Minsk accords, which you considered 'crap'. The Fortna's article given above points out exactly the very issues I have mentioned.
Quoting Isaac
The only source I found is this article in which he opposes demilitarization of Crimea and Donbas, saying that it would worsen the situation. But demilitarization is the second of conditions of lasting peace given by Fortna. So it would seem (to a layman) that another strong foundation for a lasting peace would be taken out.
Note also that Lleven here does not give a proposal for a peaceful solution, only warns which solutions should be avoided. The search continues.
Quoting Isaac
Because being capable only of lower intensity effort means that you are not capable of sustaining the current intensity effort? I am not sure how to put it in simpler terms... If Russia will be unable to sustain the current level, then its military capability WILL deteriorate, right? I said nothing about 'collapsing', I said that Russia is in a worse state economically (i.e spends proportionally on the war much more than the West), so it cannot keep up with the current level of spending, with which the Economist agrees.
Given that Ukraine's potential now increases (at the current level of support) and Russia's potential decreases, the gap will widen. It will do so even if the support for the war from the West decreases, as long as it is still higher than what Russia will be able to spend, which is exactly what I wrote.
Quoting Jabberwock
In which it nowhere says anything about...
Quoting Jabberwock
...
Quoting Jabberwock
No. I've just explained that above. I'll just repeat...
Quoting Isaac
...
Quoting Jabberwock
I told you near the beginning of all this...
Quoting Isaac
I've been citing the article for the last four days.
Is there anything not clear enough there?
Quoting Jabberwock
Look up the difference between 'armistice' and 'peace deal'. Fortna is giving reasons why an actual peace deal will be difficult. Charap agrees, but is talking about an armistice.
Either way, "carry on with the war until Russia runs out of bombs" is not on either experts wish list.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes.
Quoting Jabberwock
It doesn't. As Charap points out. And even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s admits that “the war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles. The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”
Quoting Jabberwock
I know what you wrote, but it does not support your argument that war is necessary, I've given reasonable alternative interpretations.
Again, the main thing you're missing here is that war is horrible, no one with a shred of human empathy actually wants war, so to argue for it you must show it is necessary, that no other option will work. To argue for more peaceful solutions I don't have anywhere near the same burden because we prefer them anyway, I only need to show that it is possible, from there it follows that ethically we ought try it.
Simply presenting people who think war will work, or (worse) coming up with your own scenarios in which war might work is not sufficient. We don't want war because it's goddam awful. So "It could work" is woefully inadequate. "It will most likely work" still doesn't cut it. You have to show that routes to peace are actually impossible (or so unlikely as to be not worth trying). If even a single expert in the field thinks it's worth a shot, then it's worth a shot because its the option that doesn't kill tens of thousands of people.
It seems you are still not familiar with how EE economies were restructured ('given away to the West', as some said) after the communism.
Quoting Isaac
Everything is perfectly clear: in your quote Charap does not propose any solution, he just says it is needed. Can you see the difference? Fortna and co. specifically write:
Fortna specifically writes why any accord negotiated at this time would likely not bring enduring peace, so in effect any solution negotiated now would be Minsk 3 (while you agree that Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 were 'crap'). Nothing in your Charap's quote contradicts that.
Quoting Isaac
If Charap does not propose a solution that would end the war and Fortna argues that an enduring peace is not likely, then you still do not 'show there's a reasonable chance'.
Quoting Isaac
It does, it was already discussed that Ukraine has more military hardware (and much better) than it had in the beginning of the war. Soon it will have more modern planes, while Russia is losing them much faster than it can produce them. Does Charap deny that? Can you give the relevant quote?
And yes, Ukraine is using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than the West can produce it, but of course Russia is also using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than Russia (and Iran and North Korea) can produce it. The difference is that the West, due to its much greater economic potential, can ramp up production much more than Russia and its allies. It is happening already, it just takes time. Not to mention that when Stoltenberg made that comment, the decision on the DPICM stocks (about 3 mln pieces) was not yet made.
Quite familiar, but I'm no historian. Perhaps rather than relying on vague attempts at condescending dismissal, you'd actually say what issue you think I've missed.
Quoting Jabberwock
Fine, let's have an equal playing field then. You claim that continued fighting could release some more territory from occupation and deplete Russian stocks of artillery faster than Ukraine's. Which military operations exactly? What formations do you think will be successful and why (and don't give me any formations that have been tried before and ever failed because we know those don't work). What artillery supply deals will be struck? How will places like Germany fend off the rise of the far right whilst maintaining weapons supply? What budgetary mechanisms will the US and Europe put in place to avoid recession (and again, don't give me any that have failed in the past)? What policies will Ukraine put in place to maintain conscription? What economic policies will maintain the next decade of economic stability without any air access or port use?
And to be clear, in answering all of those questions don't ever supply a battle manoeuvre, policy, strategy or approach that's ever failed before because that means it will fail again. When you've provided all that data, backed up by expert testimony that it will work... then you're in a position to accuse the move to ceasefire of lacking in detail.
Quoting Jabberwock
No. And Fortna does not go on to say that another few decades of war will eventually prevent Russia from doing this again either. She's pretty pessimistic about any solution at all. Again, as I said above, if both solutions look bleak, we don't pick war because war is horrible.
Quoting Jabberwock
He does...
Quoting Jabberwock
I already have given the relevant quote. You've asked this before and I supplied Charap's conclusions that the benefits of depleting Russia's capabilities do not outweigh the costs.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's not just about economics, it's about the political ability to keep pouring money into Ukraine at the expense of other calls on that money during an economic recession. Of course if all the countries of the West put all their effort into arming Ukraine, their combined resources would be bigger than Russia's, that goes without saying. The point is that Russia is directly involved in this war and is a ruthless autocracy, so it can pretty much spend as much as it likes on military until it reaches a point of open revolt in the streets. The West are in no such position. The arms lobby are very powerful, but other lobbies are powerful too and they want a slice of the pie, plus they have to keep an electorate happy, and whilst a good media campaign can do that, people are fickle and have short attention spans, the 'Glorious War' will get boring soon and need replacing with another distraction. We've no skin in the game so haven't got the same capability to maintain investment. The troubles Germany are having right now are a good example of this.
It’s in the category “Politics and Current Affairs” and it fits perfectly in it.
If you have more complaints about staff decisions, there’s a category for that too, called “Feedback”.
The issue you missed is that if we are to talk about the IMF and US economic capitalistic oppression, then the transformation of the former EE countries is the prime example of that, so their HFIs must reflect it.
From the strategic level the most reasonable way is to cut off the land bridge to Crimea by splitting the Russian forces somewhere between Melitopol and Mariupol. That operation is underway, conducted by the Operational Command South, which was quite successful in liberating Kherson. The question about 'formations' is rather odd, frankly speaking, because operations are not typically conducted all the time with the same formations, as in order to mantain their battle readiness they must be rotated on a regular basis. The operation met with stronger resistance than expected, therefore Ukrainians (who are more conservative about their troop losses due to the accepted tactics) switched to attrition, which is more successful. The materiel losses of both sides are reported by Oryx, which is considered to be rather objective, as he was widely quoted even by Russians. The reports show that Russians are losing substantial amount of hardware, especially artillery, proportionally more that Ukrainians, which is atypical given that it is Ukraine that is on the offensive. The main reason for that is that Russians cannot have proper rear, given the terrain they have taken is only 100 km wide and completely in range of Ukrainian HIMARS and SCALPs. The problems with Russian supplies in Zaporozhia are widely reported by Russians: dismissed Popov, milbloggers Rybar, WarGonzo or Romanov. Partricular attention should be given to the blog of Andrej 'Murz' Morozov, who is a seasoned veteran of the war since 2014 and who (unlike e.g. Girkin) was not a doomsayer at all, even when he criticized the higher command. Recently he is very pessimistic about the fate of Russian forces in the South, particularly citing supply problems. This indicates that the situation may develop simiarly as in the Kherson oblast, where Russians were unable to support its troops. However, progress made this way is rather slow, so without significant breaks the land bridge is unlikely to be taken this year. However, if the operation is successful, it will enable Ukrainians to control all the land supply routes to Crimea (if they get to the Azov Sea the Kerch Bridge will not be defensible from medium range missiles). This will make Crimean forces quite difficult to maintain, which might prompt another withdrawal.
The details about funding the artillery production in the coming years can be found e.g. here and here.
I do not know what budgetary mechanisms will be applied, I think it is quite likely that they will fail. Politicians are not very good at stopping recession.
The problem with Ukrainian troops is not that it run out of men, but rather that, due its tactics, it must maintain a high quality of troops, not necessarily as numerous. They are not running meat attacks with mobiks, like Russia, so they have lower losses, but each soldier is more precious (as he is better trained and equipped). So it is not so much about conscription numbers but about training and equipping the force, which the West helps with a lot.
