Ukraine Crisis
The situation in Ukraine is becoming more dire by the minute. NATO is implying Russia is planning to invade Ukraine, whereas Russia denies this. Russia claims it will not allow Ukraine to enter NATO, as this would effectively put a hostile military alliance - NATO - right at the borders of Russia.
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
Comments (18084)
Xi weighs up support for Putin after rebellion
[sup]— Amy Hawkins · The Guardian · Jun 26, 2023[/sup]
China unlikely to be worried by ‘weaker Putin’ post Wagner revolt
[sup]— Erin Hale · Al Jazeera · Jun 29, 2023[/sup]
Analysis-China's Ukraine peace talks gambit shows shifts amid hard realities
[sup]— Laurie Chen, Martin Quin Pollard, Greg Torode, William Mallard · Reuters · Aug 5, 2023[/sup]
Perceived common adversaries seem the main driver. After that, who knows. A Russian dependency on (or debt to) China could still be a factor. Pseudo-commitment?
What to expect from China these days in this respect?
Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis
[sup]— Madeline Fitzgerald, Elliott Davis Jr · US News · Jul 25, 2023[/sup]
I am not sure how to weigh all the different global strategic shakedowns but the recent escalation since the end of the grain deal has turned the Black Sea into goo. China is a major customer of that grain. It looks like a major divergence of interests has developed between partners sworn to never part.
China isn't poor and there's still a functioning global grain market. Russia will be eager to compensate for any problems the war causes for China. Hence if China doesn't get grain from the Black Sea, then it gets it somewhere else.
The problem is for the poor countries which really suffer from higher prices. The Chinese won't have riots if grain prices are higher, but other countries (especially those who subsidize their grain prices, yet have difficulties in doing so) can be in a tight spot.
This could be balanced by exports, but recently Russia exports less and imports more. Also last year, to strengthen its currency against sanctions, Russia decided to renegotiate some of its export deals to be nominated in rubles. So a barrel of oil (sold for rubles) now buys two/thirds of goods it bought before (for yuans)...
Ukraine calls Jeddah talks productive, Russia calls them doomed
[sup]— Pavel Polityuk, Hatem Maher, Angus McDowall, Barbara Lewis · Reuters · Aug 6, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Andriy Yermak
West’s efforts to make global South support Kiev's plan doomed to failure — diplomat
[sup]— TASS · Aug 6, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Sergey Ryabkov
Kyiv doesn't want to talk with Putin (and repeats the UN). The Kremlin doesn't want to talk, just repeat demands. Doesn't look encouraging as far as talks are concerned.
Thanks for adding "sort of", but, yes, it is obvious even to staunch supporters of the war that Ukraine doesn't get "whatever it takes".
However, we are long past the moment where no-limits weapons supplies would make a major difference to the war.
Not that I would have supported such a policy when the war started or lament now the path not taken, as Russia could and likely would respond with nuclear weapons ... exactly why the policy has been to drip feed Ukraine weapons in a progressive and controlled manner that Russia can deal with without panicking (aka. win).
First, the energy contracts Russia insisted on Rubble payments was to "unfriendly countries"
Quoting The Guardian Explainer
This was not done to:
Quoting Jabberwock
But was done mainly for political reasons of forcing Europe to make exceptions to sanctions and making countries who need the gas contradict their rhetoric; essentially playing the "push comes to shove game".
With the oil, the international market quickly adjusted to Western sanctions as long as Russia can sell somewhere, as oil is primarily transported by ships which can go pretty much anywhere in the world without significant extra costs. To make a long story short, international oil flows quickly adjust to changes in buyers and sellers.
International gas flows are far less flexible in any short period of time and so there are far bigger consequences to cut off supplies either by choice or by pipelines being blown up.
What @Jabberwock also leaves out is that even these contracts where the payment is in Rubbles, the price is not actually denominated in Rubbles but still in Euro or USD and what changed was the buyer needed to do the exchange into Rubbles rather than Gazprom or the Russian central bank. There is not really any economic difference in making the buyer make the exchange into Rubbles or the seller. The difference in this case was that insisting unconverted funds could potentially be stranded if payments were made to Gazprom subsidiaries who then, due to sanctions, could not move the money, but, in my opinion, the move was mostly symbolic of making countries "bend the knee" and buy Rubbles in contradiction to their public positions.
However, the price of the gas is not denominated in Rubbles so these countries will just be buying more rubbles.
Point is @Jabberwock has no clue what he's talking about, and even ignoring the gas, Russia has plenty of foreign reserves, gold and sells plenty of Oil in other currencies that the depreciation of the Rubble has zero relevance to Russia's ability to import electronics for arms manufacturing.
Rather, a low Rubble boosts Russian exports of manufactured goods.
For years, the West complained about China manipulating it's currency ... in which direction?
Lower!!
The accusation has been China keeps it's currency undervalued in order to boost it's exports.
Currency depreciation is only a major problem if you don't export anything.
As long as you're exporting, then you're getting foreign exchange that can be used to purchase whatever critical imports you need and your domestic currency can constantly inflate (which is basically a form of tax) and there's no issue (to the government and the wealthy who get the forex).
Case in point, Sri Lanka's economy unravelled because it's major export was tourism and then with Covid there was no more tourism, so Sri Lanka suddenly had no foreign exchange coming into the country but still has critical imports it needs to buy.
Things start to go bad when traders notice this and start to bet against the Sri Lankan economy in every way possible, further devaluing their domestic currency and forcing the central bank to spend foreign reserves to try to keep things from crashing altogether while a solution is hopefully found (such as an IMF loan to kick the can down the road or then tourism restarting in Sri Lanka's case), but then things crash completely when those foreign reserves run out and the central banks only option is to to to buy critically needed foreign cash in domestic currency, resulting in hyper inflation and the collapse of the government, as no one wants Sri Lankan money so you'd need to offer a ridiculous amount to buy any foreign money.
This doesn't happen as long as you can export.
If you're able to get into the country foreign exchange (which basically all goes to the central bank) through exports then you can by definition buy whatever critical imports you need with the foreign exchange you get through said exports.
You can then print as much as money as you want as a form of taxation and a form of national "sale" to foreign buyers of manufactured goods that are denominated in Rubbles. For example, if you're a Russian business and you sell farming equipment both in Russian and to foreign buyers and all your costs are in Rubbles, then there's not really an immediate affect of a change in the Rubble exchange rate ... in fact you're happy if the Rubble goes down as you're going to make more sales; you've basically been able to offer all your foreign buyers a discount without any of your cost structure or profits changing.
Normal poor people who mostly buy food (which Russia produces) and energy (which Russia produces) and maybe some fixed costs like rent, won't feel the effects of this currency depreciation either.
Who's affected is the middle class who don't own a business exporting anything and want to buy a phone or whatever on the foreign market or want to go on vacation somewhere, now it costs a lot more.
Which is why this form of inflation is in no way an economic problem for Russia and is just a massive tax on the Russian middle class.
The reason Russia manipulated it's currency to stay high until now (which the Russian central bank could easily keep doing if it wanted) is that there was propaganda value in doing that and keeping the currency stable to work out the effects of sanctions provided domestic "confidence" (so people stay in business and can work out alternative supply chains and so on).
However, the reasons for the central bank to support the Rubble are short term and once those reasons go away, any economist will recommend "price discovery" of what the fair value of the Rubble is on the international market.
Currencies depreciate on foreign exchanges or inflate (leading to the same thing) all the time without that being some problem.
It was a problem for Sri Lanka because the central bank ran out of foreign exchange, but in the case of Russia, the Russian central bank has plenty of foreign exchange reserves, plenty mineral reserves, can easily get more, and also basically doesn't have any loans equal to or exceeding its GDP with interest payment denominated in foreign currency (which is what fucks up small, fragile developing world economies).
Another way to put things in perspective is:
Quoting Rupee Inflation Calculator
And yet, India's economy has grown significantly and is considered a major international player.
Continuous inflation and artificially devaluing your currency on the international market on-top of inflation is a standard national economic strategy that the West continuously complains about as providing competitive advantage.
There is zero reason to assume this is not also true for Russia.
Of course, there are winners and losers in inflationary policy but neo-liberal economists can go on for quite some time on how everyone basically wins in the end, poverty vanquished etc.
So, at minimum, it's highly ironic and annoying that the Western press who employ neo-liberal economists to comment on everything else are suddenly pointing to currency devaluation as some sort of blow to Russia.
Here are two charts:
As can be seen, almost half of Russia's exports are made in rubles, but only one third of imports. What Russia sells for rubles is worth 13 bln USD, but it buys for rubles only what is worth 8 bln USD. Thus devaluation of ruble IS relevant to its foreign trade. This typically could be covered by the trade surplus (i.e. if what Russia sold for foreign currencies was still more than it bought for them), but this has been also shrinking rather dramatically and it is now headed toward deficit.
Biden’s Ukraine strategy is failing
[sup]— Brahma Chellaney · The Hill · Aug 8, 2023[/sup]
Organise or fight? Three years in exile, Belarus opposition divided about path
[sup]— Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Mike Collett-White, Peter Graff · Reuters · Aug 8, 2023[/sup]
Without foreign support, would Ukraine take a Belarusian turn? Apart from assimilation, that might be ideal for Putin. At the moment, it seems some ways off. But some steps roughly in that direction have been taken.
Quoting boethius
Why likely would? It would seem rather spiteful, certainly not good for Russia(ns). Making it a nuclear war over a fifth of Ukraine (or however much would be left) suggests that the world (not just that area) has a markedly larger problem with the Kremlin, something in need of attention now (politically, tactically/strategically, militarily).
In other words, you agree with my analysis and the depreciation of the Rubble is not a problem, may even boost Russian exports and thus help that trade deficit problem ...
What is for certain is that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is not going to cause some imminent economic catastrophe.
Crash of the Rubble definitely could have been highly disruptive and caused such a economic and social unravelling at the start of the sanctions, but Russias central bank had plenty foreign currency reserves to support the Rubble.
For those wondering, the practical effect of the sanctions is massive supply chain disruption and so there's plenty of Russian businesses who have Rubbles in the bank and need to find alternative import substitutes for things that simply don't exist in Russia (ultimately exchanging Rubbles for whatever currency they need to buy whatever imports they require from somewhere else). Had the Rubble collapsed these businesses would have simply immediately failed causing further supply chain disruption and the entire economy could have unravelled.
By supporting the Rubble, the Russian central bank was basically underwriting (de facto subsidising) Russian business finding alternative supply chains and sorting things out.
Now that supply chains have been "reoriented" a fall in the Rubble actually boosts exports as now everything is cheaper for foreign buyers.
Generally speaking, all these macro economic moves have winners and losers and if it's good or bad and for who depends on a bunch of specifics. For example, if the government prints money to spend on social programs, that's basically just taxing the middle class to transfer wealth to the poor and invest in education and health and other things that ultimately benefit everything. If the governments prints money to "monetise" banker bets that went bad, that's taxing the middle and even lower classes to transfer wealth to the banks to further capture the political system.
In terms of domestically and international politics, had NATO truly done "what it takes" and given Ukraine all manner of military equipment Ukraine could possibly want or need, started training on F16s and a thousand tanks and every sort of missile, and hell, why not F-35 and F-22's while we're "doing what it takes" and so on, then Russia could easily say they are fighting NATO, de facto attacked by NATO and so they're using nuclear weapons. So the optics would be "nuclear favourable".
Furthermore, if supplying all these advanced weapons to Ukraine resulted in major battlefield victories and Russia was losing, then the choice would essentially be between massive civil unrest and potential collapse of the economy and government or to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation.
Obviously there are costs to using nuclear weapons, but faced with total destruction (in this case of the Russian government or "regime" or whatever you want to call it) then any tool that avoids that is a preferable option.
Therefore, as long as Ukraine can be defeated with conventional means and, more importantly, has no chance of defeating Russia, then the costs of using nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits. Since NATO doesn't want Russia to use nuclear weapons as it has no response, hence NATO basically introduces one weapons system at a time so that Russia can easily adapt and overcome.
No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices. Due to its huge official (and probably even bigger unofficial) deficit Russia no longer can provide such deep discounts on resources, so even with the better exchange rate (and, as I have shown, it helps only some, as half of the exports are in rubles) the opportunistic trade with India and China is slowing down - they now have enormous, cheaply bought reserves. Few countries are willng to break the price caps, Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts. Russia will not be able to boost its resource sales significantly. And beside resources there is not much to boost - the industrial base is undercut by the sanctions, Russian arms sales are the lowest since the USSR, obviously due to domestic demand. Add to this the greatest labor shortage since the 1990s...
Imports, on the other hand, steadily grow, which will drain Russia of its hard currencies.
That's why I literally say:
Quoting boethius
I say "in this case of the Russian government or "regime" or whatever you want to call it" as military defeat could spiral into civil unrest and unravelling of the economy (people in the streets rather than dealing with supply line disruption of the sanctions).
Likely, in such a scenario, the Russian decision makers (certainly Putin, maybe others as well) would conclude that using nukes on Ukraine to "stabilise" the situation is the pathway that leads to the least use of nuclear weapons. Better to nuke a few military formations and assets than the unravelling of the Russian government and nuclear armed warlords nuking whole cities. Whether that would happen or not, that would certainly be the argument of the pro-nuking debaters in such a meeting: that not-doing-the-thing leads to more of that very thing. I.e. by nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki we are in fact saving lives. Of course, can be debated both ways.
Now, how effective the full compliment of applicable NATO weapons would be in the battle space at the start of the war I'm not sure (maybe Russian anti-air missiles can shoot down F-16s on mass, Western tanks would not make much difference etc., and maybe Russia could even shoot down F-35 if that was possible to supply, train and support, or maybe they would not have been able to deal with advanced NATO weapons, or then maybe they could but the Russians run out of missiles etc.), so it's not a given that more weapons to Ukraine would have made a major difference. Advanced weapons take a long time to train on to become proficient and then more time to integrate those systems into a battle doctrine, unlike handheld missiles, so would have depended on what the limiting factors were for Ukraine at the start of the war. It's entirely possible that scrounging up and throwing in as much old soviet equipment as possible was the only effective strategy for NATO and tanks and planes are more symbols than potential game changers at any point in the conflict.
What is certain is that NATO decided very deliberately to not come close to testing that scenario because Russia could respond with nuclear weapons if it works. If it doesn't work then it's bad PR for Western military equipment (at this stage of the war there's plenty of excuses that the Ukrainians are tired, the Russians laid down all these mines and have air cover etc. -- excuses that would work less well at the start of the conflict): point being it's a lose-lose situation making an honest attempt to support Ukraine defeating Russia on the conventional battle field. What's a win for the US is subjugating Europe and sacrificing Ukrainians to do so.
You have a remarkable ability to have zero clue what you're talking about.
Russian resources are sold at international prices and if offered at a discount due to having limited buyers due to sanctions that has nothing to do with the Rubble exchange rate, but would just be 20% or whatever off the international price that's denominated in USD (even if the sale is made in other currencies, the price will be set relative the international price).
Where currency devaluation cheapens exports is in things that are not commodities but services or manufactured goods where the inputs are bought in Rubbles (i.e. labour and domestic resources and components -- if you need to import most of the inputs to your product then currency devaluation doesn't necessarily result in a lower price of the final product).
Devaluing your currency has an immediate effect of making your exports (dominated by domestic inputs) cheaper to international buyers while also making imports into your country more expensive thus encouraging buying domestic.
Of course, if your exports require all sorts of imports to produce (energy, material, services etc.), such as basically any small country that specialises in a few parts of the value chain, then currency devaluation can have the opposite effect, but that's not Russia's case.
You are literally grasping at straws trying to spin these changes in currency and trade balance winds as some sort of fatal blow to the Russian economy.
Russia is not in a recession and pretty much any economist on the planet will be able to inform you that supporting the price of the Rubble has only short term reasons for doing (subsidise import substitution to adapt to sanctions and provide stability and "confidence" generally speaking) but those reasons go away and long term it's wise to let the currency float (at least pretty close) to its market rate (supporting your currency is, fundamentally, subsidising capital flight out of the country).
Quoting Jabberwock
First, Russia doesn't sell to countries that have a price cap:
Quoting BBC
And there are enough countries to purchase Russian output, in particular China and India as well as countries willing to man-in-the-middle Russian oil to Europe.
Whatever discounts Russia offered in 2022 or even 2023 to lower "friction" is relative higher prices due to anxiety caused by things like ... a big war.
And stating that "Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts" like that's against Russias interest or desires is just laughable.
Both Russia and Saudi Arabia always want output cuts as major oil exporters ... just "if everybody does it".
OPEC is a cartel who's entire purpose is to cut oil production and Saudi Arabia and Russia are in this cartel to always try to do that.
What matters is profits and if oil is 2% oversupplied or 2% undersupplied on the global market has a huge difference on profits, so if you can form a cartel to cut production and so fix prices high then you make far more profits than selling 10% more volume but at half or less the price.
So, if you can get enough exporting partners together you can all agree to cut production and sell less volume but at a higher price and make not only far more revenue but even more profits.
That's what OPEC is about, so Saudi Arabia "demanding" output cuts during this conflict is basically siding with Russia to make mad coin.
Quoting Reuters - Saudi Arabia, Russia deepen oil cuts, sending prices higher
The oil cuts are literally good, not bad, for Russian oil export revenue.
Of course, the US exports oil too, so higher prices are a mixed bag to the US, in particular US elites who are the people that matter in the US system.
Europe on the other hand ...
Let us see about that...
Quoting boethius
Yes, that is exactly what I wrote: 'No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices.' Russia had to provide significant discounts to find new customers for its resources, but it is no longer able to do that as it needs to make profit.
Quoting boethius
Most of Russia's exports are related to raw resources. We do not know what portion of it is denominated in rubles, what we do know is that Russia wanted to move away from USD and EUR in its trades. It could move solely to foreign currencies, such as CNY, but then it would put control of its trade into Chinese hands, which it might not be willing to do. We also do know (thanks to the chart given above) that a portion of the exports is pegged to RUB.
However, it does not matter much, because there will be no boom in the trade of resources, for reasons already given.
Quoting boethius
That is exactly Russia's case for most exports beside resources, because its industry is underdeveloped and heavily relies (or did, when it worked) on imported inputs, most of those from Western countries. That is why its e.g. automoblie industry practically collapsed - Russians have no know-how, no domestic industrial machinery, etc. There will be no export boom for Russian cars, if the door handles come off or the car does not start.
Quoting boethius
We do not know in what state Russian industry is, as we do not know what part is directed to the war effort. And while it might provide better employment and some short-term benefits, it does not lead to development in the long term.
Quoting boethius
Yes, I know that. That was my argument, maybe it was too succint. There will be no boom in resource sales for Russia, because there will be no or very few new customers who will be willing to break the price cap (and going through intermediaries diminishes profits).
Quoting boethius
No, as I have already mentioned. China and India were eager to buy at the discount, but it was not profitable enough for Russia. Besides they bought much more than they need already and they cannot store unlimited amounts, not to mention that China's economy is cooling off significantly. Russia will struggle to maintain the exports at the current levels, export boom is simply unrealistic.
Quoting boethius
Again, while generally you are correct, you are wrong in this particular case. Russia does not want output cuts NOW, it needs to increase its exports to cover rapidly growing imports.
Quoting boethius
Nope. China and India will simply buy less if the price is raised (and they already buy from Russia below the OPEC price) as they have gotten enough cheap oil already, countries working with the West will not buy if the price cap is exceeded. All that is left is the illicit trade, but that will not be sufficient. Again, no boom in sight.
I'm assuming the Kremlin knows, but might be wrong I suppose.
Or, do you think Putin is that spiteful (and mad)?
He'd jeopardize lots more than himself, and has been told so by more than one party on more than one occasion.
(For that matter, there's a chance it could lead to unrest within Russia.)
At times, Putin comes through as meticulously calculating.
Incidentally, in this respect, I'd be more worried about Kim Jong Un.
Yes, let's continue, why not?
Quoting Jabberwock
... You literally wrote:
Quoting Jabberwock
Linking exchange rates to the commodity prices, somehow mitigating the already existing discounts that are too much of a discount and Russia's problem?
I didn't have time to unpack entirely how little sense that makes on each level. I leave it as an exercise to the reader.
I also didn't even have time to point out that Russia has large cash reserves and so can run a deficit.
We are all Keynesians now except for this guy.
Quoting Jabberwock
None of it is denominated in Rubbles.
Countries who sell commodities do so relative the international spot price of those commodities.
You have literally zero clue how the international commodities market functions and you're insistence on providing analysis based on complete ignorance is, as I say, remarkable.
Quoting Jabberwock
In any major macro-economic shift (such as cutting off nearly all trade with the West) there are losers and winners (what matters is how many of each in the mystical agragate of the economist). Russian economy is growing, so pointing out sectors that were losers from recent events is not indicative of the whole.
Quoting Jabberwock
First, Russia makes regular revenue and foreign exchange off the sale of resources in completely normal market conditions and does not require a boom to continue to do so.
Second, commodity price increases are due to either shocks (which are by nature unpredictable) or then follow the international business cycle (recessions put downward pressure on commodity prices and growth puts upward pressure, in a cycle that is not really cyclical but a one way street to environmental collapse, but that is a larger time frame than the war at hand).
Third, I must admit I do not know the reasons given, feel free to provide them again.
Quoting Jabberwock
... I thought you literally just told us because you know??
Quoting Jabberwock
Which is just anti-Russian rhetoric, I'd say racist, based on nothing, but also self-contradictory.
Quoting Jabberwock
You're argument was:
Quoting Jabberwock
Which definitely implies Russia is selling under a price cap few are willing to "break" and so the only way to increase revenue is to sell more volume but the mean Saudi's are demanding Russia keep output cuts.
But if you're now saying your argument was too "succinct" to make any sense or have and meaning, yeah, sure.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, zero understanding of commodity markets. Russia's primary concern when the war started was maintaining market share and ensuring it's oil flows somewhere. Storage is limited and stopping oil producing oil wells can be costly and do irreversible harm to the oil field for a bunch of complicated geological reasons (of course producing the oil efficiently will harm humanity more, but that's not Russia's main concern in 2022 or 2023 ... and possibly for the foreseeable future as they'll have a large amount of the world's arable land and can just watch world burn if they feel like, you know, we've been less than understanding).
Quoting Jabberwock
I literally explained several times that Russia (and Saudi Arabia and the other major oil exporters) want high prices and are perfectly happy to cut production if it means prices are higher. For example, obviously you'd be willing to sell 10% less if you are selling at 100% higher the price, but it's even more sensitive to price than that because what you actually care about is profits and the profits will increase even faster than revenue with price increases. It's basic math, I can break it down with additions and multiplications and subtractions if you want.
Now, what each oil exporter doesn't want to do is take it on themselves to cut production just to see another oil producer increase production and take their market share; if they did that then they'd be selling less at the same price and so simply making less money; if they then increased production to try to win back that market share then the price will decrease. The solution is to form a cartel and get enough of the market to coordinate production cuts to increase the price while no single cartel member looses market share relative the other members.
It's called friendship.
Quoting Jabberwock
Where do I argue some sort of commodities boom is coming? Generally speaking or even for Russia?
This literally comes from literally no where.
I've simply pointed out that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is quite usual and expected and not, in itself nor in this actual context, some harbringer of economic doom.
As long as Russia can sell a large quantity of commodities it will have foreign exchange and some sort of forex driven economic collapse (as certainly can happen as we've recently seen in Sri Lanka) is basically impossible in Russia's case.
Of course, some sectors of the Russian economy may do better may do worse, sanctions or central bank economic policies may or may not be the cause, but at the moment Russia's economy is growing so there's zero reason to believe there are some imminent economic problems that would affect the war effort, which is what we're discussing here.
Also, for people interested in actually understanding the situation rather than just swallow anti-Russia rhetoric, commodity producing nations don't go bust in one or two or several years. These are massive material and financial flows and have large amounts of momentum and what matters is a whole bunch of years. Even if Russia did sell at deep discounts in 2022 and 2023 (which we don't really have enough details of all the horse trading that goes on to really know much) this is just 2 years in decades and decades. 10 years would be a reasonable time frame to consider, such as Russia amassing a war chest over 10 years before invading Ukraine, and there is no evidence that Russian buyers of commodities have enough leverage to turn Russia into a vassal state that is unable to sell relative the international market rate.
If the Kremlin was faced with the unravelling of the Russian economy and state, from their perspective, nuking Ukraine would be stabilising.
Certainly that may not be true for the rest of the world, but we are considering the actions and decisions of the Russians in the scenario that NATO actually did provide "unlimited support" and "whatever it takes".
NATO would not nuke Russia in return and, at least in my opinion, nuking a bunch of key formations and infrastructure in Ukraine would arrest any offensive momentum. Some people disagree that nukes would be militarily effective ... but I find that hard to believe, and not just "because nukes" but because there are plenty of missile strikes on targets that survive and are repaired and attacked again (bridges, air-fields, logistics hubs) that a tactical nuclear weapon would not only dispatch in one go but permanently. The fact these targets are struck again and again simply to disrupt them indicates to me at least that they are of significant importance and simply nuking them off the map would be of comparable significant military advantage.
And yes, obviously would send the US to defcon 1 and things would be tense.
However, there's zero reason for the US to strike Russia with nuclear weapons and risk escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange so the US would likely do nothing.
Why would the US risk it's own cities in retaliating on Ukraine's behalf? Zero reason.
Now, the Neocons spent significant grey matter on trying to crack this impasse by brainstorming non-nuclear retaliation options that could potentially deter Russia from using nukes in Ukraine to therefore justify more and more advanced weapons systems being sent to Ukraine.
(Again, I don't think it's a given that there was a significantly better strategy than pouring in every piece of old soviet equipment NATO could find) but the neocons definitely wanted a "no limits" policy and that didn't happen because they never solved the nuclear retaliation (or lack thereof of an option) problem.
They'd say things like "oh, we'll strike Crimea with conventional missiles and sink the black sea fleet!!"
However, Russia could just eat that and not retaliate in turn as a "cost to doing business".
Of course, there would be significant costs to Russia and significant chaos down the line (including to Russia) due to the disruption to the international system using nukes would cause, which explains why they don't go around nuking people.
And, keep in mind, if Putin was hell bent on nuking Ukraine, or anyone, that would have happened already.
Putin is not an irrational actor, he has different goals that are at odds with Western goals but the West does not define rationality. The West goes around saying it defines rationality to justify imposing imperialistic policies on weaker parties since other forms of justification (the glory of the emperor or the will of God or straight up plunder) are incompatible with the Western advertised ethos.
Your argument was that depreciation of ruble was great for Russia, because it boosts exports. While in theory that is correct, in this particular case it will not boost Russian exports, for the numerous reasons I have already given.
Quoting boethius
Oh, so for balance point out which sectors are booming, beside the military ones.
Quoting boethius
Lol, you are hilarious... You know who Dmitry Medvedev is? This is what he said seven years ago (Google translated):
Quoting Dmitry Medvedev
Are you saying he is an anti-Russian racist?
Quoting boethius
Russia was selling under the price cap practically till June and it was accused of lying about the cuts (as Daniel Yergin pointed out).
Quoting boethius
Russia's primary concern was to maintain revenues, given that half of its budget is financed by resource exports. You are pretty confident China and India will buy same amounts for higher prices, but actually give no argument for that. And it does not align too well with the facts: China's July crude imports drop to lowest since January India's purchases peaked in April.
Quoting boethius
Again, what is true in principle does not necessarily apply to each and every situation. Sure, Russia would be happy to sell a somewhat smaller amount for a much higher price. The question is who will be happy to buy from Russia at those inflated prices. You assume that China and India will happily buy the same amounts of oil if it is much more expensive. That assumption is, to put it very mildly, unreasonable.
Quoting boethius
And I have pointed out why Russia's exports will stall while its imports soar. I did not write that I expect a collapse, I wrote that it will be more and more dififcult for Russia to pay for its imports.
Impressive, sinister, disgusting:
Russia’s latest effort to sway young minds: High-school textbooks praising the conflict in Ukraine
[sup]— Ivana Kottasová, Uliana Pavlova · CNN · Aug 9, 2023[/sup]
As per Sergey Kravtsov:
Quoting RIA Novosti · Jun 23, 2023
Quoting TASS · Aug 7, 2023
Quoting Katerina Tertytchnaya
Quoting Ian Garner
Putin consolidated powers and put Russia on a non-peace trajectory. Goes hand-in-hand with the reenculturation efforts that have come up in the thread. I'm guessing it'll work, at least to an extent, perhaps depending on what others do.
[sub]"War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength."[/sub]
No where do I say the depreciation of the Ruble is "great for Russia", I explain why the Russian central bank supported the Ruble and how letting the Ruble float (or close to float) is wiser and in some ways inevitable central bank policy policy. I explain there's winners and losers in these sorts of macro economic shifts, exporters of manufactured goods that have foreign buyers with inputs purchased in Rubles being among the winners but there are of course both losers and plenty of other effects.
My point is this currency change is no unexpected nor dramatic nor, due to the particular circumstances of having reoriented supply chains, not a signal of high risk or imminent collapse or inability to prosecute the war (which is what we're discussing).
I explain the depreciation is also in essence a tax on the middle class who therefore are losers in this scenario, insofar as they don't ultimately benefit from increased exports of manufactured goods and services.
I also explain how depreciation of the Ruble has nothing to do with Russia's ability to get foreign exchange in selling commodities on international markets denominated in foreign currencies (and the fact Russia forced some countries to pay in Rubles is of little importance).
More to the point, none of these macro-economic variables mean much if they aren't the cause of or symptom of recession, which the Russian economy is not currently in and the depreciation of the Ruble against other currencies is unlikely to cause recession.
Balance of trade and capital flows and so on can go one way one year and another way the other year ... or, you know, consistently have a trade deficit for decades such as in the case of the United States.
Quoting Jabberwock
He's saying the same thing as me:
Quoting boethius
Any economy will have sectors that rely heavily on imports, that is not indicative of the whole.
What is more indicative is recession or not. If the Russian economy is growing then maybe it's doing other things of value where it is more competitive.
Plenty of countries are not competitive in all those sectors you mentioned and a long list of other sectors.
Being competitive or then protecting / subsidising a domestic industry is important if the sector is strategic, but there is literally no country on the planet that is fully self sufficient.
If Russia is getting infrastructure built faster and cheaper by the Chinese then maybe that's building capacity that creates more overall value ... which is basically economics 101.
Japan imports a lot of oil, Saudi's import a lot of arms, America imports a lot of electronics and random stuff.
Pointing to an economy and then pointing to a sector that is heavily reliant on imports means absolutely nothing and you can do that with every country. What matters is if those dependence relations can be disrupted or manipulated. The West tried to disrupt those dependence relations prophesying doom and the Russian economy was able to adapt. Now the argument is the dependence relations are manipulated by China and India and so on and prophesying ... I'm not exactly sure, a few points off the international spot price for a few years?
Quoting Jabberwock
I have zero problem accepting massive discounts in 2022 and 2023, as I explain these are massive flows of material and finance over decades and centuries and what matters is the medium and long term and not any given year or two. I even explain why Russia needs to offload the oil at nearly any price as the oil wells can't easily be turned off and on. However, there is zero evidence Russia is somehow stuck with those discounts for any significant period of time.
You seem to just randomly assign points to me in total disconnect to anything I've written or the points you've made, and then argue against those points sometimes repeating my arguments I've made against your points that you've actually written.
It's tiresome.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia built up massive foreign currency reserves as well as gold and other precious metals reserves.
The priority in 2022 was not maintaining revenue (whole point of having a war chest) but to maintain market share, especially in fossil fuels.
The reason maintaining market share is important is that industrial projects and capacity can have long lead times and cost significant capital and may not be easy to just shut off and on again (in terms of the state of equipment, skills, supply lines, etc.), especially oil fields of which shutting off may damage the oil fields permanently.
So, Russia offered deep discounts to be sure to move it's stuff and maintain market share.
It would take many, many years for Russia to entirely deplete it's war chest and running a budget or trade deficit for a single year might be a warning sign or might be smart investment that will create larger growth and surpluses down the line, depends on what the money is spent on and what capacities imports help build.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's basic math.
Maybe I'll explain it tomorrow with the actual volume and price numbers of the recent oil market to show what price increases make the price cuts worth it in terms of revenue and the how much bigger an effect it has on profits (which is what matters).
Quoting Jabberwock
Well, the main point of my analysis is that this isn't the case.
Insofar as Russia sells a lot of commodities denominated in foreign currencies (how the international commodities market works) there will be the forex available to buy whatever imports Russia needs.
Across the board subsidising all imports is a simplifying measure that's practical in the case of the disruption of the sanctions to ensure business have the purchasing power to find substitutes, but now that the Russian economy has adapted it is far more efficient to let the currency float and then target the sectors you want to support (that have some strategic value) since supporting the price of the currency is a massive subsidy covering everything (dildos to capital flight) and so covers what you want but also everything you don't want or don't care about. Targeting subsidies means bureaucratic overheads (that you can't implement and scale in an emergency) but is far more efficient over the long run (why countries are constantly accusing each other of unfairly subsidising strategic sectors).
As long as Russia has a large foreign currency revenue from selling commodities it is easy for the Russian government to subsidise any given sector it wants to protect / grow.
There is no structural problem that is currently happening in Russia.
Of course, managing an economy is difficult and simply because Russia has the foreign exchange to subsidise imports of whatever it wants doesn't mean it will do so wisely, but that would be mismanaging in the future and not some structural problem that you seem to be describing.
Also, for the record I don't expect Russia to grossly mismanage these sorts of economic questions; Russian economic policy has been pretty effective in recent years so presumably that will continue.
We're discussing the hypothetical situation where at the start of the war NATO provided Ukraine no limits support and Ukraine routing the Russians and Russian lines and military falling apart and civil unrest and the economy unravelling due to both losing the war and the disruptive effects of the sanctions and the collapse of the Russian government imminent.
In such a situation, dropping nukes on Ukraine would stabilise the military situation as Ukraine would have no way to nuclear retaliate. Stabilising from their perspective (the perspective of the people considering nuclear use in a unstable and deteriorating situation).
Hence, NATO did not provide "no limits" support to Ukraine, so, in the least, NATO agrees with me.
It just doesn't seem like Ukraine can take it back...without getting destroyed in the process...and the Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas want to stay part of Russia
It's quite possible that this war becomes a frozen conflict (as Russia just loves frozen conflicts!) and Russia keeps the Donbass. However Russia giving "unhappy Ukrainians" the option to leave is more remote when you take into account just what Russia has now done in the occupied territories with it's Russification programs and even kidnapping children.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Wars do end some way or another in the end. And do note that Russia hasn't been able for a long time to conquer new territories and has entrenched itself in a very defensive posture, likely because of necessity.
I'm not so sure that the US & NATO response of using force in the case of nuclear weapons being used was just a bluff. Or is a bluff.
The response was to be / would be limited: to Russian targets in Ukraine and the Black Sea and likely would have been for a brief period. The Russian Air Force and the Black Sea fleet would have a tough time facing NATO air power over Ukraine.
It's one thing of NATO giving aid to Ukraine, it's another thing for NATO to create that "no-fly zone" over Ukraine that Ukrainians wanted in the first place or use active force. And notice the limited response: not a nuclear response, not striking Russia everywhere in an all out fashion.
Putin's rhetoric just confuses which are the sides here as giving weapons and aid to a country that is fighting the other Superpower was totally normal during the Cold War.
I know many disagree, but I believe the Donbass--which Russia certainly hasn't captured--was their territorial goal. I less have faith Russia could end this by actually capturing and holding it than I have little faith Ukraine could recapture it without losing an irrevocable amount of their people
To give an alternative possibility than the frozen conflict hypothesis of @ssu, the weapons systems being used are too advanced and too destructive to result in any sort of stability resulting in a war of attrition that the Ukrainians are losing.
Ukrainians are losing the war of attrition not simply because they are smaller country that can absorb less losses, but because they lack all sorts of capabilities entirely.
We could go weapons system by weapon system, but the overall reason is that NATO is designed primarily as an air force with the approach of gaining air superiority and then air dominance and then dealing with things on the ground by relentless bombing.
Whether this is the best strategy for NATO to have or not is of little importance in the current conflict since NATO doesn't want to and arguably can't effectively transfer this equipment to Ukraine anyways, and Russian air defence systems can shoot down all such planes, even F-35 and F-22, if they're close enough even without any particular technology to shoot down stealth air-craft. Stealth aircraft don't allow you to just go fly over the front and drop bombs at will with zero risk. Of course, perhaps US / NATO as a whole could effectively suppress and attrit Russian air defence and then be able to bomb at will or largely at will, which would be a different conversation.
What matters in the current situation is that even if NATO could establish air superiority / air dominance, itself against Russia, there's zero way to transfer these capabilities to Ukraine. Likewise, even more flexible (in terms of ground facilities) air assets like helicopter gun ships can't just be sent to Ukraine.
Long story short, Russia is prepared to fight exactly this kind of war and NATO is not for reasons that are easy to explain: 1. Russia is there 2. the US isn't there. Moreover, the US has no plausible threat of being invaded by land and so focuses on both defence projecting force globally by sea and air.
Even if NATO wanted to, it's simply impossible to just transfer the NATO way of war fighting to Ukraine.
For these reasons, support to Ukraine was most effective during the phase of just scrounging up old soviet equipment, and sending in NATO equipment instead has shown essentially zero results as Ukrainians have barely and training on these systems and they aren't designed for the conditions ... and you still need air power and air defence which Ukraine has essentially run out of.
To put it simply, Ukraine doesn't have the capacity to fight a war of attrition indefinitely and NATO doesn't have what Ukraine would need to even attempt to do so and Ukrainian man power and will is not some magical given but has a breaking point.
And the above is only in material and capacity terms, if you then consider in addition the strategic situation, Russia has a massive advantage.
For, the front line is not constrained to the South-East of Ukraine but is in fact the entire border with Russia and Belarus. Russia chooses to only fight in the South-East of Ukraine during this attritional phase of the conflict not simply because that's where the Russian speakers are and the land they want to keep, but also it's the farthest point from NATO supply lines in Poland. To supply the front in the South-East Ukraine needs to travel a maximum of distance which creates delays and all sorts of logistical problems while maximising the amount of time Russia has to observe material and troop movements and plan accordingly.
Not only has NATO forbid Ukraine to invade Russia proper but there's essentially no strategic advantage in doing so ... there's not really anywhere to go once you're in Russia.
So, if Ukraine wants to make gains it's only realistic choice is to attack the Russian heavily fortified lines in the South-East as there's nothing to accomplish in Russia and the purpose of the Ukrainian war effort is to liberate previously held Ukrainian territory. Ukraine can only attack where it will face the deepest mine fields and maximum fortifications.
However, no where is it written that Russia will just stay in the South-East along the built-up line of contact and can only attack Ukraine where it has build up defences. At any time Russia can move into Ukraine along any part of the border in "big arrow" offensive mode.
Sure, if you ignore all the differences between certain countries, then they are exactly the same. I am pointing specific issues which make Russia's situation difficult and you just ignore them and go back to your generalities.
Quoting boethius
Lol. No, he is not. He gives examples of specific sectors which indicate the bigger problem which is the overreliance on raw resource exports - that is the whole point of the meeting (and his speech). I have asked you to provide the examples of the sectors (beside the military one, which is also not doing that great) which are booming and seemingly you are unable to give any.
Quoting boethius
Yes, but Russia is not 'any economy', it is Russian economy. When I point out specific issues with it, you just dismiss them and go back to your generalities. Anyone even vaguely familiar with Russian economy knows that it is overreliant on resource exports (like many economies with access to significant resources) and knows that its industry is underdeveloped. Here is an Al Jazeera article on that, just in case you will not believe biased Western media. It is commendable that you have general knowledge, but it does not replace specific knowledge of the actual situation.
Quoting boethius
The actual issue is that you do not engage with any specific points, you just fall back on your general economic knowledge, which does not address the actual issues. For example, you wrote this long reply without addressing the issue of demand at all, even though I have pointed out repeatedly why Russia might have a problem with increasing revenue from supplies to India and China (which are its main clients now).
Quoting boethius
You forgot to mention that over half of that massive war chest is frozen by the West... Revenue might not be priority at the beginning of the war, but it is now. Budget spending ballooning by over 40% is not exactly a trifle. Running deficit might be a smart investment, if you expect that your revenues will increase or that your spending will decrease in near future, but neither seems likely in case of Russia. But sure, do your basic math: take the unfrozen part of the war chest, compare it to the amount Russia's budget spending increased this year and calculate how many are 'many, many years'.
Quoting boethius
No, it is not. 'Basic math' will not tell you how much oil China and India will buy if you increase the prices. If you disregard that factor, your 'basic math' calculations are utterly useless.
Quoting boethius
The problem is that the main point of your analysis is not supported by any facts. Insofar Russia sold a lot of commodities to clients who took advantage of their low prices, as it lost its other clients. Expecting that the new clients will buy the same amounts if the prices are significantly higher or that they will buy much more at the same prices requires a bit more stronger argument than just arithmetic projection. So give the actual argument. 'Export revenues can grow in any country' will not cut it.
Quoting boethius
Lol. That is most curious, given that Russia did not subsidize them properly when it had higher revenues and much lower expenditures. Are you even aware that Russia's economy peaked in 2014 and after Crimea failed to recover under much lighter sanctions?
Russia's economic situation would be difficult if it was in or we had reason to believe it was heading towards recession, that's what all these various macro economic variables synthesise to.
If all the things you point to were a "difficult situation" then why isn't there a recession or analysts predicting a recession?
Quoting Reuters - Russia to hold rates next week, 2023 GDP growth may improve, Reuters poll shows
And in the same article:
Quoting Reuters - Russia to hold rates next week, 2023 GDP growth may improve, Reuters poll shows
So there is zero "difficult situation".
Quoting Jabberwock
You're literally repeating my arguments to me.
You point to sectors reliant on exports as some sort of economic problem, I explain that (in the context of there being no recession) it would be only a problem if there's some strategic consideration; you then cite someone explaining the same thing, I point that out and then you re-explain this argument that reliance on imports is not a economic problem in itself (if there's no recession caused by said reliance, just normal economic phenomena of specialising in some things and importing others) but would be a strategic problem.
I.e. we both agree these imports do not represent some structural economic problem which was and is your argument.
Whether there's some strategic vulnerability, such as over-reliance on China, these imports represent is a different question, but you'd need to elaborate an actual argument of how China both intends and is going to actually exploit such reliance. For, China is also reliant on Russia for a significant amount of the commodities it needs.
And again, I don't claim Russia's economy is or will be booming.
I literally state:
Quoting boethius
You claim there is a "difficult situation".
What was you're original argument:
Quoting Jabberwock
You literally use the word "devastating".
Devastating for what? "for the Russian war effort".
Which is relevant to this conversation of the war in Ukraine.
You've now moved the goal posts to Russian economy is not "booming" after accepting all my arguments.
The key one is that Russia can effectively pay for whatever imports it needs for it's war effort with commodities: Russia sells commodities relative the international price (that has nothing to do with the value of the Rouble) and brings in foreign exchange which Russia can then use to buy imports it requires for military equipment.
At no point is Russia forced to try to buy foreign exchange with Roubles to then buy imports for military equipment.
You have zero clue what you're talking about and now just flailing around strawmen and throwing the goal posts off the field entirely.
If you're now no longer arguing that the currency devaluation is "devastating for the Russian war effort", then not being clear that you've retracted and reformulated your position to "not booming" and "weak in some strategic sectors" is tiresome, bad faith, and the sign of a weak mind that is not even aware of what it has said in the past, or then you're just a no-good, damn dirty liar.
If the ICC has made the case against these actions and the numbers are well in the many thousands, including cases where Russia has then released back Ukrainian children who had been taken earlier, the idea of it not happening is absurd.
Issuing Russian passports has been one way to advance Russification:
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
I think you make a separation of what the objectives were prior to the assault and what they have become after a year and a half of fighting. One assumption was that the Ukrainians wouldn't put up a defense and thus the "lightning strike" attempt for example towards Kyiv, which ended badly. It's a bit eary just how close to what Russia tried to get is to what Russian propaganda earlier published as the boundaries of Novorossiya:
Even if securing the land bridge to Crimea was successful, the obvious failure was to reach Odessa and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. Yet now it looks like Russians attempt to hold on what they have and not attempt (at least now) to go on the offensive. Building huge defensive lines also limits your own forces.
As to propaganda, there has been loads coming from both sides. The fact Russia has made clear only the Donbas is not on the table, and they would be free to negotiate without taking anymore does give some weight to the fact the Donbas was/is their goal....not proof, but weight.
And simplistic charts hardly express real human ambitions and/or realpolitik. It completely ignores the US-backed Maidan coup that overthrew a democratic election greatly backed by the citizens of the Donbas, the rise of the AZovs following the coup whose crimes against Donbas Ukrainians were chronicled by Amnesty international, and Poroshenko's banning of the Russian language...all leading to Donbass calls for independence Putin told them not to do. Do you have any sympathies for these Russian Ukrainians or do you just see them as vile separatists Ukraine can treat however they like. I would imagine it's the former
‘We expected less resistance’: Ukrainian troops on southern front learn not to underestimate their enemy
[sup]— Nick Paton Walsh, Kosta Gak, Olha Konovalova, Florence Davey-Attlee, Brice Laine · CNN · Aug 9, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Julia (frontline medic)]Hatred is very strong.[/quote]
:/
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Crimea?
I mean the country Putin is president of. If you prefer: why did Putin invade Ukraine? Although, that's an awkward sentence. Why did Putin direct his armed forces to invade Ukraine?
Putin is the leader of Russia. Had he not wanted to invade Ukraine, it wouldn't have been invaded. Why did Putin want Ukraine attacked? What do you think was his primary motivation?
So, I think Putin did this for Putin, but it was also a smart, beneficail move for his country as a NATO-member Ukraine could wipe out the Donbass Russians with NATO's full backing and The US could use Ukraine to continually attack Russia through their NATO base. And does Putin care about the Donbass Russians? Probably not. But Russians do and certainly wouldn't want them erased
Yes, you are repeating claims that have been repeated already many many times in this thread.
What is the rule here? Are positions only allowed to be said once?
In similar fashion dozens of countries ought to have the "right not to consider" other countries and territories similarly. But once you acknowledge the independence of a country and it's borders, be it Ukraine, Ireland or Finland, you don't make statements of that country being "artificial" or that it's independence was an error or accident. Or that the borders are wrong. The insanity of Russian imperialism would perhaps be more clear to people if some other country would start similar rhetoric about their neighbors. Perhaps Austria should declare it's objective to re-establish the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the UK would declare that it's objective is to get the whole of Ireland back into the Kingdom, because Home Rule etc. was an error. After all, the two countries have language and cultural ties quite as long as Russia and Ukraine share.
But once a country doesn't recognize the borders of it's neighbors, it becomes instantly a genuine threat to it's neighbors. The preferable method would be everything in the neocolonial playbook to influence your neighbors, but annexation of territory goes too far.
This is the reason just why Europe has gotten so against Russia's actions. It is also the reason why NATO has enlarged itself as it has, because Finland and Sweden would have never, ever, joined NATO and would happily have good relations with Russia if it wasn't for the 2022 invasion.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
What missiles are you talking about? Besides, Ukraine wouldn't have become a NATO member. It wouldn't have been just the countries like Hungary that would have opposed this, it actually would have been Germany. But then February 24th 2022 happened. Ukraine's path to NATO would have been blocked just the way Turkey's EU membership is off and no way happening, but theoretically (hypocritically) possible.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Well, it's a bit difficult to catch up to a thread that is over 500 pages long, I guess.
It depends on what you take to be a resolution of such claims. For sure there is enough disagreement.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
The rule here is that positions ought to be repeated many more times than God can count.
Probably not that simple, and rightly isn't quite right. :)
But you're right that Crimea has had an increasing population of Russians.
Whether Khrushchev was wrong or not [sup]("was carried out in accordance with the 1936 Soviet constitution")[/sup], the previous ethnic cleansing was wrong.
Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?
[sup]— Mark Kramer · Wilson Center · Mar 23, 2014[/sup]
Shifting Loyalty: Moscow Accused Of Reshaping Annexed Crimea's Demographics
[sup]— Rostyslav Khotin, Rostyslav Khotin, Robert Coalson · RFE/RL · May 31, 2018[/sup]
Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution
[sup]— Steven Pifer · Brookings · Mar 18, 2019[/sup]
Myth 12: ‘Crimea was always Russian’
[sup]— Orysia Lutsevych · Chatham House · May 13, 2021[/sup]
They almost all do, or at least act as if they have that right. Look what's going on in Niger; France and USA are threatening and terrorizing it as if its their country. The US currently has bases there and in Syria, which they bombed as if it was their territory, and are stealing their oil. They did it to Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, too, and with the NATO--a supposedly defensive alliance's--help. They bombed Yugoslavia and cut Kosovo out of it with no respect for those borders at all. So we clearly have no set rules about border respect. And again, Crimea was never part of Ukraine proper but part of it when it was a territory for 40 years, after being part of Russia for hundreds. Even if there is a rule about borders, it wouldn't quite apply hereQuoting ssu
Quoting ssu
This isn't an issue of imperialism at this point. It is a security and territorial dispute. You can argue its a wrong one on Russia's part, but this isn't--at least not yet--an act of imperialism. Also, there's no "insanity" here, unless you think France and the US are acting insane now in NigerQuoting ssu
Quoting ssu
Actually, you do. Do you actually think Putin, or any somewhat functional world leader, tells us their exact motivations? I'm no Putin fan, like Biden, Macron, Zelensky, Trump, and Obama, he is an oppressive, neoliberal Capitalist leader who has robbed his own people. That being said, I don't think it's wise to assume leaders you don't like are stupid. Putin may be a lot of things, but he hasn't survived in Russia for so long by being stupid
Quoting ssu
NATO missiles. And none of this is true. It is fact the US refused to take Ukraine membership off the table; considering NATO's spread, that rightly threatened NATO and Russia. It is fact Ukraine refused to promise NATO neutrality, meaning they would have been fair NATO territory for NATO missiles, weapons, and soldiers. This also rightly threatened Putin and Russia
It's cliche by now, but remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Was Kennedy wrong to feel threatened
Yes, "rightly" is a bit too pat. However, and the ethnic cleansing was wrong, the will of the Crimeans, the Russian history of Crimea, and the Poroshenko/Zelensky treatment of Crimea does make it best for the Crimeans to stay in Russia. If, after all this, they choose to move to Ukraine, I would support that
France and it's former colonies should have another thread, but France isn't annexing it's former colonies back!
The perfect example in this case is Belarus compared to Ukraine. Russia has (also) aspirations for Belarus, it has troops in the country, close ties yet it hasn't annexed territories of Belarus or questioned it's sovereignty. And nobody is openly complaining about this, because Belarus a sovereign state.
Russia has usually used proxy forces, which it has backed up with it's armed forces if (or when) the proxies have gotten into trouble. This has happened in Transnistria, Georgia and in Ukraine with the so-called "frozen conflicts". And this kind of warfare by Russia was tolerated by Western Europe for long. Yet the annexations of large parts of Ukraine simply went over the line.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Nonsense.
Russian imperialism has been, all the time in history, about security and territory. Yeah, there's no large oceans separating Russia from what isn't Russia, but in their place Russia just has a huge steppe. Hence Russian imperialism has always been about going as far as possible you can go, no matter how un-Russian these Asian or European territories have been. It is the version of Russian imperialism and colonialism. After all, Russia is genuinely an empire, not a nation state, even now. Catherine the Great put it quite aptly when she said: "“I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”
That is in the heart of Russian imperialism.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Not their exact motivations, but do you then totally dismiss what they state for their reasons for the actions they do? If you do so, you should explain why. Because what Putin says about Ukraine does matter. Just as important as is his opposition to NATO.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Again, what "NATO missiles" in Ukraine are you talking about?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
And the fact is that NATO is an international organization where the US doesn't decide everything and new members have to be accepted by all members. Just look at how difficult the road for Sweden has been. Hungary openly opposes NATO membership of Ukraine (see here) and there's not much the US can do. Remember how many times the US and it's presidents have been disappointed in NATO.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Notice that this thread started before February 24th 2022. Hence the name of the thread is Ukraine crisis, not Ukraine war. And we aren't talking about the US invasion of Cuba or the US-Cuban war.
Hence if Putin would have just staged a huge exercise and gotten the promises that NATO wouldn't enlarge to Ukraine (which it did get from Germany), then that would be similar to Cuban Missile Crisis.
And this just shows how weak the argument is that it was all about NATO expansion that made him do it, because obviously when listening to Putin, it wasn't. Sure, NATO was one perfect reason especially for the anti-US propaganda, but forgetting other reasons (Crimea, Novorossiya) is simply wrong. If Ukraine would have a constitution like Moldova that forbids NATO membership, it's still likely that Putin's Russia would have started this war. Crimea being the best example of this.
France has miltary bases in Niger the country wants out, they have half their financial reserves in their bank, and they are crossing into Niger's airspace. That is imperialism and disrespect of borders, period. Anyone OK with that has no place complaining about Russia
Quoting ssu
No, this is a terrible analogy. Belarus and Russia are allies with shared ethnic groups. France is a racist white colonizer of Niger, a country like all the countries they have inhabited--they have brutalized and robbed of their resources
Quoting ssu
No. Great sense
Sorry, but the history of Russian imperialism can't compete with that of the NATO countries like the US, Spain, Germany, the UK and France. So, if you'r going back to Catherine the Great--love Elle Fanning by the way--then we have to discuss all of theirs. Yes histories are important, but we still have to evaluate acts on their own to a great degree. This invasion needs to be evaluated with history in mind, but not as the determinant. Same with the US and France's imperialist actions in Niger
Quoting ssu
No I dont' and I never did. You seem to treat them like gospel, though and that is in error
Quoting ssu
The missiles NATO regularly puts in their NATO countries, many of them pointing to Russia. If you think the US has made public what exact missiles they put in, that would be naive, no?
Quoting ssu
Thinking the US doesn't control NATO is just naive. They spend the most money, have the most bases, and they are the only country who starts their own wars and drag evereyone else into it, bossing around the other NATO countries as they do. Hungary and Orban are outliers and they already want him out, just like they got out Imran Khan
Quoting ssu
The Cuban Missile crisis is extremely relevant, both historically and strategically. So, I used it as analogy. That's how discourse often works
Quoting ssu
So it doesn't show how weak this argument is or that it is weak at all. Again, you think you know Putin's motivations; I don't get that. And correctly crticizing the US is not anti-US propaganda. I coordinated protests of the Iraq war...lot of people called that criticism "anti-US propagana too." And no, they wouldn't have started it. Ukraine had been a country for almost 25 years before Maidan, many of those years run by Putin. There was no conflict before Maidan
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
? This would be a common fallacy.
It's been a while since Crimea was a part of Russia. It's been a legitimate part of Ukraine for a while. In 2014 Putin's Russia launched the land-grab. The UN concurs. "Period" (to use your word). But of course human rights should be respected in Crimea. And in Russia, Belarus, etc. Ukraine has to fulfill this and a few other things to be accepted into the EU. From memory, Ukraine has to be a transparent democracy to be accepted by NATO. Putin's Russia has regressed, Ukraine has progressed some (barring PTSD). Putin's supposed NATO-phobia has also been discussed (not sure I'm up to digging it all out).
No, it's not a common fallacy; it's not a fallacy at all. It has not been a legitimate part of Ukraine for a while; it has been a part of it for a short while compared to how long it has been part of Russia. It's like saying if Kruschev gave Ukraine to Belarus for the same amount of time, Ukraine would legitimately be part of Belarus...it wouldn't
Putin's Russia has not regressed, their economy is going strong, Brics is going well, and it looks like they're getting the Donbass...and they're now China's number one pal. Ukraine hasn't progressed. They've had civil war and strife since the Maidan coup, they've been consistently listed among the most corrupt countries in Europe, they've lost hundreds of thousands of their citizens--and probably the Donbass--and NATO and US are losing patient with them.
Lol.
Just as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso were allies with France ...until a change in leadership! And the huge protests against Lukashenko earlier (until Russia sent help) and that some Belarussians are fighting for Ukraine show that all is not fine and dandy in Belarus. Many Belarussian commentators have been worried that Russia will take over their country for a long time.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
What is naive is totally dismissing how the organization actually works.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Again, you should give reasons just why you ignore the reasons Putin has given for his annexations of territory. I don't get that.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Glorious Russia going from triumph to triumph!!! Hail Putin!!!
(Corruption Perceptions Index)
Ukraine: 116th
Russia: 137th
I wonder if Russia making a large scale attack on Ukraine has had an effect on just why Ukraine has it so bad now...
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
and then claim
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
why are you so confidently expressing the following?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
OK let's not talk about Putin's, Biden's, Zelensky's, Macron's, and Xi's motivations, or simply assume they are selfish and self-centered. Let's talk about "legitimate threat against the country and himself", what makes a threat perception (NOT based on leaders' actual motivations because we do not know that other than assuming they are selfish) but on potential and precedent (like placing NATO missiles on the border between Ukraine and Russia that could kill Russian people and trigger a regime change in Russia) "legitimate"? And what would need to happen for you to believe that is an act of imperialism yet?
Because the economy is in war mode. Russia is spending a lot of money to make new weapons, ammunition etc. Therefore its industrial output is steady, there is no unemployment (in fact, there are drastic labor shortages), wages in some sectors are steadily increasing etc. So on paper there is no recession. The catch is that this industrial output mostly goes up in smoke - it does not contribute to the development of the economy as a whole, in fact it drains other sectors of labor force and support, so it is not prime pumping, just the opposite.
Quoting boethius
No, we do not agree that the problem is limited to some sectors, you just assert that contradicting the sources I have provided.
Overreliance of Russia's industry on imports due to its underdevelopment was a serious problem even before the war. A majority of the Russian industry run mostly on Western technology. Those inputs now, due to sanctions, are seriously limited. While the industry can run without that input for some time, it has no potential to grow, simply because Russia does not have an extended technological base. China will not be willing to commit to develop it, of course, as it would be against its interests. And it will demand premium on whatever it decides to supply, given that Russia has very limited options. In the foreseeable future Russia will not have any significant exports beyond resources and its other sectors will likely stagnate or shrink. For the same reasons its imports will grow. That is why its trade surplus is quickly shrinking.
Quoting boethius
Yes, I retract the inital argument, it was based on the data (supposedly from the Bank of Russia, shown in the chart before) that half of Russian exports are denominated in ruble, which seemingly was incorrect.
LOL...Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso were colonies (not allies) of France---and France clearly thinks Niger still is. You must think Haiti and Algeria were France's allies and India was Britain's...:) And Belarusians not liking Russia doesn't keep them from being their ally. Many europeans hate America; that doesn't mean their countries aren't America's allies
Quoting ssu
And I didn't do so...you and others should stop doing so, though
Quoting ssu
I didn't ignore those reasons. I correctly said they alone don't constitute his motivations. You should stop ignoring that
Quoting ssu
Ukraine's corruption level was terrible way before the invasion
Quoting ssu
You said it, not me
Quoting neomac
I didn't accuse others. He said he knew Putin's motivations beforehand
Quoting neomac
Because I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things
Quoting neomac
I'm not addressing motivations or psychologies here. I'm addressing general characteristics...and most leaders' today, particualry the ones Ilisted, are greatly driven by self interest....as many firemen/women are greatly driven by wanting to help people. You think otherwise?
Quoting neomac
A legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat. What do you think a legitimate threat is? And when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism
Where did he say it? Can you quote him saying this verbatim?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
By distinguishing imperialist acts and imperialist motivations, are you suggesting that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts have no imperialist motivations? If so, do you have historical examples to illustrate your point?
BTW psychologists typically talk about motivations based on people's behavior (words and acts), right?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
OK when you are talking about selfish leaders (selfishness here is about leaders' psychology and motivations, right?) you do not mean to address particular motivations or psychologies but general ones. Talking generally about motivations and psychologies , I suspect that the difference between politicians and ordinary people in terms of "selfishness" may be biased in favor ordinary people when the judgement comes from ordinary people.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea? If so when did it start to become a legitimate threat to Ukraine? If not, was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine before the invasion of Crimea?
Here you go:
"I wouldn't presume to know his actual motivations. I don't know him and I'm not a psychologist.
— Jack Rogozhin
You don't have to be. A good start is to read what Putin has said and written. There's bound to be some links to his actual motivations on what he has written or what speeches he has given."
Quoting neomac
Where did I distinguish between imperialist acts and imperialist motivations? Where did I say the invasion was an imperialist act, and how do you draw that suggestion from the first premise? You're making a lot of unfounded assumptions here
Quoting neomac
No, selfishness is a characteristic, not a motivation. If a hot-headed person yells at someone because they are hot-headed, that doesn't mean they are motivated by hot-headedness. Again, you are drawing unfounded conclusions
Quoting neomac
If ordinary peoples' judgments of politicians are just a reflection of their own bias, then every ordinary person's judgement of Putin would just be their bias, not an objective judgment. I'm surprised you believe that
Quoting neomac
You ask the same question twice here and you make the presumption Russia just invaded Crimea out of the blue without taking into account the factors preceding and causing that, so the question is a loaded one. Also, if by threat, you mean actually threatening Ukraine,I would say no
This is a very good point to make. Economists rarely want to take into consideration of their models when countries are in wartime economy: the statistics just look so great. Never mind that people are worse off, production figures are usually off the charts. Conscription of hundreds of thousands do have an effect on labour. The only negative aspect is if your enemy is destroying your factories and infrastructure and you have millions of refugees ...like Ukraine is experiencing now.
[sup]— Samya Kullab, Illia Novikov, Emma Burrows · AP · Aug 11, 2023[/sup]
I'm not sure "trade" expresses how generous Russia has been. At least Ukraine has received some good air defense from others, though "sitting ducks with some repellent" is a precarious situation.
[sup]? Svitlana volunteers (Efrem Lukatsky · AP · Aug 11, 2023); is that an AK-47?[/sup]
The African countries have been allies in the War on Terror (that curious war that started with 9/11, you remember). Operation Serval was widely appraised... and then things turned south (as usual they do). But back in 2013:
With Operation Barkhane things went something like in Afghanistan and France ended the operation last year. In the vacuum, the countries seem to hope for Russia to be solution.
And Belarussia was a part of the Russian Empire and then part of the Soviet Union. Just like Kazakhstan etc. Heck, my country was a colony of Russia for a brief time.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
And corruption was worse in Russia, yet I think the damage the war has done to the economy is worse.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Really? :smirk:
The fact you are still denying they were coloinies of France, and are still being treated as such by France is bizarre. It goes against the facts. Feel free to show how they have not been colonies. You haven't yet
The fact France worked with friendly governments--like the recently overthrown one-- at times doesn't change that, particularly since France has, along with the US, worked with those same jihadists who have terrorized Niger
And no, Russia's corruption wasn't worse, but at least we both agree Ukraine and Russia have been corrupt way before the invasion
And yeah, you said it, not me. Really :grin:
It seems you are both saying that NATO is putting nuclear missiles in countries bordering Russia and this is not public knowledge. That seems to be rather self-contradictory? Given that you say that NATO does that 'regularly', where exactly it did that and when?
Here is some info for you if you don't
https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/NATO_NSNW_factsheet.pdf#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20it%20is%20estimated%20that%20there%20are,Base%20in%20the%20Netherlands%2C%20and%20Incirlik%20in%20Turkey.
"The United States and its NATO allies do not disclose exact figures for its European-deployed stockpiles."
What exactly do you think NATO was going to do with Ukraine for defense once it became member?
The reason why I talked about “accusation” is that in the passage you just quoted ssu is arguing about a link between Putin’s motivations and what he said. So if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts (like invading and annexing Donbas and Crimea) others can ground their claims about Russian imperialism on speech acts (like denying Ukrainian identity as distinct from the Russian, talking about denazifying Ukraine) made to legitimate certain non-speech acts.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Dude, chill down, I’m still exploring your assumptions with some questions. You distinguish acts from motivations (“I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”). And then you distinguish imperialist acts from non-imperialist acts (“when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”). And you also seem to acknowledge that imperialist motivations can exist in political leaders, but you don't know if Putin's motivations are imperialist, that's why you focus on acts. Therefore you must distinguish imperialist motivations from imperialist actions too, that’s logic.
I didn’t say nor implied that you said “the invasion was an imperialist act”. I’m aware you are trying to argue against it.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
I didn’t mean that selfishness is a motivation, but that when you talk about leaders’ selfishness you are talking about psychology and motivations of such leaders. Indeed, it’s hard for me to even understand what you mean by “selfishness” without referring to people’s motivations.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
First, my claim was generic about ordinary people’s bias, I didn’t say every ordinary person is biased about politicians’ selfishness. Generic generalisations should not be conflated with universal generalisations. The bias I’m referring to can be read in different ways: e.g. avg politicians may be prone to selfish reasoning no more than avg ordinary people, “selfish” reasoning may not always be as bad as ordinary people would often assume.
Second, concerning Putin, he may hold some nationalist motivations (and I don’t take nationalism to be a form a selfishness) besides worrying about his own political or material survival (which would be a more selfish motivation).
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
I asked you the same question by mistake. Indeed my second question should have been “was Russia a legitimate threat to Ukraine [s]before[/s] after the invasion of Crimea?”. I’m not making “the presumption Russia just invaded Crimea out of the blue without taking into account the factors preceding and causing that” (assumed it makes sense). On the contrary I’m reasoning from your own assumptions. You yourself claimed “histories are important, but we still have to evaluate acts on their own to a great degree” (like all the declarations against Ukraine joining NATO) and “a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat”. So If NATO could be perceived as a legitimate threat by Russia, why couldn’t Russia be perceived as a legitimate threat by Ukraine prior to the invasion of Crimea and/or after?
[sup]— Edith M Lederer · AP · Aug 10, 2023[/sup]
A fifth of Georgia, a fifth of Ukraine (at the moment), ..., enlarging the world's largest country.
Dmitry Polyanskiy · Aug 10, 2023 (notice the X :grin:)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Dpol_un/status/1689694111832395777[/tweet]
A couple or so continents Russophobic? :brow: Putinistaphobic, maybe, and not democracyphobic. Putin has managed to create much hate [sup](May 26, 2023; Aug 1, 2023)[/sup], not the least in Ukraine. Sacrificed? The Ukrainians want to join the EU, were and are asking for help in repelling the invaders, etc. They said "No", and the UN concurs. Polyansky is repeating the scripted partyline, give it up already, "alternate world" type bullshit [sup](Mar 4, 2023; Jun 16, 2023; Jul 11, 2023; Jul 28, 2023)[/sup].
FYI, old interview, journalist on the ground, diplomat in New York:
There is no ‘war’ in Ukraine, claims Russia’s deputy ambassador to the UN
[sup]— Krishnan Guru-Murthy · Channel 4 · Mar 29, 2022 · 13m:20s[/sup]
Re nukery: Oct 16, 2022 (e.g. @Jack Rogozhin)
That second quote isnt mine (it's SSU's). So, I still made no accusation and you haven't shown I have. I also made no speech acts and you haven't shown I have. Also, you don't get to tell me how I make my arguments, just as I don't get to tell you how you make yours. Let's actually discuss the issue
Quoting neomac
I am and was chill, and my quote you posted shows that. So, you need to chill a bit yourself. I made no assumptions. As I showed, you have and did. And no, one does not have to distinguish imperialism motivations from non-materialist motivations when one does so with imperialist and non-materialist acts, and I already showed that. Your saying otherwise is just an assumption, not logic. Show otherwise if you can
Quoting neomac
I showed why this you're wrong here in the quote you quoted of mine above. I'm sorry your understanding of "selfishness" is limited as such
Quoting neomac
Generic and universal work the same here; universal is just more extreme. You made a claim about how ordinary people are biased towards politicians, and I correctly showed how that would apply to their (including your) view of Putin as well
Quoting neomac
Yes, and evaluating acts on their own to a great degree includes immediate and primary causes, with less (but not no) attention given to older history. That would include the Maidan coup, the burning alive of the Crimean anti-coup protesters in the trade house building, Kiev's shelling of the Donbass Ukrainians, and Kiev's admitted (Merkle admits this too) breaking of the Minsk Accords
I answered your final question in my last post. You're repeating your questions again
[sup]— AP · Aug 11, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Wally Adeyemo
4 billionaires (Aven, Fridman, Khan, Kuzmichev) further restricted. Businesses of Putinistas curtailed. Un/fair?
Well, you did write 'regularly'.
And no, your link does not back that up. NATO stopped doing that in the 1950s, that is BEFORE the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since then no new countries received nuclear weapons. So there are no reasons to believe that NATO would deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine, if it did not deploy them in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia.
And yes my link backed it up as it did not show they stopped doing that in the 1950s. So, you're just wrong or lying. I'll give you the credit for the former
And you never answered the question above. Do you really think NATO just sends money to its member countries? :grin:
Your link shows that they introduced nuclear weapons to new countries after 1950s? Which countries exactly?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Your claim was that NATO regularly puts missiles into NATO countries, I wanted to clear up what exactly you meant by that. For now all I know is that 'regularly does not mean on a regular basis'. So what missiles did you have in mind, what countries and when?
I have answered all of your questions...and shown you to be wrong. You have still not answered my one question above. It is time for you to start answering my questions, starting with this one
If your answer to 'what missiles does NATO deploy regularly to NATO countries' are the missiles deployed lastly in the 1950s, then it clearly contradicts your claim that Russia could be threatened by NATO missiles deployed in Ukraine, given that NATO does not deploy nuclear missiles in any new NATO countries.
I will answer your questions not related to missiles after we settle your claims about missiles.
And you don't get to decide what questions are asked and answered, and you don't get to be the only one who asks questions and have them answered
I will continue discussing this subject with others whom--while we disagree--do not engage in such bad faith. Have a good weekend
You have claimed that Russia could be threatened by missiles deployed in Ukraine and pointing at Russia. However, NATO has not deployed such missiles in any new country since 1950s, so we have absolutely no reason to believe that it would start doing that in Ukraine. Thus your claim is completely unfounded. instead of admitting that you were uninformed on this issue, you engage in bad rhetoric.
First, your name in the quotation came from the quotation function not from me.
Second, you are right. I didn’t formulate my question appropriately. I was wrong in using the word “accusation” there. Mea culpa. What however I noticed is that ssu didn’t make any explicit knowledge claim first, it was you to introduce it while commenting his claims, to question ssu implicit knowledge claim. I didn’t find it fair because “if you can ground your claims about Russian imperialism on non-speech acts (like invading and annexing Donbas and Crimea) others can ground their claims about Russian imperialism on speech acts (like denying Ukrainian identity as distinct from the Russian, talking about denazifying Ukraine) made to legitimate certain non-speech acts.”
Third, when I talked about “speech acts” I was referring to the acts committed by Russia, not you. You based your arguments on Russian invasion and annexation, ssu based his arguments based on what Putin said and wrote to legitimate Russian invasion and annexation.
Forth, to be clear, if I don’t understand your reasoning or your assumptions, and I feel like questioning them, then I’ll question them. I've been doing this for several hundred pages before you joined the thread and nothing could change it. That’s a philosophy forum after all.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Unless your glibly usage of the verb “to show” shows otherwise.
I didn’t say that one has “to distinguish imperialism motivations from non-materialist motivations when one does so with imperialist and non-materialist acts”. I took as premises your distinctions between motivations and acts, between imperialist acts and non-imperialist acts, and between imperialist motivations and non-imperialist motivations, and then concluded that also imperialist motivations and imperialist acts are distinct. If set M (set of motivations) is distinct from set A (set of actions), M is constituted by subsets M1 and M2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist motivations), and A is constituted by subsets A1 and A2 (e.g. imperialist and non-imperialist acts), then M is distinct from A subsets as much as A is distinct from M subsets as much as M subsets are distinct from A subsets. This conditional must be logically true if we understand the notion of “distinction” in the same way. If not, I literally do not understand what you are claiming.
So either those premises are wrong or we do not share the same notion of “distinction”. That’s all there is to clarify to me at this point.
Again, I’m simply asking questions to understand your assumptions (for example on what you take to be imperialist or a legitimate threat). And for that reason I do not want my non-shared implicit assumptions nor misreadings nor my slips of the tongue get in the way of your attempts to clarify yourself. What I can’t avoid however is to question your views on things I find unclear or unconvincing about your claims. Your final balance sheet of what you succeeded in showing and I failed at every round doesn't impress me and, worse, it shows nothing more than your lack of self-confidence to me.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
All right, can you give me your definition of “selfishness” as a general characteristic that is not about motivations and psychologies? Because after a quick check on wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_egoism) I find statements like this: [I]Psychological egoism is the view that humans are always motivated by self-interest and selfishness, even in what seem to be acts of altruism. It claims that, when people choose to help others, they do so ultimately because of the personal benefits that they themselves expect to obtain, directly or indirectly, from so doing[/I]. And this is also what I mean when I claim that “selfishness” even as a general characteristic is still about psychology and motivations.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
First, if you intend to question my assumptions appropriately, fine but you have to understand them as close as possible to how I understand them. I didn’t make a particularly strong claim, I just made a cautious conjecture. Concerning the distinction of generic generalisations and universal generalisations, they are not the same as far as my claims are concerned, I clarified what I meant, plus there is a whole entry in SEP (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/), if you are unfamiliar with it.
Second, I also answered positively about Putin to the extent that ordinary people’s may be biased about Putin’s selfishness too. I don’t find it implausible that Putin could be motivated to some extent by genuine nationalist reasons as his rhetoric of the great patriotic war, the Russian minority genocide in Ukraine and Russian Crimea suggests, and I don’t take Putin’s nationalist motives to be selfish motives as such. That is perfectly compatible with Putin also having more selfish motives like his political survival.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
You see, there is a lot more to unpack in your “evaluating acts on their own to a great degree”. Each example of “immediate and primary causes” you listed is controversial and can be used to argue the opposite, namely that the alleged coups and their consequences were “immediate and primary causes” for Ukraine to look for Western support against a foreign power messing up within its territory, and discounting the fact that Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules. But I’m not interested to investigate them further at this point. What I would say though is that none of them SHOWS “a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat” AGAINST Russia to me, does it to you? The torture, imprisonment, and persecution of (more than a million?) muslim Uyghurs by China doesn’t count as a legitimate threat to muslim states from China, or does it to you?
I absolutely didn't say that. Actually, the Sahel is worth a thread of it's own so I started one here. Especially what is happening with Niger.
I think I've made my point there.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
By that list I quoted it is.
Lukashenko joking about Wagner troops on the Polish border.
Sabre rattling...
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
You did say that. I pointed out Niger was a French colony and you countered by saying they were allies. But at least we both agree Niger was a French colony and is still being treated as one
Quoting ssu
That list is neither exhaustive nor the authority on the matter. But at least we can agree both Ukraine and Russia are corrupt
Allies in the war on Terror. Belarus is an ally of Russia. But Belarus has also been a part of Russia. And Russia influences Belarus a lot. Has a lot of forces in Belarus.
Please see the other thread about Niger.
Quoting ssu
Quoting neomac
As you can see, that quote couldn't have come from the quote function as it was SSU's quote responding to me. To willfully misrepresent that is either a mistake or dishonest; i'll assume it was the former
Quoting neomac
SSU did make a knowledge claim about how I could know things. I, on the other hand didn't "ground my claims on Russian imperialism on non-speech acts" and you didn't show I did. Also you are mixing up two discussions here, try to stick the one that was at hand
Quoting neomac
I never said you can't question my reasonings...I made no assumptions. I said you can't misrepresent my reasoning and arguments as you are doing now. This is a philosophy forum after all
Quoting neomac
My usage of the verb "to show" wasn't glib; it was accurate
Quoting neomac
You did say that.
Quoting neomac
So what is your point here? I literally do not understand what you are claiming
Quoting neomac
This is just ad hominem and projection. It shows nothing more than your lack of self-confidence to me. And what do you mean by "final balance sheet"? It's a bizarre phrase for a philosophical discussion
Quoting neomac
Yes: the quality or condition of being selfish...from Merrian-Webster. As I said, it's a characteristic
Quoting neomac
No, nothing I said was controversial. You keep making claims without backing them up, and that is not appropriate for a philosophical conversation. Also, the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what is both wrong and anti-Humanist. According to you, American slaves and Native Americans needed to bow to its country's rules of slavery and oppression, and Japanese Americans would have been wrong to defy the US' internment of them...and all rebels, including the American Revolutionaries were inherently wrong. This is pure authoritarianism. Poroshenko literally said Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas would be cut off from state benefits and their own language and you want them to sit like good dogs and take it...because rules?
BBC News Russian: Russian officer flees to Lithuania and requests political asylum
[sup]— Meduza, BBC · Aug 11, 2023[/sup]
Mar 22, 2023; Jun 23, 2023
Some give their reasons, though they may just try to appease authorities at their destination, or not.
I suppose some overall/unspecific categories/reasons could be freedoms, justice systems, living standards, politics, regress, oppression, fear, ... Seems less likely that some would do so to spy for Putin's Russia or sabotage their destination, though it has happened in cases where, say, a ragtag group of refugees arrives at a border post.
Leaving/defecting/fleeing (either way) takes resources/resourcefulness that not everyone has, and of course it takes motivation/rationale.
Russians stop providing insulin to civilians without Russian citizenship in occupied village in Kherson Oblast
[sup]— Tetiana Lozovenko · Ukrainska Pravda · Aug 11, 2023[/sup]
Destabilize/insurrect, propaganda efforts, invade, bomb, threaten, reenculturation efforts, sham votes, annex, force citizenship, landgrab, ... Imperialism, enlarging the world's largest country.
Whatever happened to the Ghost of Kiev and the Snake Island "massacre"?
And (as they incidentally point out) it's not the first such report.
Aug 4, 2023
( :grin: Ghosts ... Nov 18, 2022 )
And it not being the first report doesn't change that. There were lots of reports about the "Ghost of Kiev"--which was a total hoax--and Russian bounties in Afghanistan, which didn't make that true either
https://www.globalresearch.ca/ukrainian-official-admits-she-lied-about-russians-committing-mass-rape-convince-countries-send-more-weapons/5783014
Then I don’t know what else went wrong in my quotation and I don’t mind to correct it. If you wish so, just tell me. This incident is however irrelevant to the point I was making and I also acknowledged that the word “accusation” was bad wording, so I’m not going to waste more time on such mishaps.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Ssu’s implicit claim came after you solicited him and he clarified on what grounds he made his claims. At the first round, your response seemed to me something like: Putin did not commit imperialist acts, therefore Putin didn’t have imperialist motivations. Were this the case, then you too in the end were making an implicit knowledge claim on Putin’s motivations, just you took Putin’s acts as more relevant evidence than Putin’s words to assess imperialist motivations.
But then at a second round you wrote “I'm not addressing the motivations here; I'm addressing the act. Those are not the same things”, so you are addressing just “the act”. And you wrote “when Russia extends greatly beyond the Donbass and begins regularly taking resources from that area and its citizens, then I will consider it imperialism”, so what I understood so far is that you can assess Russian imperialism based on such acts, independently from whatever Putin’s declared motivations were. I take such acts to be broadly “non-speech acts” because such acts are not talking and writing. So yes you were grounding your claims on non-speech acts actually or hypothetically committed by Russia, while ssu was arguing based on what was written and said by Putin, so broadly Putin’s speech-acts, to legitimise what Putin did (invading and annexing Ukrainian territories).
The point here is that your claims are implicit knowledge claims grounded on certain evidences relevant for your understanding of “imperialism” as much as ssu’s implicit knowledge claims are grounded on other evidences relevant for his understanding of “imperialism”. And as long as one just expresses one’s beliefs to illustrate one’s own implicit assumptions to an interlocutor who doesn’t necessarily share them there is nothing really challenging about it, one is simply talking past each other.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
The point is that if I misrepresented them, maybe it’s because I didn’t understand them and need to question your claims to understand them better, after all you do not seem to understand my claims either. And since we are at the beginning of our exchange, you joined just recently this thread, and we don’t know each other from other threads unintentional misunderstandings are likely to happen on such controversial political topics.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Whatever makes you happy.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Again, I was asking questions for you to clarify your views, not making a point yet. The question was: “by distinguishing imperialist acts and imperialist motivations, are you suggesting that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts can have no imperialist motivations?”. You had problems to understand the question, so I clarified in that piece you quoted, that my understanding is that since you distinguish motivations and acts then you also distinguish imperialist motivations and imperialist acts, because this is what your claims would allow me to logically infer. So I hope that after my clarifications you can answer the question.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Again, whatever makes you happy.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Sure a psychological characteristic concerning people’s motivations. Not, say, a chemical characteristic concerning unicorns’ rainbow farts, or am I misinterpreting you?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
First, yes it is controversial for one reason or the other, again you just recently joined the thread, and I’m not here to keep you up-to-date on what has been discussed in this thread. Just as an example, what you call “the Maidan coup” has sparked some controversy in this thread at least 7 months ago (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/776025), use the search function. Also the alleged Ukrainian war crimes sparked some controversies in this thread.
Second, I didn’t claim that “the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what”. My claim wasn’t about moral assessments of laws and related citizens’ attitude, it was about what Russia can claim as a legitimate threat against Russia. Even if Ukraine is repressing or oppressing a minority of its own citizens, that doesn’t seem to be a threat against Russia (so much so that Russia needed to distribute Russian passports into annexed territories to have a convenient pretext that Ukraine is threatening Russian citizens). If China tortures, imprisons, and persecutes Chinese muslim Uyghurs that doesn’t count as a legitimate threat against muslim states either. Right? BTW Russia too oppresses minorities up until now (like the Crimean Tatars which were occupying Crimea way before the Russians) that doesn’t make it a legitimate threat against other states (other than Ukraine of course, since Crimean Tatars are Ukrainian citizens too within Ukrainian territories), or does it?
Good that this little interlude is over.
However, the data can be completely correct even for commodities.
Saying the exports are denominated in Rubles just means that people needed to buy Rubles one way or another to then buy whatever it is. However, the contracts can easily just reference the international spot price in USD one way or another, and, even if the contracts are in rubbles commodities usually trade on a fairly short term basis so there would be winners and losers in any currency change. Additionally, commodities traders generally hedge against such currency fluctuations so the winners and losers can be completely different parties, all financiers in Shanghai for example, who provide markets for these sorts of derivatives.
And, obviously, saying have is in Rubles is the same as saying half is in hard currency of other nations, which in Russias is a significant amount of cash in addition to it's cash and precious metals reserves.
There was certainly the possibility of severe economic dislocations when the war and sanctions started as supply line disruption could have caused cascading failures in industry, infrastructure which then immediately spill over into financial chaos and civil unrest making the problem even worse.
I don't think anyone outside the Kremlin has any good idea of how close or far such a total system failure was due to Western sanctions. What we do know is that they did prepare for 8 years for that exact scenario and were able to mitigate it.
After nearly 18 months it's extremely implausible that Russia would have some severe economic problem now.
The main reason is that everything the West supplied, China and India also supplies. "Competitive advantage" of Western technology can easily be 1 or 2 %.
Unlike the cold war, there's no critical technologies today that the West is far ahead of everyone else.
So, it was certainly disruptive for a whole country to change supply chains on such a large scale, but substitutes do exist and it was pure Western hubris to believe that they didn't or there's something special about Western tech in today's market.
Quoting neomac
This is all supposition, and you admit it is. You cannot make a logical claim based on "it seems" and "what I understood" and assert it as fact. That is not just analytically incorrect, it is syllogistcally so. You must provide factual premises to synthesize a factual claim..and you don't do that here. Also, you clearly don't know what "speech act" means.
Quoting neomac
The one who needs to heed this admonishment is you, as you have been doing what you admonish against here this whole discussion, and you do it in the sentence right above. You make another false claim against me without supporting it in any way, which is not philosophical at all. Remember, what is asserted without proof or evidentiary support can be refuted without such
Quoting neomac
This is not an excuse for misrepresentation. You should only claim, particularly in a philosophical discussion, your interlocutor is doing or saying something if you actually think they are. If you are not, you should either say "I think you are doing/saying this" or "i think you are doing saying this, could you clarify if you are or are not." Otherwise you are being unfair to your interlocutor and degrading the discussion
Quoting neomac
Your inference here makes no sense syllogistically or syntactically; motivations is neither mentioned nor implied. Again, you are imposing your erroneous belief and acting like it is a correct inference.
Quoting neomac
It is controversial for those who deny the facts, such as the US sending CIA agents to Ukraine right before the coup, and Gloria Nuland and our ambassador to Ukraine discussing who should replace the deposed democratically-elected leader...as if they have substantial say. The fact Nuland recently visited Niger to sway events there shows she hasn't changed her spots
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
You did claim this and you did not just say that about Russia...you said what you said above, proving me right.
Quoting neomac
Actually it is a threat against Russia and their people as it is fomenting violence and murder right at their border, which can spill into their own territory. And it is being done against their own ethnic people who were citizens of their country only thirty years ago. If Mexico had annexed San Diego 30 years ago and started slaughtering the Americans within their new borders, the US certainly--and rightly--would militarily step in
And you must certainly disapprove of all of the US's military border crossings/bombings since WWII. I agree with you there.
Quoting neomac
This is a terrible analogy. Firstly, this action against the Uygures is still in dispute; the UN admits they have no evidence of such a persecution. Secondly, the Uyghurs are not ethnically Russian and the posited persecution is neither at the Russian border or involving shellings at that border
As I wrote, it is now impossible to determine how much Russia trades in rubles and how it is affected by the exchange rate, as that depends on the terms of the contracts and the info coming out of Russia seems rather contradictory.
Quoting boethius
That is absurdly untrue. Even China is very much reliant on the Western technology:
https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-more-dependent-us-and-our-technology-you-think
Most of Russia's industries now have a choice: go back to the eighties (which will make them completely uncompetitive anywhere outside the domestic market) or fold. All Russia has left is the resource trade and even that will suffer, as most oilfields and gas fields were serviced by Western companies. You cannot buy such equipment and knowhow through parallel import.
If you understood anything about how the commodities market works internationally -- or then read and reflected on even a small part of what I explained about it -- you would know that any imbalance between the international spot price and unclosed contracts relative the Ruble would be small and short term.
Instead of pretending like you know anything about what you're talking about and that maybe there are 10s of billions, or hell why not hundreds of billions of dollars worth of unclosed commodities contracts in Rubles could have been out there: that for some unexplained and irrational reasons that have zero evidence actually exists, the Kremlin, knowing that their currency could be a weak point, decided to commit for the long haul to Ruble prices for their commodities and have taken a severe hit now that the Ruble is cheaper to buy.
Or, you know, you could be honest and just say you have no clue what you're talking about but happy to learn.
Quoting Jabberwock
We are talking about Russia and what critical supplies Russia needs for their economy to simply function.
Obviously, since Russia's economy has not collapsed and nearly entirely cut off from Western supply chains, it's able to source what it needs from mostly China.
I'm also talking about critical technologies.
You also don't know how licensing works. That you need to purchase a license doesn't mean you can't produce whatever it is, it's that you can't export it into the Western economies as it's protected by a patent.
The fact the authors of the article you cite (from the spin machine that is the Heritage Foundation) don't understand the difference between capacity and licensing render their analysis completely useless.
Now, compare this situation where China is spending big to license technologies in order to be able to export those technologies back to the West to the technological differences between China and the West during the cold war, then you'd understand my point.
Yes, I am happy to learn, just point me to the source that specifies that the portion of the Russian exports denominated in rubles is negligible.
Quoting boethius
It seems you have a problem with distingushing between technologies and products, which is quite amusing from someone accusing me of ignorance.
Sure, Russia can get raw materials from China and other countries. But it cannot source from there production lines, machinery parks, in fact, it cannot even get spare parts for the Western equipment it already has. It cannot extend its maintenance contracts, without which its machinery will be useless sooner or later. China cannot provide to Russia its licenced technologies, even illicitly, because then it would risk breaking those licenses - it would simply not be worth it. Russian industry faces forced obsolescence, and, due to the nature of today's equipment, it will be sooner than later. Today most equipment has software and firmware that needs to be customized and updated, otherwise it becomes junk. Chechens could not even steal tractors properly, because they had a kill switch. E.g. Microsoft will stop renewing licences in September - it would not be a problem twenty years ago, as everything could be cracked and would work as well. Now half of it is SaaS, with some Russian companies having a significant part of their business in the Western cloud, which will be simply switched off. Sure, you can move everything to a Russian operator, but costs time and money.
Will those problems collapse Russian economy? No. They will just make it even more obsolete and uncompetitive than it was before.
[sup]— Daniel Boffey · The Guardian · Aug 13, 2023[/sup]
... Great lengths gone to install then remove mines. Seems almost absurd.
Quoting Jul 8, 2023
Yeh, it is.
In general, there's much to be said about democracy of course: technicalities, implementation, practicalities, ... A large topic in its own right. [sup](Nov 4, 2013; Feb 19, 2020)[/sup]
The Economist Democracy Index might be the most common of this sort of thing, and uses a handful of categories to assess a society's status. Others use different methods. Most (that I know of) differentiate autocracy—anocracy—democracy on some weighted scale / to varying degrees. Some societies haven't changed much over time, some have seen a sudden regress (? direction), some have moved slowly (e.g. ? direction), etc. Anyway, various renditions/reports taken together can give an impression of what's (been) going on around the world:
Democracy
[sup]— Bastian Herre, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Max Roser · Our World in Data · 2013-[/sup]
The animated map that explains the world
[sup]— Zack Beauchamp · Vox · Apr 22, 2014[/sup]
Forms of Government, 2018
[sup]— National Geographic[/sup]
Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic
[sup]— Drew DeSilver · Pew Research Center · May 14, 2019[/sup]
The Shifting Global Balance of Autocracy and Democracy
[sup]— Thomas Carothers, Saskia Brechenmacher, Staffan I Lindberg, Carnegie · Apr 8, 2022 · 56m:19s[/sup]
Mapped: The State of Global Democracy in 2022
[sup]— Raul Amoros, Nick Routley, Sabrina Fortin · Visual Capitalist · May 13, 2022[/sup]
The State of Democracy
[sup]— Martin Armstrong · Statista · Feb 17, 2023[/sup]
Mapped: The State of Democracy Around the World
[sup]— Avery Koop, Joyce Ma · Visual Capitalist · Apr 24, 2023[/sup]
For recent years and perhaps for some time to come, I'm expecting a drop (further), if mapped out later. (Check the African situation (thanks @ssu); Russia (apropos); Ukraine (apropos; Jul 23, 2023); Afghanistan (Dec 20, 2022; Aug 14, 2023); maybe Ecuador (sort of peripheral in this context); ...)
So, what the heck is the deal?
What, if anything, should be done?
The fact I’m stating is nothing other than my understanding of your views. As I repeated many times, I’m not sure to understand your claims, so I’m expressing how I understood what you said so far, and “it seems” and “I understood” are intentional warnings to signal that. You too keep misunderstanding what I (and others) say and render your own misrepresentations as a factual claim as you just did by attributing to me inference I didn’t make. Instead of repeating that I’m misrepresenting you, even though I’m literally quoting your claims, can you try to clarify better what you meant in those quotes?
Since you know, what does “speech act” mean in your own words? I’m eager to share your superior knowledge.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
I still have no idea what you are talking about though. You keep accusing me of misrepresenting you, but adding no clarifications about the claims I allegedly misrepresented in order to rectify my misrepresentations, and keep avoiding to answer my questions directly. So I’ll cut with this pointless exchange over my alleged misrepresentations by asking you more directly: do you distinguish imperialist acts and imperialist motivations as you distinguish acts and motivations? Yes or no? If so, would this distinction imply that non-imperialist acts can have imperialist motivations and that imperialist acts can have no imperialist motivations?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Well I don’t really see why reiterated expressions of “it seems”, “I understood” and “am I misinterpreting you?” can not do the same job as “I think you are doing/saying this”, but if that will make things more clear to you then I’ll give it a try. Glad that you got rid of your glib “you don't get to tell me how I make my arguments, just as I don't get to tell you how you make yours”.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
But I wasn’t making an inference of the kind you suggest. I was simply making explicit what I thought and still think you are leaving implicit, based on ordinary semantics. Indeed, strictly speaking, the Merrian-Webster definition doesn’t mention nor implies that “selfishness” is a characteristic for that matter, the words used are “quality” and “condition”, not “characteristic”. But if you implicitly assume that English speaking people have enough semantic competence to understand that “quality” and “condition” equate to “characteristic” in that context, then I too can implicitly assume that English speaking people can have enough semantic competence to understand if “selfishness” is a psychological characteristic or non-psychological characteristic, if it’s about people’s motivations or it’s not about people’s motivations. Besides relying on the Merrian-Webster definition simply shifts the burden of the semantic clarification from “selfishness” to “being selfish”. So I’ll cut with this pointless exchange over my alleged misrepresentation by asking you more directly: is “selfishness” a psychological characteristic about people’s motivations to you? Yes or no? If yes then, “selfishness”, as a general characteristic of politicians, is still a claim about their psychology and motivations, as I said. If no, enlighten me what kind of characteristic is that?
Notice also that here you are not using “I think you are doing/saying this” (i.e. “I think your inference makes no sense…”) but actually presenting as a fact you misrepresentation of my claim as a “syllogistically or syntactically” inference.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Well, then it’s controversial because it wouldn’t make much sense to me to claim that there is a controversy about facts for those who agree on the facts. I think what you are trying to say is that there is an overwhelming large consensus over certain facts (like CIA agents and Gloria Nuland). The problem however is not necessarily on denying such facts but on questioning if such facts are enough to support the claim that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda claims (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity). But again, I’m not interested in restarting the debate about these facts as such. And as long as you keep accusing me to misrepresent you at every exchange for whatever reason (including irrelevant editing incidents), instead of clarifying better your views, I don’t feel encouraged to widen the debate over other subjects. My focus is on your claims about “imperialism” and ”legitimate threat”.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
I claimed “Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules”, but that’s it. “No matter what” is your spurious addition. And, I didn’t mean to make a moral claim either. To me “must” can legitimately express a rule-based injunction that can apply to maths, logic, juridical laws, morality, games, etc. (e.g. if you want to play chess, you must abide by chess rules), so with that statement I meant to make a legal and political claim: sovereign states (like Ukraine, Russia, the US, Switzerland, etc.) impose their rules over their citizens within their territories by using their coercive power, so citizens must abide by them if they do not want to pay the consequences. This holds for democratic and non-democratic regimes, moral and nor moral laws. And since we were talking about legitimate threats AGAINST Russia, my point was: can imposing rules to its own citizens by a sovereign state (Ukraine) be a legitimate threat against other sovereign states (Russia)?
BTW even here nowhere you are saying “I think you are doing/saying this”, but you keep asserting your misrepresentations of my views as a fact, proofs. And yet you admonish me to do otherwise with your views. I almost feel like complaining about this treatment. But my spider-senses tell me that you have a very good excuse or justification that makes you happy, right?
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
First, if Russia didn’t spill violence and murder into Ukraine by supporting militarily the separatists FIRST, and so be a legitimate threat AGAINST Ukraine, its people and its territory (according to your own notion of “legitimate threat”), things wouldn’t as likely have reached such a scale to be a legitimate threat AGAINST Russia and its borders, assumed that’s the case. Indeed, what does it mean “it can spill into their own territory”? How could such violence and murder spill into the Russian territory and become a threat against Russian people and territory exactly? Let’s not forget that Russia has the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, that Ukrainian military couldn’t match in the past and still can hardly match the Russian war machine with the current Western support, and a quite effective repressive machine within its own territory against unwanted political movements or social unrest?
Second, I find the claim “And it is being done against their own ethnic people who were citizens of their country only thirty years ago.” quite problematic for several reasons:
1. thirty years ago they were citizens of the Soviet Union not of Russia,
2. if ethnic Russians are Ukrainian citizens they must abide by the Ukrainian rules in Ukraine as much as ethnic Ukrainians who are Russian citizens must abide by the Russian rules in Russia,
3. if ethnic Russians feel persecuted they can still flee Ukraine as much the Jews fled from Nazi Germany, being so close to the Russian border it shouldn’t have been that difficult, and since Russia was so keen on saving the ethnic Russians in Ukraine with all the land they have, they could have helped them with the same efficiency the Soviet Union deported Crimean Tatars from Crimea to relocate inside Russia as they have relocated Ukrainian children.
4. if protecting ethnicity was a reason for invading and annexing, how about all Ukrainian citizens of those annexed areas which weren’t ethnic Russians or just pro-Russia?
5. Russia itself is a multi-ethnic country and repressed the separatist movements in Chechnya supported by many ethnic Chechens, why can’t Ukraine do the same within its territory and its ethnic minorities?
6. There are Russian minorities also in other Russian neighboring countries, like in some Baltic States, if such minorities complain about prosecution and want to separate from the State that is hosting them, Russia should see it as a legitimate threat against Russia, and so again invade and annex those territories too, but if that’s the reasoning all neighboring countries with Russian minorities should see Russia as a legitimate threat against their security with all non-assimilated Russian minorities, right?
Certainly, I do understand that Russia is concerned about ethnic Russians around the world and can exercise diplomatic and coercive pressure to protect them, if they are threatened. But can this predicament be qualified as a legitimate threat AGAINST Russia? Or AGAINST Russia more than or with greater priority than a legitimate threat AGAINST Ukraine? And consequently justify invasion + annexation by Russia of Ukrainian territories?
Concerning your last remark, I “must certainly disapprove of all of the US's military border crossings/bombings since WWII”, if I shared enough of your assumptions. That's not my impression.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Firstly, “disputed” as the claim that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup. Or that the Ukrainians committed a genocide in Donbas. Can you post a link with the UN admitting “they have no evidence of such a persecution”? Anyway the UN is not the only relevant source about the Uyghurs’ case. BTW the UN also condemned Russian aggression of Ukraine (https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm), this is not controversial either, or is it?
Secondly, I’m still trying to understand your notion of “legitimate threat“ (“a legitimate threat to the security of a nation and its borders, and the safety of its people, is a legimtiate threat”, and I’ll ignore that it would be a very bad definition, being evidently tautological), I think you are conceiving it as a geopolitical general principle not as a principle that just happens to be so narrow that it can practically apply only to the Russian state, people and borders. Indeed, there have been and are lots of proxy conflicts and inter-states and intra-states threats in the world (think of the conflicts in the Middle East between major powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, or the case of Islamic terrorism) which are grounded more and religion then ethnicity. So the analogy with Uyghurs case was a way to test how your notion of “legitimate threat“ works in other scenarios.
Anyways, since you now insist on ethnicity and borders, I'll reformulate the hypothetical case of the Uyghurs: the Uyghurs are Muslim, ethnically Turkic, living in the Xinjiang and confining with another Muslim and ethnically Turkic state, namely Kazakhstan, so if China is oppressing Uyghurs, would this be a legitimate threat against Kazakhstan (let’s forget that the Kazakh government wants to preserve good relations with China, it’s just a hypothesis), to the point that they would be justified to invade and annex Xinjiang, if they only could?
And if you still don’t like the Uyghurs analogy, how about the inter-ethnic conflicts on the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Armenia and Azerbaijan? Which state’s acts are “a legitimate threat” against which state? Which state would your notion of “legitimate threat” justify territorial invasion and annexation from which state? In other words, let’s see if you can find a real case good enough analogy to illustrate how your notion of “legitimate threat” applies on other non-Russian related scenarios. Because if you can’t , well that’s a problem to me.
Besides, your second comment makes me wonder how narrow is your notion of “legitimate threat”: e.g. by “nation” and “its people” you mean “citizens” or “dominant ethnic group”? A threat against the safety of the people of a given state can be qualified as a “legitimate threat“ against the State no matter if such people are living within their State or somewhere else? For example, Ukrainians ethnically Jewish are suffering as well the horrible consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fighting for that too (https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukrainian-jews-recount-stories-of-survival-endurance-escape-after-1-year-of-war/, https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/in-ukraine-jews-embrace-their-double-identity, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/01/1126217137/jewish-ukrainian-father-son-soldiers-russia-war), Zelensky himself is a Ukrainian Jewish president, so is Russia a legitimate threat against Israel given that Russia is murdering and willing to murder ethnic Jews in Ukraine?
Yes you were
Quoting neomac
I agree here and this is what we should be discussing
Quoting neomac
Yes you did, and it's reprehensible...and I made no spurious addition and you haven't shown I have. Using your inane, reprehensible logic, slaves should have followed America's rules for slaves and blacks in jim Crow should have followed its rules of segregation
Quoting neomac
This is an unfounded lie. What happened first is the US backed coup led to 50 Russian Ukrainians being burned alive in the Trade House and Donbass Russian Ukrainians rejecting the coup being shelled and terrorized by Azov Nazis. The fact you ignore that is also reprehensible. And calling it a "revolution of dignity" when it was a foreign-backed coup where citizens and police were executed by CIA-trained snipers is both erroneous and disgusting
https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/14/economy/russia-ruble-slump-ukraine-war/index.html
The supposed 'coup' was preceded by three months of protests with dozens of thousands of participants. Were those all CIA agents?
On 12 April 2014 Igor Girkin, an FSB officer sent from Russia to instigate violence has led militants to attack SBU headquarters in Sloviansk. Odessa fire was on 2 May.
The most important development is typically left out of the "US Coup" narrative: That after few months Ukraine held democratic elections after the revolution where the ultra-nationalists lost (the Svoboda party was out of the new administration). And since then there has been many governments and a party that didn't exist in 2014 won the Parliamentary and Presidential elections, which is now leading Ukraine.
But somehow they are CIA backed nazis. Even if lead by a Russian speaking Jew.
You should write “I thought you were making an inference” or “I still think you were making an inference”. Unfortunately you are wrong as a matter of fact and beyond any reasonable doubt.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Too late for that, I think your own notions of “imperialism” and “legitimate threat” may likely be part of your main assumptions in discussing about the alleged coup, so I think you too should be focusing on such notions of yours even before talking about those facts. At this point, if you are not willing to clarify your own notions, then neither am I in discussing your understanding of those facts.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Yes I did, and I’ll do it again easy-peasy. You attributed to me “the notion citizens have to abide by their country's rules no matter what” while my original quote was “Ukrainian ethnic Russians and Russophone are still Ukrainians and must abide by Ukrainians rules.” (dot sign included). So there is no final “no matter what” in my original quote, you spuriously added it and then presented it as a factual report of what I said or meant. But you are factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt. If you think you could infer it from my original quote, then your inference here makes no sense syllogistically or syntactically; “no matter what” is neither mentioned nor implied. If you thought you were making explicit what I left implicit, then you are still factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt: indeed, what I left implicit at most is “if they do not want to pay the consequences” and not “no matter what“. Finally, and more importantly, I didn’t make a moral claim, but a political and legal one that holds for any state. So yes, you are factually wrong beyond any reasonable doubt no matter how you want to play it.
Oh, and if you don’t like to waste your time, then let me warn you that I don’t care about your emotional blackmailing.
Quoting Jack Rogozhin
Focus, I was talking about your notion of “legitimate threat” as it applies in the inter-ethnic conflict between Ukraine and Russia. And even if, for the sake of your argument, one was willing to concede that there was a “coup”, it remains the fact that it was widely welcomed by the dominant ethnic group in Ukraine as much the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea was widely welcomed by the dominant ethnic group in Crimea (which however is a minority in Ukraine). So much so that Ukrainians are asking support from the US against Russia, not from Russia against the US.