Air access in Ukraine is negligible for transportation of goods. Sea transportation will have to be replaced by land transport (mostly railway), which has about half of capacity. The railway network will have to be expanded (it has already gained 470 km of new and renewed tracks last year, despite the war). Poland has pledged significant expansion of its eastern network, which will be connected to its central communication hub. There are talks with Romania, which would strengthen its infrastructure to allow export of Ukrainian goods from its ports. Still, the throughput will be lower than the sea transportation, reaching at best two thirds of its volume (this figure might be incorrect, as I cannot recall the source for it, I will keep looking).
Quoting Isaac
Not really. Throughout the thread I have already provided much more facts and details to support my arguments than you did. The playing field was never even, but not the way you suggest.
The fact remains that you have failed to provide a proposal of a solution that would likely bring lasting peace, which, by your words, you are required to do. The ceasefire proposition does not do that.
Quoting Isaac
Fortna pretty much argues that the war was inevitable in the long run. And it is not because she suddenly turned a blood-thirsty militarist, on the contrary, she still believes that negotiations and peace accords are the best way to achieve lasting peace. She just argues, in great detail, why at this particular point it is very unlikely. But many of those issues apply equally well to the situation before the war - the points she makes concerning Putin's situation pretty much align with what I was saying even before I found that article. Your chosen expert seems to to agree with my points, as painful as it might be for you.
Quoting Isaac
An armistice without a settlement? So hostilities cease, Ukraine seeks Swedish-style informal cooperation with NATO with close integration of forces and of course arms itself to the teeth with the help of its newfound informal allies. It also seeks to join EU, with the democratic and economic improvements that entails. All this means that Ukraine practically and actively leaves the Russian sphere of influence. Can we at least take a guess how willing Putin would be to maintain ceasefire in such case? While doing that, we have to consider arguments of some people that claim that the very prospect of Ukraine in NATO practically pushed Putin to war AND the argument that Putin sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a grave danger.
Quoting Isaac
Your claim was that Ukraine's military potential does not increase, so that quote does not support it.
Quoting Isaac
You seem to be fond of dramatic false alternatives. Maintaining the current level of support costs the US less than one percent of its annual budget and Russia already cannot keep up. So the West does not have to put 'all their effort', in fact, it is enough that it puts a rather modest effort, like it does right now. Most of the hardware that the West has given to Ukraine was either decommissoned or on its way to be replaced, so it is not that the West is losing some previous assets. And no, Russia cannot spend as much as it likes, it can only spend as much as it has, which is not much compared to the West, given its economy is twenty times smaller. When the West dials down the aid, which is to be expected, it will still outspend Russia rather easily.
They're not any more. They may be a prime example of how it worked in the late 90s, but they're not an example of how it works now. They're also, more to the point of the argument, not an example of the sort of 'club' Ukraine is looking to join became unlike Ukraine, they did not have such crippling debts, predatory monopolies like Black Rock, destroyed infrastructure, and huge globally important assets, nor were they entering into a fractured Europe in recession.
Quoting Jabberwock
I wasn't questioning your ability to make stuff up. I was questioning the extent to which any of it can be demonstrated to be a viable solution.
You've not cited a single expert source, just come up with a load of wild speculation. You might as well have said "Ukraine will perform an incantation to summon demons who will fight off the Russians". A load of military acronyms doesn't stand in place of an argument here, which, in this context would be in the form "so-and-so states that...", preferably followed by a citation. Absent of that, we're in the same boat since all we have of specifics with actual expert basis, are the conclusions.
Quoting Jabberwock
Neither article addresses the issues Charap raises, they both just give targets, not the means by which those targets will be met given political opposition. Nor do either of those sources give relative figures showing that the resultant production mentioned will be higher than Russia's.
Quoting Jabberwock
Well then. If they fail, how will the West sustain the expenditure reliant on them?
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, this is un-cited. I have no reason to believe you. Mearsheimer, for example says...
... and here's one of your lauded Ukrainian officials you claimed earlier had their fingers on the pulse quoted in the Washington Post...
Quoting Jabberwock
So who is it claiming any of this will work? Charap said...
...So who is it claiming Charap's conclusion here is nonsense?
Again, if it's not nonsense, if it's just one of the options, then we try peace, because war is horrible, we try it only if we absolutely have to, not on a preponderance of evidence.
Quoting Jabberwock
Indeed you have. As I said, I've no interest in having the absurd discussion you're thinking of. The idea that us throwing our 'data' at each other results in anything other than the exact same positions we both started with is naive beyond reckoning. I'm asking here for something different. I'm asking for expert support for the notion that, for example, Charap's position is actually non-viable. Because if you can't show that, then you have no argument. If a peaceful solution is viable, then we ought try it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nowhere does she say anything even approaching your points. She doesn't argue that Ukraine can win territory back, she doesn't argue that wearing Russia down will solve the problem in the long run, she doesn't argue that Russia are unlikely to improve their measures of freedom.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. Clearly we can. Did you think Charap was joking? Had he temporarily lost his mind? Maybe had too much to drink? Obviously, if an expert in foreign relations thinks it is possible then it is clearly possible. You don't have to agree with him, but you (an unqualified layman) sneering at him (a qualified, experienced and respected strategist) just makes you look stupid.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, my claim is that it cannot increase faster than Russia's
Quoting Jabberwock
Well then it must be the 'modest effort' that is proving hard to sustain mustn't it? Otherwise why would Charap (a fucking expert in these exact questions) say otherwise? It's patently absurd for you to think you can in any way dismiss his conclusion by just guessing how difficult it might be.
Basically, it comes down to this - several experts consider talks, ceasefires, and an end to military offensives is not only a viable, but a necessary strategy. Since that strategy kills fewer people (and results in far less collateral damage) - again, in the view of these same experts, it is a strategy we ought to follow in favour of more destructive ones. To argue against this, you have to show that these experts are not right. You personal opinion doesn't do that.
'Crippling' is rather subjective, but they did have debts, most of which were cancelled by the economic oppressors. Why think with Ukraine it would be different, given its strategic importance for the US? The infrastructure was not 'destroyed' as such, just completely obsolete (if I remember correctly, at some time in the 90s Poland had the most modern telephone infrastructure, as it was completely new - the old one was simply torn down and replaced). Western companies bought post-communist industries in bulk for spare change ('robbery privatization' was the term used). So while the situation was not similar, but certainly analogous. I am surprised you object, given you considered Russia's and Ukraine's situation ten years ago to be very similar, so your standards of similarity seem very broad. Now they have high HFIs, then so will Ukraine, as your argument went.
Quoting Isaac
How about Ben Hodges, ex-commanding general of the US forces in Europe? Is he expert enough for you or Is he also making wild speculations?
https://www.newsweek.com/how-ukraine-retake-crimea-us-general-ben-hodges-russia-counteroffensive-1796264
Does that mean I am alone in the boat now?
Quoting Isaac
You have asked a very specific question:
Quoting Isaac
And you got very specific answer: now you are complaining it does not answer your other unasked questions? How sad.
Quoting Isaac
It will not. Which economies are more likely to fail: those of the West, which carry a relatively small economic burden and are not hindered by dozens of sanctions or the Russian one?
Quoting Isaac
How many times Putin has to attack Ukraine for you to consider that his promises of peace are not actually worth much? Fortna, the fucking expert on negotiations and agreements writes: 'No leader in the world can believe a promise by Russia to stop fighting'.
Quoting Isaac
I have already given you one: Fortna says achieving lasting peace with Putin is non-viable.
Quoting Isaac
I did not say ALL of my points. I just meant those where I have pointed out that negotiating agreement with Putin is unlikely to bring lasting peace.
Quoting Isaac
Charap thinks it is possible, he just has no idea now:
He then suggests mechanisms mentioned by Fortna. The only issue is that Fortna herself gives a very specific argument why those measures will not work in this case. Charap does not address any of the issues she mentions at all.
Quoting Isaac
Your own source (the Economist) claims that Russia's military will decrease.
Quoting Isaac
Your fucking expert writes:
Note 'eventually'. On the other hand Russia is facing 'budgetary challenges' right now.
Quoting Isaac
So far you mentioned one expert, Charap, who proposes opening diplomatic channels for future negotiations, while maintaining fighting and other means of pressure on Russia (he specifically mentions that diplomacy cannot come at the expense of coercion). So yes, possibly once Russia is weakened enough such talks might be started. The issue is that it would undermine Putin's regime, so he is unlikely to enter such agreements. The other issue, mentioned both by Charap and Fortna, is that the means to assure his compliance are very limited.
There's more to the story of course, yet seems to follow an old playbook.
Nyberg writes up some political history:
Russia, Ukraine, and Poland: The End of a Tragic Triangle
[sup]— René Nyberg · Carnegie · Jul 28, 2023[/sup]
(... also check the cr?e?py TASS post above)
Bit of a contrast in terms of Russia here:
Niger coup (reports from Jul 31, 2023): CNN, Forbes (Russian flags)
Georgian protests (reports from Aug 1, 2023): BBC, Business Insider (simmering Kremlin-hate)
Maybe they should get together? :D
Anyway, while going over all this...stuff, I sure hope Putin hasn't had more warring in mind all along.
Hard at work to "recruit" here:
Russia Takes Its Ukraine Information War Into Video Games
[sup]— Steven Lee Myers, Steven Lee Myers · The New York Times · Jul 30, 2023[/sup]
Minecraft and Roblox are being used to spread Russian propaganda to kids
[sup]— Michael Beckwith · Metro News · Jul 31, 2023[/sup]
Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda had made its way into ‘Minecraft’
[sup]— news.com.au · Aug 2, 2023 · 2m:24s[/sup]
I predict it'll work, though to a limited extent.
Today Belarussian choppers violated Polish airspace.
Russia is forcing Ukrainians from occupied Crimea and Donbas to fight in its invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Halya Coynash · Human Rights in Ukraine · Mar 7, 2022[/sup]
Russia turns to Donbas conscripts to fill front lines
[sup]— Polina Ivanova · Financial Times · Jun 11, 2022[/sup]
Russia Pressing Men In Occupied Areas Of Ukraine Into Fight Against Ukrainian Forces
[sup]— RFE/RL · Sep 26, 2022[/sup]
Russia "officially" annexes Donbas on Sep 30, 2022
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
Russia engaged in extensive effort to force Ukrainians in Russian-occupied territories to accept Russian citizenship, report says
[sup]— Jennifer Hansler · CNN · Aug 2, 2023[/sup]
Furthermore, unfortunate people are trapped between Russian and Ukrainian law:
Russia forced them to fight. Ukraine tried them for treason
[sup]— Kateryna Farbar · openDemocracy · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
I'm guessing (conjecture on my part) that Ukraine / Ukrainian law is more amenable to un-trap those people. Ukraine also has an interest in acceptance into organizations that would look favorable on such amendments. Maybe the resident legal experts know something?
By the way, if mercenaries (not a national army) attack Poland in some way, can NATO then identify a nation to hold accountable? I guess so.
Wagner Attack On Poland Will Be Treated As Russian Attack On NATO: US Ambassador To UN
[sup]— Parth Satam · The EurAsian Times · Aug 1, 2023[/sup]
Well, if they were deployed from Belarus (who hasn't exactly kept their presence/status a secret)...
Apart from spying and destabilization and such efforts, it seems unlikely that Belarus (or Russia) would attack Poland.
There seems to be no conceivable motivation to attack Poland. So this must be posturing.
The question is who the addressee of this posturing is. Probably not Poland or the West, this would be a very clumsy attempt at ramping up the war scare.
The domestic russian/ belarus audience? Not sure what that would be intended to communicate, I don't think there's any appetite in either country for widening the conflict.
So the remaining possibility seems to be that this related to the internal politics between Russia and Belarus. Is Lukashenko demonstrating that he is capable of independent foreign policy moves?
I'm comparing Ukraine and Russia in similar global economic and political circumstances (both ten years ago and both now). You're comparing completely different circumstances (the collapse of communism and rise of Europe). The world has changed fundamentally since then, the rise of globalism, the take over of the financial industry, the move from national government control to multinational companies... We're in a different world. And figures from 30 years ago are not necessary. We have modern day examples.
Quoting Jabberwock
You mean the Ben Hodges who held the chair at CEPA, funded by the arms industry? The guy who has, throughout his advisory career advocated a stronger NATO and has politically endorsed Joe Biden? That Ben Hodges?
Funny how when Sachs was mentioned you spent several pages on how unreliable he was as a source because of his political leanings and history of advocacy for a particular policy...
But sure, he'll do.
So where does he say that negative assessments of Ukraine's chances are all nonsense? Because, as seems to be stubbornly difficult to get across, we hate war. We choose war as a last resort, when all.other options are spent. So to support war you have to show all other options are spent. Your experts need to show, not just the.possibility that Ukraine might win, but the near impossibility that they would lose. They need to show, not just the possibility that Ukraine could outgun Russia in the long run, but the near impossibility that they would not...
You're not accepting, not even addressing, the asymmetry here. We don't want war. It's horrific. It needs a very strong argument in favour of it.
We do not go to war on a preponderance of evidence in favour.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia. But Russia will spend as much of it's income as it possibly can on the military first and has a single objective - Ukraine. The West has a million other objectives, and political opponents opposed to spending anything at all on Ukraine. So it will take a collapse for Russia to stop spending, a mere dip into deeper recession will be enough to cause the West to question its commitment.
Comparing the economies alone is ridiculous. As if spending were merely an accounting issue and not a political one.
Quoting Jabberwock
He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on.
Quoting Jabberwock
She doesn't. She's pessimistic about the chances, but that's only relevant to this discussion if she were more optimistic about the chances of a long war bringing about peace and she isn't.
To use Fortna to support your argument you'd have to select out her opinion on negotiations and ignore her opinion on war.
Quoting Jabberwock
Exactly. But we can agree on the low chances of negotiation succeeding. Where we disagree is that war has a higher chance (and enough higher to justify the massive costs). Fortna is equally pessimistic on that matter.
Quoting Jabberwock
And? Is Ukraine going to store up all the weapons it gets and not use them then?
Quoting Jabberwock
You're reaching. If your argument hangs on the use of 'eventually' you're really clutching at straws. What matters is not the terminology, it's the conclusion. Charap concludes that winning a long war is not likely enough to justify the cost, so whatever he meant, it must lead to that conclusion. If what he meant was that the West would run into problems way down the line, but Russia would do so first, then it wouldn't lead to the conclusion he reached would it? So that cannot be what he meant. It's really the bare minimum of charitable interpretation to assume the reasons back the conclusion.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, that's not what Charap is suggesting. He's suggesting such talks right now. Not 'once Russia is weakened enough. His argument is the exact opposite, that waiting for Russia to be more weakened is not worth the cost.
Who is the "we" here? Are you talking about what conditions for support the US or EU population might find acceptable?
Quoting Isaac
Three times. He attacked Crimea in early 2014. Then in late 2014 regular russian forces crossed the border and attacked AFU formations in the Donbas as they were about to mop up the separatists there.
Russia has repeatedly attacked across the border into Donbas whenever the situation of the separatists seemed endangered, so we could run the tally higher if we wanted to.
It's difficult to disagree with the broad strokes of the analysis, but it's also not at all clear to me what one is supposed to take away from that.
Anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of the strategic situation realises that neither side can achieve a decisive victory that would enable them to dictate peace terms.
Which obviously means that the parties involved need to continuously evaluate how they could end the conflict. I'm sure this is already happening all the time, though obviously behind closed doors.
But again this is merely the basic understanding of the situation. It does not include any actionable suggestions. It doesn't even really offer any useful framework to develop such a plan.
The crux of the issue is not that people don't want to negotiate. The crux is that both sides have vital interests in play which they are unable to align, and thus the outcome is continued fighting. As a rule, humans are willing to accept a lot of suffering to defend their interests. Pointing out the suffering won't help.
You have given no examples how those factors affect HFI. As we have seen, there are factors which barely change the indicator (like rising authoritarian rule in Russia), so we cannot predict whether what you write will do. The fact is that the very countries that had very similar problems that you mention now have stellar HFIs.
Quoting Isaac
You mean he is biased? Of course he is. Does that mean that he makes wild speculations? Rather unlikely, it would be rather damaging to his reputation if he made military predictions completely divorced from reality.
Quoting Isaac
No, we choose war when other options are unlikely to bring lasting peace and bear negative consequences. You yourself called Minsk accords 'crap'. But that was the exact option you advocate for: bad, but supposedly meant to bring peace. That was the best non-war option all could come up with. Was it a good one? Did it have positive consequences? Did bring lasting peace?
Also, which of your experts you mentioned said that all options must be spent, no matter how likely or with what consequences? Charap writes about the US policy at the beginning of the war:
so definitely he does not advise the approach of 'no war no matter the cost'. He also, as I have already mentioned, advises to maintain the military pressure on Russia to make it more likely to enter negotiations, which includes the counteroffensive, even it is not absolutely certain it will succeed (on the contrary, he admits that the result is pretty much unpredictable, yet he still supports it, unlike you).
Fortna specifically writes that negotations are very unlikely to bring about the expected results, so she is not for 'spending all the options' either.