Dude, if it is of any consolation, you must know I take no particular pleasure in damaging your goofy self-promoting beliefs and claims. Actually it’s getting more and more boring. In any case, I’m here to entertain myself, not to tolerate your incontinent lack of self-confidence. I’m not your therapist and I have no pity for you.
Quoting jorndoe
Russians will soldier on and just try to cope with it. It's not like they could be angry on the ballot box and choose a different leader and party in the oncoming presidential elections next March. Besides, they have it quite easy compared to the Ukrainians.
Furthermore, Russia did experience also higher inflation that for example the eurozone, even if now isn't so rapid:
Quoting Jens Stoltenberg (Sep 30, 2022)
Quoting Stian Jenssen (Aug 15, 2023)
Quoting Mykhailo Podolyak (Aug 15, 2023)
Here one major problem "Ukraine is burning through ammunition faster than the US and NATO can produce it": https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/17/politics/us-weapons-factories-ukraine-ammunition/index.html
If either France or the US will say by a high ranking diplomat or official that Wagner and Russia has been involved, that surely would show that they are on the warfoot with Russia in Africa. If they don't say that, it tells something also.
And as Wagner is a private company and the members are mercenaries, it's not an escalation to attack them as would be let's say Russia military advisors of the armed forces or deployed Russian troops. This happened with Wagner and US forces coming into blows in a fight on an Conoco oil installation in Syria.
Well, considerable resources have gone to Ukraine. Weaponry production has been up'd here and there due to supplying Ukraine. (The providers haven't particularly moved toward wartime-alike economy.) Various democracies, the UN, and NATO officials have condemned the invasion and taken steps to help the defender.
Quoting Viktor Khrenin · TASS · Aug 15, 2023
"A direct military clash" with Ukraine was already initiated by the Kremlin, which has consequences. :shrug: The Kremlin and Minsk are hardly the victims here. Should Belarus become a genuine democracy, where political opposition wouldn't have to be in exile, the situation would likely be different.
Quoting Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs · Mar 25, 2022
Quoting Putin (paraphrased) · Reuters · Jul 22, 2023
Much emanates from the invasion; ironically, Putin's Russia has breathed some life into NATO. I suppose NATO and Russia/Belarus could still "clash" due to the invasion of Ukraine despite much tiptoeing. (And an attack on Poland Finland Lithuania Romania would be a "clash", for example.)
[sup]— AP · Aug 17, 2023[/sup]
Nothing new I guess, "foreign agent" and "undesirable" have become go-to's for doing away with transparency and opposition. Regress. They're a democracy-monitor, how dangerous can they be?
Conversely, Ukraine had (and has) international and domestic monitors. I guess that would end if they were to be assimilated by Russia.
Quoting jorndoe
If Ukrainian elections would be rigged, yes, we would know about it. I'm pretty confident about that.
And in Ukraine the war has done something which the WW2 did in Finland, it ended the political quarrel about language. And also the real threat from the far right (which actually was the worst prior to 2014) has in my view subsided to a Russian talking point (and even the Russian's aren't talking about denazification so much).
Perhaps in my view the only real obstacle is for Ukraine is to do away with the corruption. You see, a lot of money is now pured to the country and if (when) the war is over, the West will likely help with the reconstruction effort. Here lies the possibility of a problem: if this is done without supervision, it will just creat rampant corruption as all the money poured into Afghanistan did. If Ukraine is left to itself, this might be the hardest problem afterwards. And as someone observed: if Russia then stay basically where it is now, who will genuinely invest in the country? The fear of the war reigniting will be there. Hence Western security guarantees will be needed then.
Only one thing will bring Putin to ceasefire: Crimea
[sup]— Patrick Drennan · The Hill · Aug 17, 2023[/sup]
At least a fairly straightforward account of what's been going on.
Worth adding that Stalin (in office 1922-1952) paved the way rather effectively by replacing locals with Russians in Crimea (called ethnic genocide/cleansing by some). [sup]1, 2, 3, 4[/sup]
Incidentally, Mearsheimer and Drennan agree that Crimea is important to Putin.
Analytical report based on the results of WAR, PEACE, VICTORY, AND FUTURE SURVEY
[sup]— OPORA · Jul 27, 2023[/sup]
78% of Ukrainians share the idea that all Russians are accountable for the aggression against Ukraine :/ (bad, and differs from how Zelenskyy has pointed at Putin + team explicitly — growing hate)
70% of Ukrainians consider it crucial for all the territories to be liberated from the enemy to call it a victory in the war
57% of Ukrainians want to punish everyone who was directly involved in planning, approving, arranging, and committing the war crimes
68% of Ukrainians think that the prosecution and punishment of the criminals should be subject to the national and international laws
95% of Ukrainians expect that the state will insist on Russia compensating for the losses caused during the war
40% of Ukrainians believe that reparations will actually be paid (that seems optimistic, yet many Ukrainians are optimistic in other questions as well)
How so?
With Crimea, Russia can easily block (as it does) sea routes Ukraine is quite dependent, as we have seen. You see, the route from Odessa and other ports (and we have to forget ports in the Azov sea) and any sea route to them is easily inside the range of even the land based K-300P Bastion anti-ship missile system.
Yet the Black Sea isn't the only route to global sea trade for Russia and even without Crimea, Russia still would have it's ports in Novorossiysk among others in the Black Sea.
The Novorossiysk port in Russia (proper) on the Black Sea. Quite large, actually:
And the Russian fleet has a military naval base there already:
If your argument is that Russia needs Crimea for it's imperial domain, then I agree. For Russia to show that it can unify all Russians living now in various other sovereign states back to mother Russia, sure, Crimea is great achievement in furthering this ideal. Especially for Putin it was the victory he can boast about. But once you get something, usually the appetite grows and there's many Russians still out of Russia. Comes to mind how Hitler viewed the Volksdeutsche and had the policy of Heim ins Reich.
Among all, it would be simply a humilitian for a country that think of itself as an natural Empire. Yes, that would be difficult for a country that thinks it's still a Superpower.
Quoting Jabberwock
Well, to literally get landforces into Crimea is difficult. In this map triangles show where Russia has built fortifications. A lot of trenches and dragons teeth in the Crimea too now.
I am assuming that the treaty actually ends the war (i.e. Russia cannot continue it in a near future, at least not until Ukraine is in NATO). The population in Crimea is mostly Russians, so it would be quite difficult to integrate after the war. As you write, for Russia it is a prized jewel of the empire, losing Sevastopol would be a hard blow; for Ukraine not so much.
Quoting ssu
But if you have Zaporozhia, it is quite easy to cut off supplies from Crimea - just take down the Kerch Bridge. That is what the current offensive is about.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2014/05/27/the-energy-dimensions-of-russias-annexation-of-crimea/index.html
I mean, the CIA probably has given at least some sort of minor support to most of these movements but that hardly means it's decisive or even moved the needle. It's like Russia's whopping $117,000 in shitty anti-Clinton ad buys in 2016 (which they paid for in roubles, lol, that'd be like 200 million roubles now too, their currency is tanking hard). Ok, so they did it, but it probably did fuck all. (Whereas the DNC email hack was actually effective.)
Seven dead including six-year-old girl as Russian missile hits center of Ukraine’s Chernihiv city
[sup]— Maria Kostenko, Sarah Dean, Sophie Tanno · CNN · Aug 19, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Zelenskyy]A Russian missile hit right in the center of the city, in our Chernihiv. A square, the polytechnic university, a theater.[/quote]
Ukrainian air force reportedly shot down 15 of 17 Iranian-made Shahed drones overnight. ("sitting ducks with some repellent")
Not military target.
Plain intimidation (however deadly)? Spite?
One target-picking method has been reported before: Jun 28, 2023.
(nah, don't expect insurance to cover the damaged cars :grin:)
Bulgarian minister: 'We cannot rule out' clash between NATO, Russia in Black Sea
[sup]— Martin Fornusek · The Kyiv Independent · Aug 18, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Todor Tagarev
... Sea, ground (e.g. Wagner), air, public statements.
:/
Everything's coming up Milhouse.
Or if Ukraine is in NATO, that would be a guarantee that Russia doesn't the war after rebuilding it's offensive capacity.
Quoting Jabberwock
As you write, the whole war hasn't been much of a blow for Russia, but for Ukraine it surely has. A few drone strikes basically on military installations and the sanctions aren't anywhere close to what Ukraine is going through.
Quoting Jabberwock
To have Crimea under siege isn't similar to occupying it. In this situation Russia can simply transfer all the non-crucial people out of Crimea and still hold on to it. Remember the siege of Leningrad.
Actually, it has been the Department of State, not the CIA, which at the present has been most successful. And of course there really are NGOs, or simply rich people like Soros. Of course Putin just puts them all into the same basket as there is only one basket in Russia: his basket. As in an earlier discussion about the subject, one PF member reminded that actually the US supported the opposition (to further democracy) in France when there was a social democratic administration there. France asked formally about the issue (what the hell?) and the humiliated US had to acknowledge that someone in the government apparatus had done such a thing.
But here's the issue: the best success of this kind of aiding the opposition happened in Serbia (to ouster Milosevic) and was done by the State Department. With little money and effort Milosevic was ousted and his regime crumbled. The CIA really wasn't involved and neither the military. And at that time, the US was quite open about it. Yet is Serbia in NATO? No, Serbia is a close friend to Russia. It isn't at all close to the US. And we know the reason: if NATO bombs the country, the people surely won't be happy about it.
Yet this is what the anti-US crowd seem to forget: countries are independent actors, and so are the politicians and groups of these countries. Some opposition movement or general can accept US support, but that doesn't make him a puppet of the US.
The puppets we have seen are like the former President of Afghanistan, who since high-school had lived in the US and made an stellar career in Washington and in international organizations. Anywhere else than in Afghanistan, that is. Hence it's no wonder that this guy, after been told to leave by the Taleban, abandoned his country and government with likely hundreds of millions of dollars and didn't put up a defence like Zelensky. But for some an Ukrainian administration that has nothing to do with the 2014 revolution are CIA backed nazis.
Not the Zelensky approach:
[sup]— AP · Aug 22, 2023[/sup]
More or less Russian forward bases in Belarus. As someone has noted, the Kremlin is confident that Lukashenko will maintain power/grip for the foreseeable future. (*psst* now is a cool time for Belarus to swiftly oust Lukashenko :wink:)
Would the Kremlin be capable of handling a free Belarus while warring on Ukraine?
If the Belarusians were determined, I have some doubts they could maintain "two fronts", but they'd surely try/intervene and their confidence suggests they're deeply embedded in Belarusian power structures already.
‘Silence is killing me:’ A firefighter on Ukraine’s frontlines yearns to be back at work
[sup]— Kostyantin Gak, Nick Paton Walsh, Brice Laine · CNN · Aug 22, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Dima]I agree there are normal adequate people anywhere, on each side. But I will hate them until the end of my life.[/quote]
More of that hate :/
https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/23/wagner-mercenary-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-killed-in-plane-crash
A feint as opposed to getting killed?
What a surprise
Mutiny feint? Russian aircraft shot down feint? The mutineer then killed feint? :roll:
Quoting Oleksandr Kubrakov · Reuters · Aug 23, 2023
Quoting Reuters via Al Arabiya · Aug 23, 2023
Yet, the same old self-victimizing crud:
Russia wants to end war unleashed by West in Ukraine: Vladimir Putin at BRICS
[sup]— Sahil Sinha · India Today · Aug 23, 2023[/sup]
? Script got old some time ago. Give it up already.
Opinion: Russia’s neighbors have a message for Putin
[sup]— Frida Ghitis · CNN · Aug 23, 2023[/sup]
Some share Domenikovska's concern. :)
• Prigozhin died in plane crash
• Putin had Prigozhin killed
Not sure if they wanted us to believe he is dead but he isn't, or that he's only presumed dead but he is, or that he was supposed to be in Russia but in reality he is still in Africa or in Belarus, or neither, because he is in Ukraine. Dead or alive.
This reminds of a famous line from Shakespeare's Hamlet: "There are more feints in Russia, dude, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
There are many possibilities and schemes to consider.
But as that Austrian psychologist once said: "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar."
"CIA Propaganda!" "Hollywood Lies!"
Then the crew might be sanctioned, it'll be banned anywhere within Putin's reach (except he'll watch it), and he'll tell the FSB to look for someone to create a "counter-movie".
Sean Penn's Ukraine documentary 'Superpower' premieres at Berlin International Film Festival
[sup]— Mark Armstrong, AP · Euronews · Feb 18, 2023[/sup]
Sean Penn's 'Immersive' Ukraine War Documentary Previewed in New Trailer
[sup]— Kimberlee Speakman · People · Aug 23, 2023[/sup]
Superpower (2023)
[sup]— IMDb[/sup]
Just ask yourself, why wasn't Prigozhin simply detained and court-martialed or faced a trial in the Russian justice system? Not only mutiny, but shooting down aircraft of the Russia Air Force would in any country be such an outrageous attack, basically multiple murders, hence the case ought to be very clear cut. Stalin had at least show trials for the most prominent victims of his purges.
Now there's not even a thread of the state working as it should.
If the leadership of a country cannot rely on it's own judicial system, but is left to use mobster killings, it's quite understandable that they can in turn be whacked too. And nobody will give a fuck about it, because the credibility has gone.
It's all part of [s]Baldrick's[/s] Putin's Cunning Plan.
to make us misunderestimate him.
Prigozhin possibly had a deal with Putin which included a concession to stay out of Russian politics and foreign affairs. If he did, then he violated the terms of the deal by making sure he stayed in the public eye as a viable opposition leader both at home and abroad. Did he expect Putin to retire?
More importantly than Prig's death though, Tokmak, a main Russian logistics hub and the ostensible primary intermediate goal of Ukraine's offensive seems to finally have come into at least base bleed artillery range, with what appear to be geolocated videos of the linchpin of Russia's southern logistics coming under heavy shelling.
It's unclear how well they can move supplies and men once they lose that hub, but the amount of reserves they threw into defending it would suggest they also think it's important.
WATCH: People lay flowers for Wagner founder Prigozhin outside HQ in St Petersburg
[sup]— Euronews · Aug 24, 2023 · 1m[/sup]
Prigozhin plane crash: What's next after Wagner Group leader's apparent demise?
[sup]— Shannon K Crawford · ABC · Aug 25, 2023[/sup]
Maybe Putin will try to install a trusted ruthless gangster somehow. As long as they can get fighting and money going.
Ah, you mean like Trump wasn't fumbling in his Presidency with his administration just waiting for the next thing he would say, but it all was just 4D Chess that we simply didn't figure out?
So his move is to make himself look weak and his regime incapable of functioning as it should?
Quoting jorndoe
It was the age old trick of separating your military to different competing parties in order to avoid an other power center than you emerging. First the division of Russian Armed Forces and the National Guard (which is headed by former bodyguard and friend of Putin) and then the use of private armies (which actually there are more than just the Wagner) when you want deniability.
That works when all of the organizations remain loyal and compete for your for your attention. It's gone horribly wrong when they literally fight each other (something that basically is happening in Sudan right now). Then the whole system of "divide and rule" is only an underlying structural reason for weakness and instability.
I would assume that now Putin will try to centralize the military again and won't let the entrepreneurial spirit of the private mercenary groups roam freely. But once you have created such a system, it isn't so easy to simply dismantle it. How long Prigozhin was still living after the mutiny and that he simply wasn't detained and court-martialed (with the same end result) just shows how fragile the situation is for Putin.
(During the mutiny, Prigozhin sitting with Russian generals in Rostov on Don, who were or weren't his prisoners)
And the scariest part is that by telling the truth about the war (with a populist way), Prigozhin started to have popularity. And that people lay flowers in memorials for Prigozhin just tells that Putin's control isn't anything compared to Stalin.
Quoting Oleksiy Danilov (Aug 26, 2023)
I'm not convinced that someone else in particular ordered Prigozhin to initiate their "march of justice". If enough of his people complained repeatedly (and/or died), then that might have given him a nudge in that direction.
Wagner boss Prigozhin says his soldiers won’t sign contracts with Russian army
[sup]— Wilhelmine Preussen · POLITICO · Jun 11, 2023[/sup]
Wagner fighters are furious and vowing vengeance after their leader Prigozhin's presumed death in a plane crash
[sup]— Thibault Spirlet · Business Insider · Aug 24, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Alexander Lukashenko (Aug 26, 2023)
Quoting Alex Stambaugh, Katharina Krebs, Heather Chen · CNN · Aug 26, 2023
Quoting Alexander Lukashenko (Aug 26, 2023)
Says he "cannot imagine that Putin did it, that he is to blame" but suggests someone did, is to blame, though.
Putin orders Wagner fighters to sign oath of allegiance
[sup]— Andrew Osborn, Guy Faulconbridge, Kirsten Donovan · Reuters · Aug 26, 2023[/sup]
Ah, That then solves it! With that mandatory oath, everything is fine now, I guess... :smirk:
The Euromaidan protests started in Nov 2013, just prior to Russia grabbing Crimea.
In Feb 2014, the Russo-Ukrainian war started, and Russia grabbed Crimea.
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down in Jul 2014.
Almost a decade of warring as of typing.
(In this context, I might use "Putin's Russia" rather than just "Russia", but that may just be me.)
Ukrainian forces now appear within striking distance of the next series of prepared Russian defensive positions, which may be weaker than the previous set of Russian defenses but still pose a significant challenge. (ISW · Aug 26, 2023)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1695594706728538503[/tweet]
Jetzt kämpft sich die Ukraine durch den schwierigsten Teil der Front (via google translate)
[sup]— FOCUS online · Aug 27, 2023[/sup]
Russia ranks high (worldwide) on tanks, self-propelled artillery, towed artillery, rocket projectors, and also aircraft fleet, attack aircraft, attack helicopter fleet, which is, apart from population size, pretty much what Ukraine is fighting (with help from others). However, Ukraine's helpers could probably establish air superiority relatively easily [sup](also Jul 27, 2023; Jul 24, 2023; Jul 5, 2023)[/sup].
2023 Military Strength Ranking is an overall assessment based on 60 factors.
Second, this Ukrainian offensive has been an unmitigated disaster and going way too slow. If the Russians feared any kind of breakthrough to begin with they've had ample time to react.
The media you keep linking deal in the deadly drug called hopium, not reality.
As Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Gains Momentum, Russia Is Deploying Some Of Its Last Good Reserves
[sup]— David Axe · Forbes · Aug 27, 2023[/sup]
There was some chatter among Russian military bloggers echoing Axe, but who knows what's going on. There have also been rumors of TOS-1A MLRS deployments and of Russian command abandoning troops around Dnipro. I guess time will (or might) tell.
Russian Neo-Nazi Paramilitary Group Issues Putin an Ultimatum: ISW [sup](also ? Aug 26, 2023)[/sup]
[sup]— Andrew Stanton · Newsweek · Aug 27, 2023[/sup]
Rusich Group
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
The spiraling cost of war means growing economic pain for Russia
[sup]— Clare Sebastian, Hanna Ziady, Anna Cooban, Tim Lister, Olesya Dmitracova · CNN · Aug 28, 2023[/sup]
Hard to tell what's going on with Capo dei capi.
In follow-up to this Aug 23, 2023 comment:
The Ukraine war, propaganda-style, is coming to Russian movie screens. Will people watch?
[sup]— Dasha Litvinova, Jake Coyle · AP · Aug 28, 2023[/sup]
On cue.
Furthermore, I think that Surovikin did actually a fairly good job at simply going to this fortified defensive lines: it's courageous for a general to basically admit that your army cannot attack, maneuver and gain territory, but simply goes on the defensive behind entrenched lines and huge minefields.
FMI, do you mean GlobalFirepower? ISW? FOCUS online? Another one?
Some rough estimates of troop sizes ...
Russia
Pre-invasion at border: 169,000 - 190,000 [sup]military + paramilitary + 34,000 separatist militias, 4, 5[/sup]
Pre-invasion total: 900,000 military [sup]6[/sup], 554,000 paramilitary [sup]6[/sup]
In February 2023: + 200,000 newly mobilised soldiers [sup]7[/sup]
In May 2023: 300,000+ active personnel in Ukraine [sup]8[/sup]
Ukraine
Pre-invasion total: 196,600 military [sup]9[/sup], 102,000 paramilitary [sup]9[/sup]
July 2022 total: up to 700,000 [sup]10[/sup]
ISW has been the prime peddler of nonsense and some of the other articles refer to their claims. At this point the ISW is little more than a mouthpiece of the US DoD / MIC (which they're funded by, by the way).
But to pick some slogans that I saw passing by:
1. "The next defensive line will be weaker than the last"
2. "The offensive is picking up steam"
3. "The offensive was targeted at the strongest part in the Russian lines"
These are all claims that don't pass the basic military common sense test:
1. Defense in depth gets stronger with depth.
2. Offensives produce quick results or they fail.
3. Offensives are targeted at weak points in the enemy line.
Quoting jorndoe
Russia has almost ten times the GDP of Ukraine and a vastly larger manpower pool to draw from.
Do these numbers pass the common sense test in your mind?
EDIT: I was actually thinking about CSIS and not ISW, so some of my criticism was wrongly addressed. My gripe with their claims still stands though, and I am similarly suspicious of ISW's affiliation.
Quoting Tzeentch
Well, some more numbers... Russia (largest country in the world) is about 28 times the size of Ukraine, GDP is about a factor 15 (not per capita), population is about 4 times larger. Ukraine has been and is receiving a good deal of help: civil, arms. It's unclear exactly what, but, likely, Russia has been / is receiving some stuff from China, Iran, North Korea, maybe others. In terms of home production, unlike Russia, Ukraine hasn't really had that much (though they've been inventive with drones and such, including old stuff), but are reportedly working with Rheinmetall, Baykar, and others to set up Ukrainian production. Sanctions has some effects on Russia's arms production.
Anyway, I haven't seen indications that there are significantly more Russian than Ukrainian fighters in Ukraine at the moment. But the Kremlin has spent a significant amount of shells and rockets (and troops) in 17 or 18 months of warring. Reports suggest much more unity among Ukrainians (and hate towards the invaders).
? I think most of this stuff is repetition
Then again my point:
If the Russians managed to capture 20% of Ukraine while outnumbered, how could the Ukrainians ever hope to go on the offensive successfully?
Going on the offensive is extremely difficult and costly, and if anything the troop counts have shifted into Russia's favor.
Quoting jorndoe
Russia is reportedly enjoying a between 5 and 10 to 1 artillery advantage. That's massive, especially considering artillery is perhaps the single most important factor in a war of attrition.
I understand the desire to turn this into something positive, but the bottomline is the Russians have vastly more firepower than the Ukrainians, and that's a terrible situation to be in as first-hand accounts of the Ukrainian frontlines attest to. Constant artillery shelling takes a real toll on people.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
How many Russian and Ukrainian troops do you think there are in Ukraine at the moment?
There's that vastly again, though about firepower this time:
Quoting Tzeentch
I have no idea, truth be told. If any trustworthy sources exist for these numbers I have yet to see them.
However, Russia's GDP and population size imply it has the capability to field a vastly bigger army, and I find information on those figures trustworthy enough to produce a rough estimate of the balance of power. Even the most charitable interpretation paints a bleak picture for Ukraine.
The fact that Russia outnumbers the Ukrainians by a comfortable margin is a matter of common sense to me.
Quoting jorndoe
That the Russians enjoy a large artillery advantage is accepted fact at this point, and a matter of common sense as well based on the indicators I named earlier. Mearsheimer often cites the 5-10:1 artillery advantage.
The Ukrainian media themselves talks about these matters here:
I don't take sources very seriously in this war - the amount of information warfare going on makes it all untrustworthy, but again, these are just matters of common sense. It should be obvious to anyone with a functioning brain.
It was an accepted fact a year ago, now things have changed rather significantly.
, yeah, high cost of being friends with Prigozhin (or sharing some of his ideas), including for the Kremlin, but it seems they took Surovikin off the board.
, 28 times the country size and 4 times the population are reliable; 4 times the troops in Ukraine is rather doubtful. Also, Wagner loss. Russia has (surely had) a comprehensive stock of artillery and rockets (GlobalFirepower). They've used (some of) it generously. Lots of rockets and drones downed. Ukraine is getting some help. ? hardly hopium
Body-Double? Wagner Group Leader Yevgeny Prigozhin May Not Have Been on Plane That Crashed, Says Aviation Expert
[sup]— Joshua Wilburn · Knewz · Aug 23, 2023[/sup]
Yevgeny Prigozhin is alive and plotting his revenge on Putin after body double was killed in plane assassination plot, Russian analyst claims
[sup]— Will Stewart · Daily Mail · Aug 29, 2023[/sup]
Wagner Boss Yevgeny Prigozhin is Still Alive and Plotting His Revenge on Vladimir Putin, Russian Analyst Claims
[sup]— Connor Surmonte · RadarOnline · Aug 29, 2023[/sup]
FBI and European partners seize major malware network in blow to global cybercrime
[sup]— Frank Bajak, Stefanie Dazio · AP · Aug 29, 2023[/sup]
Who are Anonymous Sudan? Hacker group behind behind Twitter outage mocks Elon Musk’s rebrand
[sup]— Saqib Shah · Evening Standard · Aug 29, 2023[/sup]
Well, the Anonymous hacker group has attacked Russia and taken credit.
The whole idea of Russia is that it is an Empire. Russian's cannot see themselves as a nation state: there's Tatarstan, there's Chechnya and many other places that really aren't Russian. There are 26 official languages in Russia, and about 100 languages spoken in the country. That doesn't sound anything like a nation state with one people. Hence the fear is, especially with the ruling elite, is that if the Empire of Russia isn't upheld as "natural" Russia, then everything will collapse. Hence you cannot have democracy, you have to have a strong central. government and a strongman leading it. (Especially when the state hasn't been able to provide prosperity for it's people as in the West.)
Meanwhile, the 21st century's real and only empire, the American empire, is showing actual signs of falling apart.
Interesting, never heard that before.
[i] January 11, 1986
Requiem for the American Empire
“Empires are restless organisms. They must constantly renew themselves; should an empire start leaking energy, it will die.”
Gore Vidal
[/i]
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/requiem-american-empire/
Quoting jorndoe
The US is essentially an island nation. Grabbing land is not the way it expands its empire. If you want a better understanding of what US imperialism looks like and the deep impact it has on nations, take a look at the example of Japan.
Quoting jorndoe
Obviously not, both for the Afgani's sake and the Americans themselves. Though if one wished to expediate the US empire's collapse, one should certainly have advocated for the Americans staying there.
The mess that's unfolding there right now is a direct result of the US having destabilized the country, and more western destabilizing won't fix it, it'll just make it worse.
Quoting jorndoe
Even if Russia can't be considered an empire in the same way the US is, obviously there's plenty wrong with Russian rule for people wanting to resist it.
It's a bit odd though, how Ukraine was wooed with promises of security. Now that same NATO is refusing to get its hands dirty as Ukraine is being wrecked as a direct result of NATO's advances. What sort of diplomacy is that? "We'll guarantee your security if there's anything left of you after you get done fighting that bear over there."
But whatever empire Ukraine wishes to join is up to them.
Yeah until someone again pointed at the actual signs of NATO falling apart:
Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead
https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead
But I guess you know better.
And yet: In an interview published in Germany's Zeit magazine on Wednesday, former German chancellor Angela Merkel said that the Minsk agreements had been an attempt to "give Ukraine time" to build up its defences.
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-russia-may-have-make-ukraine-deal-one-day-partners-cheated-past-2022-12-09/
Same old in Moscow:
'I stand by my opinion': Russian on trial for critical Ukraine interview
[sup]— AFP and RFE/RL · Aug 30, 2023[/sup]
[quote=Yuri Kokhovets (37)]I stand by my opinion. Nothing has changed.[/quote]
[quote=Radik Gabitov]I did not like it so I contacted the Investigative Committee.[/quote]
[tweet]https://twitter.com/RFERL/status/1652777944992059392[/tweet]
Quoting Tzeentch
What Afghans? The Taliban you mean? Check this Aug 27, 2023 comment. (Hmm Might be better to move any further comments on this to the/some other thread.)
Quoting Tzeentch
In all honesty, I tend to be more concerned about an "authoritarian empire" than a "democratic empire" :D (also see "Same old in Moscow" above and, well, more comments in this thread than I care to dig out).
You know who put the Taliban in charge? I'm sure you do.
Afghanistan wasn't such a terrible place before that. Reminds me a bit of Iran, actually. Iran too used to be a relatively modern nation. Didn't the US get involved there as well? And look at it now.
Quoting jorndoe
Of the two, the US is certainly the more worrying one to me. I think the Russians can't hold a candle to the amount of misery and destruction the US has wreaked upon the world - all of which it neatly tucked away in the creases of history, of course.
Quoting jorndoe
Whether that's a good thing remains to be seen. Any long-term solutions between Europe and Russia will have to involve some modus vivendi with regards to Ukraine and elsewhere. If military deterrence becomes the only tool for peace it's not a matter of 'if' but a matter of 'when' a new war will break out. And I'm somewhat confident neither the Europeans (of which I am one) nor the Russians want that.
:fire: :fire:
But that didn't answer the query. You just took an opportunity to point fingers at your favorite enemy instead. :shrug: (How about you ask a sizeable percentage of the Afghan population?)
Quoting Tzeentch
You know, that's why I asked @yebiga (on a few occasions) to fire up a fresh thread on that:
Quoting Jun 21, 2023
Too bad they never did. What about you? After all, there's so much to say (as you've shown), so much discussion-worthy, yes? (you won't have to look over your shoulders, be interesting :up: like an exposition)
:fire: :fire:
Isn't everything collapsing?
EU was collapsing...at least so said many American commentators.
UK was collapsing...again Scotland is thinking about independence, so any day now, right? And then there's North Ireland, hard Brexit and that unfortunate border issue.
China was collapsing...any day now.
Spain was collapsing... the Catalan independence movement got really far, right?
Sweden was collapsing... remember Sweden, Sweden! As Trump said.
Italy was collapsing... any day now a new crisis has to come from that country.
Greece was collapsing... yes, those debts need to be reshuffled again.
Venezuela was collapsing... millions of Venezuelian refugees cannot be wrong.
Pakistan was collapsing... no really, this country might be really collapsing!
Sudan, Niger, Mali were all collapsing... so much, really, that I started a thread to watch what happens.
Somalia was collapsing... or has that already collapsed?
Did I miss any? Please add if I overlooked some obviously collapsing country.
Putin's days numbered as FSB in process of choosing next Russian president
[sup]— Joel Day · Daily Express · Aug 30, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Yuri Felshtinsky
Whatever the case, I doubt Putin is out for the time being. Looking for a successor is plausible enough, though. Ough Patrushev.
Ukraine's Kharkiv builds classrooms underground to protect students from missiles
[sup]— Vitalii Hnidyi, Max Hunder, Angus MacSwan · Reuters · Aug 30, 2023[/sup]
Media: Education Minister says 76% of institutions in Ukraine have bomb shelters
[sup]— Dinara Khalilova · The Kyiv Independent · Aug 31, 2023[/sup]
In wartime Ukraine, going back to school means preparing for air raids and huddling in shelters
[sup]— Olga Voitovych, Ivana Kottasová · CNN · Sep 1, 2023[/sup]
Not like when I went to school, fortunately. Kind of a testament to Kremlin efforts I suppose. Hopefully, some of those rooms will become tourist attractions instead, the sooner the better.
Meanwhile:
Russian students are returning to school, where they face new lessons to boost their patriotism
[sup]— Dasha Litvinova · AP · Sep 1, 2023[/sup]
Inside Putin's push to rewrite Russian history in favor of his war in Ukraine
[sup]— Yuliya Talmazan, Artem Grudinin · NBC · Sep 3, 2023[/sup]
Wow.
During the Soviet Union a Russian would talk and behave quite differently when in his or her work and in a public event and then when in his or her kitchen among his or her closest friends. I think this hasn't been forgotten in Putin's Russia.
Besides, feeding with a spoon patriotism has a negative impact on patriotism. Especially when you started a war that the vast majority of people never wanted.
If you want people really to be patriotic, let it really be voluntary. Like umm....in Ukraine?
This repression of any grass-roots movements actually hindered Russia's first mobilization efforts: a state that has fought in every way against people organizing anything in the grass roots (or even holding a small rally) then basically ordered a mobilization without an actual organization to do this, which would have meant that the people ought to have had the initiative on their own to assist with organizing the mobilization.
As to the former (Ukraine), I'm thinking that hate, unity, nationalism, patriotism grow easy during invasion, ongoing bombing, interrupted while trying to shed the shackles of the dominating neighbor.
As to the latter (Russia), those state-sanctioned, organized, systematic efforts carry a faint whiff of Hitlerjugend (and Soviet methods), which remains kind of ironic. Putin lashes out at West ‘cancelling’ Russian culture, says it reeks of Hitler’s Germany (TASS · Mar 25, 2022). If this is what the Kremlin means by "a multipolar world", then ... well, they're not particularly trying to go for a peaceful path forward. Regress. Looks like an indirect admission of lack of faith in the people. Hopefully, they'll see through it (and not get arrested).
Anyway, such differences in (going back to) school. And different still in, say, Norway and Canada.
Yes, manufactured by Ukrainian volunteers at the start of the war when Russian forces were still racing for their initial objectives.
Quoting jorndoe
Nothing instills social cohesion and national identity than an enemy that attacks your country and you make a successful defense against it.
The UK and it's obsession especially with the Batlle of Britain shows this quite well.
I can believe what is happening in Ukraine now. The same thing happened actually in Finland. In 1939 just two decades had gone from a bloody civil war that had divided the country. The country had been also ripped by turmoil about language politics (just like Ukraine had been before the invasion). And then Winter War happened. It really unified the country: there wasn't any "fifth column" or traitorous socialists in the country welcoming the Soviet troops as some might have believed there to be (at least that was said to the Soviet troops, that it was a war of liberating the Finnish workers).
Now of course in Ukraine the war is still going on...
Quoting jorndoe
Indeed. If Russia was truly fighting a defensive war, there would be large numbers of Russians expats going back to Russia. There wouldn't have been the brain drain that we saw happening when the mobilization was started.
But I'm hopeful that Russia can shed it's fascist tendencies and perhaps become a normal democracy someday. But I acknowledge it will be difficult. Yet Spain and Portugal aren't anymore fascist.
Oh it tastes sooo good. I'm sooo badly addicted to it.
How Ukrainians are fleeing life in Russian-held territory
[sup]— Aya Ibrahim · Deutsche Welle · Sep 1, 2023 · 3m:28s[/sup]
Ukrainians in the occupied Donbas area (maybe others) apparently make their way to such border crossings, away from the frontlines. Those kids may still not be out of harm's way, though. Bumpy, yet in contrast to relatively nearby warring. At first, I thought that soldier on the right, at the start of the footage, looked like wearing a bomb (:grin:).
Such markedly different choices of words regarding governments (embedded links mine) ...
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
I'm sure you can see why some suspect(ed) you of ... ehh certain autocrat/anti-democratic sympathies (and an axe to grind). Hereby encouraging you to whip up a new thread.
Recruitments from prisons have come up prior.
Quoting Putin · Reuters · Dec 21, 2022
Quoting Bloomberg · Mar 24, 2023
Quoting UK Ministry of Defence · Sep 3, 2023
Quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba · Sep 4, 2023
[sup]— Global News · Sep 5, 2023 · 1m:47s[/sup]
Quoting Dec 20, 2022
And now "the West" "glorifies Nazism"?
Give it up already. Got old some time ago.
Moscow stages local elections in occupied parts of Ukraine
[sup]— Felix Light, Felix Hoske, Philippa Fletcher · Reuters · Aug 31, 2023[/sup]
Russia holds elections in occupied Ukrainian regions in an effort to tighten its grip there
[sup]— Yuras Karmanau, Dasha Litvinova · AP · Sep 8, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine and US condemn ‘sham elections’ in Crimea, Russia decries ‘meddling’
[sup]— Vikrant Singh · WION · Sep 8, 2023[/sup]
Alternate headline: "The Kremlin looks to expand regressive Russia to grabbed land."
I imagine they get lots of requests for comments from news agencies and others.
An open session with them and journalists from all over would be nifty.
Quoting “Baska” · CNN · Sep 8, 2023
Quoting Rob Picheta, Yulia Kesaieva, Vasco Cotovio, Svitlana Vlasova, Andrew Carey · CNN · Sep 8, 2023
"Joint US-Armenia military exercise to be held in Armenia on September 11-20 " - https://tass.com/world/1670475
"Armenian PM says depending solely on Russia for security was 'strategic mistake'"
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenian-pm-says-depending-solely-russia-security-was-strategic-mistake-2023-09-03/
TheKremlinYap · Sep 9, 2023 · 1m:12s
[sup]— How long will the war last?
— I think there's still plenty of time to spend. It is pointless to talk about a specified period. If we are talking about Eastern Europe, which we will have to... Of course, then it will be longer.
— Ukraine is only a stepping stone?
— Yes, absolutely. It is only the beginning. I think that all kinds of ideologists and instigators of this war will not stop here.
— How long do you feel they'll have enough fervor for this offensive?
— Until the end of August. Their fervor will last until the end of August, and then there will be a short break. They won't accomplish much in the winter. By spring, I think it will all be over. The question is that we will have to respond to their offensive at some point in time. We have to liberate our lands. Unequivocally. It must be done, and we will have to do it.[/sup]
Might have been mainly intended for the general Russian population?
Either way, it goes well with earlier statements (The Guardian, AP, RIA) from Sergey Lavrov + team, and Oleksii Reznikov later echoed some of this (BI). What to make of Dmitry Medvedev's fiery rambling (AJ, The Hill, TASS) in this context? "Ideologist/instigator"? The Moldovans have been nervous for some time (RFE/RL, AP+VOA, WSJ, Reuters, Yahoo, WION, CNN). Incidentally, we've seen other expansive (and provocative) activities (ArcticToday, CNN, AJ, Reuters, CTV, NP) of the world's largest country.
A Putinian vision at work or something? What's your take anyway?
https://wiadomosci-wp-pl.translate.goog/polak-opowiada-o-tragicznej-sytuacji-w-ukrainie-sprzet-pali-sie-jak-zapalki-6934373478947744a?fbclid=IwAR1kBtdnbSMDJYGyVLIESmpNI-gWWULbaswF8mBry2vXIdRP5PA51teQyc8&_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fr&_x_tr_pto=wapp
Ivan Prieobrazhensky: After Prigozhin's death, Putin may attack Shoigu (via google translate)
[sup]— Tatiana Kolesnychenko, Ivan Prieobrazhensky · Wirtualna Polska · Aug 28, 2023[/sup]
Has themes from Game of Thrones or The Prince (like opportunism, heartlessness, meticulous calculation, assassination, ruthlessness, whatever means to justify ends, deniability, cynicism, all that).
(stumbled upon Wirtualna Polska, thanks )
Inventive...
Ukraine gets paper drones from Australia
[sup]— Daisuke Sato · Defence Blog · Mar 21, 2023[/sup]
Like a child's project, with profound impact: How cardboard drones can shape Ukraine war
[sup]— Madeleine Wedesweiler · SBS+AAP · Sep 6, 2023[/sup]
Payload: 5 kg
Wingspan: 2 m
Speed: 60 km/h
Range: 120 km
Price: US$3,500
If (half) a dozen of those can take out, say, a parked fighter plane, then it seems worthwhile for the defenders.
[sup]— Gwladys Fouche, Sabine Siebold, Nick Macfie · Reuters · Sep 16, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Eirik Kristoffersen
Has come up before.
Russia threatens ‘military and political consequences’ if Finland, Sweden try joining NATO (Feb 25, 2022) ? Russian Official Warns Finland, Sweden Against Joining NATO (Mar 12, 2022) ? Ukraine War: Russia warns Sweden and Finland against Nato membership (Apr 11, 2022) ? Russia warns of nuclear deployment if Sweden, Finland join NATO (Apr 14, 2022) ? Russia threatens ‘retaliatory steps’ if Finland joins NATO (May 12, 2022) ? Putin sees no threat from NATO expansion, warns against military build-up (May 16, 2022) ? Putin says Finland and Sweden can 'go ahead' and join NATO but warned the countries against hosting the alliance's 'military contingents and infrastructure' (Jun 30, 2022).
Ukrainian NATO membership would primarily mean limiting Putin's Russia's military to do whatever, including land-grab (Jul 3, 2022; Oct 19, 2022).
Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine (Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch · Foreign Policy · Sep 28, 2022). Russia’s Reindeer Brigade Is Fighting For Its Survival In Southern Ukraine (David Axe · Forbes · Oct 7, 2022). (Is the Kremlin neglecting the CSTO (Jan 11, 2023)? Armenia (Gabriel Gavin · POLITICO · Sep 13, 2023)?)
If Putin's Russia were to assimilate a fifth of Ukraine, then their NATO-phobic argument would continue to apply to the remaining four-fifths of Ukraine just the same. If Putin's Russia was to assimilate all of Ukraine, then Putin's logic could equally be raised vice versa by Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia (Oct 13, 2022; Nov 26, 2022), and hence the EU. Open-ended, perpetual.
As mentioned before, NATO isn't that dire existential threat to the world's largest country. Buying into that verges a bit on gullibility. Conversely, grabbing that fifth of Ukraine could well make a difference to the Kremlin's geo-political-military power (and perhaps satisfy Putin (Sep 2016; May 2020)).
Finnish military analysts have estimated that basically Russia needs a decade to recover from the war. There is absolutely no denying that Russia has lost huge amounts of equipment and manpower. Of course putting all the resources to serve the military-industrial complex and increase arms production is totally possible for Russia as it's a political choice, yet that has a huge effect on the welfare of Russian people. And we shouldn't forget that when Putin came into power, the Russian armed forces were a catastrophe, basically a shell of the Soviet Armed forces where basically only the strategic rocket forces ad been taken care of. It took 20 years and a higher oil price for Putin do something about it. And now he is in a war, hence shouldn't underestimate the Russians:
Can Russia economically do it? Here we should remember that actually a nation going on a war footing (without it's infrastructure and cities being bombed to rubble) makes economic indicators go haywire. For example during WW2, during a time when rationing was introduced to Americans, manufacturing of private cars was stopped etc, the economy just skyrocketed (with the debt also).
Even if GNP is not a common indicator, that the total output of goods and services OVER DOUBLED in six years (and then came off a cliff) tells just why economists usually start from 1946 and never produce longer statistics that include wartime to peacetime.
Of course Western defense spending has gone up. I think in Finland the defense spending has grown about 45% and reservists are training such size and intensity never seen before, actually. And I don't think Finland isn't the biggest here, Poland has a massive weapons procurement plan underway.
Putin says Russia developing weapons based on ‘new physical principles’
[sup]— Tuqa Khalid · Al Arabiya · Sep 12, 2023[/sup]
John Brennan opines (re Trump) ...
Putin wants to salvage Ukraine loss by electing Trump: former CIA director
[sup]— Sarah K Burris · Raw Story · Sep 12, 2023[/sup]
Ekaterina Schulmann opines ...
Russian analyst predicts controversial decision by Putin post-election
[sup]— Henrik R · dagens.com · Sep 16, 2023[/sup]
'Just can't sell': Ukraine harvests sunflowers as war blocks ports
[sup]— France 24 / AFP · Sep 18, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine says it will sue Poland, Hungary and Slovakia over food import bans
[sup]— Tom Balmforth, Pavel Polityuk, Anna Wlodarczuk-Semczuk, Anna Pruchnicka, Timothy Heritage · Reuters · Sep 18, 2023[/sup]
Farmers across Bulgaria protest against Ukrainian grain as EU divide grows
[sup]— Valentina Petrova, Stephen McGrath · AP · Sep 18, 2023[/sup]
Meanwhile, the regress continues in Russia:
Human rights in Russia have 'significantly deteriorated' since war - UN expert
[sup]— Emma Farge, Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, Rachel More, Gareth Jones · Reuters · Sep 18, 2023[/sup]
Human rights in Russia have ‘significantly’ worsened since Ukraine war began, UN-backed expert says
[sup]— AP · Sep 18, 2023[/sup]
:chin: well, not unheard of, part of a modus operandi ...
A sneaky move at a Kremlin meeting may show why Putin took his time in eliminating Prigozhin
[sup]— Paul Iddon · Business Insider · Sep 17, 2023[/sup]
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/19/africa/ukraine-military-sudan-wagner-cmd-intl/index.html
The Russian offensive? Well, that was only the small advances that Wagner made. Nothing else. :wink:
And the Ukrainian counter-offensive? Going as anything would go without an air arm / air superiority. The whole "offensive" is more of Western media expectations (as last year Ukraine could gain a lot of ground). Now Ukrainians are facing deep entrenched lines from the Black Sea up to the northern border between Ukraine and Russia. And Russia still enjoys an advantage in artillery, even if the amount of munitions they use has gone down dramatically. That means that Ukrainians would be crazy if they made a head on assault on the defensive line with concentrated large forces. Hence it's a war of attrition.
Poland will stop providing weapons to Ukraine as dispute over grain imports deepens
So can we conclude Ukraine taking back Crimea is a pipedream?
I'm just wondering if this failed offensive is what will break the western media bubble, or if people in the West will keep puffing copium until there's not a single Ukrainian man left to fulfill their fantasies.
One additional note: right now Poland supplies new armaments produced in Poland (mostly ammo), those supplies are still ongoing and will not be stopped.
Seems you are eager to jump to conclusions, especially to the failure of Ukrainian actions. Yet I don't think the will of the Ukrainians to continue the fight has eroded. This war will continue on.
Quoting Tzeentch
How about Russia? Putin doesn't want to make another mobilization of reservists. And if Wagner PMC itself said that it had lost over 20 000 killed in Bakhmut, the death toll is high on the Russian side too. Hence I wouldn't jump into conclusions yet how this war will end.
What can be concluded is that with the West continuing backing Ukraine, Russia cannot win. And without Western backing, Ukraine cannot win.
Quoting Jabberwock
Interesting. Can you give references?
https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-wojna-z-rosja/news-rzecznik-rzadu-o-broni-dla-ukrainy-wylacznie-wczesniej-uzgod,nId,7039252#crp_state=1
Who is the "us" in this statement?
Tripping minefields?
Quoting Tzeentch
With a bit of luck, we're not talking an "end state", more like regress or progress, authoritarianism or democracy, etc. Ukraine and the UN have repeatedly said "No" to Putin's regressive Russia, to the bulging-by-land-grab of Putin's authoritarian Russia, etc. Can't have missed it.
Ukraine, Russia and the tense UN encounter that almost happened — but didn’t (Jennifer Peltz · AP · Sep 20, 2023)
Quoting Edi Rama
(As an aside, Putin admits to Ukraine conducting a COUNTERoffensive, i.e. a response to the invasion by the Kremlin. Different from prior rhetoric, aside from the excuse.)
I'm vaguely reminded of ...
"If Russia stops fighting, the war ends. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends." (C-SPAN · Sep 22, 2022 · 11m:21s)
Planned walkouts from Russia’s speech and the elephant in the room: Inside the UN General Assembly (Emin Pasha · The Independent · Sep 22, 2022)
Nothing new though. Also, North Korea is worrisome, but maybe there's a bit of (unofficial) tension with the Kremlin?
Right, so there's no plan. Just vacuous rhetoric with no sense of the human cost, which this offensive was a shining example of. This we already knew.
Quoting jorndoe
He'd be wrong. It was an offensive. Not a counteroffensive, since there was no Russian offensive to counter; that had already ceased months prior.
It's just a buzzword now. It sounds flashy, and flashy sounding language might goad people into supporting senseless waste of human lives.
Quoting Paine
I'm talking from the West's perspective.
Why do you assume Ukrainian operations to be "ill-advised"? If you don't have air superiority and Russia still has a lot of artillery, large scale attacks on the Surovikin line would be foolish. Something like what was witnessed last year cannot happen because of the Surovikin lin. If you haven't noticed, it's basically small scale attacks and advances are small.
Yours is just vacuous rhetoric with no sense of human affairs. One can devise a plan and then revise it.
There can be plans A B C D... Z and beyond. If there are plans, effectively made by political or military agents, it will be rational to not divulge them in public and to expect they won't be divulged. One can at best guess and, laymen or uninformed experts, can be wrong.
It's not just the military point that is going to be relevant for our moral siding. Nor the Western propaganda, a good part of which is pro-Russian, like yours. The sense of human cost doesn't need to be assessed in military terms nor in terms of just human lives. You keep reasoning within the bubble of your non-shared assumptions. Even pro-Russian Russian analysts get the stakes MORE OBJECTIVELY than you ever could:
[i]On the home front
Since the military conflict in Ukraine is not an all out war, the loser will not be the side who physically runs out of strength, but rather the one who loses the will to fight sooner. What is important here is a clear vision of victory and a clear strategy for achieving it.
Russia initially had problems with this: The start came as a shock to everyone and just as suddenly turned into a protracted military conflict with a series of humiliating defeats.
Russian society was able to withstand the blow last year and – albeit not immediately, only towards the end of the year – pulled itself together and prepared for a long and hard struggle. The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. The latter, by the way, will be the most difficult legally; here – for the sake of international legitimacy – Jesuitical forms such as a 99-year lease are possible. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, on this point.
Although this concept of victory has not been articulated, it is intuitively clear; the actions of the authorities at all levels do not contradict it; and society, although not very happy (only people who are not completely healthy enjoy armed conflicts), has rallied and is ready, if not to participate directly, then to support or at least tolerate it. All this will sooner or later produce results at the front – if the enemy does not respond with the same unity.[/i]
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/
Quoting Tzeentch
At least, not making Russia win according to the Russian definition of "victory".
The amount of preparation, manpower and materiel that goes into an offensive means that it must make some form of strategic impact. If it cannot do that, it's a waste. And Ukraine being in the position it is in cannot afford to waste anything.
It was obviously a huge failure. Calling it 'small attacks and advances' is nonsense. To go on the offensive, you must first break through the enemy's defenses. This must be done as quickly and decisively as possible. The longer an offensive is stuck on the enemy's defenses, the more it suffers, and that seems to be what happened. (It's the point of defense-in-depth)
Moreover, it gives the enemy time to adapt their defensive lines to account for any possible breakthrough, which would nullify any advances made.
People were suggesting this offensive would go all the way to Melitopol. Now it's clear they won't be able to take Tokmak - the first village of some significance on the way there. Hardly anything new, of course. People have warned that this would be the predictable outcome long before the offensive even started. It's just tragic.
The pressing question is, why did the West push Ukraine into this disaster? You suggested it was due to media pressure - I kind of doubt that, but if western media is dictating the Ukrainian war effort then things are even more dire than I thought.
It's a materiel battle, Tzeentch.
And the forces that are put into not such huge, actually. Keeping the initiative is crucial. If you think that giving the initiative to the Russians would be helpful to the Ukrainians, you are wrong.
Quoting Tzeentch
No. There are far more ways to defeat an enemy. You seem to have no idea how a materiel battle works.
Quoting Tzeentch
To breach the Surovikin line Ukrainians should have a) air superiority and b) enough resources to go through fortified and mined defensive lines in depth. The US could do that in Kuwait after pummeling the Iraqi troops with air power on a desert which offered minimal cover, then basically on single file columns go through the minefields. The Ukrainians cannot do that. Not without air superiority.
(US Forces going through the minefields in the Kuwaiti desert: An ideal target if enemy artillery would be around.)
Quoting Tzeentch
What disaster? The only disaster are those who think that Ukraine has to achieve a quick victory over a superior enemy, or then it's meaningless to support them. Do these people get bored or what? Does the war become somehow an irritant to them? Luckily the commitment is better than the media portrays it to be.
Ah, the next buzzword is introduced, since 'counteroffensive' obviously didn't work out so well.
If what you're trying to do is convince me that people standing on the sideline fueled by media propaganda can produce an endless supply of hopium, don't bother. I am already aware.
It's not a buzzword. I gather you have no military training and little knowledge of warfare, tactics or military history in general.
Quoting Tzeentch
All I'm saying that this war can very well continue for a long time.
Wrong on all accounts. Unfortunately for you I even hold an academic degree in military studies. But nice try, I guess.
Oh, well that is then quite fascinating! Then you understand how stupid the whole idea of Ukraine somehow making a breakthrough to Melitopol or even to the Sea of Azov is. Without air superiority that isn't going to happen.
Genuinely curious, what did you study in your military studies?
Of course. That's what I and many others have been saying for months.
Quoting ssu
Military history and military thinkers, the development of contemporary land, naval and air doctrine, irregular warfare, modern conflicts, etc. I also had the opportunity to follow courses on propaganda (euphemistically called 'information warfare') - very eye-opening.
What are the textbooks in which you studied it?
I'll say that by far the most influential book, 'eye-opening' if you will, I've read on the matter is Unrestricted Warfare (1999), written by two Chinese colonels.
When I looked up that link I noticed there's a version out from 2015 that's called 'Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America', which is hilariously ironic since the book analyses the American way of warfare and extrapolates trends that are believed to carry into the future and transform the nature of warfare.
Just too ironic.
And not just for months, since the very beginning clear arguments have been presented of why it's simply unfeasible for Ukraine to attempt to remove Russia from its former territory by military means.
At the time the only argument for continued fighting was able to present was that "maybe" Ukraine has some surprise in store.
And, since the beginning, the question has been to the pro-more-war side of the issue to either explain how Ukraine has a chance of winning military (without invoking magical thinking) or then explain how indefinite warfare benefits Ukraine (in particular if they do all this fighting and lose).
However, not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer.
That it is simply Ukraine's choice is the answer and we must just take it for granted that Zelensky speaks for all Ukrainians.
But who doesn't have a choice is Westerners supplying weapons. No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight!!
If they can't "vote with their feet" if they don't actually want to fight as they can't leave, that's called wanting to fight apparently, and if they can't vote as elections are suspended, that's just not only wanting to fight but fighting for democracy.
Quoting President of Poland, as quoted by Reuters
The only argument I heard that things will be different in Ukraine is that Ukraine is European (aka. white).
However, seems to me the scene seems set to play out exactly as before.
It will only lose more if it doesn't seek a diplomatic solution, and I think the biggest obstacle to that course of action is the United States. More specifically, the egos of the neocons that have been cultivating this conflict since at least the early 2000's like Nuland. The whole Biden administration is extremely hawkish on Ukraine, going back decades, and it's no coincidence this conflict boiled over when Biden took office.
ok thanks, I'll have a look into it.
What's even worse is that early on I also put it to the "pro-Ukrainians" that if Ukrainian former lands is so important, why not send NATO boots on the ground to defend it? which was met with a combination of not-our-fight, can't escalate are you crazy, Russia has nukes! and but, but, but, but we're harming Russia for free!!!
And through all this Ukrainian cheerleading not a single moments reflection on the lives lost.
Not a single prediction ever comes true from Russian low morale will somehow cause total collapse of Russian lines, sanctions will destroy the Russian economy, Ukraine doesn't need heavy weapons when they have "saint Javelins", Ukraine doesn't need Western Heavy weapons, Western heavy weapons will be a game changer, but ok the next heavy weapon will be a game changer, Ukraine will "cut the land bridge", Russia has run out of missiles! Russia is running out of artillery! etc. etc. etc.
And yet not a single moments reflection of questioning source of these predictions and there relation to any discernable reality.
I doubt many will want to swallow this pill, but this is the worst part, isn't it?
NATO has goaded Ukraine into picking a fight with the Russians. Ukrainian leaders probably were fed some ambiguous shit like "The US/NATO will support Ukraine in their fight against Russia!"
Now that push has come to shove, that support seems to be limited to sending arms, and not a single NATO country is willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine.
To me, that implies incredible cynism on the part of NATO. Not that I want NATO to send troops to Ukraine and spark WWIII, but it dangled that promise of safety infront of the Ukrainians only to hang them out to dry.
People like to forget, but the first things Ukraine was "fighting for" was "the right to join NATO" and a NATO no-fly zone.
Earlier I cited a pro-Russian Russian analyst claiming: The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. (https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/). Now would it be perfectly fine with you for whatever reason to let Russia win according to that definition of Russian victory?
This is mumbo jumbo to me.
"Denying the Russians victory" sounds like a quote from Dr. Strangelove's General Jack Ripper.
I would worry about ending this senseless waste of human life as soon as possible, and steer towards a stable peace. That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides.
Uhm... I guess you don't call the invasion an offensive? It's the offense, what the Ukrainians are working to counter. :D In Putin's words, too.
Quoting Tzeentch
Uhm... "counteroffensive" is a flashy-sounding buzzword...? :brow: Weird.
Quoting Tzeentch
Really? It's really quite easy to understand. :shrug:
Where do you get this stuff?
Hello Boethius, back on the job? Ah, the Great almighty Russian armed forces!
Well, what I remember was that the "clear arguments" were for the Ukrainian Nazis just to roll over and die. Because Ukrainians were Nazis, right? And that the whole war wasn't of Russia's choosing, but actually the fault of the US, we've heard that. Several cherished (and cherish) this view. And Before the attack it was that the US is making whimsical accusations that Russia will attack Ukraine, but that was I think before you (I don't remember).
But let's just look at the past comment just why and how unfeasible it has been to attempt to remove Russia from its "former territory" (Hint, Soviet or Imperial territory) by military means.
Some old quotes:
And for the last, the best from last year...
:blush:
So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right?
The clear arguments were that Ukraine has less man power, far less material in what you are now calling a material war, barely any airforce, needing to traverse 1000 km to supply the front whereas the front is next door to Russia pre-invasion.
The additional clear arguments is that NATO does not wage and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting, relying on a strategy that assumes gaining air supremacy (which makes sense if you are the US projecting power around the globe, but does not make sense if you are Ukraine defending against a lot of artillery without said NATO airforce).
Quoting ssu
Exactly what one would expect looking at the numbers and looking at the disparity in forces is happening: Ukraine has suffered massive casualties, needs to conscript down to 16 years of age, and has not achieved anything militarily.
This literally is what happened. The Russians have been disabling the Ukrainian grid at will.
I'm pretty sure I didn't even say this, but I'm sure many Russias see the Donbass as ethnic Russians that have been re-integrated into Russia and with the annexation support Russia's defense of this legal Russian territory (legal as far as Russia is concerned).
But you take the trouble to get these quotes, why not just use the quote function so it's clear who is saying what and when and anyone can easily find the context.
I do that "work" as part of my new "job" later I guess.
This is exactly what the Wagner narrative turned out to be that these highly motivated professional mercenaries took Bahkmut because they are so good and professional, only these highly skilled professionals could oust the brave defenders. Of course, less professional soldiers manning the rear and quieter parts of the front are essential in supporting said mercenaries.
Ukraine has done exactly that, putting conscripts into Bahkmut with essentially no training, whereas Russia fought Bahkmut with only mercenaries which are not conscripts at all. The reservists Russia called up are, whether you want to call them conscripts or not, are already trained and have been training all throughout the Bahkmut ordeal.
Again, I don't think I said this, but it is also what is happening, just not as early as this poster predicts. Take Poland for example, distancing from support to Ukraine, calling Ukraine ungrateful and a drowning man (pretty strong words) due to upcoming elections.
This is what Russia has been doing. Unless the West's own figures are wrong, the amount of troops Russia has committed to Ukraine at any given time has been remarkably low.
This I probably said, but I'm pretty sure was when Russia was still advancing. The stall narrative basically came out in the first days of the offensive when clearly nothing was stalled. But we could go back and debate that sort of things retrospectively if you want.
Definitely I did predict Russia would continue the siege of Kiev but I also did mention they had other option such as pulling back and just keeping and defending what they already took in the Donbas.
Keep in mind that the paper (written before the war) analysing different scenarios of a Russian invasion concluded establishing a land bridge to Crimea was the maximum war aims achievable by Russias force disposition. I made it clear that maybe they will just do exactly what that paper said was the maximum they could do.
I also made clear that the purposes of laying siege to Kiev was both to tie up Ukrainian troops, as the Capital takes priority over everything else and can't fall, and also to apply pressure for a diplomatic resolution. So, all that analysis was entirely correct.
This too I likely said, and definitely armour in this war has not been decisive outside the first days of the invasion.
However, that Russia can simply flank the Ukrainian lines remains completely true. The front is not what the Western media calls the front in the Donbas but the entire border.
There are large formations of Russian troops in Belarus for example, but simply moving large amounts of troops and equipment around the border with Ukraine to conduct an offensive anywhere is entirely possible.
So we'll see.
If you've been following my analysis as closely as you're citations of some of what I have said seems to indicate, you'd know that Russia's own military doctrine is that a modern war would have 3 phases: first a manoeuvre phase supported by advanced capabilities but this would get bogged down due to the small quantities of advanced capabilities, followed by an attritional phase where neither army can make significant advances but large quantities of men and material are being lost (due to things like drones, precise strikes etc.), and then a termination phase that will be won by the side that out-learned their opponent in the attritional phase.
That the war moved into a attritional phase is therefore not a surprise in that this is exactly what Russian doctrine calls for as well as this doctrine may simply reflect the truth of modern warfare (that a modern army needs advanced capabilities to compete but it's impossible to afford to fight a whole war with them, so there's this crazy mix and a high rate of attrition).
I definitely agree Ukraine managed to prevent complete encirclement and thus the dynamic didn't change and they had the determination to continue to fight.
As I said at the time, they fought to the point of maximum leverage to negotiate the best resolution to the war.
But please, explain how Ukraine leverage has increased since their breaking the siege of Kiev.
Also of note, the war is not over and Kiev can be sieged again at any time.
Likewise, Russia can still potentially invade right to the Dnieper.
If their doctrine is correct and they have indeed out-learned the Ukrainians then we may see the return to manoeuvre warfare and these strategies play out.
Russia says it sees growing friction between Ukraine and Poland, West
[sup]— Peter Graff · Reuters · Sep 22, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Pesky
I hadn't really expected the Kremlin to target Poland this way, whatever the tactic they're running with. Then again, insidious conspiracy theories come out of those people ? the top official at that.
Quoting boethius
That's not within NATO's mandate, is it? Others may not have such a charter, though. But, hey, maybe you're right, end the tiptoeing.
Quoting boethius
... seems to often enough be put forth by those saying that Ukraine should capitulate.
There is no tiptoeing, there's a very clear objective to weaken Europe, in particular the Euro, and give money to the defence contractors and start a new cold war so even more money flows to defence contractors: everyone pulling their weight and spending 2% of GDP, No Free Rides!!
Quoting jorndoe
The logic also goes the other way, that if it makes no sense for NATO to pick a fight with a nuclear armed opponent, neither does it make sense for Ukraine.
I get you're really desperate to frame me as being 'pro-Russian', but perhaps you can tone it down a little.
Quoting Tzeentch
Note the keyword. I even underlined it for you.
Quoting boethius
You changed the subject.
Quoting Sep 17, 2023
@Tzeentch, what does that...stuff suggest? (in terms of the future?)
[sup]• Full text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine
• Russia’s Eliminationist Rhetoric Against Ukraine: A Collection[/sup]
You mean NATO assistance has to traverse 1000 km to supply the front in Ukraine or what? Well, it's their country so that isn't a big problem.
Otherwise yes, but note that with an inferior armed forces, with less equipment and not much of an air force has put Russia to entrench itself behind WW1 lines and isn't taking much anywhere the initiave.
Quoting boethius
Well, this is the kind of war Finland was preparing for. Not going for the brainfart of an idea of New-NATO new threats was in hindsight a very good choice. And seems like Poland is now preparing for something similar. Yes, NATO depends on air power and that is totally rational. However what has changed is the idea that a) conventional war in Europe is extremely unlikely so you don't prepare for one and b) wars aren't short and hence you do have to have those materiel and ammo stocks.
Quoting boethius
Really? What's your reference to conscripting 16 years of age? I haven't heard this.
And isn't it an military achievement that Kyiv wasn't encircled, Kharkiv wasn't lost, territory has been taken back from Russia and a lot of Russian equipment has been destroyed too
Quoting boethius
And Ukrainians have been repairing that grid also at will:
Quoting boethius
You said it. :wink:
See . Other's are too quotes. I do sense a bias towards the Russians in your comments.
Quoting ssu
I did not deny saying this and I pointed it out it's true.
Where I am unsure the citation is from me or someone else I say so.
And again, why not just use the citation function so it's clear who said what and when.
For example, when I stated:
Quoting boethius
First, this is in the context of responding to the comment:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
My comment is explaining why Russian would want to encircle Kiev, because once the capital is encircled the dynamic changes.
And the first sentences of explaining that is:
Quoting boethius
In other words, encircling the capital would change the military, social and political dynamic (so one reason the Russians are trying to do it) and it also absorbs a lot of Ukrainian forces as their top priority is to prevent encirclement (precisely because that changes the military, social and political dynamic) which has the benefit for the Russians of gaining ground in the south.
In literally my next comment I clarify:
Quoting boethius
Precisely to clarify that Kiev may succeed in preventing encirclement, break the siege and rout the Russians with a surprise counter offensive, or even just be sieged for a long time.
I add further clarification in my next posts that:
Quoting boethius
And when asked:
Quoting Changeling
I respond:
Quoting boethius
In other words, the context makes it abundantly clear that I am engaged in analysis of different possibilities, including the Ukrainians completely routing the Russians in some brilliant surprise move.
However, I explain why I don't think that will happen:
Quoting boethius
I then go onto explain what would change that situation and be a game changer:
Quoting boethius
Which is exactly what everyone accepts a year later that Ukraine needs a lot of armour to do any offensive maneuovre.
I explained this March 10th, 2022, less than a month into the war right after explaining Ukraine contesting the skies is "untenable".
I could provide even more context to explain that my analysis at the time was completely accurate.
After all this military analysis of the different scenarios (not predictions), in my next comment I state:
Quoting boethius
In particular:
Quoting boethius
Which is what happened. If you believe the Russians they retreated from the siege of Kiev as a show of good faith in what they believed was preliminary agreement to end the war.
So, I fail to see how any of this analysis was anything other than spot on.
Quoting ukranews.com
Seems the confusion was caused by above statement, by referring to them as conscripts it would seem to mean they are conscripted, but I have not found explanation of why the age of registration was lowered.
So not actually conscripting 16 year old's, but just making the register. I did not find any clarity on if they can still leave Ukraine at 16 or not.
It is a big problem if you're logistics hubs can be hit by missiles, grid and rail disabled, and also that it just takes time to move things over this distance and maintain all the equipment and infrastructure needed to do so etc.
As for the initiative, we'll see what happens next.
If the Russian strategy of attrition is successful then Ukraine has indeed run out of anti-air missiles and Russia can get close enough to the front to use lot's of guide bombs and attack helicopters and Ukrainian supply chains and ammunition are under extreme strain and this will permit Russia to go on the initiative, also due to building up large formations not yet committed to battle.
If Ukraine's strategy is successful then none of that will happen and they will remove Russia from their former territory.
Quoting ssu
In other words you agree that NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for.
I've explicitly stated multiple times that one of my purposes in the thread is to explain Russia's perspective as mutual understanding is required to negotiate peace.
The reason I don't equally represent the Ukrainian perspective is because we get that not only from other posters here such as yourself but the main stream media. We are inundated with the Ukrainian perspective.
Likewise, that Russia (having larger amounts of men and material) may simply win the war due to those advantages is another reason to negotiate peace, but I make clear many times that is not inevitable, maybe sanctions or low morale will cause some sort of collapse anytime (I just do not see any actual evidence for that nor historical precedent, but sure it's possible).
The reason to understand the opposing perspective is to first simply evaluate the situation.
We are told by the Ukrainian perspective that the Russians are all low morale and not motivated etc. Which is you believe then is one reason to seek a military solution as Russia is "weak". But is that true? It's perhaps wise to take into consideration Russia's arguments and reasoning (from government, media, ordinary people etc.), not just what Ukraine says about Russia, in making an evaluation of Russian determination.
Likewise, a sober analysis of force disposition and capabilities and recourses is also perhaps a wise thing to do in evaluating the project of defeating Russia in military terms.
If the conclusion of such an analysis looking at the different arguments and perspectives concludes Ukraine has little chance of achieving its objectives with military force, then there is little alternative to negotiation.
Lastly, in understanding the perspectives of the different sides it is maybe possible to negotiate. The only person you encounter who you can completely ignore what they say and what they believe is someone you can beat to death.
Otherwise, you have to deal with people you encounter and that requires some understanding them to some degree.
This plus having people on the inside to facilitate their rapid takeover. What we know now is that part of Russia's strategy hinged heavily on the fact that government and defense officials would move to support their ousting of the current regime, either through direct support or through failing to mount a proper defense.
Russia's intelligence services had done a lot of work to "pave the way," for the invasion through bribes and persuasion campaigns. At least part of the reason they went in with such a small force relative to the population of Ukraine, and from so many different lines of attack, was because they were expecting for their advance to be facilitated in key areas. Then, the large number of axes of attack and their rapid progress would hopefully cause Ukrainians to see that the cause was hopeless.
But in many cases people took the bribes proffered to them and then reported the incidents to the Ukrainian intelligence services. Or they took the bribes and just didn't support the Russians when the time came.
It's just like Prigozhin's coup attempts. If he had picked up more military defectors, then more people would have likely joined him. People don't want to be on the losing side. Because Ukrainian resistance was effective in some areas, people who might have flipped didn't. Kherson is an area where they had significant "inside help."
And of course this has consequences for Russia. While Ukraine couldn't defend on a every front at once, neither could Russia effectively support it's large number of axes, resulting in very high equipment losses from infantry ambushes on supply lines and the TB2 becoming an absolute horror for the Russians until they regrouped and began focusing on having proper air defenses for advances.
IMO, one of the biggest problems for Russia's initial plan was the failure to properly suppress enemy air defenses. This not only messed up their air assault heavy campaign strategy, but was a massive propaganda and moral victory for Ukraine, the elite VDV being shot out of the sky in engagement after engagement without having any effect.
Not as much desperate as you are to repeatedly frame your opponents as being addicted to "deadly drug" or “hopium” of Western propaganda. Besides there is nothing I’ve said to tone down, even a little. Indeed I still find the expression "pro-Russian" as a non-hyperbolic and most certainly accurate qualification of your views. The problem is not the words chosen it’s their meaning and implications. If I say: "Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all others", this would sound pro-democracy, wouldn’t it? Yes it would and rightly so. That is, it doesn't matter how badly you talk about Russia, but how badly you talk about it relative to their alternatives like NATO or the US, especially if it is matter to decide the political fate of the countries involved in this war and which will impact our present and future lives. You are pro-Russian as far as I’m concerned beyond any reasonable doubt and I don’t need your confirmation to that, I’m just soliciting you (and your sidekicks) to provide arguments to ground your moral and geopolitical positions as applied to this war instead of hiding behind your pointless sarcasm and framing your opponents as NATO cheerleaders. As far as I’ve read, you didn't bring arguments that the actual Russian propaganda supporting the war against Ukraine didn't make (so exactly zero of your arguments proves that you care about Ukrainian lives more than they themselves do), nor brought any arguments to support more likely effective policies of constraining Russian imperial ambitions alternative to what the Westerners are supporting because likely you do not see Russia as a geopolitical threat, certainly not as the US, since the US is the great Satan, right? So let me tone it up a little more: you are even more pro-Russian than certain pro-Russian Russian analysts, as I’ve pointed out earlier.
Quoting Tzeentch
And then I'm the disingenuous one?! By underlining this twice pointless keyword which seemingly has a flavor of neutrality, in reality you are underlining how hypocritical and flawed your claims are. So, by all means, thanks a lot for underlining it for me.
As far as I can tell, everybody shared understanding here is that a negotiation “often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides” in order to succeed and that negotiation is a plausible and welcomed way to end this war. So your dodgy answer is apparently nothing more than a platitude which nobody disagrees with. The rhetoric purpose of this platitude however is to hide all what is really controversial about your beliefs and therefore would be more pertinent to bring up in answering my question. What is controversial is under what conditions could and would be desirable this negotiation to happen, in particular concerning the Ukrainian negotiation power toward Russian claimed requirements (which I gave you an example of). This negotiation power could be weaker or stronger depending on a load of evolving circumstances, many of which might be hidden to us. However before, during and after the beginning of the war until now you and your sidekicks were fine with having Ukraine agree on Russian requirements by withdrawing the Western military support (which the Ukrainians have asked for and the Westerners were willing to provide according to Western national interest), without bothering with Ukrainian negotiation power and related circumstances to preserve self-determination, not surprisingly so because you even overlook Ukrainian agency at your convenience. The West should appease the Russians (their sense of security, their geopolitical projections, the Black Sea fleet, not bother them in their “back yard”, repay for the broken promise of “not one inch further East”, thwart the nuclear threat, etc.), so as your guru Mearsheimer suggests Ukraine should accept to remain under the influence of Russia. If this isn’t pro-Russian I don’t know what is.
Second, there are deeper flaws in your and your sidekicks’ views though. You and your sidekicks often accuse [1] your opponents of something like “not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer” and something like “No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight!”. These arguments are grounded on alleged rational requirements (like a theory of victory or a victory assessment in terms of human life costs) or meant to discredit alleged Western excuses behind Ukrainian’s choices (like “Ukraine wants to fight”) for an exploitative and manipulative behaviour by the West at the expense of the Ukrainians. Both assumptions are not only questionable on their own merits (as I argued in the past on several occasions with little or no feedback) but can very easily be retorted against your own views in the same fashion. Indeed, you too do not have a “theory of peace” and instead pretend to rely on Ukrainian choice (all of a sudden Ukraine has regained its agency back like in “Ukraine found an agreement with Russia in April ’22!”) to determine “the uncomfortable but necessary concessions” the Ukrainians would freely choose ONLY AFTER the Western choice to not support them anyways. And this ALWAYS for exploitative and manipulative reasons, given your US-phobia or aversion to the “Great Satan” (just emulating your penchant for cheap discrediting expressions which you never felt like toning down), this would be a blow in the face of the American imperialism. Besides you too have nowhere presented how much loss of freedom, well being or security would be worth for the Ukrainians not to fight back the Russians.
Third, to me “being neutral” means that either you are indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong in this war. Or it means that you place exactly equal responsibility on fighting parties and/or promote policies that maintain good economic/political relationships with both or with neither involved parties (assumed they would allow it). But you are not indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong. Nor you and your sidekicks have ever given arguments supporting an equal attitude toward belligerents or involved third parties, indeed you put the greatest blame on the US and advocate opposition to the the current American leadership in this war while keeping totally silent about Russia. Now, given that you and your sidekicks can not claim impartiality by any means, as far as I am concerned what remains to be rationally investigated is your approach in picking sides. One of my core assumptions is that it would be more rational to start with the simple question “what do you prefer for you and people you really care about between living like an avg Westerner or an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian?” instead of “what can you do to save the entire present and future humanity materially, psychologically and morally from war, starvation, diseases, exploitation, manipulation?”. And you know why “more rational”? Because I have no reasonable doubt that I and you too (or anybody else in this thread for that matter) have a clue on how to answer the first but absolutely no fucking clue about answering the second (I even doubt it makes sense). Whatever answer I give to that core question will guide my siding with the international circumstances (given my very limited but hopefully rational enough understanding of them) which would be more likely benign toward my preferences.
[1]
Quoting boethius
Sure. In this case I was also interested in reporting the views of a sober pro-Russian Russian geopolitical analyst on the current situation (others in the same site maintain that nuclear bombing a NATO country like Poland would be the necessary evil to win this war, go figure).
Which sounds kind of suprising given that NATO has been so rightly perceived as a growing unbearable threat against Russia at least since 2008, right?
NATO's planes and submarines and missiles and nuclear weapons are definitely a threat.
I personally have my doubts as to the effectiveness of the F-35 stealthiness, but it is still a dangerous aircraft and capable of many dangerous things.
The problem Ukraine has is that it has none of those things.
The problem the West has in supporting Ukraine fighting is that it simply doesn't have what Ukraine would need to have a chance.
And yet "NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for”. Moreover until the very last moment no Western country nor the Ukrainian president himself was believing that Russia would invade, except for the US, but it was too late to PREPARE. Not to mention the still ongoing weaponry supply in dribs and drabs when Ukraine is engaged in a full-out war for its own survival, right?
The point being, if NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY a growing unbearable security threat against Russia (as it is claimed by pro-Russians), before and after the occupation of Crimea, why on earth NATO members weren’t preparing for a war in Ukraine?
My answer is that there was NO EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat against Russia due to NATO meddling in Ukraine. Indeed it’s totally the opposite: it’s precisely because the threat of NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY WEAK and WEAKENING (the US military presence in Europe declining for decades, “Nato is brain dead”, Trump isolationism and destablization of the US democracy , the delay of Ukrainian membership, embarrassing American withdrawal from Afghanistan, European divisions between European countries, between Germany and the US especially about Russia, between European people and their political elites, the weak response of the West against Crimea grabbing, the growing tension with raising Chinese power, the islamist terrorism) while Putin’s successfully meddling in Western politics, successful crushing the Chechen independentist movements, Russian successful military adventurism in Georgia, in the Middle East , in Africa and in Ukraine, Putin’s domestic popularity AND Russian readiness for a war in Ukraine were EVIDENTLY GROWING that Putin took the Western EVIDENT lowest confidence in NATO, divisions and unreadiness to military confront Russia in Ukraine as a window of opportunity for Russia to boldly invade Ukraine. This is a rational strategy given Russian hegemonic ambitions: it is smarter to take the initiative to attack your enemies while they are weak and less threatening, instead of attacking them while they are strong and threatening (like immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union). But that also means that Russia was not compelled AT ALL to aggress Ukraine by an EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat from NATO against Russia, it was Putin’s deliberate choice to pursue hegemonic expansion at the expense of a decaying NATO. On the other side one might question now if the West and NATO are as weak as Putin thought they were. And if at the next round the West will be as unprepared to face the EVIDENT and now UNBEARABLE security threat from Russia against the West.
Meaning? What is bothering you exactly?
Vietnam: "who gives a shit?".
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
Just because Ukraine has Nazi paramilitaries and just because it's impossible to take photos of Ukrainian soldiers without capturing Nazi insignia and just because Ukrainian Nazis get applauded in parliament doesn't mean we're on the side of the Nazis, you crazy Russian shill.
[/quote]
[1]
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/jewish-ukraine-fights-nazi-russia-zelensky
https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-zelensky-adviser-40-jewish-heroes-fighting-in-mariupol-steel-plant/
I agree with the first link on the fact that Ukraine's identity is messy.
"Ukraine will accept Moscow's conditions or cease to exist." The Kremlin sends threats [sup](google translate)[/sup]
[sup]— Miko?aj Pietraszewski · Wiadomo?ci Radio ZET · Sep 25, 2023[/sup]
I don't think there's much new about this, though.
And likely the reason why apparently the Ukrainians prefer to be called "Nazis" instead of "Russians", go figure.
And yet American fought against the British empire for their independence, despite "the same pillars of each nation".
Quoting javi2541997
Sure, Zelensky has definitely failed with you. So disappointing. Now I'm gonna pick his ears next time I see him.
True, but both nations agree on the fact that they are in the Western world, and share the same language and interests. The rebellion of the USA against the UK was a taxation or public administration problem rather than a cultural war.
Quoting neomac
Nah, we all are already busy paying the high costs and inflation, while our public budget is feeding them. :roll:
It was cultural and identitarian too. Read Paine: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Sense
And then the US allied with the British archenemy, the French with whom they shared at least republican spirit.
Quoting javi2541997
I hear you, bro. I'd prefer me, you and our entire families to be bombed, raped and tortured by the Russians than paying the high costs of inflation , while our public budget is feeding them. :roll:
Ask to yourself: Are the families of the Western world responsible?
Secondly, why don't we care about the rest of the world as well as we do about Ukraine? What about Syria? Afghanistan? Niger? Libya and Morocco natural disasters? Do these ring a bell to you?
Thirdly, what about Russian citizens? They are not guilty of having Putin as President running their country. You are speaking about deaths, injuries and rapes. But these are suffered by the people of the other "side" too, but we do not care because our politicians are hypocritical. In this stupid war, it seems that there is only one victim and the rest "deserve" to be dead and isolated economically from the rest of the world. What a terrible mistake to not allow Russia to express themselves better. The aggression of Putin is not justified, as well as should not be disrespect for everything related to Russia either.
Quoting neomac
Interesting. You can fight for your American identity and cultural values, but hey! We do not allow Russians to defend their Cyrillic heritage! Russians bad and Putin a dictator! :roll:
As the expression goes: "Taxation without Representation."
It was also a about "lawyers, guns, and money." Also known as the British Mercantile economy:
Quoting Jennifer Monroe McCutchen
Interesting to watch Republicans claiming they’re against funding…see how long that lasts.
[hide]
* Pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc., all while Russia was repeatedly calling it a red line (acknowledged by allies, experts, and our CIA as threatening and provocative).
[/hide]
Weren’t you the one claiming that Putin was an imperialist trying to take over the world a while back? Right…
The reason I say this is because there are various things within Washington's behavior that simply don't make sense otherwise.
Why would they course for war for 20 years straight while refusing any meaningful dialogue with Russia? To me that implies they intentionally sought to start a conflict.
Why would they take this course, while simultaneously being unwilling to commit to a victory? There's not analyst in the world that gave Ukraine any chance of victory prior to this war. To me that implies that a military victory was never Washington's objective in the first place.
While the war is ongoing, why would they boycot a peace deal and also use diplomatic negotiations as a tool to mislead the Russians, intentionally souring the little trust that may have been there and making negotiations impossible for the foreseeable future? To me that implies Washington is not interested in a diplomatic solution to this war, and wishes for it to continue for as long as possible.
On the other hand, just for an addendum to your comment, I miss more efforts by European institutions to let Russia be part of those. I am not asking for a full membership because I understand that Russia needs deep changes in its public administration and system, as an overall. But, again, I think that Frankfort (or Paris, depending on the context) should have made more efforts towards Russia and tried to take a more neutral position, as much as Switzerland has always done.
It would be a great act of hypocrisy of Western institutions if we let Ukraine be part of everything unconditionally. In this sense, I perceive that Ukraine is playing two sides: the U.S. and the European Union. When Zelensky is not able to get funding to keep fighting or has some disagreement with an EU state (such as Poland), he quickly goes to Washington; and if Republicans will the 2024 elections, he will ask for some integration in the EU. I cannot trust the behaviour of a nation like this one, and Zelensky is demanding more than Ukraine should get in real circumstances.
I don't think Russia would want to be part of the EU or NATO, even though such options have been explored in the past, mainly because it would entail ceding some sovereignty to Brussels (or Washington in the case of NATO).
However, economic ties had been strengthened in the period before the 2014 (and even after). Perhaps Washington felt the Russians and Europeans were in fact cozying up to each other a little too much, to such an extent that the Europeans could no longer be counted on to pick the American side if a conflict were to break out between say, the United States, China and Russia.
Quoting javi2541997
I know very little of Zelensky, and considering he had an acting career in the past it is hard to gauge whether he's acting or being genuine. But I do have some sympathy for him, and certainly for the Ukrainian people.
They've been led down the primrose path, and now they're being hung out to dry.
Being a European myself, I put a lot of blame with the weak European leadership, who should have been savvy to what the Americans were up to in Ukraine and given a clear 'no'.
Oh, yes! You are right, I completely forgot the unconditional requirements for joining the EU is ceding part of the sovereignty.
Quoting Tzeentch
I have sympathy - and most importantly, empathy - with Russian folks too. I think they are in a difficult situation, because being a regular citizen on the side which everyone hates is messy. I wish them the best for the future because it is obvious that Putin will not last in power forever. Sooner or later, he will die, and we will see what will happen in post-Putin Russia. I wish we had all learnt from our mistakes, and we wouldn't treat them with superiority. This is what happened under the Yeltsin administration. He was the puppet of Washington and everybody treated him as a drunk clown, soiling Russia's dignity.
If I could see the point of asking myself this, maybe I would.
Quoting javi2541997
Because Ukraine is not threatening to the West, it wants to join the West. Not the same with Russia.
What about Syria? Afghanistan? Niger? Libya and Morocco natural disasters? Do you have any news?
Bells are ringing everywhere from everywhere: natural disasters, climate change, pollution, war, famine, inequality, exploitation, inflation, overpopulation, racism, classism, sexism, populism, oligarchs, dictators, criminals, cancer, obesity, pandemics, personal economic, health, mental, relational, professional issues, and aliens… lots of aliens everywhere kept hidden by the pentagon (aliens love to reside only and exclusively inside the pentagon). So… fucking what? What do you want to do about it? What’s your gospel, holy Javi.
Quoting javi2541997
Yet they largely support the war, as far as I can tell:
[I]In August 2023, eight out of ten percent of Russians approved of activities of the Russian President Vladimir Putin. The popularity level was three percent higher than in September 2022, when the figure declined following the announcement of a partial mobilization in the country. After Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February 2022, the approval rating increased. During the COVID-19 lockdown in the spring of 2020, the figure declined[/I].
https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/
And then compare the Russians under Putin, with the Iranians under the Ayatollah. See any difference?
Quoting javi2541997
Nobody has invaded Russia proper. The Americans fought against the British Imperial power in the past, Ukraine is fighting against the Russian Imperial power in the present. While Russia is currently fighting to revive its Imperial power against a seemingly-decaying American Imperial power.
Quoting Mikie
Impressive memory. Sarcasm for sarcasm, sure, Putin is an imperialist trying to take over the universe, paradise, hell, dreamland, Barbie World and most importantly be the object of all your most erotic dreams for the rest of your life. And I suspect that so far he overwhelmingly succeeded on the last one.
Quoting javi2541997
Two false claims about me.
Never said, implied nor suggested that Putin is “psychopath”. Never denied Ukraine's Nazi past, I’ve discussed about it in more than one occasion in my past posts. And even my rebuttal to you wasn’t meant to deny, but to suggest an explanation. For the Ukrainians Nazism was a powerful way to gain independence from oppressive Russia (read the whole story of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Bandera). Communism and Islam play/ed that role too against oppressive (neo)colonial empires.
BTW Putin cheerfully supports neonazi movements in his home country and around the world (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Nazism_in_Russia). The great Patriotic Heros from “Wagner” - wink wink - had a well known neonazi as a leader https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Utkin). The problem is when they turn against Russia. BTW for Russians “nazi” is more synonym of anti-Russian than of “anti-Jew” (anti-semitism in Russia has also a very long and glorious history).
They want to be funded by the Western world, which is different. Because speaking plainly and frankly, they are part of the East world. They no longer want to be funded by Russia for reasons that remain unclear to me.
Quoting neomac
I can't take you seriously if you believe in those statistics.
Quoting neomac
Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and many of its Axis allies, starting on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during the Second World War. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
I can’t decide for the Ukrainians which world they want to be part of, nor their motives to do so.
They have chosen the West (and it’s not the first time) and they are ready to pay for it.
It’s on the Westerners to decide what to do about it in the face of the Russian threat against the West too, and declaredly so.
Quoting javi2541997
But you should. Surely that’s not the only source of my belief, it was just a sample. As far as I can tell, even concerning those Russians fighting on the front line who may believe that Putin made a big mistake, still Putin managed to convince them that it’s about Russian survival and grievances against the West. So thanks to the pro-Russian propaganda that is even so successful abroad, in the democratic West (and in this thread too), people may genuinely support Putin.
Quoting javi2541997
Dude, I was referring to the current war. Ukraine, the US, NATO didn’t invade Russia proper. Russia invaded Ukraine proper. Period. Besides, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa is about Nazi Germany invading Russia (with which Russia was a very good ally for a good while for expansionist reasons) not Ukrainians invading Russia. Not to mention all the Ukrainians who fought back German Nazis for Soviet Union: According to researchers, during 1943-1945 about 4.5 million Ukrainians became Red Army soldiers. After June 1944, 33% of the Soviet Red Army consisted of Ukrainians . The losses of the Ukrainian people during World War Two account for 19-35% of the total losses of the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Ukrainian_Front
Are you aware that the so called "Russian threat" is only in Washington's paranoia? If you were from Finland, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, etc. I would respect your argument. But, it is obvious that Putin is not that stupid to attack NATO members.
Quoting neomac
No, you didn't: The Americans fought against the British Imperial power in the past...,
1776 is pretty far from our current year, indeed!
Quoting neomac
Your arguments are based on the false premise that in the Western world there are no threats, which, of course, is completely wrong. I think that before giving lessons to the East we should have to look ourselves in the mirror, and act humbly. If you think that a Russian commander is more dangerous for your security than some psychopath with the right to purchase weapons, you are not experiencing reality, and it is clear that you are living under the lies of Western propaganda. I see and experience a lot of threats in daily life which do not come from Russia precisely: Inflation, scarcity, unemployment, insecurity, political instability, etc. But, didn't you pretend to defend that the Western world is awesome?
Similar to what's come up before (2022Mar13, 2022Jul21, 2022Oct8, 2022Nov9), suppose that Ukraine had ... ? declared neutrality with respect to international military alliance memberships, formally on paper / constitutionally (2022Mar8, 2022Mar9, 2022Mar11); ? retained right to self-defense, e.g. from invaders (shouldn't be controversial), including foreign training and/or weaponry as the case may be; ? explicitly stated that others respect sovereignty, self-determination, freedom to seek own path (shouldn't be controversial); ? actively pursued EU membership, and perhaps sought other such cooperation ... Something along those lines.
The question is what might we then have expected from the Kremlin. Seems like they covered their bases, but what might have transpired then?
I joined this thread a while back and discussed this too on several occasions.
The Russian threat doesn’t consist in attacking Spain out of the blue yesterday. But in wanting to regain its sphere of influence in Easter Europe which then will have an impact on International power balance. Indeed that also implies likely eroding Western security and economic defences (EU and NATO) with all its means: nuclear threats, economic dependencies, political corruption, troll factories, international alliances (with the worst authoritarian regimes including North Corea), adventurism in Africa and Middle East a REPEATEDLY DECLARED intent to establish a new world order along with his Chinese boyfriend. It’s been more than a decade that he was preparing the Russian come back. And attacking Ukraine was Putin’s way to prove to Russians and the Rest of the World how weak is the decaying West and that the king (the US) is naked.
Besides geopolitics is all about security dilemmas, so if one discounts the arguments behind certain choices, it's always "paranoia", INCLUDING Putin's paranoia of NATO encirclement.
Quoting javi2541997
Dude, I was insisting an a historical analogy between the US and Ukraine fighting against oppressive imperialism, to support my view of the present war and the Ukrainian attitude toward it, not giving you lessons about Russian history. Again I joined this thread a while back and discussed Russian history too on several occasions, and with many participants. We discussed repeatedly about the Russian fear of invasion since the Mongols (Russia was invaded by Poliand too!) and how much pro-Russian propaganda (including Mearsheimer’s views) is built on it. So don’t get so excited over nothing.
Quoting javi2541997
Evidently you didn’t read much of what I wrote in this thread. My arguments do not rely on the premise that “in the Western world there are no threats” or that “the Western world is awesome” AT ALL. In international politics, I think it’s intellectually more honest to reason in terms of lesser evil, than to reason as self-entitled nobodies teaching other nobodies their gospel over an utopian world where all evil is magically gone.
Operation Barbarossa was the Axis invading the USSR, which was a composite of many current and previous states in any event. An invasion that was initially so successful because Russia was a military ally of the Nazis, helping them dismember Poland, and thus giving them a launching point for their invasion, and selling them vast supplies of war material until literally the day they attacked.
The Russian mythos of constant invasions requires a pretty selective reading of history. You know, "Napoleon pounced upon Russia," ignoring that they had just fought four wars sending invasion armies west against France prior to that. Germany invaded Russia twice, ignoring that the countries only bordered each other because both were involved in dismantling Poland (multiple times), and that Russia conquered the Baltics, Finland, etc. through wars of aggression. Every country has their own self-serving narratives, but the whole "let's forget we allied with Hitler," thing is a particularly big exclusion for a national mythos founded on WWII.
I agree. Nonetheless, I still don't know why it is dangerous to switch the power balance often. Every powerful and rich nation tends to impose its way of seeing things. The U.S. did it after WWII, and Russia did it as well in the Soviet era. This is the kind of world we live in, some nations need to be under the umbrella of others, depending on the values and principles they have in common. Yet, it is important to highlight one important fact here. You mentioned my country and I promise you that if my nation got attacked by Morocco - for example - nobody would care. Yes, NATO would defend us, but it is just protocol like. If we disappear as a whole tomorrow, nobody would care honestly. But why does Washington care that much about Ukraine? Again, I am sceptic. There is something I can't see and it is hidden. So, there is hypocrisy defending some nations and others don't.
Quoting neomac
True, but while the security dilemmas of Russia are very well argued, Washington's not. It is not the same as letting Ukraine join NATO, which is close to Russian frontiers, as having some rockets in Cuba. The U.S. created - pretty well - a big international fence with the aim to get their enemies as far as possible. And they accomplished it, because most of the wars have always taken part far away from their frontiers: WWII, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, etc.
Quoting neomac
Bollocks! That's what the puppet Zelensky should have in mind!
War became virtually inevitable when Washington expressed its wishes to incorporate Ukraine into NATO, and then backed up that intention by supporting a coup and by starting to train and arm the Ukrainians.
Even if NATO membership was being held off, the Russians feared Washington would create a fait accompli when it started arming the Ukrainians to such an extent that in time the Russians wouldn't be able to object.
The importance of Ukraine is especially tied to Crimea and Sevastopol. Ukraine entering a rival military alliance would mean Russian access to the Black Sea and its strategic partners could be cut off at any point in time. It had a long-term lend lease deal, which Ukraine could simply cancel and then it would be up to Russia to invade, which would at that point be completely unfeasible.
Everybody involved at the political level is (or should be) aware of this, which is why Washington's attempt to change Ukraine's neutral status in 2008 and 2014 should be seen as a deliberate attempt at escalation.
EU membership may be a difficult point. The EU isn't a military alliance, but the Europhiles in Brussel certainly fantasize about turning the EU into a 'United States of Europe', with a European army, etc., which would essentially create the same situation as if Ukraine would join NATO. One could argue that such a situation is far away, but the nature of geopolitics is long-term.
Right now it will be very difficult to come to a peace agreement, since trust between Russia and the West has been completely shattered (it should be attempted regardless).
Russia is not going to return the territories it now occupies, simply because the trust isn't there to leave Crimea in the same vulnerable situation that it was in. That was the point of their invasion. And it is unlikely Ukraine (and Washington) would agree to a peace deal that doesn't return territory.
The harsh truth is that the rest of Ukraine is only of marginal importance to Russia and Washington, and it will likely end up being the pawn in the geopolitical game for years to come. I only see things getting worse for Ukraine.
No one was claiming Putin had imperialist ambitions back then. Now the story has changed retroactively, ignoring historical fact to justify the continuation of war and take a sizable responsibility off the US.
Well it depends on what you take to be relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). Of course if you ignore Russian history [1] and Russian grievances after the fall of Soviet Union. And Putin's political history even prior 2008, sure there is no shred of evidence.
[1]
So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 1993
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf (page 54)
[i]WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IS LIKELY
Despite some testy moments, relations between Russia and Ukraine have generally been stable since the Soviet breakup. There are, however, good reasons to fear that these relations might deterio
rate. First, the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them. Great powers that share a long and unprotected common border, like that between
Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.
Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet col lapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between
these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this
relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism suffering under backdrop, small on either side.
several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the
of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for exam
ple, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a "transitional" phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon
be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.
Fourth, there is the problem of mixed populations. Roughly 11.5 million Russians live in Ukraine (comprising 22 percent of Ukraine's population) and approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians live in Russia. Abuse of either minority by the local majority could be a flash point for crisis.[/i]
The same Mearsheimer who agrees there was no evidence whatsoever of Putin’s imperialism for the NATO provocation in 2008? Sure.
Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago. If that’s what you mean, no I don’t consider that evidence for why NATO needed expansion at the Bucharest summit in April of 2008. A meeting in which Putin was invited. (Odd move if he was considered such a threat.)
The narrative of Russian imperialism prior to 2008 necessitating the expansion of NATO is revisionism. That’s not what happened. Which is why you and people like you can give no evidence of it, and have to report to vague statements like “Russian history.”
Quoting neomac
No he didn’t. He wrote that in 1993. And he never once advocates for Ukraine becoming a member of NATO— in fact accurately predicts that any tensions between the countries would only escalate if that happened. Which is exactly what happened. He states this clearly in the paper you cite but apparently didn’t read.
Try to get the basic facts right at least.
Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago.
Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO:
[I]By the end of his tenure however, Ismay had become the biggest advocate of the organisation he had famously said earlier on in his political career, was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”[/I]https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/declassified_137930.htm
Quoting Mikie
All the rhetoric strength of your argument relies on this mystiphying locution “he was considered such a threat” (again ask your offensive-realist guru Mearsheimer how he thinks States assess threat).
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY.
The liberal views of the American governments were optimistic enough and thought they could play stick and carrot with Russia (economic aids, reintegration in the Western-led international community, energy business with Europe, returning nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, go figure!). And stick wasn’t meant to be much of a stick, since NATO is a defensive alliance which in the US even East European lobbies supported, fearing a Russian imperialist-nationalist revival.
This was obvious to every prominent geopolitical analyst since immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union: it’s not just the Russo-phobo Brzezinski (whose views were much more influential than your guru Mearsheimer’s on the American administration) but also your guru offensive-realist Mearsheimer who were aware of it and warned pretty vocally on not UNDERESTIMATING the Russian threat.
So the leading Western Europeans didn’t hear the Eastern Europeans warnings about Russia, at the prospect of having cheap oil/gas for their industries, Russia was far away and they felt well protected by the US.
And American administrations didn’t feel pressed by Russian revanchism at the end of the Cold War no matter how American analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer) were vocal about it.
So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries even though it wasn’t considered “such a threat” by many optimistic Western administrations. They thought they could close en eye while Russia was playing friendly, even two when Russia took Crimea. Until they couldn't when Russia invaded Ukraine.
BTW also the reunification of Germany and now its rearming triggered and triggers security dilemmas in neighbouring countries. The point is that Germany lost the war , they elites completely replaced. That’s not true for Russia, after the collapse of Soviet Union, as President Putin himself is living proof of.
Quoting Mikie
It hurts badly when your chosen guru embarrasses you so patently, I know. Do you want a hug?
Quoting Mikie
Absolutely, mine was just a typo, whose correction I highly welcome. Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 and it comes from your guru. So thanks! LOL
70 years ago.
That’s not what was argued in 2008.
Quoting neomac
Right— which makes the Bucharest Summit an unnecessary and stupid provocation.
Quoting neomac
No, it wasn’t.
Nor was Russian imperialism cited as a reason in 2008.
Quoting neomac
No, it doesn’t. You’re inability to comprehend what you read isn’t my problem. I’ll help:
Quoting Mikie
Which is true. Which your falsely-dated reference outlines very well:
[quote=The Article You Quoted But Didn’t Understand]
Political will aside, extending NATO’s security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet Union is not wise. It is sure to enrage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently.
[/quote]
Which is exactly what happened 15 years after this article, at the Bucharest Summit. It’s laughable you still think this somehow supports all the smoke you blow
He’s not my guru. You’re the one citing him, not me.
I’m more partial to the late Stephen Cohen. I’d recommended his analysis too.
It wasn’t a typo. 1993 and 2013 are vastly different. You simply misread the fact that the article was accessed in the 2010s. You just carelessly used it in the hopes it would support your case, failing to notice it supports exactly what I mentioned — and which you can’t seem to follow (or won’t allow yourself to). But your poor reading comprehension isn’t my fault.
But good to know you can’t even own up to mistakes, and that I’m basically dealing with a child. Your poor writing skills and silly attempts at insults were proof enough. I appreciate the extra confirmation though. :up:
Where is the mention of Russian imperialism? Where is the Russian threat that warranted NATO membership, after it was made clear this would be considered by Russia to be a provocation?
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
I guess it’ll just never be admitted that the US provoked this war long ago, out of fear that this somehow makes Putin inculpable. Which it doesn’t.
Here's what Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, said about that recently:
Ol' Jens here saying the quiet part out loud. Russia voiced clear concerns about NATO enlargement, and what did NATO do? It doubled down. We sure showed those Russians not to tell us what to do, eh?
It's clear to me that this war was purposefully provoked.
It's well beyond that point of sending Ukrainian solders to get back territory, it's just to lead them to certain death. Sad.
Why stupid provocation? If the premise of the Bucharest Summit was “We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism.” And “We reaffirm to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.” Then the conclusion “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.” (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm) is consequential. If it isn’t, it means that the premise is wrong.
Your argument is self-defeating: to be a stupid provocation, one must admit a hegemonic ambition from Russia over Ukraine as Mearsheimer does. Which could have been VERY WELL overlooked by an overconfident American administration in light of all concessions made to Russia and partnership with Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union. That doesn’t exclude at all the perception of a potential conflicts in Ukraine. If A and B are likely going to fight (as Mearsheimer suggests Russia and Ukraine would do in 1993, and Russia being the bully one, with or without Putin), a third party could keep them separated.
It’s obvious for the hegemon to play the hegemon, if it isn’t it’s because a competitor intends to challenge the hegemon. But than that’s a threat for the hegemon.
Quoting Mikie.
So what? “Imperialism’ can be easily taken as a derogatory expression, so while one is playing diplomacy with a potential competitor to be tamed and whose declared intentions are not fully trusted, of course this word won’t be used . Unless you are really claiming that NATO declaration should have sounded more like “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO because fucking Russian imperialism has to stop, right little Putin?”. Surely that would be a provocation, wouldn’t it? But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO?
In any case the issue of Russian imperialism was totally evident among American anlysts prior to 2008:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/03/26/the-russia-debate-nixon-vs-brzezinski/31124b6b-f0d3-4449-a0ce-da2b8e55043e/
“Two opposing camps have formed in America's foreign policy establishment over the opportunities and dangers rising from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The one you will want to join depends on how you view the nature and strength of Russian imperialism at the end of the 20th century.”
Quoting Mikie
I don’t think you understood my argument at all. You keep assessing it from within your frame of implicit assumptions, which I’m questioning. For example I’m questioning Mearsheimer TOO. I just pointed out that Mearsheimer, your guru not mine, in his article of 1993 prior 2008 was expressly talking about the risks of conflict based on historical reasons concerning Russia and Ukraine which you were so ready to discount (“Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast Bolshevism.”) not based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And that the Russians didn’t tolerate an independent Ukraine “several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for example, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a ‘transitional’ phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.” which again is not an assessment based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And claiming that joining NATO was or was not a good idea is based on this premise about Great Powers like Russia are perceived as a threat by countries like Ukraine.
The general point here is that assessing security dilemmas involving Great Powers doesn’t need to go through declared intentions of presidents AT ALL. And this general point is not contradicted by Mearsheimer’s offensive realism principles:
[I]The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.
There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability[/I]
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)
That is why your belief that evidences of Putin’s declared intentions or American President’s declared intentions in a precise moment are all that counts in assessing responsibilities without understanding deeper geopolitical dynamics is catastrophically misguided. And that’s a problem for latest Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin arguments too (I suspect there are theoretical reasons why he made this argument, but they are irrelavant to the point I’m making).