Quoting Isaac
For Russia it will not take collapse to limit the spending, as has been already pointed out in your own source (a dramatic false alternative again). In the West it is very likely that the spending will be limited as well, as I have already acknowledged. Comparing the economies is important to show the scale - even if the West cuts its assistance by half, it will still be a significant burden on Russia which it will be unlikely to meet. Spending as much of its income as it possibly can will still not be enough. And politics in Russia should not be disregarded either, given that it already had a coup attempt. It is not that Putin can completely ignore domestic dissent.
Quoting Isaac
He took Crimea in 2014, the forces he supported broke the Minsk accords in 2015, he started a full-scale hostilities in 2022. Are you considering this as a single attack?
Quoting Isaac
She writes that achieving lasting peace with Putin through negotiations is very unlikely, which is the very thing you propose. How is it irrelevant to the discussion?
Quoting Isaac
Ukrainians want to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Russia (and Putin in particular) are willing to use force to stop them. That is the underlying conflict here. For that reason negotiations will not bring lasting peace, because Putin will never agree to that. The only way to resolve the conflict is to facilitate that transition the best that we can. It is regrettable that it must be done in the conditions of war, but as Fortna points out, Putin would not have it any other way.
Quoting Isaac
No, it will use them, but their depletion rate is lower than the acquisition rate at this point. Of course, the deliveries will eventually stop, as the West does not have unlimited supply of surplus hardware, but most of it has not even been delivered (e.g. Ukraine got about 20% of promised tanks).
Quoting Isaac
Charap concludes that a decisive victory is not likely and that the conflict will last for a long time. We have also discussed that the conflict will lose its intensity (the West will be willing to dial down the assistance, Russia will be forced to limit its spending), so there will be a long, low-intensity conflict. That is what all cited experts agree on.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, he suggests that the diplomatic channel should be opened now. But he is saying that it should be done in parallel with supplementing the counteroffensive, which is the opposite of what you suggest:
He clearly advocates helping Kyiv with the counteroffensive and the 'push on the battlefield'. That would mean that we should supply Kyiv with as much military hardware, ammunition and other resources as we can to improve its negotiating position, right?
Odd, that's the second time in the last few days someone has picked me up on that particular usage, perhaps an American vs English thing? Using 'we' this way is just the same as saying 'one' only slightly less formal - it's just a generic 'everybody'. I'm making an ethical claim. Read it as 'one ought...' Did your mother never say "we don't drop litter", or somesuch?
Quoting Echarmion
We could. The context was in the breaking of peace agreements, so support for separatists didn't seem to fit. The conclusion is the same either way. If the fact that a nation has previous attacked another were held as reasons not to negotiate with them we'd be in an almost permanent state of war. So if Russia were some kind of serial attacker, we might have something to go on, but their history of attacks in Eastern Ukraine is little more than to restate that there is a dispute over that territory.
Quoting Echarmion
You're making the same assumption @Jabberwock makes with...
Quoting Jabberwock
... that there's a binary choice. What I'm advocating, what Charap is saying is not that some switch needs to be flicked to 'turn on' negotiations and 'turn off' war, but that the emphasis is currently in the wrong place. Negotiations are under-supported, and war is over-encouraged.
What I'm standing against in this thread is the utter rejection of anything remotely misaligned with the mainstream view that Ukraine should be wholly supported in any effort it chooses to do, which currently is full scale war to reclaim all of it's territories. I think that's naive and shows a callous disregard for those others affected. The framing of brave democracy-loving freedom fighters fending off evil authoritarian imperialists is absurd (with the exception of the evil authoritarian bit - that's about right). It's a regional conflict over disputed territory because of separatism, the same kind of separatism which elsewhere has lead to independence, and a general siding with the separatists in the liberal West. Either way, the West's involvement has been almost universally, in such cases, to broker peace, not to take sides (at least the public portrayal has been such). So supplying arms to one side, which in most countries constitutes a war crime, whilst barely moving on talks, even shutting them down at time, is a change in emphasis which is unwarranted by the circumstances.
Third time lucky... Authoritarian rule is an indicator, not a factor affecting indicators. The HFI attempts to include in its measure degrees of authoritarianism, it is therefore already included in any comparison. Things like the actions of predatory monopolies like Black Rock (or Halliburton in Iraq), are not measures already included in the HFI, so we have to speculate on the effect they might have had. If you still don't get it this time, it's probably best we just drop this.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. The same applies to Sachs, but it didn't stop you attempting to downplay the relevance of his statements with this accusation of bias.
And since when ha making predictions divorced from reality hampered the career of retired military advisor. Have you looked at the track record of the current crop of ex-military advisors? accuracy isn't an issue. Cushy jobs consulting for arms dealers and government agencies are far more important and those are not gained by accuracy, they're gained by loyalty.
Quoting Jabberwock
Well then we've reached the limit of our disagreement. I think it is inhumanely monstrous to simply 'choose' war as if it were an equal option to peace dependant only on the chances of success.
Quoting Jabberwock
None. That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. It clearly failed.
Quoting Jabberwock
So you claim, but without evidence. You've yet to supply anything with relative amounts. Sure, if the West cuts aid in half it will still be enough. But are they going to cut aid in half? or third? or quarter? There's significant calls in America to cut it to zero, likewise Germany.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I've asked you time and again for a very simple and very reasonable request that you cite what I have claimed in your post rather than make up what you think I've claimed. It's really the bare minimum of decent honest debate that you argue against the claims I've made. I simply will not answer again to claims I've not made. there is a quote function, it's not hard to use.
Quoting https://original.antiwar.com/ted_snider/2023/07/26/russia-decides-not-to-renew-grain-deal-some-context/
I guess it's because your approach didn't suggest an ethical statement to me.
When making such a judgement, I wouldn't consider the chances of success the most relevant aspect, though they're not irrelevant either.
Quoting Isaac
Fair enough, though it still suggests that the current russian leadership has decided they're in this for the long game. That means the kind of short term freezing of the conflict with intent to then negotiate a long term solution once cooler heads prevail is unlikely to work.
Quoting Isaac
I see your point, but I'm not sure what evidence you're expecting to see pointing towards negotiations.
Quoting Isaac
This kinda suggests you're expecting Ukraine or it's allies to pre-emptively concede territory before negotiations have actually begun, or to publicly set limits to further support.
That sounds pretty naive to me. We're talking about two parties who are involved in a full scale war to assert their interests. And Ukraine's partners not only have to consider the immediate material impact of a peace deal but also it's psychological impact on geopolitics. To put it bluntly, the West cannot afford to be seen as an unreliable ally.
Negotiations are going to be conducted via secret backchannels. They're going to be publicly disavowed. This is necessary both to preserve your leverage as well as to safe face in the international arena.
Quoting Isaac
I disagree with your assessment of the separatist movement. It would have fizzled out and been quashed within months had not the russian military directly intervened.
It's also a very different situation in that Russia has started a fully fledged invasion in order to destroy Ukraine as it currently exist and absorb most of it's territory. That's old school imperialism.
That's a direct challenge to the previous status quo of "imperialism by invitation". It's a significant breach of the post-war order and at the same time a challenge to the West. The west has every reason to defend it's "empire" by supporting Ukraine which is, after all, in this by their choice and for their own interests.
No, what Putin does to his people is not an indicator, it is a factor affecting the indicator. You are just confused.
Quoting Isaac
I did not down play the relevance of Sachs' statements, I just pointed out he is not an impartial witness to the negotiations, which was implied.
You have accused me of making things up, i.e. the specific operation plan, because it was not from an expert, so you claimed we are both in the same boat. I gave you the plan from the expert, so you are in the boat of unspecificed operating plans alone.
Quoting Isaac
As I wrote long time ago, I understand that you feel that way, however, most people do not. You also seem to believe that it is an imperative that everyone felt like you, but again, it is just you.
Quoting Isaac
If your moral sense is different than that of most people, then all I can do is to empathize with you. Your insistence that the majority abandons their moral view (which, as you say, does not need backing up), is a bit unrealistic, though.
Quoting Isaac
The military American aid to Ukraine amounts to 42 bln USD. It is harder to find data on help from other countries, but estimates put it at about the same figure. This year the whole military budget of Russia is about 80 bln USD. However, not all of it or possibly even most of it is not directed to the war effort - Russia has military personel and bases all over the country, fleets etc., which still must be maintained. But this constitutes one fourth of the annual budget, as the Economist pointed out, Russia will not be able to keep it at this level, especially that not all costs of war are directly related to the military.
And yes, the aid may be cut to zero and the Russian economy may collapse overnight. Both options are possible, but unlikely.
Quoting Isaac
I am very sorry then, what do you propose? Because it is extremely hard to extract that small bit of information out of you. Repeating 'negotiations' is not very helpful, for the reasons given by Fortna.