Besides nobody needs to stick to Mearsheimer’s apparently narrow notion and application of the notion “Russian imperialism” AT ALL. And I certainly don’t. So I can’t care less if Mearsheimer uses the word “imperialism” for his own reason. I can care if he acknowledges or not what to me counts as expression of Russian imperialism. And he does. That’s the evidence I need, not his word choices.
On the other side Mearsheimer’s wording choices are important to you because he is your guru, so if he is critical toward the expression “Russia imperialism” for whatever reason, you feel you kicked my ass so badly. Besides your understanding of geopolitics seems grounded on declared intentions of presidents which is simply outlandish also from the perspective of Mearshaimer’s offensive realism.
Quoting Mikie
It was a typo. And once you understand my argument correctly you would understand why it was important for me to report Mearsheimer’s views on Russia before 2008 (and not after), because your challenge was about evidences concerning Russian threat prior to 2008, and that what you mentioned (Mearsheimer’s disagreeing with NATO expansion) supports my argument that Russia was a threat: indeed that’s why Mearsheimer supported leaving a nuclear deterrence in Ukraine. And if Mearsheimer doesn’t call that “Russian imperialism”, who gives a shit?
Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so.
You’re confusing the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia, which Mearsheimer discusses, and the justification for NATO involvement, which today is claimed to be the threat of Russian imperialism — which is incorrect, and which is why the very same person (Mearsheimer) was rightly against it all along, including 1993.
If Russia was such a threat, surely that would have been mentioned in 2008. But even if kept secret for whatever reason, anyone with a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue, thus creating a self fulfilling prophecy.
Quoting neomac
US hegemony. To make Ukraine a “Western bulwark on Russian borders.” Russia was believed to be too WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008.
It certainly wasn’t because of a Russian imperialist threat. Which is why none of that was mentioned, and which is why Putin was himself at the summit. Any talk of Russian threats as justification for NATO wasn’t even mentioned until 2014.
I’ll skip the rest of your jumbled ramblings. You’ve not shown you even understand what’s being argued. I’m talking about Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008, and about NATO. I’m not talking about historical relations or ancient history or 90s reactions to the dissolution of the USSR. That’s your own diversion.
From the official Kremlin press release on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council:
Quoting President of Russia
Quoting President of Russia
And what was that position exactly?
That they are not too happy about it, as they felt it does not contribute to the security in Europe. Still, the quote given above from the press release still available on Putin's official site clearly shows that Ukraine's joining NATO obviously was not a 'red line'.
That’s fairly straightforward. This is 2008.
It wasn’t just Putin, of course.
The US ambassador, William Burns, said as much in his memo to the secretary of state:
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/28/did-the-us-really-take-russias-nato-concerns-very-seriously/
This is a non sequitur. At most you can argue that there was a “very strong” reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so. And reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition (among them, all the concessions they made to Russia).
“Red lines” are not necessarily a geopolitical imperative AT ALL. Attacking Crimea was a “red line”, it got attacked. Killing Soleimani was crossing a red line, it got crossed. But most of all, why was Ukraine a “red line”? What does it mean? What does it imply? Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed, since “declared intentions” seem to be so decisive to your argument.
Quoting Mikie
You wish I made such confusion but I didn’t. Indeed I limited myself to cite Mearsheimer to counter your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences concerning “the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia”, reason why Russia was perceived as a troublemaker by many prominent geopolitical analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer), independently from Russian presidents’ declared intentions. I didn’t argue that suffices to support NATO involvement. Yet.
First let’s get on the same track over the relevant facts.
Quoting Mikie
That the claimed “threat of Russian imperialism” is incorrect is just a cheap claim. I’m more interested to hear effective arguments to support it. That also presupposes shared understanding of what “threat of Russian imperialism” means and what constitutes evidence for it.
“Mearsheimer said so” may be a strong argument if one takes Mearsheimer as his guru. That’s not my case.
Quoting Mikie
Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, why “surely” that would have been mentioned in 2008?
Your reasoning is all behind these ambiguous expressions. I clarified what is my understanding of “Russia was such a threat” and why “surely” should have NOT been mentioned. NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. Even between 2000 and 2008.
The notion of “provocation” presupposes that Russia had interest in having NATO out of Ukraine not to preserve its independence from an oppressive hegemon, because we agree that the perceived historical oppressor of Ukraine was Russia not the US, and Ukraine was seeking security from NATO against Russia. So Russian interest was about taking control over Ukraine. In other words, it was matter of hegemonic competition, about great powers antagonising each others and having the means to act accordingly (let's not forget the Russia is a nuclear power even after the collapse of Soviet Union).
Geopolitical relations can be rife of provocations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Russia was afraid of NATO expansion and wanted to counter it, but then a decaying NATO revived and expanded even more thanks to Putin. This phenomenon is very much EXPECTED because when there are reasons to mistrust one another (as in Russia Ukraine or Russia and the US), any defensive move by a state to contain a potential threat from the other will be perceived as a hostile move. So, calling it “provocation” doesn’t hold as a justification for NOT expanding NATO either (Brzezinski uses this as an argument IN FAVOR of NATO expansion, go figure!). Unless you are conflating facts (Russia’s perceived provocation from NATO expansion) with justification.
What I may concede is a weaker version of “a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue”, that is why I talked about overconfidence. Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement in Ukraine was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your implicit assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look myopic and dogmatic to me.
Quoting Mikie
Dude, focus, I argued about it already. I agree with “because of US hegemony” and with “Russia was believed to be to WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008” but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine, the competing hegemonic interest on both sides IS the threat and security dilemma I’m talking about. AND OF COURSE the hegemon (the US) acts at the expense of its competitors (Russia) when the latter ARE PERCEIVED AS WEAK, and postpone it further may be already TOO late to do it. For the same reason Russia aggressed Ukraine NOW and not in 2008, because Putin thinks he is strong enough, and NATO/US/ the West is weak enough that they can’t do much about it. And why would Russia do that? Because NATO is perceived as a threat by Russians! Even though I just said that Putin felt confident (or overconfident?) that NATO was brain dead!
Competing great powers constitute a reciprocal threat, this is the expected core of their security dilemmas. Such power politics dynamics perfectly in line with your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive-realist views on how states assess security threats in the geopolitical arena. However all these facts are not enough to decide how to establish moral or geopolitical justifications of NATO expansion or blame for the ongoing war.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look not only myopic, dogmatic, but self-defeating.
Quoting Mikie
Again, your argument is grounded on a load of implicit assumptions which I’m questioning and you have a hard time to make them explicit and compelling.
1 - On what grounds should we exclusively focus our understanding of Russia vs the US/NATO on “Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008” to understand justifications and place blames? NATO expansion started BEFORE Putin, NATO-Ukraine relationships started BEFORE Putin, relevant reasons by involved parties were based on the historical antagonism between Russia and Ukraine, Russian Soviet Union and NATO and the future of European security, and not based on Russian presidents declared intentions at a given time. Mearshimer’s 1993 prediction of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was based on historical evidences not on President Yeltsin’s declarations of intents, and was concerning the future not just 1993, immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union, the most vulnerable moment of recent Russian history. So much so that for some the concern was not to humiliate them (as it happened with Germany after WW I) and find a way to reintegrate them in the international community, maybe even as an ally of the West. While the idea of Ukraine joining NATO dragged forever.
Additionally, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the elites of the soviet unions didn’t vanish like in Nazi Germany, they survived. Putin is indeed one of them. So why shouldn’t the reasons of the past concern these 8 years of Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008? There would be no perceived provocation and no need of NATO expansion if those reasons weren’t there. Putin himself has plenty of historical claims about his right to land grabbing in Ukraine, which apparently weren’t brought up during the Bucharest Summit, right?
2 - Security dilemmas do not need to be exclusively or primarily grounded on presidents’ declared intentions AT ALL. As also your guru Mearsheimer writes: “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)
3 - What was doing Putin in 2000-2008? Consolidating authoritarian power in Russia, crushing independents movements within Russian borders, nurturing far-right ethnic nationalist fan-base, grunting over coloured revolutions in ex-Soviet area, instead of using the Western support, indulgence and partnership to increase democracy, welfare and quell revanchist ideologies. And when it finished with that he started projecting Russian power beyond its boarders. Actually China and Iran did the same : enjoyed the economic and institutional benefits of American promoted globalisation and then used what has been capitalised to grow authoritarian, revanchist against the hegemon, and to project power beyond their borders. So even during 2000-2008 Putin was NOT PERCEIVED as a piece of cake AT ALL (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0151.pdf), and most vocally not by Eastern European countries neighbouring Russia (including Poland and Baltic countries). For them talking about Russian imperialism was not taboo EVEN during 2000-2008.
However the most evident threat of that time, especially for the US and West Europe, was Islamist terrorism which Putin also wanted to fight. And in any case the hegemon preferred “the carrot and stick” strategy to deal with Russia, China and Iran, even though later these countries turned against the US. The point is that the story is not just NATO expanded and provoked Russia, but at the same time globalisation expanded BENEFITING RUSSIA and its resourgence.
02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.
https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html
Learn what these words mean before using them.
Quoting neomac
Nope. That was your projection.
Quoting neomac
I just did above. Plenty more.
Quoting neomac
That Russia has imperial ambitions, that they seek to conquer not just Ukraine but other countries, etc. Claims that have been made by the US and others since 2014, and retroactively made as justification for 2008 — which isn’t true.
Quoting neomac
I’ve already acknowledged this.
Quoting neomac
It wasn’t poorly planned, and of course there are reasons and justifications given. The actual reason is that the US wanted to make Eastern Europe like Western Europe, and figured Russia was to weak to do anything about it. So in 2008, despite warnings, they started the process anyway.
You can buy the US rationale if you want to. I don’t. But either way, the outcome was clear: it would provoke Russia. This was known since the early 90s, in fact.
Quoting neomac
Are you really not convinced that at least by 2008, Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be threatening to Russian security? They said so explicitly. It’s not about what you or I feel, it’s about how they felt about it. The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway. So Crimea and now the Ukraine War shouldn’t be a mystery.
As I quoted above, the US’s own ambassador knew this and warned the secretary of state (Rice):
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
You seem obsessed with this guy. I haven’t cited him once— except in response to your referencing him. He’s hardly a “guru” of mine, although he’s a valuable resource.
So, are you just ignorant or what? Hard to take you seriously when you repeatedly sound so silly. Makes it easier to ignore most of your cumbersome writing though.
If in 2002 Russia clearly declared that they have some reservations, but in general they do not object to Ukraine's joining, then the West did not cross any lines in 2008, given that it was just a continuation of the process started even before 2002. It is Russia's reaction that is unexpected and somewhat irrational - if it was not a vital threat in 2002, why would it be in 2008?
He didn’t say it wasn’t a threat in 2002. But recall this was after 9/11, and the issue was terrorism. Yes, things changed between 2002 and 2008. Is that not obvious?
What happened? The Orange Revolution, for one. But there were other tensions, including issues with Nosovo at the beginning of 2008. Any cooperation with NATO was out the window long before the Bucharest summit.
The proponents of the theory 'it is all because of NATO expansion' are just content with stating that he suddenly in 2008 started to see Ukraine in NATO as a vital threat, while he was and is perfectly calm about the Baltics or the Scandinavian countries. They feel no need to explain that difference, even though such view is absurdly irrational.
Concerns over the effects of NATO enlargement literally started as soon as the Soviet Union dissolved, so lets not play coy here.
On your second point, it's obvious why Finland and Sweden pose little threat. Do you know what the Russian-Finnish border looks like?
Unfortunately for some, the archives are actually loaded with proclamations like this. Not just from the Russians themselves, but from people in the Washington establishment too.
This 'head-in-sand' style approach where you hope people won't go digging through the archives to prove you wrong is getting rather tiresome.
It’s not all because of NATO expansion. But that’s the most direct cause.
Also, it wasn’t “sudden.” As explained earlier. You seem to ignore changes from 2002 to 2008.
Lastly, the differences are obvious. Russia doesn’t like any of it, as they were promised NATO wouldnt expand in the 90s, but Ukraine is unique. Look at a map and you’ll see why.
No, it is not the most direct cause, as it was not a cause of war with Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.
And no, your explanations did not explain anything - NATO did not organize the Orange Revolution and the differences about Kosovo in no way made NATO more threatening to Russia. NATO did not actively do anything in that period that would make it a bigger threat to Russia.
And no, differences are not obvious. The distance from Ukraine to Moscow is about 100 km shorter than from Latvia, so it is negligible. But to be sure, I have checked the map from 2002 and Ukraine has not moved a bit from that time. Thus the difference between 'Ukraine in NATO is not a big concern to us' in 2002 and 'it is a grave threat' in 2008 has nothing to do with its location.
Russia's position on Ukraine / Georgia NATO membership was known well before the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and not 'unexpected' at all. The Russian view is discussed at length in several leaked memos written by former CIA director William Burns, one of which is titled 'Nyet Means Nyet: Russia's NATO Enlargement Redlines'.
Here's are two memos from the lead up to the 2008 Summit:
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW748_a.html
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW265_a.html
It's honestly quite stunning how poorly read people here are after 511 pages of discussion.
Embarrassing!
Actually, embarrassment is a good word here, because everyone already knows that Canada isn't ruled by a Nazi regime (or fascist or authoritarian). That won't deter certain parties from using the event as diversion, or to sow mistrust or division, though.
Above I have given a quote from Putin's official site. So yes, I agree it is quite stunning.
You’d be surprised. I would argue Canada places more power in the hands of its leader than does any other western country. Trudeau invoked the Emergency Act to quell protests critical of his government’s handling of the pandemic, for example. These powers allowed him to engage in nefarious activity against his own citizens, like directing banks to freeze their accounts. Imagine if the US president tried to do that.
The bottomline is your assertions are objectively untrue. We've got Washington officials going on record saying the exact opposite of what you're saying.
The bottomline is that Putin's declarations on Ukraine's joning NATO completely changed between 2002 and 2008. Given that it was only six years in between and NATO did not really do anything to change that perception, that reaction very well could be considered unexpected and irrational.
Maybe next time just read what you comment on. Then you would not have to complain about your own poor reading skills. Or ask what is the argument about after you comment on it.
'Not really anything', except for expanding NATO by another 7 countries, and planning another 2 - Ukraine and Georgia.
NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.
NATO expansionism had received wide-spread criticism, even from people within the administrations that carried out the policy. You can read the memoires of people like Madeline Albright or Robert Gates.
George Kennan termed NATO expansion as 'starting a new Cold War' back in 1998!
And here you are arguing the 'Russians acted unexpected and irrational'.
What can I say? It's a joke.
Quoting Jabberwock
Very impressive, kiddo. :rofl:
Is this serious?
Quoting Jabberwock
Oh good — glad you feel that way. The Russians felt differently. Our own ambassador acknowledges the sentiment in the memo I cited above. I guess none of that matters, since according to some internet dude Russia had no reason to view NATO as a threat. :up:
Quoting Jabberwock
But it does have to do with the events that occurred after 2002.
And the idea that Russia was OK with Ukraine membership in NATO in 2002 is flawed anyway— and contradicted by the same article. But even accepting it wholesale, there’s a concept called “time”, and so things change between one year and the next. Worth paying attention to.
The seven countries started admission in 1999, so in 2002 when Putin said that the expansion 'does not cloud the relations' he was fully aware of the process, so that could not have changed his mind. Quoting Tzeentch
So you STILL have not read the quote you have decided to discuss? Incredible... Poor reading indeed.
Yes, because militarily NATO in Ukraine is not much different than NATO in the Baltics. One might argue that losing 'friendly' access to Kaliningrad (with its missiles directed at Berlin) and cutting off most of the Baltic shore would be viewed as much more threatening. So it is not about NATO as such and it never was.
Quoting Mikie
I do not question that Russian attitudes have changed, but you still have failed to explain what NATO actually DID in that period that would change them. You cited two things - the Orange Revolution, but it is not something that NATO did, and Kosovo, which does not really explain the turnabout. So please, tell me what NATO did.
Quoting Mikie
I am glad you feel that way, but Putin has clearly stated that it would not 'cloud the relations' and it is really Ukraine's choice. So who has the right view of Putin's or Russia's attitudes - Putin or you, a random Internet dude? Surely you see a difference between 'they were not too happy about it' and 'they were ready to start war about it'?
It is very different in fact.
Quoting Jabberwock
It has been all along. But things do change at different points in time— which you’re apparently unwilling to understand.
2004, when the three countries you mentioned joined NATO, was after your 2002 quote. That changed things too, but Russia couldn’t do much about it.
Quoting Jabberwock
From the Russian point of view — not mine. I can run through the history if you’d like, but there’s plenty of resources available.
Quoting Jabberwock
The 2004 enlargement was one. Orange revolution wasn’t caused by NATO, but neither was Nosovo independence — but NATO supported it, and even led troops there. This did not go unrecognized.
But I don’t really see the sense in this. What are you arguing? Not that the Russians didn’t say it was a threat, but that they were lying — or had no actual reason to fear NATO? If the latter, that’s not up to us to say. Maybe the US has nothing to fear if China decides to make a military pact with Mexico — but listening to the US’s concerns would be wise regardless.
Again, listen to our own ambassador. Was he lying too? If not, then 2008 was the beginning of a great mistake, with foreseeable consequences.
Quoting Jabberwock
He didn’t say it in 2008, did he? If he did, I’d agree that the reaction to Bucharest would be baffling indeed.
But he didn’t. So apparently you’re much more interested in listening to Putin when it fits your purposes—in 2002– but unwilling to do so from 2008, which is far more relevant, when he says that NATO including Ukraine is a “direct threat.”
Also from 2008:
https://www.unian.info/world/amp-111033-text-of-putin-s-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/44078
https://web.archive.org/web/20080410213408/http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080331/ap_on_re_eu/russia_vs_nato_1
What is unclear about the bolded part?
What’s the response? “Well 6 years ago Putin said something different and nothing has happened to justify a change in heart.” Again, is this serious?
Unsupported assertion.
Quoting Mikie
In 2002 Putin was perfectly aware that the Baltics will join NATO soon, as the process was started in 1999. In fact, the conference with NATO from which the quote was given would be a perfect opportunity to voice his concerns. Yet he did not, he just praised NATO-Russia cooperation and said that Ukraine may choose its alliances.
Quoting Mikie
Please do. The very fact that you believed that Putin in 2002 was unaware of the planned 2004 expansion shows that your knowledge in this respect might be somewhat lacking.
Quoting Mikie
The 2004 enlargement was a done deal in 2002. And Russians recognized that NATO led troops in Kosovo AFTER 2002? Then they must have been rather unattentive, given that the troops were there since 1999... together with Russians! Yes, please tell me about history...
Quoting Mikie
Yes, I know you do not see the sense in this, because, as i wrote, on your theory it is completely inexplicable. Putin was great friends with NATO in 2002 and was just slightly annoyed with the expansion, and in 2008 it was unacceptable and the red line, even though nothing much changed about NATO which would not have been known to him in 2002. Unless you know and understand why the sudden change of heart, you will be missing the bigger picture. But obviously you cannot, given your rather inaccurate guesses. Your theory also is unable to explain why Putin practically shrugged off the joining of the Baltics.
Quoting Mikie
Yes, Putin said one thing in 2002 and quite another in 2008, even though nothing much happened that had to do with NATO. That is the exact issue I am drawing your attention to.
Quoting Mikie
On the contrary, quite a lot happened to justify his change of heart, but it has very llitle to do with NATO.
Not completely accurate, but irrelevant in any case.
Quoting Jabberwock
Whatever the causes of Russia’s stance, it was indeed their stance in 2008, which is where this current crisis began in earnest.
Whatever point you’re trying to make with 2002, or the lead up to 2008, just state it outright. Maybe Putin found God. Maybe he decided to take over Eastern Europe. Whatever speculation you have, it’s still irrelevant. Russia’s position was clear in 2008. (In fact clear since the 90s, but that’s not relevant so there’s no need discussing it.)
Quoting Jabberwock
He was very well aware, yes. Never said otherwise.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, there are explanations. But all of them are completely irrelevant.
No, on your theory there are no such explanations, as it is pretty obvious after your completely unsuccessful attempts to provide them. That is why you try to dismiss them as irrelevant. I believed that if I have shown you that your theory has a big gaping hole, that might prompt you to seek an actual explanation, but it seems I was wrong, you are perfectly fine with overlooking it. God told Putin to change the policy? Right, that must be it.
The point is that the cause of the change of the politics is essential for the explanation of the current situation. And that cause is domestic: Putin in those years was faced with serious and economic problems, his rule was threatened by the wave of 'color revolutions' (you got that one right, but it still had nothing to do with NATO) and Russians were increasingly resenting the fall of the USSR, turning to those who openly embraced nationalistic and imperialistic ideas, like Zhirinovsky. In order to capture the support of hardliners Putin has made the turn from praising European cooperation toward near-open hostility in such a short period. Yes, NATO was one of the talking points, but it was pretty low on the list - more important was maintaining and expanding the sphere of influence in the 'Russian mir'. That is why he called the fall of the USSR 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century' in 2005, that is why he openly denied Ukraine's statehood in 2008 while still in 2002 he considered it to be a sovereign country that can decide about its own fate. That is why the concept of the 'near abroad' has resurfaced again. Objectively, NATO did not become a greater threat, it just became a convenient tool for making internal politics. But without the NATO expansion perspective that internal politics would have proceeded exactly the same - Russian imperialists are not so much threatened by the former republics joining a military alliance, but by the very idea of their independence. The Baltics are an exception here, as the Russian influences were much weaker there even in the USSR, that is why their joining NATO and the West in general was just shrugged off.
Thus the idea that if there were no NATO expansion plans, Russia would happily live peacefully along its neighbors, has little to do with reality. Let me remind you why the Euromaidan happened - it was a reaction of Ukrainians to Russia forcing Yanukovych to renege on his promises for trade integration with the EU - this had nothing to do with NATO. When Russia invaded Crimea, Ukraine actually had military neutrality enshrined in the constitution. So no, NATO did not provoke the conflict, the conflict at its core is caused by Ukraine's (and other republics) drive to sovereignty. Whether it chose to join NATO, EU or just tightened informal cooperation with the West while ditching Russian influence, the result would be the same.
Except that NATO's big daddy, the US, was directly involved in the coup.
We've even got Nuland on tape, designing the new Ukrainian government before the coup happened. :lol:
“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression literally meaning “it doesn’t follow” and that would be already enough, if you understood my charitable objection: "There was no reason to do so" doesn't informally follow from "Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line". But, if one wants to be more pedantic, it’s also a well-known label for the following logic fallacy: “in logic and philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy), which your argument - as it is formulated, namely “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” - SO OBVIOUSLY is.
Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with?
Quoting Mikie.
Oh really?! So pray tell, what else was the point of “Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago” exactly? Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. Give me an example of how else you would formulate the same content to sound dismissive.
Quoting Mikie
Well that’s very disappointing wrt what I expressly asked. Indeed, if that’s Putin’s full quote you are referring to is “The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc, whose members' actions are regulated, among other [documents], by Article 5 of the Washington [North Atlantic] Treaty, will be taken in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia." (https://www.rferl.org/a/1079735.html) is rather equivocal wrt the nature of the security threat and indeterminate about its consequences.
1 - First of all, why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? Was Russia implying that they wanted to aggress Ukraine, therefore they didn’t like the idea that Ukraine could invoke article 5, and defend itself with the support of NATO countries? Or that Ukrainians felt that once Ukraine was protected by NATO they were determined to military aggress Russia? But in that case Ukraine couldn’t invoke Article 5 right? Besides Russia is a military nuclear power (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) that any country fears, how plausible would be to have Ukraine to attack Russia (nuclear missiles in European bases remain under the control of the US, not of the hosting countries)? Not to mention that history clearly tells us that Russia oppressed Ukraine not the other way around. And there are official Russian quotes that are very open about letting Ukraine decide what organisation to join. So which is it? Besides did Russia ever express declared intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty. I’d say yes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum), so did Putin between 2000-2008 ever declare intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty? If not, what did this missing declaration imply? That Putin was committed or not committed to Budapest memorandum? Besides, as the Budapest memorandum suggests, one of the main concern of the US was the fate of the Russian nuclear arsenal after the collapse of Soviet Union, as it still would be if Russia collapses. But then there would be two perceived strong reasons about Russian military nuclear power INDEPENDENTLY from Putin or any other Russian President that would make an aggression of Russia by NATO unlikely, and which are stronger than the threat of Putin’s feeling provoked as such: indeed the US wouldn’t have to be so much worried if Iran feels provoked and sets red lines, because it is not a military nuclear power yet, right?
2 - Putin’s claim doesn’t specify what will happen if lines are crossed AT ALL. Did Putin mean that if Ukraine joins NATO Russia will start a nuclear war with NATO states right away? Or just a conventional war against NATO? But if he ALREADY had no fear to do that, why a defensive art.5 invoked by Ukraine inside NATO would be a security threat to Putin which would have the same effect? And if a full-out war was too risky to him, why not supporting far-right terrorism in Europe/US/Ukraine? Why not provoking civil wars in Europe, inflating national identities, or immigration crisis? Or it means that Putin would start a war just in Ukraine? But then why didn’t Putin declare war to Ukraine much earlier (during Trump, Obama, Bush administrations)?! Ukraine and the West would have been totally unprepared back then, why give them the chance to prepare themselves for a war?! If the Western plan of having Ukraine joining NATO was such a threat, why did he take a good decade to such unbreakable threat which NATO wasn’t prepared for?! Or Putin simply meant that he needed to find a security framework that would include Russian concerns in some satisfactory form with no specifications attached to it? Or else, did he mean he would be ready to annex Crimea in 2014 back then? Or invade Ukraine in 2022? The alleged genocide of Russians in Donbas were an issue back then too?! How about Finland? Also Finland joining NATO matches that claim, will Putin aggress Finland too now?! If not, why not?!
Do you have quotes from 2000-2008 clarifying these points , because if you haven’t and we want to stick to declared intentions then you too could be the one who is trying to interpret retroactively what Putin meant back in 2008 in light of what it happened since 2014, thanks to the fact Putin’s threat could mean and, and in your eyes, even justify literally any hostile reaction against the West at any time, because he felt provoked, right?
BTW if we should care only about declared intentions to assess security threats, why is Putin dispensed with doing the same (“And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia.")? Maybe it’s because threat assessment by state leaders are not necessarily based on mere declared intentions? Notice also that there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment).
In any case, economic or military blackmails may not work as one might think or wish on countries with hegemonic ambitions: if that’s true for Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, that should be very much expected to be true also for the hegemonic power too.
Quoting Mikie
You didn’t quote any of such claims nor proved that they are “retroactively” made as justification for 2008. Indeed arguments for NATO expansion came prior 2014 and 2008, and prior to Putin’s presidency, and do not need to rely on Putin’s declared intentions but on the evidences of Russian-Ukrainian history (evidences you acknowledged). So much so that Putin himself is still picking from Russian (also Imperial) history to justify his war and his territorial annexations, go figure. Besides Putin’s politics during 2000-2008 didn’t do anything to contradict Russian imperialist ambitions, on the contrary all he has done is to ENABLE the pursuit of imperial ambitions after necessary power consolidation (so much so that Russia changed its military doctrine already in 2010 which would most certainly come in handy in any possible annexation of territories in neighbouring countries with Russian minorities). And Putin is member of the Cold War mentality Russian elites so trust issues with him shouldn’t come as a surprise AT ALL.
Again you didn’t explain what counts as evidence to support the claim “Russia has imperial ambitions”. For Ukraine, Georgia and Poland, any attempt to question post-Soviet Union countries independent foreign policy was expression of Russian imperial ambitions even during 2000-2008 (https://www.aei.org/articles/love-and-hate-polish-russian-relations-marred-by-russian-unpredictability-and-eu-and-nato-uncertainty/, https://jamestown.org/program/poland-plays-strategic-role-in-ukraines-orange-revolution/, https://euobserver.com/world/22861). Why are they wrong and you right? Notice that one can extend or narrow the semantic of a notion at convenience: example, “Russia has not imperial ambitions, because no Russian president proclaimed himself emperor”. But then why are we talking about American imperialism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_imperialism)? There are no American emperors either.
What about “hegemonic ambitions” instead of “imperial ambitions”? Do you like that expression better? If so (why so?), do you exclude that Putin’s Russia had hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine in 2008 as well? And that Putin’s “provocation” claims didn’t presuppose it? What would constitute relevant evidence to assess hegemonic ambitions in geopolitics?
Quoting Mikie
“It wasn’t poorly planned” is a claim not an argument, and I don’t need to buy any rationale. Yet. I limit myself to try to understand what it was and get you to do the same exercise to sound more challenging. I acknowledge the fact that Russia was sensitive about it, and vocally so. But these are not all the relevant facts about the relation between the US and Russia: indeed, Putins’ 2000-2008 Russia might have been weaker than it was in 2013, but not as weak as it was Russia under Yeltsin in terms of power consolidation and domestic popularity. However even then, during Yeltsin, Ukraine didn’t join the West despite all reasons in favour of that (it was because the West couldn’t care less to have Ukraine joining NATO or because Russian opposition was diplomatically taken into account?!). Besides in that period the most imminent threat to the US or broadly the West was Islamist terrorism, and Russia was willing to cooperate with the West against a common enemy, so that was likely a strong reason on both sides to not escalate reciprocal hostilities. Besides the US pushed Ukraine to give back nuclear weapons to Russia (benefiting Russia), and then Western countries wanted to do business with Russia (that’s why states like Germany were against Ukraine joining NATO, and yet Finland had no problems, why the difference?). At the same time Russia enjoyed the benefits of globalisation so he kept playing as friendly as he could for its own convenience until he felt the right moment to invaded Ukraine. Russia used its resources capitalized during the globalization not to increase democracy, welfare state in Russia and quell revanchist ideologies against the West, but to project military/political power and anti-American propaganda beyond its borders, in the West (through political corruption, trolling farms, support to far-right movements), in the Middle East, in Africa, build alliances with authoritarian regimes like China and Iran to counterbalance the hegemon. All these are FACTS to be acknowledged. Right? Finally “provoking Russia” should be taken in the geopolitical context of a hegemonic competition. Otherwise it doesn’t make any sense. Right?
Quoting Mikie
As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security, but I understand threats in terms of power struggle for hegemony, which have their game rules driven by security dilemmas and their historical background. Not for the puerile reason that “Putin said so” and the universe knew it since ever.
“The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway” is expected also in light of your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive realism which is all about states being security maximisers (ideas that are echoed in American officials like the Wolfowitz Doctrine and “many of its tenets re-emerged in the Bush Doctrine” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfowitz_Doctrine). However your guru Mearsheimer didn’t seem to take much into account Western globalization nor how much it benefited America’s hegemonic competitors (Russia included). Nor take into account that the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO didn’t damage Russia's national security AT ALL because it never materialised and nobody started a military aggression against Russia from Ukraine, on the contrary the narrative of Ukraine joining NATO as a provocation (which your guru Mearsheimer also spins) literally empowered and emboldened Russian anti-American propaganda in the West , revanchist and imperialist views in domestic country, and its business with West Europe, especially with Germany (which means wealth to invest in military ramp-up and projection that MOST CERTAINLY ENABLED the Ukrainian war whatever the fuck Putin’s declared intentions were in 2000). See? Yet another example of self-fulfilling prophecy. Hegemonic competitors need no help to find and voice pretexts about national security and national interest to pursue their power struggles, what they may desperately need is the ENABLING means to effectively pursue their hegemonic goals.
Notice also the difference in our approaches. You are discussing Ukrainian war to assess blame based on whatever naive and implicit understanding of geopolitical conflicts makes you happy, I discuss Ukrainian war to understand geopolitical conflicts as such first, independently from my preferences.
Quoting Mikie
Oh do you mean that it is pure coincidence that you brought up the same arguments that Mearsheimer abundantly defended (starting with “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault?”), popularised (everywhere he could as other fantastic superheroes like Chomsky and Sachs) and got so viral in the internet (including this thread)? BTW why didn’t you protest earlier if I was so awfully “ignorant or what”?
Don’t waste your time convince me otherwise, because that’s a totally irrelevant issue: indeed, even if we want to pretend that Mearsheimer is not your guru, all the points I made still hold against your as much as Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin views.
[1]
Article 5
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm
But nice try, I guess.
Is this all you have? Blowing smoke in the hopes people aren't well-informed enough to see through it?
Russian imperialists? I guess that’s just assumed. Given that, we can make up a nice story that removes any US responsibility. How convenient.
Quoting Jabberwock
No one said that. But there wouldn’t have been invasion. Of course NATO is only the most direct cause — but there are others.
Quoting Jabberwock
US influence isn’t restricted to NATO. The US’s plans for Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, had several aspects. The “democratization” pretext is always there. Making the world safe for freedom, etc.— like Iraq and every other country we interfere with.
Quoting Jabberwock
That’s nice. Whether it’s true, who knows? Maybe, maybe not.
But irrelevant. Why? Because we don’t continue plans to welcome Ukraine to NATO when Russia, and our own ambassador, warns explicitly (rather than reading minds) that it would be considered a provocation. That is very clear. Which is why all you have in response that’s concrete — and not a nice story — are reports from 2002, six years prior.
So your entire point was to fill in the “gaps” with the typical United States propaganda. I figured.
“Hey Russia is telling us Ukraine is a red line. Our ambassador agrees. Let’s go ahead and push for it anyway, because they were fine with it years ago and they’re real motive is that they hate freedom.”
No, sorry.
It wasn’t close to a non sequitur. Try learning what words mean before trying to sound smart.
The only one embarrassing themselves is you.
Quoting neomac
NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat,” which is the point. I’ll go with what was actually said over what long-winded stories you want to share.
Quoting neomac
Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me.
Maybe Canada joining a “defensive” military alliance with China would be fine in the US— who knows? But I’m guessing the US would consider it a threat— and if I were China, or Canada, I would take that seriously.
Quoting neomac
No one is talking about “declared intentions,” only what was considered a provocation and threat — which was clear enough for our own ambassador to understand.
Quoting neomac
Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
So you’re just an ignoramus I guess. Oh well.
I have made up Zhirinovsky? Is that your poor attempt at masking your lack of knowledge on the subject?
Here is an article covering Russian propaganda, mostly on Ukraine. You can see on the charts that the demands to 'liberate Ukraine' have peaked after 2004 (i.e. the Orange Revolution). 'Ukraine is a fake country' has a pronounced peak around 2005:
http://file:///C:/Temp/Downloads/EJTS_2022_Vol_10_No_2+(5)+(3).pdf
I can provide quite a few other examples, including from Russian TV.
Quoting Mikie
How exactly can you know that?
Quoting Mikie
Your claim was that the expansion of NATO was provocation to war. If you want to change your mind and say that it was actually general US influence and not the expansion as such, just say so.
Quoting Mikie
And that is exactly what happened - after 2008 the plans of Ukraine joining NATO were shelved and in 2010 Ukraine adopted legislation that would prevent it from joining military alliances. Yet in 2014 Russia has still invaded it, taking Crimea. Given that NATO expansion could no longer serve as a pretext, they have made up different ones. So it seems giving up on NATO does not prevent Russian invasions.
Quoting Mikie
No, I have filled up the gaps with specific facts from Russian history which you were blissfully unaware of, as is quite evident. You just pretend that the change of the policy did not happen, because the explanation for that change undermines your whole narrative.
Because it was stated explicitly, for years, that there would be consequences and that Russia would react to further provocation. When they actually did, it should have come as no surprise -- especially after Biden administration actions in 2021. (Which we could go over if you like -- but I'm not getting into the weeds on any issue when the general argument isn't even understood. If this gives the appearance that I am "unaware" of history, I don't care.)
That's the most direct cause. But there are others, as I've repeatedly said. Incorporating Ukraine wasn't restricted to NATO. That was simply the most threatening. Attempts to liberalize and join the EU were others.
Russian stance on NATO was known clearly in 2008, when this began. It was known by the United States, in fact. Again:
The above is not Russian propaganda. It was Bush's own ambassador. So Burns was wrong, but you, who act as if you're the only one who's read up on this subject -- apparently consisting of a few Wikipedia articles -- are privy to the "true" motives of Putin's. And the evidence given is that he has supposedly changed his position since 2002. Too bad you weren't around to inform Germany and France that Russian warnings should be ignored, and given them lectures about how the "real" motives were fear of democracy.
Quoting Jabberwock
NATO membership is one part of overall US influence, yes. How you think I'm changing my mind on this is baffling. NATO isn't part of United States influence? I see them as one and the same thing -- but even if we're to separate the two somehow, NATO expansion on it's own was the main driver of the Ukraine war.
Quoting Jabberwock
For someone who feels entitled to give lectures on history, you sure do leave out of a lot when it's convenient. So nothing else happened in 2014 that may be relevant to this story, huh? Putin just decided, out of the blue, to invade Crimea. Is this supposed to be serious? What were the reasons given, and should we at least know them, if not take them seriously? Do you know what they were? Or do you not care, given that you have a direct line to Putin's soul?
In any case, the events after 2014 are also interesting. Was this also a time when NATO expansion was off the table? You would think so, after Crimea. But no -- the push continued, even stronger.
Quoting Jabberwock
What change in policy?
To quote the one source in which you have so far based your entire argument:
Quoting President of Russia
But again, it's really not worth arguing over that. I've already granted you that point. So I hardly am "pretending" otherwise. What I've repeatedly said is that it has nothing to do with 2008. The position then was quite clear. You want to pretend that position, in 2008, can be ignored because of the 'sudden change of heart' from 2002. I think that is and was a grave mistake.
If China, today, announces that they support Taiwan independence, how should we react? Should we say, "Well just last year their stance was completely different"? Should we ignore what they say because it's a change from statements in the past? I don't think so. I think we should listen and take it seriously.
So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof?
What else do you think it means, prof? Teach me, I’m eager to learn from your superior knowledge.
And then apply your own definition to your own argument:
[b]“Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so”.
In what sense this crystal clear textbook example of non sequitur according to the definition I provided, is not a non sequitur?[/b]
Quoting Mikie.
Dude, should we or shouldn’t we dismiss accounts based on historical rationales? I accused you of being dismissive, you protested that it was my projection. Who is right? If we should dismiss them, then your comment was indeed dismissive, not my projection, if we shouldn’t dismiss them in explaining NATO expansion, then they hold. So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” .
Besides you keep repeating claims without providing much to supporting them, not to mention your reluctance to clarify your grounding assumptions, despite all my questions.
NATO has an "open door policy" for candidate members, right? Did candidate members from East Europe express concern for perceived “Russian threat” (from Visegrad, Vilnius group, Ukraine, or Georgia) given past history while seeking NATO protection and triggering explicit opposition from Russia? Yes or no? If yes, this is a relevant and persistent driving factor of NATO expansion. Otherwise it isn’t. Which is it?
I don’t need to state that’s the only driving factor, indeed one should take into consideration also the hot debate between national security advisors (among them, experts like Brzezi?ski), the Congress and President’s administrations in understanding the American national interest in the post-cold war wrt NATO and how it impacted NATO enlargement. Surely those Clinton’s and Bush Jr’s administrations (differently from Bush senior’s administration) may have suffered from excessive overconfidence about their understanding and pursuit of NATO enlargement vis-a-vis of the Russian threat.
Quoting Mikie
No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? Unless it would be fine with you if Russia (and its emulators: China, Iran, Nord Korea, Islamic regimes) voiced all sorts of made-up security concerns and red lines to make whatever exploitative demands against the West with the complacency and submissiveness of Western “useful idiots”, right? In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda?
BTW I can’t help but notice yours is another typical dodgy answer that happens to coincide with Mearsheimer’s when challenged on that.
Quoting Mikie
And on what geopolitical grounds, is it so decisive to you to talk “only what was considered a provocation and threat” by Putin for explanations or justification of the current war?
Quoting Mikie
Another non sequitur. “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” is a fact (which I’m acknowledging). “The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years” is a normative claim (that you are making).
How does the latter claim logically follow from the former claim?
As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well.
Again, if you do not explicit your assumptions, your claims look dogmatic and myopic, or worse illogic. Non sequiturs.
I'm sorry that your reading comprehension is poor. But that's not my fault. I assume you're not a native English speaker, and in that case I'm not making fun -- I certainly wouldn't be good at understanding the nuances of Russian or Spanish.
Quoting neomac
What was the threat in 2008, and why was it never mentioned? If kept quiet about, where is the evidence that Russian invasion or aggression was imminent at that time?
I won't hold my breath -- because there was none. Just vague appeals to old tensions, most of them within Ukraine itself (which was deeply split, as is seen from election results/language distribution comparisons).
So if there was no imminent threat from Russia, why did NATO expand? Well, they told us why at the Bucharest Summit. No mystery.
Quoting neomac
Shouldn't that be "your guru Brzenzinski"?
Quoting neomac
So you ask me, not the Russians, because you assume I'm going to repeat what the Russian's have said about this?
Your logic is baffling.
The Russian position on NATO was clear that they considered it a threat. You ask why they felt it was a threat, as if this hasn't been explained a thousand times.
What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference?
Quoting neomac
Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington.
Quoting neomac
And again you don't know what that means, or you fail to see the connection. I'll assume the latter, so I'll make it clearer:
(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.
Apparently you're arguing it wasn't a mistake, that somehow pushing for NATO expansion, despite Russian warnings, was a good move. So I assume you think this war is a good thing too. I don’t share that sentiment.
I suppose you believe it was wise for the USSR to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, right? That wasn't a mistake either, by your logic.
Quoting neomac
So when a war finally breaks out because of this expansion, we still think it's just fine?
You'd fit right in with the Washington crowd.
But that does not answer the question. You are supposed to argue that Russia would NOT attack Ukraine if not for NATO expansion. If Ukraine's increasing independence and its EU aspirations are also the reasons, you have to give a proper argument that Russia why none of those would be a reason for invasion. That might be a bit hard, given that Russia did invade Ukraine in 2014 exactly for those reasons.
Quoting Mikie
No, it was not, because the conflict started when Ukraine's prospect of joining NATO were dim.
Quoting Mikie
No, Putin did not invade Ukraine out of the blue, as I wrote, it was the reaction to Euromaidan. Did you skip that part?
And sure, Ukraine rejected its neutrality pledge after Russia has invaded it, in hope of seeking the protection. How is that unreasonable?
Quoting Mikie
You argue that there was no change in the policy between 2002 and 2008 based on the quote from 2002? You do know that 2002 happened before 2008?
Quoting Mikie
No, I fully acknowledge the change of the policy and the rhetoric, I was just pointing out that it was part of a bigger process in which the stance of NATO was only a minor point. Yes, Russians used fierce rhetoric about the NATO expansion, but at that time they used similar rhetoric about Ukraine's and other republics' independence, status of minorities, state integrity and other topics. Picking just NATO expansion and arguing as if it was the only one point in that rhetoric is missing the bigger picture.
So, again: make the argument that Russia would NOT invade Ukraine if it e.g. tried to join the EU or broke its ties with Russia.
So I’m supposed to argue for something that didn’t happen. No thank you.
No, I don’t think there would be a war today if it weren’t for NATO involvement in Ukraine — if that’s what you’re asking. But you keep switching topics. Above I was referring to the current war in Ukraine, the invasion of 2022— not 2014, which is related but not the same.
Quoting Jabberwock
It started at the Bucharest summit and escalated from there. But if you’re referring to Crimea, then yes— that occurred for a different reason which you deliberately ignored: the ouster of Yanukovych, which the United States supported. All the while, in the background, NATO membership was of course still on the table.
The connection here is obvious, and you want to gloss over with word games: “Well NATO wasn’t directly involved with overthrowing Yanukovych, so clearly it wasn’t a factor in annexing Crimea.” But you know very well what Yanukovych’s stand was regarding NATO.
So no, NATO prospects were far from dim after the “coup” (according to Russia) that the US and its allies supported.
So much for Crimea. What I’ve been discussing, however, is the current war. The prospects of NATO were there all along, and played a significant (but varied) role in various events prior. The most direct result of the current war was NATO provocation, in the years after 2014 but especially 2021.
The most direct cause of Crimea was Yanukovych‘s overthrow. But again, that’s not the same thing— and in any case, NATO was still a significant factor. The world is complex, and these things are connected. I don’t make a huge distinction between NATO and general “US influence,” as I’ve said. If that’s confusing, fine — I’ll be more precise. But anyone who can’t see how these things are at least interrelated isn’t paying attention.
Quoting Jabberwock
I assume you saw “after Crimea.” So by “Ukraine invasion” you’re referring to 2022, which is a reaction to Euromaidan? That’s your explanation? Very odd. Quite a delayed reaction.
Quoting Jabberwock
The reaction to the Bucharest Summit was over NATO. This occurred in 2008. So I really don’t know what you’re talking about here.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don’t have to, since it didn’t happen. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 — which was different from 2022. Both involved US influence, but the latter’s cause (of the much larger war) was mostly NATO.
So we can see the differences based on reaction. When the EUUAA was signed — a pretty big deal to Russia— there wasn’t the level of reaction of 2022.
Maybe there would be one if Ukraine tried to join the EU— who knows? If so, then that would be the direct cause of the reaction. But since it hasn’t happened, there’s no point discussing it.
It reconfirms the Ukraine hypothesis but they stop at making a link to the government. I wonder how private players can get their hands on TNT without consent ow knowledge from the local authorities. There has to be an evidence trail of multiple witnesses somewhere.
My personal most likely scenario is that either this was ordered by or done with the knowledge of the Ukrainian government. In the latter case they chose not to intervene.
The second most likely is that it doesn't stop there and other EU(?) countries were involved.
The third is a US or Russian submarine and all this is a big distraction. And here I find US involvement more likely due to the interests involved.
Given that we have Seymour Hersh's story, the US incriminating a 'Ukrainian group', and of course the US incriminating itself by constantly threatening to end Nordstream if war were to break out, I think the picture is starting to come together.
I'll give that documentary a watch later. Thanks!
The following week starts the Nobel laureates ceremony. I think it is a beautiful and vivid place to appreciate interesting and intelligent people. Well, as a reminder, the Nobel Foundation cancelled the Russian ambassador, and this means that there will not be Russian laureates, although it is a country full of intelligent and cultural people...
Nobel Foundation reverses decision to invite Russia to prize ceremony.
On the other hand, can you imagine a world without Dostoyevski or Shólojov? It is a disgrace the efforts to cancel Russian culture. There are some universities - like Milan - or symposiums which avoid Russian participants. It is pathetic. For example, there was a symposium about Dostoevsky in Nagoya (Japan) and the Russian specialists were cancelled. :roll: https://elpais.com/opinion/2023-09-04/dostoievski-y-ucrania-en-japon.html
Although sooner or later Ukraine will be irrelevant to most people, the 'Karamazov brothers' will remain. Culture is above economics and politics!
Honestly, the idea that an operation of this magnitude was carried out from a sailing yacht I find unlikely, bordering on the impossible.
Performing underwater demolitions is obviously a highly specialized job. Precision navigation equipment, seabed scanning equipment, diving equipment, a crane of some sort - these are things I would expect a vessel to be capable of to be used in for this type of operation.
The documentary tackles some of the criticism, but in my opinion doesn't go into enough detail to make this unlikely story any more likely. A 100m dive is something that experienced, civilian divers can do, but the diving depth is not the extraordinary part.
The documentary also claims that the demolitions could have been done using a small amount of explosives, but the Nordstream explosions measured between 2.1 - 2.3 on the Richter Scale. So yea, obviously not a small explosion. Quite a massive one, in fact. 2.0 on the Richter Scale is equivalent to one ton of TNT.
Personally I don't believe it.
Lastly, the documentary says no one takes Hersh's story seriously. That statement reeks, because it's by far the most logical scenario to have taken place, and it is obviously SOP to have a cover story in place if the US did do it. To say 'no one takes it seriously' is typical deflection.
It sounds to me like this story was made up to deflect blame from the US. Ukraine is not a NATO ally, so Ukraine bombing Nordstream would be slightly less outrageous than the US bombing its allies' infrastructure. Maybe it was carried out by Ukrainian divers, but if that's the case it wasn't without US involvement. No way.
A while back people linked a Swedish documentary with all sorts of experts insinuating Russia was the likely culprit. So yea, I take these documentaries with a grain of salt to begin with, especially if the 'experts' are people I never heard of and will probably never hear from again.
In any case, I'm not in favour of any specific scenario since the information simply isn't there but I do assign a decent probability to this group of people being involved. How much deeper it goes is another question.
That the US is responsible is certainly just an educated guess of mine. But I tried to focus more on the absurdity of the theory that's being presented.
Quoting Benkei
The issue here is that there's no way to get hundreds of pounds of explosives to the seafloor without specialized equipment. I think we can agree that they didn't just kick a few hundred pounds of C4 overboard and hoped for the best, so there's an explanation lacking of how they did this off the back of a yacht.
Handling these types of weights underwater (let alone explosives) is a delicate task that requires absolute precision, but let me get to the next point:
Quoting Benkei
- The precise location of these pipelines isn't public knowledge, so some form of seabed scanning equipment is required to locate the pipelines before the operation can take place. Trial and error is not realistic. It's possible they got the information from a third party.
- Ships don't lie still in the water (and neither do explosive packages for that matter). They drift. And when one is lowering hundreds of pounds worth of explosives into the water that people have to handle at a 100m depth, a vessel is required that can maintain its position with a high degree of accuracy.
- I don't know how one would handle hundreds of pounds of explosives without atleast a crane.
- And diving equipment is self-explanatory. Presumably the divers had to carry out some actions at the bottom, so decompression would be a time-consuming process that could take several hours. Communication equipment, safety equipment, bare necessities unless you're suicidal.
Without some kind of explanation of how they worked, it's hard to take the yacht story seriously.
This would hardly be the technological challenge you make it out to be. The depths at which the pipeline was damaged are within technical scuba diving range. The pipeline is likely easy to spot on a modern 'fish finder'. GPS controlled autopilot makes holding a position relatively simple...
The depths of the pipeline (80m - 110m) are well within what is considered 'technical diving' range (60m+). Things like oxygen toxicity and decompression sickness become life hazards, and these dives are only to be undertaken by trained, experienced and well-equipped divers. It will be hard for civilians to even find training for dives below 100m, but it is possible.
Quoting wonderer1
No - at least not with something you can simply strap to a small sailing yacht. Again, the depths of the pipelines is between 80m - 110m. You would need something sizable to reach that deep.
Furthermore, sound doesn't travel in straight lines underwater, so "spotting" is easy. Pinpointing to the degree of accuracy required for an operation like this is a whole other ballgame that would require extensive surveillance.
Quoting wonderer1
On the type of sailing yacht purported to have carried out the operation? Nah.
You may be confused by measurements in meters instead of feet. Or maybe you don't understand the technical implications of dangling a few hundred tons of explosives from a wire and having people work on it at a depth of a 100m.
No, you are supposed to argue to support your claim: that there would be no war without the talk of NATO expansion. That is essential if you also claim that the war was provoked by NATO. 'I don't think' is not an argument.
And no, I am switching the topics, if you think the 2014 invasion and and the 2022 are unrelated then it is just bizarre and clearly shows you are missing the bigger picture, the background of what was actually happening in Russia during Putin's rule. These are not two different wars, these are just the stages of the same conflict. As you are seemingly unaware, the hostilities have never really ceased, they just had different phases of intensity.
Quoting Mikie
No, it did not start at the Bucharest summit, which you yourself have acknowledged, citing as one of the causes the Orange Revolution, which happened in 2004. I have shown you the article about the many sources of the Russian propaganda from 2004-2005 which clearly denied Ukraine's statehood, demanded that Ukrainians be 'liberated' etc. That was the time when the Putin's rhetoric changed, partially due to the hardliners' influences, but not only that, the evolution of the Russian internal politics is a rather complex subject.
And how exactly I have 'ignored' the ouster of Yanukovych, given that I have cited the Euromaidan as the reason, twice, because you have accused me of the same once before? Let me guess, you do not even know what the Euromaidan is, and you are unaware that Euromaidan and the ouster of Yanukovych are the same thing?
Sure, the US supported the Euromaidan, so what? It was still a grass-root movement protesting the abandonment of tighter integration with the EU. Are you saying that Russia would not react to the Euromaidan if the US did not support it? That is rather unrealistic, to put it mildly. The 2014 invasion was over the loss of influence of Russia on the internal politics.
And no, Yanukovych's stand was not regarding NATO, it was about the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement. I understand you do not make huge distinctions, but you are aware that the EU and the US are not the same?
Quoting Mikie
As I wrote, these are not two different wars, this is the same Russia trying to exert its influence on the same Ukraine by any means it seems fit. It has invaded Crimea, then it supported an armed rebellion on the territory of Ukraine for eight years (which you are seemingly unaware of) and then moved to open hostilities again. So yes, you still need that argument that Russia would not invade Ukraine again if not for NATO.
And sure, everything is interrelated, that is the exact point I am making. It is you who is making a claim based on separate, selected facts ignoring all the others, Russian internal politics in particular.
Quoting Mikie
Sigh. You wrote:
Quoting Mikie
So you have impiled that I have not given the reason for the invasion of CRIMEA, as you wrote yourself.
To which I have responded:
Quoting Jabberwock
So clearly I have referred to your own quote about Crimea.
Quoting Mikie
Yes, you do have to, because it is your claim that without NATO expansion the war would NOT happen. That the cause was NATO is just your assertion, which is seriously undermined by the facts: the hostile attitude toward Ukraine started at least after the Orange Revolution, not after 2008 as your claim, Russia has once already invaded Ukraine for its drive to integrate with the EU (or the drive toward independence in general) and it has organized and supported an armed rebellion long before any talks of NATO resurfaced again.
There was no war in Ukraine prior to 2008. So there — I just proved it.
How silly.
NATO was the most direct cause of the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of evidence for this. Now you ask me to show that in an alternate universe, where NATO expansion wasn’t on the table, that there wouldn’t be war. No, I can’t do that, because I don’t possess the magic.
Quoting Jabberwock
Uh…
Quoting Mikie
Quoting Jabberwock
True — they are all a result of 2008 and US influence in the region.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, it did start at the Bucharest Summit. I mentioned the OR in response to your irrelevant perplexity at why claims differed in 2008 from 2002.
To be clear, by “it” I’m referring to 2022.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, which is different than specifically mentioning Yanukovych and his stance on NATO, which is the connection you claim doesn’t exist (“NATO had no involvement”).
Quoting Jabberwock
Then I suggest you read about Yanukovych and his position regarding NATO expansion. It’s relevant indeed. So yes, NATO was always in the background as a threat— since 2008. That is not to say it was the most direct cause of Crimea, as I said repeatedly. But it was still a major factor in the regime change.
Quoting Jabberwock
Was there a Russian invasion of Ukraine prior to the NATO provocation of 2008?
Notice these things happened after 2008, when NATO was a looming threat— even during a relatively Russian- friendly time under a character like Yanukovych.
Quoting Jabberwock
I’m happy to get to events after 2014. But you’re the one who diverted the conversation back to Crimea, not me.
Quoting Jabberwock
:up: I won’t argue it — if that’s what you meant, fine. I must have misread it.
Quoting Jabberwock
I never once made that claim, which is ridiculous — because I’m not a wizard.
The claim I made was that NATO involvement was the most direct cause of the war (the current war).
What would have happened if NATO wasn’t training troops, providing weapons, conducting drills, etc? Your guess is as good as mine. Maybe there would be war still. Maybe Ukraine would invade Russia. Who knows? I don’t see it as being likely— but I don’t have a Time Machine to tell you definitively one way or another.
Quoting Jabberwock
I’m not talking about hostile attitudes, I’m talking about actions.
If Russia invaded Ukraine in 2005, my position would be wrong.
So give me the alternative. You clearly don’t care about what Putin or his diplomats say— you don’t care what the US ambassador says. So what’s the “real” reason to suddenly become hostile to Ukraine? Changing internal politics in Russia? Okay — unpack that a little, and give some evidence. Because it seems very obvious NATO expansion was considered a red line, and that reactions would happen the more they pushed. You seem to think they’re lying and it’s just a cover for something else.
I also think you mistakenly believe I’m putting the entirety of this war on NATO. I’m not. That happened to be the most direct cause — not the ONLY one. I also focus on it because I’m a US citizen, and so I criticize them more so than other countries, who may indeed share in some responsibility.
This is incorrect. Which is why I asked about NATO activities after 2014. If you’d like to move on to that now, I’d be happy to. Because it’s very relevant to the 2022 invasion and thus what’s happening today.
NATO never “resurfaced” because it never went underground. It was there all along — in fact more so after Crimea.
https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/technology/technical/technical.html:
https://www.saltwatersportsman.com/story/gear/how-to-choose-the-best-fish-finder-frequency/:
Clearly you don't know what you are talking about.
Nah. What you're suggesting is a joke, really.
Reading and having an admiration for Russian writers, is an apology to Russia. Wow! We are living in the era of stupidity and 'cancel culture'. Yet, I would like to highlight my words again: 'Karamazov brothers' or 'The Don' will remain in the passage of the years, because these are pieces of culture and not your brainwashed propaganda. According to your own basis, I bet you never read Don Quixote because it comes from a bloody imperialist country as well, right? Pathetic.
On the other hand, I will try to answer to your following fallacious assessment: 'Arguably Russia should be the richest country on the planet and its citizens enjoying the highest standard of living. Why isn't it; why aren't they?'
I do not know where you get the premise that Russia should be the richest country and its citizens the happiest. But I will not hesitate in using data to contradict your position. I will use a comparison between my country and Russia. I act with good faith and humbly, at least. You will be amazed.
GDP: $2.36 trillion (Spain) / $4.77 trillion (Russia)
GDP per capita: $31,223 (Spain) / $33,263 (Russia)
Unemployment ratio: 11.6% (Spain) / 5.2% (Russia)
Suicide ratio: 6.1 per 100,000 people. (Spain) / 10.7 per 100,000 people.
Well, showing those facts, it is proven that Russia is a better country than some - at least than mine -. The suicide ratio is high but is even higher in Spain if we compare the proportion of numbers of citizens.
But that was your claim! You wrote specifically:
Quoting Mikie
To which I have asked how do you know that. I am glad now that you do admit that you cannot know that.
NATO was the most convenient pretext this time for increasing the ongoing hostilities. But as we know from the Russian invasion of Crimea, any other pretext will do.
Quoting Mikie
So you believe the fact that Russia turned hostile toward Ukraine after 2004 has nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, even though the Crimea invasion was directly caused by the events quite similar to the Orange Revolution. Seriously?
And the careful distinction of 'it' very well shows how peculiar your views you are. Let me sum them up: you carefully ignore the fact that Russians got hostile at Ukraine in 2004, then in 2008 NATO supposedly provokes Russia, but Russia does nothing but protest (even though provoking Russia with NATO expansion supposedly causes wars - if it was worth the war then would be the time!), then Russia takes a break from being threatened and provoked by NATO expansion, invades Ukraine for related but distinctly different reasons (without even mentioning NATO expansion!), then goes back to being threatened by NATO expansion and invades again in 2022.
If that summary somehow misrepresents your views, please correct me.
Quoting Mikie
Well, I actually I did read about it. Wiki claims that in his speech he stated:
Quoting Wikipedia
Unfortunately, it does not provide the source.
Also, this article from BBC sums up things nicely, with such passages like:
Quoting BBC
As I understand, from your suggestion that I read about his position, you have a citation where Yanukovych says something completely opposite? Can you provide it?
Quoting Mikie
Was there a war after the 2008 provocation? Because if the war in 2022 is the reaction to 2008 provocation, then it must be... how you put it? Oh, yes: 'Quite a delayed reaction'.
So on your interpretation Russia was under constant threat of NATO's invasion since 2008, yet it started the invasion of Ukraine as late as in 2022, even though in the meantime it has ALSO invaded the very same Ukraine (and supported the armed rebellion) for different reasons... Really?
Quoting Mikie
Well, you did write:
Quoting Mikie
Was that ridiculous?
Quoting Mikie
Well, you made that specific claim, 'But there wouldn't have been invasion', so I take it you have changed your position.
And I find it VERY likely that Russia would attack Ukraine again, for the very same reasons it has attacked in in 2014 and supported hostilities since that time.
And, actually, you do not have to have a time machine, you can use historical sources to get to know the situation better, then you can have a better view of the possible outcomes. I heartily recommend it. If you have used them, you would now that the hostilities have never ceased and Ukraine was preparing troops, weapons etc. exactly for the reason that it was ALREADY in conflict with Russia.
Quoting Mikie
And I am talking about actions, 14 thousand people died in Donbas between 2014 and 2021, which you seem to be blissfully unaware of. For you there were two related, but different wars, at two different times, simply because you do not know the facts. Could that lack of knowledge influence your view that it was unlikely Russia would have attacked Ukraine? By the way, you might also not know that there were half-hearted attempts to end the hostilities known as the Minsk Accords. Care to know how much of them is devoted to the supposedly essential issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO?
Quoting Mikie
Well, by that logic, given that Russia did not invade Ukraine right after 2008, your position is also wrong. NATO provoked Russia with expansion, Russia did nothing for fourteen years (of course, it did invade Ukraine in the meantime, but that does not count). After all, you believe that the threat from NATO was constant from 2008 till 2022, don't you?
Quoting Mikie
I care about Putin's pretexts of post-USSR conflicts (because there were many) about as much as I care about Bush's pretexts of Iraq's second invasion. In today's world attacking other countries without casus belli is frowned upon, so they always try to come up with something. Amusingly, Putin's 'official' reasons for invading Crimea were quite different than what you have described (he was supposedly defending the Crimea's Russian minority against the oppresive Kiyv government), so you do not believe him either.
As I wrote, the internal situation in Russia in those years was quite complex and it is difficult to summarize it in a few paragraphs (especially when you say that I am entitled to lectures on history). In general, Putin's predecessor, Yeltsin, after what seemed to be a drive toward democratization, had to face a Communist putsch. The results were somewhat ambiguous: it is true that the putsch was defeated and the vision of the return of hardliners was averted, but at the same time his grip on power was significantly strengthened and the transition to democracy never fully recovered. This was compounded by the fact that his power to a large degree depended on the support of oligarchs, who got rich in the course of 'wild privatization' of the state companies (many of them remained 'state' only in name). Given that his circles were engaged in the rampant corruption, facing end of presidency he chose to 'annoit' a relatively unknown Putin as his successor. Note that his election was most likely legitimate - given lack of democratic traditions, Russians seemingly did not mind being told who to vote for. But it should be noted that he gained a lot of popularity due to his hardline handling of the Chechen conflict (some say it was even started by Russians, but it cannot be proven).
Still, Putin's rule was not that strong during his first term - he was not as popular as Yeltsin (he had just 53% of support) and he did not have a good support base similar to 'Yeltsin's familia' (especially after the fallout with Berezovsky). And after 2000 Russians became very disappointed with the consequences of the fall of the USSR: after initial enthusiasm, they began to resent it, especially that the new economy lacked the social safety nets of the old system, crime was rampant, inflation began to rise again etc. Geopolitically former republics began to distance themselves from Russia. More importantly, the Chechen War was still ongoing, with possible expansion of the conflict to other republics. This in turn activated Russian nationalists, who demanded strong suppression of rebellious republics, especially after the Moscow theatre massacre.
Thus Putin just before his second term elections had to appease both those who yearned for the return of the USSR and those who supported imperialistic rhetoric. Of course, there was no real conflict between the two: USSR was as imperialistic as Russia before, as it basically treated many of its republics and satellites as colonies (but that would require an even longer lecture, even though understanding that is essential to current events).
Putin has actually embraced both, and that is still evident in Russian propaganda. E.g. Solovyov has no problem praising both Stalin and tzarist politics, even though communists have completely renounced tzars (officially, at least). In order to strengthen his support before elections he both praised the USSR (calling its fall 'the greatest tragedy') and taking a much harder stance on the dealings with former republics. That included Ukraine, but was in no way limited to it, as the main focus was Caucasus, which did not even show any NATO aspirations. This coincided with the supposed global war on terror, which conveniently allowed him to frame all the ongoing conflicts as anti-terroristic (to be clear, some of the unrest in the Caucasus was inspired by Islamic extremists). That is why the concept of the Russian MIr has been officially adopted.
However, in the meantime something even worse happened: the Color Revolutions have begun. These were even worse, because they not only caused the former republics to move away from Russian influences, but threatened Putin directly: around 2004 his rule was already much more authoritarian (and corrupt) than in 2000 and 'exporting' of the protests to Russia could end in his ouster or worse. This of course increased the already heightened tensions between Russia and other republics. After the elections in 2004 Putin enjoyed much stronger popular support, but his foreign policy has visibly changed, as mentioned in our discussion.
Quoting Mikie
What you, in my opinion, fail to see is that the conflict runs much deeper and NATO expansion is just one of the points, not decisive one. The underlying issue is that Putin is no longer willing (or cannot afford) to allow losing Russian influence in the former republics, even against the will of their populations.
Quoting Mikie
So when BBC wrote that Ukraine 'effectively rejects any ambition to join Nato', they were completely wrong. I see.
Quoting boethius
And what kind of peace do you think Russia will opt for?
Quoting boethius
Are we told that, actually by the Ukrainians? Compared to Ukrainians, how much stories of young Russians living abroad going back to Russia to fight the war? I think it's obvious that for Russians this more like an experience of Vietnam, even if the occasional explosion happens in Russian territory.
Quoting boethius
Yeah, to be registered is not the same as to be drafted into the army. I assume the Ukrainians do anticipate this war going possibly for many years still.
Quoting boethius
NATO has nuclear weapons, hence any kind of confrontation with another nuclear armed foe (like Russia) makes the war extremely dangerous. But actually we do have a precedent: Last time Pakistan and India clashed in their border regions, you had both sides having a nuclear deterrence. What was obvious was that both side treated every escalation of the conflict with huge attention.
And do notice that the West can change. Were there rolling blackouts in Germany last winter because of an energy crisis? No, but remember how Russian propaganda was excited how bad Germany will have it during the winter 2022-2023... Hence NATO countries can get their act together and can alter their military-industrial base. As I've stated, the rearmament program that Poland has gone for is quite huge.
“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English, Russian or Spanish.
In logic, “non sequitur” refers to a deductive fallacy.
Understanding if this claim of yours “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is or not a non sequitur has nothing to do with native English speakers’ nuances you’re raving about, and all to do with understanding what constitutes a logically valid deduction. So in any language you would translate your argument, your argument as it is formulated is an obvious “non sequitur”.
My point wasn’t meant to be pedantic though, but to solicit you to EXPLICIT the IMPLICIT premise. This premise should sound something like “If Russia feels provoked by NATO expansion, then there is NO reason for NATO expansion” for you to draw that conclusion. This premise is not self-evidently true AT ALL, so you have to argue to support it, that is why I objected: “At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so.” This objection is particularly pertinent in geopolitics because, as explained, in a domain where there are strong competing interests and mistrust (like during great powers’ struggles), defensive measures (like military alliances) can be perceived as aggressive and can likely escalate tensions. That’s why you can take “President Putin felt provoked by NATO expansion” at best as ONE relevant premise of your reasoning for concluding “there was NO valid reason to do it”. But unless you make explicit the other relevant implicit premises enabling you to draw your conclusion, your argument has no force. As it is, it sounds dogmatic and very myopic about geopolitical reasons.
Quoting Mikie
1 - I never said that “Russian invasion or aggression” was “imminent” (and notice that even “imminent” doesn’t equate to a timestamp like “4 April 2008 at 13:45:12 UTC”). Indeed geopolitical security dilemmas are not primarily focused on IMMINENT threats (that’s why I repeatedly asked you what you mean by “such a threat”, remember?). AND OBVIOUSLY SO, because when the military threat is IMMINENT, it may be already TOO LATE to counter it. BTW even Ukraine joining NATO wasn’t about IMMINENT threats against Russia either but on prospective/historical threats any ex-KGB spy Russian president from the Cold War, worried about NATO-encirclement, Russian hegemonic status and broken promises by the West to Soviet Union leaders, can VERY WELL perceive!. Besides perceived IMMINENT threats like Islamic Terrorism in years 2000-2008 may indeed cloud politicians’ perception of not IMMINENT but way more DESTABILIZING prospective/historical threats. Again, geopolitical security dilemmas are primarily shaped by historical trends, geographic/demographic constraints and actual military and non-military resources to effectively engage in power struggles, NOT by declared intentions from President X at a given time Y. BTW even the hegemonic competition between China and the US is not an imminent military threat either but a prospective/historical threat, which for the US might be more decisive than the threat from Russia. That is why the US is establishing and strengthening military alliances in the Pacific. And China is vocally opposing them and it feels “provoked”.
2 - The Bucharest Summit doesn’t mention the Russian threat as much as the "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS " doesn’t mention the Chinese threat (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/), yet everyone with a functioning brain, including China, are aware that is about the perceived Chinese threat as much as
everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia.
3 - The Bucharest summit brings the distinctive signature of the Bush administration committed to the free world and to counter the imminent threats (like Islamist terrorism) but it hides under the carpet of free-world rhetoric and promises or the concern from the imminent threat from Islamic terrorism or the infamous Bush-Putin bromance and assurances (remember Putin’s words “And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia”?) the notorious motivations for those who joined or wanted to join NATO, the reiterated vocal Russian concerns and the reiterated American national interest advisors vocally warning about it. But, as I argued, this move didn’t come without MASSIVE BENEFITS instrumental to Russia hegemonic ambitions as well as to the invasion/aggression of Ukraine: like good business with the West, free-pass for military projection in Middle East, free pass for political/media channels/allies in the West for spinning anti-NATO narrative.
4 - It doesn’t suffice to say Putin got motives (he got provoked in 2008!) to explain this war, one has also to explain how he got the means and the confidence to invade Ukraine only 14 years later in 2022 snd despite the fact that Ukraine still didn’t join NATO. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to morally justify why he used his accumulated power to hit back at Ukraine and the West, one has to morally justify why Putin shouldn’t have had STRONGER motives to use his accumulated power to improve welfare, freedoms, industries, public services in Russia like Germany did after the end of WW2. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to geopolitically justify this war, one must also be able to explain how the Western threat against Russian hegemonic ambitions could be BEST contained by annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022.
Quoting Mikie
Not really. First, I read both Brzenzinski’s AND Mearsheimer’s (among others) geopolitical analysis primarily to understand geopolitics, I do not cherrypick only the analysis of the one that best supports my preconceived popular condemnation of the American foreign policies no matter how poor my understanding of the American geopolitics is. Second, I’m putting a different weight on the two not because the former promoted NATO-expansion for Russian threat containment (however critical about how Clinton and Bush administrations dealt with it!) while the second was against it (yet certainly not because the Russian hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine or the Russian historical/prospective threat didn’t exist!), but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, heavily involved in the debate about NATO or NATO expansion within political administrations, Mearsheimer no.
Quoting Mikie
I’m asking you because “you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade ‘useful Idiots’ in the West, right?”.
Imagine this: an angry dude comes at you asking a refund because you hit his car while driving. Now, you can see he is angry from his body language, but you honestly believe you did not hit his car (e.g. you noticed that there is no dent nor scratch in your car nor his, nor you can recall your car trajectory being near enough to the angry’s dude or noise of an accident), so you want to know why he thinks you hit his car, wouldn’t you? Now imagine your wife by your side telling you: “But don’t you see how angry he is?! He is repeatedly telling you hit his car, not only once, but repeatedly, it is your fault if he is so angry! And now you have to refund him”. You protest: “he might be angry, but I don’t think I’ve hit his car so I want to know why he believes this, maybe he is mistaken. Do you know why he thinks I hit his car by any chance?”. And your wife shocked by your obtusity replies: “What?! Why are you asking me?! You should ask him, not me. I’m just saying it’s your fault if he is angry at you because he repeatedly said you repeatedly hit his car, so you shouldn’t have hit his car even once, it was your mistake, and now he’s justified to ask for a refund. Stop hitting his car and making him angry!”.
Unless there is a huge trust issue (like your wife has strong reasons to believe you are a systematic liar and the stranger is honest beyond any reasonable doubt), wouldn’t you think your wife is definitely a nut case to divorce from as soon as possible? I most certainly would.
By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception.
Quoting Mikie
1 - I expressly asked you to give Putin’s most unequivocal quotes specifying nature of the threat and its consequences if red lines were crossed, you didn’t provide any yet. And I also explained why I needed them: “there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment)”.
2 - If not Putin’s quotes, you could still use concrete historical analogies to illustrate your point, as I did (i.e. the military cooperation between Cuba and Soviet Union that led to the Cuban missile crisis). Instead you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did, and didn’t do during the Cold War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine.
Quoting Mikie.
To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine”.
Quoting Mikie
And again you don't know what “non sequitur” means, or you fail to see why your argument is a “non sequitur”. I’ll assume both. I'll make it clearer how embarrassingly poor your reasoning is from a logic point of view, step by step. Ready?
As a starter, either we understand that boldened “If… then…” as a logic propositional operator or we understand it as a logic deduction.
In the first case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p -> q” or “if p then q” (where p = “it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a ‘red line’)” and q = “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.”). In this case you are not offering an argument, but just a conditional proposition which could either serve as a premise for some argument or result as a conclusion from some argument. If it’s a premise for some argument, that argument won’t be proven to be sound until the premise is proven to be true along with other premises. On the other side, if it’s a conclusion drawn from some argument, where is the argument? It’s missing. Not to mention that this conditional proposition is evidently not analytically true (its truth doesn’t depend on the meaning of the words of p and q), and I questioned its empirical truth as well. In other words, you would just be offering a statement you happen to believe in, without a solid argument to support it. But I do not care about your beliefs as such, I care about the arguments that are supposed to support them. So where are the arguments?
In the second case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p ? q” or “q (syntactically) derives from p”. In other words, from the premise p one can syntactically derive q by applying transformation rules governing logic propositional operators. This is not a conditional proposition, but a formal deductive argument between atomic propositions (indeed neither p nor q contain propositional logic operators). Unfortunately, in propositional logic, the rule is that atomic propositions can not be derived from atomic propositions. So, in propositional logic, your argument would be definitely false (q doesn’t follow from p, non sequitur).
Furthermore, the casual combination of “if.., then…” that could be easily taken as a propositional logic operator (by those familiar with propositional logic) to talk about the truth of certain propositions, as if you were performing some truth-functional calculus over propositions (like a deduction), with the declared intention to “make it clearer” to me because I don’t get the nuances of English as I’m not a native English speaker, strongly suggests that you are catastrophically conflating conditional propositions with deductive arguments, likely because you are too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is.
Quoting Mikie
Not really. So far I was arguing that Russian warnings are not a strong reason to believe that NATO expansion was the most relevant factor to explain the current war or to justify blame-attribution for the war (as your guru Mearsheimer claims “the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault").
Quoting Mikie
As far as I’m concerned, it was a nightmarish risky move, but not escalatory in the sense that it was proportional to the nuclear threat the US was exposing USSR to. However Soviet Union’s bold move turned out to be effective in the end: [I]“On Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba”[/I] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).
Quoting Mikie
As far as I’m concerned, it is understandable to feel anguished by wars and threats of wars, whose horrible consequences one perceives to be likely or unavoidably exposed to. And uncertainties about it can feel as an intolerable psychological torture.
Unfortunately reality may differ from our preferences in all sorts of nightmarish ways like e.g. an incurable cancer. So instead of whining over it, go in denial, blame the convenient scapegoat or
look for help from holy gurus and snake-handlers, I find it more helpful to cope with my anguishes and uncertainties to try to understand the reality I’m facing, especially concerning events much bigger than me (as an incurable cancer or a escalatory competition for hegemony), and then to see what I can afford in that scenario to serve my preferences (for example, I prefer for me and people I care to live like an avg American, European, Japanese, South Korean, Canadian or Australian, than to live like an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian or North Korean, you?).
Until you raise the quality of your arguments, I'll leave you at that.
So your entire argument rests on the fact that I can only give an opinion, not definitive proof, of what might have happened. An odd line to take.
Yes, you got me. Maybe had I not driven to work yesterday, my car would have still run out of gas. I can’t definitively prove otherwise — but I view it as unlikely.
Quoting Jabberwock
Why pretext? A pretext that was known and warned about for years, and such even several experts agreed would likely happen if such activities continued?
Seems like a very elaborate ruse.
Quoting Jabberwock
Appreciate the effort.
NATO is one line of US influence, and an important one. There are others. Why does the US want to expand NATO, support overthrowing a president, etc.? It's part of a very clear strategy for eastern Europe.
Quoting BBC
Quoting Jabberwock
When did I say that? Your citation is correct: he was against NATO membership. Very clear. I don't see where the confusion is.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting Jabberwock
There were two aggressions after 2008, yes. 2014 and 2022. That doesn't prove that they wouldn't have occurred anyway -- but it certainly doesn't disprove that Bucharest didn't have lasting impacts. Which it did.
There were other impacts as well. Remember, NATO was one part of US strategy in the region. Just happened to be the "red line" for Russia -- which you disregard.
So why was there such a delay? Because things changed and escalated. First, Russian military capacity changed. Second, the US supported pushing out a pro-Russian president. Third, and leading directly to all-out invasion, NATO provided training (for YEARS), weapons, and conducted drills -- and then, to top it off, in 2021, reaffirmed its position from 2008.
So if that seems like odd timing, you're just not paying attention. In fact the Russians were screaming about this for months, if not years -- to no avail. Because they're just liars and thugs, after all, so who cares what they say or think? Besides, everyone knows NATO is "defensive," and is no threat to Russia. "Just look at the Baltics." And so forth.
Quoting Jabberwock
Ok, I'll put it this way: if they invaded at any point from 2000-2008, or especially after 2004-2008, I'd be wrong. If they cited NATO expansion, that would be very odd. They could have cited US influence, however.
Quoting Jabberwock
True, and we should listen and see if there's any truth to it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Of course it runs deeper. Of course there are complexities. To argue the Ukraine invasion of 2022 had IittIe to do with NATO is simply ignoring the facts, in my view. If China were training troops and conducting military driIIs in Mexico, and then China announces it would push for a pact -- despite warnings of the US -- I think the response by the US would be not that surprising, and one would say China's involvement was a decisive factor indeed. True, we could aIso make up other stories, and of course there'd be some truth in them, but to ignore the gIaringIy obvious just isn't serious.
Quoting Jabberwock
So military training, weapons, Operation Sea Breeze, and the Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership (September of 2021) -- aII of this we should ignore because at some point the BBC said -- God knows when -- that Ukraine rejects any ambition to join NATO?
Again, this just isn't serious.
I know what non sequitur means. You apparently don't. You've also proven my point about misunderstanding English nuance.
Quoting neomac
I'm not talking about Ukraine or Georgia's perceptions. I'm sure they have their reasons, which I respect. To argue it was mostly about "historical threats" is at best haIf-truth. But try to stay on topic.
I'm talking about Russia's perception, right or wrong. Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat.
Quoting neomac
And this is a reason to take him more seriously?
You do you.
Quoting neomac
I already did. China making the exact same moves in Mexico that the US/NATO has done in Ukraine, and you bet your ass the US would react. I would consider that playing with fire on China's part.
And I don't have to give reasons for the threat perception, any more than I have to give reasons for Georgian threat perceptions of Russia. I simply look at what they say, and if it makes some sense, I take it seriously. In this case, it seems to me Russia has some reason for concern. But in any case, it's not what I think -- it's what THEY think. Which I've repeated several times.
Quoting Mikie
I noticed you couldn't answer this. Too bad.
Quoting neomac
Good god, can you read?
I'll repeat: Regardless of what *I* myself believe about the Monroe Doctrine, it is in fact a foreign policy of the US. So the question isn't about "rationalizing" fears, especially not my own. If you had taken a few extra seconds to read what was written, you'd quickly see your response was irrelevant.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
:snicker: How original.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
:lol: I can't wait.
Quoting neomac
lol. Oh how smart! I guess you're really showing me a thing or two!
Quoting neomac
You really are embarrassing yourself.
I'll repeat, again, what was said:
(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.
The numbering was not meant to imply this is a syllogism. What I'm saying is obvious, but let's change the labels:
If the US considers nuclear weapons in CUBA a threat, then the USSR doing so anyway, despite these warnings, is a mistake.
If you're struggling with WHY it's a mistake, I'll tell you: because it'd be nice not having World War III. In the case of Russia, it'd be nice not having Russians and Ukrainians killed and billions of dollars spent on weapons.
Now maybe it would have happened without NATO involvement, as Jabberwock seems to believe, but at least the US would be nearly blameless.
Quoting neomac
Intellectualizing something rather straightforward doesn't have the affect you think it does.
It makes you look like this guy:
I am not accusing you of 'cancelling' Russian culture. I just wrote those paragraphs because I thought it was unfair to mix up things. 'Karamazov Brothers' and a normal/regular Russian citizen is not guilty of Russian oligarchy. The latter doesn't represent the real Russia and it is unfair. To be honest, I think I have sympathy with them because I understand what it feels like living in a country with a dictatorial background. My point is that there is an abyss between the Russian Kremlin and the citizenship of Moscow or the rest of the Oblasts. Most of the statistics - which come from the Western media - showing that most of the Russians support this war are twisted and these are not reliable to me.
On the other hand, I agree with you in the point that the Russian natural resources have always been poorly managed. Since 1991, the oligarchy members are the only ones who make profits on it. Then, this causes a dysfunctional social structure. The Russian middle-class is not perceiving everything that they deserve. But it is important to highlight that the middle-class of every Western country has experienced a decrease in their purchase power because of Zelensky's childish behaviour of not allowing us to buy Russian natural resources. I wonder whether they will pay us back one day (as well as Japan and Germany did after WWII), or if our budget went to unclaimed funds...
Nonetheless, what about the unfair financial block from the Western world? This attitude only harms the Russian citizens we are debating about, and has zero effects on the Russian oligarchy. So, I can't see the point in not having financial relationships with them. Even with all the blocks from the Western world, they are still the 9th economy of the world and we - the European hypocrites - still buy them oil and gas. Amazing! I am jealous of the resistance of the Russian state.
In 1997 he wrote an influential book called 'The Grand Chessboard' in which he detailed American geopolitical strategy post-Cold War.
Here's a post I wrote months ago with some juicy quotes from Brzezinski's book that will give a glimpse into the mindset of the Washington elite. It paints a rather bleak picture.
Why someone would refer to Brzezinski to deny Washington's culpability remains a mystery.
I agree that the "experts say it's possible" is weak and it would be great if they'd give some more information on it why they say so. But that statement is lifted from the official investigators intermediary reports so probably isn't disclosed because they're not done yet with the investigation.
The damage on the loading bay was consistent with "heavy equipment/machinery". I think forensic research can probably tell what damaged it if they really wanted to. Traces of explosives and other things could have been found as well.
But even if that all bears out, it still doesn't answer whether this was a false-flag operation or not.
The issue is, as I have mentioned, that you select just a few facts that suit your theory that Russian intensification of the conflict was unlikely and ignore all others. You simply ignore the underlying roots of the conflict and focus solely on its single aspect. The issue is that this approach leaves you comically unable to explain major facts of the Ukraine-Russia's relations. The prime example is your constant pretending that the Donbas rebellion did not happen.
Quoting Mikie
Because it allows to 'sell' the war to people less familiar with the history of the region, as can be seen even in this thread. That in turn helps to undermine the support for Ukraine - as can be seen, in many cases quite effectively.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, that is the US strategy, but that does not mean the US is the main cause of the processes. That is what you got completely wrong. Given that you are an American, maybe an analogy from the American history will help: France has supported the American Revolution, provided weapons and even troops to Americans, because it suited France's interests in the conflict with the British. Yet if I wrote that France has organized the American Revolution, therefore should be blamed for it, nobody would take me seriously. Sure, France has suported it, but it was the Americans who were the main force behind it, they wanted to be independent from the British and they would seek independence sooner or later, with France's support or not. That is exactly the case with the Eastern Europe. It is the former Russian satellites and former republics who want to get out from under the Russian influence - sure, the US supports it, because it suits its purposes, but is not the force behind the movement. Here is an article from the Polish state poll-taking agency from 1997. Not only it shows the overwhelming majority supports membership in NATO, but it clearly shows that Poles considered NATO to be a security guarantee against Russia:
Quoting CBOS
Eastern Europeans have always considered Russia as a threat and for very good reasons. And it was not a matter of long past history - the last Russian troops (generally viewed as the occupiers) left Poland in 1993. In 1968 some Czechs and Slovaks, after Russia crushed their freedom with its tanks, promised to never shave until the Russian troops left - they did so in 1991:
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-25-mn-1335-story.html
so the memory was still rather vivid.
In the Baltics the memory of the Russian interventions were even more fresh: Russians tried militarily to suppress their independence in 1991. The clashes were small and they failed, but only because Russians were too weak, not because they were not willing. For the Baltics joining NATO was a question of survival: they had every reason to believe that once Russia gets stronger, it might want to thwart their independence again.
Your view that the EE countries did not perceive Russia as a threat is completely, utterly wrong. It was their fear of Russia that made them desperately seeking the membership in NATO. Sure, the US was eager to complyl, as it suited their geopolitical interests, but they were not the main force for the expansion. They could only either allow it or prevent it. That does not mean that the West did not want to normalize the relations with Russia - they surely hoped that maybe Russia abandons its imperialistic tendencies. Still, it would be unwise not to prepare for the worst, especially that the political situation in Russia was far from stable.
Quoting Mikie
Well, you have claimed that NATO expansion was the major factor in the regime change, when it was clearly not. Yanukovych, when elected, promised two things: economic integration with the EU and abandoning NATO aspirations. Ukrainians were fine with that - due to the Russian reaction in 2008 NATO the prospect of quick admission were dim, so Ukrainians decided neutrality was the best course - the relevant legislation was accepted by the pariiament with public acceptance. Thus your claim that the NATO perspective was 'never underground' is clearly false - Ukraine did abandon its NATO aspirations. However, that was not enough for Russians - they have coerced Yanukovych to abandon the agreement with the EU, which sparked massive protests, which in turn led to his ouster. if Russians did not meddle at that point, Yanukovych most likely would remain the president, if he was fulfilling his electoral promises, and Ukraine would remain neutral. But even that course of action was not acceptable for Russians, because Ukraine closely cooperating with the EU would gradually move out of Russia's sphere of influence, even if it was militarily neutral and not in NATO. Of course, after Russia invaded Ukraine and started the rebellion in Donbas, Ukrainians have realized that their pledge of neutrality meant nothing to Russia, so they began to prepare for the full-scale conflict with Russia, which they saw as invevitable.
Quoting Mikie
Except that the agression in 2014 and the Donbas rebellion had nothing to do with NATO, as explained above, because then Ukraine's NATO aspirations were abandonded, so at that point Bucharest did not have a lasting impact. That is why Russians during 2014 did not mention NATO at all, because at that point it did not matter. If Russians did not meddle with the EU integration, Ukraine would remain militarily neutral, just like Moldova. But that was not enough for Russians, hence the invasion and the unrest in Donbas which you stubbornly ignore (which is understandable, because it completely contradicts your narrative of 'two different agressions').
Quoting Mikie
Again, you just ignore the fact that things have deescalated with Yanukovych. As you say yourself, he was more pro-Russian than pro-European, unlike most Ukrainians (especially in the Western Ukraine) and he clearly curtailed NATO aspirations, with pariiament's support. And yes, the US supported pushing him out, but they did not cause it. Can you see the difference? The massive protests sparked for a specific reason, which the US had nothing to do with. Ironically, Russians had more to do with his ouster than the US - because for Putin he was pro-Russian, but not enough (as he was still seeking economic ties with the EU). And military training began AFTER Ukraine was attacked and had to fend off the conflict in Donbas.
Mikie: 'Russia would not attack if Ukraine did not want to join NATO!'
Jabberwock: 'Russia has attacked Ukraine in 2014 precisely when it has abandoned its NATO aspirations.'
Mikie: 'Let us talk about something else! How about 2022?'
Quoting Mikie
But that is not what I have pointed out. Your claim was that in 2008 they had sufficient reason to start a war. Obviously it was not sufficient, given that they have not started it. If it was because they were too weak militarily, as you know say, then that equally applies to the years before 2008.
Quoting Mikie
Your wording very well betrays your mindset: 'China trains troops in Mexico', not 'Mexicans are trained by China'. 'China pushes for a pact', not 'Mexico wants a pact with China'. For you only 'global players' exist, all others are just pawns with no agency. That is exactly how you consider the countries of the Eastern Europe or the former republics. We should carefully listen to what Russians perceive as a threat, but attitudes of Ukrainians and others are irrelevant. You 'respect' their opinions, but completely ignore them.
So let me rephrase your analogy: Mexico is training troops with China and drives for a pact in China AFTER the US has already attacked it. It does make a difference, does it not?
Quoting Mikie
That is exactly what I was pointing out. If any fact does not suit your narrative, you just dismiss it. Ukraine has clearly abandoned its NATO aspirations and DESPITE THIS, Russia has still invaded it and organized and sponsored an armed rebellion for eight years. Has it passed your mind that Ukraine's subsequent abandonment of neutrality and military training of troops AFTER 2014 might possibly have something to do with the fact that Russia has ALREADY attacked it and sustained an open armed conflict since 2014? As I understand, you believe Ukraine's reaction should be: 'Oh, yes, they have taken Crimea, and are killing our troops in Donbas, let us pretend none of this is happening, then they SURELY will not attack us in full force, if only we do not mention NATO'. Do you realize how absurd that sounds?
OK since you know, for the second time, tell me what “non sequitur” is supposed to mean and prove from that definition that “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is not a non sequitur.
Quoting Mikie
Dude, I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me. Now, arguments need premises and conclusions, and it’s on you to clarify your arguments to support your own beliefs, at least those I and you do not share.
“Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is a belief that you and me share in the sense that we find it plausible enough, what I’m questioning is how you get from that claim to “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. More precisely, “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake” can not be logically deduced from “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” if you understand propositional logic. You need more premises, all of them have to be true (or at least plausible enough), and logically linked to the conclusion. That’s the only game I’m interested in playing in a philosophy forum, including in this thread.
The topic of this thread is “Ukraine Crisis” and I’m talking about the "historical threats" coming from Russia at the expense of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity, which the Ukraine Crisis exemplifies, how is my comment not on topic exactly?
Quoting Mikie
As far as I’m concerned, if one wants to rationally investigate the security dilemmas shaping post Cold-War American foreign policies, one must have a look into how American national security advisors who contributed to shape post Cold-War American foreign policies, actually understood security dilemmas from the American perspective. Unless you are suggesting that consulting a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet is a more reliable method to do that, of course.
Quoting Mikie.
And I made my objections to it, so if you do not address the points I brought up then you still have no strong enough reasons to support your claims, as far as I’m concerned.
Quoting Mikie
First of all, nobody is forcing you to give reasons for others’ threat perception, I’m just challenging you to give YOUR reasons for YOUR conclusions. But unfortunately so far you gave only one premise that doesn’t suffice to get to your targeted conclusion, for logic reasons and not only. In any case that’s the game I’m playing , and if you didn’t get it yet, it’s your problem not mine.
Secondly, now I also deeply doubt you understand what you yourself write. If you explicitly specify "and if it makes some sense" that means it’s not enough that what Russian politicians say about Russia’s threat perception is fine whatever they say. It must also make some sense. And I guess that by “makes some sense” you are not referring to grammar rules, but to your own understanding of State’s security concerns, am I right? Namely, such an understanding that could deny for example “Putin’s repeatedly said that Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is the highest security threat in Russian history, so Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is clearly a mistake” as making some sense, am I right? If so, then your own understanding of the Russian threat perception is not exclusively based on what they say, but it is based on additional assumptions about State’s security concerns which allow you to discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which don’t.
As far as I’m concerned, to better discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which ones don’t, it’s better to start with looking into what geopolitical experts say because it’s their profession to study this stuff, and especially if such experts actually contributed to shaping some State’s foreign policies, like Brzezinski. And this is one Brzezinski's quote for you to ponder: [I]Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well[/I].
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm
In other words, Brezinski is an example of “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” as much as an example of the fact that acknowledging “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is not enough to believe “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. Indeed from the same premise (but not only, of course!) Brzezinski draws exactly the opposite conclusion: “If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well”. However, the most important reason why I cited Brezinski is not because I take him to be evidently right and you evidently wrong, or simply because he is a prominent geopolitical expert and you are just a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet parroting his guru Mearsheimer’s cherry-picked claims, but because he was actually contributing to shape American foreign policies also in the case of NATO enlargement. That allows me to say that my objections to your arguments are not only plausible for logical reasons but also for geopolitical reasons.
Quoting Mikie
Of course I couldn’t, indeed I also argued why, from a geopolitical point of view, YOU TOO NOR ANYBODY ELSE (including your guru Mearsheimer) can give a conclusive answer to your own questions based on a hypothetical analogy, which we are pretending it is not biased. And I’ll repeat it: [I]“you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did during post Cold-War time, and didn’t do during the Cold-War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine[/I].
Quoting Mikie
I still doubt you fully understand what you yourself write. So let me teach you some English nuances. You wrote: [I]“I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it”[/I], the question is why on earth China or Russia should hear your advise “however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington”?!
Dude, you have to give arguments to even try to score points, not just make emotional appeals in disguise like “But it's still very real”. What on earth is the expression “it’s very real” supposed to mean for great powers in a hegemonic race? What does it imply? What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them? Besides I've already anticipated this pointless objection: To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine."
You look exactly like a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet with less than amateurish understanding of boxing or interest in this sport advising a young heavy weight boxer who, in his professional carrier, reached the point to challenge the world champion for the first time with something like: “Hey Mike Tyson, I wouldn’t try to test the World Champion , you know, because the risk that he is going to kick your ass badly is very real, so very very very real that one can’t imagine more very very very very very very very very real risk in the universe of the actual, possible and impossible worlds -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of a World Champion (which obviously means I’m so very very very real objectively reliable)”.
Quoting Mikie
Why mistaken?! From a geopolitical point of view, USSR’s move was indeed effective to counter the military nuclear threat coming from the US. And besides, this didn’t require the US:
1 - to start a war in Cuba
2 - to annex Cuba
3 - to nuclear bomb Cuba
4 - to force a regime change in Cuba
5 - to force a change in Cuba’s security alliance
6 - to force a demilitarised Cuba
7 - to force a neutral Cuba
So what’s the geopolitical lesson one could get from this historical example?
If placing nuclear weapons in Ukraine was the specific security threat perceived by Putin, a balanced agreement could be found as it happened during the Cuban Crisis. If it’s not that, what else?
The threat from neonazi against Russian minorities? The threat for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea? The training of the Ukraine troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the Russian border? Depending on how these specific threats are actually formulated, individually or collectively, one might see if negotiable solutions were possible to avoid this war. On the other side, talking generically of Russian security threats without specifying the nature of such threats and then demand satisfaction for very specific desired solutions (i.e. Ukraine out of NATO, demilitarised, neutral) ain't gonna work smoothly on those who are particularly sensitive about Russian hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine: like Ukraine and the US, to name a few.
Surely the pro-Russian narrative of NATO as a security threat against Russia turned out to be particularly effective in easy-to-impression minds infesting this thread.
Quoting Mikie.
At last you have made another premise of your reasoning explicit. The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. So what if geopolitical reality doesn’t work based on people’s preferences? We can’t dogmatically assume it does or it should do. Right? I myself wish the same as much as I wish an incurable cancer of anybody I care to be curable, but I don’t find rational to use my wishes to establish what can be cured or can’t. So the best I can do, is to try to understand better where we are with the medical research on cancer and for example give my support to scientific programmes that look more promising, given my understanding of the status of the medical research on cancer.
The same goes with geopolitics, the best nobodies like me can do (at least in best effort mode) is to place their political support on the current or rising hegemon that is likely the least oppressive to them, depending on our understanding of geopolitical hegemonic races, if they occur. That’s why in my arguments I rely more on geopolitical analysts than on my own wishes.
Quoting Mikie
“Intellectualizing”? Dude, maybe you are not familiar with the nuances of propositional logic 101, but that’s pretty embarrassing to read in a philosophy forum by one of its moderators (?!).
Why someone would refer to Mearsheimer to deny Russia' hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine, even prior to any NATO expansion further east, remains a mystery.
Quoting tim wood
Ukraine is not some one's else house. They don't even claim all their vast territory but three important provinces: Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk. These three 'municipal dumas' have always belonged to Russia, and they have been managed by Russian authorities since the Russian empire.
[...] Saint Petersburg, Moscow, [i]Kyiv, Odesa, Riga, and the Polish cities of Warsaw and ?ód?. These elected their delegates to the Duma directly, and though their votes were divided (on the basis of taxable property) in such a way as to give the advantage to wealth, each returned the same number of delegates.[/i] State Duma (Russian Empire) Look at the following map of the Russian Empire when they fought against the Ottomans. It is obvious that those territories belonged to Russia, and they were recognised internationally as part of their vast nation. It is written in the treaties:
One of the main errors committed in the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the lack of precision in 'drawing' the new maps for the new republics. Ukraine considered those territories as a subdivision of them, while the Russian Federation stated that they were 'Federal subjects'. More precisely the Russian Constitution says: "1. The Russian Federation includes the following subjects of the Russian Federation: [...] Republic of Crimea http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-04.htm
[i]In 1774, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by Catherine the Great with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca making the Tatars of the Crimea politically independent. Catherine the Great's incorporation of the Crimea in 1783 into the Russian Empire increased Russia's power in the Black Sea area.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence in 1991 most of the peninsula was reorganized as the Republic of Crimea, although in 1995 the Republic was forcibly abolished by Ukraine with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea established firmly under Ukrainian authority. A 1997 treaty partitioned the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, allowing Russia to continue basing its fleet in Sevastopol, with the lease extended in 2010.[/i] https://books.google.es/books?id=i1C2MHgujb4C&pg=PA194&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
At least I like Russian cuisine very much. It's there with the French cuisine as the hallmark of Western food culture (and I think is even better than Italian cuisine, actually). :yum:
And luckily my favorite Russian restaurant remains open, even if it does show the Ukrainian flag on it's front door and doesn't anymore serve Russian vodka (as vodka is a State monopoly for Putin), but has changed to Ukrainian vodka. (If you are ever in Helsinki, I urge to go and taste the above food Sword of Ivan in Restaurant Saslik!)
Do notice the difference!
Quoting javi2541997
As did my country also belong to Russia. Until it didn't, when we gained independence. Just like Ukraine got it's independence and Russia did recognize the independence of Ukraine and it's borders. Until it didn't anymore. And that's the whole issue here with Russia. The nah... these countries around me are "artificial"!
It's basically like having a divorce where the husband accepts the divorce but then years after suddenly appears at the front door of his ex-wife, declares that they have made a vow in front of God and thus will be married until death departs them and then attempts to violently rape his ex, because it's his wife.
And then some will say: "Oh but we have to understand the man's side in this case! Didn't the wife also say "until death aparts us", so he has a point, right?"
Sure. "There was no reason to do so" is a general statement, which I believe true. Clearly I don't mean "any reason whatsoever," as there can always be reasons given about anything. But no (good) reason, no. It's obvious that is implied. But I understand that if you're reading everything literally, like a 10-year-old, it'll set you off into a tangent about what you think are fancy-sounding "fallacies."
Quoting neomac
Yes, intellectualizing. We’re all impressed that you took freshman logic, I’m sure. You seem to know less about logic than you do about Ukraine, but in any case it’s totally irrelevant since it wasn’t a syllogism. But like with “non sequitors” and the like, you’re just confused. The following is a good example:
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
First, I’m not literally saying I would “give advice” to China or Russia. So that’s ridiculous.
Second, the statement about reasoning behind the fears refers to the Monroe Doctrine, and how it doesn’t matter if one thinks it is irrational or rational. Why? Because it is, in fact, a policy.
So you completely failed to understand what was written, and then embarrassingly preface your silliness with “let me teach you English nuance.” Lol.
The biggest egomaniacs turn out to be the most delusional. Yours is a good example.
Quoting neomac
Depends on the goals. I assume starting conflicts and wars isn’t the objective, and if it is it’s wrong. But assuming the USSR didn’t want to cause nuclear war, then putting missiles in Cuba was a mistake — and was extremely risky and foolish if done for other reasons (like getting weapons out of Turkey, which I also think was a mistake on the US’s part).
Quoting neomac
That it turned out OK doesn’t make it a good decision. This is a common mistake in decision-making.
That I even have to point this out further shows I’m dealing with an intellectual child.
Quoting neomac
Once again you have no clue what you’re talking about. Mine wasn’t a statement about reality. It was expressing a basic value, and assuming other non-pathological people also share that value. Not wanting the world to be engulfed in nuclear Holocaust is a pretty minimal and non-controversial expectation.
Try to make sure you understand what you’re reading before writing 5 tedious paragraphs. Save yourself time, because I skip everything you write after it’s clear you completely misunderstood.
Quoting neomac
You rely on one person, your guru Brzezinski— and do so poorly.
BTW, so much for your threat to “leave [me] to it.”
Now if you don’t mind, I’d like to get back to a better conversation with Jabberwock, who at least makes an attempt to understand what others are saying, and converses like an adult.
I expected you would have used Finland as an example. But it is obvious that the example of the Finnish are very far away from the Ukrainian, or speaking frankly, 'Kyi' or the 'Kievan Rus'. Oleg set himself up as prince in Kyiv, and declared that it should be the "mother of Rus' cities."
I did some quick research on the history of your beautiful country - I wish one day I can visit it - and the tribes were always ruling on different territories, until the unstoppable expansion of the Russian Empire. Nonetheless, if the following information is not biassed or mistaken, the Russian Empire considered the Duchy of Finland as 'autonomous': In 1809, as a result of the Finnish War, Finland became part of the Russian Empire as the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. Alexander I did not want the Grand Duchy to be a constitutional monarchy but the governmental institutions born during the Swedish rule offered him a more efficient form of government than the absolute monarchy in Russia. This evolved into a high level of autonomy by the end of the 19th century. https://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?rev_t=20151206184816&url=http%3A%2Fweb.eduskunta.fi%2FResource.phx%2Fparliament%2Faboutparliament%2Fpresentation%2Fhistory.htx#federation=archive.wikiwix.com&tab=url
We can say that Finland was a province of the vast Russian Empire and both sides were aware of the differences amongst the other. Yet, Ukraine is fully similar to Russia, and they were 'born' with the same characteristics: language, religion and culture. Thus, the ethnicity. While the Finnish people have always been a Baltic ethnic group, Ukrainians and Russians come from the same group: Slavs.
The following map is very well drawn, and we can see how Finland has always been different from Russia. While Ukraine - or at least the modern Crimea and Donetsk - was part of Russian origins, clearly.