Recently you have quoted Charap, so it seemed like you endorse his plan. Do you? Do you advocate solid support for the Ukrainian offensive along starting the negotiations? Do you believe that coercion should be as strong as diplomacy? I was under impression that you do not, but I do not want to misinterpret you again.
Quoting Isaac
Are you saying Sachs was writing nonsense? Putin had nothing to do with this at all? It was never about NATO? 'Free and prosperous' Ukraine is not a threat to Putin, as you have claimed? If separatists got their independence, Putin would just look happily as Ukraine joins NATO and EU? Really...
...
Accident? (????????) Incompetence? Not knowing there's a bit of tension at the moment?
Provocation? Russians have done some of that lately anyway.
Probing? Testing? If so, then they got some responses (though no Polish/NATO air appearance).
Who knows; I'm not sure it's easy to determine.
There have been some activities to do with Poland. Targeted by the Kremlin: exposed, made public (embarrassment?), cr?e?py crap, what's next?
Attacking Poland directly involves NATO directly; I doubt they'd want that (despite the tiptoeing around them).
They're just being buttheads.
Well, that explains a lot. For my part, all the arguments I've made here have been ethical. I'm simply saying we have an ethical duty to support the options which most promote human well-being.
Quoting Echarmion
Indeed. I think most are hoping for different heads rather than merely cooler versions of the same ones. Armistice whilst that change takes place is simply a more humanitarian option that simmering war whilst that change takes place. Either solution requires a change in leadership (or a force of hand if not a direct replacement). The question is how we handle the interim.
Some seem to think that the slightly increased chance of leadership change resulting from war (maybe battlefield losses, or mass morale failure) are worth the enormous casualty rate, destruction and risk of escalation. I'm saying those harms massively outweigh any slight increase in the chance of regime change. Armistice and political pressure is perhaps slower and has a lower chance of success, but is by far the more humanitarian option and should only be discarded if it absolutely fails (I'd even go as far as saying repeatedly fails), or causes more material harm.
Quoting Echarmion
I'm not so much here criticising the powers involved, though I would do that, but the lay voices clamouring for more war, repeating the clarion calls in favour of it (Russia are weak, Ukraine are going to win any minute, Ukrainians are all brave freedom fighters and deserve everything we can give them... etc). Political leaders might pay only scant attention to their populace, but the least we can do is clamour for peace, not war.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't think the West are quite so constrained as that. A few European leaders have been quite blunt recently about not simply giving Ukraine whatever they want, and have in some cases rebuked Zelensky quite severely.
The West also has to consider the risks of escalation, the costs to domestic politics, the continuing harms to trade and finance... They've more accounts to balance than simply being allies.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, We'll obviously never be quite sure how much is being negotiated, but both parties have electorates and polities to satisfy who may well not be placated by the mere hint that something might be going on.
Quoting Echarmion
Sure. I don't think that makes it less of a separatist issue. Less would hold the DPR to be a mere happy coincidence to Putin's imperialism. Separatism has been around in the region since the early 20th century so it would be odd indeed if it just so happened to be about to 'fizzle out' just as Russia were about to take advantage of it.
Gaining powerful allies doesn't make separatism less separatism, though I suspect most are now bitterly regretting their choice of ally.
Quoting Echarmion
If we could be sure of that, then yes, but I don't think that's clear at all. I'm sure you're aware of the evidence and counter-evidence, I won't rehash it unless needed, but clearly there are schools of opinion which dissent from the preferred narrative about Putin's original intentions. I think his intention now is far less disputed, however. He clearly intends to destroy Ukraine.
What is clear though, is whatever could be said of Putin's intentions some months into the invasion, it was not thought so clearly at the start, yet the intention to arm and push Ukraine, if necessary, became policy quickly. I think even if it were true now that we know Putin's true intent is imperialist aggression, we still acted excessively hawkish when we did not know that.
Quoting Echarmion
'Reason' I agree. But as I said, I'm here making an ethical argument. Putin had every reason to invade Ukraine. It was just morally wrong to do so.
Well no, but something like what's in the first sentence wouldn't surprise me honestly. The US has a lot of problems but a biggie is the legacy of chattel slavery. If we provide aid and support to country not burdened by such a history, they might very well do better than we do.
Plus, there's that whole "do as I say not as I do" effect. I'm just saying a result like this might not be that ludicrous.
That's probably not what's going on here, though. Remember, Russia attacked Ukraine and Obama let it go. This is Biden's call. He chose to publicly threaten every entity in the world which does business with the US to sanction Russia or suffer the consequences. Big decisions frequently come down to the personalities on the scene at the time, not principles.
?
I know this is a thread about the war in Ukraine, but I was addressing the general question about how countries in the US sphere of influence develop.
Oh, sorry.
Charap...
... But as I said, I don't think it's relevant at this stage. If you're at the point of assuming there is no such plan, then my providing evidence of one is irrelevant. Anyone with even a passing interest in this conflict would have come across arguments like Charap's so your rhetorical demands for the details show either an incredibly well-structured set of media-blinkers (that somehow you've managed to get through the last year without even accidentally reading any opposing views), or a really odd arguing style in which you think that perhaps if I don't know what the arguments are, that somehow... works as a mark against them?
Quoting Jabberwock
I don't know if you've much experience with moral claims, but that's pretty much the modus operandi. Moral claims are about how we ought behave, their whole purpose is that others are also bound by them, otherwise they're not moral claims, they're merely statements of preference.
Quoting Jabberwock
As above, it wouldn't be a moral claim if it was in the form "I prefer X, but you guys do as you please"
Quoting Jabberwock
Really? Then what was this... https://www.businessinsider.com/which-house-republicans-voted-gaetz-end-military-aid-ukraine-2023-7?op=1&r=US&IR=T ?
Or https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/05/american-support-ukraine-poll/ ?
Germany's initial cause for hesitation hasn't suddenly disappeared... https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60155002
In what way does this add up to "unlikely"?
Quoting Jabberwock
I thought I'd been clear. In line with people like Charap, and numerous others, I'm in favour of a much stronger effort toward negotiated solutions than we're currently seeing to end the immediate fighting. I'm also (unlike Charap, I expect), opposed to nationalism so I'm less concerned about territorial occupation. Russia were manifestly wrong to forcibly take control of the Eastern territories, Ukraine are equally manifestly wrong to do so as well. What is wrong is using military force to take control of territory, who 'owned' it is the first place does nothing to mitigate that wrong unless one can very strongly demonstrate that the humanitarian benefit of changing ownership will outweigh the harms from the war required to do so. Here they do not.
As to the "lasting peace with Putin" claim. I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I support lasting peace. Full stop. I don't see much of a way in which that can happen with Putin as leader of Russia (I don't see much of a way that can happen with Zelensky as leader of Ukraine either).
I think this needs to be qualified though by allowing people to choose what they consider well-being. This might involve making the whole world worse off.
Quoting Isaac
I think the core disagreement here is how we evaluate harm. You said in another post that you're not a nationalist and don't particularly care about who "owns" what territory. I agree with that. But, for better or worse, sovereign states are the building blocks of them current international order and the people living in the quite evidently do care. They're willing to die for it, apparently.
Of course the quality of an argument counts, not whether people accept it, but that's only half the issue. Must not people have the last word when it comes to what they regard as harm and how severe they consider is?
If we accept that people have such a freedom, then this means there must be a set of rules that's not concerned with minimising harm but instead with creating some rule-based order that creates spheres of freedom. And those who put themselves out of this order must then be opposed, violently if necessary.
Thus I don't think it's actually clear that a status quo ceasefire is preferable to continued fighting from a moral perspective. There are moral costs to accepting the results of aggression.
Quoting Isaac
True, but it is a time-honored tradition that in situations like this, the big superpowers often find that the tail is wagging the dog with respect to their smaller allies. It happened quite a lot during the cold war. It's a bit of a sunk costs fallacy, but also the reasonable concern that a failure to support an ally in a critical situation might have a ripple effect and destroy trust more generally. To give an example: What might Taiwan think about an US that pressures Ukraine to accept a loss of territory at least temporarily?
Quoting Isaac
I'm not quite sure what you're referring to as "excessively hawkish". The west has been arming and training Ukraine since 2014. But certainly once a massive invasion force - which could have no plausible goal other than to conquer most of Ukraine - crossed the border, there was no longer any way to limit the conflict. From that point it was total war for Ukraine, and it's not clear to me how it could have been anything else.
Quoting Isaac
I would find a moral philosophy that doesn't include the right to self defense somewhat absurd though.