Exactly. But respecting the Russian sovereignty on Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. It is written in the Russian constitution:
Chapter 3. The Federal Structure
Article 65
1. The Russian Federation includes the following subjects of the Russian Federation:
Republic of Adygeya, Republic of Altai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Daghestan, Republic of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Republic of Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, Republic of Crimea, Republic of Mari El, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of North Ossetia - Alania, Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Tuva, Udmurtian Republic, Republic of Khakassia, Chechen Republic, Chuvash Republic;
Altai Territory, Trans-Baikal Territory, Kamchatka Territory, Krasnodar Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Perm Territory, Primorye Territory, Stavropol Territory, Khabarovsk Territory;
Amur Region, Arkhangelsk Region, Astrakhan Region, Belgorod Region, Bryansk Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Ivanovo Region, Irkutsk Region, Kaliningrad Region, Kaluga Region, Kemerovo Region, Kirov Region, Kostroma Region, Kurgan Region, Kursk Region, Leningrad Region, Lipetsk Region, Magadan Region, Moscow Region, Murmansk Region, Nizhny Novgorod Region, Novgorod Region, Novosibirsk Region, Omsk Region, Orenburg Region, Orel Region, Penza Region, Pskov Region, Rostov Region, Ryazan Region, Samara Region, Saratov Region, Sakhalin Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Smolensk Region, Tambov Region, Tomsk Region, Tver Region, Tula Region, Tyumen Region, Ulyanovsk Region, Vladimir Region, Volgograd Region, Vologda Region, Voronezh Region, Yaroslavl Region;
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sevastopol - cities of federal importance.
I already countered such pointless remarks:
1 - [I]“I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me. Now, arguments need premises and conclusions, and it’s on you to clarify your arguments to support your own beliefs, especially those I and you do not share”.[/I]
2 -[I]“At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so. And reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition (among them, all the concessions they made to Russia)”.
“This objection is particularly pertinent in geopolitics because, as explained, in a domain where there are strong competing interests and mistrust (like during great powers’ struggles), defensive measures (like military alliances) can be perceived as aggressive and can likely escalate tensions.”[/I]
Replace “very strong” with “good” or “very good” or “very very very very very good” and still ALL my objections hold (the logic and the geopolitical).
As the logic objections goes, even if you replace “There was no reason to do so" with "There was no (good) reason to do so" (BTW if that’s what you call “English nuance” then it’s evidently false, there is nothing specifically “English” in this nuance, if it’s not what English nuance were you referring to?), it would still be a non sequitur, because propositional logic has nothing to do with interpreting claims literally or non-literally, but with FORMAL logic links between propositions.
Aren’t we done yet?!
Quoting Mikie
I already countered such pointless claim: [I]“My point wasn’t meant to be pedantic though, but to solicit you to EXPLICIT the IMPLICIT premise”[/I]. And that I was able of a charitable reading like you are suggesting is evident since the first time I made that objection: [I]“At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so”[/I]. Even in this case, that doesn’t make your argument strong enough because, as I wrote, [I]“reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition”[/I].
Replace ‘very strong’ with ‘good’ or ‘very very very very real good’ and my logic and geopolitical objections still hold.
Quoting Mikie
It wasn’t a VALID syllogism. And not even an evidently SOUND syllogism, after making explicit the implicit premise, which I did for you ([I]“This premise should sound something like “If Russia feels provoked by NATO expansion, then there is NO reason for NATO expansion” for you to draw that conclusion”[/I]).
The fact that you are hopelessly trying to escape from is that you were trying to make an argument. But your clumsy argument is evidently objectionable from a logic and geopolitical point of view. And even grounding one’s arguments on implicit assumptions over what one claims to be “good” for him or the world, doesn’t make the explicit argument more logic or geopolitically conclusive.
On the other side, even if we pretend you were not trying hard to make an argument, just a general claim expressing what you believe to be true, then I’ll repeat it once again: [I]“I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me”. [/I]
Quoting Mikie
By conveniently chopping my quotation you overlooked 2 points: 1. That I was in fact giving a charitable reading of your still questionable claim 2. That you are still overlooking the “English nuance” I was sarcastically referring to. Here is the part you candidly dropped:
[I]“Dude, you have to give arguments to even try to score points, not just make emotional appeals in disguise like “But it's still very real”. What on earth is the expression “it’s very real” supposed to mean for great powers in a hegemonic race? What does it imply? What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them?
You look exactly like a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet advising a young heavy weight boxer who, in his professional carrier, reached the point to challenge the world champion for the first time with something like: “Hey Mike Tyson, I wouldn’t try to test the World Champion , you know, because the risk that he is going to kick your ass badly is very real, so very very very real that one can’t imagine more very very very very very very very very real in the universe of the actual, possible and impossible worlds -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of a World Champion (which obviously means I’m so very very very real objectively reliable)”.[/I]
The problem I was pointing out IS NOT the possibility for you to literally “give advice” to China or Russia as much as it IS NOT the possibility for you to literally “give advice” to Mike Tyson, the problem is the questionable confidence you put in having worthy advice given YOUR understanding of what “it's still very real” in a challenging foreign policy (or sport competition) versus China or Russia’s (Mike Tyson’s) understanding of it.
Besides I made this last point very clearly here: [I]“be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine”[/I]. The nuance here is that without proper arguments grounded on shared assumptions about geopolitical scenarios and implications, your “But it's still very real” remains an emotional appeal behind the appearance of a factual claim over an existing policy like “the Monroe Doctrine”.
Quoting Mikie
From a geopolitical perspective, OF COURSE it does matter if, in a hegemonic competition against the US, competitors like Russia and China want to assess “What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them?”. And OF COURSE it matters if you want to explain and/or justify the economic/military clash between competitors as function of respective security dilemmas, threat perception and containment strategies.
If you do not care about the geopolitical perspective, then we have another non-shared assumption and we need arguments in support or against geopolitics as a domain of research and analysis. I gave you one argument (but it’s not the only one): [I]The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. So what if geopolitical reality doesn’t work based on people’s preferences? We can’t dogmatically assume it does or it should do. Right? I myself wish the same as much as I wish an incurable cancer of anybody I care to be curable, but I don’t find rational to use my wishes to establish what can be cured or can’t[/I]. What is yours?
Quoting Mikie.
I see in there 4 main claims and no argument in their support:
- I don’t need an argument for the first one, since I find it plausible enough from a geopolitical point of view: namely states do not pursue war for the sake of it. Ever heard the quote “War is merely the continuation of politics with other means” from Carl von Clausewitz? In other words, war is more a means to achieve objectives than an objective per se. And this might be very well true for Putin, Khomeini or Hitler too. I find such assumption so plausible that I didn’t even see the point in making it explicit, given that I didn’t make any claim nor argument questioning it.
- I need however a (plausible enough) argument for “assuming the USSR didn’t want to cause nuclear war, then putting missiles in Cuba was a mistake” because, from a geopolitical point of view, this was a proportional (and non-escalatory) countermove against the move made by the US, even under the assumptions that it could be very risky (“game theory” was born to model such kind of risks).
- I need a (plausible enough) argument for “was extremely risky and foolish if done for other reasons” and “which I also think was a mistake on the US’s part”, because from a geopolitical point of view, nuclear weapons can be (and mostly are) used as deterrent to prevent wars resulting from conventional military aggression by state enemies against homeland. And they seem quite effective in doing this.
Quoting Mikie.
Again just statements and zero arguments. Here two objections:
- If wars are bad and especially nuclear wars, why on earth deciding to do something that prevents a nuclear war or de-escalate the threat of a nuclear war is a bad decision?
- It doesn’t matter how confidently you apply two distinct labels like “OK decision” and “good decision” to qualify decisions, which any intellectual senile can do despite suffering from a severe dementia. What matters to me is if you are able to make explicit the criteria to discriminate between the two types of decisions, and to provide the arguments in their support to properly frame GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES. That’s all intellectual children like me care about.
Quoting Mikie.
Again you have a hard time not only to understand what I write but also to understand what you yourself write. That “it'd be nice”-statements of yours are not about reality is something I clearly acknowledged when I wrote “The problem is that ‘it'd be nice’ is expressing your best wishes, your preferences". Also expressions of wishes and preferences are not statements about reality of wars and states, right? Pointing out that your “it'd be nice”-statements are expression of “basic value” or “minimal and non-controversial expectation” as if you are making a deep remark, doesn’t change the fact that your “it'd be nice”-statements can still express nothing more than wishes, desires or preferences as “it'd be nice”-statements normally do, it doesn’t matter how widely shared and strongly felt they are (yet another English nuance I have to teach you about). Indeed, I too expressly acknowledged that I share them, as much as I can share the wish for anybody I care about to survive a cancer (isn't life a basic value?). Yet the fact that there are shared expectations, basic values, shared preferences, desires and wishes, doesn’t make more evident that what we collectively expect, prefer, wish, desire, hold as a basic value can be achieved as much as the human wish to survive a cancer, no matter how intensely felt or shared by the entire humanity, doesn’t make it more evident that cancer is curable.
Quoting Mikie.
And conveniently so because you are unable to properly argue and counter-argue.
Quoting Mikie
Hallelujah!
The next thing is that Russia's identity is imperial, there is actually nothing else. Soviet Union was a continuation of the Empire and Russia itself couldn't find another identity for itself, especially after it's present leader see the collapse of the Soviet Union as an "unfortunate tragedy", which assumes it was simply a mistake. The fact is it wasn't simply a mistake. Once countries get idependence that's it, to assume the independence is a "mistake".
The third issue that Russia hasn't understood that it has lost the empire. Permanently. The point of humiliation for the UK and France was the Suez crisis (and for France in Africa perhaps the present). Yet for Russia it might only be this war with Ukraine. Or something else in the future.
I agree.
Quoting ssu
As well as the British, Spanish, American, French, or even German identity. That's how the world and countries - as we know nowadays - were built in the past. The territories were under the shadow of those vast kingdoms. Some states still have that 'pride' in their DNA, others don't. While Spain gave up on everything in 1898 with the lost of Cuba and Puerto Rico, Russia has always tried to keep their borders safe and controlled. Maybe they are proud of themselves, and we have low self-esteem as a failed Empire.
Quoting ssu
I had in mind the same idea, ssu. Not only they believe that the fall of Soviet Union was a mistake, but I truly believe that it was literally, sort of. Because that vast territory splitting apart in different republics was a chaos. It is true that some countries managed the independence correctly, for example: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but others don't, such as the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, most of those 'new' republics never really got independence from Moscow or the Kremlin. They became satellite countries, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, Turkmenistan, etc. And I also consider Ukraine part of this list too.
Quoting ssu
I agree that they should accept that the Russian Empire ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the enter of capitalism in their culture. Nonetheless, I think the Western world should not disrespect Russia as we - not all countries, for sure - since 1991. I say that the fall of the USSR was a failure, but Boris Yeltsein as a President is even worse. He made great reforms in modern Russia, but he also undermined respect for Russia. Frankly, Putin was necessary for Russia's defence from the Western world. They did not - and will not wither - accept being a more 'satellite' state of the USA. They consider themselves as superpowers, and honestly I think they are. Despite the economic block, they remain in the 9th position of the world's largest economies and their geographical position is excellent. They even have some 'democratic' allies which support them silently: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Republican party, etc.
That wasn’t the numbered statement, which you used to show us all your poor understanding of freshman logic. That was the statement you incorrectly claimed was a non sequitur.
At least try to get that right.
Anyway, the argument stands: the US has been pushing a plan for Eastern Europe for years. That includes NATO membership.
It’s no coincidence that Russia reacted in 2022, especially after NATO training, weapons supplies, military drills and, significantly, the reaffirming the position from Bucharest in September 2021.
If you want to pretend there’s some other reason, fine— go with that. There’s partial truth in it. But to disregard what a country has been saying for years is stupid, assuming we’re against war. Likewise, continuing the war instead of pushing for negotiations or at least a ceasefire is also morally bankrupt.
Quoting neomac
Yeah, because I stop reading after you show you have no clue what you’re talking about.
Quoting neomac
Yeah, I’m really not interested in what you consider an argument or not an argument. You’ve shown so far to have the understanding and conversational style of a high schooler who thinks he’s in a debate, and “winning.” The reality is that you’re just embarrassing.
Quoting neomac
Then go read a book. I couldn’t care less about what you “need.” I’m certainly not going to explain it to a child who thinks he’s in debate class.
Quoting neomac
Says the guy doing nothing except making random claims and bickering over statements he doesn’t understand.
You’re a waste of time. Do me a favor: read a book about logic and Ukraine. You can use it. Then grow up a little.
Maybe repeat “your guru Mearsheimer” for the thousandth time. Solidify your place in the running for goofiest forum members.
Putin is opening up a new front against the West
[sup]— Ivana Stradner · The Telegraph · Sep 30, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Dmitry Peskov · Reuters · Oct 2, 2023
I'm noticing some familiar rhetoric coming from Aleksandar Vu?i?. Hopefully the Balkans won't catch fire, wild- or otherwise. Anyway, the divide and conquer strategy seems evident. Works better if home can be glued together by the likes of strong nationalism, or perhaps an empire-mindset. Is Stradner on point?
Dmitry Medvedev threatens to strike German missile manufacturing plants
[sup]— Roman Petrenko · Ukrainska Pravda · Oct 1, 2023[/sup]
I suppose some would say that the Kremlin and whatever has become "legitimate targets". Who would want to, though? For that matter, ordinarily, why would anyone want to invade Russia? What has Russia in the crosshairs is more like democracy, better transparency, less regression, less oppression, whatever it all is. Maybe that's what's to the (current) Kremlin's disliking? A resolute "rebellion" against a more progressive, open, free, non-irredentist, diverse Russian society?
The war caused the US/German/Turkish/Australian/other military-industrial complex to make a big buck, not vice versa, the US/German/Turkish/Australian/other military-industrial complex didn't cause the war. The Kremlin continues generous bombing throughout (condemned by the UN and the good baker Jones of upper Negombo, Sri Lanka). As far as I know, that military-industrial complex isn't supplying Russia — supply and demand misaligned — but could be wrong. China, Iran, maybe North Korea, on the other hand...
That being said, one might easily enough argue that weapons manufacturing is morally questionable, unless for defense. If only all manufacturing of weaponry made for homicide could be intentionally ended, then we (humans) would have made significant (moral) progress, but it only takes one. Defense depends existentially on offense, and they say that "the best defense is a good offense".
Long sad story. Won't cease or decrease by concessions to land-snacking authoritarians, that systematically indoctrinate a country's children for stark nationalism and war. Crapping on those that aren't cowards or stand up against this crap might be getting a bit too close to complicity for comfort. (Note, Kim Jong Un is taking notes.)
I would disagree with this. Spanish identity isn't imperial anymore. You don't think the Netherlands is essential of your country. Or Mexico or Cuba. Spanish imperialism is quite well in the past. Last time I think it was the Rif war...
And the Brits? Lol. They have to protect the statue of Winston Churchill when something happens in the US. British imperialism is something that Monty Python mocked pretty well.
I would agree that we do not feel that The Netherlands belongs to us, or it is part of our culture/identity. But Cuba is another different story. I don't consider them very different to the Canary Islands or the rest of the peninsula, and I disagree that sooner or later they will be independent of us. They never got real independence, by the way. Cuba has always been under the pressure of the USA and dictatorships (Batista's, Castro's family, etc.)
We feel that the US robbed us our Caribbean pearl - As well as the Russian perceive that Crimea could be robbed by the Westerns, ha! -. The American State declared war against Spain just to help Cuba to be free, supposedly. This is a big lie, they just wanted to keep promoting their presence on the American continent. Cuba has never been free since it became independent of us.
Mexico and the other nations are irrelevant to us. We know we share the same language, and just it. But, losing Cuba hurt back then, and the feeling remains even though it happened nearly 130 years ago. We even have a saying that goes: Más se perdió en Cuba..., which means that there will not be a greater sense of loss than losing Cuba.
It is comprehensible. We are feeling that fatigue too, but the main difference is that our government is reckless and will keep wasting money and resources on Ukraine. I saw it coming - Slovakia's coming PM -, our nations are committing a big job and effort to supply them. But Zelensky doesn't seem to be satisfied entirely. So, the new positions of Poland and Hungary are understandable. If the U.S. is now doubting on keeping the fund, imagine us with fewer resources and poorer economies.
Robert Fico won the most votes in the 2023 parliamentary election with 22.95% of the vote and winning 42 seats fairly. And because he will not be a reckless dude, the Western media is already treating him poorly: He Is ProO RusSiAN!!!1!!1!1!1! https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/01/world/slovakia-election-pro-russia-robert-fico-win-intl-hnk/index.html
These journalists piss me off...
Indeed I claimed/argued that BOTH the following arguments of yours are non sequiturs:
1 - [I]“Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was
considered a red line. There was no reason to do so”[/I]
2 -[I](1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake[/I] .
Because from atomic propositions one can not infer other atomic propositions in propositional logic.
You keep repeating that I have a poor understanding of freshman logic yet without ever clarifying what is the correct understanding. For the fourth time, tell me what “non sequitur” is supposed to mean in freshman logic (feel free to quote textbooks about logic) and prove from that definition that your 2 arguments, as they are formulated, are NOT “non sequiturs” but correct inferences according to propositional logic. I bet you can't.
And there is no way you can recover from that. So suck it up and move on. And never ever dare to come back to this again. Ever.
Quoting Mikie
Some more dogmatic claims.
Quoting Mikie.
Some more convenient chopping.
Quoting Mikie
Some more dismissive or offensive remarks.
Quoting Mikie
Some more pointless advice.
Quoting Mikie
Some more delusional accusations.
Quoting Mikie
Some more petulant whining.
Yawn.
Because you don’t know what it means. If you do, then you’ve failed to understand what was said. I’m not interested in holding your hand in explanation. You’re worth the minimal amount of time.
Quoting neomac
No, just pure logic. But it does presume I’m dealing with a non-pathological adult, so I can see why you’ve struggled with it.
“Your guru Aristotle” said that.
Some more shameless self-serving delirium.
Quoting The Budapest Memorandum
1. A forced 'Memorandum' is not above a country's constitution.
2. Yeah, the 'existing borders', but these borders - specifically - have always been part of Russia, whether you like it or not, that's the truth. Maybe Luhansk and Donetsk are another different story.
How exactly was the Budapest Memorandum 'forced'? Russia signed it, because it wanted to get rid of the Ukrainian nukes. Moreover Russia has also signed the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, which confirmed inviolability of the borders - was that forced, too?
Also the constitution argument makes no sense at all: those regions were added to the Russian Constitution AFTER they were annexed (i.e. in 2014 and 2022), so in the time of the Budapest Memorandum and the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty the Russian Constitution clearly stated those regions are NOT Russia. On the other hand, according to Ukrainian's constitution from 1992 Crimea already WAS part of Ukraine. Why exactly the Russian constitution is supposed to trump the Ukrainian constitution?
And what about Kaliningrad? Historically it was not part of Russia, can Germans just take it, provided they add it to their constitution after annexation?
You state that we should not give credit to Russian constitution, but why we have to do so regarding Ukrainian? It is funny how the Ukrainians expropiate Crimea from the Russians between 1992 and 1997, when that peninsula was part of Russian Empire for centuries. Frankly, the Ukranians acted with bad faith and Putin is taking back all that belong to Russia.
Quoting Jabberwock
That's a different story. Don't mix up things. We are debating about Crimea. But, if you want to dive in, fine. Provide some data, at least...
[Kaliningrad]
In the context of the Seven Year War, all of East Prussia was conquered and partly occupied by the Russian Empire (1758–1762).Immanuel Kant is famous for having sworn allegiance to Empress Elizabeth of Russia.
The annexed territory was populated with Soviet citizens, mostly ethnic Russians but to a lesser extent also Ukrainians and Belarusians. What a paradise it seems!
In 2010, the German magazine Der Spiegel published a report claiming that Kaliningrad had been offered to Germany in 1990 (against payment). The offer was not seriously considered by the West German government which, at the time, saw reunification with East Germany as a higher priority.
Hmmm... It doesn't seem that the German authorities are as interested in Kaliningrad as Russians are as much in Crimea...
You should be aware that repeating the assertion does not prove it. Can you provide evidence that the treaties were forced?
And the claim that Crimea has 'always' been part of Russia is wildly incorrect. 174 years is not 'always', is it? It was much longer under the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire than under Russia. And whether you like it or not, Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine 1957, so formally it has been with Ukraine since that time.
Russians have less claim to it as Turks, and they have less claim to it than Tatars. You basically claim that Catherine's conquest somehow made it Russian forever, while all the other changes are irrelevant. That is rather silly.
Quoting javi2541997
So we agree that the constitution argument is pointless. And between 1992 and 1997 Crimea did not belong to the Russian Federation, It tried to gain independence, but was not formally recognized by anyone. DId Chechenya stop being part of the Russian Federation, because it had self-declared independent government?
Quoting javi2541997
And in the context of Khruschev decision Crimea has been Ukrainian since 1957. Again, you seem to believe that only Russian conquests count.
Quoting javi2541997
But if they do get interested, they have every right to seize it, is that correct?
The evidence: https://books.google.es/books?id=i1C2MHgujb4C&pg=PA194&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
Quoting Jabberwock
I think you do not understand how the Soviet Union used to work. Between 1917 and 1991, Ukraine and Russia didn't exist at all. They were the Soviet Union altogether, a single and unique nation. So, Khrushchev didn't give Crimea to Ukraine. I think he shared the management of the Oblast with other authorities far from Moscow. If Ukraine didn't exist until 1991 - or what we understand as Ukraine nowadays... - how was it possible to give a territory to a non-existing nation? It seems illogical to me.
Quoting Jabberwock
It does count because it is written and signed in the treaties, my mate.
Later that year, the Ottoman Empire signed an agreement with Russia that recognised the loss of Crimea and other territories that had been held by the Khanate. The agreement, signed on 28 December 1783, was negotiated by Russian diplomat Yakov Bulgakov. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_the_Crimean_Khanate_by_the_Russian_Empire
Quoting Jabberwock
You agree with me, then. Or... you just follow up the basic argument that 'Western countries can claim territories, but Russia doesn't.'
The argument that Crimea has always been Russian is often grounded also on the idea that Crimea is ethnically Russian. What that remark seems to forget is that Russians turned out to be
- The ethnic relative majority wrt to the Crimean Tatars only after 1897 (so practically at the beginning of XX century) thanks to massive deportation of Crimean Tatars (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars#/media/File:Demographics_of_Crimea.png) and parallel re-population of Crimea by Russians (Russification).
- And the absolute ethnic majority only after 1939.
This is how "since forever" Crimea was Russian.
It does not load.
Quoting javi2541997
I understand perfectly well how the Soviet Union worked - mostly Russians forced other nations under its boot, militarily, like with the Baltics, or by other means, like Holodomor in Ukraine. And no, being in one state does not make them one nation, which even the legislation of the USSR confirmed.
And maybe instead of just thinking, you should consult historical sources, which clearly state something different?
Quoting Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the Belovezha Accords, signed by Russia, clearly established that the dissolution of the USSR established new countries within the borders of the former republics. which Russia confirmed with two treaties, as noted above.
Quoting javi2541997
Oh, so the Budapest Memorandum and the border treaty were 'forced' and they do not count, but the treaty with the Ottoman Empire, signed after the war, does. We should consider only treaties that suit you and ignore all the others, is that correct?
Quoting javi2541997
No, the point is I do not agree with you, just like Russians would not agree with you that Germans have the right to Kaliningrad.
The hell, no! You claim that I am not looking into reliable sources, I would say the same regarding you and your arguments...
The Soviet Union was nominally a federal union of fifteen national republics; in practice, both its government and its economy were highly centralized until its final years. It was a one-party state governed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the city of Moscow serving as its capital as well as that of its largest and most populous republic: the Russian SFSR.
Historian Matthew White wrote that it was an open secret that the country's federal structure was 'window dressing' for Russian dominance. For that reason, the people of the USSR were usually called 'Russians', not 'Soviets', since 'everyone knew who really ran the show.
Quoting Jabberwock
Mate, the point here is not whether the treaties fit me or not. I am showing you evidence of why Crimea belongs to Russia. I was not part of those treaties, but I think it is obvious that Crimea had belonged to Russia for centuries, and it was confirmed both internationally and legally. These facts are not undermined just because, in the Soviet Union, Crimea was managed by Ukranians. When the USSR fell, the Ukrainians proceeded with bad faith and said: 'Hey, if we managed Crimea for only 34 years - in comparison to Russia, which managed it for centuries - then it belongs to our artificial new nation.
Quoting Jabberwock
Are you referring to Prussia, right? Another vast empire which took some territories as theirs as well. Does The Dollart ring a bell to you? The Netherlands and Germany do not agree on the exact course of the border through the bay.
Let's go and fund The Netherlands because of evil Germany... oh, this is childish.
But that is exactly what I am writing about: it was never 'one nation', as you claim, it was a federation of republics ruled by Russians, often more like colonies.
Quoting javi2541997
You are hilarious. Just a moment ago you claimed it 'always' belonged to Russia, because you were blissfully unaware that Russia got it in 1783. Now it is supposedly 'for centuries', which still is rather dubious, given it was 174 years. Then you have claimed that it was given 'under administration', because you were blissfully unaware that it was formally transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Did those two examples of your argumentation from complete historical ignorance teach you anything? No, because you know better, historical facts notwithstanding.
Yes, Crimea belonged to the tsarist Russia from 1783 to 1919, then it belonged to Russian SFSR, then in 1957 was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR, which was legally confirmed. Then, with the dissolution of the USSR, it remained with Ukraine within the borders of the former republic, according to the Belovezha Accords, which Russia has signed. Then in the Budapest Memorandum and finally in the Russian–Ukrainian Friendship Treaty Russia has solemnly confirmed that Crimea belongs to Ukraine . So it was not something that 'Ukraine said in bad faith', that is what Russia internationally and legally confirmed and which the international community, the UN included, recognizes.
Boris Yeltsein's Russia and not the modern Russia as we know nowadays. This is the point I want to defend at all costs. I doubt that Russia signed those treaties freely and Ukraine is a poor beautiful bunny surrounded by evil. I must admit that I am wrong when I said 'for centuries', but 174 years is a long duration for me. It is true that they transferred the administration to the 'Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic'
Nonetheless, Ukraine didn't exist as a nation yet. The Russians shared the management of Crimea with good faith and when the Soviet Union split apart, the Ukrainians thought that there was a unique opportunity to take Crimea. It is not my problem if you can't see it, but I would use an example: imagine you giving me your house as a lease, but recognising that you are the owner, while I just manage your house. The years pass by, and then I decide to take your home because one day 'you transferred me the possession'
Quoting Jabberwock
Don't be dishonest. You never claimed that it was a federation of republics. You stated that Ukraine already existed, which not.
Status: Satellite state of the Russian SFSR (1919–1922); Union Republic of the Soviet Union (1922–1991). Also, the 1977 Soviet Constitution says: Article 75. The territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a single entity and comprises the territories of the Union Republics.
Of course, we have to respect the Constitution of each nation. Some are well done and written, and others don't. I am not claiming that the Russian constitution is perfect, but admitting that I am not anyone to say their law and jurisdiction is rubbish. It is easy to blame them for everything related to injustice and corrupt judges. But can you name one country whose judges and laws work perfectly?
Quoting tim wood
There are no separate nor independent countries, mate. You are part of the block of the Western world, the European Union and NATO or you are part of the Russia/China spectrum. It seems that Ukraine decided to be part of the first group, but I wonder what kind of freedom they are looking for.
Well, the Russians have never made a secret of what they believe their security concerns are. It is the West (primarily the US) that has refused dialogue of any sort for as long as this conflict has existed.
With your remarks about the Russian constitution, you seem to imply you don't view these things as matters that should be discussed, but rather taken at face value and dismissed if it doesn't appeal. But correct me if I'm wrong.
It would be awesome if this kind of conflict could be resolved by this kind of discussion. But in the real world, it's settled by bloodshed. When it's over, we'll all know who owns what.
The Russians are after world domination by force? You'll have to explain that one.
Quoting tim wood
The US has never over the course of some 20+ years veered from its course to do exactly what the Russians were warning them about.
Even diplomatic negotiations like Minsk were used as a tool of conflict.
So yes, I maintain that no (meaningful) dialogue has taken place.
So we should ignore treaties from thirty years ago, because Russia has changed, but we should honor the treaties from two hundred years ago, even though the modern Turkey is not the former Ottoman Empire. Which also did not sign the treaty freely, because it has just been beaten in a war. Half of borders in Europe are the result of some war, therefore one of the sides did not accept them freely. Germany did not accept freely the loss of Alzatia, Konigsberg and Breslau, Poland did not accept freely the loss of Lvov, Finland did not accept freely the loss of the Karellian Strait, I go on on this way forever. The British did not accept freely the American Independence and Charles is certainly not George. Does that mean they have a right to demand America back? Somehow you insist only Russia has a right to demand its former lands, because for some reasons treaties do not apply to it.
Quoting javi2541997
Another issue in our discussion is that you lack understanding of even the most basic terms. You confuse 'nation' with 'state', 'state' with 'republic' etc. Ukrainians did not 'take' Crimea. Ukraine was established as acountry at the dissolution of the USSR, according to a joint agreement known as the Belovezha Accords, within the then current borders of the former republics. If the current Ukraine has no right to the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR, then the current Russia has no right to the territory of the fomer Russian SFSR, because they have received their legal status in the exact same way. That is why your analogy is completely false, you simply do not understand the legal framework involved.
This is from the Alma-Ata Protocol (which supplemented the Belovezha Accords):
Quoting The Alma-Ata Protocol
Which part of the 'the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force, territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders' do you not understand?
Quoting javi2541997
Can you provide the exact quote where I state that?
On the other hand, we have to respect another nation's constitution, with the aim of getting reciprocal respect. I cannot gain your trust in me if I do not respect your system firstly.
I said: I think you do not understand how the Soviet Union used to work. Between 1917 and 1991, Ukraine and Russia didn't exist at all. They were the Soviet Union altogether, a single and unique nation.
You said: I understand perfectly well how the Soviet Union worked - mostly Russians forced other nations under its boot, militarily, like with the Baltics, or by other means, like Holodomor in Ukraine. And no, being in one state does not make them one nation, which even the legislation of the USSR confirmed. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842651
On the other hand, I personally think that if you want to understand my position, you have to stay away from the Western media more often. I know that there were hundreds of treaties where countries or states lost part of their territory because of losing a war or other issues. Nonetheless, most of those treaties always abused the position of the loser. This was one of the main causes of the ascence of Hitler. Does Alsace-Lorraine ring a bell to you?
When the Soviet Union split apart in different nations, the Western world saw it as a good opportunity to make the Russian position weaker. Divide and you will win, you know. And having Yeltsein as President was a terrible mistake because he didn't have respect for others, making Russia's position like a circus.
The Alma-Ata protocol means nothing to me and to Putin either - as much as the USA regarding international criminal court ha! - If Russia hadn't signed the treaty or protocol, the Western media would say: Oh wow look at them, they are not a democracy and bla, bla. It is obvious that sooner or later this conflict will arise because the Western world never respected the soul of Russia. It is a clear threat to put NATO headquarters closer to Ukraine or even allow this country to join the group. Would you feel safe if Russia put their navy next to your coast?
If Empire Russia never recognised the independence of Latin American countries, why do we have to recognise Ukraine's sovereignty in Crimea? Because the USA goes mad and blocks us financially? By the way, why cannot the Europeans act as neutral countries instead of being enemies of Russia? These are the questions you should wonder about, and stop wondering about Crimea, because it is clear that - at least for those who are not influenced by CNN or BBC - it will be part of Russia. I bet they will remain as part of theirs!
Obviously by that I meant Ukraine as a region, not as a state. And yes, you do not understand what 'nation' is.
Quoting javi2541997
When the Soviet Union fell apart, the citizens of the Russian SFSR decided to establish the Russian Federation within the borders of that republic. How hard is that to understand? The Russia has the borders it has because that were the borders of the SFSR. And it is rather ironic that you claim Yeltsin's election was a mistake, because he had no respect for others. Does Putin have respect for anyone?
Quoting javi2541997
At least you are honest and drop the false pretense: you do not care about the international treaties, law or decency in general. You believe that Russia should take what it wants by force, if it wants it. Well, fortunately it is not strong enough.
Quoting javi2541997
If you do not understand why international treaties should be respected, I see no point in further discussion. Europeans are not neutral, because they do not want to be attacked by Russia one day. If Russia is not stopped now, it would have to be stopped some time in the future. And whether Crimea will be part of Russia - well, we will see.
Yet for Putin, Ukraine (and actually other countries like Kazakhstan) are artificial. And when a neighboring country thinks your country is "artificial", all alarms should go off.
Quoting Jabberwock
:100: :up:
We actually should treat Russia as we have treated Western imperial powers: all the territory they gained that hadn't already had the same language or culture (hence we can separate unification of Germany and Italy from their colonial aspirations) especially in the 19th Century ought to be seen as imperialism, and if these territories have gotten independence afterwards, we should talk about decolonization.
But in Russia's case, somehow this decolonization is totally unacceptable. And lands that it has taken as late as the 19th Century are part of the "eternal" Russia!!!
He is selfish because we all have to waste our resources and time on an impossible project. Many people - including you - claims that they could be more developed if they were not part of the Russian presence. Well, this is a lie. Ukraine is far from being a socially responsible country. Come on, dude... They do not even respect gay marriage. Is Russia responsible for this too?
Quoting tim wood
I do not know. What does the White House say?
Quoting tim wood
You can flag my posts if you want to, and let the moderators decide. Nonetheless, I am aware that I am speaking the truth when you guys accuse me of being denial and spreading disinformation. What a classic, I already received this kind of commentaries in 'Donald Trump' thread...
Quoting tim wood
Oh really? According to you, we should not respect the Russian constitution because its damn 65th article says that the Russian Federation extends to Sevastopol. Yet, at the same time, our governments promote businesses in countries whose constitutions allow them to hit women, such as Morocco or Qatar. Aren't you tired of this Western hypocrisy?
And actually we do have already an example of this: Chechnya. Nobody (except muslim extremists) lifted a finger for Chechnya as Chechnya tried to gain independence. Nobody recognized Chechnyan independence either. Not one country dared to cross lines with Russia in this matter. The last time when Barcelona tried to get away from Spain, I don't remember any European country coming forward to recognize them and giving them military assistance.
Hence it really matters the fact that Ukraine is a sovereign country that Russia has recognized. It's really the issue why all the countries have helped Ukraine and not sent the message that they hope that a peaceful solution can be found. Or simply kept silent about the matter. It is really the magic line that has been crossed by Russia now.
Respectfully suggest that this particular conversation be continued over here: Who Owns the Land?
A & B are in a war with each other. Both A & B claim that they - and they alone - have the right to rule / govern / control a particular piece of real estate.
Is there any legal / moral framework that can be used to resolve these issues in an impartial manner? Or put differently - what are the rules for determining the rightful owner of said property?
Having an enforcement mechanism is a related but separate issue.
Just to be clear - I have no clue how to answer this difficult question.
This doesn't describe the war in Ukraine, though. Russia doesn't claim any such rights.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_annexation_of_Donetsk,_Kherson,_Luhansk_and_Zaporizhzhia_oblasts
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation
Sometimes crayons can help with geography, attached. :)
Right - but there's an entire page of posts over just this point. I'm trying to suggest (in my own inadequate way) that the discussion is pointless unless there is some sort of agreement over the ground rules. Otherwise everyone is just talking past one another.
:up:
Quoting tim wood
My name is Javier Miranda Jiménez. I am a 26-year-old Spanish citizen in Madrid. My aim is to defend free of speech and European borders and identity. I am 'pro': Habsburg Kingdom; Russian Tsars; Prussia; Otto von Bismarck; Dutch monarchy; Swedish monarchy; Danish monarchy; Norwegian monarchy; Austro-Hungarian Empire; Greek monarchy the Kingdom of Romania and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.
I do not recognise: 'Catalunya', 'Ukranian Crimea', 'Kosovo', 'Moldova', 'Macedonia' and the rest of artificial entities which were born recently.
If that's to be a 'troll' for you, OK. What can I do? I will not change my inner values and ideas.
I will leave this thread for a while, it is becoming boring to me. See you sooner or later, with the international recognition of Russian sovereignty in Crimea, mate! :smile:
- “provocation” (as in “The West provoked Russia”)
- “culpability” (as in “Washington's culpability”),
- “belong” (as in “Crimea belongs to Russia”),
- “security” (as “the West ignored Russian security concerns”)
- “promises” (as in “the broken promises from the West to Russia”)
- “pushing” (as in “The US pushed the Ukrainians into this war”)
- “respect” (as in “We should respect Russian constitution”)
- "life" (as in the "No sense of the human life cost of this war")
all of which I find pretty mystiphicatory given how they are used.
Indeed their sense is practically never clarified in their meaning and implications, nor grounded on explicit assumptions about relations between states. Instead these keywords are taken as perfectly commonsensical and somehow universal, especially they can apply to issues concerning states or administrations as easy-peasy as a kindergarten teacher can apply them to two kids bickering over a toy. So much so, that even questioning them is taken to be hypocritical or unfair or propaganda-addicted or over-"intellectualising" or “childish” (since they are kindergarten teachers).
Yet these keywords can very much come loaded with all sorts of non-shared moral/ideological assumptions (and conceptual confusions too) which I find legitimate to question, especially in a PHILOSOPHY forum, because if philosophy is not ALSO about questioning anybody’s given-for-granted assumptions, I don’t know what is.
[i]“This is not a territorial conflict or even the establishment of a regional geopolitical balance. The question is much broader and more fundamental: we are talking about the principles on which the new world order will be based.
Lasting peace will be established only when everyone begins to feel safe, understand that their opinion is respected and that there is a balance in the world, when no one is able to force or force others to live and behave as the hegemon wishes, even if this contradicts sovereignty, genuine interests, traditions, and the foundations of peoples and states. In such a scheme, the very concept of any kind of sovereignty is simply denied and thrown, excuse me, into the trash.” [/i]
https://kremlin-ru.translate.goog/events/president/news/72444?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fr&_x_tr_pto=wapp&_x_tr_hist=true
That's the most overlooked by the pro-Putin "cheerleaders" and Russian "propaganda-hopium" addicted and yet repeatedly emphasized Putin's goal: a new world order, which is a direct challenge against the West and mostly against the US. It's not about the past, but about the future. A future without the American hegemon. A future were everybody is gonna be happy, no more wars, no more exploitation, no more greedy elites, just nations and traditions coexisting peacefully or hand-in-hand. Putin as the new Messiah of the post-communist and post-fascist orphans.
Notice the old alternate world type stuff again?
Quoting Putin
Which makes this stuff ironic:
Quoting Putin
Shift the blame, claim they're doing what you're doing. It's like when Lavrov says "The West" is genocide'ing the Ukrainians, yet it's his military bombing the Ukrainians (ongoingly). Old. The Kremlin ordered the invasion of Ukraine and before that we already know that Russian (military) actors were running some things behind the scenes in Donbas. It's an MO seen elsewhere. There have been quality elections in Ukraine since 2014, and they might have been hard to digest for the Kremlin.
Quoting Putin
Incidentally, a mantra of echo-chamber-maids, yet there are lots of people who check what comes out of freedom-deprived societies, Valdai, and whatever else.
Reports like this have been trickling in for a long time by now from various sources:
Ombudsman: Russia to open military camp for youth in occupied Crimea
[sup]— Nate Ostiller · The Kyiv Independent via Yahoo · Oct 4, 2023[/sup]
Not particularly peace-bound (except for the kind that comes after strife/killing). Gross. Some say it violates international humanitarian law. Would parents want the trajectory for upcoming generations these systematic efforts set out?
'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin
[sup]— Polina Nikolskaya, Maria Tsvetkova, Christian Lowe, Pravin Char · Reuters · Oct 3, 2023[/sup]
Storm-Z Shtrafbats? Wagner mercs are in it for the money; these folks are apparently addicts, riffraff, mentally challenged, ..., "undesirables".
Well, he is not wrong:
Victoria Nuland: Ukrainians Deserve Respect From Their Government
This was posted on December 19th, 2013. Months before the coup take place.
Did they make good on their promises to ensure a secure, prosperous and democratic Ukraine? I think not, but you be the judge.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67025706
Terminology:
A coup d'état, or simply a coup, is an illegal and overt attempt by a military organisation or other government elites to unseat an incumbent leadership by force. A self-coup is when a leader, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means.
A self-coup, also called an autocoup (from the Spanish: autogolpe), or coup from the top, is a form of coup d'état in which a nation's head, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means. The leader may dissolve or render powerless the national legislature and unlawfully assume extraordinary powers not granted under normal circumstances. Other measures may include annulling the nation's constitution, suspending civil courts, and having the head of government assume dictatorial powers
While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started more spontaneously and by larger groups of uncoordinated people. The distinction is not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by the coup plotters to pretend to democratic legitimacy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
Do you have better definitions from your educational background?
Quoting Tzeentch
Did Nuland specify any deadline for "a secure, prosperous and democratic Ukraine"? A Unix timestamp in UTC format somewhere?
This time some cringy quotes from the Minister of Defence from my very own home country. In Dutch we say, "plaatsvervangende schaamte".
Ukraine's fight is being instrumentalized by the West. Occupying Russia in Ukraine is a great way of keeping NATO safe.
Let's ignore the fact that that very same NATO dangled the promise of safety infront of the Ukrainians and goaded them into playing hardball with the Russians.
NATO security at Ukraine's expense? It's what I and many others have been saying here for a while.
What's worse is that this "plan" is fucking stupid, excuse my French. It's probably what the Americans are whispering in the ears of our dimwitted European "leadership" to foster support for a war that's not in Europe's interest.
How is NATO going to be secure by essentially degrading European-Russian relations and remilitarizing Russia while DEmilitarizing Europe?
But hey, folks like Kasja get to play pretend with the big boys in Washington, so all is well.
Exactly. :up:
You explained pretty well what I defended with arguments in my latest posts, but some users just do not see or call you 'pro-Russian' if you have a more eclectic idea or opinion on this conflict.
It is obvious that the conflict will be perpetual if the Western world is obsessed with disapproving Russia in literally everything. I even posted my full opposition to all of those universities which are ready to block Russian culture, - I was called 'Pro-Putin' for just defending Dostoevsky... *sigh*
I only see a reliable ending, with good faith if both sides have mutual respect. I expect a similar effort from European states, and I even feel very ashamed of this situation, to be honest.
For me, it is clear that Washington is so interested in degrading Russia and pushing EU members against them. A terrible situation for both Europeans and Russians, but not for Americans. Yikes!
And she is not the only one: 'We are defending you,' says Zelensky on EU visit
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/european-union/article/2023/02/09/zelensky-addresses-eu-parliament-seeking-weapons-in-brussels-visit_6015008_156.html
What's the problem EXACTLY?
Quoting Tzeentch
What do you mean by "instrumentalized" EXACTLY?
Quoting Tzeentch
Why do you keep repeating it for a while? What do you mean by "NATO security at Ukraine's expense"? What is the problem EXACTLY?
Quoting Tzeentch
Maybe it looks so stupid because there was no plan at all. Indeed when was the time to increase the military spending in Europe and to take a harsher position toward Putin, what did the Europeans do? Keep doing business with Putin financed his war machine too.
And If West and East Ukrainians are divided wrt to Russia. The same goes with West and East Europe.
If Europe outsourced to the US its security to avoid getting their hands dirty and just make business now they are paying the consequences.
Quoting Tzeentch
Totally agree. Since the US might not handle it anymore given the pressure from within and from China, keeping Russia busy in an Ukrainian war will buy the Europeans time to re-balance and redistribute the burden of Western security? And maybe the re-balancing won't be homogeneous in Western vs Eastern Europe. And even if the US loses the grip on Western Europe, it's still on the Europeans to decide what to do next and to what extent coordinate their effort. Still it seems Russia can count on a wide popular and political support in the West. Yours included, since you do not see Russia as a threat to the West right?
Quoting Euromaidan
By the way, that's not the "US–Ukraine Association Agreement", but the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement.
A "coup"? :chin: If so, then it's the right kind for good reasons, unlike various forceful army takeovers just by would-be dictators with guns, or this, or Jan 6 for that matter. They're now actively seeking to fulfill requirements for EU membership despite being in the middle of a war.
Indeed, notice that "the amount of money that was spent" wasn't a secret or anything, good point. The Ukrainians (and the UN) said "No" to the Kremlin (repeatedly), which invaded + grabbed land, accused Ukraine of being ruled by a Nazi regime, what-have-you. The Kremlin sort of moves toward a Cold War II, except now having learned from 1991.
Quoting Oct 5, 2023
But there's nothing new in the above. Repeatedly calling 2014 just a US thing, ignoring the Ukrainians — like the Putinistas — is repeated misrepresentation.
Ah, like Iraq forced the US to invade it by violating US red lines? Or like the Poles forced Hitler to invade by violating his red lines?
What do you think about that?
I take that as a clear sign they believe the West is out of aces and they are winning the war. Any takers?
As to the former, now suppose that Ukraine had entered a defense agreement with, say, France, the UK, Luxembourg, Australia, South Korea, Japan, whoever, so that Ukraine had a multinational force (+ gear) present, and those countries had Ukrainian forces present. What might we then have expected from the Kremlin? (Say, anything significantly different from what we're seeing today?)
As to the latter ...
Quoting Oct 6, 2023
Quoting Oct 6, 2023
What does "winning the war" mean exactly?
What might we then have expected from the Kremlin? (two cases now) ? fairly specific
What's up with the repeated misrepresentation anyways?
Not particularly difficult to understand, but could be difficult to respond to, depending... No matter, if you can't or don't want to. :up:
I couldn't have said it better. That's what is close to winning the war we ever could get.
Anyway, you've been mostly polite thus far:
Quoting jorndoe
If Ukraine's neutral status were threatened in some other way, we might expect the very same behavior from the Kremlin, especially if no meaningful dialogue takes place.
Quoting jorndoe
I never said the Maidan coup was "just a US thing", so I'm not sure what misrepresentation you're talking about.
Quoting neomac
Obviously I cannot look into the minds of the Kremlin, but if I had to make an educated guess:
- Either force a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine problem that involves a neutral Ukraine.
- In the absence of a diplomatic solution, Russia would annex those parts of Ukraine that it deems vitally important (unclear if this includes more than what it already holds), and turn the rest of Ukraine into a ruin.
I don't need any educated(?!) guess, just an educated factual acknowledgment of the fact that Putin has committed himself to two notions of "victories":
1. denazification, demiitarization, neutralization of Ukraine
2. establish a new world order
Annexation of land bridge and wrecked Ukraine was never defined as a victory. Surely it's what Russia might take as a compensation to justify the war in case the first goal fails and prevent an Ukrainian military comeback. But it can't be a victory if there is no international acknowledgement and no peace treaty. It will become just a frozen conflict.
Besides calling the second scenario a victory, would mean for us that the famous security concerns Russia was talking about by NATO enlargement were just a territorial demand over Crimea and a land bridge to protect Russian minorities, but this means that security concerns weren't about Russia proper (historical fear of invasion, the missiles against Moscow, etc). But if they were, then why isn't the threat still there given that Ukrainians hate even more the Russians now than before the war and might want to take revenge as soon as they can? So, no the threat for Russia would still be there and therefore no victory because Russia can't call itself safe. Actually it's way less safe now that it was before the war, as the attacks in Russia proper prove.
You calling it a "victory" for the Russians, tells more about you than about the Russians.
Quoting javi2541997
Yes this is what I take to be Putin's most ambitious and long term goal. It's a long run though.
Damn. I extend an olive branch and gave a serious response to your question, and you give me this? How sad.
C'mon dude don't be so sensitive.
My suggestion would be, don't waste your time replying to forum members that try to frame you as being partisan. They're not worth your time and effort.
Quoting javi2541997
Exactly. European and American interests diverge at key points, and the current European leadership is completely incapable of safeguarding those lines.
So you are not partisans and yet you have identified the US as the bad guy and the fact that the interest of EU and the US diverge. You constantly repeat that the bad guy is the US, how is that not partisan exactly?
If the interest of the US and the EU diverge, what about the interest of Russia and the EU? Do they diverge or do they converge?
Regardless of NATO (and the US)
Quoting Tzeentch
A move to democracy against corruption etc
:up: (un-difficult)
Outrage in Russia after Putin's speech. Just look at these comments ? re Valdai 2023 Oct 5
[sup]— MCZ · essanews · Oct 6, 2023[/sup]
It's a farce in Russia. They showed maps and everything came to light ? re Sep 30 Russia enlargement
[sup]— PAB · essanews · Oct 5, 2023[/sup]
A takeaway is the crackdowns.
Moldova switches supplier, which might have some economic implications:
Moldova will no longer buy gas from Russia's Gazprom -RIA cites energy minister
[sup]— Louise Heavens · Reuters via Nasdaq · Oct 2, 2023[/sup]
The way that you phrased your hypothetical, those other countries would be forming a bloc that would function essentially the same as NATO.
So in that sense it doesn't matter which military bloc or hegemon takes the role of NATO and US respectively, assuming of course there's a credible threat of Russia being kicked out of Ukraine permanently.
Quoting jorndoe
That's a bit of a rose-coloured way of imagining things.
Having the US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs design the government hardly seems democratic to me. I also wonder how much of that 5 billion was spent on bribes. :sweat:
I gave a pretty elaborate response to this question, by the way:
Quoting Tzeentch
Why “virtually inevitable”? Why do you keep calling it “coup”? If Washington supported a coup, who else organised the coup?
Quoting Tzeentch
So the Russian fears are the only ones we should care about if we want to talk about the genesis (and responsibilities?) of the war, not the fears of Ukraine, not the fears of Eastern Europeans, not the fears of Washington about Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. Why is that?
What evidences do you have to support the claim that Russia’s fears were about “Washington would create a fait accompli” despite the fact that “NATO membership was being held off”?
Is it another educated guess?
What would support Russian belief that “Russians wouldn't be able to object”? They kept objecting against NATO enlargement since the collapse of Soviet Union, and they had as leverage allies (Hungary), appeasing partners (Germany), a prominent NATO-averse country (France) and cooperative rivals (Turkey), lots of commodity business with the West, an international reputation that wasn’t as compromised as that of Washington, a US distracted with internal issues and China, AN ENTIRE populist political front in Europe and especially in the US sympathising with Russia, a nuclear arsenal to spend in case of aggression from enemies? Weren't Russians aware of these assets? So why all this fear if NATO was never as weak as it was before starting this war?
Why do you keep talking about FEARS and not OPPORTUNITIES for hegemonic expansion?
Quoting Tzeentch
What evidences are there to support the claim that “The importance of Ukraine is especially tied to Crimea and Sevastopol“? If this was the case why didn’t Russia negotiate Ukraine’s NATO membership for Russia’s control over Sevastopol and Crimea (or independent Crimea)?
Besides Russian access to the Black Sea and its strategic partners is not cut off if they lose Sevastopol, indeed they have other ways to access the Black Sea as much as when Baltic ex-USSR Republics joined NATO, this didn’t cut off Russian access to the Baltic Sea because Russians have other ways to access it.
Quoting Tzeentch
Or a deliberate defensive move solicited by Ukrainians against a overly jealous historical oppressor.
Quoting Tzeentch
Sure, but why do we have to care only about Russia’s security concerns apparently only grounded on their fears and nothing else? If we reason EXCLUSIVELY in terms of perception (why should we?!), then we can talk EXCLUSIVELY of perceived threats for the West posed by a overly jealous regional power with the imperialist history and military capacity of Russia too, right?
If yes how do you want to make them to coexist?
Ukraine should exist only as a buffer state and its foreign policies should be established and negotiated between Washington and the Kremlin? Is that what your educated guess suggests?
Cool, do you have any historical examples of buffer states that function as you suggest? Pls start with Russian history.
Quoting Tzeentch
The other harsh truth is that the Ukrainians have to decide whom to side with. And this is what normally pawns don’t nor can’t do. Right?
Pls destroy my objections one by one as only you can. I beg you on my knees.
Ha! This is funny, you feel bothered because we identify American interests as not reliable, yet you are completely free to not trust Russian objectives. If you read your arguments deeply, you are agreeing with me indirectly. I said a lot of times in this thread that some users just call me 'troll' or 'Pro-Russian' for having a more neutral position and trying to understand the behaviour of Putin. Doesn't this position make you be a partisan of the Western world? Why do we trust in America and not in Russia when the latter is closer to our interests and reality? At least Russia never applied tariffs to Spanish products.
On the other hand, the interests of Russia and the EU are absolutely legitimate. You are the ones who have always seen them as enemies, not us. Nonetheless, the weak leadership of the EU has conditioned a greater presence of Washington in the ambitions of a utopian relationship with Russia. Due to the - obliged - block to Russia, the middle-class of Europe has suffered an increase in their cost of life, because Russia was the main supplier of oil and gas. The partisans of the Western world say that we don't have to buy Russian natural resources because they are evil. But hey! Let's buy oil and gas from Algeria and Qatar, countries where free expression doesn't exist and women are objects. Why don't we block them as well? It is easier to see the world in your bubble from Washington.
The issue that bothers me the most is how we are wasting resources and time on nothing. Just to satisfy the caprices of a few. Russia is ready to end this war, but for unknown reasons, Ukraine and some - the UK and USA - don't want to.
Dude, again, you didn’t read much of what I wrote in this thread. I never claimed to be not partisan. I never claimed to be impartial. I am pro-US, pro-NATO, pro-West, OF COURSE. And have always DECLARED it and I’ve always argued ALSO in terms of picking a side. But I always take this to be understood primarily in relative and conditional terms (e.g. in the current situation, given the geopolitical power relations what’s the lesser evil, side with the US or with Russia?). So it doesn’t bother me at all to be called pro-US, pro-NATO, pro-Western, and that is also why I do not need your permission to call you pro-Russians after reading your arguments. What may bother me is to be accused of being fooled by pro-Western propaganda. My reasons do not depend on pro-Western propaganda but on my understanding of geopolitics, history and personal preferences.
Claiming to be “more neutral position” and “the latter is closer to our interests and reality”, independently if you are right or wrong, point to the fact that you can not call yourself neutral, or impartial, or non-partisan. And the point that your ideas so cheerfully overlap with those of Tzeench, suggests that his views are partial and partisan as well.
Quoting javi2541997
Because the West understands power relations more than the popular propaganda of freedom and democracy in the West suggests to people with a naive understanding of both power relations and Western propaganda. And Qatar and Algeria are not hegemonic powers threatening the West as Russia is doing.
Quoting javi2541997
The reasons are not that unknown: Ukrainian will to fight on one side, on the other bog down Russia in their own mess if Russia can not or should not be defeated militarily, on the American side. Russia is ALWAYS ready to peace if it’s on its own terms, of course. Also Ukraine and the US are ALWAYS ready for peace if it’s on in their own terms, of course.
And running drills, and “reaffirming” the commitment to Bucharest in 2021, etc.
Funny that it’s so difficult to understand the reaction from Russia when US responses in a similar scenario would go unquestioned.
“Putin evil” doesn’t allow it, I guess.
Iraq and Vietnam either, but we destroyed their structures and created a big division amongst their citizens. Do you perceive the hypocrisy of the Western now?
I respect your love and commitment to the Western world. Who am I to say that you are wrong? I wish some would have the same empathy and respect for other cultures and preferences... Yet, sorry to accuse you that you have been brainwashed by the Western media to dislike Russia and everything related to East Europe. It is funny when our journalists - my circus country included, for sure! - are obsessed with showing how evil Putin is. He is attacking the sovereignty of Ukraine! - whilst nobody cared about Georgia back in 2008 - and he is a dictator because he poisoned his political rivals - whilst Ukraine doesn't even recognise gay marriage, but hey, they deserve to be part of EU membership and Western civilisation.
Furthermore, are you aware of how the UK acted against IRA members in N. Ireland back in the 1970s and 1980s? Do you really think that's a moral and legitimate way to proceed? The 1981 Irish hunger strike left ten young boys dying for starvation due to their hunger strike. Margaret Thatcher showed zero empathy for them and zero respect for their deaths. Could you imagine the hypocrisy if this happened in Russia?
I ask you: Why didn't the world condemn - or block - the United Kingdom for such abominable behaviour?
That's the Western world you love and care for...
Except it wouldn't. There'd be no NATO expansion involved for example (as linked), but rather a "defense agreement" involving "whoever" (perhaps including China). Okie, so, in this case, we wouldn't expect much difference from the Kremlin from what we're seeing today. (?)
That was the second of the two cases, the first didn't include such an agreement. What might we then have expected from the Kremlin?
Quoting Tzeentch
Wonder away. As linked, the Ukrainians were and are looking to Europe rather than Putin's Russia, and are in the process of fulfilling EU membership requirements (despite invasion + being attacked) — democracy, ongoing efforts, hard work. At one extreme, declaring Kyiv a CIA puppet is misrepresentation, for example.
Quoting Oct 5, 2023
Anyway, nothing new, these repetitions make things a bit trite.
EDIT: better links
No. The American intervention in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan can be questioned from the American national interest point of view too. Yet the US has so far been the greatest hegemonic power, so we should expect that it reasons and acts as such. And commits awful mistakes as only great powers can do. Yet the US hasn’t been an oppressive hegemon for Western and pro-Western countries (European countries, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia) as much as Russia was at the time of Soviet Union (that's why when it collapsed, the Eastern European countries tried to join the West) and now against Ukraine. So much as so that despite the Vietnam war Vietnamese prefer to military ally with the US against China than to ally with China against the US: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
Quoting javi2541997
Quoting javi2541997
I don’t love the Western world. I simply prefer to live as an avg Westerner than an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian, North Korean. You?
Quoting javi2541997
Quoting javi2541997
No need to worry… you would just be a nobody saying to another nobody who doesn’t care about your opinion, he’s wrong or brainwashed. So say whatever makes you happy.
The bother I feel when I’m accused of being brainwashed is just part of an intellectual game, nothing I take personally.
Quoting javi2541997
As far as I’m concerned, it’s not possible to have the entire world respect the entire world always at the same time under whatever condition, if that means to let others do whatever they feel like doing. So my belief vs your belief.
Quoting javi2541997
I personally don’t give a shit if Ukraine recognises gay marriages. I simply find dangerous for our standard of life to give oppressive authoritarian regimes with hegemonic ambitions the opportunity to destabilise the Western World. And Russia benefited from the Pax Americana SIGNIFICANTLY MORE than it got damaged by NATO/West/US messing in its Ukrainian backyard. Indeed if it didn’t benefit that much, it wouldn’t dare to aggress Ukraine the way it did.
Quoting javi2541997
The difference would still be that you can whine over Western hypocrisy against the British government and build a political protest over it, try to do the same in Russia.
Your rant about Western hypocrisy or lack of empathy doesn’t impress me.
Probably I and you hold non-shared assumptions about the relation between politics and morality (which I discussed a while ago in this thread). I’m most certainly sure that neither me nor you nor anybody in this thread nor anybody in the world nor any politician in the entire human history has a fucking clue on how to fix the world, bring justice for the entire humanity for ever and ever, even with the bestest intentions. So, as you can guess, my expectations about politicians by default are already very low as morality is concerned.
Well, they have a good economic and beautiful cities, culture, museums, etc. Maybe I will give it a chance in the future. Who knows? What I am sure about is that I will not go to Mississippi or Ohio. I don't want to get shot by police officers just for being Hispanic.
Quoting neomac
My aim is not to attack you, but to show evidence and arguments to open your eyes. There can be other data, reality, facts, circumstances. The world is more complex than just put the finger on Russia and accuse them of everything. I want to know the truth, and it seems that the Western media is far from telling me so.
Quoting neomac
But they want to be part of the Western World, not the East!
Quoting neomac
You didn't understand anything of what I wrote... There were a lot of Irishmen who tried to criticise the hypocrisy and abuse of British politics, but they ended up dying of starvation or in jail... So the abuse of governments happens everywhere, not only in Russia. But we only feel astonished when they are the ones one who act in such a way.
I don’t talk about tourism, I don’t talk about giving a chance. I talk about living your life as an avg person in Western countries vs in one of those authoritarian countries. Which one do you personally prefer?
Quoting javi2541997
Good luck.
Quoting javi2541997
Gay marriage is not accepted even in Italy.
Quoting javi2541997
You can counter claims I made, not the ones I didn’t. Governments can be abusive and oppressive, the UK was an empire so they also have a past and more recent history of oppression. But so fucking what? Let me help you with your pointless argument: everywhere is the same shit. All politicians are evil nazi pedophiles and cannibals especially the Western politicians, Biden is twice worst than Hitler and Stalin and Gengis Khan together. And all human beings are shitty selfish coward useful idiots, Westerners worst of all. Now the question remains: I still prefer to live as an avg Westerner than an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian, North Korean. You?
And to stay with your historical reference: I still prefer to live as an avg English or Irish in Tatcher's era than an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian, North Korean. You?
Ukraine is currently seeking membership of both, with encouragement from / support of most (a couple or so are uncertain). As far as the war goes, Ukraine has overwhelming UN support. There's a bit that the Kremlin ignores or wants to undo.
Quoting Oct 13, 2022
Would you rather be a middle-class person in Russia or in a PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) country? That's the question we should care about, and how we can understand if some countries are worthy of living in, and others don't. It is not the Anglo-Saxon world only.
Quoting neomac
But then why do our Western media only focus on Russian abuse of gay people and not on Italy? Don't you really perceive the hypocrisy I am talking about?
Quoting neomac
I know a lot of people who are happy and find their lives satisfied living in China, for example. It is a country with a lot of opportunities. Before this useless war, Moscow was an interesting city for a lot of international stakeholders. Oh, one thing, they are not authoritarian just because the law is effective in their countries. I promise I want to try to live there for a while. Would you do the same in Romania or the South of Spain? Again, the Western World is not only the UK and US. :smile:
Your conclusion: Most countries are rubbish regarding the treatment of their citizens, but for unclear reasons, the Western world is more attractive than the East because *insert a senseless argument*
PIGS, OF COURSE. You? And why is this the question I should care about?
I’m living and lived in several Western countries, and am pro-West, not specifically pro-Anglo-Saxon World. I don’t particularly like the Anglo-Saxon World, at all. Still prefer it over Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.
Quoting javi2541997
The hypocrisy you perceive as many (but not necessarily all) double standards accusations are either irrelevant or unjustified to me. I don’t take politicians to be morally committed to Universal Justice as their rhetoric may suggest to naive people like you. And in geopolitics, one doesn’t treat actual or potential allies in the same way it treats actual or potential enemies, OF COURSE. I find this arguably VERY MUCH rational.
As far as I’m personally concerned, I too am partial and perfectly fine to be. I’m particularly disturbed by military nuclear powers with an authoritarian regime, historically infamous for being oppressive, and with such hegemonic ambitions to invest its accumulated resources by doing business with the West to economically blackmail, corrupt and intoxicate the political environment in the West, cultivate political hatred and revanchism against the West domestically, and go to war against Western countries instead of improving economic, political and social well-being of its own people at large. This is the reason you have to address with your bestest arguments, if you have any.
Quoting javi2541997
I traveled a lot around the world and also in authoritarian countries, I’ve a large network of personal and professional acquaintances around the World including from authoritarian regimes. I’m living and working in a multi-ethnic environment. I myself come from a foreign immigrant family and married with a foreigner (from a non-Western country).
Again, I’m not talking about privileged people, nor about the ability to live (happily or unhappily) in a country, nor about OTHER people, I’m asking you if YOU would prefer to live as an AVG person in China, Russia, Iran or as an AVG person in a Western country, let’s say, Spain, WHATEVER YOUR understanding of life in these countries is and whatever parameters YOU find relevant to assess life standards.
Quoting javi2541997
“Do you prefer X or Y?” and “give me the reasons why you prefer X over Y?” are two different questions. I just asked you the first and you still didn’t answer, while I answered the same questions I addressed to you and your questions too.
Why are you always obsessed with these four countries? I agree that Iran and North Korea need to change in some areas, but Russia and China are inspiring models. Two main reasons for my argument:
1. They have economic stability, and they are important in the financial scene. Russia is the main supplier of oil and gas, and China the supplier of... everything. Imagine if they were not being banned or blocked by the westerners, they would be superpowers.
2. They do not have immigration problems or cultural conflicts. They are well known for keeping aside illegal immigration, and it is very difficult to establish ghettos in their cities. It is important to keep the cities safe. Are you going to ignore the illegal immigration problem in Europe too?
Quoting neomac
This is outrageous. As far as I know, the USA - king of the westerners - is the only nation who dropped nuclear weapons on another nation: Japan. Or do you think that the Japanese deserved it because they were ruled by Hirohito?
Quoting neomac
Yes.
Quoting neomac
My arguments were not written in this direction, but I am perceiving that you want to twist them. Are you looking for evidence and data? OK, I will show you, despite the fact that you will not take them into account, because if they show high standards in those countries, you will not believe it...
Moscow: Gross Regional Product: €281billion / (€22205 per capita) The city has over 40 percent of its territory covered by greenery, making it one of the greenest cities in the world. Moscow has one of the largest municipal economies in Europe and it accounts more than one-fifth of Russia's gross domestic product (GDP). Overall, economic stability has improved in recent years. In 2019 the Economist Intelligence Unit's Worldwide Cost of Living survey put Moscow to 102nd place in the biannual ranking of 133 most expensive cities. There are 1,696 high schools in Moscow, as well as 91 colleges. The Moscow Metro is a world leader in the frequency of train traffic—intervals during peak hours do not exceed 90 seconds. The Moscow Metro is also the first and only one in the world to switch to this schedule. In February 2023, Moscow was the first in the world to reduce the intervals of metro trains to 80 seconds. It is the third metro system in the world (after Madrid and Beijing), which has two ring lines.
Moscow
It seems to me a pretty and attractive city to live in...
Do they? How are you measuring this?
Quoting javi2541997
China is already a great power. Russia isn't and won't become one. Just selling your oil and gas doesn't turn you into a great power.
Quoting javi2541997
Yeah this is straight up bullshit. Chechnya? The Uighurs?
Quoting javi2541997
That noone particularly wants to move to Russia is not an argument in its favour. There's certainly illegal immigration into China, but China is so big that it's not as noticeable and there's not much information easily available on the scale.
Quoting javi2541997
Have you actually looked at crime statistics?
Quoting javi2541997
And now look at Japan today and wonder why it's still such a successful country.
Quoting javi2541997
Just don't live in a building where you could accidentally fall out the window to your death.
We have a user here who backs up the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
I will not waste my time on answering you in the rest of the comments because I already did it to neomac, and you are ill-mannered for diving in other people's business.
Quoting javi2541997
So you don't care to back up your claims and instead make a pathetic and unfounded attempt at ad-hominem?
I consider this an admission of defeat on your part.
In Russia political opponents fall out of windows. In the US they get shot in broad daylight.
Pick your poison, I suppose.
The advantage is that the magical bullets are harder to acquire, so unless you're about to uncover the CIA's secret moon base where they experiment on aliens you're pretty safe.
Damn, I shouldn't have said that...
I do not know what is worse, whether poisoning a system to execute an elected president or lying to their own citizenship in everything which is regarded to Kennedy's death.
Or what about using the authorities to execute a human rights lawyer in Northern Ireland? Pat Finucane
The thing that bothers me the most is how western lovers justify those acts by the government because the politicians were 'elected' in a ballot, and they think they live covered by a great umbrella. Not like Xi, he is a bad guy and Putin is even worse because he doesn't have opposition in the Duma.
Because this is a thread about the war in Ukraine, so I take to be pertinent to talk about the Western involvement in this war as much as the non-Western involvement in this war. China, Iran and North Korea are indirectly supporting Russia and its most ambitious stated goal to establish a new World Order alternative to the Western-led World Order, also through this war.
Quoting javi2541997
Even if we assume true your questionable claims about Russia and China economic stability or their lack of “immigration problems or cultural conflicts”, it’s not enough. Indeed I talked about AVG standard of life, meaning that it is important to see how public and private resources and services are distributed over the population, how large is the middle class, how easy it is to move from lower classes to higher, etc.
Quoting javi2541997
I still take the US as the lesser evil. So much so that even Vietnam and Japan after having suffered a great deal due to past American administrations’ decisions (including something like being nuclear bombed twice), decided to ally with the US.
Besides you chopped my quote, if you hadn’t, you would see that my choice is still consistent even if the U.S. is the only country to have used nuclear weapons on another country. As said elsewhere, I don’t take politicians to be morally committed to universal justice, nor I think there are known effective recipes to grant universal justice, so I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil, conditionally and comparatively .
Quoting javi2541997
I appreciate your honesty. And I take it as a further (however redundant) evidence of your pro-Russian views. The easiest way for you to permanently migrate to Russia is to volunteer to join the Russian front in Donbas and fight the selfish Ukrainians and evil West/NATO/US to restore justice in this world. Meanwhile I can only wish you to migrate to Russia and be replaced by an illegal immigrant with more favorable views about the West as soon as possible. After what they may have suffered to have the opportunity to live in the West, they most certainly deserve to be part of the West more than you do. Do you agree?
Quoting javi2541997
If you are arguing in support of your answers to my question [I]“I’m asking you if YOU would prefer to live as an AVG person in China, Russia, Iran or as an AVG person in a Western country, let’s say, Spain, whatever YOUR understanding of life in these countries is and whatever parameters YOU find relevant to assess life standards”[/i] then it’s you who is twisting things. As far as I’m concerned, your data do not concern the AVG Russian life standards, I even doubt they are suitable metrics to asses the AVG life standards in Moscow.
[sup]— TASS · Oct 4, 2023[/sup]
Kremlin angry at Norway joining EU ban on Russian cars
[sup]— Charles Szumski · EURACTIV · Oct 5, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Lavrov
Quoting Zakharova
Yeah, Norway is Nazist. Not. So, for Putin's team, it takes pseudo-paranoia to avoid addressing why that was implemented (by EU, Norway) in the first place.
: "We appreciate your sentiment towards the Old Axis. We will rise again." ;)
, say, there are some marked differences between Kennedy (1917-1963) and Litvinenko (1962-2006). Anything further on those NATO and coup things, by the way?
A fully understandable objective, don't you think? They are free to attempt to get a different type of world. Who are we to stop them? Maybe this is where the conflict could arise. The continuous obsession with implementing how the nations should be and live.
Quoting neomac
OK, I see you like the digits I showed, so I will continue to use others as well - they are reliable, don't be shy to accept them - :
Russia: In 2022, the Economist calculated that Russia did graduate into the category of high-income economies by 2022, if counted at purchasing power parity rather than the exchange rate, but could fall below the threshold because of invasion of Ukraine. In December 2022 in a study an economist at the Bank of Russia’s Research and Forecasting Department, finds that the import dependence of the Russian economy is relatively low, does not exceed the median for other countries and the share of imports in most industries is lower than in other countries. The key explanation for this could be the low involvement of the Russian economy in global value supply chains and its focus on production of raw materials. However, 60% of Russia’s imports come from the countries that have announced sanctions against Russia. Russia's expenditure on education has grown from 2.7% of the GDP in 2005 to 4.7% in 2018 but remains below the OECD average of 4.9% A 2015 estimate by the United States Central Intelligence Agency puts the literacy rate in Russia at 99.7% (99.7% for men, 99.6% for women). The Human Rights Measurement Initiative finds that Russia is fulfilling 86.8% of what it should be fulfilling for the right to education, based on its level of income. Russia 1
A member of the middle class is defined as someone who considers themselves ‘above average’ on two or more of the indices.
By this measure, almost 50.8% of all Russian families belonged to the middle class, up from 41.8% in 2000. Check this out!!! https://iq.hse.ru/en/news/276242940.html#:~:text=Russia%E2%80%99s%20Middle%20Class%201%20Between%20the%20rich%20and,for%20its%20active%20use%20of%20paid%20services.%20
Quoting neomac
Yes.
Quoting neomac
Don't push me to death, mate. You will have me around for years defending Russia. We are not done yet. :smile:
Quoting neomac
I thought you would not like - or accept - the metrics of Moscow's living standards and economics, even though I made a big effort to share them with you...
That's why I get bothered. Why don't you believe in information related to Russia?
I'm sure there are. I just sought to point out that the US isn't a stranger to political killings, and wagging the finger at Russia is rather hypocritical.
Quoting jorndoe
I'm not sure what else you expect me to say. I have responded to your questions. If you think something is lacking in my response, it would really help if you would state your questions a bit more clearly.
Did you take my post as finger wagging? It was intended as a humorous jab.
In any event I think scale does matter.
Quoting javi2541997
They are free to attempt it, we are free to attempt to stop it.
Quoting javi2541997
Ah, and Russia did not invade Ukraine to "implement how the nation should be and live"? Because as I remember the stated goal is to "denazify and demilitarise".
Quoting javi2541997
So, living in Russia is great and you want to live there. Just not as a Russian because the dictator might send you to the front to die.
Can you see how this is a faintly ridiculous stance to take?
Quoting javi2541997
The information is not the point. It's your argument that's lacking. There's more to life than the number of metro trains.
It wasn't aimed specifically at you. It's just a thing that comes up with some regularity.
Well, expectations aren't so high I suppose, but at least you did respond to some. Stopping in the middle? Oh well, if you can't/won't.
What did you think of Stradner's post (Sep 30, 2023)?
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/05/world/europe/ukraine-zelensky-elections-war.html
Interestingly, watch dogs seem to be more against holding elections, as are the opposition candidates. The idea is that the elections will be marred by continued martial law and that it also won't be a particularly fair election environment. Being wartime leader confers huge advantage for Zelensky and could help him expand his power.
There is also the question of votes in Russian held areas, which would shift outcomes.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1707669326776410440[/tweet]
I wonder when those guys will declare independence (from Russia in addition to Ukraine), with guarded borders and all that. Maybe it's not in the cards. Anyway, harsh words. I thought the Kremlin was concerned with neo-Nazism, though?
I think she's right that these conflicts are related to the war in Ukraine, and perhaps more directly with the shifting geopolitical landscape in a wider sense.
However, it would be too easy to label this as 'a thing evil Russia does', because the US / The West seems to be doing the same, for example in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
It’s not an obsession. It’s exactly what states are expected to do: rule over a certain territory and pursue national interest with allies or against competitors in the international arena. Allies and competitors will exercise peer-pressure no matter how powerful a country is. Powerful countries will always exercise the greatest pressure, though. As already argued many times Russia too has hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine which, in this case, means imposing by brute force how Ukraine should be and live.
Besides Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are countries with great competitive interests between them too, despite their conjoint effort to counter-balance the hegemon, perceived now as weak. To that extant I find their objective understandable. But I’m pro-West and find all these countries more oppressive powers than the US so I support policies and a stance aiming at suppressing or containing the threat coming from these countries.
Quoting javi2541997
Still not enough, you have to compare the AVG living standards between Russia and the West.
Quoting javi2541997
Dude, it’s not that difficult to fetch stats about Russia on the Internet.
And overall Russia doesn’t stand a chance:
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/civil-liberties-index-eiu
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-by-country
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_social_welfare_spending
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/unemployment_rate/
https://wisevoter.com/country-rankings/standard-of-living-by-country/
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/au/investing/currencies/top-10-strongest-currencies-in-the-world/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_suicide_rate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate
https://ocindex.net/2021/rankings/?y=2023&f=rankings&view=List
https://www.internationalinsurance.com/health/systems/
https://rankedex.com/society-rankings/education-index
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/cleanest-countries-in-the-world
https://www.iqair.com/world-most-polluted-countries
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_by_net_migration_rate
https://www.passportindex.org/byRank.php?country=fr
Not to mention the possibility for avg Westerners to move and migrate for economic opportunities more easily within the West.
Besides, as far as I’m concerned, it’s not only matter of stats. I’m taking into consideration all sorts of feedback I could gather through professional and personal acquaintances from around the world. So don’t waste your time trying to convince me otherwise.
To what end? Dictatorship, authoritarianism? Sortition? Democracy?
For the sake of our children's children, I'll run with the latter. Otherwise ...
Quoting Nov 30, 2022
Your choice. :up:
Although I understand what you are defending with arguments, here is when I disagree with you. Are you really sure that the USA is a lesser threat to the world? Latin America, Asia, Africa and East Europe would disagree with you. It is obvious that the White House no longer bombs citizens and cities, but the ambitions remain in a more subtle way: imposing Capitalism worldwide, the rule of the Dollar, your military headquarters being settled worldwide (we have two!), Hollywood culture..., the homogeneous plan of speaking English worldwide, etc. If you do not consider those as a threat...
Quoting neomac
OK. I will not give up on my beliefs, so here is the comparative between Russia and your lovely 'Western family'
Russia: GDP Increase $4.771 trillion
• Per capita Increase $33,263
Gini (2020) Positive 36.0
HDI (2021) Increase 0.822 very high.
Spain: GDP $2.36 trillion
• Per capita Increase $31,223
Gini (2021) Positive decrease 33.0[9]
HDI (2021) Increase 0.905
Greece: GDP $418.113 billion
Per Capita $22,595
Gini (2022) Positive decrease 31.4[7]
HDI Increase 0.887.
Are you happy now? And keep in mind that Russia is suffering an unfair financial block from the West. Imagine their development without our weird behaviour in Europe just to make the White House happy.
Quoting neomac
I don't believe those statistics. They are made by Western universities and foundations. They have zero relevance to me.
Written by another user who backs up the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Don't waste your time. I will not answer posts from a 'Pro-Genocide' and destructive cultures-Japan-Asia like you.
Japan raps Russia's 'illegal occupation' of disputed islets in rally
[sup]— Kyodo News · Feb 7, 2023[/sup]
Putin Is Opening A Door For China
[sup]— Alexander Etkind · NO?MA · Apr 20, 2023[/sup]
Kremlin calls Polish decision to rename Kaliningrad 'hostile act'
[sup]— Andrew Osborn · Reuters · May 10, 2023[/sup]
Russia may be devoured by its neighbours (archived)
[sup]— Svitlana Morenets · The Telegraph · May 31, 2023[/sup]
Explained: Why Has Russia Rejected China's New Map, What All Territorial Disputes Does China Have With Neighbours?
[sup]— Madhur Sharma · Outlook (India) · Sep 4, 2023[/sup]
Might Moldova eye Transnistria? What of Kazakhstan? Georgia? Technically possible, but not likely (as far as I can tell anyway). Would certainly...complicate things. (What might Lukashenko do?)
, say what...?
Quoting jorndoe
They did.
Quoting jorndoe
They did.
Quoting jorndoe
They did, back in 2008 but nobody gave a f*ck. Russo-Georgian War Relations reached a full diplomatic crisis by April 2008, when NATO promised to consider Georgia's bid for membership. Yikes! The same problem kicked in fifteen years ago. What a damn coincidence!
Quoting jorndoe
This dude is zero relevant. You guys love to create enemies in each Eastern country, and I agree with Putin in this fact.
I never argued that the US is a lesser threat to the World. I only argued that the US is a less oppressive hegemon to the West than Russia was for centuries toward the people it submitted and can still be given how they are treating the Ukrainians or Georgian or Belarusian, and the Russians themselves.
The US is a great threat to countries with rival hegemonic ambitions like Russia and China, and yet the US wasn’t hostile toward them during the post Cold War era of globalization. Indeed that’s how Russia and China got rich, influential and bold. Russia and China didn’t use their wealth to increase AVG standard of life to the level of Western countries, they used it to strengthen their authoritarian regime, increase hegemonic influence and anti-Western narratives abroad. And that doesn’t sound promising even for the population of countries whose government seek partnership with Russia and China, like the Iranians. I sympathise with the Iranians not with the Russians.
Quoting javi2541997
Some countries from those regions not all. East Europe like Poland, Baltic Countries and Ukraine? Asia like Vietnam, Japan and South Korea?
Quoting javi2541997
Yes that’s exactly what non-oppressive hegemons are expected to do, buy popular consensus (not just oligarchy’s consensus) through shared rules, business agreements, sharing technologies, granting political and civil rights, communicate a peaceful and cooperative narrative between allies through words, acts and cultural exchanges. But OBVIOUSLY not to the extent of compromising their power advantage against potential/actual rivals. That makes perfect sense to me, if we are expecting more than this we are likely delusional and if we want more than this for us, we must be ready to pay the consequences, which for Europeans likely means moving the hegemonic conflict, political and military, from the margin of Europe, in the heart of Europe. And if the US loses, Russia will be the hegemon with a greater chance of exploitative/abusive behaviour than the US, given that Russia has more to get than to offer to Europeans and reasons to humiliate the West as a triumphant retaliation.
Quoting javi2541997
OK now you may have given me an answer from your point of view, not mine though. I most certainly keep in mind that Russia is suffering a financial block from the West, since network of allies and enemies is also what can determine AVG standard of life of a country.
Quoting javi2541997
Whatever makes you happy.
I think you should define 'oppression' if you want me to agree with you. If you truly think that Russia has been more oppressive than the US in the last centuries, we have a big issue here because you are away from reality itself.
Quoting neomac
Tell how Russia treats countries such as South Korea or Vietnam oppressively, because they are so far away from their geopolitical ambitions. I am seeing you coming, and maybe you would say: Don't you remember how Soviet Russia supported Vietnam? And why not, mate? They are free to back up countries with similar ideologies. They also support Syria for the Baaz socialist party.
Quoting neomac
Ha! ha! This one made me laugh :lol:
Quoting neomac
Mate, I am providing you with reliable information on the middle-class of Russia, but I feel that you do not believe in the metrics, or you just don't open the links I have shared with you. OK, don't worry that much, I will open the link and share the information and proven evidence in this thread. Nonetheless, keep in mind that if you do not believe in these metrics, it is your problem, not Russia's.
The HSE Centre for Studies of Income and Living Standards studied the dynamics of the middle class and its behaviour with regard to paid services. The study was based on data drawn from the HSE Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) for the years 2000 to 2017, and the results were presented at the 20th April International Academic Conference hosted by HSE.
The HSE researchers applied three criteria for their study:
[b]Material well-being;
Social and professional status;
Self-identification.[/b]
The middle class is identified according to the following factors: income, savings, property (durable goods), real estate and assets typical of villagers (land and farming revenue).
Although the overall middle class grew continually from 2000 until 2015 and levelled off only in the lead-up to 2017, the generalized middle class continued to expand right up until 2017.
The middle class is heterogeneous and includes several different groups:
The core. This includes those who satisfy all three of the above-listed criteria.
The semi-core. Those who satisfy two of the three criteria.
The periphery. Those who satisfy only one of the criteria.
The generalized middle class consists of those households belonging to the core and semi-core, while the overall middle class also includes those in the periphery.
Happy now? https://iq.hse.ru/en/news/276242940.html#:~:text=Russia%E2%80%99s%20Middle%20Class%201%20Between%20the%20rich%20and,for%20its%20active%20use%20of%20paid%20services.%20
As a starting point, I take “oppression” as an expression of political averse preference (which admits degrees and possible revision of course) by an individual or collective subject toward hegemonic influence wrt available alternatives. I say "starting point" because one can also make further distinctions: popular or elite, actual or potential, economic or military, compensation-based or comparatively-based, etc.
If ex Warsaw pact countries and ex Soviet Republics prefer to join the West (like EU and NATO) instead of remaining under Russian sphere of influence, it likely means that these countries likely perceive EU and NATO as less oppressive than joining Russian sphere of influence.
If Vietnam prefers to military/economically ally with the US instead of China, then it means that Vietnam finds the US less oppressive than China.
If European countries prefer to preserve or want to join American-led/supervised Western institutions like EU/NATO, then it means they find such institutions as less oppressive than remaining exposed to the influence of other hegemons (like Russia or China).
Quoting javi2541997
South Korea or Vietnam are more concerned by China than by Russia. So in their case I would say they feel the US to be a less oppressive hegemon than China.
Yet since the US is competing also with Russia then of course South Korea or Vietnam will likely act in line with what their hegemon has chosen to do against Russia. Do ut des.
Quoting javi2541997
Laughing is not an argument, though. On the other side, risus abundat in ore stultorum.
Quoting javi2541997
I read your link. But, again, my question was about comparing AVG in the West with AVG in Russia according to relevant metrics. That link at best shows the metrics and the source you care. My previous answer showed the metrics and the source I care. With an addendum: the direct experience or feedback I got from acquaintances from countries like Russia, Iran and China.
And when it's matter of my preference, of course it's my problem not Russia's.
Dude, I’m not here, in this philosophy forum, because I care for my family, my country, the West, the Ukrainians, Humanity. Or to convince anonymous nobodies from the internet about my beliefs. I’m here EXCLUSIVELY because I care about myself and the way I think. I’m here EXCLUSIVELY to clarify my own ideas to myself through the intellectual challenges other pose, especially if they are interested to do the same for themselves. In other words, our exchange is to me just an intellectual and self-targeted exercise. Like brushing teeth or go jogging. To do that I just need arguments, hopefully as compelling as possible.
Quoting jorndoe
:brow:
I partially agree with some of these points and disagree at the same time.
There is a big debate about whether the EU countries established the European Union freely, or whether it was an attempt to not depend on the two blocks: not the USA and Russia (the Soviet Union back then). Yet, it is true that European institution ended up being more linked with Washington and not with Russia. I still see it as a notorious mistake. I don't attempt to ignore the USA because it is impossible, but I wish they had had a more neutral position, and don't perceive Russia as an enemy. I see this objective far more than ever, and I feel that the White House is satisfied with this.
On the other hand, there are some nations which were pushed to join those American institutions. One example is Spain. We had to join NATO to show that we were your friends, and then get accepted by the European Union. There was a big disappointment amongst the citizens because most of us were against NATO back in the day. You can check this out on the Internet if you want to, but I don't want to bother you with my irrelevant country.
Quoting neomac
Well, I understand why it is so difficult to persuade you. If you do not give a chance to my evidence or metrics, it will be very complex to make your eyes open. There are some metrics which come from Western institutions or magazines, such as 'The Economist'. Furthermore, since the war started, it is complex to find out reliable information about Russia's reality because the Western media manipulates us and the Kremlin blocks the most information they can. But fortunately, there are some premises that we can consider as true:
1. Russia is a rich and developed country but with a few problems.
2. More than 50 % of Russians live in the Middle-class
3. Then, Russia is a country with high-quality living standards, but they must face some issues as every nation does.
Furthermore, even the International Monetary Fund - a great biassed Western institution - says that the purchasing power parity will keep rising in Russia in the following years: $36,135.834 (2024); $37,273.366 (2025), etc. Do you still think that the average family in Russia lives or will live badly? Is the IMF a reliable source for you?
Poverty line: 12.10% in 2020. This means that more than 85 % - the middle-class obviously - of Russians live well. More metrics from a Western lover institution: The World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/home
My premise still holds, states are expected to rule over a certain territory and pursue national interest with allies or against competitors in the international arena. Allies and competitors will exercise peer-pressure no matter how powerful a country is. But powerful countries will always exercise the greatest pressure, though. So politicians’ choices are always conditional on given power relations, whatever one’s wishes are. So even “pushing” needs to be qualified more carefully: there are “sticks” and “carrots”, so the proportion of these factors can make the difference. And, again, the difference must be taken in prospective and comparative terms. That’s what it means to me to be realistic when talking politics. I find European populist movements far from being realistic and definitely useful idiots for hostile foreign powers.
And it’s totally false to claim that Russia was perceived as an “enemy” by American administrations (despite the warning of the American analysts of the Russian threat). America financed Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union, returned the nuclear arsenal to Russia from Ukraine, opened the Western market to Russia (when USSR was the enemy, there was no globalization) and gave a free pass to Russia in Middle East and Africa when Islamist terrorism was perceived as the imminent enemy. Meanwhile Russia grew hostile to the West because still pursuing hegemonic ambitions not welfare or wellbeing of its people (the same story with Iran and China), while the American reputation was severely stained by the 2 infamous adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. And once the Americans realised that their globalization was nurturing hegemonic competitors and warned the EU, the EU underestimated the American security concerns. And still the response of the West was hesitant toward Russia, even after the invasion of Crimea. The Americans were still distracted by domestic issues (thanks also to Russia’s meddling) and China, while the EU was still needy of cheap Russian oil and gas and the Chinese market. So Russia got emboldened and moved on to take a larger piece of the cake. Not fear but opportunity pushed Russia into this war. And if America didn’t react as it reacted (and notice that its reaction is still softer than one might expect), the king would be perceived as naked. So here we are.
Quoting javi2541997
You waste your energies because you do not understand what I’m asking nor why. If historical circumstances are such that I have to chose between two hegemons, I will chose the hegemon which lets me enjoy the most favourable ratio of carrots/sticks to MY taste, not to YOUR taste. The avg ratio of carrots/sticks in Russia (not to mention the countries under its direct hegemonic influence like Belarus) until now looks still undoubtedly shitty compared to the ratio of of carrots/sticks Western countries get under the US hegemony. I gave you the metrics relevant to me to measure the ratio carrots/sticks. And again stats are not the whole story.
Some in Congress want to cut Ukraine aid and boost Taiwan’s. But Taiwan sees its fate tied to Kyiv’s
[sup]— Didi Tang · AP · Oct 9, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Hsiao Bi-khim
Quoting Bradley Bowman
... Well, now add the wretched Middle Eastern escalation.
Other related news ...
Kremlin-Friendly Hungary Government Wants to Hold Back Some Ukraine Aid
[sup]— Jorge Valero · Bloomberg · Oct 3, 2023[/sup]
Slovakia halts military aid for Ukraine as parties that oppose it negotiate to form a new government
[sup]— AP · Oct 5, 2023[/sup]
Understandable. Who am I to force you to choose your taste?
But, as much as I can remember, our debate didn't start because of likes or preferences. You asked me for evidence and metrics on the Russian middle-class, and I have provided them using both Western and 'Pro-Russia' sources. Then, you said that they are not reliable to you, something that I must not complain about because I do not trust Western institutions either. You are not admitting it, but I feel that you ended up in the conclusion that Russia is a cool place in objective terms. Speaking subjectively, maybe it is not likeable for some people, including you, and I respect your position. If you think that the world governed by Western institutions is better, cool. But stop believing in false premises about Russia.
Quoting neomac
I do not waste my time because I am helping you to see the truth. :smile:
Then your memory is fooling you.
As far as I’m concerned the following is the relevant starting point:
Quoting neomac
Next, since your answers weren’t focused on what I was asking, I gave you more clarifications as follows:
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
Next, YOU started throwing at me stats by yourself because, at his point, I didn’t ask you for evidence and metrics yet. So much so that you wrote all by yourself as follows:
Quoting javi2541997
But I was unimpressed because you offered mostly non-AVG aggregated metrics and trivia highlights which can objectively be misleading to assess AVG standard of life in Russia or in Moscow, EVEN IF THEY ARE ACCURATE (so the objection didn’t concern their reliability of your stats per se, but their relevance wrt what I was asking). And aggregated stats about Moscow can not be taken as representative of the AVG standard of life in the entire Russia. Most importantly, I didn’t ask you to compare cities (like Moscow vs Melilla), I asked you to express your preference as a function of AVG standards of life between states (e.g. Russa vs Spain), so I objected:
Quoting neomac
----
Quoting javi2541997
Well it doesn’t work. You should try to help me see the truth by paying me instead. But I’m very expensive (and do not accept rubles, moy drug).
Putins wrath finally for joining NATO?
Good that we got in and weren't left hanging like Sweden. :smile:
BTW, what would Putin, the "Russian security concerns" whiner, suggest to address Israeli security concerns?
I think he won't be able to stay quiet, hence we will hear about it.
But I see a bit of contradiction in your arguments, mate. Firstly, you say that you want evidences in how it is to live in Russia, not just for tourism. I showed you some evidence which you didn't like. Later on, you also said that you like Western countries because you travelled around them... That's contradictory.
Quoting neomac
Because my points are based on the fact that Russia is likeable basically. To back up my opinion, I showed you evidence. If you don't like them, and you do not want to accept the reality it is your problem mate, not Russia's or mine.
Quoting neomac
I did that, but you rejected my arguments too... here
Quoting neomac
I partially agree.
It is true that I focused on Moscow and not other Oblasts or cities. Well, this is due to using metrics, we tend to focus on capital cities because they are the places where most of the citizens live. It is the largest city in Russia by population, but we can take into account another city: Saint Petersburg.
St. Petersburg is a major trade gateway, financial and industrial center of Russia specialising in oil and gas trade, shipbuilding yards, aerospace industry. St. Petersburg has three large cargo seaports: Bolshoi Port St. Petersburg, Kronstadt, and Lomonosov. Toyota is building a plant in Shuishary, one of the suburbs; General Motors and Nissan have signed deals with the Russian government too. Automotive and parts industry is on the rise here during the last decade. The federal subject's gross regional product as of 2021 was ?9.44 trillion (€108 billion), ranked second in Russia, after Moscow.
Impressive! It is clearly a city full of opportunities for Russian citizens.
Quoting neomac
Well, you just accept that you are open to accepting bribes. Ha! Don't bother if a Russian politician does it as well. This is all that I have in my wallet. Take it or leave it!
My claim is that NATO membership, after years of training, arms supply, and drills, was the main cause of the invasion. There are others, of course. The US has many reasons for its actions in Eastern Europe, as do the Russians.
Quoting Jabberwock
A better analogy would be: were the British responsible for the revolution, given its actions leading up to it? I’d say yes.
Quoting Jabberwock
Russia attacked in 2014 after the US-back coup, yes. NATO did not abandon its plans after 2014. In fact it increased its involvement— now under the invented “imperialist ambitions” cover.
Your thesis that Ukraine abandoned its NATO ambitions in 2014 is proof that Russia would attack Ukraine no matter what, and that NATO was just the latest cover story, confuses two things: 1), US influence, and 2) one such influence: NATO. You also ignore the fact that the NATO threat was in the background since 2008. It did not disappear as a threat simply because one leader was against it. But when that leader is removed, with US support, in favor of the pro-EU and pro-NATO, US-approved Poroshenko — yes, I’d say NATO is still a factor in Russian decisions.
Again, the actions of Russia took place AFTER the coup, not before— so I’m really not seeing your point that NATO couldn’t possibly factor into Russian aggression in Crimea. Sure, it wasn’t the main factor in this case— and I never said it was — but it was not irrelevant either.
That makes no sense though. Russia already had a perfectly good frozen conflict in the Donbas. There'd be no way for NATO membership of a country in an active (if sporadic) armed conflict with Russia.
Quoting Mikie
Obviously if you attack a country it'll look for protection. What was the Russian strategy here according to you?
Dude, this exchange is getting surreal. Or surrealistic.
Do you wear long pointy upward moustache by any chance?
I didn’t write anywhere that I want evidences, indeed you can not quote me saying it, and I even made it clear when I wrote the following:
Quoting neomac
So I didn’t ask you for evidences. It’s you by your own initiative to throw evidences at me with the following preamble:
Quoting javi2541997
And my objections weren’t about the evidences per se nor because I needed evidences, but since you were trying to answer my question by providing some evidences, I limited myself to question their pertinence.
It’s as if I’m asking you: “do you prefer to eat a pizza in an Italian pizzeria or in a Chinese pizzeria?”
And you answered:
- I know people who enjoyed Chinese restaurants.
- I would give a chance one day to try a Chinese restaurant.
- People can eat in a Chinese restaurant and be happy.
- Chinese restaurants are particularly trendy in China, and demand for it will grow in the next years.
- You can find the best Chinese restaurants in Beijing
- 100 millions of Chinese restaurants in Beijing. With a nice view on the Yellow river.
- 60% of the people in China can afford to eat in a Chinese restaurant.
- In China restaurants can serve you a meal in 3 seconds.
I hope you understand that no matter how true these claims are, none of these evidences are sensibly pertinent to answer my question “do you prefer to eat a pizza in an Italian pizzeria or in a Chinese pizzeria?”. Because the question is about pizzerias and not whatever restaurant one can find in China, and about comparing Italian pizzeria vs Chinese pizzeria, not about Chinese pizzerias per se or the pizzerias in Beijing.
Quoting javi2541997
I do bother because Russia would pay a politician to spread Russian lies not me.
Or are you suggesting me to spread Russian lies for free as you do?
Again, you completely ignore why Ukraine has started training, arms supply and drills - because it has ALREADY been invaded and there was still ongoing conflict with Russia. Russia has attacked Ukraine and has maintained the armed conflict for eight years, so Ukraine began to arm itself - that was the sequence of events, which you consistently ignore.
Quoting Mikie
But that was not the point. The point was that mere support is not sufficient to be cited as a cause. You have given no support why we should think Russia would not attack Ukraine without US/NATO actions and you are desperately ignoring the evidence that Russia did start the armed conflict for other reasons.
Quoting Mikie
No, Russia attacked after it has messed up, because its meddling has sparkled a popular uprising. ANOTHER point that you desperately ignore in your analysis.
Quoting Mikie
No, it was not 'one leader', it was legislation adopted by the whole parliament. That basically neutralized the NATO threat. And the leader was removed because Russia has messed up in a different matter. Without Russian meddling Yushchenko would remain in power and Ukraine would be militarily neutral, just as it was decided by the parliament.
Quoting Mikie
Well, I have evidence why it would not be very relevant - Ukraine has pledged neutrality and Russia did not mention NATO when it has invaded Crimea. On the other hand, you say NATO was definitely a factor, because you say so. See the difference?
However, given that you have acknowledged that it was not the main factor for the agression, that is all I need to reject your argument: given that NATO expansion was not the main factor in starting the conflict, all we have to do is to consider whether that main factors have ceased to exist before the further escalation of the conflict (which has never ceased, contrary to your claims). And the answer is, of course, no - Russia still had the same reasons, so it started the full-scale war.
This is again a strange request.
I do have support: it didn’t happen. What did happen is attacks during a period of US involvement.
So as long as we’re asking for ridiculous things: you’ve given no support that Russia would have attacked WITHOUT US influences.
Quoting Jabberwock
A US-backed/funded uprising, yes.
Quoting Jabberwock
Without US meddling, you mean.
Quoting Jabberwock
It was certainly the main factor in 2022.
Except that’s complete nonsense:
[quote=Putin, 2014]
Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank you to them for this.
[/quote]
https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Address_by_President_of_the_Russian_Federation_on_the_reunification_of_the_Republic_of_Crimea_and_the_city_of_Sevastopol_with_Russia
So yes, it was very much a factor. EU expansion was also a factor. US-backed coups was also a factor. Add it up, and US influence is all over these events.
But we’re supposed to believe Russia shouldn’t have been worried, that their fears were completely unwarranted, and that NATO was irrelevant — because you say so.
Sorry, no.
Did Russia have a reason to attack Ukraine, when it had a pro-Russian president at the helm and its neutrality confirmed by the pariiament?
Hmmm... .
Quoting neomac
Ah, if your objections weren't about evidence, why do you reject them all?
Quoting neomac
Again, your arguments against my comments are twisted. I am pretty aware of what you were looking for when you started debating with me. I even answered you more than one time that I would rather live in an Eastern nation than a Western one, and I admitted that an Ukrainian has more right to live in the EU than me, frankly. To argue why I say those things, I provided reliable data along with my comments. Yet, you decided to refuse to accept them. As I said, that's your problem with not accepting that Russia is an important and likeable country, not mine.
On the other hand, the example of Chinese pizzerias is good. Nice try. But you should apply to yourself as well, because you are given as granted that every Western city is more suitable than Russia. I ask you now then: Would you live in Bucharest or Jaén? Don't say that in this part of the globe, life standards are better per se and, because you visited some Western cities, the rest are exactly as you are thinking about.
Quoting neomac
This is hilarious.
1. Why is a Russian representative necessarily a liar?
2. Again, I am working pro bono to help you to reach out the truth.
I told you: [I]“since you were trying to answer my question by providing some evidences, I limited myself to question their pertinence.”[/I]
Now it’s you who seemingly has a hard time to understand the distinction between “pertinence” and “accuracy”, and despite the repeated clarifications.
Quoting javi2541997
No it’s you who is twisting things. I asked you one question and expected a pertinent answer. If I ask you: “what time is it?” and your answer is “In Australia is summer”, your answer however true is not pertinent, no matter how many evidences you bring to support the claim “In Australia is summer”. And it’s not my question that needs to be revised to fit your answer, it’s your answer that needs to be revised to fit my question.
Quoting javi2541997
That’s false, I didn’t say anywhere nor give for granted that “every Western city is more suitable than Russia” indeed you can not quote me saying it. And I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand. I simply asked you to compare avg standard of life between Western countries and Russia. At best you can question or ask me why it is relevant to me to assess AVG standards of life by country. But if you intend to sensibly answer my question as it is, then I’m obviously expecting a pertinent answer from you, that’s all. And if you fail to provide a pertinent answer, I’m free to signal it as such.
Quoting javi2541997
1. I didn’t write anywhere “a Russian representative is necessarily a liar”. Again, I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand.
2. It was a sarcastic joke.
Anyways we are going off topic, here. Your misunderstanding of my question is completely marginal to the subject of this thread and seeing you embarrass yourself again is getting boring. If you understood the clarifications I’ve given to you in this post, good for you. If you didn’t, I’ll remember you in my prayers. If I’ll remember to convert before dying, obviously.
But that’s not what happened. Crimea occurred after the coup, not before and not during. Once it was known that Yanukovych was gone and replaced by a pro-Western leader — yes, they had reason to annex Crimea at that point.
I’m not saying their reasons are “good” reasons or that I agree with them.
You are evading the question: was Russia threatened by NATO enough to invade when it had a pro-Russian president and legislated Ukraine's neutrality?
To be honest, I think you forgot why I showed evidences of why Moscow or Saint Petersburg can be nice cities to live in. Our discussion started because you stated the following premise: The western world is a better place to live in and it is less oppresive. I disagreed, saying that the Western media manipulates us to hate Russia. You didn't believe such a claim, and then I showed you why I sustain those opinions. The metrics I have shared are pretty good, but instead of being honest and accepting that Russia can be likeable too, you started to twist things. Your premises have no sense and you are off topic. Again, Is Russia that bad? Because I already proved why it is not, but I haven't seen any from your side.
Quoting neomac
OK, I say the same regarding my evidences. It is not my business if you don't want to accept them.
Quoting neomac
I don't question your opinion and thoughts because that would be arrogant on my side. I am not anyone to say if comparing the middle-classes of each country is relevant or not. For some reasons, this emerged during our debate, and then I did my best at showing data. If I had questioned the relevance of your inquiry, I would be a lazy person who doesn't know how to address questions.
Quoting neomac
:up:
I gave you some evidences for MY assessment:
[I]Dude, it’s not that difficult to fetch stats about Russia on the Internet.
And overall Russia doesn’t stand a chance:
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/civil-liberties-index-eiu
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-by-country
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_social_welfare_spending
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/unemployment_rate/
https://wisevoter.com/country-rankings/standard-of-living-by-country/
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/au/investing/currencies/top-10-strongest-currencies-in-the-world/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_suicide_rate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate
https://ocindex.net/2021/rankings/?y=2023&f=rankings&view=List
https://www.internationalinsurance.com/health/systems/
https://rankedex.com/society-rankings/education-index
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/cleanest-countries-in-the-world
https://www.iqair.com/world-most-polluted-countries
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_by_net_migration_rate
https://www.passportindex.org/byRank.php?country=fr
Not to mention the possibility for avg Westerners to move and migrate for economic opportunities more easily within the West.[/i]
And I don't care if you do not trust my sources.
Quoting javi2541997
You are attributing to me beliefs, questions and claims that evidently do not correspond to what I wrote:
“Are you looking for evidence and data? OK, I will show you”
“You asked me for evidence and metrics on the Russian middle-class”
“you said that they are not reliable to you”
“you say that you want evidences in how it is to live in Russia”
“you are given as granted that every Western city is more suitable than Russia”
“Why is a Russian representative necessarily a liar?”
I didn't do the same with you.
Quoting javi2541997
But your “evidences of why Moscow or Saint Petersburg can be nice cities to live in” is not pertinent to answer the question I asked because I asked about your preference between the AVG standard of life in the whole fucking country of Russia compared to the AVG standard of life in a whole fucking European country, like Spain.
Believe or not, I respect your effort. Another thing is my own disbelief in Western propaganda.
Quoting neomac
Preferences depend on someone's tastes, and according to my own aims and purposes, I personally consider Russia as a better place to live in than other countries of the EU. For example, if I had to leave Spain, I would try something in Russia, Japan, Ireland, Scotland, etc. But I do not see myself living in the average famous city: London, Rome or Paris. The hello no! They have a big problem with multiculturalism and insecurity in the streets.
There are other countries inside the EU which can fit my preferences, such as Poland and Hungary. I was in Kraków, and it was fantastic, and I felt good expending my time there.
What I am looking for in my preferences for a good city to live in is two main aspects: security (control on illegal immigration, so the neighbourhoods don't have ghetto problems. Sadly, Madrid - as well as other Western cities - is losing this battle) authenticity (the ambient, urbanism, behaviour, etc. Maintains their roots, and it is not influenced by Western 'activities' such as Mc Donald's or Netflix). According to my tastes, I see Moscow more authentic than London or Los Angeles, for example.
Quoting Sep 26, 2023
Quoting Oct 6, 2023
Prior on those particular considerations, by the way...
Quoting Oct 7, 2023
Quoting Oct 7, 2023
Anyway, there's been lots of repetition in the thread (including on the (supposed) NATO-phobia). Maybe that's why we're on page 519 or so. Think we can hit 1K? :) (ok, that's a bit cynical)
When Yanukovych was in office, no. When he was thrown out? More so, of course— but still not the main driver.
Still hardly non-existent or irrelevant, as you’ve claimed.
Great, so finally we agree that at that period NATO was not seen by Russia as a direct threat. But Yanukovych was ousted due to the course of events initiated by Russians, not by NATO or the US. Russians overplayed their hand, coerced him to abandon the EU trade deal and sparked the protests in the Maidan demanding his ouster. Ukrainians were so outraged meddling that they have chosen a much more direct pro-Western course. Sure, the US has supported it, but it started without the West and rather caught it by surpise. So how exactly is that US/NATO fault?
No, he was ousted by an uprising with plenty of social engineering and funding from the US — which had been happening for years, in fact. To the tune of billions of dollars (with a B).
You can blame Russia for this — fine. I don’t care to squabble. I’m happy to blame Russia. But again, if we’re interested in their perspective — in what they consider threats, in reasoning for their actions, etc — it’s good to know the full story. Turns out there’s some truth to it.
In any case, whether it was solely Russia’s fault for the uprising is irrelevant— maybe they did push too far, etc. Doesn’t have any bearing whatsoever on what we’re discussing here. Yanukovych’s overthrow was not something Russia wanted or liked, and they considered this a time when they could lose Ukraine completely to Western influence— the EU, NATO, etc. So they invaded Crimea. Shouldn’t have been a surprise.
Now it’s true a story has been fabricated since then, about Russian imperialism and Putin’s ambitions and so forth— wanting to take over all the old Soviet territories, etc. But that’s only been the official Western-propagated story since 2014, and ignores a great deal of history. It wasn’t the story in 2008, when they pushed for NATO membership and started the ball rolling with our current situation.
Oh, so now it is 'social engineering', because you simply cannot accept the fact that it is Ukrainians themselves that finally want to leave the Russian sphere of influence, just like many other countries in the region. You absolutely do not care what Ukrainians think about that.
And now you are just contradicting yourself. First you acknowledge that Russia's reaction was caused by its refusal to let Ukraine leave its influence and then claim that the imperialism is a 'fabricated story'. But that is one and the same - Russia's imperlalism is exactly the demand to call the shots in its former republics, it is not necessarily about physically annexing the lands. Belarus is the prime example of how that works in practice. You renounce the claim of Russian imperialism without actually understanding what it is. This is evident just from the claim that it is 'Western-propagated'. No, it is not, the most vocal opponents of Russian imperialism are of course Russia's neighbors, who have been telling about it for centuries. It is just that the West has realized what they are talking about after the Crimea invasion.
I do— but I’ll repeat myself again: what’s relevant isn’t what I think, it’s what the Russians think. Is there any reason for them to be concerned? What do they say? Do they believe Western forces were involved? Do they mention NATO at all (which you claimed they didn’t)? Yes. Now— is there any truth to those claims? Turns out, yes. Turns out the US was funding pro-democracy groups for years.
Now I’m in favor of democracy. I’m in favor of Ukrainians deciding for themselves what to do. But the topic here is also what Russians perceive, because we’re discussing the causes of their aggressions.
The US would love to have us believe they had no hand in any of this— totally blameless. But we should question whether that’s true. We should listen to the Russians, to our own ambassadors, to dissent scholars, etc., and see if it holds any weight. I think it does, especially given the United States’ role as a world power the last 60+ years.
Quoting Jabberwock
Alright, so what is US involvement if not imperialism? Diplomacy and good will?
Imperialism was not given as a reason for NATO expansion. But Poland and others already joined— with no invasion, regardless. Ukraine was and is a red line for Russia, as they stated clearly for years. If not wanting NATO on your doorstep is imperialism, so be it. But that’s a stretch, I think. I wouldn’t hear many claiming the US as being imperialist if it annexed Baha in reaction to a Chinese-backed regime change in Mexico. Or that it wished to conquer Mexico and this was the proof.
Russia had and has no intention of conquering Ukraine. The logistics don’t add up, among other reasons. The goal isn’t conquest or re-forming the USSR.
If Russia wanted to “call the shots” in all its former territories, it failed miserably. Having some say in whether a neighbor along your borders —with historical and cultural ties to Russia, especially in the east — joins western military alliances and gets dominated by western interests is a little different.
I’m in favor of Ukrainian freedom. They should put it to a vote and work it out. But let’s not pretend that Russia hadn’t been screaming about this for years, even before 2014 when the polls started to change in favor of NATO.
I don’t like Russia or what Russia is doing. But I’m a US citizen, and I don’t like what we’ve done — and are doing— either.
The difference is that if Russians oppose the Ukrainian independence in general, then the conflict would likely arise sooner or later anyway, as Ukrainians became more and more uncomfortable in the Russian mir. Not to mention that a threat toward one's country can be seen as a legitimate reason for an armed conflict. Desire to keep a neighboring sovereign country undemocratic - not so much.
Quoting Mikie
Poland and other countries have joined specifically because they considered Russia as a potential threat. And having NATO in the Baltics or Finland is exactly having it on one's doorstep. Ukraine is different for other reasons.
Quoting Mikie
And again, you do not understand the Russian imperialism, if you believe it must 'conquer' anything. I have given you already an example of Belarus, has it been conquered? If you are unfamiliar with the situation there, have the countries of the Warsaw Pact been 'conquered' during the time of the USSR? No, they were supposedly 'liberated', which does not change the fact that they were victims of the Russian imperialism. Only at that time the West preferred to look the other way.
Yes, Russia has lost its grip over the former republics after the fall of the USSR, but that is the exact problem: it wants it back. That is the root problem of conflicts of which Ukraine is only the biggest one.
Quoting Mikie
But that is exactly what they did. That is why the conflict has much less to do with the Western machinations and much more with the Ukraine's desire to reorient itself. As I wrote here before, Ukrainians stood before a choice between being like the Baltics and being like Belarus. It is not surprising that they chose what they did.
Okay— this is an important difference. I don’t buy this.
You said a second before that imperialism isn’t restricted to conquering a region — fine. Now you fall back on the position that Russia does want to take over former republics. Not sure what “wants it back” would mean otherwise.
Maybe I was not clear - when I wrote Russia 'wants it back' I meant the control, not the physical territories. In fact, in many ways it is more convenient for Russia to control them from the back - when the protests erupted in Belarus, they turned their anger toward Lukashenka, not Putin (even though Russians had significant part in suppressing them). If the protests succeeded, Lukashenka would bear the consequences. The Warsaw Pact worked similar in many aspects.
You were clear. Abundantly.
Alright, so by your definition we have two countries with competing geopolitical goals, and thus two “imperial” powers. If that is indeed what is meant, than the US is winning, by far, and from the Russian point of view is quite threatening.
Your claim is that Russia should have no control over Ukraine, a significant piece of the overall power game. I mostly agree — it should be the people who decide. On the other hand, do you also agree the US should exercise no control? That they shouldn’t have pushed for NATO membership in 2008, for example, when the polls showed the people did not want to join it and Russia was posing no threat? Was Russia supposed to just sit back and watch, no matter what happens? Would the US be expected to do so in similar circumstances?
Seems to me you’re just fine with imperialism, provided it’s the good guys doing it.
Not exactly, the two are not even simliar. While the US did many things which should be condemned (like the war in Iraq), the influence it has in its allied countries is incomparable to what Russia is doing or tries to do. Saying that the US controls, say, Poland or Lithuania in the same way like Russia controls Belarus is simply absurd, the simple difference being that in Poland and the Baltics people can just vote out their governments. Lack of or significant deficit of democracy is necessary for Russia to exert control.
And I still do not understand what exactly do you mean by 'pushing for NATO membership' in 2008. Reading you one might think that Ukraine was being dragged into NATO by force... As we have already discussed, Ukraine had plans to join NATO long before that, with signing the Action Plan and official Kuchma's declaration in 2002. After the Orange Revolution Yushchenko confirmed those aspirations (here is his speech from 2005). In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia hoped to enter the Membership Action Plan, which the US supported, but Germany and France blocked, so Ukraine and Georgia were rebuffed (so much for the US hegemony!). So in fact, in 2008 Ukraine got less than its government wanted and expected - instead of the specific measures they only got vague promises. Comparing the accession paths of other countries, I would say for Ukraine in 2008 the accession process has been actually slowed down, not accelerated.
And yes, since 2002 (when the number of supporters and opponents was about equal) the policy of joining NATO lost popularity in Ukraine (unlike joining the EU), which was one of the reasons why it was scrapped when Yanukovych was elected. Still, until that time it was the official policy of Ukraine.
Exactly. One is the good guy, one isn’t. And that’s the fundamental upstream issue by which you interpret everything else.
Quoting Jabberwock
Except I never once said that. The US actions in central and South America are certainly comparable — if not far worse. To say nothing of the atrocities in the Middle East, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, etc. If you want to be serious about “imperial aggression,” comparing the US and Russia is indeed absurd — the US is far worse.
Quoting Jabberwock
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19547.htm
Kuchma’s declaration was an attempt to gain favor with NATO. But regardless, the US wasn’t pushing at that point and wasn’t serious about Ukraine membership. It had its own problems at the time, and knew very well that this would provoke Russia. There was no official US push until 2008. And it’s US involvement that Russia reacted against, and what’s relevant.
It is not a matter of my interpretation. Belarussians are dying and are jailed to get out from the rule of 'one guy' and do not mind the other one. People in those countries in the Eastern Europe who did join the West are quite happy about, it is about the single issue they agree on. And their distrust of Russia remained high even when they have already did. They freely vote and choose those politicians who maintain that course. It is those who remain under Russian rule who must be suppressed, that is why all the colored revolutions happened.
Quoting Mikie
I will not argue about that, the very simple fact is that in the region we talk about leaving Russia and joining the West has significantly improved the lives of those people, in their own opinion. Ukrainians, Georgians and others were witness to that and wanted to join them. So no, as far as the Eastern Europe is concerned, there is no comparison.
Quoting Mikie
'Gain favor with NATO'? Which part of the 'its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures' is not clear to you?
Also, can you provide any evidence that the US did not treat Ukraine's membership 'seriously'?
Quoting Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Viktor Yushchenko
Was that a joke?
Quoting President Bush Discusses NATO Alliance During Visit to Latvia November 28, 2006
Is he joking or is he pushing?
Quoting David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs June 22, 2006
Is he serious?
Ukraine officially started its path toward NATO membership in 2002 and followed more or less the same path as other countries joining NATO before it - for Poland it took eight years from the Rome summit. Ukraine (and Georgia) gradually fulfilled the required criteria concerning the army size, structure, etc. Saying that the preparations for Ukraine's joining were 'not serious' simply ignores the historical record. What is worse, it even ignores our previous discussion, which started with the Putin's quote - at the time he was not that concerned with the expansion, but there is no indication he does not treat it 'seriously'.
In 2008 the next expected step for Ukraine, Georgia an Croatia was entering the MAP - Ukraine asked for this in January. It was denied that mostly due to opposition from Germany and France, the U.S. tried to convince them, but obviously failed. So you are saying Russians suddenly turned from a peaceful nation to a belligerent one because Bush has tried to convince Europeans of basically sticking to the plan established in 2002, even though he failed miserably? That makes no sense at all.
Yet the polling indicated the opposite, and had for years, up to and including 2008. So what Ukrainians are you talking about? Not the people.
Quoting Jabberwock
Good. So just know that the US has a hand in this as well, for decades. This wasn't an accident, and it was done with the full knowledge that it would provoke Russia. That was a mistake. It also wasn't being pushed by the people of Ukraine at that time.
The reason for NATO expansion is obvious. It's part of an overall strategy for Eastern Europe, mostly to do with, ultimately, money. To argue the US cares about democracy or the people of Ukraine is laughable. So the question is: was it worth it, knowing full well that it would eventually provoke a response -- as our own ambassador had warned about? I don't think so.
Quoting Jabberwock
And they didn't choose it. But regardless, no. This is not the same as the statement "Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO." That occurred at Bucharest.
Quoting Jabberwock
It's the US position I was talking about. Prior to Bucharest, there were only the vague statements you provided -- "Someday." That day became much more real, to Russia, in 2008.
Quoting Jabberwock
No -- their position was quite clear, for years, concerning Ukraine membership in NATO.
Unless you're seriously arguing that Russia was in favor of Ukrainian membership in NATO, this discussion is pointless. If you accept what the US's own experts said at the time regarding Russia's position, then let's move on.
The support for joining NATO was about equal in 2002 and decreased from then (as the Russian opposition increased), but the support for closer ties with the EU was much higher, starting with 60% in 2000. So yes, the people.
Quoting Mikie
It is becoming frustrating that you simply ignore all the sources I provide, because you know better. Kuchma has pushed for NATO membership and so did Yushchenko. Their declarations are quite clear and numerous. Ukraine was on the path to joining NATO since 2002, which Putin himself has acknowledged. Sure, US supported it more than some other countries, but so what? NATO is an organization, the US is influential there, but you are clearly overestimating its power, as the Bucharest summit shows - the US did not get what they wanted.
Quoting Mikie
Yes, both Kuchma and Yushchenko did choose it, they have adopted the Action Plan in 2002 and acted accordingly. Ukraine made all the necessary steps required for membership, closely cooperated within the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the only snag was the disagreement between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in 2006, but then they got back on track. In Bucharest Ukraine actually got less than it expected, so you are completely wrong about that and documents show it.
Quoting NATO-Ukraine Action Plan
That is the exact statement from 2002 from the site of NATO. Again, which part of LONG-TERM GOAL OF NATO MEMBERSHIP is that hard to understand that I have to repeat it over and over?
Quoting Mikie
No, that is laughably false. Exactly the opposite has happened.
Quoting NATO launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine
NATO has invited Ukraine. Got it? To discuss in detail its aspirations to membership. Got it? In 2005. That is a year which came BEFORE 2008. Is that clear enough?
As to the US position prior to Bucharest:
Is the act of the US Congress serious enough for you?
I see you have carefully omitted the part where I ask you for evidence that the US did not treat the Ukraine's membership seriously before 2008. Is that because you are unable to do it? Can you give ANY evidence that the US position has somehow changed in 2008? Because I can give you a ton of other quotes that show it has basically remained the same for decades.
Quoting Mikie
I have already given you the quote from Putin where he says it will not particularly influence the relations with Ukraine. Have you already forgotten it?
And it is your claim that the US supposedly did something in 2008 that caused Russian reaction. It seems you are completely unable to support it. In fact, you are so far unable to articulate what it exactly was.
What gives you that idea?
Hardly. But nice that you change it up to the EU when convenient.
Quoting Jabberwock
And I think you’re underestimating it.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
I was very clearly responding to the above quotation you provided, where Bush said NATO membership was open to the “Ukrainian people if they choose it.” As already has been established, the people didn’t choose anything of the sort.
Quoting Jabberwock
Which part of “someday” statements is hard to understand? If you can’t tell the difference, from Russia’s point of view, then you’re not paying attention. Bucharest was much more threatening, and that was obvious at the time.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, Bucharest was different from the Russian point of view. Why? Because it was made unambiguous and immediate: “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”
Your inability to see why Russia would consider this threatening is in keeping with your general dismissal of their concerns, since you’ve convinced yourself that it’s mostly nonsense. But that prevents you from seeing what our own ambassador saw:
And what Putin said at Bucharest:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7
Which is a pity. But apparently, you can see into the soul of Putin, and can legitimately disregard these statements because Russia is a bad imperial power, and the US a good one— which supposedly had little influence in all this.
I reject that thesis. The US has had massive influence— over other European countries, over financial incentives, over shaping public opinion, and over military training. NATO, along with the general push to make Ukraine a “liberal democracy,” and the integration into the EU, were seen — rightly or wrongly — as a threat to Russia. No obfuscation will change that fact.
Quoting Jabberwock
The one quotation, which is questionable, also contains the opposite sentiment. But in any case, it was stated long before 2008. Notice what I said: “at the time.” Do you not accept that at that time— 2008 at Bucharest—Russia was very clear about its position on Ukraine joining NATO? Burns seemed to think so— and I’ll go with his expertise, and Putin’s statements at the time (along with others), over ONE questionable, contradictory statement from 6 years prior. That you pin your hopes on that, and totally avoid 2008, is just avoidance.
Quoting Kyrylo Budanov · Roman Kravets, Nazariy Mazilyuk · Ukrainian Pravda · Oct 12, 2023
Well, it doesn't seem likely that Ukraine would send weapons away.
The Sky Shield move is a (by)product of, or reaction to, the Russia ? Ukraine warring...
Germany, nine other nations push ahead with joint air defence procurement
[sup]— Sabine Siebold, Bart Meijer, Rod Nickel · Reuters · Oct 11, 2023[/sup]
19 European countries are in on it at the moment. Defence-oriented only. Concerned with Russia. The Kremlin likely doesn't care much. It does look like the Kremlin is taking or forcing a path to a Cold War II, with some Hot spots, except they've learned from how the last one ended. With a powerful authoritarian Cold War expert at the helm ... appeasement and encouragement (+ proliferation of the authoritarianism) then go hand-in-hand, (re)armament (like Sky Shield) and division and the requisite flaming rhetoric/propaganda/threats go hand-in-hand ...
Do you mean our weapons which were given to them for fighting against Russia?
Quoting jorndoe
Oh, yes, that's a given! Russia is the only country which wants to polarise the world. But hey, Israel - backed up by the US and EU - has the right to occupy Gaza and kill thousands of citizens, including children. I think you guys need to be more pragmatic. The Kremlin is not that bad and the White House is not that good.
LOL. Let's enjoy Putin's "opposite sentiment" (apparently all that must matter to the universe, especially to prove that the US is the Great Satan beyond any reasonable doubt, and let's call it - as it deserves - "pure logic"):
[i]
“This compromise, which was eventually adopted by all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, did not suit Georgia, Ukraine, or Russia. Saakashvili was indignant. But even more indignant was Vladimir Putin, who arrived in Bucharest on the last day of the summit, when the decision not to extend the MAP had already been made. All the same, he was furious that NATO was still keeping Georgia and Ukraine hanging on by approving the prospect of future membership.
According to witnesses, at a meeting behind closed doors Putin flew into a rage on the topic of Ukraine. “Ukraine is not even a country,” he told Bush. “Part of it lies in Eastern Europe, and the other, more significant part was given by us as a gift!” He finished his short speech with these words: “If Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”
Few paid attention to Putin’s warning, since all were focused on the smoldering tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi. The idea of conflict breaking out between Russia and Ukraine seemed preposterous. Besides, Putin only had a month left in his term. The inauguration of the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, was scheduled for May 7”.
[/i]
Source: "All the Kremlin's Men" by Mikhail Zygar
No, I do not 'change it up', I consider both, so do Ukrainians and obviously so do Russians. It is your problem that you are fixated on the NATO issue and you see nothing else.
Quoting Mikie
You claim that the US very much wanted for Ukraine to join NATO in 2008, Ukraine still is not in NATO. That is not evidence of very strong influence, if you ask me.
Quoting Mikie
That is desperate clutching at straws. The US support for Ukraine in NATO was unwavering at least since 2001, as evidenced by plenty of documents, and you still have provided NO EVIDENCE that it was otherwise.
Quoting Mikie
The declaration from 2002 is worded almost exactly the same as the one from 2008. And there is a lot of documents in between that show increased cooperation and working toward Ukraine's membership, including those I have already quoted. If that is not enough, there are plenty of records of the workings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission between 2002-2005 that show this. And it is you who is not paying attention, because I have already given you plenty of evidence that the Russian stance has changed BEFORE 2008. So your claim that 'Bucharest was much more threatening' is pure assertion, not based on any evidence. You have just entered the discussion with such belief and no amount of evidence is going to change it.
Quoting Mikie
Which was exactly the same as all the declarations which have been made since 2002, as a heap of documents from NATO itself attests. There is a string of well documented declarations and actions from 2002 to 2008 which clearly shows that the preparations for the accession were ongoging, with a slowdown in 2006 due to arising disputes among Ukrainians themselves. Still, Ukraine has expected to receive the MAP in Bucharest - that would begin the real and immediate process of accession. Instead it was specifically denied that, due to protests from Germany and France, and was only told it will become a member, with no specific deadline. So you got it completely backwards, if there was a 'someday' declaration, then it was the one from Bucharest. Which is further confirmed by the following events: after 2008 the integration efforts have slowed down and the path toward Ukraine's neutrality has been followed.
Quoting Mikie
No, I cannot see into soul of anyone and do not even attempt to, you do. I give you direct quote from Putin, yet you insist he thought then something else. I try to base my knowledge on the available documents, which you simply ignore, because you simply know better.
Quoting Mikie
Except there was no particular push, as you are obviously unable to provide any evidence for it. Ukraine has decided to join NATO in 2002 as shown in the documents, with lukewarm reaction from Putin at that time, and followed that process, as shown in the documents. The US position has not changed a bit since then, the Russian position did, which prompted the reaction of Germany and France (and the internal support in Ukraine), as shown in the documents. Because of this the process has been shelved, neutrality has been chosen and the focus turned to trade integration with the EU. Given that you say the US is not interested in democratization and betterment of the Ukrainian people, at that moment, the US have failed miserably in its plans.
If what you said was true, then at that time Russia should not care much about what happened in Ukraine, as the main threat, in your opinion, has been removed. But we know that is not what happened - Russia has seen the EU integration at least as an equal threat and decided to derail that process, which spectacularly backfired.
Quoting Mikie
But I have already acknowledged that Russia strongly opposed Ukraine's NATO membership and have given evidence that it has started after 2002 but before 2008, around 2004-2005. But that does not suit your narrative that the US somehow changed its policy and 'did' something in 2008 to which Russians only reacted at that time (for which, it should be again noted, you have given no evidence and for which I have given plenty of counterevidence), so you just ignore it, as usual.
Except Russia’s own statements, Burns’ memo to Rice, Germany and France’s statements, etc. All of which you dismiss. So your judgment of what constitutes “evidence” is worthless to me.
Quoting Jabberwock
Seems to contradict your prior statements.
Quoting Jabberwock
Funny— I too have quotes from Putin. Several and, more relevant, from 2008. In fact I also give quotes from the US ambassador, and can provide statements from Germany and France leaders at the time as well. Yet you “insist [they] thought something else.” In fact you just ignore all of it, since it’s inconvenient to your preferred narrative of a sudden “irrational” change.
On the other band, you give one statement from six years prior, which is both irrelevant and which I have addressed several times— as a reminder, it also contains the following:
What does that mean to you? What “position” do you think he’s referring to?
Quoting Jabberwock
There is abundant evidence. Again, your judgment of what counts as evidence is totally worthless.
Quoting Jabberwock
Which is another threat. But no, it hasn’t been “shelved.” It continues right to today. It was made especially egregious in 2021. Google the September US announcement on Ukraine, or Wikipedia “Operation Sea Breeze.”
Your story just isn’t serious.
Quoting Jabberwock
Maybe you’re just playing games at this point.
I’ll repeat once again: NATO is one threat. Not the only threat. Can’t get much clearer.
And if you can’t recognize that EU expansion was seen as a Trojan horse for NATO, by Russia, then you have zero interest in understanding this situation.
Quoting Jabberwock
Ask the Russians what the issue was if you don’t believe me. The US was pushing for NATO forever, and Russia’s position has been the same forever— since 91. The difference, however, is that it looked like it was truly going to happen, and soon. With both Ukraine and Georgia.
It doesn’t matter if you can’t get your head around the reaction. It doesn’t matter if you dismiss or discount their very real warnings because they “changed their minds” in 2004/2005 (Putin in 2004: “'Russia's position toward the enlargement of NATO is well known and has not changed”). It doesn’t matter if you consider it irrational. This was the Russian position.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-nato-has-become-flash-point-russia-ukraine
Is there CFR a Russian propaganda outlet? They too get the story completely wrong, according to an internet guy.
(FYI, Oct 10, 2023 comment on the Middle East crisis)
BBC did not report that Ukraine is sending arms to Hamas, a video was fabricated
[sup]— Philip Marcelo, Hanna Arhirova · AP · Oct 11, 2023[/sup]
None of these prove the claim. They all just reiterate the basic fact that Russia is opposed to NATO expansion, which noone denies.
You just refuse to understand the contrary position and are engaging in a duel with a strawman, hence why the discussion is going nowhere.
Quoting Mikie
Just like you ignore all the evidence that the Russian reaction has more to do with their internal politics and perceived strength than with the concrete state of NATO membership.
What had changed before 2008 was not Russian willingness to enforce its influence in it's former satellites, but it's ability.
You're discounting the possibility that Putin - and the elite he represents - never intended to accept the collapse of the SU as a world power and always intended to re-establish it - they just lacked the ability.
Quoting Mikie
So is yours. You're engaging in motivated reasoning.
Quoting Mikie
Anything post 2014 cannot support your argument, because of course after the Russian invasion the situation changed.
Quoting Mikie
That's a fully general counterargument though. If I go around claiming X is really just a Trojan horse for Y, I can support any arbitrary conclusion.
Quoting Mikie
So how come that in both cases - Ukraine and Georgia - Russia opportunistically acted according to local circumstance, rather than reacting directly to Bucharest?
:roll:
Of course that matters. It’s a truism. Whether it has “more to do” with it is the point.
But thanks for interjecting with claims about strawmaning and motivated reasoning while you demonstrate exactly that.
You're clearly angry and trying to "win" the argument, and it shows. You're not convincing this way, and if you care about actually having a useful conversation - rather than a pointless shouting match, you should change that.
Not angry, but thank you for attempting to read minds.
I hardly consider my conversation with Jabberwock a “shouting match.” But thank you for your input.
No, I have quoted them as the explanation of what happened in Bucharest. Due to Russian protests, Germany and France's objections and lack of support from Ukrainians Ukraine was denied the MAP which was the expected step on the path to NATO and instead was given a very vague promise with no specific timeline, i.e. literally 'someday'.
Quoting Mikie
That is a blatant misrepresentation of what I wrote. I have already acknowledged two or three times that Putin has strongly objected to the expansion in 2008 (and somewhat earlier), last time I did was at the end of my last post. So no, I do not ignore any of it, I have talked about it in very specific detail - that the Russian stance has significantly hardened since 2002 and what were the reasons for that change. And yes, the change was somewhat fast, but it was not irrational by any measure, it was caused by the internal political changes in Russia itself, which I have already explained twice.
Quoting Mikie
As I have already written, he was opposed to it, just like he was opposed to joining Poland, the Baltics and now Finland. In fact, the statements concerning Finland are practically the same as they were concerning Ukraine in 2002. But there was no talk of red lines whatsoever, on the contrary, Putin's communique at the summit in 2002 clearly states his hopes for closer cooperation with NATO (despite Ukraine entering the Action Plan).
Quoting Mikie
Again, asserting the existence of evidence is not evidence. If it is 'abundant', you should have no problem with providing it. Yet somehow you do not.
Quoting Mikie
I have SPECIFICALLY written that the process was shelved between 2008 and 2014, and I did it several times, so what 2021 has to do with it? Sometimes it seems you do not even read what you respond to.
Quoting Mikie
Oh, so now the EU cooperation is also the US fault. Is that your 'understanding of the situation'? No, the EU cooperation (not expansion, you are confused again) was not a 'Trojan horse' and it was not a separate 'threat' from NATO, as you believe. These are (as I have already written many times) just aspects of the same root cause of the conflict, i.e. the Ukrainian drive toward independence from Russia. For a moment it seemed you began to understand this, but now the hope is lost.
Quoting Mikie
That is hilarious... 'The US was pushing for NATO forever'? Yet just a page ago you wrote 'But regardless, the US wasn’t pushing at that point and wasn’t serious about Ukraine membership'. So the US was pushing forever, except at times when it was not pushing and was not serious... It is rather clear who is not serious. And confused.
Quoting Mikie
BBC still has a report concerning the very meeting that quote comes from. It is reported that 'Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the expansion of Nato will not help meet security challenges facing the world today. But he told Nato chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer that his disapproval should not affect relations with Russia'. He is also quoted:
Quoting Putin calls new Nato 'unhelpful'
So yes, he clearly disapproves, but says it should not affect the relations (which is almost the same as the quote from 2002). Does that sound like a red line to you? in fact, it seems Ukraine (which has already entered the Action Plan by this time) was not even mentioned at the meeting.
Quoting Mikie
They literally write that 'In the YEARS that followed, Putin GREW INCREASINGLY outspoken in his displeasure at NATO’s inroads into Eastern Europe', so if that was supposed to show that Putin's position did not change, you have picked just the quote that says the exact opposite. It confirms what I have written many times: over the years Putin's disapproval grew from rather mild to quite strong.
It wasn’t fast — it was the same position all along. It was the same position in the 90s, in 2002, in 2004, and in 2008. As I’ve shown multiple times now.
Quoting Jabberwock
Okay, so your quote from 2002 is useless. He was opposed then, he was opposed in 2008. Did the harshness of the rhetoric change? Of course— as situations change. The position remained exactly the same.
Quoting Jabberwock
I have, again and again. You simply wave your hand and say I haven’t— or that it doesn’t count. Too bad.
Quoting Jabberwock
And it seems you don’t even read what you write:
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
No mention of 2014. If you want to be clear, then state “it was shelved UNTIL 2014,” not “has been,” which implies up to the present.
Quoting Jabberwock
I hate to be the one to tell you, but theUS has a massive influence in the world, including the EU.
Quoting Jabberwock
I said the complete opposite, in fact. It was not a completely separate threat from NATO— it was related, in fact. From the Russian point of view.
But how nice it must be to save your hand in complete disregard for that perspective, and declare “no, sorry, you’re not threatened— because it’s simply not a threat.” Cool.
It was a threat, and was stated as such. Your dismissals are as worthless as your judgments of evidence.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, true. “Independence from Russia,” and into the sphere of US influence. Which according to you was opposed by Russia, but not a threat— that part they were just lying about or using as pretext.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes, exactly. “I strongly oppose Ukraine joining NATO, but that opposition shouldn’t mean we stop talking.”
It doesn’t mean “Hey, I strongly disapprove of this— but if it happens, no big deal, and shouldn’t affect relations.” You’re just misreading it, in an attempt to support a strange narrative.
The US always wanted Ukraine and any other Eastern European nation in NATO (true, “push” is an ambiguous term here) — but pressed for it at various strengths at various times. Russian opposition was always there as well, very consistent— but it’s rhetoric differed in tone at various times.
You want to point to different years, context free, in an attempt to show inconsistencies. The reality is that the US plan for Eastern Europe since 1991 and Russia’s position on those plans have been very stable indeed. All the smoke that’s been blown notwithstanding.
Quoting Jabberwock
See above. His position was the same — true, he grew more outspoken and the rhetoric differed at various times. No kidding. So what? There was also a war started over this, and there wasn’t a war in 2004. That’s very different as well, I’d say.
I think the point is if Putin would have wanted Crimea and the parts of Ukraine if there wouldn't be any NATO, if it would have been disbanded after the Cold War.
I say to that hypothetical question yes! He likely would have taken the Baltic states too. Too important! Too close to St. Petersburg, his home town. And "realists" would totally understand and accept this.
There is no overcoming the fact that Putin see's Ukraine as an artificial state and the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest tragedy of these times. Hence his "make Russia great again" policy would have happened even without NATO. And that makes the NATO argument very questionable.
And people who doubt this, well, there's country called Moldavia, with Russian "peacekeepers" and a proxy state called Transnistria and a frozen conflict. And Moldavia isn't wanting to join NATO.
No, it was not the same position. Your claim was that it was always a 'red line', which is not true, as I have shown multiple times now.
Quoting Mikie
No, it is not useless, like the other quote from 2004 it shows the change in the attitude. Unless you do not see the difference between 'I oppose it, but it will not change much between us', which is exactly what the quotes say, and 'I oppose it, but the consequences will be terrible', which is the later stance. You have try not to look real hard to not see the difference.
Quoting Mikie
No, you have not. In fact, you cannot even decide whether first the US was 'not serious' and then came the big push in 2008 or whether the push was always there. So, was there a big push in 2008, i.e. did the US change its position then, as you have claimed from the beginning (but for which you have given no evidence and which I have easily countered with clear evidence that the US position has not changed much)?
Quoting Mikie
Because I have mentioned it many times before, when we have discussed the issue of training, arming etc. and when I have clearly stated that it was the reaction to invasion and ongoning conflict in Donbas.
Quoting Mikie
Can you provide any evidence that the US decides who joins the EU? Or is that another of your assertions?
Quoting Mikie
That is rather funny from someone who not long ago claimed that not joining NATO would prevent the war. So the trade cooperation with the EU threatens Putin ('BECAUSE NATO!'). If Putin sees everything as a threat, there is no point in appeasing him, is there?
Quoting Mikie
If Russia sees Ukraine's independence as a threat, how is that Ukraine's fault, not to mention the US? Your argument has now devolved to the point that if Ukraine joined trade cooperation with the EU, then it would still be the US fault. It is simply absurd.
Speaking of polls, since 2014 the Ukrainian support for NATO membership has risen from 50% to 70% (from 20% before that). Did the US did that as well? If so, how exactly? It also shows how absurd your argument is - if the NATO membership was the main point of the conflict, then for Ukrainians to actually want to join it would be completely irrational, bordering on suicidal. Joining NATO should be the last thing they wanted. On the other hand, if they have expected that Russia would escalate the ongoing conflict anyway, then such attitude would be quite reasonable - they would join the only organization that could provide them protection. That also explains why they have sought closer military cooperation, training, arming etc. So: is an Internet guy seeing things much clearer than 30 millions of Ukrainians, or possibly they have better idea what is the cause of the Russian agression than you?
Quoting Mikie
Sure, I am reading it wrong and you are reading it right. Because 'He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine.' actually means 'This is a great threat, a big red line and he will start a war over it'. That must be it, it is just that you alone that are capable of seeing this. Right.
Quoting Mikie
That is the most sorrowful attempt at backtracking I have seen in a while. You wrote literally that the US 'was not pushing' and that it was 'not serious' about Ukraine's membership. When I have given clear quotes that completely contradict those claims, instead of admitting it, you have made a complete turnaround and now try to pretend that you never claimed it and claimed just the opposite. Seriously... 'There was no official US push until 2008', that is what you wrote, because you were completely unaware of the issues you are trying to discuss. 'The US was pushing for NATO forever', that is what you wrote when you have realized how wrong you were. No amount of verbal gymnastics will change that.
Of course, you are still unable to tell what it was exactly that the US did in 2008 (it could not be the 'push', if the push was forever, right?), which was supposed to be your argument...
Quoting Mikie
So now you say that Russia began a war in 2022 over the exact same positions which both the US and Russia held since 1991. Right... Yet somehow I remember you writing 'prior to 2008, when the NATO provocation began'... This gets funnier with every post...
[sup]— Yulia Drozd, Natalya Kushnir, Oleksiy Pshemyskiy, Tatiana Rymarenko, Tatiana Rymarenko · ABC · Oct 5, 2023[/sup]
Vladimir Putin says civilian toll from Israeli ground attack in Gaza would be ‘unacceptable’
[sup]— Reuters via South China Morning Post · Oct 13, 2023[/sup]
Paraphrasing Biden to Trump ... Shut up already Pukin.
Why Russia is engaged in a delicate balancing act in the Israel-Hamas war
[sup]— AP · Oct 12, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Fantastic arguments. “No, opposite.” How tedious.
Quoting Jabberwock
The European countries — from Britain to Germany to France, have basically taken orders from Washington for years.
It’s like asking if the US “controls” the UN.
Quoting Jabberwock
Except that was never said. I realize that’s what your mind has created, yes.
Quoting Jabberwock
Except I don’t say that. I’m not talking about “fault,” I’m discussing what Russian’s have stated over and over again, and which you ignore.
Quoting Jabberwock
No— Crimea did that.
Quoting Jabberwock
And so we’re back to the beginning. What was the imminent threat from Russia in 2008 that NATO needed to expand to its borders? None.
The claim you’re making is that Russia would have invaded anyway, regardless of US influence. Well, we won’t ever know, will we? But it’s a nice, unfalsiable story to tell to justify US imperialism. “Hey, they would have done it anyway, so might as well go ahead with it despite dire warnings.”
Perhaps the US should talk about including Taiwan as part of a military alliance, start training troops, offering supplies, etc. China has been clear about where it stands, but we should go ahead with it regardless, since China would probably start a war anyway.
Quoting Jabberwock
“Ukraine will be a member of NATO”. This is at the NATO summit. Plans were set to be put in motion. It’s true that they weren’t, yes. But that set the stage for where we are today.
You’ve provided nothing equivalent prior to Bucharest.
Quoting Jabberwock
I don’t see how this is confusing. The Russian position on NATO was very clear — for years. So yes, a reaction to a renewed intent (even referring to the 2008 summit) to have Ukraine join NATO, as communicated in 2021, shouldn’t be a shocker. Quite consistent, in fact.
Well what you said was this:
Quoting Mikie
And this:
Quoting Mikie
So your position is that, if Ukrainian NATO membership had not been confirmed in 2008, there would have been no 2022 invasion. And I think it's reasonable to assume that you mean to say there would have been no invasion at all in a similar timeframe. Otherwise all you're saying would be that different events would be different.
My question then is: what was the goal of the 2022 invasion? To prevent NATO membership?
Quoting Mikie
Let me rephrase, since it’s apparently confusing: there would (likely) be no invasion. True, I assumed we all agree I don’t have a Time Machine so can’t be 100% certain. You got me.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, which it did. But it was stupid, in my view. It’s driven Finland and others right into the hands of the US, and has “lost” Western Ukraine for generations, who will obviously not forget this aggression.
How did it do that?
Russian troops were on Ukrainian soil since 2014. AFAIK no one has ever suggested Ukraine could possibly join NATO with an active Russian army on its soil.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/
I don’t think the official stamp was necessary, given that NATO was all over Ukraine anyway. I think the point was to essentially make Ukraine a mess, which it has.
What do you think this statement proves? I don't want to try to guess your point and get it wrong.
Quoting Mikie
More a mess than before, you mean? But then why the full scale invasion? With vague goals and plenty of rhetoric that clearly suggests a major annexation?
For context, prior to 2022 I would have agreed with your assessment. One could even argue that Putin had played his hand quite well, given that he had gotten Crimea and neutralised both Georgia and Ukraine for a relatively small cost, especially in terms of international relations.
But after 2022 this argument is seriously weakened. Because now a different interpretation, that is consistent with the evidence, suggests itself: That rather than being a miscalculation and a weird aberration, the 2022 invasion is actually the core of Putin's strategy. That all the previous steps were merely expedient holding actions until the main event could be launched.
Without suggesting a moral equivalence, I think a comparison to Germany in 1939 is apt. Until the invasion of Poland, it was still plausible (to contemporaries, anyways) to interpret Hitler's actions as merely a revision of Versailles and attempt to join the German people. Afterward, not so much.
What was the imminent threat to Russia in 2008 from NATO needing to expand to Russian borders? None. You are unable to argue why one needs to reason from Russia's perspective to attribute blame or most of the blame to the US. You didn't even explain why in 2023 Ukraine is not part of NATO yet if the US gives orders to its allies and wanted Ukraine inside NATO so badly since 2008, since ever.
Appreciate it.
It further proves, in my view, the Biden administration’s commitment to Ukraine. That means even more NATO training, drills, weapons, etc. All right along the Russian border. And recommitting to Ukrainian membership.
Quoting Echarmion
I’m not sure what you’re asking here. It was an invasion, yes. The goal wasn’t to annex all of Ukraine.
Quoting Echarmion
But the evidence for that isn’t convincing.
There were warnings for months prior to the invasion. Whether it was foregone, I don’t know. But it seems interesting that nearly every time the US escalates, Russia reacts. I don’t think it’s coincidence or some cover story for Russia. I also don’t buy those who try to pretend like there was no escalation, or who dismiss Russian claims.
And just think how different the whole situation would be if Putin wouldn't have taken Crimea and the Revolution of Dignity would have been one in just a line of revolutions in Ukraine? As hard it is for Sweden to join NATO, it would have been a lot harder for Ukraine to join. It's membership would have been as remote as Turkey joining the EU. What US Presidents declare don't matter, they come and go every four to eight years.
Without the annexation that went too far (Crimea), Russia could have easily been "the adult in the room". Germany would have continued to rely on cheap Russian energy and basically the West would have continued it's de facto dearmament it had started since the end of the Cold War. Russia's actions in Georgia and overall in the Caucasus would have been forgotten (because it's Caucasus, a Wild East just like the Middle East).
He only then would have had to face the problems in Russian economic growth... which he doesn't have an answer.
Hence a reason for the "Make Russia Great Again" campaign: wars have always worked for Putin!
We do agree, though, that NATO would never (outside of it already being in a hot war) admit a country that is already in an active armed conflict with Russia, right?
So this is US support that falls short of actual membership, and I think people, including Russia, understand it as such.
Quoting Mikie
Probably not, but annex a substantial part of it, and probably install a satellite regime in others.
That goes a long, long way beyond preventing Ukraine's NATO membership. So this is something your theory should be able to account for. Can it?
Quoting Mikie
You don't buy it. Alright. But since this is a forum, and a philosophy forum at that, I'd expect more of an argument than "I don't agree with your assessment".
There's been back and forth for pages upon pages on whether there actually was a US escalation, when it was etc. It doesn't seem useful to rehash them.
Hence my approach of trying to elucidate the Russian motivation, given your theory.
Russia made warnings and demands during the troop buildup, yes. But everyone seems to agree that this was an ultimatum meant to fail, since there is no way rolling NATO back to the 1990 status could succeed.
Is your argument that Putin seriously intended these demands to result in a NATO rollback?
The question remains what exactly the Russian motivation was for the invasion, assuming your theory is correct.
I also think that the statements Putin has published - and considering influences such as Dugin - it is likely that Putin does really believe Russia needs to be a world superpower. And this, in his thinking, includes it's right to an economic zone of control and territorial buffer.
Quoting Echarmion
If we go by the peace negotiations that took place in March / April of 2022, the Russians offered peace in return for the independence of Donbas and Ukrainian neutrality.
In my opinion, this shows Russian goals in Ukraine were not primarily territorial. It's only when peace negotiations failed (blocked by the US) that they dug themselves in in Kherson and Zaporizhia, and started to prepare for a long war.
There's nothing to indicate Russia intended to turn Ukraine into a satellite, nor does that appear at all feasible to me.
It's even unclear whether Donbas would join Russia, or whether it would remain 'independent' and serve as a buffer (though in that case, 'satellite' would probably be the correct term).
And the paratroopers at Hostomel were there for a sightseeing tour, presumably?
No that's not fair to your position. It's of course possible that Russia engaged in a major, multi-pronged offensive in order to have leverage for an independent Donbas. It's an insane amount of effort for a minor goal, but It's possible.
But where do you take that peace proposal from, exactly? AFAIK the exact proposals made were not public.
Quoting Tzeentch
What's the evidence for this?
Quoting Tzeentch
You mean apart from the actual invasion forces, the statements made by Putin and others and the leaked plans to that effect?
That's not nothing.
Quoting Tzeentch
How is it unclear? The territories have in fact been annexed by Russia.
Yes. Russia needs to be an Empire. It cannot be anything else, or it ceases to exist! That is what the present leadership of Russia thinks.
If NATO enlargement would be truly the most important issue here, then you wouldn't go annexing territories and stating that your neighboring countries are "artificial".
Forcing Ukraine to become neutral is far from a minor goal. It would constitute a major US defeat.
Quoting Echarmion
The accounts of the neutral diplomats who were present, as given to us by people like Jeffrey Sachs.
Quoting Echarmion
When has Putin stated he intends to turn Ukraine into a satellite?
Yes, there was a massive invasion. Russia had to force the world's most powerful nation to back off.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, after diplomatic negotiations were blocked.
Ukraine has agreed to neutrality every time it was brought up in negotiations.
The sticking point is that Russia always wanted disarmed neutrality while Ukraine has insisted on armed neutrality.
Quoting Tzeentch
Like what? I'm not aware of any such accounts, nor how a professor of economics is supposedly privy to them.
Quoting Tzeentch
When he announced the aim to "demilitarise and denazify".
What else would that mean?
Quoting Tzeentch
What? I don't understand this at all.
Quoting Tzeentch
Remember that funny episode when a member of Putin's cabinet talked on TV about the admission of the Donbas republics as russian subjects before they had even been officially recognised and made such a request?
Forgive me my bluntness, but it is laughable to argue that Russia was unfortunately forced to annex territory by US intransigence. That's russian state TV levels of propaganda.
Quoting Echarmion
So you're either unaware of the United States' deep involvement in Ukraine, or trying to deny it.
In either case there's no point in continuing this kind of discussion.
If you're genuinely interested in learning more about this conflict, feel free to read through some of the replies I've dropped here. They'll also include links and sources.
Oh Bullshit!
"Oh I'm sorry you're to ignorant for me to explain please educate yourself".
What an absolute asshole move. You don't want to continue? Fine. No-one is forcing you. But don't dress it up as an unfortunate circumstance forced onto you.
Go ahead and prove your point with argument, or graciously retreat.
Note that I didn't refuse to explain. You'll find all the explanation you need in this very thread, with links, sources and all. I've probably written about a book's worth and can't be arsed to repeat it all. If you're unaware of US involvement in Ukraine I would suggest starting at page 1.
Quoting Echarmion
Sometimes being an asshole and simply being honest look very much alike.
Hilarious.
You should learn yourself too about Russia's involvement in Ukrainian affairs before lecturing others.
Noo, you don't refuse, you're just requesting I read 520 pages to maybe figure out what the fuck you meant.
No, thanks. Pointing to "a books worth" of text as supposed explanation for a single sentence is a dishonest move, as you should know.
Quoting Tzeentch
No, I don't think they do. I think that this is rather too convenient an explanation.
The actual arguments were right after that. Maybe you should read the whole paragraphs instead of just the first sentences, that would make our discussion much more efficient, as I would not need to repeat the same arguments and sources over again.
Quoting Mikie
Again: I was asking for evidence that the US controls the membership of the EU. Instead you just give your assertions again. That is exactly how this whole discussion with you: the only thing that you can bring to this dicussion are your strong beliefs, which do not seem to be supported by much evidence.
Quoting Mikie
The exact words you have used were: 'But there wouldn’t have been invasion'. You seem to think that if you do enough backtracking, your previous statements should be erased: no, that is not the way it works.
Quoting Mikie
Russians have stated quite different things, as I have shown in our discussion, and their actions show something yet different, so maybe you should not focus only on what they said and in just particular periods.
Quoting Mikie
So you acknowledge that the main support of your argument: Ukraine's military arming and training with NATO countries between 2014 and 2021 is not the US doing, but reaction to Russia's invasion. We are making a progress then.
Quoting Mikie
The threat was not imminent, but it was definitely there, because nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies were always part of the Russian internal politics. In fact, as I have shown, the nationalistic rhetoric in the propaganda has significantly increased from 2004.
You acknowledge yourself that NATO was only one of the causes of Russia's aggression. This drove you to such absurd argument that the EU trade agreement is 'the US influence' as well. So your nice story that Russia would not invade if not for the US influence is even more unfalsifiable. Still, cries from the Russian propaganda 'Ukraine should not exist because it is an artificial country' do not seem to be related to the US influence, are they?
Quoting Mikie
And here you go again... You have this absurd idea that whatever happens in the world it is a doing of the superpower, 'because influence'. If Taiwan entered a military alliance, and started training troops and getting supplies, it would be the Taiwan's decision, not the US, just like it was Ukraine's decision after 2004, which you have acknowledged yourself. Ukraine did not start training troops and getting supplies because the US made them, but because of Crimea, which significantly increased the popular support for such actions.
Quoting Mikie
That is an obvious and blatant lie, there is no putting it differently. I have given you about half a dozen of quotes and excerpts from the document which have shown that Ukraine was preparing to join NATO since 2002. It has entered the Action Plan, which was the first stage of structural and organizational preparations, it has entered the Intensified Dialogue in 2005, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission has been established, which main purpose was coordinating its accession. And you yourself said that the plans were the same since 1991, so how could they be 'set to be put in motion' in 2008? You keep contradicting yourself.
Quoting Mikie
Lol. So now it is not 'the push', but 'the renewed intent'. But the intent was not 'renewed' either, as NATO was working with Ukraine on accession since 2002, with a short pause in 2006, as I have already shown.
:up:
Because it’s so obvious to me I feel that a) you’re being disingenuous or b) are so unaware of US power that explaining it in detail is a diversion. But as quickly as possible: no, there US doesn’t directly control membership in the EU. Europe does rely, however, on the US for their defense. That alone is a pretty big deal, to say nothing of economic leverage.
Quoting Jabberwock
As I said earlier: yes, you got me. I am indeed backtracking on that statement. I cannot be 100% certain that Russia wouldn’t have invaded anyway, even if NATO didn’t exist or there was no US involvement whatsoever. True. I don’t have a time machine.
Quoting Jabberwock
What I’ve been trying to emphasize is the Russian perspective, right or wrong. That means whether the Ukrainians support NATO membership or not, whether the US is simply giving them what they want, whether the US is justified in arming Ukraine, etc. Maybe they are, maybe they aren’t, maybe it’s opportunistic — a good pretext for fighting a proxy war it wanted all along. I have my opinion on all of that. But that wasn’t the topic.
Right or wrong, I think the evidence — from our own government, from statements from the Kremlin, from scholarship — shows that US involvement was all over this conflict, and that Putin has been a very reactive leader.
Quoting Jabberwock
Of what? Not of what’s only retroactively claimed now, of Russian imperialist ambitions.
You’re doing a lot of assuming. But there’s no evidence suggesting Russia was planning on conquering Ukraine or annexing parts of Ukraine prior to 2008. Making the push of NATO expansion rather odd. But we know why: the US had explicit plans for Eastern Europe. The goal was to make it a Western-style democracy.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yes. The main cause in 2022— a secondary cause in 2014. These things are interconnected, as I’ve demonstrated repeatedly, with plenty of evidence.
Quoting Jabberwock
True, as I mentioned above. I’ll retract that statement, given I don’t have a time machine— nor do you. But I do consider it unlikely to have happened without the US meddling.
Quoting Jabberwock
And once again you completely miss the point.
How would China react to this, based on what we know?
I’m not arguing whether Taiwan is right or wrong in their decisions.
Quoting Jabberwock
They applied for MAP in Bucharest, 2008. That’s very serious, for reasons articulated by Burns and others. I don’t see anything equivalent to that prior to Bucharest. However much you want to pretend 2008 was nothing different. It was different.
Quoting Jabberwock
To take a broader view for a second. Perhaps it’s worth asking yourself why the US cares so much about Ukraine, to the tune of billions of dollars? Would it be fighting such a proxy war in Sudan?
Ukraine is strategically important to the US, as it is for Russia. Despite your dismissals, this is indeed a fight between two powers. Ukraine is caught in the middle, and wouldn’t survive a week without US military aid (or training). This bigger picture shouldn’t be overlooked.
We can go on believing in US benevolence and love of democracy, and that Washington really cares about the Ukrainian people. Or we can take the less comfortable path and take seriously what Russia says, and has said all along, about NATO’s actions and US influence. I see a lot of truth in it, despite my being against Russian aggression.
(The same is true of the current war in Israel, incidentally. It’s worth listening to the Palestinian people. Or we can take the easier route and claim there’s simply evil, similar to the story about Russia.)
You come back, over and over, to Russian “internal politics.” Let’s see what that means exactly, and get some evidence. Because otherwise it’s yet another vague claim.
Additionally, Ukraine wouldn't be accepted into the EU if there was a genocide going on. They've gotten their share of attention/spotlight lately, historical and otherwise.
These coincide:
• Euromaidan + the Revolution of Dignity;
• Russian military operations in Donbas, preceded by Russian "preparations" and other operations ?²?¹? ²?¹? ²?¹? ²?¹? ²?¹? ²?²² ²?²² ²?²²?;
• Russian accusations of genocide in Donbas;
• "green men" in Crimea.
Contours of (planned) moves of the largest country around, by Kremlin decree, more so than of Russian "defense" against NATO specifically.
I think that's the main sticking point here: That you're willing to give Putin this huge benefit of the doubt, despite the statements he made re Ukraine (that it's not a real state and just an unnatural creation that really should be part of Russia).
You're saying we are retroactively applying intentions to Putin. That's true. But that's how assessing intentions always works.
It seems to me, and I suspect others here feel the same, that to call Putin's action "very reactive" is essentially absolving him of a significant share of blame. That, imho, is unacceptable.
They would not be accepted in any possible way. North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and Moldova are recognised candidates which cannot join the EU yet. They made a lot of efforts to join the club, especially Moldova with a huge tax reform or Serbia with a big reform on civil issues (such as being more empathic with gay marriages, for example).
Ukraine didn't do anything. Their 'potential' membership is just a stupid movement from the West to keep deteriorating Russia's interests and safety.
Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any "European state" that respects the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law", may apply to join the EU.
Do you really think Zelensky's Ukraine fulfils those requirements?
2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement signed
2017 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in effect
2022 EU Accession of Ukraine application
2022 EU Accession of Ukraine candidacy accepted
Progress on 7 required reforms 2022 Feb 28 - 2023 Jun 22 (wartime)
Yes, sure, they are capable of making progress during a war... :roll:
The rest of the countries need years, even a decade. And these Ukrainian mates in just nearly two years are progressing... Are there any who really trust in such fictional data?
, oddly enough perhaps, the argument Stephen Cohen put forth (presumably on behalf of the Russian population) is more or less what you hear from nationalists (and some conservatives) regarding refugees and immigrants in many countries. Conversely, it's not so much what you hear from the population in Eastern European NATO member countries.
I think one can readily accept Cohen's analysis (which tracks with what I've read about Russia post 1991) without then arriving at the conclusion that NATO expansion was a main contributing cause of the 2022 invasion.
While the resentment and sense of hypocrisy was caused by western behaviour in the 90s and early 2000s, including of course the eastern expansion of NATO, it is not today simply a reaction to NATO. I think rather that the resentment (for which the West certainly deserves blame) has combined with other currents of Russian politics to form a toxic cocktail of nationalism, chauvinism, resentment and hybris.
And to say that this cocktail, which Putin represents, is essentially a reaction to NATO expansion is such a significant simplification and distortion that it has to be labeled false.
Or , worse, putting most of the blame on the US while discounting others parties' influence in shaping the relevant events and their perception (including Ukraine and EU).
2015, by the way.
Either this was obvious from day 1 to anyone who would look at the facts and the historical record, or that is an astonishing coincidence!
You mean people predicted Russia would invade Ukraine when Russia amassed an invasion Army at the border and started making demands?
Their foresight is amazing.
Edit: I would guess everyone here has seen at least one of Mearsheimer's talks. I don't think the disagreement is about the basic analysis of the situation so much as about what the Russian leadership actually thinks and intends.
Don't worry they are going to re-post Mearsheimer's gospel again. The problem is that they are reading just the parts (skipping others, as much as Mearsheimer does) that are convenient to construe a strong moral case against the US, which plays in favor of Russia. And they are fine with that.
I don't think Mearsheimer even argued that it's simply NATO expansionism driving the Russian actions. He considers the expansion reckless and wrong headed, but iirc doesn't claim that Russia would be less belingerent towards its neighbours without it.
His position seems to be that the US shouldn't get involved in the region, since it's not vital to US interests, and should just allow Russia a free reign over it's neighbours. He makes no claim on what Russia intends to do with this freedom, or that this will be better for the people involved.
Within the framing of his realpolitik approach, I think the argument works. But it's focused only on avoiding a conflict between the big powers and doesn't support the argument that Russia wouldn't wish to incorporate (in some way) Ukraine if there was no NATO
So the answer is:
a) it is obvious b) actually, it does not
Your backtracking is definitely getting better! Because, as it has become the norm in our discussion, you have no means to support your bold theses. On the other hand, countering them is quite easy: you say that Germany and France are 'taking orders from the US', yet in Bucharest, in the supposedly most important matter for the US, they did just the opposite what the US wanted, which you have acknowledged.
But even if taken at face value, this claim goes against your argument: if membership in the EU is just joining the US camp (because it is so obvious!), then the great support of Ukrainians for joining the EU means that they wanted to be under the US hegemony, contrary to what you said. Is that correct?
Quoting Mikie
It was very much the topic - we are dicussing whether the US involvement is the root cause of the conflict or not. And you seem to acknowledge that it is not - you finally begin to see that the main issue is Ukraine distancing itself from Russia. Sure, the US helps it to support its own interests, but removing the US influence would not remove the conflict itself.
Quoting Mikie
That claim only shows your total ignorance. It would not be so annoying, that happens, if not for the fact that I have tried several times to correct it. At the end I have given several articles that show how utterly incorrect you are.
Quoting Mikie
But it is not about evidence of imminent invasion, it is all about feelings, have you forgotten? In your argument it is enough for Russia just to feel threatened. By what you are saying now, Russia should not be threatened by NATO at all, because there is no evidence suggesting NATO was planning on conquering Russia or annexing part of it! The double standard is preposterous.
For your argument to hold water you would need to argue that Russia was more threatened by NATO aggression than Ukraine was threatened by Russia. But that is simply absurd. After 1990s the West did not have politicians demanding conquering Russia. Russia very much did have politicians demanding 'reunification' with former republics, who had significant impact on its policies.
Quoting Mikie
So Russia has invaded Ukraine in 2014 for the main cause which was not NATO expansion. The conflict was ongoing since then, with different intensity. Your argument is now that Russia would likely not escalate it further if Ukraine did not arm itself in response to Russia's aggression. Do you realize how absurd that sounds?
Quoting Mikie
The MAP would be the expected and planned third step in the ongoing process continuing since 2002. So yes, logically there was nothing equivalent before, because first the other two steps had to be taken. But it is absurd to say that step one and step two are not worth talking about, while the third step is suddenly a 'provocation'. That simply does not make sense.
Quoting Mikie
No, Ukraine is not 'caught in the middle'. It is for you, because you are so used to talk about imperlaiism, that you treat it nothing like a pawn, with no agency of its own. Ukrainians have voted for independence in 1991 and since then they try to get out of Russia's influence (of course, with some differences in opinions, especially between the regions). Many in Russia are opposing that, as they see Ukraine as part of the 'greater Russia', over which Moscow should dominate. That is the root cause of the conflict. The US decided to support them, for its own selfish interests, of course, I have never denied that. But the actual question is: without the US influence, would there be no conflict at all or simply there would be a conflict in which Ukraine would have less chance to succeed? I have strong reasons to believe the latter: the nationalistic (which in Russia is practically synonymous with 'imperialistic') tendencies in Russia have grown stronger since the fall of the USSR, which Putin has used to consolidate his power. 'Losing' Ukraine would be hard to swallow for many Russians - but it should not be their call.
Quoting Mikie
Well, I have already given you a gist, which you have seemed not to absord. But sure, more sources are always better.
An article from 1994, when Russian nationalism was very much in the background (but still present):
Quoting UKRAINIAN VOTE RESULTS: NO MANDATE FOR MOSCOW
And this is from 2002. While it focuses mainly on those republics which remained within the RF, it is quite insightful as far as the possible directions of the politics are concerned. Note this particular passage in which the author describes the goals of what he calls the nationalistic mainstream (yes, there were worse):
Quoting Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West
This one, from 2000, is also quite interesting:
https://www.hoover.org/research/lingering-dream-empire
And here one from 2003. Note that it ends with the following:
Quoting The Era of Liberalism versus Communism in Russia Is Over
Ironically, the author sees Putin as moderate and Western-oriented and predicts that Putin's successors would adopt even more nationalistic (i.e. imperialistic) line. But Putin would have none of that: he himself reoriented his policies (as evidenced by the differences in his statements, which began our discussion) in that direction.
I remind you, the latest of those three is from 2003, when Putin has still appeared quite friendly and cooperative: so much for the 'retroactive story'. But those also pose the question: did Ukraine had a reason to consider Russia a threat, given the trends described there? I would very much say so.
I doubt that his views about Ukraine can be easily located within the framing of his realpolitik approach which he called "offensive realism" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism). And there are some Mearsheimer's theory's explicit tenets that are worth reminding to support my skepticism about Mearsheimer's recent views about Ukraine:
1. Great powers are security maximizers => so isolationism must no be expected as the most likely behavior from great powers.
2. States can never be certain of the intentions of other states => so no matter how many declarations and promises are made, great powers will not fully trust each others.
3. Geopolitics is not about moral condemnation but about understanding how states actually behave as a function of security dilemmas and actual capabilities => so "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault" and obsessing over "Russia's threat perception" (as if it is all that matters) may sound very misleading if we are talking geopolitics, especially within the realist framework.
If he gets the speakership, will he try to be more inclusive or shut the US down until the demands of the small group of extremists are met?
(By the way, the thread established a while back that "Everyone bad". :grin:)
Sometimes the road to hell is paved with good intentions; not trying at all is worse.
So, anyway, to what end?
There isn't an international conspiracy out to delete Russia(n culture), unlike the Kremlin trying to ditch Ukrainian culture (has also come up in the thread before).
In this context, I'd be less concerned with McDonald's spreading all over sort of like a "capitalist virus" or "f?k?rs stealing our women", and more concerned with democracy transparency freedom versus regression authoritarianism oppression.
Opposing a "No" to the latter facilitates the latter.
North and South Korea, East and West Germany, Russia and Finland, ... Also China and the Uyghurs, theocracy and ceremonial constitutional monarchy, ...
3 lawyers arrested, 2 fled the country:
Navalny lawyer flees Russia, leaving opposition leader alone in court
[sup]— Robyn Dixon · Washington Post · Oct 17, 2023[/sup]
Not looking good for that guy.
If the annexed territories are supposedly within the former administrative borders of oblasts, then from their point of view Ukraine is occupying a large swath of them. That would mean that Russia does not have much choice but to fight until they are 'liberated'. (This interpretation also carries the unfortunate consquence that it clearly shows the supposed 'referendum' was bogus - there is no way the numbers could add up to what was officially announced, not that many people care).
On the other hand, if the new territories are within the borders of Russian occupation, then the state from what day should be taken into consideration? Is Kherson officially Russian in the Russian eyes or not? No official will say a word about it, Peskov asked about that has evaded the question, I think three times.
Oh I think it can recover. Every year brings a fresh new batch of conscripts and the Russian military industrial complex can chug out a limited number of tanks, guns and ammo. It will be likely more than the West provides Ukraine.
I think Russia could make an offensive let's say next year spring/summer.
Maybe if they say of the defensive instead of burning through hundreds of vehicles, tubes, and thousands of soldiers in attacks on entrenched positions. The fighting is a walkable distance from the pre-2022 borders, progress as been... slow to say the least.
With contract troops being chewed up on defense and them trending towards having less armor and less artillery, IDK. Conscripts work a lot better for sitting in trenches and defending when attacked, when they have to defend to live, then being forced to attack.
It's possible the whole reason for the annexation was to pre-empt pacifists in the higher echelons by forcing them to commit to "defending Russia".
If the exact borders are unclear that gives room for political maneuvers. Seems like the kind of thing Putin, still a KGB man at heart, would do.
Quoting ssu
I think the best Russia can hope for in the foreseeable future is to force Ukraine onto the defensive and continue the kind of grinding single-target assaults that so far have been the only successful strategy.
I think it's unlikely Russia can do any sweeping offensive even if western aid to Ukraine is reduced.
So far neither side in the conflict has found a way to break through prepared defenses.
The only big game changer that seems in the cards is if either side gains air superiority. The state of Ukraine's air defense seems the best kept secret of the war so far. They seem to be doing fine, but it's hard to tell whether there is a secret crisis brewing. OTOH Ukraine will likely get at least some F16, which might make a difference (probably also depending on what kind of ammunition is supplied).
In other news it looks like the more moderate Republicans in the US are not going down without a fight. Jim Jordan might need to agree to further aid on Ukraine (which is still popular even with republicans, though less of them want to ship weapons directly).
Unverified as far as I know:
From Kyiv in 3 days to a "deficit in body bags in Donetsk": Russian volunteer urgently needs help with purchasing corpse bags for soldiers currently assaulting in Avdiivka. They also need food, but this must only come in closed packages, because "you don't know if someone's going to add something to it". (@wartranslated · Oct 13, 2023 · 1m)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1712755347155272040[/tweet]
:o
[sup]— Brendan Cole · Newsweek · Oct 17, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Putin
Apart from Gerashchenko's comments, is this ? also a sneaky way of justifying "extending" his (and Xi's) presidency...? :)
One wonders about a lot of the support. But the support is given by politician who illogically see one or another weapon system as "escalatory" or something, then only give few. Which then drags the war on.
It's incredibly frustrating. Tanks and IFVs should have been provided from the outset. The F-16 should already be operating, and significantly more units of MLRS (although supplying munitions might be difficult, but they could have upped production). The "surge" in production for shells and artillery systems is also quite underwhelming.
If these had all been brought in before the summer, maybe with modern attack helicopters too, the war would very likely be over, or at least largely no longer in Ukraine's borders.
What can I say?
Yes. Perhaps!
Russia is unable to widen the war without jumping up a nuclear option. They're fielding 40, 50, sometimes 60 year old unupdated hardware and rushing under strength formations that were promised they wouldn't be deployed until January (time to actually be trained and equipped) to stabilize the front. They are increasingly reliant on conscripts. They just had a coup that forced the government to flee the capital. They now have fewer tanks than Ukraine and are headed towards being behind them in artillery.
Fears of collapsing the Russian state if they are defeated to badly? Sure, that makes sense.
Fears that they are going to successfully invade Poland or something? That seems completely implausible. They can't even keep momentum in the current war they have.
Any doubt that NATO would have total air supremacy in a war with Russia was cleared up by the fact that the Ukrainian air force is still operating to this day. They were able to carry out enough SEAD with rigged up HARMS on old platforms they were never designed to work with to carry out CAS missions in Kherson. Russian AD, which proved so permeable in Syria to Israeli sorties (thousands a year for a decade straight without losing a pilot) has looked anemic here too on a larger scale. The pitiful response to the Wagner advance on Moscow was the definitive proof. If Russia tried to widen the war they would be comically outmatched.
They aren't even defending the Armenians, so there is obviously internal recognition of this.
Quoting Petro Andriushchenko · Sep 27, 2023
Russians build rail links to Mariupol, Volnovakha and Donetsk
[sup]— Alona Mazurenko · Ukrainska Pravda · Sep 27, 2023[/sup]
Russians so worried about Ukrainian breakthrough on Donetsk front that they have begun to fortify occupied Mariupol
[sup]— The New Voice of Ukraine · Oct 12, 2023[/sup]
Ukraine’s Next Target: Russian Supply Lines
[sup]— Daniel Michaels · Wall Street Journal · Oct 12, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Daniel Michaels
I don't think the Russian Mariupol efforts are new, though. Strategic importance for them. Meanwhile, Avdiivka is keeping both parties busy.
Yes. That's what worries a lot of people.
It has always struck me as kind of a useless worry though. Noone has been able to identify a scenario where any use of nukes makes strategic sense for Russia. Indeed this conflict seems like a very good example for the argument that as military weapons in the strict sense, nukes are useless.
While the possibility remains that the Russian regime turns into some kind of death cult and tries to burn it all down, it doesn't seem to make sense to base any decisions on this possibility.
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2860
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2861
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2865
While he always was a bit on the pessimistic side (although not completely into doomposting, like Girkin), his observations seem consistent with what is happening on the ground.
It doesn't have to be a death cult. The Regime just has to be very desperate, to the point where they start thinking, "a few tactical nukes, strategically placed..." If it looks like Ukraine starts pushing Russia back to their border, or Putin thinks he's about to be overthrown, why not roll the dice, from his point of view? If he thinks it's likely he's going to be deposed and killed, what would he have to lose?
To what end, though?
If Putin is willing to hit the red button over Ukraine, then the world (in general) already has a markedly larger problem (sort of masked/hidden in rhetoric). For that matter, certainly not in the best interest of Russians. On the other hand, as a promised response to a nuclear attack, it seems to work well enough. Maybe. (I'd be more worried about Kim Jong Un at the moment.)
The Putinistas have had a decade or two to think Ukraine over, when they had spare time. There are some suggestions that parts of the (current) Kremlin's moves have been prepared/strategized for a long while, despite setbacks/bumps.
AFAIK Putin doesn't have the ability to unilaterally instigate a nuclear strike, he'd need the cooperation of the army high command. Which, in a scenario where his head is on the line, he presumably doesn't have.
It's hard to see how any use of nukes doesn't make the situation simply worse for Russia. It seems almost guaranteed that, if Russia uses any nuclear weapon, they'll loose their remaining allies. China isn't going to want to be associated with it, nor will anyone else.
It's also highly questionable whether any military advantage that's even remotely commensurate could be achieved.
Bombing the direct frontline will achieve little unless you positively blanket it with bombs. Hitting any kind of strategic target like transportation, C&C or production will almost inevitably involve hitting a city.
I don't think the Russian people will accept nuking a Ukrainian city as part of the "special military operation". Given Putin's reluctance to even call a general mobilisation, I think it's safe to assume he doesn't believe the population would accept a total war against Ukraine.
So really all that seems even remotely useful is to stage some kind of nuclear demonstration to scare Ukraine's western allies. But even that might just have the opposite effect and ensure an even more unanimous front against Russia.
And that's not considering the likely NATO response, which would probably be a no fly zone over Ukraine and possibly airstrikes on russian troops in Ukraine.
Carnegie · Apr 7, 2023
Bloomberg · Jun 8, 2023
If within Putin's reach, it's safer for them to play along in any case (for now at least). :death:
UN · Jul 28, 2023
POLITICO · Aug 4, 2023
Marcus Keupp seems too optimistic (to me):
watson · Oct 20, 2023 (en)
Mentioned Russian losses alone won't do it, at least not in the near future, though at some point...
Besides, with friends like Kim Jong Un, what can go wrong? :)
Al Jazeera · Sep 13, 2023
ABC · Oct 8, 2023
LONG LIVE THE BRICS!
This is kinda hilarious, given that Ukraine has a history of colonialism, and the coloniser was Russia.
Russia has lost at least around two regiments worth of equipment, and probably more men since they switched to unsupported infantry assaults, attacking a literal trash heap. This might be more WWIesque than even Bakhmut.
It seems a decision was made that an offensive must occur [I] somewhere[/I] but why they picked a frontal assault on a an area they have banged their head against without progress for just under a decade is beyond me. Then, another Russian helicopter appears to have been downed by Russian air defenses, this after the heavy losses to their remaining rotary wing craft from MLRS attacks earlier in the week.
Of course, Russian milbloggers don't think this will slow things down. "After the armor is expended, then come the 'meat assaults.'" Grim.
The documented armor losses do not suggest blew production capabilities. A lot of hardware is stuff that hasn't been produced in 50-60+ years.
Once the ammo and armor are in short in supply, then suddenly it's back to a nearly frozen conflict. Nearly. And time for that wonderful trench warfare.
[sup]— Gareth Jones · Reuters · Oct 23, 2023[/sup]
Allow me to rephrase Pesky's statement :D
I was a bit taken aback by the strength of evidence implicating the Kremlin circle, a real-life conspiracy if you will.
For his flaws, Navalny's story is also a story of Putin's authoritarian regime. I doubt Navalny would be a worse president than Putin is (regressive opaque oppressive sinister).
A Discussion of “Navalny": the Documentary
[sup]— Wilson Center · 58m · Apr 18, 2022[/sup]
Bits and pieces of Putin's televised response in 2020 (or related) can be found out there ... RFE/RL, CBC, CNN, DW, Daily Mail, BBC, ... "Yeah, sorry Pukin. Won't fly."
Column: Is the documentary ‘Navalny’ a life insurance policy for the imprisoned Russian opposition leader?
[sup]— Robin Abcarian · Los Angeles Times · Dec 14, 2022[/sup]
Unless something changes, it seems unlikely Navalny will ever see the light of day again (or his lawyers), but whatever happened to Kudryavtsev...?
If I were in Kyiv, I'd be looking elsewhere.
[sup]— Alec Russell, Christopher Miller, Roman Olearchyk · Financial Times · Oct 23, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Denys Shmyhal
Back to sticks'n'stones? :) (if only everyone would run out at the same time :cool:)
Concerning if Ukraine becomes a military-industrial powerhouse? At the moment they have good reasons. Later?
, the Kremlin blamed the Navalny poisoning thing on the CIA of all things. It became ridiculous some time ago. Meanwhile, they proliferate authoritarianism regression oppression contra democracy transparency freedom, which they continue to divert/misdirect from when blaming everyone else (with some success I might add).
Unexpected:
Anchor of Chinese container vessel caused damage to Balticconnector gas pipeline, Finnish police say
[sup]— Jari Tanner · AP · Oct 24, 2023[/sup]
Also an interesting choice given the last "frontal assaults until we grind down our manpower," style offensive ended in a coup and the government having to flee Moscow.
Bright side for them, it seems possible from reports that they may have gained a foot hold on the trash heap they're fighting over (seriously).
Basically Avdiivka will now turn into the next Bakhmut, where the Ukrainian forces will have to choose between defending the city from a severely compromised position, or retreating.
Given the state of foreign support for Ukraine amidst the Middle-East crisis, there will be a lot of pressure on the Ukrainian forces to defend it, which how the Russians aim to attrition the Ukrainian forces.
It seems like, just like with Bakhmut, they're planning the heaviest fighting over the winter months.
Is one of Russia’s oldest allies slipping from the Kremlin’s orbit?
[sup]— Christian Edwards, Caolán Magee · CNN · Sep 17, 2023[/sup]
France sends weapons to Armenia amid fears of new conflict with Azerbaijan
[sup]— Laura Kayali, Gabriel Gavin · POLITICO · Oct 23, 2023[/sup]
Azerbaijan Could Invade Armenia. The U.S. Must Intervene
[sup]— Simon Maghakyan · TIME · Oct 24, 2023[/sup]
Perhaps a "world order" ought to be one by which attacks/takeovers are less feasible, more disincentivized? Ethics-driven culture seems to have partially failed.
US says China has significantly expanded its nuclear arsenal
[sup]— Al Jazeera · Oct 20, 2023[/sup]
Russia unconcerned by China increasing nuclear arsenal capabilities, says Kremlin
[sup]— Alexander Marrow, Gareth Jones · Reuters · Oct 25, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Pesky
What threats have been exerted prompting China's (supposed) need for a fresh nuclear arms race? Oddly perhaps, the Kremlin comes up first in that respect.
[sup]— t-online · Oct 24, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Pukin
Plainly, Rota isn't Nazi or a sympathizer. Neither is the Canadian government, nor the Canadian populace at large. That then makes Putin a liar, caught in the act. Don't know if any of his home peers called him out; if any have or will, hopefully, they won't get "sent away" as "extremists".
But, hey, yes, there are many good Germans.
‘So Russians don’t fear them’ Putin administration tells pro-government media not to report on crimes committed by returning soldiers
[sup]— Andrey Pertsev · Meduza · Oct 24, 2023[/sup]
Oh yeah, it's tactically useful, for sure. I just question the rationale for expending the massive amount of resources that have already been lost there given the apparent odds of success. It would be the equivalent of the AFU launching another NATO style maneuver offensive directly into Russian defenses (and on a significantly larger scale), with the goal apparently being to secure an arbitrary political border for x date .
Particularly the use of penal assault brigades given how wonderfully that went last time. :roll:
[sup]— Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Frederick W Kagan · RFE/RL · Aug 28, 2023[/sup]
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2023
[sup]— Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Frederick W Kagan · ISW · Oct 24, 2023[/sup]
This was Ukraine's militarily nonsensical reasoning for their offensive.
Nonsensical because achieving an "arbitrary political border for x date" had essentially zero chance of success and also doesn't end the war. Russia would still be there with an army and able to invade at any point along the entire border (the front line is the entire border with Russia and Belarus).
The need for the Ukrainian offensive was purely for PR purposes of propping up the narrative that Ukraine can "win".
However, there is no symmetry here. The reason Ukraine's offensive makes no military sense is because Ukraine has no chance of winning the war of attrition, and even less chance by recklessly charging at Russian prepared defences.
Russia on the other hand can win the war of attrition. It is an illusion to believe Ukraine can "keep it up" indefinitely.
Some forces and equipment were expended to secure positions around Avdiivka to create a cauldron to attrit Ukrainian forces there everyday, which as @'Tzeentch' has already pointed out.
Quoting Tzeentch
So, the losses needed to secure the position needs to be evaluated against the attritional value of the cauldron. If the Ukrainians retreat to better positions then the losses achieved the political value of winning a battle.
Point being, it is erroneous to equate the Russian offensive with the recent Ukrainian offensive. Yes, Russia faces the same challenges that the Ukrainians faced but with more equipment, air superiority, and more man power available.
That Ukraine attacked Russian prepared defences and attritted a large part of their forces is essentially a dream come true if you're trying to win a war of attrition.
The correct military strategy for Ukraine would be to not attack Russian lines but focus on defence and maximize the cost of Russian advances.
However, the problem Ukraine has is that the Western and Ukrainian narrative is that they can and will "win" on the battlefield. This narrative maximizes support for more war and rejecting peace talks (why talk peace if you can just win), but requires Ukraine to recklessly attack Russian lines in order to keep the narrative somewhat plausible. Of course politically speaking, if Ukraine can't secure aid then the entire government would collapse so the strategy must be to play to what sounds good to a Western audience (which is that we're repeating WWII somehow ... and what people remember most about WWII is that "we won"); so in this light it is the only strategy that keeps things going (especially when there was hope that economic sanctions would lead to economic collapse in Russia) the main problem now is that there is no where to go for Ukraine.
Unless the promise of economic collapse and political breakdown in Russia actually materializes, Ukraine will lose the war of attrition which means at some point total collapse of Ukrainian lines.
The point of the drive was take the railhead at Tocomak and cut off forces on the river in Russian held Kherson to withdraw. It's aim was cutting ground lines of communications, the exact thing it did to force a Russian withdrawal from the rest of Kherson and Kharkiv.
The other objective is obviously to get the bridge to Crimea in MLRS range so it can be destroyed. A follow on goal would be to drive to Melitopol and encircle Russian forced in Kherson if they had yet to withdraw.
Russia is aiming at a far smaller operation here, nothing that can really be said to be of strategic value, unless one considers that getting the "legally defined boundaries of the Donbass," within their control might make suing for some sort of peace more palatable domestically.
Which then accomplishes what? What did the withdrawal from Kherson and around Kharkiv accomplish for the Ukrainians other than feeding the narrative they can "win"?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
If hitting the bridge was so important ... why not just ask the US to supply the longer range ATACMS rather than waste precious lives and equipment to carve out a a tiny cauldron into Russian heavily fortified lines?
Oh right, because Ukraine only gets the "next thing" after suffering military disasters and so the "next thing" is no longer an escalation but can drag the war out a bit longer.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I just explained to you, after @Tzeentch just explained to you, that Russia's aim is to attrit the Ukrainians to the breaking point (which just like every individual, every organization has). They do this by creating cauldron's around Ukrainian forces and hitting them with artillery and glide bombs until they leave.
We can definitely say the strategic value of capturing some high ground around said cauldron is to more efficiently attrit the Ukrainians while minimizing losses. Of course maybe the losses weren't "worth it" to achieve this purpose, but that is beside the point as Russia can absorb far more losses than the Ukrainians: that's what attritional warfare means when you are the larger force.
The facts are Ukraine essentially does not have any air power and Russia seems to have now nearly completely attritted their air defence (just as the leaked pentagon papers informed us), enough to effectively use glide bombs and attack helicopters at will.
Zelensky was recently in Washington to explain that with 100 000 000 000 USD more that "maybe" they can achieve a stalemate for the next year.
In other words, what I and others pointed out in the first weeks of the war (that Ukraine has zero hope of some sort of military victory) is now official policy of both the US and Ukraine nearly 2 years later.
For, Ukraine is not only at a significant military disadvantage in terms of numbers and capabilities, but its economy is in ruins and backers need not only provide militarily but float the entire Ukrainian government and heavily subsidize the economy ... all while Russia's economy is growing and able to self-finance its war effort.
The situation is not good for Ukraine and cannot possibly last.
What is clear is that the current goal is to try to keep things together until the next US election, since as unpopular as the 100 000 000 000 more USD to Ukraine maybe, a complete military debacle for the "friend" Ukraine would be even worse.
A goal I think is achievable and then we'll see the war wound down after said election (whoever wins).
Not just the US, but you're right. They should just have been given the tools/resources from the get-go.
On Russian Nuclear Threat, Putin Lets Others Rattle the Saber
[sup]— Paul Sonne, David E Sanger · New York Times · Oct 7, 2023[/sup]
Oct 20, 2023
Ukraine holds peace formula talks in Malta, Russia absent
[sup]— Christopher Scicluna, Elaine Monaghan, Andrew Gray, Olena Harmash, David Evans, Mike Harrison · Reuters · Oct 28, 2023[/sup]
The world has told the Kremlin ???.
'Momentum is on side of Russia' despite minor Ukrainian victories, 'increasing opposition' to Putin
[sup]— François Picard · France 24 · 9m:44s · Oct 26, 2023[/sup]
By the way, , Hawley's comments, "I also wish our European allies to do their part", echoes what Obama and others have aired prior. So easily post-Yalta is forgotten (also set out in some detail by Anne Applebaum (2012)).
Opinion | Josh Hawley Is Wrong About Israel and Ukraine
[sup]— Rich Lowry · POLITICO · Oct 11, 2023[/sup]
Russia-Ukraine are warring, Hamas-Israel are warring, though not China. Hawley's "I don't see where this is going" oddly forgets the active and violent proliferation of authoritarianism regression oppression contra democracy transparency freedom. I suppose Kara-Murza likely agrees.
It freed a bunch of their territory and subjects from russian occupation?
That's kinda what the war is about, isn't it?
Quoting boethius
What military disasters had Ukraine suffered?
Quoting boethius
So why are they loosing more men and materiel every day? That doesn't sound like winning a war of attrition.Quoting boethius
And your evidence for this is?
Quoting boethius
Lol, yeah according to Josh Hawley, one of the people trying to turn the US into a Putin style "managed democracy". Why would I believe anything a known con-man like this says?
Might be something in the air...
Obviously if the intention was to actually "beat" the Russians then that's what would have occurred.
It didn't occur because that is not the intention.
You really haven't caught on? You really believe the drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine since the start of the war, just enough to prop them up, is just a bureaucratic oversight of some kind or well intentioned difference in policy that just so happens to have been proven wrong?
You're really that naive?
I mean you're right about that, but your reasoning is odd.
There's a very obvious reason why the west wouldn't want Ukraine to "beat" the russians. The same reason why they didn't send their air forces to flatten the russian invaders. The west doesn't want to give Russia an excuse to use nukes.
So yes the western strategy is a kind of death by a thousand cuts. They prefer the russians to bleed themselves dry in a slow grind over some calamitous collapse which could have unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics. They even prefer Ukraine to loose in a slow grind over such a scenario.
I guess just playing dumb is the copium of choice at this stage of the war.
But to play along to your obtuse delusions, "freeing" a bunch of people, more so in regions that had already largely been evacuated of anyone who wanted to leave to Ukraine, is not justification for military action. In this case, even if "fighting for freedom" was the goal (which I very much doubt) the interest of the greater number must prevail over the smaller number.
There was a tiny number of people to "free" in these regions compared to the total Ukrainian population, so therefore it would not be justified to expend valuable military resources to free a small number of people if it greatly increases the risk to the larger number.
Going on these offensives is extremely costly to Ukraine in terms of men and material.
Now, if they "win" the war of attrition against Russia, then clearly they had those resources to spare, but if they don't win the war that is actually currently happening then it will become clear what the cost of expending large amounts of resources on offensives actually turns out to be.
Quoting Echarmion
Losing 20% of their territory in the first days of the war, not even striking the bridges out of Crimea but letting massive columns go through and behind the prepared defences around the Donbas was definitely a military disaster. Bahkmut was a military disaster. This latest offensive was a military disaster.
Now, if you think Ukraine can just keep grinding indefinitely like a tech bro in a coffee shop, then you're just completely delusional.
We are now at a phase of the war where it is accepted Ukraine has no potential for victory with some sort of maneuver warfare, which is, by definition, the only way to win against superior numbers and resources, so the only other way to win is through attrition which is a war that Ukraine can't possibly win.
I prepend "military" to all this analysis as there would still be the option of victory through some sort of revolution in Russia or total economic failing under the sanctions (the theory of victory when Ukraine rejected peace talks), which maybe someone here will still argue will actually happen "this time", but that seems a distant dream even to the present dreamers.
Quoting Echarmion
The analysis is answering the question of why Russia took the position in question.
Yes, Russia loses men and material, but so too the Ukrainians, that's what makes it a war of attrition.
Quoting Echarmion
Russia's use of glide bombs and attack helicopters has been covered extensively even by the Western mainstream press, so if you don't follow events in the slightest why do you feel you contribute anything to this conversation.
But to satisfy your lazy quest for knowledge here's a journalist from Forbes literally using the words "at will".
Quoting Forbes
Quoting Echarmion
He's reporting what Zelensky said to him and his colleagues, what the administration said the day before, it would be a pretty bold lie which others in attendance could easily call him out on.
So your contention is that he's a liar and everyone else present in these meetings or privy to the information is a liar?
Perhaps he is a conman generally speaking, but you should have some of that actual evidence you so easily demand of others in calling a sitting US senator a liar about events that literally just happened, in which no one's contradicting his narrative, and "stalemate" is the key word coming from plenty of angles so hardly implausible that's exactly what Zelensky stated.
First, the reasoning is not odd, it didn't happen because that was not the intention.
Second, I've explained dozens of times already that the drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine is precisely because Russia has nuclear weapons.
Quoting Echarmion
This is the new copium of choice in recent comments.
For, if there is no collapse ... how exactly does Russia lose exactly? Isn't the key word in a "death by a thousand cuts" the death part? How exactly does Russia die by a thousand cuts without a "calamitous collapse" which could have "unforeseeable consequences for russian internal politics"?
The war is about separating Russian resources from German industry and locking in the Europeans as vassal states without sovereignty being even an option on the table anymore; destroy the Euro as a possible competitor to the dollar while we're at it.
However, we are in agreement that the US / NATO "They even prefer Ukraine to loose in a slow grind over such a scenario".
This is literally an article about Russian helicopters being shot down by advancing UAF forces. It details how Ukraine has increased the air defense capabilities over brigades advancing into Russian-held territory.
The destruction of a large number of rotary wing craft over the past two weeks thanks to the US (finally) delivering long(er) range missiles has further reduced Russia's ability to use rotary wing craft. First, because obviously they can't use destroyed craft, and must repair damaged craft, but moreover because they now have to store them quite far out, near the limits of their operational range.
The claim that Russia can use their air force "at will" is patently ridiculous no matter who says it. Why would they be trying to knock out the power grid by lobbing air defense and anti-ship missiles at power plants, and firing off volleys over the Black Sea if they were actually free to just hit Ukrainian cities with their massive supply of cheap gravity bombs? It makes absolutely no sense.
Have Russian sorties been increasing as of late? They haven't. They have been using air assets less and less. They have sometimes thrown them into operations to help fill a gap (e.g., the rout in Kharkiv was plugged using air assets, although at the cost of several losses). They have been using more glide bombs, which is helping them, but they have been prioritizing longer range glide bombs precisely because they can't use the same strategies they were using in Syria due to losses. Moreover, their problem is more lack of trained pilots than airframes.
Russia retains a significant advantage in air power, but this is more of an aid to them on defense than offense, since they have been unable to carry out complex air operations for the entire war nor to carry out successful SEAD.
Right. Getting to a place where you have less armor and less artillery than your opponent, where things look to be ending up, is not a sign that you are winning a war of attrition.
I would certainly allow that Ukraine may not be able to break Russian defenses and take back additional large areas of territory, although this doesn't seem that unlikely. I would even allow that in the long term, looking out to 2026-2028, if the stars align right, Russia might be in a position to carry out significant offensive operations; but it's hard to see the current strategy as "paying off" in the short term.
The same might be said of Ukrainian reconquest of a good deal of territory. But at least there, one could argue that another collapse in the front ala Kharkiv or Kherson might be enough to end the war. If the bridge to Crimea can be knocked out, the peninsula put under siege, and most land within the 2014 borders put under Ukraine's control, it does seem like it would be quite difficult to continue justifying the invasion.
People have been bashing each other's heads in for scraps of territory for hundreds of years.
Quoting boethius
This completely ignores how humans actually think. Noone is going to just hand away what they think is "their land" if they have a choice.
Quoting boethius
War isn't fought on some excel spreadsheet where losses are added up and then the winner is decided. The territory matters. Initiative matters. Morale matters. Public opinion matters..
Quoting boethius
Nonsense, holding off the russian invasion the way they did was a massive victory, way beyond what anyone had expected. It was a disaster for Russia.
Quoting boethius
More bullshit. How was it disastrous? Ukraine lost a single city, and that's it. There was no follow up on the side of Russia.
Quoting boethius
This is at least vaguely plausible, but still there's no evidence Ukraine has been decisively weakened by the failure to push further.
Quoting boethius
Everyone has limited resources. Russia doesn't have magical endless potential to wage war. Russia can absolutely loose a war of attrition in Ukraine. The soviet union, which was much stronger then than Russia is today, lost a war of attrition in Afghanistan.
Quoting boethius
The point of glide bombs is literally that you can use them from out of range of air defenses...
And the helicopters cannot operate at will above the frontline, as the Forbes article you linked shows regardless of the poorly written last paragraph.
Quoting boethius
Given that he claims the US election was "stolen", bold lies seem right up his alley. What does it matter to him if he is called out? He's a MAGA republican so anyone who calls him out is a globalist shill and that is that.
More to the point, noone else is reporting these bold claims.
Quoting boethius
It's very implausible if you actually follow how the war develops day by day.
Quoting boethius
The same way they lost in Afghanistan, or Chechnya. The same way the US lost in Vietnam or again in Afghanistan. They're fighting a limited war for political goals. Their opponent is fighting a total war. This has not often worked out for the side trying to fight a limited war.
Quoting boethius
Oh right, Putin invaded in order to turn the EU into US vassals, that makes sense.
Particularly because the US is well known for its policy of turning allies into vassal states without sovereignty. Just look at....uh....
The point is Ukraine doesn't have such helicopters to be shot down.
The other point would be the damage these helicopters do.
Sure, Ukraine can shoot some down from time to time, that's what attritional warfare is.
Both sides take losses in a war of attrition, that's sort of the definition.
Ukraine has less man power and less capabilities ... so how is it going to win a war of attrition?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Again why is it "finally"?
Why didn't US just supply these weapons before the Ukrainian offensive ... or then during when Ukraine was having so much trouble even getting to Russian fortified lines with armoured vehicles due to said helicopters?
Why only supply the missiles after the offensive has failed and the capability of the attack helicopters was realized in their ideal role of destroying advancing armoured columns?
The copium is so thick it's hard to see in here.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
So the same journalist you just cited to minimize the effectiveness of Russian helicopter (which his point was more that "maybe" Ukraine will be able to deal with them ) is also "ridiculous" when he says something you don't like. We can of course get pedantic over what exactly "at will" means, how pervasive and permissive it means "exactly", but we at agree that Forbes and myself use it in the same way; if you'd reserve the expression more for explaining wizards literally conjuring up glide bombs with their minds and solemn chants, that's your prerogative.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
How do you use more glide bombs with less sorties?
But again, the point is Ukraine essentially has no airforce in which it can be attritted.
Having less men and less capabilities is not a good position in a war of attrition.
Of course, maybe Russia will "tire out", feel free to present evidence that will happen "this time", but there's a lot of lives to gamble to test such a theory.
Did you even read what I wrote?
What I wrote assumed Ukraine's goal of "freedom" and pointed out that freeing a few while putting the rest at risk makes no military sense.
Attacking prepared defences in a war of attrition as the smaller party is the opposite of military sanity. This is the point to make it more clear.
Of course, the reason for doing so is to maintain a (delusional) narrative that the West just kind of needs to hear right now and since the star of the war, which leads to the vast sums of money required to even be in the game. To have "a chance", Ukraine needs to do militarily stupid things for the sake of optics.
Now, if the required sacrifices on the Western political altar led to the promised demise of the Russian state by mechanism that were and remain essentially voodoo (i.e. magical thinking without any precedent in history at all), then the military moves would have had to have made sense had the things that would have made them make sense happened to have actually happened. But they didn't.
That entirely depends on the larger situation. You can't just sit on the defensive all the time either. There are plenty of plausible reasons why Ukraine might want to push even into prepared russian defenses - to fix troops in place, to keep russian commanders on the defensive psychologically, to seize tactically advantageous positions, to force the russian artillery to fire so they can be targeted with counter-battery fire. I could go on, but the point is your analysis is simplistic to the point of being useless.
Quoting boethius
Noone wants the demise of the russian state, that would be a terrible outcome for everyone. The west has plenty of good reasons to want Russia to fail in this endavour, do I need to list them?
This is true. One is fighting for survival, one for limited objectives. A small anecdote: when Hamas attacked Israel you had many reports of Israeli reservists flying from abroad to get to their units. Just like many Ukrainians opted to go back to Ukraine when the war started. However I didn't find reporting of Russian expats flying back to Russia to join the mobilization...
Quoting boethius
Well, a Soviet Union, with far more arms and men, did tire from fighting a far smaller war Afghanistan, even they managed to kill far more Afghans than the US ever. But you assume this war hasn't had any effect on Russia?
Denial of Georgia's EU membership bid would be "a big victory for Russia," President Zourabichvili says
[sup]— Sharyn Alfonsi, Ashley Velie, Jennifer Dozor, Erin DuCharme, Peter M Berman · CBS · Oct 29, 2023[/sup]
, let me just check that I understand your theory, the military-industrial complex decides what is and isn't sent to Ukraine, and they're in business.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/26/russia-prison-population-convicts-war/
How many more prisoners they can recruit for combat roles is anyone's guess. The heavy use of prisoners, who are seen as "disposable," in front line combat roles and assault teams seems like one of the causes of the incredibly high losses for the Russians (UK MOD estimate, 190,000 KIA or permanently disabled, 300,000 casualties). Leaked US estimates had Russian fatalities 71% higher than Ukrainian losses (120,000 versus 70,000), and the use of prisoners in "meat assaults," is the primary culprit per both Western defense agencies and Russian milbloggers. But once this pool is depleted, can tactics change?
Treating conscripts the same way seems to risk larger morale issues across the force.
EU leaders approve using profits from frozen Russian assets
[sup]— Paola Tamma, Jacopo Barigazzi, Laura Hülsemann · POLITICO · Oct 27, 2023[/sup]
Moscow will confiscate EU assets if Brussels 'steals' frozen Russian funds, Putin ally [†] says
[sup]— Reuters · Oct 29, 2023[/sup]
For: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland
Cautious due to legalities and economics: Belgium, Luxembourg
Hesitant due to € financialities: France, Germany, ... (The European Central Bank)
[†] Volodin
Out of Solovyov, Medvedev, Trump, who rambles or bullshits the most? :D
Attention, Germany! Russian propagandist Solovyev threatens that Berlin will exist "under the Russian flag." (Gerashchenko · 1m:18s · Oct 30, 2023)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1718972907609579874[/tweet]
Quite incredible statistics, actually.
More so when you consider the concentration of prisoner losses in the limited areas of offensive operations, (Bakhmut and Pisky earlier and Avdiika now).
Over the past days Russia has declared control of the waste heap near Avdviika! Yet then the UAF published media showing the waste heap being retaken! Russia again demonstrated that they had planted a flag on the waste heap. UAF released video of Russian waste heap forces being destroyed. Then the waste heap was no man's land. Now the UAF once again appears to control the waste heap!
Last count I saw was 190 Russian vehicles destroyed in the vicinity of the waste heap. I haven't seen a count of Ukrainian vehicles, although they are much lower because they are defending and so using far fewer vehicles and not moving through enemy mine fields.
The contested landfill that has become the hot spot of the entire conflict for now.
When soldiers say they are "fighting World War I, just with drones and social media," I see why.
North Korea believed to have exported over 1 million shells to Russia
[sup]— Yoonjung Seo, Sophie Tanno · CNN · Nov 1, 2023[/sup]
Those 10 shipments could have made a big :fire: somewhere.
, seems absurd. I guess there's some sort of tactical advantage of sitting on the hill.
And I think the part that it's a landfill tell it's well.
But simply in the times of drones, ATGMs, instant artillery and good Ground Based Air Defence on both sides, it comes to very limited fighting. For large scale maneuvers simply would result into far heavier losses.
New recruitment scheme for those unwilling to join the Russian army. (Anton Gerashchenko · Nov 1, 2023)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1719624240092131816[/tweet]
Some Russian polls, FYI:
Conflict with Ukraine: October 2023 estimates (en) (Levada-Center · Oct 31, 2023)
[sup]— The Economist · Nov 1, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Zaluzhnyi
Peskov commented on Zaluzhnyi’s words about the deadlock in the conflict in Ukraine (en)
[sup]— TASS · Nov 2, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Pesky
Five factors, according to Zaluzhnyi, for Ukraine to progress significantly: air force, electronic warfare, counter-battery fire, dealing with the extensive minefields, reserves.
The Kremlin's (official) goals have gone a bit here and there, though:
Lavrov says Russia’s objectives in Ukraine now extend beyond eastern Donbas region
[sup]— Radina Gigova, Sana Noor Haq, Jack Guy, Rob Picheta, Tim Lister, Kostan Nechyporenko, Oren Liebermann · CNN · Jul 20, 2022[/sup]
At least Zaluzhnyi isn't propagandizing like Pesky.
U.S., European officials broach topic of peace negotiations with Ukraine, sources say
[sup]— Courtney Kube, Carol E Lee, Kristen Welker · NBC · Nov 3, 2023[/sup]
Going by the (official current) Kremlin, it's either continue bombing/destruction, or expansion of authoritarianism regress oppression (and wherever that may lead). Meanwhile their prison population has halved or something.
It's a great and honest acknowledgement from Zaluzhnyi that the tech now has put them back to the trenches of WW1. And this is totally logical. If you have a drone which sees the tanks approaching, thanks to fire control computers, you can give the firing solution in seconds, not in minutes, to the artillery system. The it takes a minute or something for the projectile to fire and hit the target. Or then to shoot a minefield into where the tanks are moving.
And if neither side has any way by electronic warfare to severe the link, then it really is as Zaluzhnyi said. Large formations of armour rolling the Ukrainian flatlands is extremely dangerous.
Somewhat odd that considering the deteriorating situation for Ukraine it still seems to be Zelensky that is the obstacle for negotiations.
Though, in some sense I cannot blame him. He was after all promised Western support to fight the Russians, and that support has clearly come up short to achieve what was promised, or at least what was suggested as the goal: Ukraine regaining the territory it has lost during the 2022 invasion, and even retaking Crimea.
Or perhaps Zelensky is foreseeing that negotiations will not go anywhere, since interests on both sides are diametrically opposed.
Russia will not accept any agreement in which Ukraine enters NATO, and the West/Ukraine is unlikely to accept any agreement in which Ukraine doesn't enter NATO.
The same is roughly true for the issue of territory, though I think in the case of a Western concession vis-á-vis NATO membership, there's some chance that Russia will return territory to Ukraine.
But if negotiations indeed turn out to be impossible, I wonder how the war will proceed. Perhaps it will turn into a frozen conflict. While Mearsheimer has in the past suggested that he believes Russia may make at least one more push for a substantial amount of territory, in my eyes Russia does not look particularly interested in launching any real offensives.
The United States' international credibility is rapidly tanking due to its stance in the Israel-Gaza war, while the BRICS (with Russia taking a leading role) are looking to present themselves as the reasonable, mediating party.
With the Middle-East conflict looking to take up more of the West's (and especially the United States') military capacity, there is less pressure on Russia in the Ukraine war.
In other words, while the Middle-East conflict might present an opportunity for Russia to tighten the screws and press the issue in Ukraine, this does not seem to be in line with the image they are presenting of themselves in the wider international context, and this might be enough for the former not to take place.
Anyway, things might not be as rosy in those parts as Pesky says, surely not if some of those casualty estimates are in the right range.
A war economy in part (or perhaps whole) isn't all that surprising with their current leadership, is it?
Transcript: Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova on "Face the Nation," Nov. 5, 2023 (Margaret Brennan · CBS)
Well their projected military budget, if one assumes that all the shadow military budgets rise proportionally, would put Russia at the level of military spending the USSR had in the 80s. That did not go so well.
And all this to defeat just Ukraine. I think it's worth remembering, among the daily back-and-forth of the war, just how unexpected it is that Ukraine can put up this level of resistance at all. And that while Russia has certainly succeeded in wrecking Ukraine, it has also wrecked itself in the process. It'll take at least a decade for Russia to recover from the war, especially the disastrous first year.
At the same time, the share of all confirmed destroyed artillery (a good proxy for what is in use) has shown a dramatic decrease in 155/152mm guns as a share of all artillery for Russia, and an increase in 120mm guns. This bespeaks the ammunition and tube shortages. The very rapid fire mission rate early in the war probably also contributed, as you only get so many fire missions out a tube before it is degraded, and it will eventually be nonfunctional.
[sup]— Nick Mordowanec · Newsweek · Nov 6, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Patrushev (Russia Today)
Quoting Patrushev (Rossiyskaya Gazeta)
Putin ally: West increasing risk of weapons of mass destruction being used
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Andrew Osborn, Timothy Heritage · Reuters · Nov 8, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Patrushev (TASS)
Cold war style paranoia? When was the last time someone threatened the Kremlin with attacking Russia? Nuclear assault? Why would anyone want to? Investment opporutnity?
Meanwhile...