So which of the two options you presented Charap's plan is more compatible with:
Given that Charap supports further counteroffensive and military pressure, it would seem that he is for the option two, while you have specifically opted for the option one, however badly formulated. Presenting half of his plan, while ignoring the other half (i.e. the coercion) is somewhat disingenious. If I wrote 'Charap's plan is to keep fighting!', you would most likely object.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, but do not surprised that others will simply ignore your 'oughts', given they have exactly as strong grounds for their moral claims as you do.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, the opponents of the aid were outvoted 70-358. Sure, it is a significant opposition, but it still makes cutting help to zero unlikely.
And the poll from half a year ago... I can whip up a few as well:
https://www.reuters.com/world/most-americans-support-us-arming-ukraine-reutersipsos-2023-06-28/
https://news.gallup.com/poll/508037/americans-support-ukraine-war-effort.aspx
That is the way with the polls.
As for Germany, I think that quoting an article from before the war might not be the best indicator of current Germans' attitudes given that in the meantime some things happened, e.g. Russia has attacked Ukraine. Don't you think that might be a factor that would change some minds? It certainly did in case of the quoted Baerbock, who now says:
Seems her views changed a bit since the article... The article also mentions 'economic ties' which, together with the Nord Stream 2, do no longer exist, so it is even less relevant. Have you read it at all?
Quoting Isaac
So Charap's plan is not your plan after all.
Efforts toward negotiated solutions are commendable and actually made (for example, Zelensky is going to the peace summit in Saudi Arabia to hammer out a plan that could be presented to Putin), they are just unlikely to bring any lasting positive result at this point. You do not care about occupation or independence, OK, other people obviously do. I am surprised though that you do not care that the HFI of those occupied will be much lower than those who are not. The rest are just your moral claims which are simply different than the moral claims of others, so they do not need to be addressed.
Quoting Isaac
OK, so you support an option that is unlikely to happen, fully accepting that your suggestions will not be even considered given their impracticality. However, in the meantime people must be prepared for what is likely to happen and take appropriate action.
Lithuania declares more than 1,000 Belarusians and Russians to be national security risks
[sup]— Liudas Dapkus, Yuras Karmanau · AP · Aug 4, 2023[/sup]
Lithuania borders Latvia (close ally), Belarus, Poland, Kaliningrad (Russian). Lithuania and Poland ramp up security with respect to Russia and Belarus.
The border/country-free world won't happen this year, @Isaac. I suppose Schengen was one small move in that direction. With leaders like the current Kremlin around, it seems less likely to form.
Forced Passportization in Russia-Occupied Areas of Ukraine
[sup]— Yale Humanitarian Research Lab · Aug 2, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Executive Summary
The Yale link above lists some of the Kremlin's law moves. Incidentally, straightforward land-grabbing citizen-converting imperialism. And sham.
Quoting Apr 27, 2023
2022 annexation referendums in Russian-occupied Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
Fair point. Plus I suppose that could be extended to any free use of money. To the extent that the US leaves any wriggle room at all in it's loan agreements, a country using that leeway to be more socialist might be the best of both worlds... But... Surely those chickens would have to come home to roost at some point.
Also the US is still getting worse on most measures, so historical burdens can only get you so far as an excuse.... Sorry.
(But look at the UK for consolation - almost identically as bad. What are we like...)
The first part I get, the second not so much. If what some people choose to consider well-being harms others, then I don't see why we wouldn't have quite reasonable justification to prevent that. After all, if harming others isn't sufficient justification to prevent an act, then we're stuck for much moral intervention at all, aren't we?
Quoting Echarmion
Again, I agree with the first half, but not the second. For the reasons given above. It what some group of people regard as harm (or easier to express this as non-harm - desirable goals) actually harms others, or puts them at risk of harm, then we do have grounds to proscribe that behaviour or else we have no grounds to proscribe any behaviour at all.
Quoting Echarmion
So yes, for better or worse, democratic units (countries, electoral wards, etc) are how we tell what it is the people want. But these units are mere pragmatic administrative divisions. In an ideal world we'd all vote on how the entire world was run in decreasing degrees dependant on our stake, but since such an arrangement is technically impossible, we have a system of wards/counties/countries/UN. But since this is merely pragmatic, we don't need to defend any one arrangement with any kind of vigour. It's annoying at most for someone to come along and re-arrange an otherwise perfectly functioning arrangement. It's definitely not worth thousands of lives just to put it back again.
This cuts to what you say later that...
Quoting Echarmion
I agree, to a point, but this isn't direct self-defence is it? Russia didn't come in and just start shooting people. It came in with the intention to steal land. So it's land-defence, not self-defence. If I attack you, you're clearly entitled to defend yourself, even violently. But if I merely threaten you, say with a gun, to steal your car, you're not entitled to just shoot me. It might be held proportionate in some specific circumstances, but most likely wouldn't.
Likewise, and more like the situation we have with war, if a band of thieves broke into a car showroom, shot everyone in cold blood and stole a car, the police are not morally entitled to raid the thieves' hideout, shoot everyone in cold blood and retrieve the car. The fact that the car rightfully belongs to the owner doesn't somehow entitle the police to use the same methods to retrieve it as the thieves used used to obtain it. We expect better of them, we expect them to attempt to arrest the thieves and retrieve the car that way - even though that makes their job harder and the retrieval of the car more likely to fail. We treat human life as having a higher sanctity that property.
I don't see any moral argument as to why the same should not be applied to a government's territory. If another country comes and steals it using military force, they are not entitled to use the same lethal force to retrieve it just because it's rightfully theirs.
If anything, I think they have less right because at least the car owner can claim the lack of car impedes on their autonomy (they presumably had plans in mind which entailed possession of a car). The government have no such claim, they are merely landlords (custodians perhaps) and have no autonomous plans involving the land. The people who actually use the land are still there using it, they just pay taxes to a different custodian.
So no, I don't really see any justification for force applied to retrieving territory above the proposition that it actually causes less harm than not doing so would. And as I've shown in the case of Ukraine. Russia's worse record on human rights, awful though it is, is simply nowhere near the devastation of war.
As for 'punishment'. Again, capital punishment is banned in most civilised countries. We do not generally consider like for like punishment to be morally acceptable. So yes, aggressors should not be allowed to get away with aggression, but like any civilised country would not seek to simply kill a murderer, a civilised society should not seek to simply 'invade back' an aggressor who has taken territory by force. we should rise above that and apply more civilised punishments.
Yes, I would. You are continuing to ignore the asymmetry of a burden of proof. If I said "we need to jump off that cliff, I know it's a long way down and we'll probably break both legs, but I really think we need to", and you said "no, we can just take the steps", we do not have an equal burden of proof to show our courses of action are necessary. I have a much higher burden because we really, really don't want to jump off the cliff. We don't really care if we walk down the steps, so showing we need to is no big deal.
I'm proposing we don't fight a devastating war, we just leave Russia where they are and negotiate a ceasefire. That's the option any non-psychopath would want anyway if it were possible, so merely showing it could be should be enough to advocate the option. Charap's partial argument does that. He didn't link negotiations to continued fighting, ha hasn't made the argument that an armistice will only work if we also continue fighting, he's just saying that (a) we can, and (b) we ought. I agree with (a), but disagree with (b) because I don't share Charap's view on the sanctity of territory.
If, however, you were arguing that Charap said we ought continue fighting, I'd dispute that because to make an argument for war you need more than a mere preponderance of evidence, you need a very strong case that it is, regretfully, absolutely necessary.
Quoting Jabberwock
I would be very surprised if, on a philosophy forum, people simply ignored my 'oughts'. If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out?
Quoting Jabberwock
The point is that political opinions change over time. Germany is currently facing a new problem from the rise of the right wing, who are also opposed to arms sales - for their own political reasons. The US went from Obama to Trump overnight.
Quoting Jabberwock
Part of my argument is exactly the opposite. The differences really aren't that great, especially in the occupied regions. Russia's record in Crimea wasn't very different from Ukraine's record in Donbas. I don't doubt for a minute that conditions will worsen and progress toward freedom will be set back, but likewise with another decade of war.
There aren't any good options, we're picking the least worst, so merely pointing out how awful one option is doesn't really make an argument, you need to compare them. Seeing as the war currently involves conscription, imprisonment, restrictions of movement, the banning of political opposition, the banning of opposition media, the deaths to thousands of young men and women, the destruction of vital services, the disruption of livelihoods and the deeper indebtedness to institutions which have a history of restricting economic freedom and worsening inequality, not to mention the risks of starvation in other countries, and the risk of nuclear war... you have an awful lot of 'bad' to stack up against.
Most say Congress should not authorize more funding for Ukraine: survey
[sup]— Julia Shapero · The Hill · Aug 4, 2023[/sup]
At least as far as US Republicans (and the Kremlin) are concerned.
Putin's Russia demonstrably instigates lengthy destabilization and land-grabbing campaigns. By assimilating a fifth of Ukraine, those folk [sup](Aug 2, 2023, Aug 4, 2023)[/sup] are auto-enrolled in such efforts.