Moscow bombarded 118 Ukraine towns: officials | WION Speed News (WION · 13m:25s · Nov 8, 2023)
Not much by way of a peace trajectory coming out of the Kremlin circle these days. Rich powerful guys terrorize Ukraine and talk paranoia.
Chechen warlord appoints son, 15, as head of his security service (— Sara Odeen-Isbister · Metro · Nov 5, 2023) (also reported by Reuters and Euronews and others)
Not like when I grew up.
You can't be on the defensive all the time in football, you can be on the defensive all the time in a war.
Of course, there are offensive actions that will optimize defence, but the great Ukrainian offensive to cut the land bridge and then retake Crimea is not such offensive actions undertaken for the purposes of defence.
When you are a smaller country invaded by a larger country, the correct military strategy is to defend, minimizing your own losses while maximizing losses on the enemy. Of course, doing so requires defending positions until they are no longer fit for purpose and retreating to prepared fortifications behind you (the opposite direction of a foolish charge at the enemy's fortifications).
Of course, the pace of retreat must be slow enough in order to render the ongoing conquest of the entire country too costly.
Now, offensive operations do have a uses within the context of a defensive strategy. Making your enemy fear surprise offensives and counter-offensives makes them divert resources and increases the costs and complexity of planning, all of which further slows down the attacker.
The classic purpose of defending against a superior force that will eventually win is give time for diplomatic actions.
There are only two available:
1. convince other parties to join the war. For example the UK defending against Nazi Germany to buy time for the US to join the war and save them.
2. Negotiate a peace using the leverage of the high cost of further fighting.
When a larger country with a much larger military invades a smaller country with a smaller military, plan A is for the smaller country to simply capitulate. There are many sound and rational reasons to simply capitulate and this happens regularly throughout history. People don't want to die, nor see their country destroyed, and the new boss maybe remarkably similar to the old boss anyways.
However, if the smaller country musters a defence then it is in a position to negotiate better terms than an outright surrender.
Finland fighting the Soviet Union has been often cited as some sort of model for Ukraine.
Ukraine's initial defence does follow the Finnish model (or pretty much any smaller country putting up a serious defense).
However, in then quickly diverges into delusional fantasy of "beating" the Russians. Finland, not being delusional that it could defeat the Soviet Union, needed to agree to a peace and accept it lost said war with the Soviet Union, lost 20% of their territory, lost access to the Arctic Ocean, the largest lake previously split with the Soviet Union, a cultural heartland, and of course many lives, and last but not necessarily least had to concede defeat to the Soviet Union (kiss ass in more formal diplomatic parlance) and agree to pay massive war reparations that transformed the country's ecology (in order to cut down enough trees to pay for the privilege of still existing as a country).
In the case Finland, military defensive strategy coherently supported diplomatic efforts. The only nuance being the Finns did reconquer territory at one point, but this was not a delusional strategy but a bet that Nazi Germany (not themselves) would defeat the Soviet Union and they could get all their land back that way (though it should be noted the Finns also hedged their bets and did not go past their initial borders in order to have a better diplomatic position in case the Nazis lost; aka. not provide the Soviet Union with casus belli of a war of reprisal if they defeated the Nazis).
Point is, you can always be on the defensive and it is wise to do so against a superior force and the point would be to negotiate a peace that is better than both capitulation and complete conquest.
There is zero point to go on a delusional campaign right into sophisticated prepared defences of a superior force.
Catch-phrases such as "you can't just sit on the defensive all the time either." are true in football and other similar sports.
Now, if you mean that some offensive actions support defence and that by "depends on the circumstances" you agree Ukraine's campaign to "cut the land bridge" and "retake Crimea" was a delusional fools errand, then we agree.
I literally say "Of course, maybe Russia will 'tire out'," followed with "feel free to present evidence that will happen 'this time' ", and ending with "but there's a lot of lives to gamble to test such a theory."
I am completely aware that larger armies can simply tire of fighting and go home and that is one potential outcome in any war, that's why I literally say so.
That it has happened before, however, is not evidence it will happen this time.
Feel free to provide evidence Russia, in whatever general form is required to continue to prosecute the war, is not committed to said war, and in particular defending the annexed territories.
Unlike in Afghanistan in the Cold War, Russia is defending Russian speakers in the annexed regions and defending a critical long term strategic position.
Additionally, unlike Afghanistan, I would argue there isn't really an option of "just leaving" due to the geology (of there being no natural barrier between Ukraine and Russia) and politically due to the annexations.
This is not my theory at all.
"Drip Feed theory" (DFT) is that what is sent to Ukraine depends on what kind of help will prop up Ukraine in the short term while not being a real threat to Russia nor piss them off "too much".
So, the "next thing" is only sent to Ukraine after their fighting capacity is degraded sufficiently that they risk collapse if they don't get "the next thing" but also they no longer pose much of a threat even with "the next thing".
The reason for this policy is that if you sit down and really try to "push things" and consider doing what would need to be done to see through a Ukrainian victory, then rapidly you need to contend with nuclear escalation.
Help too much the Ukrainians with too sophisticated weapons and Russia can easily say things such as the weapons are entirely dependent on systems and information support outside Ukraine and is de facto at war with NATO and then not only strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons but also strike NATO bases in East-Europe.
Now, maybe NATO responds by nuking some Russian bases. If there's a full scale nuclear exchange that follows, that's not "winning" anything.
However, Russia could not respond, just take the loss in exchange for the loss of NATO bases in Eastern Europe, but retaliate instead by nuking more Ukraine, for example all the major cities rendering Ukraine completely unable to keep fighting.
And those would be the only two outcomes. Obviously, you have to nuke something if you get nuked, that goes without saying, but scenario 1 is a loss (doesn't matter much if Russia loses too for any rational actor) and scenario 2 is also a loss and arguably a win for Russia.
Of course, if there's no need to use nuclear weapons then as as has been noted many times there are lot's of reasons Russia would not use nuclear weapons in the current situation: because they are winning. Hence, if the West wants to minimize the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, then it needs to keep Russia winning by undersupplying Ukraine.
Hard to see the Russians going home.
I can't really blame anyone for not looking through the constant propaganda barrage, but the Russians are on track to decisively win the war.
Pressure on Zelensky is growing to start negotiations with the Russians. He has cancelled elections because by now everybody understands Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected. People within the Ukrainian military and political establishment are starting to admit that things are much worse than the media makes them appear.
While Zelensky is still trying to sell the myth of a Ukrainian offensive, both people in Ukraine and the Western media are openly saying its a stalemate, Ukraine is running out of men, etc.
But it's not a stalemate. Ukraine is losing, and it's losing decisively. That's why the pressure is growing. Sensible people understand that the longer Ukraine waits to negotiate, the more Ukraine's negotiating position will deteriorate.
'Stalemate' is just a cope term, to save face, to avoid having to admit defeat to domestic audiences, and to not have to utter the words "the Russians won".
The bottomline now is that Ukraine is not going to join NATO, and the question is whether negotiations will be able to produce something that the West and Ukraine can prop up to their domestic populations.
EU-membership might be that thing, though it's questionable whether this is realistic considering how utterly broken Ukraine is, and the fact that the EU has some pretty strict criteria on whether a country can join. It might simply be a carrot to dangle infront of Zelensky's face to get him to negotiate, or to give Zelensky something to sell to Ukrainians as a 'victory'.
I think this is all quite bleak and tragic, especially for Ukraine itself. I can't imagine having to make such sacrifices only for it to be in vain. But that's the price to pay for politicians who deal in delusions and fairy tales.
https://commission.europa.eu/news/enlargement-commission-recommends-starting-accession-negotiations-ukraine-moldova-bosnia-and-2023-11-08_en
Right, because it's absolutely impossible for a smaller country to win against a larger one. Never happens, ever.
Quoting boethius
And the Finns were right, while Ukraine is wrong, because?
Quoting boethius
I don't have access to the intelligence Ukraine had when deciding on that offensive, so I have no idea whether the effort was delusional. They seem to have adjusted their tactics to the situation on the ground well enough.
Quoting boethius
Now *that* is a delusional scenario unless we assume the Russian leadership is a suicide cult.
Quoting boethius
What are they winning exactly?
Quoting Tzeentch
By waving their magic war winning wand, presumably.
Quoting Tzeentch
Elections during wartime are against Ukrainian law, but your fantasy is interesting nonetheless. Care to share your evidence that Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected?
Quoting Tzeentch
Ah yes, "people are saying". Why have evidence or arguments when you can just say what people are saying?
Quoting Tzeentch
The tanks will be in Kiev any minute. You heard it here first folks!
Quoting Tzeentch
Right. Russia lost three major campaigns, but since the Ukrainian offensive also failed to reach it's objective the status quo is now a decisive russian victory. That makes total sense.
If I told you in December 2021 that Russia would expend it's entire peacetime army, it's entire stock of artillery ammunition, a large part of its armored vehicles and artillery pieces, to conquer (parts of) three Ukrainian Oblasts, you'd call that a major victory?
Quoting Tzeentch
Ukraine was never going to join NATO with Russian troops on its soil.
Quoting Tzeentch
Right, small states should just always do what their bigger neighbours want and not try to get out of there sphere of influence. Unless the neighbour is the evil imperialist US.
Russia invaded Ukraine over NATO membership/US influence specifically, and the strategic vulnerability of Crimea more broadly. They have successfully waylaid plans for Ukrainian NATO membership, and have taken 20% of Ukraine in the process, creating a landbridge to Crimea.
The Ukrainian military and economy are badly battered and basically on permanent life-support.
It's an absolute humiliation for the West, considering how the propaganda machine tried to spin the war and how Europe and the establishment media all, for some reason, jumped on the neocon bandwagon straight into this disaster.
That this would be the predictable outcome was clear to many when the war started back in 2022, and it has been quite frustrating to see how Western opinion got hijacked by propaganda and prolonged this copium-fueled war when it could have ended in March/April 2022. But people started to believe their own bullshit fairytales about pushing the Russians back to the border and out of Crimea.
Ukraine's bargaining position has only deteriorated since then, and it still is deteriorating further. Zelensky and the neocons will be unable to admit defeat, and prolong Ukraine's suffering at least until the 2024 elections, which in a cruel irony Biden is set to lose anyway.
The Russians with their tiny economy somehow managed to completely outfox the collective West. Again, it's the price the West pays for delusional leadership, but it's sad for the Ukrainians that they are the ones that have to pay the bill.
Quoting Echarmion
Ukraine was not in Russia's sphere of influence prior to the war, and its presidents actually did a fairly decent job at balancing between western and Russian interests. That balancing act is the price to pay for a small nation to exist between two large blocs.
Letting the Americans lead them down the primrose path was foolish in the extreme.
"It's not controversial" is not a substitute for an actual argument. You make an awful lot of claims but never actually supply anything as justification. Just being able to quote Mearsheimer doesn't make you some sort of authority that merely has to share their wisdom.
Is the war going terribly for Ukraine? By an objective standard, it's not. It went amazingly well earlier, so the current situation might look bad in comparison. But reducing Russia to fight a positional war on a peer footing isn't a small feat for a country that, in 2014, was barely able to react at all.
Quoting Tzeentch
Nah. Russia had troops on Ukrainian soil since 2014 an no way in hell is anyone joining NATO that is currently fighting the russian army.
You're not getting around that simple fact. Probably you'll ignore it like the others that make this same argument.
Quoting Tzeentch
If that was the plan then the Russian leadership must simply be stupid, since there's no way in hell these territories are worth burning through your entire stock of armaments.
Quoting Tzeentch
And so is the Russian military. Their economy is better able to absorb this in the short term, but this will likely be cold comfort to the average russian when the state runs out of means to cushion the domestic economy.
Quoting Tzeentch
It's an absolute humiliation for Russia. No idea why you think the West is humiliated.
Quoting Tzeentch
You mean it's frustrating that your predictions were wrong but rather than face the facts you're just going to repeat them in the hope that they'll eventually turn out true.
Quoting Tzeentch
The Ukraine is set to loose, Biden is set to loose, you should play the lottery!
Quoting Tzeentch
I'm sure the many thousands of dead russians feel very smug about having outfoxed the west.
Quoting Tzeentch
Apparently Putin did not agree with that though.
Well, this is a discussion forum where people share and talk about their ideas. I'm more than comfortable within these topics not to have to cite sources for uncontroversial claims.
Whinging about sources only to instantly hand-wave them when they're provided is a game people here play a little too often, and nothing in your demeanor suggests it would be worth my time.
In fact, you're already hand-waving Mearsheimer. Clearly you're not interested in anything I'd have to share, so don't be so dishonest as to ask for it.
Quoting Echarmion
Very difficult to understand where you're coming from.
Because the Ukrainians put up a valiant fight means Ukraine is somehow not in the process of losing the war?
I'm sure this type of emotional support counts for something to some people, but it count for nothing in the world of geopolitics.
Quoting Echarmion
Note, currently. Geopolitics is about the long-term, and the US has been arming and training the Ukrainians for an eventual war with Russia since at least 2014.
Well, they got their war.
Quoting Echarmion
Crimea is extremely important to the Russians, so I'd disagree.
If the Russians have burned through their entire stock of armaments, how come they are still winning in Ukraine? Are they continuing the fight with sticks and stones?
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, and I'm sure that will happen any day now.
Quoting Echarmion
The US attempted to wrench Ukraine from underneath the Russians' noses, and spent some 10 years arming and training the Ukrainians for this very purpose. Financial investments go back even further. Ukraine is the US neocon project.
At every step the US doubled down and played hardball.
Then Russia drew its line and is currently winning against a combined economic bloc that has over 20 times its GDP.
Russia's economy would collapse, Putin would be overthrown, the army would rebel, etc. - the Russians would be pushed back to the border and Crimea would be liberated.
It's obviously a humiliation, given how hard they went in with the rhetoric.
Quoting Echarmion
What prediction are you even talking about?
Quoting Echarmion
You fail to understand that the creation of Ukraine was based on a mutual understanding between NATO and post-Soviet Russia that Ukraine was to be a neutral bufferzone, necessary to avoid conflict.
Given the agreement was respected, the issue of Sevastopol and Crimea was negligible and Russian security interests could be covered through the lend-lease agreement they had.
It's the Americans who in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest Summit stated that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO", thus clearly signaling they were intending to change Ukraine's neutral status. That's what the Russians are and have been reacting to.
This isn't some effort of Russia to 'add Ukraine to its sphere of influence'. What a nonsensical view.
Where do I say it's impossible?
It's called evidence. Actual evidence is needed to support the idea that Ukraine is winning or can win in this case against a larger and stronger opponent. Otherwise, without evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the much larger and more powerful force is going to win a military confrontation.
Something being hypothetically possible does not lend any weight to it actually being the case in reality, which is the topic here.
Quoting Echarmion
The Finns were right because their strategy was realistic: Finland in WWII could not defeat the Soviet Union, but by defending long enough it would motivate the Soviet Union to agree to a peace on more favourable terms that outright capitulation or eventual military defeat.
The Finns leveraged their much smaller military force to maximize their defensive advantage in order to support a political objective of remaining independent.
Throughout the entire conflict with the Soviet Union, Finland maintained constant diplomatic talks.
What they didn't do is just throw their hands up, declare the Soviet Union evil, Stalin evil, and they wouldn't talk or negotiate with them and demand the world finance their entire war effort and most of their economy without any discernible political objective, or "end game" in modern talking head parlance.
Quoting Echarmion
We have enormous amounts of intelligence to go on, including regularly updated satellite imagery of Russian positions which showed us elaborate and multi-layered fortifications with extensive mine fields.
What sort of intelligence could Ukraine possibly have that would indicate attacking fortified lines built up over a whole year would be less costly to them compared to not-doing-that and waiting for Russia to attack Ukraine's own fortified positions?
Quoting Echarmion
Why didn't the US and NATO acolytes pour in all the advanced weaponry they have since trickled into Ukraine from the get go? Why aren't squadrons of f16 with all the advanced sensors and missiles and other munitions not patrolling Ukrainians skies as we speak?
The first year of the war, Ukraine had realistic chances of defeating the Russian forces that had invaded. Russia had not yet even partly mobilized, had not yet built up sophisticated defences, and were prosecuting the war with their professional soldiers and a band of mercenaries.
If the goal was to defeat Russia in Ukraine, it was certainly possible in the first months and year. Of course, that would not end the war but would be a humiliating military disaster for Russia, which combined with the disruption of the sanctions, would have solid chances of unravelling the Russian state as the Neo-cons so desired.
Now, instead of "providing what Ukraine needs" the West simply made arbitrary rules of what could be supplied: no tanks, no howitzers, no "offensive" missiles that could reach Russia proper, certainly no Western aircraft or helicopters, no advanced drones and so on.
When questioned about these limitations, sometime US or NATO officials would make up some lame excuse, but mostly they would simply say that they don't want to "escalate".
Escalate to where? To Ukraine winning, at least a first war?
No, obviously escalate to nuclear weapons.
If Russia was actually facing military defeat, lines collapsing, tens of thousands of prisoners, chaotic mobilization and so on, furious population and the start of civil unrest etc. they would certainly consider the use of nuclear weapons to salvage the situation.
Of course, we don't know if they would use nuclear weapons.
What we do know, is that the US and NATO did not want to find out what the decision would be.
And why? Because if you war game it out, if NATO and the US "pushed hard" in Ukraine and actually supplied what could deliver victory to Ukraine, and there was a flood of advanced Western weapons, then Russia certainly could legitimately say it is de facto in a state of war with NATO and so strike NATO bases in Eastern Europe with nuclear weapons as well as every bridge across the Dnieper as well as critical bunkers, C&C and supply centres to arrest the Ukrainian advance.
Now, you can argue that maybe such attacks wouldn't work, that all Russian warheads are duds or missile defence would work flawlessly to deal with it or whatever, but maybe such strikes would work perfectly well.
There is no rule that the use of tactical nuclear weapons automatically triggers a full on armageddon. You could say all Russian second strike capability are duds too ... ok, well, maybe they aren't.
So the question becomes first is it worth risking a full strategic exchange of nuclear weapons on all major cities in the West ... to protect a non-NATO members property over Russian speakers in East Ukraine?
And second, if the escalation stops and the end result is Russia hit some bases in Eastern Europe and NATO his some comparable Russian bases somewhere, and the war in Ukraine is ended as Russia can anyways just nuke at will there without there even being any treaty obligation to respond, is this a "win" for the West?
Maybe the outcome is better for the West than for Russia, but it doesn't seem to me a desirable situation.
More important than my opinion in explaining events, it is clearly NATO's opinion not to escalate anywhere close to what would cause Russia to seriously consider the use of nuclear weapons.
So, the logical corollary of such a policy is to support Ukraine enough to prop it up and avoid an embarrassing collapse but not enough to pose any real risk to Russian forces. So as Ukraine's fighting capacity diminishes, this policy calls for trying to reestablish parity with those advanced weapons that was "common sense" couldn't be sent sometimes even the month before.
Quoting Echarmion
They are winning the war. They have successfully conquered nearly a quarter of Ukraine, and arguably the most valuable quarter in terms of resources and the part that most speaks Russian.
The current "stalemate" is a war of attrition that heavily favours the larger force.
If you want to argue these aren't worthwhile moral objectives or then they are losing in some economic or political way (vis-a-vis the West; clearly Ukraine is far more damaged than Russia and is not winning in any political or economic sense against Russia), then you are free to do so, but the context of such an argument would be the Russians are at least winning militarily in Ukraine.
Yes, it's almost impossible to envision in the actual war at hand.
Unlike some remote and exotic place that normal people don't care about, the war is right on Russia's border and defending (from the Russian point of view) ethnic Russians as well as retaking lands that were Russian for hundreds of years. These are elements that strongly motivate a population to fight a war, very unlike wandering around the mountains in Afghanistan for no clear reason.
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes, we haven't even gotten to the part where all this skeptical analysis of Ukraine's prospects in a long war (compared to negotiating before or then in the short term after the war started) accumulated here and elsewhere is starting to be openly admitted and discussed even in mainstream Western media.
Quoting Tzeentch
Agreed.
What's worse than calling a war of attrition a stalemate, the comparison to WWI trench warfare is particular irritatingly ignorant.
WWI wasn't a stalemate! I'm pretty sure one side lost.
Quoting Tzeentch
This should be the problem, but the underlying problem is the extent of the losses. As soon as the war ends there is going to be a tally of Ukrainian dead and permanently disabled and it will be revealed the extent to which Ukrainians and the West were lied to and the madness driving the war will be revealed.
The entire justification for the war effort was that Ukraine was inflicting more losses than sustaining, or then the moments of skepticism about that in Western media would fall back to at least parity: that "maybe" Ukrainians aren't inflicting more losses but then it would be about the same.
It is the day of reckoning that Zelensky fears most and he will do everything to avoid it.
I would argue that it is simply not mentally possible for Zelensky to face the reality of what he has done, especially as multiple opportunities to negotiate a peace existed before and during the war.
Everyone else can just say they were following orders, naturally.
Hence the need to gradually discredit Zelensky and get rid of him.
That is my prediction anyways.
Quoting Tzeentch
It is certainly a great tragedy.
And we have definitely learned that wishful thinking doesn't win wars. Again.
What is there to discuss if you don't justify your claims re the military situation?
Quoting Tzeentch
How many armored vehicles has Russia lost? How many artillery pieces? How many soldiers?
The defense has been a bit more than a "valiant fight". Russia isn't sitting around leisurely twiddling their thumbs while they wait for Ukraine to surrender. For almost two years they have thrown everything they have into the conflict, and lost a good chunk of that.
Quoting Tzeentch
They already had Crimea. Their goals obviously went way beyond that but this doesn't fit your narrative so you'll ignore both the very obvious stated goals (demilitarise and denazify) and also the evidence in the form of actual russian invasion routes.
Quoting Tzeentch
If you think a country can go on spending more than 10% of its GDP on the military without ill effects I don't know what to tell you.
Quoting Tzeentch
So you claim. The evidence for this is flimsy as has been discussed ad nauseum already. In any event Russia had a perfectly good frozen conflict in Ukraine already.
Quoting Tzeentch
Russian troops have been fighting in Ukraine since 2014.
Quoting Tzeentch
If winning is wrecking your military and throwing away your international prestige and various lucrative trade deals, I'd hate to see what loosing looks like.
What has Russia gained, a bit of territory? That won't transform the russian economy. Russian arms have been exposed as sub-par, russian military doctrine as a failure. Russia is loosing influence in it's "near abroad", primarily to China, due to its inability to uphold commitments. The need to keep Chechnya quiet is forcing Putin to allow Kadyrov to amass a significant independent powerbase.
Really for someone to claim they "look at geopolitics" your view seems remarkably focused on a single coloured line on a map. There's a reason states have largely stopped the kind of territorial aggrandisement Russia is undertaking.
Quoting Tzeentch
I think you're substituting what officials have actually said with your idea of what they wished for.
Quoting Tzeentch
That Ukraine would fall within weeks. That the real russian army wasn't yet fully in the fight.
Kiev was supposed to fall "any day now" as you like to claim. Then it was Charkiw that was about to fall. None of it materialised yet there's still the exact same rhetoric about how Russia, with it's superior resources, cannot fail to win.
Quoting Tzeentch
Ridiculous nonsense. Ukraine was a SSR and gained independence when Jelzin decided to dissolve the USSR. That was a result of internal USSR politics, not some imagined understanding with NATO.
Quoting Tzeentch
Which was merely a reaffirmation of the previous policy, and in fact the plan was subsequently put in ice, as has been pointed out in this thread. Plus there's the previous point about NATO membership being impossible since 2014.
Quoting Tzeentch
Someone should tell Putin, because his statements very clearly say that Ukraine is an illegitimate state and should really just be part of Russia.
Ukraine won the battle for Kiev, the battle for Charkiv (that one actually was a major rout) and the battle for Kherson.
Russia meanwhile has demonstrated the ability to take territory by assaulting a relatively small sector of the front with a large, grinding assault. But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. Ukraine meanwhile has failed to penetrate heavy russian defenses.
That's the evidence, and it doesn't suggest either side is about to win decisively. At best it suggests a status quo peace.
Quoting boethius
But that wasn't the russian goal. And they have also wrecked their military to an extent that will likely prevent them from projecting serious military power for years.
That's a major defeat in my book.
Quoting boethius
No-one wants the Russian state to unravel because then the nukes are unaccounted for and who knows what happens.
The point of the restrictions was, in part, to avoid just such an unraveling.
But also because popular opinion matters and while most people who looked at the matter concluded there was very little risk of a nuclear escalation, politicians aren't elected by foreign policy experts. People were very worried about a nuclear escalation, that has mostly faded by now.
You can't win a war without taking casualties. Pretty obvious.
Quoting Echarmion
Crimea became strategically vulnerable when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status.
Quoting Echarmion
If you're saying that, I highly doubt you actually understand the implications of the size and disposition of the initial Russian invasion force.
It's a clear indicator of the fact that they had limited objectives going in.
Quoting Echarmion
Flimsy? It's right there on the US state department's website. :lol:
Quoting Uncle Sam Himself
Or maybe you'd rather hear it from chief neocon Nuland in 2013. Even before the violent coup d'etat of 2014 the US was already deeply involved in Ukraine.
Quoting Head Honcho Nuland
_
Quoting Echarmion
I never said anything like that.
I've actually extensively argued the opposite. It is clear by Russian troop counts and disposition that capturing all of Ukraine (or Kiev, for that matter) was not their goal. And Mearsheimer makes that point as well.
Capturing all of Ukraine would be crazy, and would have invited an US-backed insurgency. In fact, there are good indications that is what the US was planning for.
Here is a lovely panel by CSIS in which they elaborately explain why occupying Ukraine would be a terrible idea, and how stupid the Russians are for trying it. The joke turned out to be on them, however, since the Russians never did.
They even invited Michael Vickers - the man responsible for the US-backed insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He literally states the insurgency they could create in Ukraine would be bigger than the one in Afghanistan.
Quoting Michael G. Vickers
-
Quoting Echarmion
The US was in the process of creating a fait accompli. They almost succeeded.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
Apparent to whom? What evidence?
You demand others provide evidence (often of completely obvious things to anyone following the conflict, which is what we do here) and yet provide none yourself.
Quoting Echarmion
While Ukraine was "winning" the battle for Kiev, Russia simply rolled out of Crimea (on bridges that were neither bombed nor shelled) and created a land bridge from Crimea to Russian mainland.
However, true that Ukraine was at least able to defend Kiev and did not entirely capitulate and clearly demonstrated that if Russia was to settle things militarily it would be extremely costly (which it has been). Of course, when a smaller force makes such a demonstration to a larger force it is extremely likely that continued fighting will be even more costly to the smaller force.
Therefore, the smaller force should aim to use the leverage of the prospect of a costly and risky war (not only in itself but in terms of extrinsic events) to negotiate a peace on the most favourable terms.
Ukraine achieved that after the winning the battle of Kiev.
Unfortunately, if temporarily winning one battle among many losses, against what is essentially an imperial expeditionary force (not remotely the whole your adversary can muster) goes to your head and you, the smaller force, decide your soldiers are so much better and more motivated than your enemy and you are in fact in position to settle things on the battle field (aka. delusional), then that leverage starts going away.
The more the war goes on, the more the larger force will want to "show for it" and the more foolish the decision to keep fighting becomes compared to settling things quickly (especially when reasonable peace terms were proposed): enter wishful thinking driving strategy rather than any realistic summation of prospects.
And the reason it is delusional is that against a far larger force you'd need to inflict losses at such a disproportionate rate and sustain that against the enemy being able to do something call learning. There was never any concrete evidence Ukraine could inflict disproportionate casualties on the Russians at the scale of the entire war (certainly some engagements go better or worse) and any critical enquiry would be met with "well .... Ukraine doesn't disclose its casualties; it's a war you know, very secret stuff", but even if the propaganda was true you'd need to believe Russia would be unable to adapt and even the playing field, which is an incredibly foolish assumption considering Russia has not only more resources, available manpower but far more capabilities than Ukraine (air, sea, armour, etc.); it is not a situation where Ukraine is carpet bombing at will Russian troops equipped essentially with only small arms.
Why the myth of the incompetent Russian soldier who essentially wants to die was so critical to make Ukraine's commitment to further fighting and explicit refusal to negotiate make sense. You'd have to believe that the Russian soldier is essentially retarded to maintain the idea that the Russian army won't figure out some effective use of all its equipment, assuming you believed the propaganda that Ukraine was inflicting asymmetric losses on the Russians (rather than what was likely: Ukraine was suffering significantly more losses maintaining ground against Russia's professional and better equipped army and then later mercenaries).
Very easy to do. Just look at how much Russia has gained more territory after the initial thrust.
Let's remember that Russia has [i]lost[i] considerable territory as it lost the whole Kyiv front.
The thing is, Russia not gaining more territory is entirely congruent with the view that Russia is pursuing limited goals in Ukraine,
which in turn would be much more in line with common military logic (troops counts, etc.),
which in turn would be much more in line with sensible strategic planning
which, I'll repeat it again, was likely first and foremost concerned with avoiding a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan War against a US-backed insurgency.
Quoting ssu
It's more accurate to say that the Russians left the Kiev front.
We know what bitter fighting looks like in the context of this war. It looks like Bahkmut, the Ukrainian offensive, Avdiivka, etc.
That's not what we saw in the north.
Equally congruent is that Russia failed to reach it's goals.
Which would be incongruent with common military logic: why would Russia deploy a fraction of the troops required to occupy Ukraine?
And also with sensible strategic planning: why would Russia try to occupy a country which is already deeply enmeshed with the United States, with a gigantic insurgency being basically guaranteed?
Sure, one could hand-wave all of this under the idea that the Russians are simply incompetent, but that's a very weak explanation in my opinion.
Pah. A weak evasion. Is that what you call a discussion?
Quoting Tzeentch
After 2014? Again you're not even trying.
Quoting Tzeentch
Oh really? What major maneuver forces were held back?
Quoting Tzeentch
Again you're mixing together times and places to create a lie. Why? I don't believe you're simply unable to keep a coherent timeline in your head.
Quoting Tzeentch
Yeah "deeply involved", so what?
Quoting Tzeentch
In that case I retract my claim insofar as it implied you did. But plenty of people who did now make the same arguments you do.
Quoting Tzeentch
Out of curiosity, I looked this up, but all that Mearsheimer says is that Russia would have been unable to take all of Ukraine, but he does actually say they intended to capture Kiev.
Quoting Tzeentch
I think the joke is on the Russians for failing at their objective. Your claim that Russia couldn't possibly have intended something that would have been a bad idea doesn't seem convincing given that the entire war is a spectacularly bad idea either way.
If Russia was convinced they couldn't possibly occupy Ukraine because of US interference why did they think they could invade in the first place?
Quoting Tzeentch
More empty, outrageous claims.
You should tell the paratroopers at Hostomel. Or all the dead tank crews on the road to Kiev.
They used what they had. Period. In a rapid short war, Ukraine ought to have collapsed and a favorable pro-Russian government would have taken over the rump-state of Ukraine (what was to be left of it). And if it was easy, why not take all of it?
And they had objectives that were not met and occupying everything to the Western border wasn't that. But even those "limited" objective were not met.
And I think it's obvious what those objectives now are as Putin has actually annexed territories that he doesn't occupy in full.
Apparent from reading reports by the ISW, Oryx, or various commentators who cite their sources.
Quoting boethius
I demand argument mostly, and some reference to facts on the ground rather than airy declarations.
You, I might remind you, have provided zero evidence yourself.
Quoting boethius
So are the Ukrainians fools for strategically deciding which front to defend? Because earlier you lauded Finnland for that strategy.
Quoting boethius
These are the kind of airy statements unmoored from facts on the ground that I meant earlier.
Quoting boethius
Hahaha, yeah the famed second russian army they kept in reserve. Too bad it never made it to Ukraine...
Quoting boethius
You're discussing a strawman. The russian army has demonstrated ability to learn in various areas. That said it still seems to suffer from C&C flaws, which aren't surprising in an autocratic regime.
But anyway what's the point of discussing when you're clearly have a very different picture of reality but don't seem interested in naming your sources.
Ok, so what do you believe those limited objectives were?
My guess would be something along the lines of:
- Occupy strategically vital areas, ergo landbridge to Crimea.
- Try to force the West to negotiate a quick end to the war through a show of force around the capital.
In March/April 2022 the West blocked a peace treaty that was in the final stages of being signed, signaling the end of the first 'phase' of the war. The Russians shifted gears, rearranged their lines to cover vital areas and be able to withstand a long war since they were probably overextended initially.
And that's pretty much the war in a nutshell.
The media has been propping up this war to no end, but it really isn't much more complicated than that.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Echarmion
Clearly. All that connects Crimea to Russia is the Kerch bridge, which would not last a day under normal war-time conditions but was probably spared due to political reasons. (i.e. the Americans pressuring the Ukrainians not to push the Russians too far, as per arguments).
Imagine what the Russian situation would have looked like had the US been able to continue their militarization of Ukraine.
Quoting Echarmion
For example, only 20,000 Russian troops participated in the battle of Kiev. Woefully inadequate to effectively occupy a city of nearly 3 million inhabitants, not to mention the some 40,000 - 60,000 Ukrainian defenders. It's just not feasible by any stretch, considering a 3:1 advantage is pretty much the bare minimum for large-scale offensive operations.
There was a 3:1 advantage alright, in favor of the Ukrainians.
Of course, this was spun as a heroic defense by Ukraine. It obviously wasn't. The Russians rolled up to Kiev and then stood there for about a month to see if the negotiations would bear fruit. Skirmishes took place and of course the Russians took losses. That's what happens during war. The Russians aren't afraid to break a few eggs in order to bake an omelet.
Quoting Echarmion
No, I'm not.
The US was investing billions of dollars into Ukraine even before the Maidan and the 2014 Crimea invasion. That's what they're openly admitting.
Quoting Echarmion
The US is admitting to giving the Ukrainians billions in military aid - a country that had a critical role of neutral buffer between East and West, and you say "so what"?
Well, so what? The Russians told us, over the course of some 20 years, that they view it as a threat to their vital security. We, the West, snubbed them at every turn because we thought they were weak.
To put it in academic terms; the US fucked around and found out.
Quoting Echarmion
He does not. In his 2022 lectures he says something along the lines of 'the Russians intended to capture or threaten Kiev' (which was already a controversial statement at the time). In more recent lectures he states outright he doubts that the Russians ever intended to capture Kiev, and that's the argument I am making.
Quoting Echarmion
That's not my claim. I just think that's an extraordinarily weak explanation, probably borne of lazy thinking by lesser minds, and not really worth considering.
If the Russians are a bunch of dummies then why are we even discussing? Victory is surely right around the corner. I can't wait to see it.
Quoting Echarmion
Ah, but here's the strategy.
The Russians bit off a strategically relevant chunk that is small enough for them to pacify.
I would not be surprised if there is going to be a second invasion of Ukraine which follows roughly the same pattern. Mearsheimer seems to believe as much. He expects the Russians to take another belt of oblasts to the west of what they have occupied now.
Personally, I have my doubts about that, as expressed in this comment.
Quoting Echarmion
A failed raid or successful ambush tell us nothing about the actual goings-on of the war. These things are milked by the propaganda machine to no end, but you'll need to poke through that if you want to get a more accurate picture of the war.
War requires sacrifices and military friction supposes failures small and large. That's the nature of war.
I do not find where ISW makes any tally of Russian losses.
Oryx methodology is an absolute joke; they count any piece of video provided by Ukraine with zero context purporting to show a Russian loss as a "verified" Russian loss.
Anyways, with the end of the war we'll get a better picture of what the losses have actually been.
Quoting Echarmion
I've provided plenty of evidence throughout this discussion to support my points.
For the matter at hand however, it's not under dispute that Russia is the larger force. You don't dispute that, neither does anyone else. The argument is straightforward that the larger force is likely to win, especially in a a war of attrition that is the current configuration of the war.
The argument is so obvious based on so obvious facts that asking for references just highlights your confusion as to where you are, what your purpose in life is and what is happening generally speaking. For, you, nor anyone else, disputes these facts, so there is no need to support them with citations.
I point out that actual evidence is needed to believe the contrary: that despite being a smaller country with a smaller military and less capabilities, that Ukraine is going to win or there is even a viable path to victory.
You, nor anyone else, can now present such evidence that Ukraine is "winning" against the odds, or even a remotely plausible theory of how Ukraine could potentially win.
The best that is offered is that it's hypothetically possible for a smaller force to defeat a larger force or then larger forces have tired of war and gone home in the past.
Failing to answer such questions and find any evidence, you feebly retreat to demanding I provide evidence to support my position.
You really want evidence that Russia is the larger country with the larger military? Or do you really want evidence that the war at the moment, and since a while, is not a war of manoeuvre but of attrition?
Or do you want me to through the basic arithmetic required to understand that in any attritional process of even remote parity (of which there is no reason to believe any asymmetry is in Ukraine's favour), the larger of the abrading assemblies has the advantage.
Or do you want me to cite CNN citing Ukrainian top officials saying exactly the same thing?
Quoting Exhausted and disappointed with allies, Ukraine’s president and military chief warn of long attritional war - CNN
Quoting Echarmion
I lauded Finland for using military action to support feasible political objectives and conserving their military force through defending rather than working themselves up into a delusional war frenzy and promising to "retake every inch of Finnish lands" before recklessly throwing themselves at prepared Soviet Defences.
Now, it just so happens that Finland had suitable geography to defend against a larger force, one reason to gamble on costly military defence rather than capitulate.
Ukrainian political leaders are fools for not using their military leverage (before it is exhausted) to negotiate the best possible terms for peace.
Quoting Echarmion
What are you disputing exactly? That Ukraine won the battle of Kiev in 2022?
Or are you disputing the basic principle that military power should be used to achieve political objectives (either by physically implementing them or leverage in negotiation) ... rather than express wanton hate and strive for pointless destruction?
Quoting Echarmion
I'm referring to the fact that Russia has far larger professional standing army, far more reservists and conscripts that can be mobilized. Are you disputing this fact? That Russia, being larger, has far more manpower available?
And this famed second army does exist and is still in reserve. It may simply be used to simply continue the attritional fighting and rotate and replenish troops or maybe it will be used for some large offensive maneuver anywhere along the border with Ukraine / Belarus.
Quoting Echarmion
What straw man? I'm discussing the propaganda pervasive at the start of the war that the Russian army was incompetent and easy to defeat. Propaganda that was essential to convince the West and Ukraine to rush into total war.
For, if you paused to reflect that Russia is far larger and the degree to which, man for man, Ukraine would need to outperform Ukraine with less military capabilities (air, sea, armour, drones, electronic warfare etc.) the doubt may creep in that maybe Ukraine cannot win a total war with Russia and it would be much better for the Ukrainian people and Europe to negotiate a peace, compromise with the Russians to save lives and as much Ukrainian sovereignty as possible.
Of course, no need for such sober deliberations if the Russian soldier is some hapless retarded child wandering around the battle field in a blissfully ignorant whimsy.
Again, the position that requires evidence is the idea that Ukraine can inflict massively asymmetric losses required to win.
My position is based on the facts that are not in dispute: Russia is larger and has more military capabilities and there is no reason to believe Ukraine can somehow win in such a disadvantaged position.
Of course, US / NATO could have tried to even the odds by pouring in advanced capabilities, but they didn't because they fear nuclear escalation, which even if the risk is small is not a risk worth taking for Ukraine.
Why would "the West" be the one negotiating in such a scenario?
Quoting Tzeentch
Which is still an unsourced claim that's only repeated by people with a known pro-Russia bias.
Quoting Tzeentch
So the Americans are holding the Ukrainians back, but at the same time the Americans are the one threatening Ukraine's neutrality. Yeah makes sense....
Quoting Tzeentch
Not the answer to my question.
Also no idea where you're getting your numbers from. Per Wikipedia Ukraine had 20.000 regulars and 18.000 irregulars across the entire northern front, while Russia had some 70.000 regular troops.
And finally you're assuming perfect information and foresight on the part of Russia.
Quoting Tzeentch
Obviously. It can't be because that would disagree with your narrative.
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes, let's ignore the entire well documented battle and go with your fantasy of russian forces leisurely rolling up to the capital to wait for negotiations. Maybe the unicorns also came down to greet them?
It's just sad at this point.
Quoting Tzeentch
Changing the goalposts. Not a surprise.
Quoting Tzeentch
It was not the point under discussion. But do keep changing the subject whenever one of your so called arguments fails.
Quoting Tzeentch
How many US soldiers died? And how many Russians?
Quoting Tzeentch
You're not making an argument, you're repeating a claim. If he changed his tune that's too bad, but only illustrates he's loosing his grip on reality. It happens all too often to people who get too drunk on their own theories.
Quoting Tzeentch
Oh, lesser minds, is it? Unlike your, extraordinary mind, which knows all there is to know, without even having to deal with pesky reality on the way.
Quoting Tzeentch
Strawman. Not a particularly interesting one either.
Quoting Tzeentch
Using it's secret, second army, which will no doubt ride into battle on their magic unicorns.
But of course you don't think so because Putin the master strategist has already decided he has enough.
Quoting Tzeentch
Unless you're Ukraine. Then military friction is actually a sign of imminent collapse and every loss is a devastating defeat.
And in the meantime you'll just ignore the evidence because it suits you. Because that's proper epistemology, apparently.
Quoting boethius
I didn't ask you to prove any of these, but I'm glad you got all that anger off your chest.
Quoting boethius
I guess we'll see when the war is over. After all Finnland did loose, while Ukraine hasn't lost yet.
Quoting boethius
Yes actually, in terms of effective manpower. It does not have "far more". It has far more population, but it's ability to train and equip effective frontline forces, while still superior to Ukraine's, is not decisively larger. As evidenced by the fact that there's a stalemate and Russia has been struggling to rotate degraded units.
Quoting boethius
Oh god you're actually serious...
Quoting boethius
At the start of the war everyone assumed the russian army would overrun Ukraine in weeks, as far as I remember.
Quoting boethius
Maybe it cannot, but for one Russia is not as of now fighting a total war in Ukraine and, for another, military capabilities seem to be about at parity for now, which means that Ukraine certainly has not lost the ability to negotiate from a position of strength.
Quoting boethius
Again apart from the fact that they have alredy suffered three major defeats in this war and have had obvious problems replacing both men and materiel.
To be sure I'm not claiming Ukraine is certain to win, but so far the war has certainly not demonstrated Russia's overwhelming superiority.
I'd like to elaborate on this for the benefit of people who have been confused by Western propaganda that spins military hardware and assistance as non-threatening.
The propaganda is based on the bait-and-switch fallacy of first establishing providing military assistance is legal and then switching out legal for "non threatening", then any rational discussion of this error in reasoning simply being met with endless confusion as to what "threat means", essentially concluding with the argument that since NATO does not intend to attack Russia that therefore military hardware moved close to Russia is not threatening.
The analogy required to understand how stupid this propaganda is, is to consider the scenario where I put a loaded gun to your head and then tell you I'm not threatening you because I don't intend to pull the trigger.
That a gun to your head is a threat to your safety is independent of the intention to shoot you.
Military hardware is by definition a threat to one's safety and by definition moving said military hardware closer is moving said threat closer and the party it's being moved closer to will naturally feel more threatened than if that hardware was further away.
This was a critical piece of propaganda as without accepting moving military means closer to another country is by definition moving a threat closer to that country which may provoke said country to reduce the threat, makes any rational analysis of the situation impossible.
Of course, you can argue that the military hardware moved further and further East towards Russia has nothing to do with Russia and is just a fun exercise.
Likewise, you can argue that even if Russia should feel threatened by NATO moving hardware East it shouldn't respond by invading West; that "defending national interest" is only a US prerogative, for example.
Or one could argue that despite the hardware being an obvious threat that a rational actor should try to diminish, that NATO is so far more powerful than Russia that there is no effective response.
The problem with all these arguments is of course it begs the question of why move military hardware further East if the West has no intention to threaten Russia as it claims and maybe it's just better to negotiate peace rather than do destabilizing things, in the best light, to not really achieve anything. Did moving NATO missile bases into Eastern Europe make Eastern Europe safer and a better place? If not, what was the point again?
Fanatical fighting, however, is incompatible with rational analysis.
First and foremost, the battle for Kyiv wasn't some kind of fake attack. Yet the fall of Ukraine didn't happened and Putin (correctly) then withdraw. Yet it's obvious, starting from Clausewitz, that this was one of the most important objectives: either take or surround the capital.
Ignore what evidence?
I went and looked for ISW tally of Russian and Ukrainian losses, as even if heavily biased towards supporting Western narratives, I'd nevertheless be surprised if they were arguing Ukraine is inflicting the many multiple times more losses required to win a war of attrition with the Russians.
I ask you to actually cite the evidence you're referring to in the context of you complaining about the lack of evidence to support facts you don't dispute ... and you just claim I'm ignoring your evidence by asking for the actual evidence??
Oryx I also did not ignore but pointed out their methodology of just looking at videos published by Ukraine and taking them at face value is not even moronically intellectually dishonest but pure propaganda; it's essentially just relabelling Ukrainian propaganda and then considering it independent. Absolute rubbish.
Quoting Echarmion
What anger. I ask you questions.
That the questions don't need answering because the answers are so obvious closes the case that you are a complete fool.
You ask for "the evidence" to support my arguments, I ask you what evidence you want to see, and then you say you aren't asking me to prove any of the facts needed to make my argument that: bigger army with more capabilities is very likely to win a war of attrition.
Quoting Echarmion
Since the invasion, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands more troops thus essentially creating another army compared to the first army that invaded.
Again, what are you disputing? That Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands additional troops? Or just you'd quibble about calling such a mobilization another army?
Quoting Echarmion
This is just false. Plenty of military analysts pointed out that 200 000 troops is not enough to overrun Ukraine, that Ukraine is huge, that Ukraine has the largest Army in Europe, can mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, is supported by US / NATO weapons, logistics and intelligence.
Go and find even one expert pre-war military analysis that concluded Russia would overrun Ukraine in weeks, then contrast your failure to find even with "everybody".
Academic, think tank, and even talking heads in the media all agreed that essentially the maximum aim of the Russians would be to create a land bridge to Crimea compared to a minimalist incursion to simply protect the Donbas separatists. The idea Russia would be conquering all of Ukraine in weeks did not exist.
Of course, Ukraine could capitulate, but all there was pretty wide consensus that if Ukraine decided to fight it can put up a serious fight and would not be easy to defeat.
Quoting Echarmion
For someone who complains about a lack of evidence to support facts you don't doubt to begin with, you say a lot of baseless obviously false things.
Ukraine still has no air power remotely comparable to the Russians, and their top general complains about it regularly that air power is required for modern warfare.
Air power has been essential for conventional warfare since WWII. The entire US military strategy and force composition is centred around achieving air supremacy.
What parity?
As for negotiating from a position of strength ... Russia was offering Donbas to remain in Ukraine, just with some political autonomy so as to protect Russian speakers, both before the war and during the first phase. You seriously believe Ukraine will be able to get such a deal now?
And even if that was somehow in the cards (which it's not) what could possibly justify over a year more of fighting and such devastation to a deal that was rejected?
However, your focus on capabilities again simply highlights your complete ignorance of military affairs and total lack of understanding of "facts on the ground" you allude to.
The smaller party is going to lose a war of attrition even with parity in capabilities.
Russia does not need to fight a total war to fight with Ukraine, it needs only match Ukraine in man power and then rely on replenishing its forces and greater capabilities to grind down the Ukrainian military to the point of total collapse.
Since it's far larger, Russia can match Ukraine's total war and also keep running its peace time economy at the same time.
The fact that you understand Russia is not at total war but there is a "stalemate" (aka. war of attrition) should be enough in itself to conclude Ukraine is in a disastrous position.
Quoting Echarmion
Russia needs to balance the war effort with maintaining a functioning economy and also domestic support for the war.
This is what the West was betting Russia would be unable to do, especially under the "nuclear option" of massive sanctions.
That was the theory of victory, some sort of internal Russian collapse. Since that didn't happen, Ukraine is now screwed as there was no military backup plan. Ukraine fighting was supposed to trigger some sort of Russian revolution and so there was no need to defeat the Russian military in the field.
There was never any evidence this theory of victory could likely work (of course, in "hypothetical land" nearly anything can work) but it was an easy sell to a Western audience.
That there was no intention or plan to occupy Kiev does not mean it was a fake attack.
The purpose was to pressure Ukrainians / Zelensky into negotiating a settlement while also fixing troops while the South was conquered and pacified (and Azov battalion destroyed in Mariupol and prevent some sort of heroic rescue of them).
Pointing out 20 000 troops isn't enough to conquer in urban combat and occupy a capital city of a few million does not mean the attack was "fake", just that there was obviously no intention to do something so obviously impossible.
The Russians also shelled everything of military value in Kiev, such as war industries, so it accomplished that too.
If taking Kiev was the principal Russian objective, how come the fighting around Kiev resembled nothing like we saw in places where actual bitter fighting took place? And how come they only deployed 20,000 troops to participate in the battle and they never made any serious effort to surround the capital let alone capture Kiev? We would expect massed firepower.
I agree with you to the extent that there was obviously a point to the attack on Kiev, but in my opinion this was a show of force meant to facilitate negotiations, and it served a double purpose in pulling troops to the north to faciliate the advance in the south.
_
I agree with you. The West (i.e. the United States) knew exactly what it was doing by arming Ukraine, and it did so specifically to flip Ukraine, as they said they would do at the 2008 Bucharest Summit.
It requires an extraordinary amount of naivety to believe western intentions were benign, and even more in the case of the Russians who clearly voiced their security concerns over the course of more than a decade.
Quoting Echarmion
The Russians are responding to a western action, namely the militarization of Ukraine. They probably expected 'the West' to be more reasonable.
Instead, the United States is completely content to sacrifice Ukraine, and the EU is too dimwitted to understand what is even going on.
Quoting Echarmion
Nonsense. Jeffrey Sachs gave us clear accounts of what the people involved told him happened. Are you really going to argue he is 'pro-Russian'? The guy is as genuine as they come.
Noam Chomsky, Seymour Hersh - all pro-Russian too?
Accusing the other side of partisanship is intellectual poverty.
Quoting Echarmion
The Ukrainian general staff reported 31 BTGs moving on Kiev. That's roughly 21,000 soldiers. This figure never changed over the course of the month-long battle.
The Wiki article actually says ~20,000 irregulars + 'an undisclosed number of regular fighters' - Yea, I wonder why it's undisclosed? Perhaps the Battle of Kiev couldn't be spun into an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' if the Ukrainians were actually outnumbering the Russians on the defense, eh?
The 60,000 figure comes from a Seymour Hersh interview in which he suggests 40,000 regular troops + 20,000 irregulars, but even if we take your figure and suppose 40,000 defenders, that still puts the Ukrainian forces at a 2:1 advantage.
For urban fighting a city like Kiev we'd expect 3:1 in favor of the Russians as the bare minimum - we'd expect as much as 10:1 in one were planning for success.
Quoting Echarmion
More like, it's impossible to twist the numbers to fit an 'heroic Ukrainian victory' narrative even if you wanted to.
Quoting Echarmion
You mean the propaganda you've been binging on over the last year?
Yea. Let's ignore that.
Casualty figures do not suggest the type of bitter fighting we have seen elsewhere in the war. If the Russians intended to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses with massed force and firepower, we would expect an entirely different picture.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
Blah blah.
I hear an exhausted mind. You're just having a hard time coping.
Quoting Echarmion
I know a few people in the Biden White House who are going to lose their jobs though. But yea, the US did a great job at making the Ukrainians do the dying for them. Good for them!
Quoting Echarmion
This is toddler level.
I figured you deserved a chance at a normal discussion, but alas, it seems I was wrong.
Right, you don't ignore it, it's just all rubbish, presumably compared to some mysterious source you have yet to reveal to us.
Quoting boethius
And you would know from experience.
Quoting boethius
Perhaps you should reread what I wrote, since I did not ask you for evidence.
Quoting boethius
So you do agree that Russia has lost it's entire peacetime army after all?
Quoting boethius
I can find plenty of references ot people saying Ukraine will be overrun within weeks, but no direct claim by any military analyst.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-invasion-predictions-wrong-intelligence/32275740.html
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/03/the-will-to-fight-lessons-from-ukraine.html
So maybe you are right and military analysts did not actually predict this and I merely remember baseless claims from the media.
Can you support your claim of what military analysts said?
Quoting boethius
I think I just provided some evidence to the contrary, but feel free to provide your own.
Quoting boethius
The parity on the actual battlefield, where Russia is not actually winning currently.
Quoting boethius
Hence it hiked it's military spending to 6% of GDP which, given the profusion of shadow budgets, translates to somewhere between 10 and 20% of total GDP in terms of actual spending. That's Soviet Union levels of military expenditure.
Quoting boethius
Exactly. Hence why it cannot simply declare total war.
Quoting boethius
The plan is merely to increase the price of the war for Russia to a point where the russian regime is no longer willing to pay it. A "collapse" is not required.
You're merely claiming they did not make a serious effort. But maybe they were simply intending their plan to actually work, take key points around Kiev with an airborne assault and then quickly overrun the defense with air power and one massed column.
They did employ massed firepower, particularly from the air, but apparently underestimated Ukrainian air defense.
Quoting Tzeentch
Straight out of the propaganda playbook. Of course the actual invader who is actually responsible for the wave of death and misery unleashed by the invasion is the good guy. It's all the fault of the evil and stupid West.
It's russians who are doing the killing, not the US. Perhaps you ought to remember.
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes, actually. He was fucking hosted by Vladimir Solovyov during wartime...
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes on Noam Chomsky, his position against US imperialism mean he will always tend to portray the US as the villain, though he does not actually claim the negotiatians failed because of US and UK intereference, he merely considers it a possibility.
Seymour Hersh is not, though he is perhaps a bit too reliant on sensational anonymous sources in recent times. Still, he has often been proven right at the end. I could not find anything about Hersh repeating that particular claim though. He is mainly known for his theory that the US sabotaged Nord Stream.
Quoting Tzeentch
Looking at the source of a claim which cannot otherwise be checked is basic due dilligence. You wouldn't believe a US press release about them discovering Putin's secret Ukraine plan, dating from 20 years ago, either.
Quoting Tzeentch
You're guessing though.
Quoting Tzeentch
I'd have to see the actual interview, since again Hersh has been known in revent years to rely on anonymous sources which tell sensational stories.
Quoting Tzeentch
It is obvious the Russians did not expect Ukraine to fight seriously. That doesn't mean they did no want to take control of the city.
Quoting Tzeentch
Russia is an overwhelming superpower that is impossible to defeat. Except when it is defeated, then it was actually weak and it's not really a victory even.
Quoting Tzeentch
And you would know, because you're the military expert and we'll just have to believe you. The only thing we have actual evidence for, as far as I can see, is that Ukrainian losses were quite light, while the russian advance elements suffered heavy casualties.
This is entirely consistent with Russia abandonning the operation after failing to secure necessary preliminaries, and realising the Ukrainian army was going to stand and fight.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
Whatever. If you want to quit just do it.
Russia Turns to Longtime Arms Customers to Boost War Arsenal
[sup]— Thomas Grove, Summer Said, Luciana Magalhaes, Gordon Lubold, Saeed Shah, Chao Deng · WSJ · Nov 8, 2023[/sup]
Concerns about running out of means to terrorize Ukraine?
Occupiers report missile attack on Skadovsk: Russian base supposedly hit
[sup]— Ukrainska Pravda via Yahoo · Nov 9, 2023[/sup]
Surgical strike in the south? Either way, Saldo seems to be in a precarious situation.
, the Kremlin gets their way, or it's the nuclear way...?
The stupidest analogy you could come up with. Military threat needs to be assessed in relative terms:
- Russia is a nuclear power, Ukraine not.
- Russia has a stronger military than Ukraine (it was/is claimed to have "2nd-best military in the world").
- Russia has historically oppressed Ukraine way more than the other way around.
You even keep repeating ad nauseam the first two points to argue that Ukraine has no chance to win Russia, after being aggressed by Russia and being deprived of 20% of its territory!
Do you even read what you write?!
"Drip Feed theory" (DFT) is that what is sent to Ukraine depends on what kind of help will prop up Ukraine in the short term while not being a real threat to Russia nor piss them off "too much".
You are wasting your time. He simply repeats the same claim which I have already shown to be false. In short, he does not understand the structure of a BTG - they do not operate alone, but need significant support forces (if you look at the structure, they are missing key elements of regular army deployments). Thus '21 BTGs' in no way means that they were all the troops that were deployed. The correct figure, which I have already given him, was about 60-70 thousand.
I have also corrected him repeatedly on the actual accounts of negotiations, as reported by an actual participant, not someone who heard something (i.e. Sachs). He just regurgitates the same false claims that have already been debunked repeatedly in this very thread.
Would it be possible to link the post where you reported this?
Nonsense. For example, the Russians deployed the 1st Guards Tank Army to take Kharkiv. It didn't take Kharkiv.
According to you that also might been a fake! :blush:
Kiev and Kharkiv are several times larger, so we would expect to see comparable movements only larger in scale. Yet, nothing in the behavior of the Russian forces suggested they were preparing for a lengthy siege or months of grueling urban combat.
I know what your explanation is for that; Russian incompetence, but I think that's a weak explanation.
So: how exactly can you strenghten your position in negotiations by sending against a city an army which is obviously incapable of taking or surrounding it?
It was based on the quote of Bennett, which I believe you have provided. Should I still look for it?
There seems to be some strange compulsion to imagine secret knowledge, that only a select few are privy too. Things cannot simply be how they look. Everyone can infer intentions and goals by looking at the actions taken and statements made.
But some people need to be different. They need to see beyond the veil that ordinary minds cannot pierce. And so there must be shadowy forces that really move everything. You can treat US imperialism just as much as some metaphysical form of evil as imaginary demons. Apparently this even happens to otherwise sane and well informed people.
Wherever a 155mm projectile will not reach, a missile launched from HIMARS will reach. (Armed Forces of Ukraine · 16s · Nov 10, 2023)
Offensive and movement in monitored areas are very unsafe, hence hunkering down and longer-distance bombing.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general-zaluzhny.html
What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine?
It's also completely ignorant of the history of war. Laying siege to a city rather than trying to storm it right off the bat is a pretty old and common sense tactic, essentially as old as fortified urban centres themselves.
Of course modern cities are not fortified on purpose but it turns out lots of concrete buildings serve that purpose, and applying pressure by purposefully starving urban populations is no longer "a thing" (except if you're Israel of course), but a siege applies significant pressure nonetheless and created a significant barrier to moving people that are in Kiev to the southern front.
Even if Ukraine knew (i.e. informed by the US) that the Russians did not have enough forces to take and occupy Kiev, they still have to direct significant forces to defend the capital as it's a politically critical target. Furthermore, few things are certain in war, so likely Kiev did not "know" Russian troop numbers and disposition or then what man power Russia could divert to Kiev on short notice.
Meanwhile, during the battle of Kiev, Russia took the land bridge to Crimea and then pacified those regions they are still occupying today.
Another indication of Russian strategy to take the South and not Kiev is that Russia not only did not engage in fierce Urban combat in Kiev but bypassed most urban centres on the way to Kiev, which was a significant weakness in terms of maintaining their position around Kiev as Ukrainians could go out from these bypassed urban areas and ambush and harass the Russian supply line.
Then there is the political pressure of the capital being gotten to from both sides in short period of time and siege starting.
Now, would surrounding the capital without being able to take it and occupy it apply enough pressure to cause a complete unconditional surrender? No, obviously not, if the defence of the city was holding up there would be little reason to just completely capitulate.
However, the Russians were not asking complete capitulation, but at that time there main demands were a neutral Ukraine, recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and an independent Donbas, so occupying the South of Ukraine and slowly surrounding the capital and shelling significant parts of it and causing a refugee crisis etc. was significant pressure to accept Russian demands.
It's certainly a reasonable strategy that facilitates taking the South in the event Ukraine refuses peace terms and wants to continue fighting.
What is completely unclear is what scenario the Kremlin viewed as more likely, Ukraine accepting peace terms or then a longer war. It can be argued both ways. The story emerges, in both the West and Russia, that Russian intelligence underestimated Ukraine, but there's no hard evidence for this. It's pretty typical for countries starting a war to promise their population a quick victory even if the leaders know there is significant risk it can take a long time.
One could also argue that the operation to lay siege to Kiev had serious drawbacks such as creating the perfect scene for Zelensky to rally Ukrainian and Western support, hardening the Ukrainian will rather than weaken it and since the positions could not be maintained long term then setting up a Ukrainian victory.
Pointing out that the Russian strategy made sense and clearly on the whole delivered the result of conquering the Ukrainian lands Russia now occupies, and that the Northern operation achieved plenty of purposes other than storming and occupying Kiev, does not imply it's some optimum military maneuver.
In my view, militarily it was a good strategy and prevented Ukraine from organizing any sort of counter offensive in the South, especially to try to rescue the trapped Azov guys and destroying or capturing Azov Battalion was a significant victory for Russia in terms of consolidating their gains, but also domestic and international politics.
Politically it did have the draw backs mentioned above, but I don't think Ukraine would have been any closer to agreeing to peace terms without sieging the capital.
'Shelling targets of military value for 2 months'? I suppose you mean shelling of residential suburbs from March 4 (when the main convoy got close enough) till March 24, when they were pushed out of artillery range, not so much because Ukrainians pushed so hard, but because they were out of resources (with the most shelling, which was even then not that intense, lasting about ten days)? That is three weeks... care to list the supposed targets of military value that were hit? All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. And it is hilarious to write about 'siege' of a city - have you even looked at the map? If you get to a city and it is open in three directions, it is not a siege. Especially if you do not get closer than 25 km from it (that is farther than Ukrainians now have to Tokmak).
Quoting boethius
The supposed evidence is Tzeentch quoting an Ukrainian general in the days BEFORE the attack, so take it up with him.
Quoting boethius
So their plan was obviously NOT a long-term 'siege' of Kiyv, contrary to your claims, because you rightly conclude that it would open them to attacks from the rear and they would not be able to maintain the siege at all.
Quoting boethius
They needed just a bit of pressure, so they just laid one fourth of a siege? From the military point of view that theory goes beyond bizzare.
The 'blitz' taking of Kiyv, while risky and obviously unsuccessful, at least has some strategic merit. The northern operation as a 'siege' would be an even greater Russian failure - when you prepare for a siege, you do not issue your troops fuel for four days and you do not bypass major resistance centers (as you pointed out). The loss of material suffered there (not destroyed, but mostly abandoned, which for a long time was the main source of Ukrainian supplies) in no way justifies the supposed profit of vague 'political pressure' from one-fourth of a siege.
Although of course far more focus was paid to damage to civilian zones, the shelling of industrial zones was covered even by the Western media.
This is from the Hindu Times, just because it's not behind a paywall but it's simply repeating what was reported by AP, Reuters et al.
In this one article you have shelling of industrial zones, such as the airplane factory:
Quoting Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times
as well as how negotiations were to a peace deal:
[Kyiv areas shelled but ‘hard’ Ukraine peace talks go ahead - Hindustan Times;https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/kyiv-areas-shelled-but-hard-ukraine-peace-talks-go-ahead-101647309135539.html]The latest negotiations, which were held via video conference, were the fourth round involving higher-level officials from the two countries and the first in a week. The talks ended without a breakthrough after several hours, with an aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky saying the negotiators took “a technical pause” and planned to meet again Tuesday.
The two sides had expressed some optimism in the past few days. Mykhailo Podolyak, the aide to Zelensky, said over the weekend that Russia was “listening carefully to our proposals”. and that the negotiators would discuss “peace, ceasefire, immediate withdrawal of troops & security guarantees”.[/quote]
Now obviously a peace deal was not reached, but shelling industrial zones (of which the military value is repurposing to ) was clearly one purpose of the push to Kiev.
As you note yourself, Russian forces reached residential areas of which many industrial zones will be similar distance, if not farther, from the town centre. And even if you simply refuse to believe Russia got close enough to shell significant industrial zones it was clearly a priority for them, doing so with missiles as well:
[Russia says ammunition factory near Kyiv destroyed by missile strike - Reuters;https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ammunition-factory-near-kyiv-destroyed-by-missile-strike-2022-04-17/]April 17 (Reuters) - Russian armed forces destroyed an ammunition factory near Kyiv, Russian Defence Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said on Sunday.
"Overnight, high-precision air-launched missiles destroyed an ammunition factory near the town of Brovary in Kyiv region," Konashenkov said.[/quote]
So obviously advancing to Kiev would also accomplish this purpose of being able to destroy factories of various kinds.
Quoting Jabberwock
You have trouble with reading comprehension. I state that even if Ukraine knows Russian troop numbers approaching Kiev they still have to defend Kiev. Furthermore, even if this was your belief you could not be 100% certain the intelligence is accurate or then that Russia cannot move in more troops on short notice, so you'd need to price that risk into your defence of the city as well.
Russia does not require Kiev to believe they are genuinely attempting to take Kiev to accomplish various objectives. These explanations of pretty obvious things is in response to your thesis that:
Quoting Jabberwock
Which for all the reasons I explain, is clearly not true. It's completely coherent to send a small force to fix a large amount of troops, destroy plenty of factories and infrastructure, apply significant political pressure, while 15% of the country is conquered in the meanwhile.
It's a pretty common sense manoeuvre and if Ukraine "called the bluff" and sent significant resources to the south and undermanned their defence of Kiev, then maybe Russia would have taken the opportunity to pour in troops and storm the city.
Now, if you want to argue the Northern operation was had more drawbacks then achievements, that shelling Kiev simply increased resolve and Western support and allowed Zelensky to play the hero and ambushes on overstretched supply lines make the Russians look bad and beatable, and so on, such arguments make sense. There was certainly pros and cons to the Northern operation to siege Kiev and a lot could be considered.
For example, I'd have no problem accepting an analysis which concluded that short term the siege of Kiev nearly achieved a negotiated peace (but ultimately failed) while assisting the conquest of the Southern land bridge, and in the medium term made increased Ukrainian and Western resolve while making Russia look bad when they needed to retreat, but in the longer term creating a refugee exodus significantly weakens Ukraine structurally (economically, new soldiers aging into fighting age for a long war, less people to do things generally speaking, etc.) which aids in winning a war of attrition.
I'd even be willing accept that had Russia not sieged Kiev and simply took the land bridge that ultimately it would be more likely Ukraine would have accepted Russia's peace deal, as there would be less "bad blood".
However, that may not have been predictable from the outset, it certainly seems logical that pressuring the capital would maximize pressure for a political settlement. Furthermore, if Ukraine was able to fully focus on the South then perhaps it would have been able to counter attack and relieve Mariupol, stabilize the lines far less favourably for the Russians and that would have encouraged further fighting as much as the siege of Kiev.
The Russian strategy makes obvious sense. Certainly there is always a better strategy available, but the idea that the army that has taken and held critical land for its stated and common sense war objectives (land bridge to Crimea, protect Russian speaking separatists) is somehow incompetent or that sieging Kiev has no relation to the accomplishments in the South, is just dumb.
Quoting Jabberwock
"Long-term 'siege' " is a nice but lame strawman. Where do I say a long term siege is necessary to apply political pressure?
Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken (the withdrawal is the week after the surrender of the remaining Azov forces), tries to negotiate a peace during this time, a peace deal is not reached, they can't maintain their positions, so they are forced to leave.
There was clearly many advantages to the Russians of the push to Kiev as well as disadvantages. I have zero problem with the argument that in some final analysis there was more cons than pros, but clearly the strategy made sense and did achieve some key military objectives.
Quoting Jabberwock
The Russians are not routed and captured but have an orderly withdrawal when they retreat, so they obviously had enough fire power to hold their positions and get resupplied.
If it was a risky mad dash blitz the capital with only 4 days of fuel, then they would have all been captured when that failed.
Now, I have zero problem with the idea that the ideal scenario for the Russians is that the Ukrainians simply fall apart in terms of C&C and there's a near complete capitulation, or then no defence of the city is organized and they're able to take the city with a small force and the population accepts a total Russian victory. However, they do commit enough resources to maintain the positions they take around Kiev the time to accomplish full occupation of major cities in the south, particularly Mariupol.
However, what is clear even in your scenario is that there is not enough man power to take Kiev waging urban combat even against a small amount of defenders.
I of course agree that total capitulation by Ukraine would be the a preferred outcome of blitzing to Kiev, and if that was plan A then the Russians clearly had a plan B, but we seem to agree that their plan is not conquest of Kiev against any significant resistance.
It should also be noted that the Russian military did not make any large push towards Odessa. After they captured Cherson they made a few incursions north / northwest ward and retreated upon meeting resistance.
I think Putin thought the same about Zelensky. A puppet he could knock over in a few days.Do you think Russia began this prepared for a long war of attrition?
I doubt the Russians expected a quick military victory, considering the fact that they invaded with a force that was way too small to fully defeat the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine.
The operations in the north and around Kiev were intended to pressure Ukraine into negotiations, which we know did take place in March/April of 2022 and were subsequently blocked by the United States and Britain. So at the very least the Russians believed there was a possibility of a quick negotiated settlement through a show of military force. I guess at this time the Russians still believed the European desire for peace in eastern Europe and normal economic relations with Russia would trump neocon interests in Ukraine, but they were wrong.
Since negotiations failed, the Russian plan is probably to sit on the territory they now occupy and leverage their military advantage until either a negotiated settlement is reached or the war turns into a frozen conflict.
A quick negotiated settlement was obviously the preferred outcome, but it's pretty much unthinkable that the Russians did not plan for a situation in which negotiations failed.
Lastly, "war of attrition" is not necessarily an accurate characterization of this conflict even though the term is used a lot. It is more like a prolonged stand-off with occasional, relatively small-scale offensive actions. I don't think it is nearly as taxing on the Russian system as western media likes to suggest, and that the Russians can sustain these types of operations pretty much indefinitely.
Then why did they have those long lines of stalled transport for a week or two, and why did they run short of so many things so quickly? Can they not count?
The inactivity of the Russian forces in northern Ukraine during the initial stages of the war in my view reflects their purpose as I have described it. Had the purpose been to overwhelm defenders and surround and occupy Kiev, we would have seen an entirely different pattern, more like we saw during the battle for Bakhmut and Avdiivka but much larger in scale.
What are/were the Russians running short of?
Anecdotally, they were running short first of fuel, then of personal equipment for troops, and then of munitions and tanks and even training facilities for the reinforcements. But perhaps that is all Western propaganda.
Supposedly they were also running short on artillery shells, yet scarcely a day has gone by that the entire frontline hasn't been peppered by Russian artillery, so I do tend to take such reports with a grain of salt.
But from a military perspective, the Russians probably expended a large portion of their offensive capacity on the initial invasion. After the initial invasion failed to conclude the war through a negotiated settlement, the Russians changed their force posture towards defense and they started to dig in. At that point the demand for supplies changes also.
For example, the Russians may have been running "low" on tanks and fuel, but since they probably weren't planning further large-scale offensive operations that could also be the normal picture one would expect after the initial invasion was concluded and they entered a period of recuperation.
Even within your own logic, a puppet of who?
Obviously the US, and the US was clearly not interested in peace, rejecting to even discuss Russia's peace proposal before the war nor anything else (as well as forbidding their vassals in Europe of doing so of their own accord).
So, assuming you're correct and Putin views Zelensky a puppet of the US, why wouldn't said US puppet do what he's told and implement US policy of rejecting peace?
Russia built up a massive war chest, over 600 billion USD, over nearly a decade; why would they do that if they were not preparing to finance a potential long war of attrition.
More troops could have been committed to the initial invasion, but if the primary military goal was to secure the land bridge to Crimea then clearly the commitment was sufficient.
There's also not only the military sphere, but the Kremlin needed also to prepared and balance things for massive sanctions and economic disruption: hence prosecute the war with professional troops and mercenaries so as to overcome the initial shock of sanctions with minimal additional disruption to the civilian population.
Of course, certainly it can be argued a better strategy was available, diplomatic or militarily, but this idea that the war was initiated on some sort of whim without careful thought and planning is really quite ludicrous. There was already a war in the Donbas supported by Russia for 8 years, so clearly it is on the minds of military and political leaders that if there's no diplomatic settlement then a military solution is the only alternative. Putin received far more criticism within Russia for not intervening sooner, but obviously a war of this size and right next to Russia would be complicated, hence clear indications of preparation.
Had Russia mobilized more troops for the initial invasion, it risks Ukraine mobilizing and a blitz to take the key territory becomes harder rather than easier.
Likewise, had things been prepared even better, every soldier knowing they will be going to war and exactly what they will be doing, it again risks Ukrainian mobilization and hundreds of thousands additional dug in troops and the bridges out of Crimea mined, shelled and bombed rather than massive columns of Russian armour just rolling into South Ukraine (which clearly the Ukrainians were not prepared for and completely collapses their lines West of the Donbas allowing the Russians to conquer the land bridge).
Which also goes to explain such observations:
Quoting unenlightened
In addition to @Tzeentch already mentioning that perhaps Russian forces were adequately supplied for the advances they intended to make in the initial invasion, any giant operation is going to have all sorts of anecdotal problems along with major setbacks and confusions. No one here is arguing the Russian invasion went perfectly according to plan, we're just pointing out Russian decisions do make sense.
The idea that Russia is an irrational actor was quite clearly a myth created in the early days and sustained for over a year (sometimes cherry picking true but pretty expected things like equipment SNAFU's as well as obvious lies like exorbitant number of casualties), as it avoids the difficult question of how Ukraine is going to prevail over a far larger opponent.
You don't need a viable plan if you're fighting an army of essentially retarded monkeys.
Quoting boethius
No one here is is arguing that either, at least not any more than any human group is fundamentally irrational at any time.
Quoting boethius
I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces to remove the government and replace it with a Vichy style government of the strategically unimportant regions, and annexation of, in this case, the entire south coast. Zelensky removed has no chance to dance to anyone's tune. Given an ex comedian with no political pedigree in charge, that is not an irrational plan. That obviously didn't happen, and then there was a strange pause before the withdrawal and regrouping. It looked like a winning plan until it didn't, which was when the airport couldn't be secured.
There was even a Pro-Russian faction with support from oligarchs and security services waiting to step into the breach.
This has been argued many times, I can cite previous conversation if you want.
But good to know you aren't arguing this, in which case it should be pretty easy to see Russia's strategy does make sense and has worked well in terms of securing the land bridge to Crimea. Of course, there have been pros and cons to every decision which can be debated.
Quoting unenlightened
Well that's clearly not the Russian strategy or they would not have bothered advancing in the South at all, they would have only fought in the South insofar as it fixes Ukrainian troops there, so as to dedicate the majority of their resources to take Kiev.
Of course, I have zero issue believing the preferred outcome for the Russians is that Ukraine completely capitulates, and failing that Zelensky accepting their peace deal would be second best.
The Russians military plan, however, is clearly to take the land bridge to Crimea, which is what they do in essentially a week, and then pacify the cities involved, and their operation in the North serves to keep Kiev's main focus there.
Now, both taking land in the South and pressuring Kiev is certainly significant leverage in negotiating a peace deal, especially if Russia was offering to give that land back (which they were) and it was clear after the outbreak of the war that Ukraine was not in NATO and was not going to be. It was certainly the "rational thing to do" from the Russian point of view, but I would have hard time believing the Kremlin doesn't have the experience required to know people don't always do the rational thing as you see it and did not prepare accordingly (which they clearly did, amassing hundreds of billions of USD, hoarding gold, preparing an alternative payment system and so on).
Quoting unenlightened
You seem to think it would be easy for the Russians to replace Zelensky without lengthy and costly urban warfare in Kiev.
The scenario where what you describe is possible (with the forces Russia commits to Kiev) is one where Ukraine forces essentially don't put up a fight and Russian tanks can roll into Kiev uncontested. Again, that would certainly be the ideal scenario for the Russians and they certainly would have done that if there was no resistance.
However, Russian actions are completely inconsistent with some sort of blind belief that taking Kiev and replacing Zelensky would be easy, and as @Tzeentch points out the Ukraine military and government is filled with right with extremists who would just stage a coup if you did somehow manage to put in place a Russian puppet.
Ukraine has been preparing with support of the US for precisely this war for 8 years, there's CIA all over Ukraine, there's Nuland's famous "he's our man" and "fuck the EU" (yet the EU doesn't mind at all; indeed, "please commence with the Fucking" is the EU diplomatic position).
This whole idea that conquering all of Ukraine should have been easy is totally baseless: Ukraine is huge and difficult to sustain logistics even without resistance (it's not trivial to move tens of thousands of men and equipment and supplies), Ukraine has the largest army in Europe with the largest gaggle of armour, and their military is full of fanatical anti-Russian extremists (there are also moderates, and I'd agree that Zelensky isn't a right wing extremists, but there would be zero reason to expect moderates to dominate decision making).
Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke.
He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode.
Quoting boethius
What troops exactly?
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
You're kinda answering your own question here.
Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition.
Quoting boethius
I don't think people suggest it's a whim so much as ideological blindness from living in a filter bubble - which is a common hazard of an authoritarian regime.
Quoting boethius
I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse.
Quoting boethius
As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.
There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.
Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did.
But this is ridiculous.
What modern army is going to model their defense on 1940's France? Have you seen a Ukrainian Maginot Line anywhere?
Holding on to Kiev was Ukraine's most obvious goal, so taking Kiev while avoiding the main defensive forces is a non-starter. If anything the main body of the Ukrainian forces was located in and around Kiev.
Taking it would have required a force several times larger than what the Russians deployed on the Kiev axis, and months of grueling urban combat. Nothing in the Russian force posture suggests they were getting ready for such an operation.
Furthermore, as I've often argued here, occupying Kiev is unlikely to have been the Russians' goal for several reasons. One reason is that due to extensive US / western support it is unlikely that it would have made a large impact on the military situation. The Ukrainian army remained operational, and leadership of the war could be conducted from elsewhere.
Kinda. The entire eastern front is heavily fortified. There's a reason Bakhmut and Avdivka remained standing even as russian troops surged from Crimea to Mariupol.
Quoting Tzeentch
All the reports I read assumed that that Ukraine's strongest forces would be at the eastern front, and that cutting them off from Kiev might be a russian goal.
Quoting Tzeentch
But not if a shock-and-awe operation, including a massive airborne flanking move, lead to panic and a collapse of morale.
Quoting Tzeentch
Well Putin called it a "special military operation" with the goal to "denazify and demilitarise". If that is an indication of how the operation was conceived, then it would suggest that the goal was indeed as least as much political as military.
It is reported that about 150 people died in the 'shelling' of Kiyv in that period. It is hard to estimate, but it seems most of those were victims of missile strikes (executed from Belarus), which as we know at worst can kill up to 20-50 people at a time, if it strikes heavily populated area. So as far as artillery shelling is concerned, it is hard to estimate the effect, but it must have been rather negligible. E.g. Kharkiv, actually WAS shelled and the number of victims was about three-four times greater (although even here many attacks were with missiles, not from ground forces).
Quoting boethius
Nice backtracking here... So we agree there was no 'two-month' shelling of miltiary targets? The Antonov factory was hit, because it is on the outskirts of Kiyv, as I have acknowledged, Russians got in range that allowed them to shell far suburbs of Kiyv. Still, the effects of that shelling were rather insignificant.
Quoting boethius
Russians needed to advance to Kiyv in order to use air missiles, which were launched by planes from the territory of Belarus? Would you agree that knowing the difference between artillery shelling and air-launched missiles is rather important if you want to discuss such matters? Or is is all the same to you?
Quoting boethius
Defenders, especially with limited means, assign such resources which are required for defence. Fixing a larger force against a supposedly smaller force which is obviously not able to accomplish its goals is not a prudent military move. And, again, Russians, did not destroy 'plenty of factories and infrastructure' from ground attacks. So far you were able to name one factory, located in the suburbs.
Quoting boethius
Because 'short-term siege' is very unlikely to work. It is not a siege if the resource flow is practically unrestricted and there is no significant attrition involved. Russians did not surround the city, they did not threaten the supply lines in any way and they were not able to apply significant attrition. 'Blitz siege' is a contradiction in terms - you cannot achieve the goals of a siege quickly.
Quoting boethius
What? Russians have already withdrew from Kiyv suburbs by March 27th, i.e. before the talks have concluded, with most of the force gone from the north by April. The Azov forces have surrendered on May 20th. You clearly have no idea what you are talking about...
Quoting boethius
No, because Ukrainians did not have enough forces to attack them and it would still be a risky manouver. And yes, they had enough firepower to hold against Ukrainian attacks for some time, but not to put pressure on Kiyv from afar - the composition of the force itself assumed quick ground attack, not barrage of the city. Still, they had to leave Bucha, Irpin (the towns closest to Kiyv) after about two weeks (not two months), not because they have accomplished anything (the talks were still underway), but because they had to. Most of the northern force has already stalled midway by the middle of March (the infamous 'Kiyv convoy'), Ukrainians began counteroffensive maneouvers and liberating villages back from March 15th.
Quoting boethius
Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. The supposed 'siege' lasted about fifteen days and has accomplished very little - they have overstretched their supply lines significantly and simply could not hold their positions. They were not routed, but had to leave a lot of equipment. So no, there was no plan B at all - they have made a quick strike, they have failed and they had to leave. To say that the 'Kiyv convoy' was somehow planned is insane - no battle plan assumes forming a 60 km column of troops most of which were never deployed.
In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play.
For example, maybe Quoting Echarmion
Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology.
But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating.
Quoting Echarmion
Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.
Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.
Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources.
Quoting Echarmion
I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war.
Quoting Echarmion
The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.
Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.
Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to.
Quoting Echarmion
200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.
For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.
Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.
What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time.
Again, in a fixing operation, your goal is to commit the least amount of forces needed to tie up a maximum of the opponents forces.
Even if there's no fog of war and your enemy knows you have relatively few troops in the area, they can nevertheless not be certain you will not divert more troops at any moment in a surprise push; therefore, especially is the target is critical such as the capital, sufficient resources are likely to be devoted to make a proper defence (it would be a massive gamble to bet otherwise, and even if you bet right, your enemy may see you're undermanning the defence and take advatnage). So, even if Ukraine / US intelligence, knows Russia's Northern operation is mostly about diverting the bulk of Kiev's attention and reserves to its defence, they may easily have little choice but to do so in any case (which is what actually happens).
This is the argument in a nutshel that Kiev should have taken Russia's peace terms before or then after the war broke out: where the border is exactly has relatively little consequence on the lives of the people living in the Donbas (who no one really disputes are Russian speakers that are largely partial to Russia) whereas the war has had quite a large consequence on many people's lives far removed from the Donbas.
Putin would know from experience that even your vassals don't always do what you want them to.
Quoting boethius
Maybe, but without evidence, we wouldn't assume such plots.
Quoting boethius
It would have done serious damage to cohesion and morale. Quite possibly Putin remembered the collapse of the Afghan army when the president fled.
Quoting boethius
Sure, this would make sense. But it's simply not what happened. Russia did land it's crack paratroopers at Hostomel. Russia did send a huge convoy towards Kiev. Russia had large amounts of troops around Charkiv.
All of these were destroyed or withdrawn, with large losses in manpower and materiel. The troops on the left bank of the Dniepr fared better, but again were only withdrawn when their position clearly was untenable.
None of that can be explained by your theory, but can be explained by the alternative.
Quoting boethius
Or a long round of sanctions and insurgency. It's not conclusive towards any particular plan.
Quoting boethius
Seems like a rather large gamble, especially since the troops obviously stayed out after the exercise. I suppose we cannot rule out that Russia simply wanted to keep everyone guessing by not making any further preparations.
Quoting boethius
Imho the epistemologically sound position is to use what information we have and make an educated guess.
Even if we take reports on russian losses with a heavy dose of salt, and furthermore assume that they'd generally make sound and rational decision the evidence points to various military failures resulting in heavy losses.
Clearly a successful operation should not have resulted in Russia now fighting trench warfare. It should not have resulted in a grinding siege of Bakhmut, or the rout in Charkiv.
[I]Something[/I] went badly wrong.
No, but I have seen a Russian one.
Quoting boethius
That's all I'm saying, they went for a quick decapitation of the government alongside a push for a land bridge and as much coast line as they could, including Odessa which would have given them control of the 'breadbasket', a powerful lever in international relations. Without that regime change, it looks like they are now resigned to at best a frozen conflict for the indefinite future, because they still don't seem to have the numbers to occupy and subdue the whole country.
I literally state:
Quoting Jabberwock
It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.
It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.
The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory.
Well we agree that Putin would have preferred total unconditional surrender, but there's really zero reason to believe Putin or anyone in Russia thought that likely. Rather, the Kremlin publicly pushes for their peace proposal of giving back the entirety of the Donbas to Ukraine, in exchange for recognizing Crimea, Ukraine staying out of NATO, and some autonomy and language protections for Russian speakers in the Donbas.
But again, that Russia prepares for 8 years and amasses a large war chest and clearly had a feasible plan to deal with "the nuclear option" of massive sanctions (as their plan clearly has worked so far) is really strong evidence the Russians don't think the task easy (else they would have done it sooner) nor that they are confident task will be quick (why prepare such a large amount of finance and gold; indeed, analysts before the war were pointing out the obvious fact that Russia was amassing large reserves precisely to be in the position to fight a big, long war, or then at least credibly threaten to in order to get the deal they want).
Quoting unenlightened
I guess you can use the terms "resigned to" if you want, but the conflict is not frozen for the indefinite future.
A frozen conflict is one where significant fighting ceases, such as in Korea, and there is a standoff: neither a peace agreement nor fighting and so the military conflict, in terms of fighting, is frozen.
That is not the case in Ukraine, there is intense fighting everyday, and unsustainable rates of casualties and equipment losses on both sides.
The difference is, of course, Russia is a far larger country than Ukraine and so at loss rates even somewhat close to parity, Russia will win the war of attrition.
The media doesn't stop comparing things to the trench warfare of WWI, which is a somewhat good enough analogy, but then simply jumps to the conclusion that therefore it is a frozen conflict. The front line in WWI was immobile for most of the war and most of the front, but WWI was hardly a frozen conflict and the unsustainable rates of attrition meant one side was going to win and one side was going to lose. The United States entering the war made the massive difference of available resources to one side.
Quoting Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't
Quoting Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't
Quoting Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't
Quoting Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't
Quoting Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't
In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor.
To win a war of attrition with the Russians, Ukraine would need to inflict several times more casualties than it incurs; a central myth justifying rejecting peace talks but of which there was never any evidence and plenty of reason to believe it is in fact Russia inflicting heavier casualties due to having superior air power and more artillery.
Quoting Hamas sourcing weapons in Ukraine
The next Pikachu face moment will be when these advanced compact missile systems are used on European soil both for terrorist and criminal purposes.
And we may even experience actual undesired terrorism, not just terrorism that "just so happens" to serve existing Western policy objectives.
Wars of attrition are not fought to the last man standing, they are fought till one side loses the will to fight and disengages, as the U.S did with Vietnam and the S.U. did with Afghanistan. The attempted coup in Russia did not happen in a vacuum. There is a limit to what the Russian people will accept.
You take anything negative about the Russian invasion with a grain of salt. Perhaps too much salt for your health?
Well if we agree that the current fighting is attritional, then tiring out the Russians is a much better strategy than throwing battalions at heavily fortified positions based on the entirely delusional belief that it was possible to push the Russians out of Southern Ukraine.
Certainly larger armies have simply tired out and gone home in the past.
However, unlike the US in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan ... or the US in Afghanistan, there are far more reasons for Russians to fight in Ukraine. There's also some critical structural differences between those wars, mainly that it requires far more finance to support Ukraine than the Taliban or the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Insurgency is also common to these examples but not so present in South Ukraine.
I would definitely agree that Russia tiring out would be certainly a possibility after years and years of fighting, but I'm arguing here Ukraine (and Western supporters) can't sustain years at this level of intensity.
The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct.
Causes high blood pressure :grin:
That's an incredibly sketchy source citing anonymous reports that cannot be checked. I would not put much confidence in this article.
Quoting boethius
It's not, however, a quote, so it's really just the author's opinion. And the author is not some military analyst but a venture capitalist (and friend and ally of Peter Thiel, one of the most dangerous evil fuckers on the planet, imho anyways). For someone decrying western propaganda you're very willing to take this all at face value.
... People definitely seem to be denying exactly that:
Quoting Echarmion
But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate.
Quoting Jabberwock
Neither I nor @Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic.
And you miss entirely the point, Russia does not need to brilliantly out maneuver or out perform Ukraine, they only need to be remotely close to parity.
Russia has won some battles, Ukraine has won some battles, if it's remotely close to parity then Russia is on the path to victory as they can absorb more losses.
If having capabilities Ukraine lacks entirely, such as significant air power and electronic warfare, gives Russia a better than parity performance (on the whole) then Russian victory is even easier.
Of course, one can argue the Russian population will turn against the war before some sort of military victory emerges. This was the theory at the start of the war, but few people argue it now.
Likewise, one can argue that perhaps Russia will win but the cost is not worth it on some given scale of evaluation.
As several have argued, Ukraine losing is ok as the war damages Russia. Of course, that's terrible for Ukraine and not morally acceptable Western policy for me personally; I also have my doubts whether the war is actually weakening Russia.
What is of interest in the debate about the "Russian competence" in attacking Kiev or retreating from Kherson / Kharkiv (from my point of view) is the mythological role this idea played in encouraging Ukraine to refuse peace negotiations, which if Ukraine cannot "win" (which seems common wisdom now) was a foolish decision (if you care about lives and even Ukrainian territory as Russia was offering to give it back in exchange for a quick termination of the war).
However, if we agree Russia's plan makes sense and was executed with basic competence, I am not trying to argue they are brilliant or over-performing the Ukrainians.
For the purpose of understanding the current situation, one need only believe performance is somewhat close to parity to conclude, as you say, Ukraine is in a difficult position as, by definition, the smaller party will lose a war of attrition at parity.
I strongly suspect Russia has been able to inflict several factors greater losses on the Ukrainians due to their having significant air power and electronic warfare, but I'm not trying to convince anyone of that and we'll have a better idea of losses on both sides after the war. Rather, my basic point, is that very strong evidence would be needed to believe that despite significant air superiority and having more of essentially every kind of capability, that somehow Ukraine is inflicting several factors greater losses on Russian forces.
Accepting such basic facts, how long Ukraine (and Western supporters) can last, and will Russian be able to match that in resolve, and if Russia does have an advantage (now or at some point) due can it translate that into decisive manoeuvres (encircling large Ukrainian formation, taking bridges etc.), are all questions open for debate.
@ssu is confident Ukraine can last many years. I have serious doubts that's possible at the current intensity, but is possible by retreating to more easily defendable positions or then simply territory Russia doesn't want to occupy, and then you'd have an actual frozen conflict. However, if the conflict is actually frozen with few attacks and casualties on each side, Russia would have no reason to randomly go home either. This would be the "rump state" Mearsheimer talks about.
You're very late to the discussion, all these points have been discussed already at length, but the 200 000 troops Russia committed to invading Ukraine are not remotely enough for some sort of total wave offensive.
Russia could have mobilized millions of troops and done what you say, but that would have very likely been both a social and economic disaster and result in years of insurgency and inability to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine.
Russia's war aims are clearly what is achievable without sacrificing the entire economy by mobilizing millions of people to dedicate to years of occupation, which is occupying the areas of Ukraine that are Russian speaking and partial to Russian rule. Crimea has been occupied by Russia since 2014 and there has not been any insurgency because Crimeans are the large majority Russian speakers that all evidence we have genuinely wanted to reunite with Russia.
The idea that Russia could have easily just "tidal waved" Ukraine (the largest country in Europe with the largest army, supported by US / NATO training and intelligence, preparing for exactly this war for 8 years) is just foolish.
It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. Any rational actor who cannot simply impose their will by force, will at least see what the other side is offering and try to negotiate an acceptable deal (now, maybe no acceptable deal would have been reached if negotiations continued, but you cannot know that if you don't try).
Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life.
I take media propaganda with a grain of salt, and if I binged on it as much as the average TFP poster then I would be very worried about my salt intake indeed.
I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making.
Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.
Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces.
Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering.
Quoting boethius
There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground.
Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war?
I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. That is simply wrong and inconsistent with the known facts. It became very clear when you tried to argue for that theory, as you have quickly shown that you lack knowledge of the basic facts and timelines. I understand that you try to save face now, but trying to gloss over your gross inaccuracies is not the way to do it - it just shows that you are eager to discuss things you know little about and backtrack when faced with facts instead of admitting your errors.
I agree that Putin et. al. may have believed in a quick and easy victory, either confident in their cunning or then underestimating both the Ukrainians and the CIA. However, the plan the implement clearly prepares for things taking longer and being more difficult and more expensive: otherwise you don't amass hundreds of billions of USD worth of reserves and bullion and you don't put so much effort into being sure to take the land bridge (such as a sophisticated signals and intelligence operation resulting in uncontested advances; Kherson being the most notable in not only taking the city uncontested but bridges across the Dnieper).
Quoting Echarmion
Despite these advantages, Ukraine still has hundreds of thousands of troops and hundreds thousands more that can be mobilized and a huge area to operate on.
If Russia takes advantage of the massive border to make essentially uncontested advances (what happens) that creates deep salients that are vulnerable to harassment or even being cut off once Ukraine organizes to arrest the advances; to prevent harassment would require widening the salient significantly which in turn requires significantly more troops to take urban centres in difficult Urban combat and then effectively occupy and pacify these regions. To accomplish this in Northern Ukraine would require hundreds of thousands of additional troops; likely more troops than Russia has in its standing army (as the region is intensely hostile; it's far easier to accomplish in Russian speaking regions in the South, which may explain Russias decision to occupy there, in addition to the land bridge to Crimea and securing fresh water to Crimea being of critical strategic importance, in addition to the mineral resources and industrial capacity).
Russia simply does not have the numbers to occupy all of Ukraine or even a relatively small hostile part of it. A basic rule of thumb to be sure to pacify a population is requiring between 10 and 20 soldiers per 100 inhabitants; 10 being probably certain to achieve pacification and 20 being probably insufficient if the population is hostile (these numbers are often cited to explain why the US fails to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan).
Based on such received wisdom, Russia would need millions of troops to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine. Russia could do it, but it would be incredibly costly in terms of direct costs and consequence for the Russian economy as well as not be worth much. The land bridge to Crimea, the entirety of the Azov sea, securing fresh water to Crimea and an additional defensive buffer zone, all the resources there (from an imperial perspective) are "worth" a cost to pay. As it stands, the Russian plan has secured plenty of valuable assets, whereas occupying all of Ukraine would be an immense liability and be completely unworkable long term.
@Tzeentch has explained this several times but above is further elaboration of why Russia likely has no interest in occupying Kiev much less all of Ukraine.
Quoting Echarmion
My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis.
Quoting Echarmion
Well the situation on the ground is that Ukraine has not taken back any significant territory for essentially a year in which to affect the negotiation table, and if Ukraine is losing the war of attrition and reaching its limits in terms of man power then their position is even worse as they cannot credibly threaten to prolong the war and credibly threaten significant damage to the Russians (the major leverage a smaller power has in fighting a larger power: that continued may damage themselves but will be costly to the larger power also).
Quoting Echarmion
It depends what the peace deal is.
What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal.
The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve.
Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and a global schism in economic and political cooperation.
This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles.
Quoting boethius
There were several rounds of negotiations which presumably included an exchange of proposals, so I don't know why you'd assume that it's only Ukraine that doesn't want to negotiate.
Quoting boethius
As I recall there were constant diplomatic efforts during the troop buildup. Is Ukraine also solely responsible for all of these failing?
Quoting boethius
So you don't credit the argument that a war of aggression, or a threat with such a war, cannot become an instrument in international politics?
This goes back to the core of the moral question: if we're only concerned about limiting damage, doesn't that leave us fatally exposed to an agreessor?
The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation.
As important to my argument as negotiations obviously not succeeding and pretty bad signs such as negotiators being shot:
Quoting Reports claim Ukraine negotiator shot for treason - Times of Israel
Is that Mariupol was effectively occupied by the end of March:
Quoting Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia
And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument.
What Russian military commanders would have feared is an operation to relieve the forces in Mariupol either by reaching Mariupol or then allowing for the Ukrainian forces to break out and reach some Ukrainian Salient coming towards them (heroic deeds for the Ukrainians and an embarrassment for the Russians, and also losing the value of capturing a bunch of Azov guys).
So, once critical milestone is reached such as effectively securing the largest Ukrainian Urban centre in the south, then it makes sense to withdraw from the North (which is in anywise undermanned in a fixing operation and cannot last indefinitely) to solidify gains in the South: exactly what the Russians do.
If Russia intended to take and occupy Kiev then they would have committed far more troops and engaged in the kind of urban combat they do in Mariupol.
It's pretty common sense along with the fact that entire 200 000 troops Russia devotes to invading Ukraine could all be insufficient to occupy and pacify a hostile population the size of Kiev; so your theory involves the Russians trying to accomplish something that is commonly accepted wisdom in military schools to be impossible to do with the numbers the Russians have (and that's assuming they have zero losses, their entire force may still be insufficient to occupy and pacify Kiev ... and there would still be Ukrainian "resistance" throughout the rest of the country "doing stuff").
No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). It says the battle lasted that long, which is of course correct, but saying that the city was 'sieged' in that period just shows again that you have absolutely no clue what you are talking about. For starters, you can read the whole article, not just the first paragraph, maybe that will clear things up for you a bit. Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading.
Quoting boethius
If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov:
Quoting TASS
So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter.
I think the total destruction of Ukraine is out of the question now. That Ukraine would defend itself like this wasn't before anticipated, after all the US offered Zelensky a way out (meaning they estimated Kyiv would fall in days). Now that has changed. I think the Western aid will be to at least enough for Ukraine to defend, it won't be enough to push Russia totally out. What basically Putin can do is sit behind the Suvorov-line and the make limited counterattacks.
Yet basically after the Ukraine war either halts or goes truly to the frozen conflict mode, then in few years Russia will have built back it's capability.
Uhh... wouldn't be it according to your logic, that we lack our salt?
No, it's called a prediction. Being confident in a prediction, such as the sun will rise tomorrow as it did today, does not take away from its predictive essence.
If the war ends with a deal better than what the Russians were offering both before and immediately following the invasion, then indeed Ukraine has at least achieved better terms of land or other things for all the blood sacrificed.
If the war ends with Russia retaining, even expanding upon, the territory it already occupies then I don't see how anyone could argue Ukraine fought to a superior negotiating position.
Or do you disagree with this diagnostic procedure?
Let's start with the shelling industrial targets which was widely reported but you seem to want to deny:
Quoting Jabberwock
The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks.
Here is a Ukrainian publication citing directly the original source of the municipal government:
Quoting Russia shells Antonov factory in Kyiv
Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones.
Quoting Jabberwock
Directly from the Wikipedia article:
Quoting Battle of Kyiv
You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.
Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city.
Since you are happy to use Wikipedia as an authority, under the heading "Post-World War II":
Quoting Siege - Wikipedia
It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:
Quoting Siege
Which, ironically, you are making exactly he point that the intention of the Russians is to conquer Kiev by "well prepared assault".
Point is, an army gets to a city, starts to surround the city, people living in the subway: fits the definition of a siege.
Quoting Jabberwock
I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit.
They achieve key objectives in the meanwhile in the South, so cut their losses and evacuate the North.
As I mention, one con of this strategy is that if there is no quick peace deal and the Norther operation can't be sustained, then retreating will simply encourage the Ukrainians to fight more. So in terms of achieving a quick peace it is a gamble, but if it allows taking the South nearly uncontested (what happens) then if the peace gamble fails then at least there is something to show for the war effort as a whole.
I am not arguing the push to Kiev is some brilliant move that has only positive consequences. There are clearly pros and cons.
However, there are pros and cons, risks and advantages, to every strategy. If Russia only focused on the South, maybe Ukraine would have put up much fiercer resistance, broken the siege at Mariupol at least long enough to heroically evacuate Azov battalion, and the Russian military position would be much worse and that would simply encourage Ukraine to keep fighting.
The logic behind the multi-front war knowing ahead of time there is only resources to sustain the Southern front I would speculate has two foundations:
First, chaos and focus in the North will indeed allow conquering the south to be far easier and so if there's no peace then at least the critical strategic objective is achieved of the land bridge to Crimea and the Kremlin has "something to show for it" even if retreating in the North will be embarrassing on the moment.
Second, historically peace agreements are arrived at very quickly after fighting starts or then wars drag on for quite some time. So, based on historical precedent, if peace is not achieved in the first days and weeks of fighting, probably it won't happen in the short term, so the Russian actions apply maximum pressure at the start and if it does work then they'll fight the long war in the South.
Quoting Jabberwock
They may have received intelligence or otherwise concluded that Ukraine will not be accepting peace a deal. As I say above, Ukraine may have simply been effective at arresting Russias advance and harassing the Russian supply lines and they are unable to sustain their positions.
Additionally, once Russia has what they want in the South, it maybe perfectly acceptable to the Kremlin that the war continue and they keep their gains. Anyone with an imperialist mindset in the Kremlin will rather the war continue than Ukraine accept the peace deal on offer and be given back all the territory.
If critical positions are achieved in the South, the it would be reasonable to argue that pulling back in the North is militarily the right move, and if Ukraine does not want peace then they shall have war.
Things can be quite complicated, but overall, clearly the Russian military achieves critical objectives with their plan and execution, so they are neither irrational nor incompetent.
I agree that Russia does not intend to conquer all of Ukraine in any case, and "losing the war" for Ukraine means losing significant territory.
Quoting ssu
Not anticipated by anyone who doesn't follow the analysis of this kind of thing, but there was plenty of analysis made before the war that the maximalist war aims of Russia would be taking the land bridge all the way to the Dnieper and Russia did not have the forces available to conquer all of Ukraine and also noting Ukraine has a sizeable army, battle hardened by 8 years of war in the Donbas, has advantage in defending, and is not a trivial army to defeat.
Since most people have zero clue about anything, the Western media quickly took advantage of people's perception of Ukraine as some small and backward Eastern European state that should be easy for "the Red army" (the term even being used from time to time, but I mean here to refer to people's perceptions) to topple over. Creating the myth of Russian incompetence was absolutely essential to establish the logic of refusing all negotiation. If analysts and officials admitted that Russia clearly had a sensible plan and conquered a lot of territory in the South that would be extremely difficult for Ukraine to re-conquer if the Russians had a minimum of sense and experience in warfare (which it turns out they do), then this would have severely undermined the momentum for fighting without any clear end state or viable path to victory.
Quoting ssu
I would agree Ukraine could have certainly been able to defend had they been on the defensive and pulling back whenever positions got compromised.
However, since Ukraine defends political symbols and then even more foolishly attacks Russian fortifications, it's possible Ukraine has expended also its capacity for defence and may experience total military collapse.
In my view Russia does not want to conquer all of Ukraine, but total collapse of the front lines would mean Russia taking whatever it does want.
So I agree Ukraine won't be destroyed, but the main reason for this in my view is that Russia does not intend to completely conquer Ukraine (would be simply a long term liability, rather than Russian speaking regions with valuable resources which are long term assets).
Quoting ssu
Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war.
Since this war and now the war in Gaza and general instability has made the world a far dangerous place, as soon as the war ends my prediction is not only will the Russian military be at essentially a climax of war fighting capability but it will find a hungry market to absorb the massive arms manufacturing pace the war has created.