The problem I see is that every choice can harm others, even seemingly benign ones, if only in distant and minor ways. This being the case, it would seem to me that a strategy to minimise total harm or likewise maximise total wellbeing would have to result in a total dictatorship where everything is strictly regulated.
This might seem like a technical and arcane possibility but I think there are real world examples. Take sports, for example. Many sports can cause significant injury. That's fine, you may say, since people willingly participate. But even if we assume that noone gets hurt against their will (which I find unrealistic) it still imposes costs in society. All for the benefit of a minority. Perhaps then we should only allow activities with a certain level of risk.
Speaking of risk, what about dietary choices? Or when you move where? All possible to optimize for the greater good.
Quoting Isaac
I think you're too narrowly focused on the immediate material effect of such "rearrangement" and aren't considering the indirect effects.
How are you going to keep any system in place - pragmatic as it may be - people need the security that it's stable. Otherwise it will quickly be replaced by other arrangements, which are rarely better. One can see this effect in lots of weak states, where more informal systems - often controlled by some kind of patriarchal elite - take over.
Quoting Isaac
I mean technically they did start shooting people, but I get your point.
But I'm not really seeing the principle here. You're saying it's sometimes ok, but you're not stating what the relevant factor is. So someone can take my property. How much of it? Can they hurt me, so long as it's not deadly force?
Quoting Isaac
The problem I have with this is that it hands all the cards to the aggressor. It this inherently disadvantages the weakest targets. If I'm really strong and scary, I might not need force to dissuade a would-be aggressor. But it I'm facing someone who is stronger, how am I going to defend my rights?
How is the system going to remain credible if the aggressor is allowed to control the situation? And if you're taking even proportional retaliation off the table, then you're also weakening all other forms of pressure because any aggresor knows they have a monopoly on force.
A moral philosophy needs a way to address rule breaking. If it only works if everyone always follows it, it's simply not useful for actual humans.
Quoting Isaac
The reason we can avoid capital punishment is because, compared to an individual, the state has such overwhelming power that it can simply imprison someone, for life if necessary. But outside of these "civilised" circumstances, deadly force is sometimes the only plausible punishment.
Yes they are. That's the whole point of "sovereignty". The state has the legitimate monopoly of force within a territory. And that's a moral point too.
The example is silly, because it completely ignores the consequences and their probabilities. I have already given you the better suited example: we do not propose to disarm ourselves in the hope that everyone in the world will follow, even though global disarmament is a glorious cause and it would save us many horrible wars. We do not do that, because the likely consequences would be much worse. Very unlikely very positive result does not trump very likely negative results.
And your burden of proof is still the same: 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'.
Quoting Isaac
No, because that option is likely to bring about negative consequences, the most negative of them being the likely future war with Russia in better position. And Charap very much links negotiations to continued fighting, he specifically writes:
'require' and 'cannot' being the operative words. Him being non-psychopath, he advises that only because he considers that necessary, and he is a fucking expert in these exact questions, by your own words.
Quoting Isaac
Do you genuinely think Samuel Charap, in researching his position for RAND, just didn't think of all the factors when he declared fighting necessary? Slipped his mind, perhaps? Again, if you think you've come up with some important factors to consider that he's missed he'd be delighted to hear from you, It's his job, after all, to make accurate predictions about these things. You'd be saving him face.
Quoting Isaac
Given that we do not need to support moral claims in any way, as you say, then there is not much point of discussing them, is there? You recite your moral claims, I recite mine, we are done.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, but we do not assume that the policy will turn over overnight, because then no policy could be implemented at all. Again, your mere claim is that it is possible, you need a bit more to say that it is likely.
Quoting Isaac
The differences between countries in the Russian sphere of influence and those outside of it are pretty significant. Therefore, Ukraine should leave the Russian sphere of influence to increase its HFI.
Quoting Isaac
If the proposed course of action is very unlikely to bring about the least worst option and quite likely to bring about the worst option, then we ought to choose the course of action which will do neither.
And stacking up is quite simple: Minsk 3 will bring about both oppression AND another war in the near future, with all those consequences, when Russia recovers a bit and has a yet better staging ground for another attack on Ukraine. Therefore, we should not choose Minsk 3. Charap, the FE, agrees.
You still maintain that there is an alternative - because you say so, because you do not have to argue anything. You cited Fortna, she disagrees with you, you cited Charap, he disagrees with you. You oppose war, but do not give any reasonable alternative, beside a crap Minsk 3, because this time, maybe it might possibly, hopefully just work, even though your own experts say it is very unlikely. Policies cannot be shaped by wishful thinking.
Precisely. Moral conflicts can as well lead to war.
Absolutely. Yet we navigate this don't we? We don't throw our hands in the air and say "anything goes then". I think you've given a perfect account of why moral decisions are fraught, but that's not the same thing as giving an account of what any moral claim is wrong.
I think war, in this instance, is not even one of the difficult edge cases. It's absolutely devastating in terms of harms - thousands dead, many more thousands injured, livelihoods destroyed, millions put at risk of starvation, the entire world at risk from nuclear escalation... I can't see anyone reading that list and thinking "well... some people like racing motorbikes though.... so who know what people's idea of harm is...?"
And are you willing to extend this relativism to, say holocaust denial, rape, murder? I get what you're saying, but without qualification it sounds like special pleading for territorial war.
Quoting Echarmion
This is true, but compared to the costs of keeping the system unchanged the harms are minimal and can be fought against by other means. War is clearly not the only way of changing political systems for the better and it is by far the most devastating.
But likewise, I'm saying the same of those advocating for a military response. Not considering the consequences on things like global hunger.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't think these questions are easily answered, but my point is that they are asked and answered nonetheless. We do not merely throw up our hands because we can't decide when lethal force is appropriate against a threat of violence. We work out an approach based on an acceptance that (a) there is a line, and (b) it's not easy to see where it is. The attitude typically taken to military responses to invasion shows none of this, and I think the reason for that is nationalism, not moral nuance.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, but we do not only have military responses at our disposal. We have sanctions, we have non-violent resistance, we have violent (but non-military) resistance, we have control of the media and IT space, we have financial instruments, we have political instruments...
And as punishments go, what kind of punishment for aggression is military response? It doesn't harm Putin in any way other than indirectly (by making him less popular if he loses). We can punish Putin far more directly then that by freezing his international assets, enabling legal proceedings against him, barring him from travel, refusing to deal with his companies... Him loosing this war is at best an indirect punishment.
And this is the problem with seeing something like this from this 'zoomed out' perspective. Who is actually, literally being punished by military resistance? The conscript. The Russian soldier who was pretty much forced to serve (or lied to) is the one having his legs blown off by a Ukrainian shell, not Putin.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't see any such circumstances arising. I can see how deadly force is often the only 'defence', but not really seeing how it's ever the only 'punishment'.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
... The matter about which we disagree is the consequences and their likelihoods, so you can't invoke your judgement of the consequences and likelihoods as arguments, that's begging the question.
My argument is that because war is so awful, it requires a very strong argument in favour (much stronger than more peaceful options) showing how the consequences will be better and the likelihoods higher.
You can't counter that by saying that it doesn't have this extra burden because the consequences are better and the likelihoods higher. That's the argument we're talking about the burden of.
It's like if I said "It's really important that you prove the cup is empty" and you answer "It isn't important because the cup is empty". It's begging the question. I'm sure I can find a Wikipedia article about begging the question if you're having trouble with the concept.
Quoting Jabberwock
Who said we don't have to support moral claims? Moral claims are not empirical, they're not supported with facts but with appeal to rational and emotional values like coherence, empathy, consistency...
Quoting Jabberwock
I agree that coercion will be required. I disagree with using military offensives for that purpose. I disagree for the moral reasons I've laid out above (I value pacifism higher than I value war's potential as a coercive tool). Since these are matters of value, there's no question of deferring to Charap. Charap is an expert on foreign affairs so we ought defer to him in the matter of which strategies might work. We have no need to defer to him on value judgements. He nowhere says that negotiations will fail without decades of military offensives.
Quoting Jabberwock
If it considers that being outside of the Russian sphere of influence is the cause of those increased HFIs, and believes so so strongly that it is willing to risk utter devastation to achieve it. I've shown (by using the US as an example) that merely being outside of Russia's sphere of influence is not a very good predictor of HFI improvements, and I've argued that the devastation of war demands a very high level of confidence in its benefits before committing. There is no such high level of confidence in the theory that Ukraine will gain massive improvements in HFI merely by being outside of Russia's sphere of influence. The causal connection is weak at best.
Quoting Jabberwock
Neither author disagrees with me. That's why I cited them. I Fortna in support of the idea that armistice conditions can be strong enough to support long-term ceasefires. She does not disagree with that. I cited Charap in support of the the idea that (a) we are not currently putting enough effort into negotiation, more is needed, and (b) that and armistice could work in this specific case.
Both experts support both arguments. Fortna is pessimistic about long term peace with Putin. So am I, I expect we will have to see regime change before long-term peace can be achieved. Charap considers it morally acceptable to continue military offensives alongside negotiations on the grounds that they will act as coercive tools. I disagree that this benefit is sufficient to outweigh the cost. Since that is a value judgement, it's irrelevant that Charap disagrees with me on that. I expect Fortna does too.
I have specifically argued why your chosen course of action is unlikely to bring the positive consequences and likely to bring about the negative consequences. I have given for that the support of experts (many of your own, it so happens). That is all I am required to do. On the other hand, you are required to show that your course of action is likely to bring the positive consequences and not negative ones. You have failed to do that as, upon examination, both experts you cited claim something else. So what are the reasons you believe that the course of action you propose (whatever it is, as we are still missing any details) will likely bring about the positive consequences and not negative ones?
Quoting Isaac
You wrote something else:
Quoting Isaac
My moral sense does not support your moral claims, nor does moral sense of most people.
Quoting Isaac
Then again you need your own proposition of a plan backed up by an expert who says that non-military coercion together with diplomacy will likely work. You were unable to produce one for about two weeks now. As we have seen, just 'look it up' does not work that well, given that you did look up and came up with the plan which, it turns out, you do not support.
Quoting Isaac
Yet Ukrainians do see the causal link and are willing to risk the devastation of war to achieve it.
Quoting Isaac
It is not supermarket, you do not get to pick and choose fragments of their arguments which suit you, ignoring the rest. If you agree that long-term peace is unachievable with Putin, then nothing you can propose will lead to avoiding devastation and horrors of war. You cannot 'argue for peace' if you agree that it does not have a reasonable chance, by your own words.
Charap clearly says that the success of negotiations depends on the pressure exerted on Putin, and he does not see any other options of doing that beside military means. Do you think he, the F.E. on foreign affairs, missed all the non-military means of coercion that would likely work?
You still do not have a viable alternative, not to mention an expert who supports one.
Sure, but my argument is that we navigate it by using a set of rules that's distinct from utilitarianism - we're using the essentially deontic concept of rights and freedoms.
Quoting Isaac
No, that would not be the argument. My argument is that we need to accept a deontic philosophy which sets out the boundaries of freedoms and responsibilities, and only within that framework do utilitarian calculations take precedence.
One of the essential boundaries, to me, is that whoever is on the defensive - and of course discussing what that means is an entirely different topic - does not need to concern themselves with utilitarian calculations. In principle you may defend yourself à outrance, because it's the attacker who is putting themselves outside the framework.
Quoting Isaac
Well I disagree. What I know about human psychology tells me that humans react very badly to situations where rule-breaking is no adressed effectively, and the result is usually a far less draconian system of punishment.
If we stay in the war scenario, the alternative to an organised military defense by a state might be a protracted insurgency, which decreases the intensity of the fighting but spreads it wider.
Quoting Isaac
We take that same line when it comes to individual self defense though. And I also think this kind of "rally around the flag" effect predates nationalism in the modern sense. Humans have an ingrained sense of in-group and out-group, and whenever we perceive an out-group threat the response is extreme - both in terms of violence on the outside, but also in terms of cooperation and compassion on the inside.
Nationalism causes tons of stupid behaviour, but I don't think this one in particular can be ascribed to nationalism, apart from nationalism defining the in- an out-groups.
Quoting Isaac
We have, but there's also long experience that shows that nothing replaces a guy with a rifle on the ground. All the other means more or less require that whoever you're trying to get to change their behaviour cares to still play by your rules. Against someone who simply does not care, that will not work.
This is also a core lesson when using pacifism as a political strategy. Pacifism can be very effective if you opponent cares about appearances. If they don't though, you're just making it easier for them.
Quoting Isaac
This is of course quite true. But the problem is not limited to individual punishment. If you look at legal philosophy, the means to defend a given legal order are usually split into two broad categories: Deterrence, either by physical force of by implied threat, and identification, in terms of individual security and the feeling that the system is overall fair. Research indicates that actual punishment of offenders after the fact is only a minor factor in "keeping the peace". Far more relevant is the probability to get caught in the first place and the sense of having a stake in the system.
I bring this up to illustrate that even from a purely utilitarian point of view, there is good reason to oppose aggression and make it fail. The best way to avoid war is to demonstrate that wars don't work.
Quoting Isaac
Well in a society with very little coercive power, and no structures for things like prison sentences, it has sometimes been the case that there was either no official punishment at all or exile/ death.
It's time for Zelensky to get tough with Biden - opinion
[sup]— Alexei Bayer · The Jerusalem Post · Aug 6, 2023[/sup]
Bayer suggests an opportunist angle/pressure, though it may not be quite that simple. There are all kinds of discussions back-and-forth, not just Biden making a phonecall and that's that. Maybe old Joe wouldn't take it that well either, who knows.
But how do we determine what those rights and freedom ought be? We don't escape the trap of having to have some means of judgement. Our rights and freedoms are not exhaustive, nor are they non-contradictory, so there remains some higher order means of both determining their extents and arbitrating between their contradictions. That is all that is happening here. To simplify to one single issue. The Ukrainians have a right to self determination, the Yemenis have a right to life. Since Ukraine is Yemen's source of food, a war to regain the Ukrainian's right to self-determination is in conflict with the Yemei's right to life. This is just one example among many that occur simply because peoples are not isolated groups.
Quoting Echarmion
But that's not the case, unless you suggesting that our laws are all unethical in this regard? Self-defence is not a defence against any action at all, there's still a question of both proportionality and contemporaneousness. For self defence to be a defence in law the act has to be proportionate to the level of threat a reasonable person would understand and has to be relatively contemporaneous with the threat. You can't, for example, go to a muggers house three days later and shoot them because they took your handbag at knifepoint.
Though we might hate it, the Russians now occupy Crimea and Donbas. To propose war to retrieve them is to commit to an act of extreme violence in order to gain a material possession. The rightfulness of ownership doesn't justify the level of violence.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, but, as I mention below, punishment is just not an appropriate response here. One of the greatest errors of war is the grossly offensive and destructive nationalism and racism that is allowed to develop (encouraged often) because of the propaganda utility of this punishment narrative. Many Russians soldiers are conscripted, as are many Ukrainians. Both are also lied to. It is not possible to determine if they rightfully share the blame for their actions on the battlefield, so battle is not an appropriate punishment, even where punishment were necessary. Wars punish the working class soldiers on both sides. The actual perpetrators tend to get away with barely a dent in their fortunes.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes. Guerilla warfare, active resistance, protest (violent if necessary). Now we also have tremendous tools in information warfare too, financial instruments, and trade which prior to globalisation would not have been nearly so effective. In all cases the death rates compared to war are whole orders of magnitude lower and the risk to the rest of the world much smaller.
Quoting Echarmion
But that's the point. Nationalism is inappropriate as a definition of in-group and out-group. The fact that it hooks into quite fundamental human instincts doesn't render it either inevitable or right. There's no in-group solidarity in Ukraine. The rich screw the poor with utter contempt, same as in any country (and same for the homophobe and the homosexual, the racist and the minority, the misogynist and the woman...). Rallying round the flag is a distraction from the real in-group/out-group fight.
Quoting Echarmion
Do you think Putin is going to run out of men? Or is he going to have to, at the last, take to the battlefield himself? Because absent either of those scenarios, you're still trying to change his behaviour (when he doesn't seem to care). You're not fighting Putin with the apocryphal rifle, you're shooting other people in the hope that their deaths will change Putin's behaviour. How is that any different to freezing trade in his lucrative business activities in the hope that he'll change his mind? In neither case is the violence directed at the person responsible, at the person whose mind needs changing, they are both proxies.
Quoting Echarmion
Very true, but have defence and retaliation satisfied that aim thus far in history? Has a long drawn out war of attrition somehow demonstrated to anyone that wars don't work? Or has it been globalisation, the increase in international trade, disarmament, international fora for negotiation (like the UN), and international law which have done most to demonstrate that wars don't work?
I agree with your sentiment entirely, but another decade of fighting isn't going to show Putin that wars don't work. Putin's goal was to remove Ukraine as a threat to his power, he can do that by taking it over Belarus-style, or destroying it. Another decade of war isn't going to teach him anything other than that he might as well have set out to destroy it in the first place. Is that really the message we want to send to a nuclear armed country?
Quoting Echarmion
Again, who are we punishing? I don't see Putin being put at risk of either. I see ordinary Russian conscripts being shot at by ordinary Ukrainian conscripts whilst the fucking oligarchs in control of them both still actually trade with each other for profit.