Not everyone is a friend of the US, as surprising as that may seem to some, and everyone else will be buying battle tested arms from Russia at the high levels of production Russia has built up: this will fuel more wars around the globe.
As our environment degrades and the world starts to feel the pain, the cure for our woes will be the traditional one. Modernity, I would wager, was but a brief delirium between our fits of trembling and fever.
My god you have completely lost it.
Not only do you believe in Putin the 4D playing master strategist and that all western information is propaganda.
You seriously believe that after taking massive casualties, loosing hundreds of armored vehicles and artillery and bring reduced to buying artillery ammunition from north Korea Russia is at peak fighting capability.
This is no longer just motivated reasoning it's complete fantasy. Not even russian propaganda would make such an absurd claim.
Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. This kind of war makes an army (especially the one that wins) far more dangerous than at the start.
In parallel, Russia has greatly increased arms production.
Of course, a lot of capacity is continuously destroyed in Ukraine, but as soon as the war ends there will be a significant arms built up as well as availability for export.
Of course, @boethius knows, but people for example in the White House had "zero clue". :roll:
and onwards...
Hence you are simply wrong in saying that "people who have no clue" making these pessimistic predictions. People simply thought that the Russian army was way more better than it was in 2022. Actions in Syria looked competent and remember that the perfect military operation was the annexation of Crimea. It was a smashing military victory. Exactly why Putin could be so confident in launching a bigger operation last year.
He is saying the same thing as I just said, that Ukraine can put up fierce resistance but
Their helicopter and jet fleet could be essentially "wiped out quickly" (which is essentially what happens and the West needs to scrounge up MIGs from elsewhere).
The author is not explaining how Ukraine will collapse in a matter of days but that Ukraine has "learned a lot" and does have fighting potential, just that Russia has a heave advantage and fighting the Russians will result in heavy casualties that does not ultimately change the outcome.
This is pretty much what all the analysts were saying before the war: that Ukraine can put up a fight, they do have hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a lot of equipment, and an immense territory.
Now, where analysts said Ukraine would lose relatively soon was in the context of zero support from the West, which I think we all agree here that if the West did not intervene Ukraine could not have lasted this long (at least in terms of conventional military fighting).
Quoting ssu
The average public indeed have zero clue, the Russian invasion was ultimately arrested by massive support from the West.
This is the mythology, that somehow the small country of Ukraine that has basically no army and should be easy for Russia to simply knock over in a few days, somehow beat the odds and it therefore must be due to Russian incompetence and weakness, rather than massive support and intervention from the West (weapons systems, intelligence capabilities, finance of the entire Ukrainian military and government).
Of course, the West did not intervene enough to actually threaten a Russian defeat, and therefore, like the author you cite notes, the outcome does not ultimately change.
What is interesting here is that despite the Russian military clearly not being incompetent, achieving and then securing against Ukraine's much advertised offensive, critical strategic ground, effectively destroying not only Ukraines Soviet equipment but a large part of the entire regions, and now destroying Western armour in large quantities, there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda.
Propaganda that was critical to justify Ukraine repudiating any negotiation and promising the World victory over the Russians.
Which now we're told was never "really a thing" just something people say to motivate the troops to fight to a better negotiation position that no one can explain how Ukraine's current negotiation position is remotely improved in anyway compared to the start of the war.
Yeah, sure, and no doubt we'll soon see them rolling up the front in their Armata tanks, while a fleet of SU 57 jets clears the way.
Quoting boethius
Oh, the irony!
We've discussed this already at length, what experts were saying before the war:
Quoting boethius
This is from conversation here nearly two years ago.
Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan @Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. It also supports the argument by @ssu that analysts expected the Ukrainian military to be destroyed as a cohesive fighting force in short order.
If you wanted to prove that you can't be assumed to argue in good faith, then you have succeeded.
What was RAND corporation saying before the war:
Quoting Extending Russia - RAND Corporation
RAND essentially argues against what the US policy ultimately does:
The conclusion of the brief of their report on extending Russia is:
Quoting Overextending and Unbalancing Russia, Brief - RAND corporation
The whole idea that Russia was expected to easily win is total mythical fabrication that was created after Russias initial success that saw some of the fastest armour advances in all of history so did seem (to lay people who have no clue) that Ukraine was collapsing and Russia was easily going to take the whole country.
However, anyone who has experience of soldiery or done honest study of war could easily point out that sustaining such advances at the same rate is logistically impossible, that Ukraine is huge and cannot possibly be overrun entirely in a matter of days or weeks, that one part of the Ukraine built up defences in the South collapsed but other parts didn't move at all, and that US intelligence capabilities is a massive advantage in coordinating a defence, Ukraine has hundreds of thousands of troops and many hundreds of thousands more that can be mobilized etc.
Therefore, when Ukraine arrests the initial invasion / Russia reaches logistical limits, it seems like a great and unforeseen victory and we can all enter magical thinking land where it will be easy to defeat the Russians and no need to ever negotiate!! Hurrah!!
Of course, arresting the initial invasion does not mean being poised to win the war, even if completely uncontested Russia could not occupy all of Ukraine with 200 000 troops.
What ultimately occurs was not unexpected. Ukrainians will likely fight back; that's what they've been preparing for and training for and what soldiers are conditioned to do. Ukraine can resist ... for a time. Russia has certainly the capacity to achieve some objectives (such as the land bridge to Crimea), but not all. The war could last but Russia has a heavy advantage.
What are you talking about? Are you unable to read??
The report literally starts by stating that conquering all of Ukraine is basically impossible if you take a closer look but Putin may conquer South East Ukraine ... which is what happens.
Quoting Literally the first paragraph of the report in question
Now, the report uses the term "invasion" to mean intent to fully conquer Ukraine, and "limited incursion" for doing something like take a land bridge to Crimea.
I would not use this terminology as clearly invading anywhere in a country is still an invasion, but the paper is meant for other experts and the "invasion / incursion" distinction is made clear.
It analyses what an invasion would entail and that it's basically impossible with the forces Russia has so concludes it's exceedingly unlikely ... but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".
Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does.
So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East?
The end result is rational and achievable (limited incursion to establish a land bridge to Crimea) and accomplishes critical strategic objectives such as securing a long term defence of Crimea and something as trivial (in your analysis) as fresh water ... but somehow the start is irrational and the plan is to fully conquer Ukraine with 200 000 troops and only 10% of that force committed to the capital?
Why would irrational actors have rational results in a process as chaotic and complicated as a war?
The key paragraph to understand the report is on page 14:
Quoting Report in question
The report explains the narrative in the media of what Putin is allegedly planning to do, and notes that the analysis then just stops at "Russia wins".
However, the author then explain how the alleged plan makes absolutely no sense if it were to be executed. Russia does not have enough troops to occupy all of Ukraine, nor the troops for massive urban combat in multiple cities, and even if cities would surrender as desired (which the author finds exceedingly unlikely), Ukrainians would very likely then conduct an insurgency and trying to do this thing of full scale conquest, even if initially successful, would not achieve any political objectives; it would be just attempting to conquer Ukraine for the sake of it and then have massive problems to deal with.
So either Putin is irrational or then whether intentional or not, Western media plays into what the actual plan is: a fixing operation in the North while the South-East (a feasible objective that serves a strategic purpose and conquers Russian speakers that are easier to pacify) is achieved, which is what happens. Also of note, many parts of the alleged plan do not ever happen, such as an amphibious assault on Odessa.
If the report is read carefully, the only military objective that is feasible with the forces under consideration is taking the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson ... which is what ultimately happens.
For example:
To explain (one of many reasons) why taking Odessa in an amphibious assault would be exceedingly difficult.
Furthermore, the noted effect of MANPADS is what happens in the actual war, forcing Russian air power to stand-off positions, and so would have basically stranded any landing party trying to take Odessa in a full scale invasion as explained ... which maybe explains why that didn't happen, but ultimately only feasible military objectives were taken and occupied long term.
Russia conducts no urban combat in the North (essential for long term occupation) again: because there is no intention to occupy the North long term is the reasonable explanation.
I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'.
Quoting boethius
Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. Again, one example of shelling does not constitute 'positive outcome' in any sensible way. Beside that factory there were rather vague reports of a few shellings of the residential outskirts, but with no victim or damage reports. As I wrote the artillery shelling was negligible and you have provided zero evidence that would counter that.
Quoting boethius
Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. It does not mean that it was the scenario that Russians necessarily planned. Not that it matters that much, given that the convoy got stalled, the main force never reached Kiyv, because it has overextended its supply lines. Thus the supposed 'siege' never happened, as I have already explained. Most of the forces in vicinity of Kiyv were quick, 'expeditionary' forces lacking heavy equipment and firepower, which run out of steam around the middle of March.
Quoting boethius
Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. Given that Russian advance units (not even the main force) were stalled thirty kilometers from the city and rather far from 'nearly entirely encircling a city' (have you even looked at the map in the article?), the city was not blocked in any way, all units and civilians were free to move into and out of the city, because Russians did not have even the main roads in range. No blockade - no siege, according to the quote you have provided.
Quoting boethius
I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. But you were not, you have made specific statements which were false and inconsistent with the known facts. There was no two-month or even one-month 'siege' by any sensible definition, the effects of shelling were negligible (because Russians have never got in range, contrary to your beliefs) and Russians left in the middle of the negotiations because their assault failed and they had no other choice. Finally, the composition of the force and the progress of the campaign clearly show that Russians were ill prepared for any 'siege' of reasonable duration.
That's not what happened. I can't tell whether you're brazenly lying to my face or just for some weird reason unable to acknowledge anything that doesn't agree with your beliefs. In any event I see no reason to further engage with you.
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Jabberwock
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Jabberwock
Well, considering the shelling I was referring to is explicitly described as artillery shelling by the primary source for the information (the municipality of Kiev) in Ukrainian based publications, your issue with the article is totally irrelevant to our debate.
Quoting Jabberwock
As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation.
Quoting Jabberwock
You are correct, as far as the original source goes, the citation is:
Quoting Col. Margo Grosberg
Which Wikipedia correctly paraphrases as "siege".
All of which is a response to your claim that:
Quoting Jabberwock
Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word "siege" as it is at their discretion to describe the situation as a siege, which it obviously is.
Another appearance of the word "siege" in the Wikipedia page is a source, The Washington Post, who publishes an article literally called:
Quoting European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues - The Washington Post
But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege".
Quoting Jabberwock
The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev.
Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case.
It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege.
Quoting Jabberwock
The issues of contention in this particular part of the debate is:
1. Incompetence, as expressed by Jabberwock explicitly stating:
Quoting Echarmion
2. Whether the intention of the Russians was to take and occupy Kiev, as expressed by you stating:
Quoting Jabberwock
I, and also @Tzeentch, explain why the Russian actions are neither incompetent nor incoherent, that they make sense and achieve plenty of military objectives while also applying pressure on Kiev to accept peace terms (which clearly does not happen), to which you reply to these points with the straw man that:
Quoting Jabberwock
No where do I say the Northern operation is some "kind of cunning Russian plan".
What are the obvious facts:
1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention.
2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city.
From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success.
Insofar as it is designed to pressure Kiev into accepting a quick peace, it is a failure.
Nowhere do I say the Northern operation is entirely successful. When I explain one purpose of the Northern operation is to pressure Kiev into accepting peace terms, I am very well aware that did not happen and the war continues.
Likewise, no where do I state that the Russian actions represent the best possible strategy. Perhaps things would have gone better for the Russians without the Northern operation, or then perhaps they would have been bogged down in trench warfare trying to break through the Donbas and their columns would have never left Crimea as Ukraine would have done the obvious thing of blowing up the bridges and digging in to prevent that from happening if they were free to focus on what is happening in the South.
The position I am defending is that the Russian plan makes sense and achieves some critical military objectives.
I state clearly that I do not know what probability the Kremlin assigned to Kiev completely capitulating or then accepting peace terms early on, but what is clear is that preparations are made for that not happening and the major military focus is placed on securing critical gains to have "something to show for it" if there is no peace agreement.
That's exactly what happens.
The "limited excursion" into South-Eastern Ukraine refers to establishing a land bridge to Crimea.
Literally called by the author "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea".
Which is the third "Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1" in an order of likelihood, following the most likely in the authors opinion:
1. Sub-COA 1a: Deploy Forces to Belarus
and 2. Sub-COA 1b: Overt Deployment in Donbas
Both of which also happen.
The situation on the ground at the moment is that Russia implemented exactly this reports top 3 likely things.
The options to view actions in the North that were abandoned are:
A. Putin and his generals also believed he could waltz in and take Kiev with 20 000 troops.
B. The northern operation was primarily representing a little thing in military parlance called "deception", to divert focus and resources in the North, while more feasible military objectives are achieved in the South.
The evidence for B is that Russia does not commit the troops remotely necessary to take a city of 3 million people, bypasses all urban centres (which are critical to capture for the purposes of long term occupation, but better to avoid if the operation is ephemeral) and does not engage in any Urban combat at all, whereas in the South fierce Urban combat takes place, particular in Mariupol, as the author predicts is necessary:
Quoting FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine - Institute for the Study of War
So, what is more probable? That Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy Northern Ukraine with 20 000 troops ... or that the plan to do what Institute of the Study of War finds feasible with Russia's available forces involves a tiny bit of subterfuge and making the Ukrainians believe, at least at the very onset of the war, there is a full scale invasion with the purpose of taking the capital. Subterfuge perhaps aided by the West repeating at face value a "leaked plan" where Russia would take Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and all of Ukraine in one blow.
If your objective is A you want your enemy to believe your objective is B.
If you want to break through at a point at A, let's call is A1, then you want to trick your enemy into reinforcing other points other than A1, ideally not even in the vicinity of A but to move forces to B and C and so on.
This is called "Defeat in Detail" or more popularly "Divide and Conquer" described by Wikipedia as:
Quoting Defeat in detail - wikipedia
The end result of all these deliberations is that Russia divides Ukrainian forces between defending the North and the South, allowing Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders in the South and conquer critically strategic terriroty.
The opposition here wants us to believe that this happened accidentally or then as a "consolation prize" to Russia's actual plan of defeating and occupying the North and installing a puppet regime, dedicating about 10% of their overall force in Ukraine to this primary objective.
This latter narrative has so little support that proponents are reduced to simply refusing to accept the common use of words like "siege".
What is more interesting than debating what "siege" means, is why the myth is developed that Russia has completely failed, incompetent, irrational, in disarray, in comparison to a standard of performance expected from the Russians (easily defeat all of Ukrainian forces in a few days, as little as 3, and occupy Kiev) that no expert expected before the war, is that it supports refusing negotiations, which is what the West, in particular the US, wants Ukraine to do.
And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice.
Quoting boethius
It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range.
Quoting boethius
No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you:
Russians did not blockade the city, as most of the roads were unobstructed and out of artillery range.
So either it was a failure as a quick forward attack to capture the city or it was a failure as a siege. You may insist it was the latter, but, as I wrote, there are facts that contradict that interpretation.
Quoting boethius
Except they Russians did not encircle 'most of a city'. It is like saying 'I have nearly imprisoned him, because I closed one of the three doors available to him'. Well, it not 'imprisonment' nor 'near imprisonment'. 'One-third of a siege' is not a siege.
Quoting boethius
It WOULD be a siege, if Russians managed to blockade the city, which they did not. Saying that there was a siege is simply false. And yes, I do have an obsession with attempts to dilute the initial arguments in such a way. The fact remains that your initial claims were false. No amount of bickering over the definitions will change that. 'Oh, two months were actually three weeks, two-month shelling of military targets was actually shelling of a single factory, the near encirclement of the city was actually getting 30 km from it from and one-third encircling it, and Russians did not stay until the negotiations broke down and run away in the middle, but generally, everything checks out'. No, it does not - these were false claims stated by you and they still remain false. You can either own up to it or continue bickering, but the end result will always be that I will remind you of your false initial claims and show again they were false. If you accept that you were completely wrong when you wrote that, we can discuss other things.
Quoting boethius
Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes.
Quoting boethius
Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops.
Quoting boethius
The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. You do not move your advance troops (as you wrote yourself bypassing other centers of resistance, making them vulnerable to counterattacks) and then cut them off from resources. You do not form a 60 km column and leave it standing for days as sitting ducks. You do not leave your tanks after retreat, because they run out of fuel after a few days. There is no amount of incompetence that would allow any such diversionary plans to be executed.
For a fixing operation all you need to do is to gather your troops ready for an attack, maybe with some small incursions. Ukrainians would have to commit their defensive units anyway. You do not commit large forces into diversionary attacks by definiton. You do not drive your diversions deep into enemy lines overstretching your GLOCs, so then you have to commit even more troops to secure their withdrawal. You do not commit your best airborne troops in a diversion. Saying that the attack on Hostomel was a diversion is simply denying the facts.
Dude, read here:
Russia's demands in the early phases of the invasion included legal recognition for Russia's annexation of Crimea, independence of Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as demilitarization and "de-Nazification" of Ukraine
After Russia declared unilateral annexation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that recognition of these additional claims were necessary conditions for any peace plan.
In April 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that he wanted any peace negotiations to focus on creating a "new world order" to counter global hegemony of the United States.
Russia's demands were Ukraine's recognition of Russian-occupied Crimea, independence for separatist-controlled Luhansk and Donetsk, and "de-militarisation" and "de-Nazification". Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that while his country was ready for talks to resume, Russia's demands had not changed.
Dmitry Peskov restated Moscow's demands, that Ukraine should agree to change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, accept that the Crimea was Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you.
By the way, it should be constantly repeated that this figure has been made up by Tzeentch and is a result of his complete misunderstanding the Russian command structure (and his bad arithmetics): https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/813992
While I understand it was just a mistake on his part, his further repeating it is simply dishonest. By treating it now as gospel, other debaters simply embarass themselves.
Quoting John J. Mearsheimer
*Mearsheimer bases this on the German invasion of western Poland, and the size of Poland in relation to Ukraine. The lecture contains more detail.
Note that this is almost exactly my argument as I have defended it here for several months.
It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.
Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.
Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to [I]not[/I] join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business".
That could very well be. What's your academic background?
No problem, I am happy to teach you.
First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.
So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine.
As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.
The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war.
None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by
Quoting Aaron Mate
Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).
And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101.
For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.
The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical.
Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:
Quoting Echarmion
Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.
Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as @Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.
... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO.
To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.
Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.
Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.
The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.
Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014.
The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression.
If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.
The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.
You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.
Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.
If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces.
However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.
The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.
If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses.
The report features a detailed reconstruction of the peace negotiations that took place in March/April of 2022.
This is merely confirming what many of us already strongly suspected, but
Here are the seven points which comprise most of Schulenberg's contribution to the report:
Quoting Former UN Assistant-General Michael von der Schulenberg
Kujat and Funke conclude:
Quoting Peace for Ukraine
In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014.
An interesting read, but one should perhaps supply some context.
One the central witness for this Theory, Naftali Bennett, has himself addressed the interview and clarified:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230207191917/https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/1622571402430750721
So a more accurate translation of what was said is that the negotiations were abandonned by the west, and Bennet at the time thought this was premature and a mistake. The clarification makes clear that a deal was by no means a done deal and that Bennet himself is unsure of whether it would have been a good idea to make such a deal.
The second witness is ex-chancellor Schröder. Now Schröder is of course well known for his personal friendship with Putin and the very lucrative posts he received from the latter. So perhaps we should treat his "impression" with some caution, though of course everyone is free to decide how reliable he is.
Lastly there's the turkish foreign minister. But he doesn't actually say anything about the negotiations itself, and if you watch the interview (it's difficult with the automatic translate but you can pick up some things) you notice that he's emphasising that the negotiation are ongoing and that he will not say that either one side is closer to peace than the other.
So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does.
Does that measure up against the likelihood that Russia offered a peace deal that essentially involves a return to the status quo ante?
Yes, obviously the separatists cannot prevail by themselves and already required support in 2014 and support would inevitably require escalation to either a peaceful settlement of the Donbas conflict or then a full blown war.
Quoting Echarmion
Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.
Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be?
The main point of issue in the present debate is whether (since all present seem to agree a peace agreement is the only viable end to the conflict) Ukraine's leverage increased or decreased since the first phase of the war. Whatever Russia was offering, if Ukraine's leverage was higher in the past then they had the best chance of getting the best deal at that time in the past along with avoiding further loss of Ukrainian lives.
What a deal would have actually looked like is subordinate to whether it was a better deal than whatever Ukraine can ultimately negotiate from here.
As for what the terms actually were, Russia made the offer and key points publicly so Ukraine could have accepted publicly. One topsy-turvy narrative is that Russia was making the offer in bad faith and therefore Ukraine was right to reject the offer and insist on a military defeat of Ukraine; however, the correct negotiation move when a good offer is made in bad faith is to simply accept it and if the counter-party renegs then one's position is improved by clearly demonstrating the bad faith of the opposing party.
One issue I think is important to address is the framing are statements such as "the west prohibited Ukraine from taking the deal". US / NATO I do not think had any hard leverage that essentially means they were deciding for Zelensky / other Ukrainian leaders, but they needed to persuade Zelensky et. al. and absolutely essential to this was the mythology that was rapidly constructed to portray the Russian invasion as somehow a complete failure, Ukrainians fiercer fighters that are more motivated, Zelensky himself a brazen war hero and so on.
In short, Ukrainian decision makers, and in particular Zelensky, needed to be seduced to the neo-con world view that what actually matters is what Western people can be made to think and somehow reality will flow from such beliefs, whether they be true or false initially or at any point in the future. The promise of military aid, "whatever it takes", and tens of billions of dollars certainly helped.
This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value.
Here's another example of shelling something of military value:
Quoting Another example of shelling stuff - CBC
But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?
Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?
In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value.
Quoting Jabberwock
A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.
There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds.
Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all.
It's honestly bizarre your fixation on not only me using the word siege but as you admit yourself the mainstream media.
Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.
You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used.
Quoting Jabberwock
That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege?
Quoting Jabberwock
As I've stated several times, insofar as the purpose was to compel a peace deal, the Northern campaign failed to do that.
Insofar as the purpose was to absorb focus and resources in the North so as to contribute to success in the South, the Northern campaign was a success.
The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role.
Quoting Jabberwock
Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.
I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight?
Quoting Jabberwock
Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.
Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.
So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.
Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation.
The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting.
Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation.
But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim.
Quoting boethius
Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed.
Quoting boethius
And the flight to the moon starts with launching a rocket and when it disintegrates in the air it is a failed flight to the moon. Still, it would be rather misleading to say that the person has flown to the moon.
But sure, if we take into consideration failed sieges and failed attempts of sieges, then we can call it a failed siege.
Quoting boethius
Sure, and Russians did not do that with Kiyv - Ukrainians forces were able to move in and out freely.
Quoting boethius
As I wrote, I am completely fine with using the term 'a failed siege'.
Quoting boethius
No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations.
Quoting boethius
No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses.
Quoting boethius
No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv.
Quoting boethius
So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport?
We seem then to be on agreement of the principle point that if there was a suitable peace available based on an "acceptable neutrality", before or at the beginning of the war, then that was far better for Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as living breathing people compared to the situation now.
If we furthermore agree that using the Ukrainians to their detriment simply to harm Russia some is immoral, which I assume if you agree peace is preferable you'd agree with this additional point, then the West rejecting peace on such a basis rather than the interest of Ukrainians was certainly an immoral decision, whether it succeeds in some grand geopolitical strategic sense or not (which I have my serious doubts, countries generally getting stronger militarily, rather than weaker, from this kind of war).
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, certainly if a deal would likely end up in a worse situation later, then it's better to reject it.
Nevertheless, the logic of "better to fight now than later" still requires the expectation of winning. For example, the criticism of appeasement is levied against the great powers of the time - France, UK and the United States - who have reasonable chance of stopping Nazi Germany and completely defeating if need be. We do not direct the criticism towards Poland for not fighting to the last Polish.
What deal would have been attainable at the time we can never know for sure now, but what I think is clear is that Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, believed further fighting would improve their position; my argument of why Zelensky believed further fighting to be a better course is the various myths quickly built up around the war: Russia was incompetent and easy to beat, Putin an irrational actor as well as some sort of nostalgic reenactment of WWII Western allied solidarity ... just without anyone coming to actually help.
Quoting Jabberwock
Your first claim was literally:
Quoting Jabberwock
So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.
You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.
I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled.
Anyways, here's more evidence:
Quoting Aljazeera
Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.
It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.
Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative.
Quoting Jabberwock
Road traffic was not disrupted on the roads Russia literally occupied?
Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.
In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege.
Quoting Jabberwock
This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.
Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting.
Quoting Jabberwock
Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine.
The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there.
Even if you don't believe Wikipedia's estimate that 15 000 to 30 000 Russian troops took part in the siege of Kiev (7 - 15 % of the overall force), the entire 200 000 Russian force is not enough to occupy major Ukrainian urban centres, likely not even sufficient to occupy only Kiev, especially if the population is extremely hostile to the Russians (which plenty of Ukrainians are).
The alternative view is, instead of attempting to do something that is basically unfeasible, the Northern operation puts pressure on Kiev, keeps Ukrainian resources and operational focus there instead of in the South, shells a bunch of valuable targets, and when the South is secure and it becomes clear peace is unlikely, the Russians retreat (as expected in a fixing operation once the principle objective is accomplished elsewhere).
Quoting Jabberwock
First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre".
Quoting Battle of Antonov Airport - Wikipedia
All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.
Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish.
As for sending special forces on special missions ... that's pretty much what they are for in conventional warfare. What you want to avoid is throwing in special forces into a large infantry formation doing conventional manoeuvres where there's little or no difference between special and regular infantry.
Whether they suffered greater than expected losses or not, an air assault on an airbase to both destroy assets there as well as make the enemy believe "the real goal" is Kiev is exactly a mission where special forces can do their special thing and have an disproportionate effect on the theatre.
So, the use of special forces in a special mission is entirely expected.
Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A.
If we are discussing the allies in WWII deceiving the Nazi's as to where they plan to land in Normandy it goes without saying that this this is both a good military idea as well as there are officers that can plan and execute a deceptive campaign.
However, if we consider the idea that the Russians deceived the Ukrainians as to their primary military goal and getting Ukraine to overcommit to defending Kiev, suddenly its ludicrous that Russian officers have even read a single book on military tactics and strategies.
Again, my point, which I have repeated over and over, is that the shelling was insignificant. I admit I did not find the two cases you have quoted, but it does not change the overall picture at all - even if the total number of shellings amounted to a dozen. No amount of bickering changes the fact that the amount of shelling was minimal, contrary to your initial claims.
Quoting boethius
Your 'evidence' specifically writes about 'shelling' AFTER the ground troops have withdrawn and states:
'Russia most likely used strategic bombers, cruise missiles and Iranian-made Shaheed “kamikaze” drones, military analyst Alexander Kovalenko said in televised remarks.
That is what Al Jazeera considers 'shelling' throughout the article. I have already patiently explained to you that it is not the 'shelling' what we talk about, it is a bit tiresome to correct the same errors of you again and again, each time you decide to google 'shelling kiyv'. If you do that, at least read the article you have googled.
Quoting boethius
You have evidence for shelling of two military objects, one rather vague. But sure, you cannot come up with any more, because bad Western propaganda is hiding it from us. When unable to provide evidence for your claims, resort to conspiracy, always works.
Quoting boethius
I see exactly one report by Klitschko that the city was encircled, but it was quickly denied. However, if it was widely reported, I am sure you can provide such reports.
Quoting boethius
Not if it stalls less than two weeks into the campaign. Ukrainians did not even engage most of the troops they had at hand. They did not even have time to move their reserve units before Russians left.
Quoting boethius
But that is a strawman, as nobody argues for that. The blitz assault was meant to break through the initial defense and cause enough panic and morale drop (particularly if the government fled) that the city would surrender. That is how Wikipedia describes it:
Quoting Northern Ukraine campaign
Now, Wikipedia of course is not always reliable, but then it is not often completely wrong. So yes, it might be possible that you have access to special expert knowledge that counters the common knowledge reflected in the Wikipedia articles. However, you have proven time and again that you do not have any special knowledge, on the contrary, at the beginning of the discussion you have shown that you lack basic knowledge both of the duration and progress of the campaign. So, initially, you had a view quite different from the generally accepted one and the level of knowledge demonstrably lower than those who expressed it. When faced with facts, you continue to redress the argument: the two-month siege of Kiyv ending a week after the fall of Mariupol - such a short phrase with three factual errors! - somehow became a vague 'diversion'.
Quoting boethius
Two. We have evidence of two targets of industrial and military value (one of rather unknown value, given that all we have is a single picture) that were shelled. If the Russian plan was to shell two military targets in order to pressure Ukrainians into peace talks, it is not very surprising they have not succeeded.
Quoting boethius
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-military-losses-31st-guards-air-assault-brigade-ukraine-1712686
Quoting boethius
Yes, they presume that, because, unlike you, they are familiar with the details of the operation. You base your argument on your very general speculations, completely overlooking how the battle has actually proceeded. It makes zero sense to send your best elite troops behind the enemy lines and just leave them there, if all they were supposed to do was to destroy it (which could as well be done with missiles). Sure, special forces attack airfields, but they do have a plan to retreat rather quickly after that. Russians have dropped 300 special forces and left them there (their helicopters came back to Belarus). They were supposed to hold the airfield until the armor column arrived, but they were unable to do that - Ukrainians had time to counterattack, inflicting heavy losses. And VDV forces were not to stop Ukrainians to use the airfield - Russians could do that with missiles or the ground forces which arrived later, without engaging VDV at all. On the contrary, it is rather obvious that Russians wanted the airstrips to be intact. The special forces had a single, very specific task - to secure the airfield so it could be used by Russians and that is exactly what they tried to do, that is why they stayed instead of retreating. Again, you seem completely unaware of the details of the actual events.
Here is a more detailed article on that battle:
https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/
Quoting boethius
But that is not my objection, that is another strawman. My objection is that the nature of the attack clearly indicates that Russians wanted much more than a fixing or diversionary attack, because they have committed much more than required for those. The assault on Hostomel was, as the experts in the article quoted above wrote, a 'high-risk, high-reward strategy'. Russians took a gamble and lost a significant number of their best troops. They risked that, because they went for the main prize: quick overwhelming of the Kiyv government. That is also why the advance column moved so fast: it was also risky (as there was a danger of overstretching the supply lines - which happened - and attacks on the extended line, as you wrote yourself), but necessary to support the airborne operation. As a fixing operation such high-risk maneuvers are questionable, as a diversion they are absurd. If Russians moved slowly, overwhelming the resistance on the way to Kiyv and securing the supply lines, they would achieve even greater fixing effect, they could bring much more troops in the vicinity of Kiyv of the 70000 available in the North and siege and bombard the city much more effectively. Also they would not need to retreat in the middle of negotiations, significantly weakening their negotiating position.
This is almost a truism, isn't it? If the deal is good enough to avoid fighting then the deal is good enough to avoid fighting.
Incidentally if that was the case then there was no reason for the invasion in the first case.
Quoting boethius
And further fighting did improve Ukraine's position. Whether that will be be the case going forward is another question.
What I notice about your view, and this also goes for @Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds.
One does not need to invoke a master plan to explain Ukraine's decision to fight. They're hardly the first people in history to react with defiance when attacked by a seemingly overwhelming enemy.
That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO.
What misunderstanding?
Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO?
You're literally making up conversation that has not occurred, but please cite where we even discuss other countries joining NATO and explain again what we don't understand about the reasons for doing so.
The reasons Ukraine would want to join NATO before or even now are obvious: not only direct military protection but nuclear deterrence.
The problem is that, if you haven't noticed, Ukraine isn't in NATO. NATO could have flown to Kiev and made Ukraine apart of the club one night by surprise anytime in the last 8 years, or even right now. The explanation of why that doesn't happen by explaining that plenty of countries (including the US) doesn't want Ukraine in NATO simply expounds the obvious reason why Ukraine isn't in NATO as we speak.
If there are "rules" that would prevent NATO allowing Ukraine to join, those rules could be changed if NATO was so motivated to help their friend Ukraine. If there are common sense reasons why no one would change the rules for Ukraine, that is simply another way of saying NATO (and its parts) does not want Ukraine in NATO.
The whole point of being in NATO is to avoid exactly the war that is happening now.
So, if NATO isn't going to do you the favour of rushing over and making you apart of the club and defending you, fighting the war that you want NATO to protect you from to defend the principle of "having the right" to join NATO, is dumb.
And that was the argument for a while, that Ukraine has the "right to join NATO" and so Russia does not have the right to ask neutrality as part of a peace agreement and so Zelensky is right to reject negotiation.
It's a truism that you state.
I agree with your truism and then you complain about me agreeing with your truism.
What is not a truism is that we agree that the Russian terms on offer, at least as they appeared to be and were interpreted by diplomats and the West's own media, were reasonable, you even go so far as to say generous (a term I would hesitate to use; generous would be just leaving all the occupied territory).
Now, what is notable, is who doesn't accept this truism is Zelensky. He rejects further negotiation until his demands are met, rather than negotiate and see if there's a deal good enough to take and thus he should take it.
But it's an additional truism that you negotiate before an agreement not after your counter-party accepts your terms.
So maybe it is an obvious truism that you should negotiate and take a good enough deal if it's on offer, but it's clearly not so obvious as to be accepted by Zelensky nor his cheerleaders in the Western media.
Ukraine rejects the terms before the war and also, we are told, the whole Minsk process of diplomacy before was just a ruse and those previous settlements to the conflict were agreed to in bad faith.
Quoting Echarmion
What further fighting improved Ukraine's position?
You think now Ukraine is in a better negotiation position than it was at the start of the war? And only going forward from now their negotiation position might decrease?
You obviously didn't read what I wrote.
I explicitly stated I disagree with the narrative that the US forced Zelensky to abandon negotiating but needed to persuade him. I even go so far as use the word seduce.
The reason I use myth instead of narrative for things like Putin wanting to conquer all of Ukraine, or Russian military incompetence and Zelensky as the modern Churchill, is because there's not enough elements in these ideas to even constitute a narrative.
The other reason I use the word myth is that there's an epic dimension to these ideas; heroic defence of freedom and so on.
I wouldn't have much of a problem with the use of the word narrative but I feel myth building is more appropriate in this case.
Now, the US not being able to literally force Zelensky to do or not do things doesn't mean they didn't do their best to convince him. Where they did clearly intervene is in the coup of 2014, so that was more US agency than Ukrainian but Ukrainians had 8 years to make peace with Russia if they wanted to.
What is also of note is that all the imperialists in the Kremlin also want this war as well. Imperialists look at a map and ask why this part here isn't ours, and wars as the opportunity to make it theirs.
The US and Russian imperialists are more freinemies then actual adversaries when it comes to this particular war.
Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's.
It wasn't intended as a complaint.
Quoting boethius
I haven't said anything about what I think the terms actually were, and I have already decided that it's pointless to discuss specifics with you as our views just diverge too much.
Clearly we do not inhabit a shared reality (mentally, that is).
Quoting boethius
Mostly all the fighting in 2022 after the first couple of weeks.
Quoting boethius
Yeah, at least in terms of relative battlefield advantage. You can of course argue that the russian losses will make it harder for Russia to justify any kind of settlement, but psychological effects like this are hard to measure.
It's possible that Ukraine has passed it's peak and the war of attrition will slowly accumulate russian battlefield advantage, as well as erode Ukrainian will to fight. Certainly the very public show of disunity recently is not a good sign.
But there doesn't seem to be a reason to assume either side will collapse any time soon and a lot can happen in a long war.
Quoting boethius
Fair enough. I was just reminded of the phenomenon that, in the proxy wars of the 20th century, junior partners often acquire outsized influence, because the prestige of either the US or the USSR was bound up with their fate. So both powers ended up much deeper in wars than they really wanted.
So I think (without agreeing with the sentiment that this is a proxy war) that even if Zelensky is reliant on the west for aid, we should not discount his own influence.
For that matter, an interesting thought is that Russian involvement with the DNR and LNR, which as far as I know was opportunistic and not initially part of some larger strategy, ended up setting up the conditions of the 2022 invasion.
In that sense you maybe are right to point out that Russian support for the separatists was always likely to eventually escalate. Perhaps by sending regular russian troops into Donbas Russia unknowingly (at the time) embarked on the course that would lead to the 2022 invasion.
That's good to know.
Quoting Echarmion
Well then it seems we are of one mind on the matter and Zelensky disagrees with what is obvious truth to us.
Quoting Echarmion
I agree it's mostly an academic exercise and speculation what the best deal possible was at the time, though I would not say useless; what would have been the best diplomatic strategy (what concessions were achievable not only from Russia but the US, NATO, EU) could inform similar situations in the future.
As for the subject at hand, seems we agree that Zelensky should have been willing to accept neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some degree of independence for the separatists, certainly getting as many concessions as possible from all the involved parties for agreeing to those points.
Whether the Russian offer was "bad faith" or would result in some future war seems also now of academic interest.
Though, as I mention, if an offer is in bad faith it is still good to accept it. Likewise, even if you think a war would only be postponed for later one still needs to be confident of winning a sooner war.
[/quote]
Quoting Echarmion
We seem to agree on the major points.
Whether the Northern operation was worth the cost (which we actually know Russia casualties), and whether there was a better strategy available, it made military sense to undertake and did help achieve the military gains in the South.
Of course, geo-politically, economically, in terms domestic politics, the whole war certainly has many consequences. On these issues my position is that it is not a given that Russia is being harmed by the war, or then being more harmed than NATO as a whole (even if there is relative benefit to the US relative Europe), and of course the big winner is China (and whether Russia is a relative loser vis-a-vis China, strengthening the China block is not necessarily productive for the West). The latter point even US mainstream analysts seem to be adopting as well.
Quoting Echarmion
Then we are in agreement, by start of the war I mean the general period from before the fighting even starts to then the first weeks of fighting.
My point being that period of time Ukraine had more leverage than now. At what point it had maximum leverage is again a somewhat academic speculative exercise. The Kremlin may have been willing to make more concessions to avoid the war entirely, in which case maximum leverage was before the war. Once fighting begins then "exact leverage levels" I would argue are pretty volatile as a lot depends on perceptions and worries of decision makers.
There's huge risks in military operations of this size so as days go by the major risks may seem to be radically bigger or smaller.
What military leaders, the Kremlin and Putin are most worried about and would motivate them the most to settle the conflict so as to be sure to avoid, are potentially things that Ukraine doesn't even have the capacity to do or then doesn't ever attempt to do even if they could.
To give an extreme example, a major invasion and/or missile attacks on undisputed Russian territory is certainly something Ukraine could do, and even if doing so would likely solicit Russia responding with massive military call up (not only "unlocking that ability" in the Russian legal code but the Kremlin may feel obliged for international prestige to react as hard as possible), Russia still needs to deal with the sanctions and so such events, even if terrible for Ukraine, risk also havoc in Russia that the Kremlin legitimately believes maybe overwhelming. Maybe the Russian people band together to crush the insolent Ukrainians or maybe things start falling apart militarily or economically.
So, at the start of the war, Ukraine has this theatre level chaotic wildcard sort of leverage over Russia as well as simply the costs and risks of the fighting itself.
If it interests you, or then anyone following, to evaluate risks and stakes on this level you need to keep in mind all the possibilities. By committing to the defence Kiev and re-posturing forces for that, Russia anxiety may significantly decrease as the possibility of Ukraine actually invading Russia decreases.
The Russian plan is to prosecute the first phases of the war with 200 000 troops supplemented by mercenaries, so, at minimum, Ukraine invading Russia would cause a problem to the Kremlins preferred strategy.
I use this example not simply because it's extreme to illustrate the point of risk perception, but also Ukrainians and neo-cons have (after nearly 2 years) realized this themselves that forbidding Ukraine from invading Russia was a significant strategic weakness.
But for the subject at hand, Russia could not know for certain in any case at the start of the war that the US would forbid Ukraine from invading Russia nor that Ukraine would head such limitations; it is the risk, not what actually happens in the future (that is not known at the time), that is leverage at the negotiating table. Of course, Zelensky having zero experience was likely clueless about anything and just a snow flake on spring breeze blowing higher and tither in his understanding of the situation.
Making irrational ultimatums in public to close the door on negotiation entirely, is a sign of a weak mind that is unable to deal with complexity so seeks to simplify the situation by making the choice of the day (or hour or minute) permanent and so not need to think about the options anymore; certainly serves no diplomatic or military purpose.
Quoting Echarmion
Well I think it's more than possible Ukraine has passed its peak, but for the sake of completeness "we don't know for certain" relative casualties.
We will see how the war unfolds.
Quoting Echarmion
A war of attrition at this scale of intensity leads to sudden collapse of the one side if it continues.
This is not an insurgency where the insurgents mostly hang out among the civilian population, in well hidden and remote bases, as well as other countries entirely and can sustain a low level conflict indefinitely.
At this intensity of fighting, continuous supply of munitions is required, continuous replacement of casualties adequate enough to hold the entire front.
It's only difficult for either side to advance insofar as they must penetrate heavy fortifications and mine fields into artillery bombardment and under risk / pressure of counter attack and degradation by suicide drones, and if you manage to advance despite all that it's simply all redeployed and rebuilt 5 or 10 km further away and you need to do it all over again.
A total collapse of one part of the line would allow deep penetration where none of these things exist anymore likely leading to a cascade of collapse along the entire front.
Now, Ukraine is massive so they can always retreat far enough that they are simply out of range of Russian logistics to chase them, but it would be a massive win for Russia. If Russian history is anything to go by, collapse of the front results in political changes in the capital.
Even so, as has been discussed at length with @ssu, Ukraine could still hold plenty of defendable positions (such as the giant river in the middle of the country) as well as sustain an insurgency for years if Russia did occupy the whole country (which is unlikely for this reason), but collapse of the front would mean Russia could take more territory, possibly significantly more.
Collapse of one side of the other is essentially guaranteed at this level of intensity.
"Freeze theory" depends on the Russians giving up on advancing and so lowering the intensity to a sustainable level. Why I think this is unlikely is due to there being too many standoff munitions and drones being too effective and Russia being now totally committed to doing whatever it takes to win the war (Russia started the war with significant self-limitations clearly to make a way back to peace with the West easier' progressive deescalation was perhaps feasible before Nord Stream was blown up).
In principle, Ukraine could hold out and the Russians exhaust their offensive capability (what Western media keeps saying), but as it stands my own view is that Russia has simply too many advantages, in particular artillery and in the air with heavy standoff munitions.
Quoting Echarmion
We're in agreement here. If you read carefully the RAND report cited above, they emphasize repeatedly that escalation of the conflict is not good for the US and advise resolving the Donbas conflict, using arms support only in the context of essentially a negotiating tactic to achieve the best resolution.
There's certainly forces in Ukraine that wanted a war and played the part exactly as you say.
However, a bigger factor I think is that the war festers during the Trump presidency and Russia gate was an overriding US political game that prevented the Trump administration from doing what RAND suggests for domestic political reasons.
Personally I think this war was going to happen no matter what. Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'.
The people who are in charge now aren't just favorable to the Blob, they ARE the Blob. Neocon hawks who have all been involved in project Ukraine. If you check their political track record, you'll find they're all elbow deep in Ukraine literally for decades.
Perhaps a more interesting question would be what the goal is of project Ukraine.
In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict.
Maybe the goal of project Ukraine really was to incorporate Ukraine into NATO/EU, but perhaps this was just the red herring to provoke Russia, and the actual goal of project Ukraine lies elsewhere - perhaps the goal was a forever war between Russia and Europe.
For example, European energy dependency has been a thorn in the United States' side for at least a decade, and it ties in nicely with the US blowing up Nord Stream.
Uhh... exaclty when? 2014? Earlier?
Sorry, but the West was totally surprised with it's pants down when Russia annexed Crimea. Remember, then the Intelligence services were still fighting the War on Terror.
When you had, out of the blue, after decades without it happening Iraqis and other Third World country citizens coming with bikes without the proper documentation and seeking asylum, the officials here knew what was happening. A brief interrogation of the first asylum seekers clearly showed how Russian authorities were behind this.
The good thing now was that the politicians here weren't clueless of what is happening. That's the problem of when Russia has already shown earlier that it could do this, then even Finns can anticipate it. Luckily we are in NATO, poor of Sweden...
I doubt the US was completely surprised by it, since they had just supported a coup in Ukraine. Perhaps they hadn't anticipated that the Russians would dare invade Crimea with such a small force.
I'm sure the decision not to put boots on the ground was made somewhere between 2014-2021.
Quoting ssu
Personally, I really dislike my country throwing their lot in with countries like the US and Britain, which are essentially island nations that don't share any of the security concerns of the mainland European nations. It actually makes sense for them to play political games to keep the Eurasian continent divided, as per Mackinder's Heartland theory.
A European security structure would make more sense, though not via the EU.
More than your personal doubt, please give some reason why wouldn't this be the case? Yes, the hadn't make extensive preparations that your normal satellite intelligence would notice, that is true. But really, the focus wasn't at all in Ukraine. That is a simple fact.
Because the Russians had been drawing a red line since at least 2008, so supporting a coup was essentially calling Russia's bluff. That the US was unaware of this is simply unthinkable.
Also, I don't believe a single word that comes from US about its intelligence agencies.
Well I agree the war was extremely likely and it's definitely a testament to the power of the neo-cons that they can simply continue the policy without presidents having much say in it.
Nevertheless, I have no problem recognizing Ukrainian "agency" in parallel to the US policy.
It may certainly be true that Zelensky is Nuland's "our man" and the leverage and compromat Nuland has on Zelensky essentially guaranteed rejecting any peace or negotiation before the war.
However, not only are there other actors in Ukrainian society, once the war started and the stakes were clear I think Zelensky did have real agency. In extreme circumstances many previous obligation, pressures and considerations that seemed important before are swept away in force majeur. Had he wanted, Zelensky could have chosen to be something other than be a patsy and instead play an astute diplomatic game playing the sides off each other and making use of his leverage to cut a deal, playing the Americans and the Europeans, while keeping a step ahead of hardliners (aka. literal Nazi's) in Ukraine.
Of course, you may retort that Zelensky is an idiot and could not possibly come up with some sophisticated play that would have shoved a peace down the throats of Nuland and fellow patsies in the EU. And for myself, personally, I would not care much to defend more than the agency of an idiot.
However, it is a common refrain from apologists for US foreign policy that the disasters are co-created with "agency" of local players. It may not seem too relevant to you that the US is "invited in" to get a bunch of people killed, poisoned, maimed and tortured, but it is very important in the foundation of psychopathic analysis that victims "want it", or then at least had hypothetical chance to prevent it. So, for the sake of these fragile souls I have no problem admitting the agency of American agents does in fact exist—yeah, sure, why not I say—, but I would still leave it to them to argue what kind of agency we're talking about. The agency of a moron like Zelensky maybe little more than hypothetical and seen as Nuland elects the Ukrainian leader since 2014 then it would follow that Ukrainians have little say in the matter.
Quoting Tzeentch
Agreed.
To add to your observation, there's no actual rush to make Ukrainians as effective as possible. Drip feed theory, the centre piece of my analysis here, of only supplying the next weapons system when the previous weapon system fails to deliver any sort of victory for Ukraine, I would argue definitive proof there's no real intention to even try to defeat the Russians.
US officials have managed to impress upon the fungible minds of even the most ardent war zealot that there's some rational reason for holding back weapons all while "doing whatever it takes" to win ... but this is clearly untrue given that they can send the very weapons one day they presented as simply common sense they could not possibly send the day before. What changes as time passes is not some reevaluation of these "of course not" arguments for not sending more sophisticated weapons, but rather the destruction of Ukrainian's war fighting capability.
As the RAND paper insists upon multiple times, support to Ukraine must be "Calibrated" to avoid any real inconvenience to Russia that risks escalation, which isn't good for anyone.
Quoting Tzeentch
Well, I'm sure if Russia just "let it happen" then Ukraine and Georgia would be in NATO already, but since Russia didn't the neo-cons saw the opportunity for a new war that would be good as far as war making is concerned. The gas and destroying the Euro as a competitor the USD as well as making European states essential permanent vassals without the possibility of "playing off both sides" anymore were additional benefits. However, I'm pretty sure the neo-cons just like killing as many people as bureaucratically possible (they can't just launch nukes at random and live out their fetish of rebuilding civilization in a bunker, for example, because other bureaucrats would stop them ... for now).
So, I certainly agree with your point:
Quoting Tzeentch
But that's just dirty money business, Tim Cook has money for god's sake; no, money isn't the main motivation, you really know you're powerful when you get a lot of people killed due to your creative engagement with the world. Money is only a tool, not an end in itself you know.
Many didn't when the US intelligence services were saying that Russia will invade Ukraine in 2022. I remember that well. :smile:
Including a well-known illuminator of a thoroughfare (X)
Is this a joke?
Quoting Jabberwock
The US had a plan for Eastern Europe. That plan is not exclusively NATO. Your inability to understand that isn’t my problem.
Quoting Jabberwock
That’s not the question. It’s not about hypotheticals. It’s about the facts, of what actually happened. And US influence is all over it, from the billion + spent on social influence to NATO expansion to supporting the overthrow of the government to economic influences to supplying military training and arms.
The question is whether we — the US —should have taken the Russian perspective seriously. I think we should have. We didn’t. And that’s why we have the war.
What the Ukrainian people have wanted has varied greatly. We see from polls about NATO or EU membership that things change, and especially in different regions. So to treat Ukraine as a monolith is incorrect. But it’s also irrelevant to the point about US influence, which is all over this war and all over Ukraine for decades.
That's easy enough to say. But what does "taking the russian perspective seriously" actually imply?
Yes, it shows how ridiculous your claims are. NATO, a strictly defensive alliance, with steadily decreasing army in Europe, is a grave threat, while Russia, with openly nationalistic politicians, meddling politically and military intervening all over its neighbourhood, is not.
Quoting Mikie
It is not about my inability to understand, it is about your complete ignorance of European politics, which you have shown again and again.
Quoting Mikie
It is very much a question. Your claim is that without the US influence there would be no war, so the hypothetical (whether the war would happen without the US influence) is essential to support it. And the facts are that the underlying conflict was already in place and had little to do with the US influence: Ukraine has consistently demanded more independence from Russia and Russia's politics has clearly steered toward nationalism and imperialism. That made the war likely, as Russia has no qualms in engaging militarily in its neighbourhood. E.g. the US had zero influence over the Chechnya war or Armenia-Azerbeijan conflicts, yet both happened.
Quoting Mikie
No, it is only you who do not take the Russian perspective seriously. You have asked about the internal Russian politics and I have answered you in detail, citing specific sources. You have chosen simply to skip that part, not engage with it at all, because it clearly denies your narrative about the 'rectroactive' made-up Russian nationalism. You skip such evidence (again) and in a post or two you again will parrot the same point.
The 'Russian perspective' is that about 2004-2005 Putin has taken over the growing nationalistic trends which have demanded return to the imperialistic policy. That confirmed that the fears of its near neighbours, which they have voiced since their independence, are quite reasonable and justified, in spite of initial skepticism of the Western Europe. That is why they have joined NATO in the first place, which of course aligned with the US politics, but the US was not the main cause or drive of the process.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, it is not a monolith, no policy of any country is. Still, the majority wanted the integration with the Western Europe since 2000s. The facts are that they have chosen the president who promised them exactly that (along with neutrality i.e. non-engagement with NATO) and they have rebelled when he reneged on that promise due to Russian influence, which sparked the initial military conflict. And as I have shown, Ukrainians had every reason to fear Russia, given that significant political forces in Russia demanded not only Ukraine's subjugation, but even questioned its statehood, and Putin has openly embraced that rhetoric. That is the 'Russian perspective' you keep overlooking.
:lol:
And then…
Quoting Jabberwock
Yeah, and coming from a guy who makes statements like the one above— that cuts deep.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nope. I like to stick to reality.
Maybe there would have been a way anyway— yeah, sure. Maybe there would be a war in Israel without the US providing billions in military aid. Let’s jump in a Time Machine and see how things might turn out if things were different. Let’s kill Hitler while we’re at it and see if Germany would have started a war anyway. Who knows?
Quoting Jabberwock
Demanded more independence— like EU and NATO membership. Which clearly has nothing to do with the United States influence. Got it. Never mind what Russia was saying about this for years.
Quoting Jabberwock
No, that’s the Ukrainian perspective. You don’t even seem to know what the Russian perspective was. Which is striking— and exactly the point.
Right or wrong, there was no way Russia was going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a “Western bulwark,” and it was clear about this for years. Especially regarding NATO. If Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 weren’t evidence enough, fine. But then further funding, training, and supplying (all with US backing) — all while Russia warned against it — eventually leading to war, just as our own diplomats and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, et al., predicted, shouldn’t have been a major surprise.
To write it off as “well it would have happened anyway because Russia turned nationalistic and imperialistic” is less than great analysis. It’s the conventional view, no doubt— but I repeat myself.
"the Russian [monolith] perspective", or the (current) Kremlin's?
In this context, the main perspective is Ukrainian; just about everything that happens here is about / in Ukraine. Leave that out, and you've lost perspective — perspective that matter.
By the way, the (supposed) NATO-phobia has come numerous times in the thread already. I suppose it's time for a re-repeat?
Yeah, how convenient it would be to ignore this fact. Might as well sweep it under the rug so as not to sound repetitive.
In fact this has been predicted long before Putin, and not just coming from “monolith” Russia.
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/09/21/should-nato-growa-dissent/
I am sure it does, given that I have proven your ignorance again and again.
Quoting Mikie
I have clearly written 'independence from Russia'. And that is exactly what it entails for the countries of the Eastern Europe. At the time EU and/or NATO are the only ways that allow them to escape Russia's embrace.
Quoting Mikie
That is an obvious and blatant lie. I have provided many quotes and articles about the dominant views in Russian internal politics, the things that you have clearly no idea about. Trying to pretend I did not and carefully omitting them from your replies does not change that. You do realize that at any moment people can go back a few posts back and see clearly that you are not telling the truth?
Quoting Mikie
Ukraine had every reason to consider Russia as a threat. After 2014 it was no longer a threat, Russia was in open conflict with Ukraine since then. So yes, Ukraine has trained and developed its defences. Russia has funded, trained and supplied hostile forces in Ukraine since 2014, saying that Ukraine training and strengthening troops in response was somehow 'provoking' is beyond absurd.
Quoting Mikie
I have given plenty of evidence that supports my view. You have nothing but your deep, unortodox convictions. I get that you get a kick out of having unconventional views, the only problem is that you have nothing to back them up, on the contrary, again and again you show that you have very little knowledge of the things we discuss here. Your unconventional views seem to be based on your evident lack of knowledge.
The facts you cannot deny from the very beginning of our discussion: Since the fall of the USSR there were strong trends in Russian politics demanding return to nationalistic and imperialistic policies. In order to stay in power and maintain his grip Putin has embraced that rhetoric around 2004 and supported it with many actions in Russia's neighbourhood. It is not particularly surprising that Ukrainians in general preferred not to be turned into another Belarus and tried to follow the path of the Baltics. And, given the change in Russian internal politics, Putin was determined to stop it (even though before he had no problem with it, as is apparent from his own quotes).
To all this you can only muster 'But the US...!'. Until you understand what the actual CONFLICT is about, you will still be wrong about the direct reasons for the war.
When Mikie is wrong she aggressively doubles and triples down. Anyone who's interacted with her knows that.
Well apparently there is no conflict. There's just US imperialism, pulling all the strings.
Vladimir Putin’s interview with Le Figaro
[sup]— The Kremlin · May 31, 2017[/sup]
Quoting Putin · Oct 2023
Peskov is convinced that the next president of the Russian Federation should be “the same” as Putin
[sup]— TASS · Nov 17, 2023[/sup]
Jailed Russian nationalist Girkin warns of 'sham' presidential election
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge, Elaine Monaghan, Clelia Oziel, Barbara Lewis · Reuters · Nov 19, 2023[/sup]
I can easily see Putin and Patrushev in the Kremlin (both bad news), for example. (Navalny is rather unlikely these days.)
Time for some bets? :)
Amusingly, on Russian TV Rita and others have stated grave warnings about foreign interference in Russian presidential elections, to which Michael Bohm, the designated bad guy, asked: 'But why would anyone bother with the trouble and expenses, if the result is predetermined?' They quickly changed the subject :)
Ignorance of what, exactly? I think it’s quite clear we’re talking passed each other.
Quoting Jabberwock
You don’t seem to acknowledge the role of the US, or at best minimize it. Hence why you always talk about what “Ukraine” wanted — as if that’s an easy picture, given the internal divisions.
But suppose we take all that to be true. It does not for a moment negate the fact that Russia would view any support from the US as hostile interference. Even assuming best intentions to spread democracy and helping an ally stand up against oppression and imperialism.
Our own people knew this and said so outright. I won’t go through the quotes again. So again, were they wrong? Or does it not matter because Russia has been bent on conquering Ukraine all along? (According to you.)
Quoting Jabberwock
And what is my unconventional view, exactly?
Quoting Jabberwock
The danger of pushing NATO was known long before Putin. That never changed. Russia was weaker at some points, but the position on NATO — particularly Ukraine — remained the same.
But don’t take my word for it. Or the Kremlin’s. Take the following — from 1995 (quite a while before 2004):
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/09/21/should-nato-growa-dissent/
Just one example. Another, from 1997:
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-06/arms-control-today/opposition-nato-expansion
NATO expansion was the most direct cause of this war. Doesn’t make Putin a good guy, as simpletons will surely interpret this as saying, but it’s at least worth being honest about.
Or we can pretend the US isn’t the world superpower these last 30 years, and that its intentions are mostly benign. That there was no plan for Eastern Europe beyond spreading democracy, if those countries chose to join. Etc etc
A nice story. Conventional. Easy. (Which is why it’s so common.) But ultimately dead wrong and ignorant of history — and nuance.
I asked this before, but you seem to have taken to ignore me.
Anyways assuming that Russia views any US support as hostile interference, what is the proper course to take?
Quoting Mikie
But these are arguments from the 1990s. Could the US / European course towards Russia have been much, much better in the 90s and early 2000s? Absolutely, yes. The end of the cold war was bungled in spectacular fashion.
The problem is that your claim that:
Quoting Mikie
doesn't follow from the above. Your insistence on "the most direct cause" has no justification in your premises.
Quoting Mikie
It does seem to absolve him of a great deal of responsibility though.
Would you be OK with saying that Clemenceau, by insisting on harsh terms in the treaty of Versailles, set "the most direct cause" for world war 2?
Quoting Mikie
What are it's intentions like?
Yes, no kidding. There’s a reason for that, given that 2004 was mentioned as supposedly a turning point.
Quoting Echarmion
Fortunately we have not only all of history after the Cold War, but since at least 1945 as well, to answer this question. If one still maintains that the US’s intentions/goals/agenda is benign, I really can’t be of much help.
Why even bother replying if all you're going to do is demonstrate that you really don't want to answer?
Well, whatever. This just seems to be one of those topics that makes it impossible to talk to someone you don't share some basic assumptions with.
:up:
I think so too.
No. This decision remains the most direct cause of this war:
"On conducting a special military operation" —Putin
Yeah the most direct cause leading to the decision to invade Ukraine was…the decision to invade Ukraine.
Always brilliant.
By the way, recall Dmitry Kozak? Recall the spoken demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine and neo-Nazist Kyiv? Not a fifth of Ukraine. Well, maybe that was lying, or they're incapable of taking over (at the moment). Recall where NATO-related nuclear weapons are placed? And the Kremlin circle's hand-waving paranoia about Russia being doomed to destruction? ... Anyway, all trite re-repetition.
As an aside, I'm a bit surprised no one has claimed that Washington is the real actual true cause of Putin's rise. :)
Putin should be detained (or go on extended vacation), Ukraine should perhaps eventually join the EU, and not become a military-industrial powerhouse.
I think it's implied. How could it be anything else when US imperialism is the singular force that determines events around the world.
Well maybe only the bad ones.
Ignorance of the underlying conflict, its roots and progress.
Quoting Mikie
The internal divisions in Ukraine do not change the fact that the majority no longer wanted to be subjugated to Russia. That is why Ukraine has voted for independence in 1991, which raised objections in Russia even then, as I have shown.
And I do acknowledge the role of the US, but I do not see it as the major factor, because I consider other forces at play, which you have seemed to be blissfully unaware of, like your completely false view that Russian imperialism is a post-2008 Western invention - you might as well write 'Hey! Look! I know nothing about the Eastern Europe, yet I am so willing to discuss it!'.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, it does not negate that fact. But that is not sufficient for the argument that Russia would not be hostile toward Ukraine's independence, if not for the US interference. For that you have no evidence and there is plenty of evidence countering it. Russia treats its 'near neighbourhood' as its sphere of influence and has no qualms about heavy meddling there, politically and militarily, no matter whether the US is involved or not. The US had no involvement in Chechnya, Transnistria, Abkhazia.
And it is not 'according to me', I have given quite a few sources that clearly show the imperialistic rhetoric of some Russian circles. Putin said that Ukraine is not even a state - that is the Russian perspective that you somehow never mention (I understand that you were completely oblivious to that, but you no longer have that excuse).
Quoting Mikie
That the US influence is a major factor in the conflict.
Quoting Mikie
No, the position on NATO was not the same, as I have shown in two direct quotes from Putin (unless we assume he was lying all this time, but then we can disregard the 'Russian perspective' altogether).
And the whole quotation again ignores what was the drive for the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe in the first place. Moscow has sent its troops to Lithuania in 1991, Zhirinovsky has entered Duma in 1993 - with all due respect to the reformists, the nationalistic/imperlalistic circles were strong enough in Russia for the Eastern Europe to be reasonably wary of their big neighbour. Their populations were very supportive of joining the EU and NATO, because they were aware that being left outside might sooner or later result in Russia trying to re-establish its rule (as it did repeatedly in the past).
Quoting Mikie
No, the most direct cause of this war is Russia trying to re-establish its sphere of influence after the fall of the USSR. Sure, the US is a superpower and it was instrumental in preventing that, obviously for its own purposes, but it does not change the fact that the root of the conflict is the former 'near abroad' of Russia trying to escape its rule.
And it is rather hilarious that you speak of ignorance of history and nuance, given that you had basically no knowledge of the history of the region at the start of our discussion (beside what you read from Americans speaking mostly about American issues). It is even more so that you try to argue against US-centrism from such a narrow US-based perspective. You believe it is the US that expanded the NATO, you believe it is the US that trains and arms Ukrainians against their will, you start all your arguments with 'the US'. Well, other countries also have history and some agency, you know... The US is a superpower, but it is not omnipotent. So yes, one of us is lacking nuance and knowledge of history.
Quoting Echarmion
may simply not have the time to unpack the obvious, but fortunately I do so I'm happy to dissect all the myths that cloud and manipulate your judgement.
Not only for your own benefit, but also for those following and feel there's been something deeply wrong in the West's policies in Ukraine and are wondering what exactly.
Quoting Echarmion
Since you're fairly new to the conversation, you are perhaps unaware we've spent significant effort over the 529 pages, 20 comments each, of elaborating the different policy options.
Throughout the first phase of the war—which you seem to agree, however tentatively, that Ukraine's leverage was perhaps higher than it was now and would have gotten a better deal in terms of territory than what's available now while also avoiding all the death and destruction and depopulation that has happened since—, we discussed at length why Ukraine should negotiate (rather than repudiate any negotiation) and why the Russian offer was a reasonable one for Ukraine to take (of course trying to negotiate as many further concessions as possible, and not only from Russia but the EU as well).
So, you seem to already have agreed in this proper course of action, only adding the caveat that there would need to confidence a deal does not simply post-pone the same war. To my caveat to your caveat that you can't possibly evaluate if a deal would be a durable peace or not if you refuse to negotiate but also that having a war now rather than later nevertheless requires confidence one can win the war.
Now, when a war starts it's of course common sense to negotiate and see if it can be ended on acceptable terms, exactly what the West is doing with regard to the Gaza conflict; but with regard to Ukraine, the West (in particular the US and UK) did everything possible to encourage Zelensky to not only reject the Russian's offer but refuse to negotiate entirely.
To make matters worse, Western officials, and particularly the US, do not even hide the logic that Ukraine fighting Russia is a "good investment" as it's a chance to damage Russia without losing any American or other NATO lives. There isn't even any hesitation to simply embrace what they are accused of, manipulating Ukraine into fighting to the last Ukrainian, but rather simply embrace it whole heartedly:
Quoting Aaron Mate
Again, note that I cite Aaron Mate (not that I have a problem with that), because I have found no main stream outlet that has a single article that cites Sen. Lindsey Graham's statement in full.
Now, from time to time in this conflict it has become quite apparent that Ukraine isn't winning, does not even have a scenario in which it could "win", and the Western talking heads and legions of posters on social media rush to explain exactly the policy explained by Lindsey Graham (he is not explaining what he would like to do but is not policy as far as we know, such as assassinating Putin or providing Ukraine with nuclear weapons as has been suggested by others, but he's explaining the "structural path we're on here", in other words what the policy is and why he supports the policy).
So, to dress up US involvement in Ukraine leading up to the war as simply naive do-gooding, and the policy since the war started to arm Ukraine (but in a drip feed manner that avoids "escalation") and encourage Ukraine to continue fighting and repudiate negotiations and make absurd ultimatums (such as the negotiation can happen after Russia leaves all of Ukraine), as somehow good for Ukraine, is simply living in a delusional mythical echo chamber (that you so happily fill with noise with your fellow US sycophants whenever critical voices are absent from the thread for even a day).
I post RAND's report explaining that support for Ukraine fighting the separatists is "bleeding" Russia (their words) and that further support could "extend" Russia further (notice they don't use the word "defeat") and explicitly say this policy is at the expense of Ukraine (they don't explain how this benefits Ukraine or protects some categorical imperative and just "has to be done" for moral reasons) and furthermore state the obvious that Russia has significant military advantages in the region and warns that such a policy would need to be "calibrated" to avoid escalating into further Russian incursions into Ukraine where Ukraine would lose territory and likely be forced into a "disadvantageous peace". Most interestingly, RAND analysis does not then conclude "oh, but we'll have harmed Russia a bunch so that would be a good thing ... just at the expense of Ukraine so we can feel a bit bad about that, but we get what we wanted! USA! USA! USA" but rather views escalation into a large conflict in which Ukraine loses as a significant strategic defeat for the US and loss of prestige.
The report does explain that supporting Ukraine in escalating the conflict with Russia could be good for US strategy (again, in the context that this is at the expense of Ukraine) ... but only if Ukraine "won"—if Ukraine won there would be wider geopolitical benefits of shoring up US allies, giving confidence that US can and will defend them— but the report goes into some detail of why that is not so possible. Basically this whole business of supporting Ukraine is framed as one additional threat that the US could use in negotiation, not actually do. The RAND report does not even include arming Ukraine in its concluding list of recommended actions.
So, not only do you have US senators explaining exactly what US policy is (fight Russia to the last Ukrainian) but you have in depth analysis by the US "go-to" policy analysis group that explains pretty clearly that Ukraine cannot win a war with Russia and further military support that leads exactly to this war would be at the expense of Ukraine.
Now, other pro-Western policy posters here have often simply explicitly stated that yes this is a war to benefit US hegemony, US hegemony is better than the alternatives and if Ukraine is completely destroyed to advance US interests, then so be it.
You do not seem to have this view, but rather share my view that policy should be based on (in not entirely, then with strong consideration for) reduction of harm, in which case avoiding war is best and once the war starts then negotiating a peace sooner rather than later is also better than continued death and destruction, and that seeking to harm Russia at the expense of Ukrainians is not morally justifiable (I would also argue that this doesn't even seem to be happening, so a "careful what you wish for" warning to the pro-more-war proponents, but rather the war is strengthening Russia, but this is a secondary debate to the issue of whether it is morally acceptable to seek to harm Russia "somewhat" at the expense of near total destruction of Ukraine).
Now, if we agree on the moral fundamentals, then it doesn't seem even up for debate of what the purpose of Western policy has been leading up to the war ("extend" Russia at great risk and peril to Ukraine) and what the Western policy has been during the war (fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ... but not escalate more than that and risk Russia using Nukes).
What would be up for debate is 1. why does such a disastrous policy (at least for Ukraine, if not for the West) get put into place in the first place despite warnings directly from RAND that Ukraine have little chance of "winning" and that their losing will be a significant loss of US prestige and power, 2. how best to end the war now, and 3. understanding how the myth building works and fools people such as yourself into believing that disastrous policy is either somehow necessary or then at least "hearts were in the right place". For example, what exactly is wrong with fighting a geo-political adversary to the last citizen of a non-allied country?
Case in point:
Quoting Echarmion
Which is simply masterbating with a fellow US sycophant with more myth and propaganda.
If you took interest enough in this war and the plight of the Ukrainians to be discussing here since the beginning, you'd know we've gone over this subject multiple times.
The focus on criticizing Western policy by us critical Westerners in this thread, is because we are Westerners and citizens of countries that are part of the Western institutions organizing the policies in question as well as directly participating in sending arms and thoughts and payers.
As citizens of Western countries we not only feel more responsible for what our governments do, rather than other countries, but we are in a better position to affect the policies of our own countries compared to other countries.
No one here has framed the "US imperialism" as "the singular force that determines events around the world". However, if we look at bad things other countries do—such as Saudi Arabia literally cutting the heads off people in the town square oh and starving the Yemenis, or Ukraine tolerating and arming literal Nazi's, China creating a truly dystopian techno-police state and poised to export that around the world, or indeed Russia invading Ukraine—then again the question for us humanist critical thinkers is what can the countries and the alliances and institutions our countries participate in (i.e. the policies we affect as citizens) do about these problems.
However, if we debated these other "bad things" other countries do, what is the response from US mini-"hegemons" out here on the web? Is the answer "oh, we should definitely implement policies to try to deal with those bad things" or is it "well US power needs the Saudi's as an ally, certainly not an enemy, so we sort of need to arm Saudi Arabia and tolerate whatever bad things they do in their own country and in other countries. You know, US interests, oil, hegemony, it's all very clever. And for the Nazi's in Ukraine, that's ok if they want to fight Russians, and maybe they aren't so many or aren't so bad after all. And of course we need China to make our stuff and profits for US corporations!! So we may disapprove and China does things and maybe China is also a rival in Asia that we try to contain, but there was zero problem in transferring all the means of production to Communist china in order to depress wages and 'socialist' activity at home and make corporations tons of money being able to leverage environmental, working conditions and humans rights arbitrage in any country willing to do business that way ... not our problem if they do bad things to their own citizens!!!."
So where would that conversation go exactly? A total focus on Uzbekistan? With a human rights situation described by Wikipedia as:
Quoting Uzbekistan, Human Rights - Wikipedia
Which, as far as I know, is a human rights situation that may indeed have little to do with US imperialism.
So, please, link to where you've been discussing and working towards reducing the bad things being done by the Uzbekistan government, or then if you've "missed it" in your humanitarian mission, then what do you feel about it now and what is to be done about it? The "proper course of action" to use your words.
Quoting Echarmion
Yeah, the US has only a minor role to play in world affairs, politically and economically. How ridiculous to claim it’s responsible for things it’s clearly responsible for.
Quoting Jabberwock
I’ve gone over that at length. You want to jump around in time and then claim the story is full of holes. It’s just a boring game of whack-a-mole.
Maybe it would have been better to have laid it all out at once, from 1991 to 2022. But I can’t do that every time someone replies.
Quoting Jabberwock
Here we go with timelines again. This is what I mean.
Post 2014 invention, actually. I mentioned 2008 because of the Bucharest summit, and whether Russian imperialism was given as a reason for expansion. It wasn’t, of course. True, Crimea gave the US a nice story to tell.
In any case, your accusation doesn’t even make sense. I’m “blissfully unaware” of “other forces at play” — other forces apparently being my view on Russian imperialism? Just a muddled paragraph.
Anyway— I’ve discussed Russian “Internal politics” a great deal. You gave 3 irrelevant quotes when asked to discuss what you meant by it. Yet the claim stands: Russian positions on US involvement in Ukraine, including NATO, was stated explicitly for years, was known by the US, and was done anyway. If you want to claim this was a “minor factor,” so be it. I have no time machine and no window into Putin’s mind, so I obviously cannot falsify your unfalsifiable argument of what might have happened if everything were different.
Quoting Jabberwock
Putin has said a number of things about Ukraine. And yes, I’m very well aware of this line of argument, as it’s been repeated many times on this thread. I’ll just quote Mearsheimer, who said it best over a year ago:
Hence why you provide none.
Quoting Jabberwock
That’s the extent of your understanding of my position apparently.
So US involvement was a factor, but a minor one. That’s supposedly the big difference here. The major factor was Russian imperialist ambitions — and you point to Georgia and Crimea as evidence— I say these were reactions, and round we go.
Quoting Jabberwock
Ah yes, the one quote you come back to over and over again, even after it’s shown that Putin says the complete opposite in the very same quote. But you’ll hang on to that forever, apparently, even against a long documentary record and quotations from the US’s own cabinet members/ ambassadors.
No, the position hadn’t changed. It was the same in 1995 as it was in 2002, as it was in 2004, as it was in 2008, etc. Russia was not going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a western bulwark, a “liberal democracy,” or (especially) a member of NATO.
But yeah, one poorly documented (and contradictory) quote from Putin in 2002 definitely negates all that. Give me a break.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nope. More strawmen. Yawn.
Exactly. But it’s fun to watch people use sarcasm in such a ridiculous way. No one serious denies US power in world affairs, but in order to feel a fake sense of superiority it’s necessary to reduce this fact to absurdity: “That guy slipped on a banana peel— must be the US, ay guys? Har-har-har.”
Meanwhile, our defense industry is loving it to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. But I’m sure that has no “major” influence here either.
Anyway, thanks for taking the time to rehash it all again in detail. I really can’t do it anymore. (That’s why I could never be a teacher.)
Is it at all plausible to you that this argument from Mearsheimer is only convincing if you happen to already agree with it?
Quoting boethius
Charming.
Quoting boethius
The russian offer which we ultimately know very little about.
Ukraine did negotiate. The best source on the early negotiations, Naftali Bennet, has said he saw a 50/50 chance of a deal being made.
So the entire argument that the west has cynically manipulated Ukraine to dismiss negotiations rests on - at best - coin toss odds for an acceptable ceasefire agreement.
You can of course say you'd have taken your chances, but the case for manipulation under these circumstances is very weak.
Quoting boethius
Which noone is doing.
Quoting boethius
We're leaving out the fact that Ukrainians make decisions too again.
Quoting boethius
Pot, meet kettle.
Quoting boethius
You just fail to account for developments since. Because Ukraine did not collapse quickly, and it did not end up in a significant strategic defeat for the US.
Quoting boethius
But, crucially, I believe that the people who decide what harm they're willing to accept are the Ukrainians. Who, it bears repeating, have decided to fight this war knowing full well their chances.
Quoting boethius
Part of my moral fundamentals is that people are responsible for their actions, and that decisions are made by real people with real interests and not abstract forces.
Noone forced Russia's hand. Noone forced Ukraine's. We can discuss influence, but I reject any theory that refuses to take account of the basic reality that Putin could simply not have given the order to invade, while Zelensky (or any number of Ukrainian soldiers) could have simply refused to fight.
These were choices made, not expressions of the will of the US.
Quoting boethius
We'd have to look at specific decisions being made.
Quoting boethius
Why would I take your positions on that seriously given rhetoric like this:
Quoting boethius
Why not just talk to the mirror?
Quoting boethius
I'm not criticising the focus, I'm criticising the quality of the analysis.
Despite various statements to the contrary, and claims to nuance, the analysis is imho marred by an overreliance on overarching historical "forces" with little account made of the actual people who make decisions and the various ways in which the conflict has shifted.
How can NATO-expansion be the same issue in 1995 and 2022 despite a vastly different situation in eastern Europe? Why does it not matter that Putin already invaded Ukraine in 2014, annexed part of it's territory and created a frozen conflict? Why are we ignoring the different ways in which EU leaders have had their hand in matters, perhaps most importantly the two German chancellors, Schröder and Merkel?The situation might have been very different without a German government as friendly to Russia.
Ukrainian interests, too, seem frozen. Ukraine's internal divisions are cited, but the various changes in their position are not. The US involvement in the 2014 revolution (or coup if you prefer) is loudly touted, but russian moves that also exacerbated it are not. Putin's moves towards Ukraine have become markedly more heavy handed, even though his previous strategy had largely been effective in keeping it "neutral".
All these are simply not accounted for by the analysis that puts US "influence" front and center.
Quoting boethius
Quoting Mikie
You do realise the irony here?
No, it plays a major role, but not in every single event. Sometimes it plays an important, but not decisive role. Contrary to beliefs of some Americans, the world does not turn around the US.
Quoting Mikie
No, you have not. You have just described very limited, American perspective of things, because you were unaware of the greater context. Lack of nuance and knowledge of history, indeed. Incidentally, now you show your ignorance again, given that you want to start with 1991.
Quoting Mikie
Now you are just being ridiculous. You have not discussed Russian internal politics, because you were completely unaware of it (and you still seem to be). Obviously you believe the quotes are 'irrelevant', because you have not read them. Your claim does not 'stand', as I have already given you two quotes (more below) from Putin that directly contradict your claims. You just dissmiss them, because you are unable, in your nuance-lacking and history-ignorant argument, to account for such differences in his statements.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, if we ignore everything that Putin says, and what other Russian politicians say, and the Russian propaganda, and Dugin, and Akopov, then there is no evidence whatsoever of Russian imperialistic tendencies. Especially if we also ignore its interventions in various former republics. Because their words are 'Russian perspective' and 'Russian position' only when it suits you, otherwise they can just be ignored. If you or Mearsheimer want to convince anyone that the president of the neighbouring country with the long record of imperialistiic abuses denying Ukraine's statehood should not be perceived as a reasonable threat, then you are going beyond absurd.
Quoting Mikie
No, I point to the resentment of the Russians concerning the fall of the USSR and growing independence of its near abroad and Putin's turn toward imperlalism after 2004 in order to consolidate and strengthen his power due to the growing nationalism within Russian political circles, I point to other military interventions that the US had no involvement in and which were definitely not a 'reaction' to anything that the West did. I have described all this in detail and provided many sources, which you have obviously did not read because you consider them as irrelevant, because you just know better. I can provide literally dozens of more scholarly articles about resurgence of Russian imperialism, but you will ignore them as well. But then do not complain that I do not provide evidence, because you cannot be bothered to read it. I do not mind someone being ignorant, those issues might not be to everyone's interest. But engaging in a discussion on these matters and preferring to remain ignorant is another issue altogether.
Quoting Mikie
There were two quotes, one was from the Kremlin presidential site, another from the TV program. If you consider direct quote from the Kremlin site (which remains there to this day!) as 'poorly documented', then I wonder what level evidence you require (because you surely do not provide that).
But sure, there are more:
Quoting KREMLIN!
But it is Kremlin again, so I guess 'poorly documented'. How about this one?
Quoting When Putin Loved NATO
But the bigger issue is that, in your blissful ignorance, you completely miss the context of that first quote. You have no idea why Putin was at the NATO meeting, you have no idea what he was doing there and you have no idea why he said those things that he said. And yes, I am very well aware that there are many contradicting statements from Putin, that is what I was drawing your attention to - he says many things, but you choose only to take some of them at face value.
Oh, so years of military training, supplying weapons, conducting military drills — not decisive.
I suppose the tens of billions of dollars spent on Ukraine these last two years — also a minor role. After all, Ukraine is an independent nation that makes its own decisions and can defend itself.
Quoting Jabberwock
:roll: Okay pal.
Quoting Jabberwock
Nope, just completely taken out of context:
You literally can’t even find one quote without the next sentence contradicting your bogus claims.
No, Russia was never fine with the US turning Ukraine into a western puppet. NATO is a big part of that. Easy to understand why, if you do the uncomfortable work of putting yourself into someone else’s shoes. Apparently you’re incapable.
China forming a military alliance in Mexico or Canada wouldn’t go over well in the US. I wonder if the US’s response would be so confusing. Or perhaps the explanation would be that they wanted to conquer Canada for decades and would have attacked anyway.
Second quote, in context:
Not one word about NATO. Just more vagueness. Apparently you mistook the title of the article for something Putin actually said.
But keep trying. Maybe next time try making it up out of thin air.
For those following along with any interest in history or nuance: Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. It was known in 1995 and explained by Stanley Resor, Paul Nitze, etc., in an open letter to Clinton. It was known very well right up to 2008, when William Burns wrote the following:
It was known in June of 2021, when a massive Seabreeze exercise was conducted:
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/06/29/sebr-j29.html
It was known in September 2021, when the White House announced that
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/
It was admitted by the NATO chief himself:
https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/nato-chief-admits-expansion-behind-russian-invasion
And so on.
But yeah, how hilarious and silly to think the US has any (major) influence over NATO or the UN or the world economy or wars. After all, it’s not everywhere at once.
Yeah and Austria-Hungary went to war to get a proper investigation of the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Again, you are confused. Ukraine has trained troops with the US support and asked for weapons AFTER the conflict with Russia has already started and smouldered for eight years. To consider it a 'provocation' when Russian-supplied shells were already falling on Ukrainian troops is absurd. I understand that you were unaware that the conflict never ceased when we started this discussion, but now you have no excuse.
Quoting Mikie
But the next sentence does not contradict anything, unless you demand that we read 'organize its military policies' as 'will start war'.
And again, you just regurtitate your initial points without engaging with anything that was written afterwards. It is no wonder, because you cannot deny that you were completely ignorant about what was going in Russia before 2008, which led you to your completely mistaken view that its imperialistic tendencies are the Western invention, which is of course completely unsustainable in the view of the historic evidence I have provided (and as I wrote I can provide more). I understand that being completely wrong about that is very uncomfortable for you, but repeating your initial points ad nauseam will not change it, it will only deepen the impression that you are making your arguments from ignorance.
Quoting Mikie
Well, it was at at joint press conference of the NATO-Russian council, which dealt, among other things, with the plans on Ukraine's accession... So if Putin wanted to say 'I strongly oppose Ukraine joining NATO', that was certainly a good occasion. Yet he refrained from doing so. Why? You have no idea, so you will pretend he never said this, just like you do with the other quotes I have provided.
Quoting Mikie
But it is your take that lacks the nuance and is ignorant of history. Yes, Putin (and other Russians) said those things, but they also have said other things, sometimes quite contradictory, as I have clearly shown. In three different speeches Putin gives three different reasons for invasion of Crimea, for example. But you choose the one that suits you and simply ignore the other two, even though they contradict themselves. Because you are completely out of depth here, you do not understand why they are saying different things at different times, so you simply stick to your story, and no amount of quotes from Putin himself is going to change your view. The same goes for your view about Russian imperialism, history between those states etc. In other words, you simply pay no attention to facts that do not align with your simplistic narrative.
Translation:
(1) You cannot, and have not, provided one quote supporting your claim that the Russian stance on Ukraine and NATO has changed.
(2) You completely ignore the historical record.
Refer if you wish to the facts I present for others. Plenty of references.
Blathering on accusing others of ignorance, no matter how many times you repeat it, doesn’t make it so.
Case in point:
——
Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. It was known in 1995 and explained by Stanley Resor, Paul Nitze, etc., in an open letter to Clinton. It was known very well right up to 2008, when William Burns wrote the following:
It was known in June of 2021, when a massive Seabreeze exercise was conducted:
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/06/29/sebr-j29.html
It was known in September 2021, when the White House announced that
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/
It was admitted by the NATO chief himself:
https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/nato-chief-admits-expansion-behind-russian-invasion
And so on.
——
The response?
Quoting Jabberwock
:lol:
How convincing. I hope it convinces you, anyway. Although I doubt it does.
In any case, this is why it’s not worth taking much time to hold your hand through the history and the facts. Given you’ll just pretend it doesn’t exist. Oh well.
BTW how many rubles do I owe you, prof?
Quoting boethius.
Your reasoning looks rather out of historical circumstances.
First, Ukrainians didn’t refuse negotiation BY DEFAULT. There have been several attempts for negotiations for a ceasefire, all of them ultimately failed. Add to that a long history of failed agreements and reviving historical tensions between Ukraine and Russia. So the refusal of negotiation can very likely be a consequence of past failed negotiation attempts and failed agreements.
Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. Indeed, the idea that the US and European allies would compensate for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses is geopolitically questionable if that implies burdening the US as the hegemon (which has been explicitly and repeatedly antagonised by Russia) and its allies (which can’t easily make concessions to Russia without irritating the hegemon) for the Ukrainian losses (which, notice, would be also Western losses if Ukraine was meant to be more integrated into the Western sphere of influence!), the costs of compensating such losses, and the additional strategic risks (by emboldening Russia, China and Iran witnessing Western weakness) while, at the same time, condoning everything to an anti-Western Russia. And historically questionable: appeasing Hitler just emboldened his hegemonic ambitions (and also encouraged a nasty alliance with the Soviet Union before their great patriotic war, right prof?).
Third, whatever the Russian initial demands were circumstances for peace negotiation worsened within a month: the failure of the Russian special operation in Kiev (if the objective was Ukrainian capitulation) and the genocidal massacres (like in Bucha) became public (as much Russian state media support of Russian genocidal intents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Russia_Should_Do_with_Ukraine). Later, the deal-breaker demands included also the new annexed oblasts. So I’m not surprised that Ukrainians would be compelled to refuse negotiation. Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US.
Quoting boethius
I was talking about RUSSIAN official deal-breaker demands (given the quotations I made) not Ukrainian deal-breaker demands. Indeed, Ukrainians were opened to make concessions. But they either didn’t satisfy Russia or didn’t satisfy the Western allies (not surprisingly so if they have to play the role of security guarantors).
Quoting boethius
If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. Indeed, if the US was in the same shoes of Ukraine, namely invaded by a foreign great power historically bent to destroy, dispossess and oppress the US, would it be irrational for Americans to hyperbolically “fight to the last person” as long as powerful foreign allies helped with the weapons the US needed and the economic support? I would expect the answer would be “absolutely-fucking-lutely!” from a real American and Republican patriot like Sen. Lindsey Graham, right prof? Especially if Sen. Linsey Graham considers Russia a state sponsoring terrorism (https://twitter.com/aaronjmate/status/1554486803431886848), right prof?
Besides, claims of “using fanatical fighters” are not particularly compelling: Russia uses “fanatical fighters” in Donbas against the Ukrainian regime AS MUCH AS “non-fanatical fighters” to spread pro-Russian propaganda with the same arguments you yourself and your sidekicks are pushing here (even with greater zealousness than pro-war Russians themselves!). And this too is a “post-WWII great-power conflict 101”.
As far as I’m concerned, between the US and Ukraine there is a convergence of interests. Until the US wants to play the hegemon and Ukraine needs the US to escape from Russian sphere of influence, there is a convergence of interests. This is the relevant point I’d make.
Quoting boethius
I have no reason to specifically assume that Zelensky or Western leaders are as gullible as you wish to depict them. What I have reason to generally assume is that politicians (which are always assisted by appointed military, intelligence, economic, political and communication advisors) are not expected to easily fall for propaganda as you seem to assume. Besides it’s most certainly unreasonable to expect that political leaders’ conscious decision process would be infallible and fully transparent to the general public while history is still in the making. As far as I’m concerned, Zelensky and Western political leaders may have had no need for the sort of encouragement you are suggesting, which would be best suited more for the general Western audience. On the other side, it may be in Zelensky’s interest to press partners to keep their words in terms of commitment and remind them of related reputational costs.
Concerning the Europeans, it’s up to them to decide to what extent it’s in their best interest to remain within the American sphere of influence and play along. At this point in history, the risk they may overlook to me is that the weaker, more isolationist or more distracted the US is, the greater is the risk the hegemonic game among the US, Russia, China and Islamist regimes will move more aggressively inside an unprepared Europe. So better for the European leaders to take the time the Ukrainians bought them to prepare for the worst.
Quoting boethius
Unless there is essentially zero hope for Ukrainians to obtain the wished compensation as much as there is zero hope for joining NATO.
My expectation still remains the same: to the extent the US and its European allies strategically aim at preserving the Western world order against anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ challenges, they can’t possibly dismiss Ukraine ’s security concerns and simply reconcile with Russia after what Russia has done. Russia’s imperialist ambitions need to be frustrated as much as possible, and its military/economic projection capacity and prospects of growth should impactfully drop for decades to come wrt the trends set prior to the beginning of the war. However my understanding is also that at this point in history the US has no interest to commit more than it did. Whatever the reasons are, the American hegemony and deterrence power is dangerously eroding, and failing in Ukraine will have major reputational costs for the US leadership.
Quoting boethius
Sure, also the US intervened in support of Kiev to prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian regime given the military disadvantage of Ukraine in a war with Russia.
So what? Even if Russia’s invasion is some sort of sensible rational act on the part of a provoked Russia (which COMPLETELY RATIONALLY kills people Putin claims are one people with the Russians and repeatedly threatens to start a nuclear war over it despite nobody has aggressed Russia proper, right prof?) still there are very strong reasons to oppose it: Russia defies the Western world order and violates Ukrainian right to independence and territorial sovereignty AFTER having acknowledged it officially and repeatedly. What's so hard to understand, prof?
In any case, that’s my argument to question your views and it doesn’t rely to what you attribute to pro-Ukrainian Western propaganda to spin your own pro-Russian counter-propaganda . So you are not going to score points with me by deconstructing your own myth of Western propaganda.
[quote="boethius;852917”]The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression[/quote].
Here you are making a big deal of a fallacious equivocation. “Provocations” as Putin and Mearsheimer’s intend it PRESUPPOSE a concept of sphere of influence (as Putin says [I]“true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia”[/I]) and hegemonic conflict. In this case, such “provocations” and whining over it are part of the business of competing for hegemony (China whines over the American provocations in the Pacific). There are no accepted supreme ruling authorities to appeal to for rights violation, just security dilemmas and ways to deal with them (ALSO offensively or preventively). Which thing makes me question also certain political or moral implications you may wish to draw from it (like putting all/most/primarily the blame on the US for the current war).
Another thing however is to claim that the Russian aggression of Ukraine was “unprovoked” because Ukraine didn’t aggress Russia proper, like Hamas did instead aggress Israel proper very recently. This point is relevant for the Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West. Besides even when Ukraine fought ethnic Russians, the latter still were Ukrainian citizens in Ukrainian territory, some of which turned into anti-Ukrainian “fanatical fighters“ through the interference of a foreign imperialist power, namely Russia. Indeed, [I]“fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101”[/I], right prof? And Ukraine had sovereign power to fight them back as much as Russia had sovereign power to fight back the Chechens independence movement, right prof? On the other side, if Russia had hard power ways to end Ukrainian abuses toward ethnic Russian minorities, the West had soft power ways to obtain the same results through Westernisation (e.g. EU and NATO membership). This, again, is a rather important point if you want to talk Western world order and the interest for the Ukrainians to join the West.
BTW if Ukrainians are also “one people” with the Russians as Putin would claim , the killing ethnic Russian argument sounds rather pointless. Unless Putin explains how Ukrainians can be at the same time “one people” with the Russians but two distinct ethnic groups, to me Putin’s killing Ukrainians (including innocent civilians) amounts to killing ethnic Russians according to HIS OWN ASSUMPTIONS, right prof?
Besides Russia could have simply solicited the ethnic Russians that felt horribly “persecuted” by the Nazi Ukrainian regime to flee in Russia, like Jews did flee in Israel and the US. Russia has a big land you know and since it didn’t have problem to even forcefully and massively deport people in other parts of its own vast territory (as it did with the Ukrainians during this war and the Crimean Tatars in the past), why should it have problems to help relocate all ethnic Russians that feel persecuted by the Ukrainian regime into the motherland? Donbas’ “fanatic fighters” can’t possibly be more safe from genocidal Nazi-Vampire-Cannibal Zelensky, with all his Swastikas tattoos, worshipping Hitler and extermination of all Russians on earth in concentration camps, in some part of Siberia than in Donbas, right prof? Also because in Russia there are more nazis which will protect them than exterminating them, right prof?
[quote="boethius;852917”]If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.
The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.
You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.
Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people.
[/quote]
Again, I don’t give half a kopeck about your myth of Western propaganda. I would still find arguably rational for the US and Ukraine to oppose Russia EVEN IF Russia is rational (wrt its strategic goals), provoked (in Putin’s or Mearsheimer’s sense), competent and not easy to beat. I don’t need AT ALL to deny such assumptions to make my point which you are more than welcome to criticise, prof.
Criticising pro-West propaganda can be as easy as criticising pro-Russian propaganda. But it may not be as fruitful as you wish. Indeed, the risk of spinning your counter-propaganda at large is simply to increase political polarisation that hostile powers can/will exploit, which in turn will push more authoritarian/extremist political trends in the West.
Besides, you and your sidekick and likeminded people won’t stop to promote anti-Western and anti-US propaganda EVEN IF the US/West/NATO did what you suggest for a cease-fire in Ukraine, because their historical faults for this war and beyond are endless, right prof?
Don’t ever waste your time to talk about Western propaganda with me, if you want to score points with me. Ever.
[quote="boethius;852917”]The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.
If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces.[/quote]
Your notion of “rationality” is grounded on your own sense of the value of life, and a convenient example were the odds are taken to be clear by default and in abstraction from the historical and geopolitical context.
Once again, yours are non-shared assumptions. As far as I’m concerned, anybody can put value to their own or other people’s life the way they feel, then one can more or less share/sympathise with. So people can value their independence and social identity, more than their own lives and more than other people can share. Indeed, your reasoning is biased by the value you attribute to life, which is typically Western. Morale at war implies readiness to sacrifice ones’ life, and for military leaders to sacrifice soldiers and civilians, also at the risk of doing it disproportionately, and even against more capable adversaries. Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds fight for their independence and national identity, for generations, no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. BTW how many Russians, soldiers and civilians, were killed during the great patriotic war, prof?
I find COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL to assess human behaviour based on social standards not grounded on realistic assumptions about human behaviour. Humans value social identity and freedom to the point of fighting for them to death, take revenge for it, mistrust enemies for it, and sacrifice their own individual and collective well-being/safety for it, over decades, over generations. Afghans, Kurds, Palestinians, Israeli, Ukrainians, and Russians keep reminding us that however tragic in itself and disturbing to armchair self-entitled nobodies on the internet, this is a very common hardcore driving factor of human behaviour. To what extent that holds for Ukrainians is up to the Ukrainians to tell.
My understanding is that all countries pursuing national interest are rationally compelled to assess proximity in values, capabilities, history, ambitions and margins for cooperation wrt other countries. Ukraine is more open to join the West while Russia wants to antagonise the West. Besides, in geopolitics, as much as in the Ukrainian war, the odds especially in the long term remain uncertain. The best countries can do, is to try to gain as much relative advantage as possible over competitors, and the historical and geopolitical context offer relevant guidance in understanding the stakes of the ongoing competition.
Quoting boethius
Since the very beginning, the idea was basically that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine until it gets its demands satisfied. And such demands do not require Russia to occupy all Ukraine or murder every Ukrainian. So military loss and victory for Russia must be assessed wrt Russian demands and declared goals, as well as their evolution. And even if Zelensky’s idea of winning back all occupied territories is currently unattainable, that doesn’t imply that Ukraine is willing to surrender to all Russian demands. Indeed, until the West is backing and intends to back the Ukrainians because strategically convenient, the Ukrainians do not need to surrender to all Russian demands, even more so if they have personal reasons not to do so.
I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on.
Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections.
In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability?
Where is the link to the report?
Quoting Tzeentch
Contrary to Western interpretations?! Nobody doubts that this is Putin’s declared reason for his aggression. The questions is: Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was a LEGITIMATE reason for Putin’s aggression of Ukraine or that the US bears all/most of/primarily the blame for this war?
Quoting Tzeentch
At this link where they talk about the report you are referring to (https://braveneweurope.com/michael-von-der-schulenburg-hajo-funke-harald-kujat-peace-for-ukraine), I see that the first cited sources are essentially Naftali Bennett, Schröder, Turkish Foreign Minister. I limit myself to say that the last two may have their interest in putting the West in a bad light. Concerning Naftali Bennett, his views are significantly more nuanced than it looks by cherry-peaking what he said in his interview (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK9tLDeWBzs): indeed, he goes as far as to say at minute 2:45:41 [I]“this is pre-Bucha, Bucha massacre, once that happened I said it’s over”[/I] (it would interesting to see if Bennett has changed his mind about the Bucha massacre after the recent Hamas massacre in Israel), at minute 2:59:34 [I]“in a broad sense, I think there was a legitimate decision by the West to keep striking Putin”[/I] (referring to the more aggressive approach against Putin) or at minute 3:02:09 [I]“there was a good chance to reach a cease fire, but I’m not sure. But I’m not claiming it was the right thing. In real time I thought the right thing was a ceasefire, now I can’t say. Maybe it would have conveyed the wrong message to other countries”[/I].
Concerning the Istanbul Communiqué, two points remain predictably uneasy to settle: the territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea, the security guarantees. Concerning the security guarantees, either they exclude Russia so they become a version of NATO which Russia couldn’t possibly like if that’s Putin’s issue, or they include Russia (the aggressor) which can at the very least sabotage any effort of Ukrainian Westernisation (as much as it happens with resolutions that go against Russian interest in the UN) while being spared economic and diplomatic sanctions.
I have provided four such quotes, including two from the Kremlin presidential site itself. here is the fifth one:
Quoting Press Statement and Answers to Questions at a Joint News Conference with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
Lol, no, I supplement the historical record. The difference between us is that I acknowledge that Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. It is you who ignores the historical record that does not suit your narrative, so you claim that the stance was 'always clear'. No, it was not clear at all, as the quotes I have provided show. Also, as I have mentioned, you completely ignore the overall context of the NATO and Russia relations, such as NATO-Russia Council, from which some of the quotes come.
And let us not forget that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.
But that would have damaged trump, possibly beyond repair. Which would probably have not been in Russia's interest. Or Putin might have considered the west especially weak in the wake the COVID pandemic. Also possible is that Putin intended his invasion in 2020, coinciding with political turmoil in the US, but COVID stopped that plan. In the early days of COVID, some estimates had the mortality way higher than it actually was.
Quoting frank
Putin seems to have overestimated the strength of his military, but I doubt he overestimated it by that much.
Quoting frank
Something along these lines. Deal US prestige a crushing blow, demonstrating it's weakness as an ally, while restoring Russia's great power status and cementing his reputation in Russia.
What's not to like? But it was not to be.
Quoting frank
Arguably, he had some reason to overestimate his chances for success. In Georgia the russian forces did poorly, but were overall successful and western reactions were muted. In Ukraine in 2014, russian forces were spectacularly successful and Ukraine was even briefly staggered by a ragtag bunch of mercenary "separatists". The western reaction was less muted, but still far from unified and effective.
Taken together Putin might well have assumed that his military would pull off a blitzkrieg campaign so shocking that the Ukrainian military would be unable to respond, while the west would look on helplessly and just pile on some more toothless sanctions.
The russian military isn't some incompetent bunch of conscripted farmers, as pro Ukrainian propaganda sometimes suggested. They had much improved from their nadir in the first Chechen war. But apparently they, like some many others before them, did not sufficiently account for the effect of determined resistance aimed at their logistics and c&c.
Well, a full-scale war is not something you can do overnight. The plans must have started a few years back. Besides with the smoldering conflict in Donbas (which effectively negated any chance for Ukraine joining NATO and made EU accession much more difficult) he might have counted on regaining political influences in Ukraine. Also Zelensky was seen as an 'Eastern' candidate, in fact in the Ukrainian West he was suspected by some of being a Russian puppet or agent, given that he came from nowhere, was born in the East, barely spoke Ukrainian, etc. For Russia 'Belarusinization' was a better scenario than a simple land grab, that option was chosen when it was clear that Ukraine will decisively steer toward the West.
But I also think that the escalation might have been dictated by the internal politics. The belliigerence present in the propaganda was hard to contain (just to illustrate, they were seriously debating on the state TV plans to 'open up' the Suwalki corridor, i.e. invading Poland or Lithuania...). The 2014 sanctions, however modest, were hurting Russia more than they admitted. After 2019 the economy began to stagnate and the prospects were not rosy, so the triumph, even at the cost of some hardships, could be just what Putin needed (and the prospect of increased energy resource prices would not hurt either). Some analysts also point out that Putin could not wait much longer - the reaction of the Western Europe to 2014 annexation was timid, to put it mildly, mostly because of its dependence on Russian resources. But they have realized that and began to limit that dependence, so Putin had to make a move before they had alternatives (but was too late anyway, it turned out).
I don't think Trump can be damaged. If ten snakes popped out of his head and announced that they were from Betelgeuse and they were here to destroy the human race and started beaming lasers out of their eyes to blow up everything in sight, his followers would be like: hell yea!!
Quoting Echarmion
Something like that. I think he thought Ukraine would fall quickly.
Needed for what? To remain in power?
Quoting Jabberwock
And here is, once again, the context:
It wasn’t a question of Ukraine joining NATO.
Quoting Jabberwock
Yeah, in the same way Trump has provided evidence of a stolen election.
So far, 3 “quotes” shown to be complete garbage.
So I’ll repeat: the Russian position on US turning Ukraine into a western puppet never changed, including Ukraine joining NATO. Hence why you can’t provide a single quotation that says otherwise.
Quoting Jabberwock
The quotes show nothing of the sort, as I have now shown three times. Like I said— perhaps just making something up will be the best path for you, given you can’t find any in the real world.
And yes, the NATO-Russia council context works exactly against your thesis. That you somehow think it doesn’t is hilarious.
And again:
Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. It was known in 1995 and explained by Stanley Resor, Paul Nitze, etc., in an open letter to Clinton. It was known very well right up to 2008, when William Burns wrote the following:
It was known in June of 2021, when a massive Seabreeze exercise was conducted:
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/06/29/sebr-j29.html
It was known in September 2021, when the White House announced that
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/
It was admitted by the NATO chief himself:
https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/nato-chief-admits-expansion-behind-russian-invasion
And so on.
Not so much yet, rather to stave off dissent. Note that whoever lately dared to criticize Putin directly (like the late Prigozhin or now imprisoned Girkin) did so from even more nationalistic point of view, even the supposed champion of democracy, Navalny, made some statements in this vein. Once the jinn is out, it is hard to push it back into the bottle. And nothing cements the authoritarian rule like a common external enemy.
Just do armchair speculation. Good enough. :up:
Hey maybe Putin thought he could conquer an entire country with 190K troops. Sounds reasonable.
I have provided five quotations of Putin that basically say that Ukraine is free to do as it pleases, all in context of NATO expansion or cooperation, including some spoken at the same summit that started Ukraine's accession to NATO and including one that literally states that concerning the NATO expansion, quoted directly from the presidential site. You may pretend all you want that Putin did not say that, the record is quite clear.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, Russia is so angry with NATO expanding by Ukraine, that it organizes joint exercises with NATO. That surely works against my thesis.
Quoting Mikie
Sure, that is why on the Kremlin site there is the already known statement:
On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged.
So either Putin (and his press service) knowingly contradicts himself from sentence to sentence, or maybe Russia's unchanged position on the expansion at that time is not that clear as you believe it is. Take your pick.
But do that remembering that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.
He rose to power originally by starting a war. More war would pull the country behind him?
No. You’ve provided one quote — which isn’t even a direct quote — that’s relevant, which is then followed by a contradictory statement. That’s all you’ve given.
To remind:
“On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged.”
If that’s all you have — and apparently it is, given you can’t find another one — then that’s pretty weak indeed. But yeah, that definitely contradicts everything I provided above. :ok:
Quoting Jabberwock
So a long, well documented historical record— or one vague/contradictory, indirect quote. And that’s really all you have, isn’t it?
Guess our own ambassadors needed to completely rethink their views because of that one (reported) statement. Makes sense.
“Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”
Internet guy: “all wrong, because I found one second-hand, contradictory statement.”
Are you doing your speculation from a footstool? If so, you should upgrade!
Quoting frank
That's not quite true, Putin was elevated to power by the Jelzin family. But his success in the second Chechen war did much to secure his rule.
No, I have four other that say exactly the same thing. 'Russia has no concerns about the expansion of NATO from the standpoint of ensuring security, but Russia will organize its military policies accordingly in connection with NATO nearing its borders'. What do you believe 'NO CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXPANSION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENSUIRNG SECURITY” means, in your own words? Because I find it difficult to interpret it as 'Russia is gravely threatened by NATO expansion'. You believe that 'Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, and it will choose its own path to peace and security' is unrelated to NATO when it was spoken at the very summit dealing with Ukraine's NATO accession. So what do you think it referred to? You believe that 'processes of expanding interaction with NATO' spoken A MONTH after Ukraine has joined NATO Action Plan have nothing to do with NATO expansion... So which 'processes' did Putin have in mind? I am afraid it is a mystery only to you.
EDIT: Correction, in March Kuchma has declared his intent to join the Action Plan, it was joined in November.
Supposedly he was chosen because he demonstrated that he was corrupt, so Yeltsin, who was also corrupt, believed Putin wouldn't prosecute him for his crimes. War increased his power?
Well I'm sure the word Putin would use is not "corrupt" but "loyal". But yes that is what I read as well, and also that he was a bit of a blank slate politically. Noone knew what he really stood for. At the time, he might have simply been considered an interim solution. Someone not offensive, who would make sure the Yeltsin family got off free, and then make way for someone with more of a political profile. But Putin quickly made his mark by taking a hardline stance on Chechnya and is to this day suspected of having orchestrated terror attacks to have a pretext for a second Chechen war. That brought him into his own as a political figure in his own right.
Another allegation is that Putin was essentially always a KGB trojan horse, who played the role of the loyal vassal long enough to get into power, and then started to enact the kind of policies his KGB clique had wanted to employ since the days of the USSR.
Do note that all this is based on somewhat hazy rememberings on books I read / listened to. So it's quite possible I muddled something, Perhaps @Jabberwock can correct any glaring mistakes, since they seem knowledgeable.
Yeah, the one reference you’ve provided — a second hand account which doesn’t even quote Putin, and which contradicts your point a second later — must disprove what, for example, Paul Nitze and William Burns knew, what Germany and France knew, and what was explicitly stated over and over again by Putin (in his actual words), of which I gave a sample and which has been well documented and admitted to even by the NATO chief himself.
Makes perfect sense. That one quote also disproves the analyses of Stephen Cohen, Seymour Hersh, Jeffrey Sacks, Mearsheimer, etc. All easily dismissed because an internet guy found a quote he’s interpreted (wrongly) as “if Ukraine wants to join NATO, that’s fine with us.” Perfectly proportional.
Right. That's what I meant by saying he rose to power by starting a war. I realized Yeltsin had already picked him as a successor.
Right, fair enough. We could also say his legitimacy was forged in a war. War, or perhaps we should be more neutral and call it direct military action, has worked for Putin.
Yep.
1. Russians are fond of saying that expansion of NATO with Ukraine is the Worst Thing that Could Be Done To Russia.
2. In 1997 Yeltsin signs the NATO Founding Act, that literally stipulates that each country is sovereign and may seek its security however it wants. In simpler words, he agrees in writing that any country, including Ukraine, can do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
3. In 2002 Kuchma declares he specifically plans to start the procedure to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
4. A month later Putin meets with Kuchma and declares that they are the best buddies ever and that Ukraine can do whatever it wants with the Guys Who Plan to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (previous quote).
5. In November 2002 Kuchma and the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia meet in Brussels to plan exactly how they want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. Putin attends the meeting with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and says that he is actually the best buddies with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia who literally have just finished planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. He also adds that he wants to do many great things with the Guys Who Have Just Finished Planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021111a.htm). Moreover, he literally and specifically says that the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia will not in any way affect his relations with his newly found buddies (previous quotes).
6. In 2003 he meets again with Kuchma, the guy who just started to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia with the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and again says they are the best buddies ever (http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21987). He does not even mention in passing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
7. In 2004 he gives his full support in the coming elections to Kuchma, the Guy Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
8. Afterwards he indeed does many great things with the Other Guys Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (even after 2008, e.g. Russia was in joint exercises with NATO forces in 2011).
Got it?
No, you’ve provided one. The others were shown to be complete garbage. Easy for anyone to go back and check.
So I’m glad you see you’re sticking with “one second hand reference” versus the entire documentary record and analyses by the US’s own experts. Predictable.
Too bad Burns, for example, wasn’t around so you could educate him with your cute narrative.
It’s amazing how quickly you devolve into nonsense when confronted on your fictions. Pity.
Yes, that is about it, the only thing that might not be clear from the first paragraph is the sequence: Putin became the prime minister, he has risen up due to hardline stance in the war and then was annointed as the stand-in president in the place of resigning Yeltsin (which practically guaranteed him winning the elections). While I do not think he was exactly a KGB pawn, he certainly would not gain the power nor hold it initially without the support of the circles of the secret services and the oligarchs (which in Russia is often the same), like Berezovsky. Then he got more and more powerful by skillfully maneuvering between different hostile cliques.
Yes, it is easy for anyone to check what was actually said and in what context. That it flies over your head is not exactly my problem, I have tried. And if you mention Burns, you might have missed this part of his report:
So your beloved Burns says that NATO enlargement is used as a political tool to gain support from Russian nationalists (doesn't he know they were made up by the West?!). Could this might be the reason why Putin was saying different things to different people? Just wondering...
It can be used that way, of course. And I’m sure it’s a very emotional topic. I would assume the same would be true for the US if China were running military drills in Mexico. Wouldn’t make the US right to invade Mexico, but I think the least we’d say is that it would be a major factor.
Which we apparently can’t say about Russia— because Putin is a madman bent on conquering Ukraine with 190 thousand troops.
Do you know how many Soviet troops have initially attacked Afghanistan? Or how many American troops have invaded Panama?
By the way, you have not answered my question... If it is too difficult, maybe we can break it down: can you describe in your own words what the phrase 'Russia has no concerns' might mean?
These sorts of thought experiments have come up before, e.g. Oct 11, 2023. Let's have your take on it. (y)
I guess that's what things look like on the ground at the moment ...
Finnish volunteers target Russian soldiers during fierce gun battle in Ukraine (Daily Mail · 1m:9s · Nov 19, 2023)
... in some places anyway.
Someone should set up a venture: "Treat yourself to a thrilling action adventure in Ukraine. Safety not guaranteed. The new trend in vacation." :)
In ‘79? I have no idea. 70/80 thousand? What’s the point? Afghanistan was a population of maybe 14 million people and the situation was much different. Ukraine has 40 million people or so.
So you’re really going to argue that Russia wanted to conquer Ukraine, eh? Maybe Putin really is that stupid— but in any case there’s no evidence for it. There were other reasons for invasion. Conquest wasn’t one of them.
Except for the parts of Ukraine actually conquered and annexed, right?
I think for the Ukrainians, the distinction between "conquest" and a "special military operation to demilitarise and denazify" is rather academic.
I'd rather call it pro-Russian propaganda. Indeed, these people have no problems to whine over American imperialism EVEN WHEN American didn't "conquest" anything. While they refrain from talking about Russian imperialism when the territorial conquest actually happens before they eyes while they are denying it. The intellectual misery is cosmic.
BTW here is a useful definition of imperialism from Wikipedia:
Imperialism is the practice, theory or attitude of maintaining or extending power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing not only hard power (military and economic power) but also soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more or less formal empire. While related to the concepts of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.
And then ask them: is Russia imperialist according to that definition?
Besides the assumption that politics is about political leaders' intentions (which they wish to be more able to detect than involved political leaders) is rather myopic, also from their guru Mearsheimer's point of view . But apparently self-entitled anonymous nobodies on the internet want to teach politicians how to do their job.
By the way, you still have not answered my question. Is the phrase so difficult to understand? 'Russia has no concerns' - what could that mean?
One more evidence: 02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:
[i]Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.[/i]
https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html
I would rather turn this around and point out that @Mikie and presumably also the other posters would never accept this kind of argument If we were talking about an US invasion.
They'd scoff at the notion that the US didn't intend to "conquer" Iraq but only to fight terrorism. If we tried to argue that the US had no imperialist ambitions in Iraq and merely reacted to "reasonable security concerns", that really the "most direct cause" of the invasion was the alignment of Iraq with the supporters of radical Islam, they'd laugh us out of the room.
The invasion of Iraq is also an interesting analogy as far as the numbers are concerned. The population of Iraq is 43 million. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a large army that was considered relatively modern and effective. Yet the initial invasion forces also numbered "only" some 160.000.
If, for some wild reason, the invasion had failed, would we now be talking about how the US couldn't possibly have intended to conquer Iraq, since clearly it didn't have the troops?
Agreed.
Western policy has been a complete disaster, it's now becoming obvious, so denialists must retreat into the safety of thought terminating clichés:
Quoting Thought-terminating cliché - Wikipedia
Quoting Mikie
Thanks!
If it is of any use, I write mainly for people who maybe following the discussion and are genuinely curious what arguments can stand up to scrutiny and who can see something as propaganda or the clichés mentioned above but can't quite see the full structure of how it works.
In this light my opponents are very helpful and obliging foils.
My principle project here on the forum is to develop strategies of dealing with bad faith debaters. The first tactic of a bad faith debater is of course to try to both confuse and render the debate tiresome; so rehashing is one such counter-tactic. Most importantly is to call out and clearly explain the ulterior motives; conceding "good intentions" to a bad faith interlocutor is to concede defeat and motivated only by either cowardice or one's own ulterior motive to fraternize with, rather than confront, evil.
Okay— so Russia didn’t plan on conquering Ukraine. Glad you don’t think so. It’s hardly a strawman, though:
https://war.ukraine.ua/why-is-russia-invading-ukraine/
Quoting Jabberwock
As long as it’s not right next door in Ukraine. NATO had already expanded at the time of this quote. The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia — although there are reports that this was hardly celebrated.
What could “Russia will organize its military policies accordingly in connection with NATO nearing its borders” mean? “Yes, please, set up shop right next door to a country we view as incredibly important to us?”
It’s hard to understand why people are so confused about why NATO, or general US influence (including economic influence), in Ukraine would be considered a negative thing in Russia— even if “emotional” and irrational. I don’t think anyone serious denies this, leaving aside for a moment whether it was a major factor in the war (as I maintain) or a minor/nonexistent one.
This is a good point. You’re forgetting two things, though: first, I’m not trying to justify Russia’s actions. In fact I’ve condemned them all along. I think it’s both morally wrong and strategically stupid, as they’ve now pushed even more countries into the hands of the US.
Secondly, when analyzing the justification given by the aggressor state, you look at the evidence. The justification for invading Iraq (connections to 9/11, weapons of mass destruction, etc) turned out to be completely bogus. And the goal wasn’t to conquer Iraq anyway. The actual reason, in my view, was economic.
So in Russia’s case, is there any evidence that NATO is a major factor? Yes, there is. Doesn’t make it correct or rational. Furthermore, it doesn’t make it the only cause.
Saying the US invaded Iraq because the US is evil and George Bush is a madman wouldn’t be a strong argument. Likewise, rejecting that thesis wouldn’t justify the actual (well supported) reasons.
Me, you owe nothing.
If you have been paying attention, I have already explained several times the basics of negotiation. Attempting to redefine the terms after the deal is concluded is called reneging and an insult to anyone whose word means anything to them.
For example, when Merkel et. al. brag about the Minsk accords being agreed to in bad faith without any intention to implement it in order to "buy time" for Ukraine, it is called reneging. Hopefully that will help you remember the definition.
Had I wanted anything from you in exchange for my services, I would have negotiated that before delivering the goods, because I am a man of honour.
Quoting neomac
Quoting CNN
This is called repudiating negotiations.
To try to reinterpret what I say as claiming there was never any negotiations is foolish.
I clearly explain that there was a negotiation, nearly successful by some accounts (but clearly happened, was in the news and everything), and then Zelensky rejected the Russian offer and repudiated further negotiations with statements like the above.
Since even normal people intuit there's something wrong with walking away entirely from the negotiation table (the US is in continuous negotiation with Hamas as we speak), some pressure is put on Zelensky about it so he changes his position to he'll negotiation but only after Russia leaves Ukraine, including Crimea, entirely ... which is not how negotiation works. You negotiate the points of contention before an agreement is made and the exchange value actually occurs; simply demanding the counter-party does whatever you want before negotiating is another way of saying one refuses any negotiation.
In diplomatic parlance it's called the "cry baby move of unhinged, immature and reckless politicians that wish to see their own country burn".
Quoting neomac
First, it's not hand waiving, it's what negotiation is about: you seek as much compensation as possible from the parties involved in exchange for whatever you're giving up (money, time, apologies, legal claims, paintings, diamonds, leaving town etc.).
So, if there was a deal on the table that was "sufficient" in terms of being preferable to continued warfare, then the only thing to do is attempt to negotiate an even better formulation of the deal but with the aim of ultimately accepting anyways.
Furthermore, I am not abstracting away from anything, I have routinely and diligently analyzed the battlefield situation using both my own soldiering experience and training (including training specifically designed for a fight with the Russians and exactly the kind of warfare we've seen play out in Ukraine) as well as analysis available elsewhere, to evaluate Ukraine's chance of a battlefield victory.
My conclusion is basically no chance, due to the specifics on the ground (Ukraine lack of capacities the Russians have and Ukraine lack of quantity, such as artillery, where Ukraine does have comparable capacity: how can anyone expect soldiers to prevail in such circumstances?!).
Therefore, if Ukraine has no chance of a battlefield victory then it should strive to negotiate a peace, using the leverage of being able to do further damage to Russia (when you are a weaker party to a conflict, you're leverage is the ability to inflict damage even with little threat of victory; of course, being able to threaten actually victory is better leverage, but people seek to avoid damage if they can so generally offer concessions to terminate the war sooner rather than later; and even when no concessions are offered, such as unconditional surrender, it is still usually better, for real people under your command, to surrender unconditionally than to fight to the death).
Quoting neomac
My oh my oh my oh my.
You've said a lot there from various different perspectives that are not the same.
When I say Ukraine should seek compensation from the West in any peace deal for loss of territory, it is because they have the leverage to get that. If they can get compensation from Russia and from the West in a peace deal, that is clearly better than simply compensation from Russia.
Of course now, Ukraine has very little leverage.
But at the start of the war, for example, in exchange for accepting a peace along the lines of what Russia proposing, Zelensky could have sought various compensation from the West, in particular Europe that has the most to lose from a larger and longer war: such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO).
True, it would be a compromise where Russia is "appeased".
But as I've explained numerous times, the appeasement argument is totally fallacious and demonstrates a total lack of understanding of history.
The appeasement analogy applied to Ukraine would only be remotely similar if it was about chastising Poland for not fighting to the last Polander.
The criticism of appeasement is not levied at the smaller and weaker countries Hitler gobbled up, accusing them of surrendering or cutting deals rather than fighting to their last man and even worman, but rather the criticism of appeasement is levied at the far larger and stronger countries (UK, France, US) that had an actual chance of defeating Hitler.
Avoiding "appeasement" has nothing to do with smaller countries stuck in the middle of the great powers. It is always the same: the strong do as they will, the weak suffer what they must. And so weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers.
A situation I do not approve of, but is created out of the system of international relations—in which the key word is "national" and the nationalism from which those nations spring—and insofar as we have a system of nations then we have more and less powerful nations and among them the "great powers" who do great things – terrible, yes, but great.
Great things generally aimed at each other but sometimes also space.
The smaller powers stuck in the middle have no interest in fighting to the death for one side or another; one needs really extreme circumstances for that option to be viable.
Now, that such a peace would be potentially "bad" for the West is from a US and Western perspective, not Ukraine's perspective. You are basically giving up the ghost of your position. You are simply taking it as assumed that Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine.
And indeed, even if you are correct (which I don't think you are) in assuming any peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West, that's not an argument that Ukraine shouldn't make peace with Russia; only an argument that the West should not want Ukraine to make peace with Russia.
Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.
How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.
For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).
At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned.
Quoting neomac
Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.
Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.
War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace).
Quoting neomac
Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.
Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.
The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?!
Quoting neomac
Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ...
Quoting neomac
I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world.
However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.
Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.
People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.
It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.
Quoting neomac
How is my interpretation questionable?
If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.
How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?
Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.
For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it).
It should be noted that Russia has voiced concerns about Ukraine joining the EU as well, because the EU features a military dimension such as a mutual defense clause (making it function, on paper, in a similar way to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty).
It would of course not involve the US, which the Russians perceive as the primary instigator. That's probably why they've been more open to EU membership for Ukraine.
I think the scenario of Belarusinization was much more likely - subjugation without formal annexation. It is simply more convenient this way. But for Ukrainians that would make little difference - they would still lose their independence.
Quoting Mikie
But that directly contradicts most of the quotes you have provided! You have given quotes from 1995 and 1997 where exactly that expansion was described as a grave threat and a red line! And just a few years later it turns out that Russia does not really care about that... Your source states:
Quoting Should NATO grow
Your source clearly states that there would be no difference between the Baltics and Ukraine.
What about your other source?
Quoting Opposition to NATO Expansion
So your own sources clearly state that it was 'unacceptable'. When you write 'The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia' you directly contradict the very sources you have provided.
Not to mention that the quote I have provided was given in 2004, i.e. two years after Ukraine has started its accession to NATO. In other words, Ukraine is on its way to NATO and Kremlin's site writes 'Russia’s relations with NATO are developing positively'.
The Gulf War campaign had about a million coalition troops. The Iraqi Army was no longer considered nearly as well supplied or competent in 2003. Sanctions and the collapse of the USSR as an arms provider had crippled their military, as had a decade of a US enforced no fly zone. During the Gulf War, the US essentially defacto partitioned a whole third of Iraq, which was under Kurdish control and rule after.
When the US invaded in 2003, it has 60,000 Kurdish Peshmerga supporting their operations, and essentially started with a third of the country under their control. It still invaded with an overall coalition of about 600,000.
Another comparison might be Vietnam. South Vietnam had about half the population of Ukraine but the SVA and US forced for COIN operations there peaked at 1.4 million.
However, in general, the size of military deployments has been decreasing. Modern warfare has shown a definite trend towards quality beating quantity. Military hardware is significantly more expensive when adjusting for inflation than during WWII and soldiers now require more training.
Russia's invasion was largely predicated on the prediction that Ukraine's would collapse. The low troop numbers represent Russia's (over)confidence in this collapse, over confidence in the effectiveness of bribes they had paid to Ukrainian leaders, corruption (they thought they had more men than they did, there have been multiple trials over under strength formations and "ghost soldiers"), and general poor planning skills, more than anything relative to their war aims IMO. That and their relative inability to mobilize and support a much larger force. After all, they couldn't support the men they went in with. Having more unsupported columns wouldn't have helped them.
Like the Afghan National Army? Or the Iraqi Armed Forces in the face of ISIS? Or the South Vietnamese Army? Those three all received significantly more aid than the US had provided to Ukraine before the invasion. The US had not particularly provided all that much by means of lethal aid before the war, whereas it had fully outfitted the Iraqi military with aircraft, artillery, tanks, IFVs, stuff the US still won't give to Ukraine or has only given to them in token numbers. And the Iraqi military had way more recent combat experience than the Ukrainians, with veterans of the war with Iran, Kuwait, the Gulf, and the civil war. But collapse they definitely did.
ISIS blitzed Mosul, Kirkuk, and besieged Baghdad with a quite small force because resistance collapsed, despite plenty of Western aid and training. Less well equiped Peshmerga and Shia militias actually preformed a good deal better (partly due to essentially facing the threat of genocide).
Quality of equipment and quantity of $ aid means very little if morale collapses, or if you have effectively bribed commanders to "throw open the gates," for you. Russian intelligence operations, bribes/pressure did help them gain Kherson City easily, due to collusion. They expected that to happen in many more places?
Maybe they expected Zelensky to flee. I was a little surprised he didn't. Maybe he turned out to be the wildcard the Russians weren't expecting.
That's fair. But I do think it changes the moral judgement a fair bit whether we think of the US invasion of Iraq as a misguided and ultimately tragically counterproductive attempt at fighting terrorism or as a cynical move to exploit a tragedy in order to reshape the middle east according to the US' geopolitical interests.
For similar reasons, it does rankle me if Putin is called a "reactive leader" in this context for, even if it's not meant to exculpate him, it seems to nevertheless distract from the fact that had he not given the order, thousands victims of this war would be alive today (though this is ultimately tangential to our discussion).
Quoting Mikie
Sure, it's a different case with different facts. The analogy only goes so far.
Mostly what I'm interested in at this point isn't debating an individual point - we have tried that at length. But I do (obviously) also think I'm looking at the evidence.
You're drawing a direct line from NATO expansion to the war of Ukraine. I'm saying at some point in the 2000s the line entered a bundle of causes we might label "Russian resentment towards the west", which ended up one of the causes of the war. These views aren't really fundamentally opposed. I'm not saying "no actually, there really were WMDs in Iraq".
I think it's more useful to understand Putin's decision as an expression of his geopolitical goals. The include keeping Ukraine neutral, but they also go much beyond that.
Quoting Mikie
From where I sit, only a madman would have thrown Russia's entire available armed forces at Ukraine if they did not intend for this to result in a seismic geopolitical shift in their favour. Neutrality for Ukraine for some indefinite period doesn't strike me as such a shift.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I confess I have not really looked into this in detail. I checked the troop dispositions for Iraq out of curiosity and noticed that they didn't actually seem in an entirely different ballpark (only looking at the initial invasion force). The comparison is flawed in many ways, and yet I don't think it's entirely out of the question that Russian commanders also looked at the US invasion in Iraq as a model for their planned campaign.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No disagreement here. One can say the russian invasion forces were much too small, yet on paper they still represented one of the most formidable forces in the world. The number of nations who could have assembled something similar is small.
It only seems like apples and oranges in retrospect. In 2014, Russia saw a good deal of defections from the UAF and meaningful local collapses. There was plenty of reason for them to think that it would be the same just 8 years later. One of the reasons for them to expect this is that Western train and equip missions had a fairly mixed track record at actually building decent militaries.
Almost certainly. The whole blitz on Hostomel and rush to Kyiv makes sense in the context of a "decapitation strike" that crushes the resolve of the enemy. But, being poorly planned and executed, it instead turned into a massive stalled out convoy north of Kyiv, the decimation of the VDV sent ahead in air assaults, and eventually the entire collapse of that axis.
The most telling thing about what Russia expected to happen is the fact that what were essentially police units, armed with riot control gear and small arms alone, moving in thin skinned trucks, were sent towards the front of the advance on Kyiv and Kharkiv. This is what you move in if you think you'll mostly be dealing with unrest and protests. Instead, their advance was a disaster because they ran right into still very much active military formations with tanks and artillery.
This is just not how military planning works. Military planners tend to plan, as a minimum, for 'most likely enemy course of action' and 'most dangerous'.
In what world was the most likely thing to happen for Ukraine to collapse? Even in Putin's wildest dreams it would be a stretch, and I find it very hard to believe for any modern military to fall for that level of wishful thinking.
Where have you been the last two years lol? Of course they were wildly over confident. They accidentally published the articles they had prewritten about the collapse of Ukraine's government and were continuing to publish ridiculous maps like this until the week they decided to declare the advance on Kyiv a "feint."
Oh look, eastern Ukraine has been encircled and cut off, it's over! The only saving grace is that they didn't decide to actually launch their clearly suicidal amphibious assault on Odessa. But they still published reports about how they were "contesting it"
I don't see any evidence of that. It seems to me you're cherry-picking snippets of information (from Russian propaganda channels, no less) and interpreting them to fit your preferred narrative.
The fact is there was a peace deal on the table in March / April, in which Ukraine reneged on their plans to join NATO, and Russia returned all the territory it occupied at that time. This deal was blocked by the US and Britain.
It seems to me that forcing Kiev to the negotiating table was the main purpose of the invasion, and everything from Russian troop numbers to deployments and disposition coincides with that idea. The deal was blocked because the US knew it would be seen as a Russian victory.
If you want to view this conflict through a lens of Russian incompetence, be my guest, though. I doubt I'll be able to change your mind. Given the staggering levels of Russian incompetence I'm sure a Ukrainian victory is just around the corner.
That's not a fact, it's a wild flight of fantasy.
Quoting Tzeentch
Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory".
Quoting Echarmion
I am in the midst of writing a response to your previous comments, which also contains this same denialism:
Quoting Echarmion
Which is just so preposterously bad faith that I went all the way back to when we (by which I mean myself and other people, not yourself, actually concerned about the war and Ukrainian lives, regardless of our respective positions, when the war first broke out and a settlement is easiest to reached).
Russia's conditions for a peace settlement were made public, so we do in fact know a lot about Russia's peace offerings, and calling this knowledge "fantasy" is just ludicrous attempt to rewrite history to make the Ukrainian war effort and the West clearly doing everything possible to both start and maintain the war, as less evil and less stupid.
Quoting boethius
This is literally March 7th, 2022 (both the publication by Reuters and my comment citing Reuters in the context of the debate at the time).
Quoting Echarmion
Again, just inventing whatever that makes Western policy sound better.
This is exactly what "the West" (officials, mainstream media, zillions of commenters on social media) was insisting on, that any peace (in which Putin keeps Crimea and Ukraine accepts neutrality, which was the only deal the Russians would consider accepting) would be a win for Russia: they wanted Ukraine neutral, they want recognition of Crimea by Ukraine, so if they get that then they "win".
You're debate technique is just to think backwards to what would be convenient to be true in order to defend Western prestige (make Western policy look less stupid and evil) and just state it like it was fact.
My diagnosis of your philosophical disease is that you've, until now, happily swallowed what Western media was selling you about this war so could comfortably ignore taking a closer look, confident that certainly if the Western media and social media is so pro-Ukraine their cause and our support for their cause must be just and reasonable and going towards a good result—perhaps some are hurt, even sacrificed but it is all worthwhile, and certainly "casualties are low"—, and now that the war has clearly "gone wrong" as evidenced by radically different facts and opinions appearing in even the Western media (Ukraine can't win, casualties are high, Russia's economy is doing well actually), the cognitive dissonance has pierced your ears and arrived at your brain, and you come here to try to quell your uneasiness and retroactively prove (or then at least throw some shade on the posters who have stated since the beginning of the war the very things the Western media are now admitting, couldn't have been "really right" but just lucky guesses, nothing could have been prevented by wiser decision making, the West meant well and so on) Ukraine and Western decisions made some sort of sense and had good intentions at least, that "maybe" a preferable peace was achievable at different moments but we have little "knowledge" about it.
But feel free to provide a different narrative, personal mythology if you prefer, of why you suddenly take interest in the war now that Ukraine is clearly on the verge "not winning" with the very real risk of total collapse (especially if the dollars stop flowing).
However, the main issue is not "what exactly" Russia was offering, but that Ukraine walks away from negotiating, makes absurd ultimatums public and so on, rather than strive to get the best deal they can when they have maximum leverage.
Now, if you are in a weak position, negotiating when you have maximum leverage doesn't guarantee you get what you want (maybe there was a way to get into the EU, maybe not; maybe Donbas could be fully recovered, "autonomy" watered down, or maybe not), but not getting everything you want (like keeping "the right to join NATO" without actually joining NATO) is not a reason to refuse a deal, even less a reason to refuse continuing to negotiate.
If Russia's offer was "not quite good enough" ... then why don't we have a Reuters citation of Ukraine's counter-offer, such as neutrality and keeping the Donbas with more limited cultural protections for Russian speakers (since that's important for "some reason")?
The reason is that Zelensky is a moron and willing to destroy his country and get hundreds of thousands of his comrades killed to be on vogue ... and have a finger in billions of dollars of currency and arms flowing into the country that he has since said it's insulting to Ukraine for anyone to ask any accounting of.
Now, there is lots of philosophical nuance to analyze but as I said at the time (March 21st, 2022):
Quoting boethius
It of course goes without saying that if Zelensky eventually accepts terms that are far worse than what was on offer at the start of the war, that is called ruining his country to be on the cover of vogue magazine while Western leaders blow smoke up his ass to do what's in their interest and not Ukraine's interest.
You seem to have ommitted the part where you show Russia's pledge to retreat and return all territory, (which would include the parts of Donetsk & Luhansk not occupied prior to the 2022 invasion).
Quoting boethius
Sure, a win, but a relatively minor one which offers no long term strategic advantage to Russia.
Quoting boethius
I have a pro-Ukraine bias, but I do try to avoid looking away when bad news for Ukraine surface.
Quoting boethius
Their cause is just.
Quoting boethius
Actual offers in serious diplomatic negotiations are not made public, much less when actual lifes are at stake. Sure Ukraine could publish the offers made, but then why would we believe Ukraine was telling the full truth, and any such move could jeopardize further negotiations.
Quoting boethius
I guess we'll have to trust their judgement on when they have "maximum leverage" for now. The war isn't over.
This is just meant as an example of what Ukraine could try to get from the West using the leverage of ending the war (which some parties wanted, such as German industrialists) as well as the leverage of threatening to make peace with Russia that maximizes Western embarrassment rather than have some form of spin available for the West to pretend it is a "defeat" for Putin in some sense.
I.e. offer to make peace with Russia in a way that now claims would be "obviously" a Russian defeat:
Quoting Echarmion
And threaten to make peace with Russia in a way that maximizes Western embarrassment, going so far as to threaten "publicly admitting" Russian talking points such as Maidan was a coup and so on.
This is simply an example of the leverage Ukraine had at the time over the West and things the West has that could be good for Ukraine to get, but I am not arguing it would be trivial to get those things.
The counter-offer of the West could easily be: we'll murder you within an hour if you keep talking this way.
By explaining the leverage Ukraine has, it does not meant to be taken in a vacuum and that other parties have no leverage.
The West's leverage over Ukraine since the beginning of the war is that finance can be pulled at any time and Ukrainian government would entirely collapse, which is a far bigger threat than not sending arms.
However, this leverage was at a minimum at the very start of the war, and so when Ukraine would have had the most room to try to deploy its own leverage in negotiations.
If Ukraine tried to pull what I describe was possible at the start of the war now, his Western counterparts would just laugh in his face.
Another big point of leverage Ukraine had at the start of the war was a functioning economy that did not depend on continuous Western finance (maybe not a "great" economy, but it was functioning), so this is leverage in terms making an economic deal with the EU (which does not need to be full EU membership, there's a large spectrum of possibilities such as status similar to Norway or Switzerland) and likewise threatening (if there is nothing offered by the EU) economic rapprochement with Russia.
Now that the Ukrainian economy is completely wrecked, that leverage is also gone.
This was Russia's offer as reported at the time.
You're trying to create some sort of plausible deniability scenario that we "don't actually know" that Russia was offering something so obviously reasonable and so obviously preferable to continued fighting.
But that's just straight up rewriting history. Everyone at the time understood the Russian offer to be pulling their troops back to Russia and Crimea if the offer was accepted. There was huge amount of analysis at the time; the Reuters citation is just the most authoritative "Newspaper of record" of what the substance of the Russian offer was. We can of course debate exactly what Reuters is meaning by "independent" or then exactly what Russia's meaning is in their actual offer, as well as what Russia may have been willing to accept, but what is clear is the three main points are neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some sort of status change in Donbas (but not integration into Russia, which has happened since if you haven't noticed).
Now, obviously "all territory" does not include Crimea, but it was understood Russia was offering to pull their troops from the rest of Ukraine including the Donbas (it's not really a "retreat" if it's part of a peace agreement). Certainly Russia was not offering to abandon their allies in the Donbas, so to that extent they were not offering Donbas seperatists to be conquered by Ukraine, but rather a peace that protected the separatists as well.
However, the minutia of how a peace plan would be implemented and the exact status of the Donbas is clearly irrelevant compared to the actual point of contention here which is that Ukraine had far more leverage to try to negotiate the best deal they could ever get back then compared to now. A point you don't seem to agree with.
If you want to argue (as other posters have already done) that the Russian offer was maybe in bad faith and they would have continued the invasion even if the offer was accepted, that is not reason to reject the offer: it strengthens your diplomatic position to accept an offer that is then reneged on and would seriously weaken Russia's diplomatic position to be seen reneging on a clear offer that was clearly accepted by Ukraine (a big reason the "rest of the world" hasn't joined the West and implemented sanctions is that Russia is able to say they kept on offering reasonable peace deals that Ukraine and the West rejected: so pressure the West, not Russia, if you want peace and lower food prices).
Quoting Echarmion
Well then, what "good news" do you even see in even mainstream Western media?
Quoting Echarmion
Well, at the time, the West was framing this as giving Putin what he wants rather than punishing him for breaking the "rules based order" over annexing Crimea and the West refused to negotiate directly with Russia to try to come to a larger deal over European security architecture as a whole and so on.
For a while talking heads and social media were continuously repeating that "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" and that "Russia can't demand Ukrainian neutrality as Ukraine is a sovereign nation" as justification for repudiating any peace agreement, which are absolutely moronic points and do not justify war fighting (precisely because Ukraine can't join NATO, it should not fight a war for the "right to join NATO" and precisely because Ukraine is a sovereign country it can accept neutrality to avoid war if it wants).
Quoting Echarmion
We can come back to this point, as no one so far as actually provided an argument of why the Ukrainian cause is just. For example, in nearly 2 years of debate no one has answered the question of how many Nazi's in Ukraine would be too many Nazi's (people have admitted that there are Nazi's, just not enough to justify invasion, but then refuse to explain how many Nazi's would be too many and therefore not-invading Ukraine would be an actually accurate analogy of appeasement; a force that can stop Nazi's going and stopping Nazi's), and furthermore, not a single "pro-Ukrainian" has been able to explain why the Donbas separatist cause is not just on exactly the same grounds as the Ukrainian cause of "self determination", and even if we ignore that issue then why shelling civilians was justified, reneging on the Mink accords was justified.
However, let's assume none of that matters and it's all very simple and Russia is fundamentally in the wrong in their invasion of a sovereign nation and Ukraine is fundamentally in the right and exercising self defence.
Even assuming that, once Ukraine rejects reasonable peace terms (which you seem to accept are reasonable) then their cause is no longer just, but fanatical fighting for a hypothetically just cause. It's hypothetically a just cause to take back Crimea in the simplistic framework we are using her, but to be actually just you need to be actually able to take back Crimea, otherwise you are fighting a pointless war and getting people killed for no feasible military objective, which is not just cause.
Quoting Echarmion
What are you talking about? Offers in serious negotiations can and often are made public. Making an offer public can put further pressure on the counter-party if the offer is clearly reasonable to take, and that's why Russia made their offer public. Regardless of the West spinning it this war or that, the rest of the world concluded Russia was being reasonable and did not deserve sanctions and Ukraine was stupid and the West cynical and duplicitous.
Now, definitely Zelensky should have heeded your advice and at least kept his positions secret, such as refusing to talk to Putin and making ultimatums in public that would be a serious loss of face and obstacle to try to reverse if Ukrainian prospects became bleak even for Zelensky's "belief" based approach to the war, but again he did not.
You are trying to create some sort of plausible deniability smoke shield where none existed at the time and last time I checked smoke cannot be blown into the past.
Quoting Echarmion
Sure, this has been the position of every other "pro-Ukrainian" to debate these points: war isn't over, maybe Ukraine will turn things around, wonder weapons and all that.
We shall see.
:lol:
This is why discussion with you oompa loompas is pointless.
You could simply provide evidence of your claim.
Quoting boethius
Russia's offer was a ceasefire in place.
Quoting boethius
No, they didn't.
Quoting boethius
Then no doubt you can provide relevant evidence.
Quoting boethius
And these are their demands [I]for a ceasefire[/I].
Quoting boethius
No, that was not understood. You seem to be confusing a ceasefire with a peace treaty.
Quoting boethius
Correct.
Quoting boethius
Unless you had already made concessions and got nothing in return. As would have been the case in this scenario.
Quoting boethius
Russian offensive capabilities don't seem to have markedly improved, so they seem unable for now to do more than grind forward at a snail's pace.
Quoting boethius
Which is a reasonable position to take generally, western hypocrisy notwithstanding.
Quoting boethius
The argument was that Russia cannot demand that western nations bar Ukraine's NATO entry.
Quoting boethius
But that's relatively easy. They're fighting an aggressor who violated their undisputed borders repeatedly (and who also has a treaty obligation to protect the sovereignty of Ukraine), and they have not committed any kind of crime against humanity which might in extreme cases justify a war of aggression.
Quoting boethius
Well I'm glad to hear people here had enough sense not to.
Quoting boethius
Separatism is a thorny issue at the best of times, and the Donbas separatists lack any convincing popular legitimacy.
Quoting boethius
Even if it wasn't, it was not remotely significant enough to be cause for an invasion.
Quoting boethius
At the least Russia also failed to implement it's obligations under Minsk.
Quoting boethius
Or it can blow up the negotiations because now one side is compelled to accuse the other of lying to avoid fatally compromising their position. It's a dangerous game to play.
Sovereign countries can apply freely to international organizations.
When btw Russia started to make demands just who can and cannot join NATO was when Finnish leadership understood that the country had to apply for NATO membership, not just have it as an option and still stay out of it.
I did.
I've provided accounts of the people directly involved, accounts of people indirectly involved, reports by prominent UN and NATO representatives, opinion pieces by prominent academics, etc.
All "a flight of fantasy", of course.
This is why you're not taken seriously. You don't seem to realize that reality won't budge any further to accomodate your narrative.
Which either did not say what you claim they did or merely noted their "impressions"
Quoting Tzeentch
"Prominent" as in claim to have worked for them in the past. Posting their views on some obscure blog, quoting themselves.
Quoting Tzeentch
Whatever helps you sleep at night.
Quoting Rodion Miroshnik · Russian ambassador-at large
It's not specifically about NATO, it's about anything getting in the way of Putin's geo-military-political power/control aspirations (from memory, Mearsheimer commented similarly about those aspirations/goals). Well, NATO is still around, Putin's Soviet Union is not. And NATO is in the way of Putin's free international rein.
Again, just inventing things that would be convenient if it were true.
Are you just repeating myths that circulate in "pro-Ukrainian" echo-chambers on Reddit or Facebook and simply assuming they must be based on "something" or do you just do cursory research to get a vague impression of what you're looking for?
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Wikipedia
And, obviously, the Russian offer before the war would have occurred without any Russian forces outside of Crimea.
It is quite usual for ceasefires to also be negotiated during a war, for humanitarian purposes (such as we see in the Hamas-Isreali conflict) and / or as an attempt to deescalate the situation to give time for leaders to focus on peace negotiations.
However, trying to present the various Russian offers at different times as only ever involving a ceasefire in place is either a straight up lie or you are totally ignorant of events and have no intention to make yourself not-ignorant.
You're also directly contradicting the Reuters article I cited, which clearly describes an offer that it not a ceasefire in place, so if someone's already presented authoritative evidence to support a claim, your evidence that claim is wrong should be ... well, more than zero evidence.
Quoting Echarmion
Again, just thinking backwards to making things up that would be convenient to be true.
"Everyone" in the context refers to members of the forum commenting on events and also mainstream media, such as Reuters. But, even so, can you even provide evidence of "someone" understanding the Russian offer different at the time?
Quoting Echarmion
Are you really doubting that there was not huge amount of analysis of this war and the Russian peace terms as reported by Reuters?
I can provide you the evidence (already on this forum is a huge amount of analysis at the time), but I'd like to first confirm that you truly doubt there was a huge amount of analysis at the time reflecting what the Reuters report says about Russias offered terms.
Quoting Echarmion
Read the Wikipedia article that's literally called "Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine".
Where do you get that Russia was only ever offering a ceasefire in place? Especially before the 2022 war even occurred?
Again, just making things up, trying to create plausible deniability that there were reasonable terms on offer (reasonable in the sense of preferable to the situation for Ukraine now).
But even so, a ceasefire in place is better than losing the war. Even if your made-up version of history is correct, that Russia was only ever offering a ceasefire in place, that is certainly preferable to losing the war and all the destruction and death that has happened since.
Ok, you claim Ukraine may still win, war's not over.
Sure, but that is simply agreeing to the main point of contention here: that whatever terms Ukraine was offered, it would have been better to accept compared to losing the war, or even accepting a ceasefire in place now or at some point in the future at the current lines (which get worse, and not better, for Ukraine everyday).
If Ukraine was right to reject a ceasefire in place, it needs something to show for that too.
Quoting Echarmion
Well then we agree on the main point of contention as far as I'm concerned.
In terms of learning something to avoid future disastrous wars, the main thing of interest to me is at what points was peace achievable through talking.
The problem Ukraine gets into is that it repudiates negotiations and commits itself to achieving a better negotiation position by military means.
When I say Zelensky repudiates further peace negotiations is because he starts making both public conditions and public ultimatums to even have further peace talks.
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
So, ok, Zelensky can insist on the return of Crimea or stating Russia should withdraw first and then peace talks can maybe happen, but this is incredibly foolish if you are unable to improve your position on the battlefield.
Henry Kissinger is obviously correct in his assessment at the time.
Quoting Echarmion
This is what people here would claim, that there was not "enough' Nazi's in Ukraine to justify invasion. I simply asked if there's not enough to justify invasion, what's the definition of enough.
People make a claim with the term "enough" in it, and I simply ask for the definition of this term in the context.
For, unlike yourself, other interlocutors here wouldn't simply wantonly invent facts and rewrite history wantonly for their own convenience, and did recognize that clearly the overtly Nazi battalions in Ukraine were not a good thing, they just claimed there weren't enough of them to justify invasion. The question of what would be enough to justify invasion is a pretty common sense question.
Quoting Echarmion
Russia obviously can demand this, and NATO could agree to it and likewise Ukraine could agree to it.
Fighting a war for the right to join an organization that has had 3 decades to let you in at anytime but hasn't, is just completely dumb.
The neutrality of states in between larger powers is a common theme of negotiation throughout history and happens all the time, precisely to avoid the kind of war that is currently happening.
Nazi Germany and Japan were both sovereign nation in WWII, why should they need to accept terms of surrender and accept [i]enemy[/I] troops on their lands!?!?
Because they lost the fucking war!! Obviously no nation "wants to" accept any concessions to a hostile force, the whole thing about war is resolving what you can't actually have just because you want it.
Ukraine can't have NATO, which is just as much NATO's doing as it is Russia's.
Which just makes the whole war even more stupid, as Ukraine has consistently refused to give up what it doesn't even have, and the key point of contention leading up to war (and to make matters worse, the whole point of wanting to be in NATO is to avoid precisely the war that is currently happening; and NATO encouraging Ukraine to fight a war with a geopolitical rival for "the right to join NATO" and maybe actual protection by NATO from Russia if Ukraine first goes and "earns it" by defeating Russia first on behalf of NATO ... it's just ridiculous reasoning).
Most previous wars were at least fought over what countries did actually possess before the war started.
This is just reality. If you want to fight a war to protect some possession or right (in this case a meaningless symbolic "right to want to join NATO"), the critical question is whether you are going to win or not.
Even Disney understands this:
Quoting Echarmion
It's not easy at all, first language and cultural repression and shelling the separatists are crimes against humanity committed by overt Nazi's (that even the Western media would go and report on before they "got the memo" that the Nazi's were the good guys actually), but second it is a completely legitimate political action to seek separation after the coup in 2014.
Ukraine elected a president, the "will of the people" spoke, and that the president can negotiate foreign policy are part of the democratic rules. If the president is removed in an illegal coup, it's perfectly reasonable to call the new government illegitimate and secede. Once you've seceded it's perfectly legitimate to seek allies to come to your defence.
From 2014 to 2022 it is Ukraine that is waging a war of reconquering the separatist territories. If it's perfectly just cause to secede after an illegal coup, then Ukraine's war of aggression against the separatists is not just cause, making the separatists invitation of Russian forces to enter the war completely legitimate.
Western countries literally had to pass laws specifying that lethal aid to Ukraine was not to go to the Nazi's and Western journalists go and report that definitely lethal aid is going straight to the Nazi's. The Nazi's were not some marginal and illegal gang but had official support from both Ukraine and the West, and I honestly don't see much of a problem waging a war against said Nazi's.
My grandfather fought the Nazi's, nearly all his friends he had in the airforce died, and I'd be spitting on his grave if I'd view a conflict with literal and overt Nazi's as "relatively easy" to prove the side with said Nazi's has just cause.
But even without the Nazi's, if Ukraine has a right to self-determination so too the separatists.
Who doesn't have a right to self determination is all the Ukrainian men that cannot leave Ukraine and can be forced to fight by the government ... and why? To protect the right of self determination of Ukraine?
So, we can get into the philosophy of just war if you want, but that seems secondary to the issue of whether there was reasonable terms on offer and, whatever terms were on offer, if Ukraine had more leverage to get a better deal before or at the start of the war, compared to now.
What should be perfectly clear is that fighting for the right to join a club that doesn't let you join, is not just cause but a stupid cause.
Quoting Echarmion
What are you even talking about?
Convincing popular legitimacy in all of Ukraine?? Obviously not, that's what makes them separatists.
Or are you saying they lacked popular legitimacy in the Donbas ?
But yes, it is a thorny issue at the best of times, and therefore it is not a relatively easy issue, but a thorny issue at the best of times, to conclude Ukraine has just cause.
To blanket condemn separatism would of course be a condemnation of the United States and their little revolution and that they did not have just cause, the US of A is an immoral and illegal enterprise, and Biden should go and kneel before King Charles tomorrow and kiss the ring and give back to the crown what is rightfully his majesties property.
So, certainly just cause for the separatists is on the table, and the separatists cannot be said to be attacking the rest of Ukraine (as the front line was pretty deep in separatists terriroty), so it is clearly a war of aggression by Ukraine against the separatists to reintegrate the breakaway regions.
The separatists clearly have a right to self defence and if that requires asking Russia for help and Russia wrecking the rest of Ukraine to protect the separatists, seems perfectly legal to me. If the seceding is triggered by an illegal coup, seems entirely legal to me.
The social contract of being in a larger political unit is that the rules are followed. A president was elected to Ukraine and the rules are the president has certain powers and serves a certain term; those rules aren't followed, social contract is broken, perfectly reasonable and legitimate (and therefore just cause) to then secede from an illegitimate national government.
If you want to argue that following an illegal coup in Kiev there were equally illegal coups in the Donbas, I fail to see how such an argument, even if true (which I don't think it is), would establish anything other than both the Kiev National government and the local governments in the Donbas lack just cause.
Quoting Echarmion
It's completely enough justification. If you shell civilians you should expect anyone with a sense of duty to protect said civilians to do so.
The justification for wrecking Libya was that civilians "might" be shelled.
Quoting Echarmion
I don't know all the details of the Minsk process, if both parties were bad faith then the weaker party is far stupider for being bad faith than the stronger party (see Captain Jack Sparrow's analysis above), but what is an overriding consideration is the West simply admitting that the whole process was in bad faith to "buy time" for Ukraine. So if you have one side literally admitting the process is bad faith, seems irrelevant to try to nitpick about the other side "starting it" in terms of clashes and so on.
Ukraine was anyways in the separatist regions territory, if Ukraine was of good will about the accords (and had the sense to want to avoid a larger war with Russia) then they would have withdrawn to positions where clashes were no longer possible.
There's also video of Zelensky going and trying to order the Nazi's about, saying he's the president and so on, which they just openly defy him about. Nazi's who explicitly say they want a larger war with Russia.
So, maybe consider the possibility that the side with the literal Nazi's who want to escalate the war to be directly with Russia (believing this will collapse Russia somehow and Ukraine superiority will win somehow) is the side that frustrated peace accords previous to the larger war the Nazi's were explicitly trying to cause.
Quoting Echarmion
You're claim was that offers in serious negotiations aren't made public, to support your previous claim that "we don't know much about" the negotiations and what, if anything, Russia was offering, which you now just casually move the goal posts to this entirely new claim, that basically it maybe unwise to make your position public.
But you don't know what you're talking about. Making a negotiation position public does not compel a counter-party to call you a liar, why would it? If you outright say in public your position on selling your pants is 10 dollars, why would I call you a liar? If it's some "more serious" negotiation, again why would I call you a liar?
From your own sources:
The ultimatums Ukraine refused were tied to its"demilitarization," and mechanisms that would ensure it, which would amount to laying down their arms before an enemy that had just invaded them. The "de-Nazification" in practice, was a demand that Russia be allowed to pick who could remain in Ukraine's government.
The claim that there was ever and "offer for peace in exchange for not joining NATO," is patently false. Russia has continued to include these demands relative to neutering Ukraine's ability to resist future invasions and the right to select who can hold political office in the country.
Second, the seriousness of Russia's desires for a merely "independent Donbass" is belied by the fact that they officially annexed those regions, and southern Ukraine not long after.
The credibility of Russia in a deal predicated on "giving up Ukraine's means of self defense," strains credulity considering how they had just vociferously denied that they were going to invade Ukraine, calling the build up for the invasion "military exercises." I recall Lavrov declaring how the West would be "embarrassed" by the fact that all the Russian soldiers would simply return to their barracks, and blamed the US in particular for "building up hysteria" about a possible invasion. That was, in retrospect, obviously just patent lies.
The side (singular) with Nazis. :roll: I have already shown you in this thread that Wagner operates an explicitly Neo-Nazi unit for recruitment and that a senior leader in the group has an SS tattoo across his chest. Funny how Nazism is such a threat, and yet armed Neo Nazis operating within Russia proper can be tolerated so long as they do the bidding of Putin. He only seemed to sour on such things when a former caterer was forcing him to flee his capital (hasn't the war made Russia safer!?)
Aside from the, it's hard to see how Duginism isn't fascism. Is it the Swastika that makes the fascist?
You yourself posted the Reuters report. It said Russia would "halt military operations".
That is what you have offered regarding the [I]russian[/I] proposal. Noone doubts the ukrainian proposal involves Russia retreating.
Quoting boethius
An offer which we also do not know.
Quoting boethius
Halting your military operations is a ceasefire.
Quoting boethius
Why would I need to do that? It's your claim not mine.
Quoting boethius
I'm doubting the analysis says what you claim it does.
Quoting boethius
This is not a claim I'm making. I'm saying what you quoted describes a ceasefire in place.
Quoting boethius
That is moving the goalposts a fair bit. You have consistently claimed that Ukraine would have been better off accepting the deal on offer early in the war, rather than keep fighting. That's a very different argument.
Quoting boethius
And this, according to you, is somehow a bad thing?
Quoting boethius
Right, they could, but NATO would take a serious hit to its international standing, while leaving Ukraine out in the cold.
I understand you'd hand Russia the keys to the city and the nuclear codes too, if it'd avoid a war, but that is your opinion.
Quoting boethius
I think you missed the part where Russia annexed significant parts of Ukraine. But I guess the west forced them to do that.
Quoting boethius
If you want to be taken seriously, it'd help if you didn't just repeat russian propaganda. There was no Nazi oppression of Donbas.
Quoting boethius
It's not. There's no recognised right to separation under international law and you haven't made any moral case either.
Quoting boethius
You cannot wage a war against some political group in another country, and in any event that's not what happened.
Quoting boethius
Not under current international law.
Quoting boethius
That's not how any of this works.
Quoting boethius
Yes. The organic separatist movements in the Donbas were very localised and nothing really got off the ground until mercenaries arrived from Crimea. Even then the separatists quickly fizzled out in most areas apart from a few strongholds - notably Donetsk city.
Quoting boethius
I have no doubt it seems that way to you, but it is not legal. You cannot declare yourself a separatist and ask your neighbour to invade. It should be obvious why.
Quoting boethius
That might be an interesting question in the abstract but it is not what happened. Most of the unrest in Donbas coincided not with the Euromaidan but with the seizure of Crimea. It was also short lived until Igor Girkin, a Moscow born russian, started taking over cities with a band of mercenaries.
Quoting boethius
And look how well that turned out.
Quoting boethius
Ah yes more excellent advice from boethius. Just retreat. What's the worst that can happen?
Quoting boethius
This is an insipid and pointless sideshow.
You have claimed Russia offered to retreat to the February 2022 starting points in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality. It's upon you to provide evidence of this, which so far you haven't done.
I ultimately don't care one way or the other whether you believe diplomatic negotiations happen in public.
The point at issue was whether the Russia was offering only a "cease-fire" in place and did not include a withdrawal.
Of course, Russian offers to withdraw clearly never included Crimea, and Russian demands before the war included some form of autonomy for the Donbas region (as the Minsk accords clearly outline) and during the war the language of "independence" started to be used (such as in the Reuters article), but it was clearly understood by not only the people her eon the forum, Western media, but also Ukraine itself that Russia would be withdrawing from the rest of Ukraine and the Donbas status would not be part of Russia but some intermediary status.
Now, the Russian demands of "de-Nazification" as you describe, control over who is allowed to be in the Ukraine government, could be understood as genuine, or then as starting a negotiation "high" and then settling lower. It was pretty popular in Western analysis to assume that Putin was looking for an "off ramp" that allowed ending the war on an acceptable compromise. Especially as the West was taken for granted at the time that the war was going terribly for Russia and therefore Russia could be anyways be pressured into a peace that was "pretty good" for Ukraine; the issue of contention all the way back then was if providing an "off ramp" would be some sort of reward for Putin and if the war was anyways a good thing to harm Russia in the long term.
It could be equally argued that Russia was "starting high" as they never intended to make any peace deal at all and it was all theatre, and therefore always kept terms "just out of reach" of a reasonable compromise, which the West also claimed as presented in the Wikipedia article:
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Wikipedia
But notice now the French Foreign Minister wasn't actually there, and as far as I know no one involved in these negotiations insists on the idea that they were fake.
If we return to the source we seem both content to use as a basis to the discussion, Zelensky is presented as stating:
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Wikipedia
Followed by a description of the negotiation:
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Wikipedia
So, clearly there were terms being discussed that seemed "realistic" even to Zelensky at some point.
If the Russians started with some demands that didn't seem realistic, clearly they were flexible on those points, which is how negotiations often go.
Now, what is interesting is that any retrospective narrative placing the blame on Russia for the failure of good faith peace negotiations to find a reasonable compromise, is completely incompatible with the main Western narrative at the time which was that the Russian invasion was a failure and Putin was looking for an off-ramp. Indeed, we've just spent several pages re-discussing this topic of "incompetence".
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
What's the evidence for this? This is literally the first time I've heard of this.
I can go back and start citing what was being discussed at the time, both here and in the mainstream media, but I have zero memory of anyone stating Russia was insisting on deciding who holds office in Ukraine; what I do remember is pages and pages of discussion about the meaning of "guarantee" since at one point Zelensky was complaining that a peace agreement could not be guaranteed in some sort of absolute sense (which is basically the ontological status of guarantee: a promise that may or may not be fullfilled), and we discussed at length to what extent Ukraine could be confident in a peace deal, confident in Western or Russian "guarantees" about it, as at another point it was argued that Putin "could not be trusted" and that was why Zelensky was reasonable in repudiating any peace agreement (and my point was that a lack of 100% certainty is not a basis in itself to reject a peace deal, but must be weighed against the diplomatic, economic and military leverage of the parties involved that would incentivize them to stick to the deal; maybe we can't "trust Putin" but there's plenty of reasons he'd want to keep peace in Ukraine if it was achieved and keep all the gas flowing, and, in any case one needs to military leverage to actually win a war to justify repudiating negotiations).
Certainly Russia would be aiming to neuter Ukraine defensive capabilities as much as possible in negotiations. The reason to accept that is that you cannot win a war with said defensive capabilities.
What is also true is that Russia is the stronger party to the conflict, so can more easily play "hardball" and insist on more concessions from Ukraine than Ukraine could insist on from Russia. The basis Ukraine could negotiate retaining more, rather than less, of a conventional deterrent would be mostly that continued fighting is costly and risky for Russia, even if it has a large advantage, and also the gas issue.
My main point on these topics is not that "I know" what exactly Russia was offering at one points and to what extent, if any, Ukraine could negotiate down the Russian demands.
My point is that Ukraine's leverage was far higher at the start (both before and immediately following the invasion) than it is now, and so should have been trying to negotiate a settlement based on that leverage. Of course, even if one has the leverage to compel "rational parties" to accept a deal, there's no guarantee that would happen.
The only actual evidence of derailment of the negotiations is the assassination (by Ukraine intelligence) of a representative in the negotiation.
The person that makes public statements that render any further negotiations exceedingly difficult is Zelensky in promising to reconquer all of Ukraine, including Crimea, refusing to negotiate until Russia already leaves Ukraine, refusing to negotiate until Putin is removed from office by the West and similar claims that are embarrassing to walk back to resume peace negotiations with Putin on the basis of, at minimum, Russia keeping Crimea.
The party that removes a large part of Ukraine's leverage to end the war is the party that blew up Nord Stream 2. Maybe this was good for US gas interests, but this was definitely not good for Ukraine and any Ukrainians as it significantly reduces the incentive (and therefore potential concessions) that Russia would be willing to make.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The more the war goes on, the more Russia needs to "show for it".
That Russia annexes the regions after several failed negotiations where Russia was offering not-to-annex-the-regions (it wasn't even a point of discussion that the other 2 regions would be needing independence too, just the 2 Donbas separatist regions).
However, more importantly the Nord stream bombing happened on 26 September 2022, and Russia declared annexation of the territories on 30 September 2022.
In other words, a significant part of Ukraine's leverage in negotiating some form of return of the territories is blown up, and immediately after that Russia annexes those territories.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is pretty normal demand in these sorts of conflicts. A larger state is threatened by another large state using a smaller adjacent state as a proxy, so an acceptable compromise is that the smaller adjacent state accepts neutrality and few means of conventional deterrence.
The logic of such deals is that the larger state can destroy the smaller state, so it's basically play nice of be destroyed. We can debate the morality of such demands in some absolute moral framework, but it is pretty usual political events in the real world and has happened many times before without anyone going around and crying how "unreasonable it is".
Now, to what extent Ukraine could negotiate retaining a neutral but conventional deterrent I don't know. Maybe Russians would have accepted essentially retaining the relative force parity that existed at the time, so that Ukraine would be no worse off in a future war.
However, the logic of "fighting now rather than later" anyways implies some means to win the war now. If there's no means to win the war, then a deal that postpones conflict to later is still better to take. Maybe favourable events transpire during the delay.
As for the second point, it's also pretty normal to downplay a surprise invasion. Not everyone follows the Ukrainian playbook and makes movie trailers advertising the planned offensive.
Of course. And if it brought up, the "peace-party" immediately tells us that Crimea has been part of Russia, only given away as a birthday present inside the Soviet Union. Or then, conveniently, any earlier Russian demands for Crimea are forgotten and the annexation is introduced only as a response to revolution, sorry, US "coup". :roll: :snicker:
First, you completely ignore that obviously Russia's offer before the invasion even took place would require no withdrawal.
Had Ukraine accepted neutrality before the war, the war may not have happened, and Russia may not have seen enough sufficient cause to invade given the main point of contention was resolved.
Did refusing neutrality help Ukraine?
No. Ukraine has no allies that sent soldiers to its aid because Ukraine is already de facto neutral.
As for the Reuters article clearly states the terms "change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognise the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states".
In other words, Donetsk and Lugansk would not be annexed by Russia and there's no mention of the other regions Russia occupied in the demands as Russia would be giving them back in such a deal.
But if this was bad faith, and only a reasonable offer if there wasn't some sneaky "cease fire in place", the correct move for Ukraine would be to make a counter offer that explicitly clarifies those points. Which Ukraine never does.
Ukraine negotiates based on Russian demands, which at some points are "realistic" even according to Zelensky, but then walks away from negotiations (after Boris Johnson flies to Ukraine to convince Zelensky to not make peace).
Ukraine does not make any counter-proposal of their own that is remotely realistic.
Had Ukraine done that, clarified the points you are now equivocating on, and the Russia clearly refused such a peace deal; ok, the Russian offer was in bad faith, Russia intends to continue the war until all its demands are met without compromise, and Ukraine is in the difficult position of needing to either find some way to "win", accepting Russia's demands no matter how painful, or then losing the war and then accepting Russias demands.
You seem to think that if you "don't like terms" that's reason enough to reject them. That is not how war works.
Quoting Echarmion
We do know the Russian demands before the war. The main one was Ukrainian neutrality.
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Of course, we don't have final drafts of such deals because there is no serious negotiation.
Again, just stating whatever fact seems reasonable.
Obviously there were chances to negotiate peace at various times leading up to and during the conflict, starting with the Minsk accords, the main point of contention being NATO, and Ukraine consistently chooses to push for joining NATO rather than entertain accepting neutrality.
The war happens. If Ukraine can't win, and instead loses and significant amount of Ukrainians are killed, Ukraine depopulated through people fleeing the conflict, and the economy destroyed and furthermore far more of the coveted territory is lost in battle, clearly those opportunities for peace were preferable, and trying to join NATO did not help Ukraine one bit (just a provocation based on some foolish principle of "having the right to ask to join a club that doesn't want you" without any benefit whatsoever).
Quoting Echarmion
Which is the first step in any sort of peace plan.
But again, I've asked several times, even if the Russians were only offering a ceasefire as you claim without evidence, what's the point of refusing that offer if you can't win the war?
What does it matter if Russian terms were even worse for Ukraine than what seemed to me, everyone on the forum, and the mainstream Western media, if your interpretation is correct ... but Ukraine loses anyways?
Quoting Echarmion
Because demanding sources of points that you don't honestly disbelieve is just bad faith.
Makes you look purposefully stupid, which is much wore than being actually stupid (the latter not being a moral blemish if you can't help it). So which one is it?
Quoting Echarmion
It does not describe a cease fire in place if it goes onto list conditions such as independence for the Donbas, clearly the ceasefire is a first step of resolving the whole conflict. That is common sense interpretation of the list of demands.
But again, if the demands "actually mean" just a ceasefire in place, why is it better to lose the war at massive cost to Ukraine?
Quoting Echarmion
The key syllables are "national" in "international law". A law created by nation states in their own interest: surprise, surprise, doesn't condone separatism.
However, plenty of existing states exist due to separating from the states they were formerly apart of, so to say separatism is immoral is to claim a significant amount of existing states, including the US, is immoral and should render their territory back to their formal owners.
As you say, separatism is a "thorny" issue.
Quoting Echarmion
That's exactly how it works. "Ukraine" as some sort of "entity", whatever you want to categories it, claims the right to self determination (join NATO, resist Russian invasion) and so on, and furthermore claims the right to remove the right of self determination (freedom of movement) from a large number of its citizens in order to be able to coerce them (including nabbing them off the street) to the front line to defend the national right ... oh and all that without elections anymore as it's common sense that the "freedom side" suspends elections in a war.
That's exactly how it works: imprisonment within Ukrainian territory and forced conscription to be forced into military service (i.e. taking away people's right to self determination for themselves) in the name of self determination for the "glorious nation".
Quoting Echarmion
You criticize me for not providing further citations to prove beyond any possible equivocation you can bring up about a minor point I don't care much about (if Ukraine can't win, then they should basically accept anything that's on offer whatever it is, so ceasefire in place is perfectly reasonable as well compared to losing a war), but on this critical issue for yourself to support your case that Ukraine has just cause (without citation or argument of any kind when you state it the first time ... and the second time) you offer zero citations or evidence or even plausible arguments.
Quoting Echarmion
Separatism is based on extra-legal moral principles, obviously not legal principles of the country you're currently apart of.
You totally can declare yourself separatists and ask your neighbour to invade.
For example, if the United States of America declared itself separatists and then asked the French for help, and lets say the French even send soldiers to help and not just material, would that make the American Revolution illegitimate in your framework?
Likewise, is every separatists movement the CIA supported over the years unequivocally illegitimate because of the mere presence of foreign assistance?
Obviously if you have just case you will seek to convince others that you have just cause and you are a worthwhile cause to assist, being just.
Whether a separatist movement actually is just cause, or any armed conflict, depends on the circumstances.
Certainly the separatists have good arguments, including language and cultural repression and an illegal coup in the capital, so I do not see how it is trivial to state Ukraine shelling the separatists civilians is "insignificant". At minimum you'd need to do a lot of work to prove that the separatists had no "legitimacy". They certainly fight a losing battle against Ukrainian forces until the Russians assist covertly and stabilize the front, but that has nothing to to with popular support within the separatist territory, just pointing out the obvious that they are a smaller force than the rest of Ukraine.
However, we seem to agree that if the separatists have just cause then Ukraine does not have just cause, and Russia has therefore just cause in assisting the separatists.
Quoting Echarmion
Again, zero sources, which immediately following demanding sources for me to 100% clarify the sources I already cited, is extreme bad faith.
If you don't want to bring your own sources to the table, then it's complete idiocy to demand others provide sources (on-top of the sources they've already provided).
Quoting Echarmion
NATO bombed everything that could potentially support a plane, no matter how indirectly, and were perfectly content to see the country descend into total chaos and a breeding ground for exporting jihadism to the region.
But if you are conceding that NATO had just-cause in bombing Libya because civilians "might" get shelled, then certainly it follows Russia has just cause in invading Ukraine due to shelling of civilians in the Donbas ... which if the separatists did not have popular support why would you want to shell civilians that are actually on your side but de facto being held captive by Russian mercenaries?
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, either fight with confidence you can win or lose and capitulate anyways, so best to try to negotiate while you still have forces and leverage. The only exceptions are extreme circumstances which do not exist in the current conflict.
Forcing men into conscription and to the front lines to be killed in a losing battle is both immoral and terrible national policy anyways.
Quoting Echarmion
Again, the offer made before the war obviously required no retreat as the invasion hadn't happened yet.
Now, "everyone" at the time in Western media, and also on this forum, discussed under the assumption that Russia would accept peace (that would include withdrawal) with some for of the three main points they kept repeating were critical to them: recognition of Crimea, Ukrainian neutrality, and some status change in the Donbas, where considered the key elements (Ukraine would need to accept) to arrive at a peace.
Significant ink was dedicated to analyzing this sort of "off ramp" for Putin, and especially the Western media which assumed the war was a "disaster" and going terrible for Russia, and did not even consider the idea Putin would not take an "off-ramp" if provided one. The debate in the Western media mostly focused on the idea of any peace whatsoever being a "win" for Putin or not (or then an unfortunate compromise for the sake of Ukraine).
However, I do not dismiss the possibility that once Russia conquered the land bridge to Crimea it never had any intention of giving it back. I seriously doubt this but it's possible. If you want believe the peace deals that are reported by various parties as getting "close" and Zelensky himself saying terms seemed more realistic, was all either misinterpretation or then Russian bad faith, there's no way to completely prove otherwise.
But again, how is a cease fire in place at the time not preferable to losing the war?
So if all this discussion is just to come to the fact that Ukraine's refusing neutrality before the war, and refusing Russian demands after the war broke out, is only reasonable (certainly at least in hindsight) if Ukraine can ultimately "win" (at least on the glorious nationalistic territorial dimension).
Then sure, the "war isn't over" and we can return to analyzing the military situation, and everything else depends on that.
Literally no one here has said that.
Everyone here in favour of peace (some compromise that ends the war) has had no problem accepting Russia annexed Crimea due to their military base there coming under threat with an illegal change of government in Kiev.
You seem to be mocking your own point of view by pointing to the fact that one person's revolution is another person's coup.
This is a thread of 532 pages, so yes, that was said. And I won't bother to find the direct quote as you continue yourself:
Quoting boethius
:grin:
Rest my case, tovarich @boethius.
And again it's an entirely unsubstantiated claim that russia would have accepted a simple pledge of neutrality. Various Ukrainian governments have expressed their willingness to accept neutrality in principle.
Quoting boethius
This does not follow. Russia had already decided at that point to annex the "independent" republics, there was a rather humourous episode where a Russian official apparently switched their scripts and argued in favour of a request (as of then nonexistent) to join the RF before the republics had even been recognised by Russia.
Nor would the deal in any way obligate Russia to not demand further territory in subsequent peace negotiations. All they offered here was to halt their operations.
Quoting boethius
You yourself quoted the 15 point plan that was the Ukrainian counteroffer.
Quoting boethius
Baseless speculation.
Quoting boethius
Russia has repeatedly restated their goals to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine. Why are you not accepting their own words?
Quoting boethius
You're welcome to your opinions, but they seem far removed from reality to me.
Quoting boethius
Stop lying through your teeth.
Quoting boethius
My main interest is pointing out obvious falsehoods and inconsistencies for the benefit of others. It's quite clear you will not budge one inch whatever I say.
Quoting boethius
The right to self determination doesn't apply to individuals and is generally fulfilled so long as there is some effective form of representation for the people, i.e. the ethnic or cultural group (as a whole) in question
Quoting boethius
Well since we haven't talked about it before, it wasn't necessary. Perhaps you'd just have agreed. But here is the overview of the timeline from Wikipedia . Anything specific you take issue with?
Quoting boethius
I have zero interest in discussing morality with you, so I'll stick to the international law.
Quoting boethius
Sourcing things isn't some kind of weird dick measuring contest. I'm asking you for sources for specific claims, because those claims are false as far as I can see.
What exactly is it you take issue with? I can provide sources for the movements of Igor Girkin if you want.
Which we've both been apart of since essentially the beginning.
The "peace party", as you accurately describe us who have been promoting a negotiated settlement to the conflict and providing both justification for doing so (such as Ukraine having no viable military path to victory) and analysis of potential compromises and why they would be preferable to continued warfare as well as arguing against the "war party" position of using Ukraine as a proxy to harm Russia with little or no concern for Ukrainian welfare, have provided the context that indeed Crimea was part of Russia for a long time and there was certainly strong motivation to want it back.
None of us presented the historical grievance as justification for the annexing Crimea, and I'm sure you know the positions that were elaborated on these various points as you aren't a straight-up denialist of facts and nuance.
Quoting ssu
This is the exact opposite of your case of the "peace party" using historical grievance as justification for the annexation of Crimea.
Rather it is the obvious reality: Russia annexed Crimea to secure their military and navel base there, which was a fairly easy task considering they had a massive military and navel base already there.
Whether it was justified or not, Russia is obviously not going to give it back to Ukraine, although, notably, the Wikipedia article on the peace negotiations mentions:
Quoting Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Which if you're "party" is correct that the invasion was a disaster for Russia and they expected total capitulation and occupation of all of Ukraine in about 3 days, then perhaps Putin really was desperate for some "off ramp" and even willing to return sovereignty of Crimea to Ukraine in exchange for leasing Crimea, which would have resolved the whole "nations don't conquer new territory anymore!! (only the US can go around building bases where it wants!!!)" complaints from the West.
Maybe the offer was genuine, maybe it was some Russian ruse, but my main point on the negotiations is that the start of the war was when Ukraine had maximum leverage and should have pushed for maximum concessions. "Leasing Crimea" to Russia would certainly be the maximum concession Russia would ever make on the issue and the best Ukraine could ever negotiate if military conquest of Crimea is indeed not feasible as it appears to me since then.
But it's interesting to note how the myth of "Russian incompetence" can so easily co-exist with the myth of Russian intransigence and only pretending to negotiate and offering terms that only appeared to people are fairly reasonable (but "actually" there's no evidence for what we believed here and what Western media likewise believed).
I don't think NATO had just cause in bombing Syria, and I think humanitarian interventions in general are highly questionable.
Quoting boethius
This just seems a bizzare and obviously false claim. I can remember no-one making such assumptions.
Quoting boethius
This is a massive distortion, as negotiations hadn't ever reached a ceasefire, and all the talk about getting close and being more realistic obviously is in the context of stopping the fighting, not finding some overarching solution to the entire conflict.
Quoting boethius
We'll know when either side has lost. For now Ukraine holds a good deal more territory than it did at the time.
Quoting boethius
If it was so easy to make peace, why did it happen? Your argument is that either Zelensky is a stupid crazy person or he's being controlled by the west. Well in that case I can just argue Putin is a stupid crazy person and would attack anyways.
If we assume both leaders are reasonable and somewhat informed about the situation the only conclusion is that Russian and Ukrainian interests were fundamentally irreconcilable. And this happens to be exactly what the evidence suggests, from the rhetoric of demilitarise and denazify to the annexation of Ukrainian territories before they're even under russian control.
You don't substantiate any of your claims, just throw it out there that it's "relatively easy" to demonstrate Ukraine has just cause ... but then don't bother to do this easy work.
Worse, you're just inventing straw man positions for what I say.
For the benefit of other's I'll point out your clearly purposeful mistakes in comprehension and re-explain the actual point.
I do not claim that if Ukraine committed to neutrality we know Russia would not have invaded.
My claim is that committing to neutrality would have cost Ukraine nothing. Ukraine does not have any formal allies it is already formally neutral. Notice how no other uniformed troops of any other country entered Ukraine. Declaring neutrality when one does not have allies, is only making de jure an existing de facto state of affairs. Ukraine has "friends" and "partners" which neutrality does not exclude. Receiving arms from third party is does not compromise formal neutrality; neutral countries can still receive arms.
Therefore, declaring neutrality changes nothing and I say may prevent the war because it removes the principle Russian motivation of the war.
Now, if you want to argue Russia would have invaded anyways, that's possible, but Ukraine would have lost nothing form committing to neutrality and would be in a far better position diplomatically. Russia would have a far more difficult time justifying their actions to other nations (China, India, Africa, South America) had Ukraine committed to neutrality, sympathy would be even higher for Ukraine and Russia would look far more belligerent than it currently does.
For, simply because the West is happy to just take it for granted that Russia-bad-Ukraine-good, a position requiring zero of your sought after "substantiation", doesn't mean the rest of the world has equally little concern. Especially the large countries (China and India) have zero sympathy for small countries that make trouble for big countries, so had Ukraine actually declared neutrality then things may have turned out very different diplomatically (either far more pressure on Russia or India actually participating in sanctions).
We can't know, but the main point is it would have cost Ukraine nothing to commit to neutrality and would have had only positive benefits.
The only reason for a country without any formal allies to repudiate neutrality would be to then actually join an alliance to have some deterrence and protection.
Quoting Echarmion
Again, several different parties, including Zelensky himself, described peace talks at various moments as "realistic" in Zelensky's words or close to successful.
Clearly Russia was at least presenting reasonable positions that could form a basis for peace. If you want to argue they were only "pretending to negotiate" as others (who weren't there) have claimed; sure, that's possible.
My main criticism of Zelensky is walking away from peace negotiations entirely, making public ultimatums making public declarations that would be humiliating to walk back, and then committing to further warfare without any realistic military means to achieve military aims.
As I've stated, a cease fire in place is anyways better than continuing to fight a war that you then lose. Retaining your forces is also preserving your leverage in order to negotiate withdrawal, which, again, you is better to accept won't happen then to embark on a losing war.
Quoting Echarmion
Might be speculative to some degree what exactly Boris Johnson said to Zelensky, but it is not baseless that he encourages Zelensky to walk away from negotiations and fully commit to "liberating" all of Ukraine. Several reports by credible journalists describe Boris' purpose as to convince Zelensky to fight and not negotiate. But believe what you want to believe; if you want to believe Boris was there just for fun, or then to convince Zelensky to negotiate peace but, alas, failed, feel free to believe that.
Quoting Echarmion
What lie?
You're accusing me of lying in a statement is a question. My question is:
Quoting boethius
Which is a question. How can a question be a lie?
I'm asking you why would it matter what the Russian terms were if Ukraine goes onto lose the war? Any terms at the time, such as cease fire in place, would be far superior to losing the war.
Now, if you want to argue Ukraine will win the war or then fight to a superior negotiating position than it had at the beginning of the war, we can debate that. However, what prompted all this discussion about the Russian terms is that you explicitly agreed that Ukraine had more leverage at the start of the war than it does now, so should have pushed for a peace deal when it had maximum leverage (which I'd argue was before the war even occurred; but once it did Ukraine still had the most leverage in the first phase than it does since or now).
Which, if you can read, I use the word "if".
If your point is that "if" Ukraine win's that will prove Zelensky a military genius and Glory to Ukraine!
Go ahead, make that clear and we can debate instead Ukraine's military prospects.
Quoting Echarmion
Are you going to substantiate that? The wikipedia article simply describes the talks at that time as being based on 15 points, not some sort of draft treaty presented by Ukraine.
But even so, let's say Ukraine did have a reasonable offer at one point, clearly they repudiate their own offer when the walk away from negotiations and then make a public ultimatum (for example they'd only talk peace on the condition of Russia withdrawing all forces from Ukraine including Crimea) that are clearly not reasonable conditions for peace talks.
Quoting Echarmion
These opinions are common sense.
Clearly there were chances to negotiate peace.
Clearly if Ukraine loses the war then it would have been better to have negotiated peace terms before said losing war, and, indeed, would have been better to just accept any Russian demands, no matter how "unreasonable" compared to losing the war.
If you want to argue Ukraine will win the war and therefore not only continuously declaring their intention to join NATO but putting it in their constitution was the right move, cause they are winners on the battlefield, feel free to argue Ukraine is going to win the war.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
WTF are you talking about?
Obviously the right to self determination also applies to individuals: freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of opinion, freedom to choose career or not a career, and pretty much all the freedoms express the freedom of self-determination of individuals.
Indeed, even when it comes to conscription for war, the Western legal tradition has conscientious objection in the name of self-determination.
Of course, all freedoms are limited by a whole bunch of things, but the "freedom" and "liberty" is another word for self-determination, that individuals can (as far as is practical and respecting of the rights of others) choose their own destiny.
In any case, your theory that self-determination is "generally fulfilled" by group decisions is the exact opposite of the concept of freedom and self-determination in the Western legal tradition. To what extent, if any, it's justifiable to remove an individuals right to self-determination by, for example, forcing them to fight in a war is one more of those "thorny" issues of yours.
I have never come across a theory that presents the idea that removing an individuals right to self-determination is justified because it's anyways "generally fulfilled" by an ethnic or cultural group ... which is not even a legal argument that "the law" can take away your right to self-determination because Zelensky needs you to fight the Russians, but has even more problems than that.
However, please elaborate if you have this ethnocultural self-determination general fulfillment theory worked out.
Quoting Echarmion
Quoting Echarmion
Ok, well the way international law works is that the Russian action are de facto legal if there's no security council resolution that says otherwise; that's how international law is setup.
The security council is the authoritative body that has the power to interpret how international law applies to a given situation, and before and until that happens all legal arguments about the situation are merely legal briefs and opinions and are not legal facts.
What the Russians are doing in Ukraine is perfectly legal under international law until there is a security council resolution that says otherwise.
If you want to argue that's unfair because Russia can veto any security council resolution: Welcome to international law! You should get together with the Palestinians and voice your extra-legal grievances about how the law works.
Perhaps join Zelensky himself in demanding Russia be removed from the security council ... which, you guessed it, would require Russia's approval to be legally possible under international law.
If you don't care about extra-legal arguments, that certainly can make claims to legitimate interpretations of international law (those legal briefs and opinions mentioned above) then there's nothing to say the Russian invasion of Ukraine is illegal as there is no security council resolution that states that, and international law was setup with exactly this in mind.
Quoting Echarmion
You've thrown out all sorts of claims without any sources at all.
In your dick measuring contest analogy your dick literally measures zero inches.
So yes please, please source the Igor Girkin movement to support your claim that there is and never was any popular support for the separatists within the separatists territory.
In my own reading up on Girkin I don't see where it's stated that he conquered the Donbas with a band of Russian mercenaries and no effective popular support at all.
I do, however, see that if what you claim is true, and Girkin is the key to everything, then Ukraine could have easily won this conflict all the way back in 2014:
Quoting Igor Girkin - Wikipedia
So, if what you say is true, then we can safely conclude that Ukrainian military is totally incompetent and had the chance to simply win all the Donbas territory back in 2014 but let the key man, and his band of mercenaries, escape.
Well then we agree there.
And certainly strengthens your position if you also condemn "when NATO does it".
Quoting Echarmion
Really?? Bizarre??
Took me literally five seconds to find:
Quoting Bloomberg, September 22, 2022
This was the conversation in the Western media at the time. Russia was experiencing defeats and therefore could be pressured into a peace favourable to Ukraine ... though of course needing some compromise so that Russia accepts.
The article literally starts with the obvious reason to seek a peace:
Quoting Bloomberg, September 22, 2022
This was the discussion at the time, and given the "Russia’s military incompetence and the courage and skill of Ukraine’s forces" there wasn't much debate about whether Putin would accept a reasonable offramp. The questions of this debate was what offramp would still be adequate punishment for Putin and whether to offer an offramp at all given "the courage and skill of Ukraine’s forces" could simply deliver glorious victory instead of compromise.
Quoting Echarmion
This debatable, considering Russia did not really occupy any major urban centres in the North.
However, if you want to support general Miley's view that after the battles of Kherson and Kharkiv that Ukraine had achieved all that was militarily practical to achieve and should negotiate.
I'd agree with that too.
However, it can be debated whether Ukraine increased or decreased their negotiation leverage with those battles; it depends on the losses. If Ukraine essentially expended their offensive capabilities then easily their negotiation position decreased rather than increased; they did regain territory but made it more difficult to negotiate withdrawals from further territory and other concessions.
But I'd agree this was the last reasonable military actions by Ukraine.
Quoting Echarmion
Zelensky definitely is a stupid crazy person who did not understand that a small force can have temporary success against a larger force, and more importantly it's the potential to inflict damage (even if you will still lose) that is the main leverage of a smaller force, and this leverage is only useful before and not after expending said force.
Except for some opportune manoeuvre victories at the start of a war, further fighting decreases, rather than increases, the leverage of the smaller force while also making the larger force "need more" to show for the military effort: creating a dynamic that locks in continued pointless war of attrition (that the smaller force is nearly guaranteed to lose; a terrible dynamic as the more the larger force needs to justify the war effort, the less concessions will be on the table and the less the smaller force will be able to get to justify their own war effort).
Zelensky is also a stupid crazy person because he does not push NATO into committing better weapons in exchange for repudiating negotiations (which was clearly the deal).
Zelensky does not understand that offensive actions will be impossible (as I explained at length at the time) without armour and air power, two obvious points that Zelensky and his generals have understood far too long into the conflict.
Had Zelensky understood this sooner, he would have seen that NATO was not in fact offering "what it takes" and so either would have pressed for heavy armour in order to commit to reconquer the occupied territories, or then would have made peace with the Russians.
As I discussed in detail at the time, it was likely very possible for Ukraine to at least cut the land-bridge in the first phase of the war if they received more advanced weapons for offensive maneuvers. The "ok, ok, you can have some" sequence of weapons systems was clearly "calibrated" (to use RAND's language) to ensure Ukraine not make any significant gainse that may "provoke" the Russians too much by winning.
But this is contradictory, because the cost is right there - if Ukraine is neutral it has much less protection against any future aggression. That is unless you think that for Russia, "neutrality" would mean simply that Ukraine is not officially in NATO but can otherwise get as much western military support as it wants.
Quoting boethius
And you think that somehow this is an acceptable arrangement for Russia, that Russia would start a war over nothing but a formality?
Quoting boethius
Neither side has definetly ruled out negotiations, and if you criticize Zelensky you'd also have to criticize Russia for reiterating maximalists goals.
Quoting boethius
It matters because a lot of different scenarios can be called a loss, but that doesn't mean they're all the same. If Ukraine eventually looses some territory that's not remotely the same as, for example, Ukraine being split in two and ceasing to exist as a political entity.
Quoting boethius
Neither party presented a draft treaty.
Quoting boethius
Im talking about the right to self-determination as understood in internation al law.
This one. Not an abstract notion of freedom.
Quoting boethius
That's all quite wrong.
The UN-Charta rules out violence in international relations generally, in Art 2 section 3 and 4. The security council has some specific and far reaching powers (theoretically at least), but it is not the authoritative body on how to interpret international law. Nor does it need to declare something an attack in order for it to be one, as among other things Art. 51 of the UN-Charta makes clear. And of course there is an entire body of international law part from the UNC.
Quoting boethius
That is not my claim, nor does your demand make any sense in context.
But anyways here is Igor Girkin telling us about his role in the invasion of Crimea, so Girkin is in Crimea from February 21.
On April 12, the Slovianks Police HQ is taken, apparently by a well organised "independent group". Later interviews from Girkin make clear that he was the leader of that independent group 1, 2, 3.
Two weeks later, Girkin is acclaimed the leader of all separatist forces in Donetsk, and in May declares himself supreme commander of the DPR.
Was there anything more specific you wanted to know?
Quoting boethius
It could. But the russian military started shelling them and send regular army formations across the border to support the "separatists", at which point it became a stalemate as Ukraine wasn't at that point able to push into russian artillery and army formations.
Quoting boethius
That military defeats might force russia to accept a peace more facourable to Ukraine is an entirely different argument from the one that russia always intended to offer such conditions.
Quoting boethius
Right. And this is why it's so useful to discuss with you.
This is not contradictory in anyway.
What is contradictory is to fight a war at a significant disadvantage on some principle to join an alliance that would offer protection from said war.
You seem to just want Ukraine to be in a better position than it is, rather than the reality that Ukraine is in a far weaker position vis-a-vis Russia and no way to remedy that without the war in question (no way to sneak into NATO as NATO doesn't want Ukraine in NATO, but rather NATO, at least the US, wants Ukraine to antagonize Russia and then create a "structure" where Ukraine fights Russia to the last Ukrainian).
Ukraine is a de facto neutral country, with zero allies that comes to its aid when Ukraine is invaded, therefore it is of zero benefit to Ukraine to not offer neutrality in exchange for peace.
If Russia accepted it (of course in the context of peace agreement that addressed plenty of other issues as well) maybe Ukraine would have avoided the war from starting or then ended it in the first phase and avoided significant pain, suffering and lost lives.
If Russia rejects it, or then makes other demands that aren't reasonable (from the point of view of being able to very likely win in a war against Ukraine) ... well you have the same war as you have now!! Just that Russia would be in a far weaker position diplomatically in attacking a country that professes it is willing to be neutral.
Insofar as Ukraine refuses to commit to neutrality, other large countries see that if they don't support Russia then they could be next with a similar kind of conflict; therefore, it's in their interest to help Russia win in order for NATO to be extremely hesitant to try to arrange a similar proxy war.
If Ukraine "bent the knee" and committed to neutrality, it would be far harder for Russia to make the case to its partners that the war is justified.
Quoting Echarmion
Obviously Russia would not accept that.
As Blinken explained in public long before the war, if to do what you say and arm Ukraine to the point of having a credible deterrent to Russia, then Russia will simply match that capacity and if you continue Russia will invade before the situation got out of hand (from their point of view) which is exactly what has happened.
There is simply no way to arm and train Ukraine until it can credibly fight a war with Russia without causing said war with Russia.
You may not like it, you may feel Russia is doing something "illegal" (that we can't do anything about in the system of international law), you may feel Russia would not have valid reason to view Ukraine as a security threat, and certainly that Russia's invasion would be immoral in any case, but what you can know for sure is that a process to arm and train Ukraine to compete militarily with Russia will result in a Russian invasion to put a stop to that process.
Now, with incredible levels of support (financing the entire Ukrainian army, government and subsidizing a large part of the economy) you can keep Ukraine on life-support to fight a long war with Russia. You can, and people have, argued that's good for the West: a nice "structure" of having Ukraine fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. You can argue that's a moral and wise political thing to do; I disagree on both points.
Therefore, the only way for Ukraine to have avoided this war and the only way out of it since it started is through a negotiated settlement and offering concessions such as neutrality.
If you think the situation isn't fair for Ukraine: see Captain Jack Sparrow cited above.
If you think international law isn't working correctly ... well, they're more like guidelines ... than actual rules.
Quoting Echarmion
Yes, this is a huge factor.
Had Ukraine formally declared neutrality, it would be a "diplomatic win" for Russia, certainly still plenty of issues that would need to be resolved, but it would be a huge diplomatic cost to immediately invade a country that just declared neutrality. I would agree if negotiations did not succeed then Russia would invade anyways, but it is a huge disincentive to invade a neutral country. There are plenty of neutral countries that larger countries could easily invade (some have no army at all), it doesn't happen because it would be a massive diplomatic cost, the neutral country presents no threats (no significant military of their own and no alliances or any reason alliances would even happen) so it is easier to do business than invade.
Ukraine could have easily sought a similar path that has worked fine for plenty of other neutral countries.
If you go to wikipedia there is a list of neutral countries:
Quoting Neutral country
So, you can believe such a similar strategy for Ukraine to remain sovereign would not work, but it clearly has worked for other countries and is a viable strategy. Proclaiming neutrality creates a large diplomatic cost to an invading army and also significantly lowers any "national security paranoia" if you are indeed not a threat to anyone, that may otherwise lead to an invasion.
In the case of Ukraine, what is clear is that the attempt to not-be-neutral would with near certainty result in the present war, and the strategy of fighting a war from a weaker position so as to avoid fighting a war in the future makes no sense.
Quoting Echarmion
Sure, I specifically point out that it's not surprising nations create an international law in which only nations have right to self determination.
However, that is not a good argument to support the idea that all separatists movements do not have just cause as they don't have a "right to self determination" under international law. You'd need to argue how that even makes sense considering many of the nations concerned are the result of separatist movements they claim were just. Certainly it's not a some moral universal position.
But if you want a strictly legal view of things: coup of 2014 was illegal, therefore Ukrainian government since is illegitimate. What does the West say about the coup? Illegal but justified as "Ukrainians" wanted it, so is claimed; but even if true, a poll at some random point in time is not a legal process (that's what makes elections different than any poll).
Quoting Echarmion
Go on, please explain how you interpret international law without the security council and how that would mean anything. You're saying Israel left the West Bank decades ago?
Quoting Echarmion
You say it was all this Girkin and Russian mercenaries, and there was no popular support.
Does putting "independent group" in quotes meant to establish this was only Russian mercenaries with zero popular support?
Quoting Echarmion
Well we've resolved which army is hopeless incompetent if they let this chance just slip through their fingers without even trying.
Girrrrkkkkiiiinnn!!!!!!!
Quoting Echarmion
The demands were clearly offered before the invasion, neutrality being the main one and the easiest one to accept (as Ukraine is de facto neutral).
It's entirely possible Russia would have fought anyways to the conclusion of the battle of Kiev or then to the battle of Kharkiv and Kherson or fought anyways until now.
We can't evaluate what exactly Russia would have accepted at any given point to avoid going to war or resolving it once it started. We can evaluate what seems to be the main issues for Russia and what would seem a rational course of action but you can always claim Russia was "pretending" to negotiate.
What we can evaluate is the leverage of the different parties. If Ukraine is losing the war then clearly its leverage was higher in the past and now is much lower and will be lowest if it fights to a collapse of its forces entirely.
We can also evaluate that some concessions Ukraine can make cost nothing. Declaring neutrality costs nothing because Ukraine is already a neutral country with only itself to rely on, and accepting Russia has Crimea and Ukraine can't physically take it back likewise would cost nothing since Ukraine does not have Crimea. With respect to these things Ukraine doesn't have (actual allies, Crimea) we can also evaluate that the diplomatic cost would be incredibly higher for Russia's invasion if Ukraine "gave Russia what it wanted" on these two points, and since Ukraine doesn't have either its position to fight a war is unaffected.
Indeed, maybe Ukraine would have gotten the heavy weapons and air power needed to actually win a conventional war right from the start if Russia violated the "rules based order" even harder by invading a proclaimed neutral country. Certainly sympathy for Ukraine would be far higher if it had neutral status when invaded, rather trying to join a alliance that creates regularly reports, sometimes hundreds of pages long, on how Russia can be damaged in various ways, "extended" for example.
Oh, and definitely History will remember Zelensky as a stupid crazy person if it turns out it was obviously incredibly foolish to promise a total defeat of Russian forces on all previously help Ukrainian territory and he got hundreds of thousands of his comrades killed in this stupid and crazy pursuit.
But sure, maybe Zelensky is a military genius and is about to deliver victory across the entire front, and casualties have been like super low as Zelensky claims.
However, if Zelensky loses, it will also clearly become even stupider and even crazier the act of publicly making these promises as well as ultimatums to even restart negotiations that, as you point out, only make negotiations far harder (which Zelensky, and moreover Ukraine, would certainly need if they are unable to simply win on the battlefield).
Zelensky has zero political or military experience. He was able to pretend things were going well for a time, but it may turn out to be both stupid and crazy to make decisions based on what you're able to pretend is true rather than trying to see what is actually true.
Quoting boethius
So it is not, in fact, the case that neutrality costs Ukraine nothing or that neutrality would be sufficient to satisfy russian interests.
Instead what Russia demands is that Ukraine be not just neutral but (effectively vis a vis Russia) disarmed.
Quoting boethius
So you're well aware that what Russia demands is for Ukraine to submit, yet you blithely go on declaring that this is of no consequence to Ukraine.
Quoting boethius
It can make sense to fight a war now to avoid a situation where you'd have to demilitarise and thus be without any defense in the future. If you have the capacity to resist meaningfully and force concessions, which Ukraine clearly has.
Quoting boethius
I don't, and I'd appreciate it if you didn't lie so much.
Quoting boethius
Who else do you think the fighters were, all upstanding Donbas citizens who just so happened to be on vacation in Crimea?
Quoting boethius
As opposed to you, no doubt.
It should be noted that at the time of annexation of Crimea Ukraine had neutrality clause in its constitution, and the reason given was that the new government might some day allow Western forces to station in Ukraine. Thus the claim that Russia might be satisfied with any 'formal neutrality' is obviously false.
Indeed. Formal neutrality hasn't left Moldova safe from Russia's interventions either.
We could also bring up this quote from September 23, 2023, by Sergei Lavrov:
And then in case someone wanted to argue that Lavrov here means that the only condition is Ukraine's non-block status, he says this:
So Russia accepts Ukrainian sovereignty - provided of course the internal politics of Ukraine are agreeable to Russia.
And this is the official diplomatic version.
And , and others.
You guys have come to a point of really pure insanity.
Ukraine literally put the intention to join NATO in their constitution, basically declared that as their national mission and NATO reciprocated the fantasy by making partnerships of various kinds and explicitly saying Ukraine would join NATO one day (just left the fine print out that "some day", if it ever comes, is long, long, long after the day it would have been useful to Ukraine to be in NATO).
You can read about the above directly on NATO's website:
Quoting NATO's official website
The above is obviously not a commitment to neutrality.
If Ukraine remained technically neutral, it's only because it has no allies.
Russia's demands was a commitment to neutrality, obviously stronger than NATO literally explaining on their own website that Ukraine abandoned non-alignment and passed laws to make NATO membership a strategic foreign policy objective.
You guys are literally rewriting history on the fly.
It's truly incredible.
I don't have time today to deal with the rest of the nonsense, but don't worry your pretty little heads, I'll find time in the coming days.
However, you guys should really contemplate what brings you to needing to believe Ukraine was a neutral country all along a la Costa Rica.
Yes, it is truly incredible that your reading comprehension is so low. But it does explain some of your views.
I have specifically written that AT THE TIME OF ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA Ukraine had a neutrality clause.
Yes. As the quote you made yourself says: "Ukraine pursued a non-alignment policy, which it terminated in response to Russia’s aggression."
Do you understand what 'in response' means? No?
People in a philosophy forum ought to understand cause and effect.
Quoting Jabberwock
:100: :up:
Neutrality clause was implemented when NATO (i.e. Germany and France) have shelved Ukraine's aspirations to indetermined future in place of the scheduled specific enagement. It is astounding that such basic facts from history must still be explained (repeatedly).
Lindtman is the leader of social democrat party after Sanna Marin, which just shows how in unison the political parties are about the situation.
Do something twice, and you lose strategic surprise initiative.
When some years ago Russia did the same kind of maneuver, the Finnish politicians were dumbfounded and didn't know how to reply. Only behind closed doors the authorities understood the hybrid attack. Now it was immediately revealed by the media how the FSB was behind this. EU countries firmly understand this and there isn't anymore the discord that happened with the refugee crisis in 2016. The response is world away from what it was back then.
That discord and uncertainty is now in how to deal with the situation in the Middle East, not with Russia.
This is the point in question:
Quoting Jabberwock
Disputing my point that Ukraine is obviously not "neutral", but rather Aha!! Ukraine had a "neutrality clause in its constitution"!! and has been neutral the whole time, the Russians have been just delirious as to the political position of Ukraine and invaded a neutral country! OMG hold the presses!!!
A point you then assent to by stating:
Quoting ssu
"Indeed" being an approbation of the referenced points n this context.
Not only is Ukraine not neutral, but I provide further clarification of what neutral means (that anyone of good faith willing to accuse others of lacking "reading comprehension" can easily go read and educate themselves on what "neutrality" obviously means in international relations) with the Wikipedia article that is literally called "neutral country" and I even list the "neutral countries" according to this definition I am Using, but if you were still confused why "Ukraine" doesn't appear on that list, you could easily go to the article and use the power of "reading comprehension" to read it and see that is literally starts with a definition of neutral "country":
To which, if you can apply that reading comprehension you covet so much, the definition of "neutral country" on the Wikipedia page literally tilted "neutral country" explicitly clarifies neutrality to be a "permanent" commitment and explicitly lists NATO as an alliance a neutral country would be committing to avoid joining.
Obviously if you declare your intention to join a military alliance and that military alliance not only creates all sorts of military partnerships and support but also reciprocates and publicly declares they'll let you in oh ... some day, that is not neutral.
If "neutrality" language is left in law or the constitution it is clearly irrelevant.
To support my point that Ukraine is obviously not neutral I cite NATO's own webpage.
You then manage to obliviate yourself about what we're even talking about, what the point of contention is, what you previously cheered on as brilliant argumentation, and you then manage to respond that essentially: of course Ukraine isn't Neutral, Russia is annexed Crimea dumb dumb!!!
Let's "read" it again shall we:
Quoting ssu
You literally go in 2 comments from approving of the idea Ukraine is neutral, and has been neutral this whole time, to just repeating my claim:
Quoting boethius
What do you even perceive yourself to be doing?
Even putting aside your just ignoring the previous discussion, Do (or did) you genuinely believe that I'm claiming Ukraine "abandoned non-alignment" for fun? Or because Zimbabwe might invade at any moment?
Obviously Ukraine wants to be in NATO for protection and deterrence towards Russia.
The problem, as you may have noticed, is that Ukraine isn't in NATO and the process of trying to get into NATO for protection from a war may (and obviously will in this case) cause exactly the war you are trying to avoid.
Joining NATO is at best a gambit with some odds of success, a gambit that has clearly failed (just odds are basically zero, so it's not a gambit but rather defiantly asking to be invaded which is what has happened).
If you want to argue that gambit was a good one, just so happens caused the war it was meant to prevent, go ahead.
If you want to argue that countries should pursue "what they want" in the name of "rights and freedom" even if it will very likely cause the mass trauma, depopulation, economic destruction, and hundreds of thousands of KIA and permanently wounded: feel free to explain this subtle political art that justifies such a course of action.
The only way out of the war for Ukraine before the war and since the war started and now, was and is diplomacy.
Putting in your constitution your goal is to join NATO is simply taunting Russia to invade for no benefit: as probability of NATO letting Ukraine in before the war is exactly the closest value you can get to zero and still be able to perform statistical calculations of some kind in a world ruled by quantum mechanics.
The simple fact is that when Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine was neutral, as its constitution stipulated. True, it has been previously vaguely promised NATO membership, but at the same time it was excluded from the membership action plan, which was the necessary condition for accession. It was supposed to be 'reviewed' in December 2008, but it never was. That (and the declining support in Ukraine, due to the politicization of the issue) led to the change of the policy from 'seeking membership in NATO' to 'declaring neutrality'. That is why your own quote says 'From 2010 to 2014, Ukraine pursued a non-alignment policy'. The policy was later TERMINATED, due Russian invasion, which means it has ended. The same thing happened to Sweden: it was a neutral country for a long time but then it decided to join NATO, as the Wikipedia article states. It does not mean that because Sweden has done that, then it has never been neutral, because it was not 'permanent'. That is why Sweden and Ukraine are on the 'List of formerly neutral countries' in the very same Wiki article.
You claim that I 'rewrite history' and then proceed to quote two sources that confirm exactly what I wrote. Are you surprised that I question your reading comprehension?
That's actually the context for the current conflict. Stalin, worried about Ukrainian nationalism, which had been a potent force during the Russian Civil War (e.g Nestor Makhno) put into place policies that amounted to the "enforced starvation of the Ukrainian population." This was paired with arrests and executions of Ukrainian cultural and political leaders and the destruction of cultural artifacts. Stalin's policies killed 3.5-5 million Ukrainians from 1932-1933, around 1 in every 10 people.
While Ukraine was being drastically and intentionally depopulated of Ukrainians (and Jews), Stalin began settling Russians and some other minorities in the land, particularly out East. These populations were provided with food, with the net result being that Ukraine went from about 9% Russian to 1/5th. (A large wave of mass deportations after WWII also helped achieve this). This was not unique to the Soviets. The Russian Empire had long used forced resettlement to secure territory, and you can see such tactics in use as far back as Babylon and Assyria.
And indeed, the current war has largely been justified for internal Russian audiences in terms of the need for Russia to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine from oppression and assault.
To a much lesser extent, Russia has done similar things in this war, moving people into occupied territories and sending children with living Ukrainian parents to adoption programs so that they can be "raised as Russians." But such things, while certainly reprehensible, are on an absolutely tiny scale compared to the Soviet atrocities.
So, that is sort of the background, particularly for the conflict over the Donbass. But it would be a mistake to frame it as purely an ethnic conflict, because, as a whole, ethnic Russians with Ukrainian citizenship have also opposed Russia's invasion of their country. Thankfully, this old history doesn't have the same salience as it does in Israel. There isn't any popular movement to remove the Russians from these areas (Kremlin propagandists would disagree of course.)
Of course, being an English language forum, we hear more about "NATO expansion/aggression" as the cause of the invasion, not "the genocide in the Donbas." It seems to me that English-language efforts to justify the war have completely given up on selling that narrative.
First, you explain yourself that Ukraine and NATO are holding talks, going towards NATO membership:
NATOQuoting Jabberwock
Which does not satisfy the criteria of a neutral country.
Your argument that Ukraine was neutral in 2014 is basically explaining that it wasn't neutral but was "vaguely promised" to join NATO and then some bureaucratic hangups: tada! neutrality!!
Now, the point of "termination" of non-alignment is simply to establish that obviously Ukraine is not neutral in 2022.
We were discussing what Zelensky could do to avoid the invasion in 2022.
Obviously Ukraine has no commitment to neutrality in 2022 whatsoever, literally has joining NATO in its constitution, and my point is committing to neutrality may have avoided the war.
More importantly, as Ukraine had and has no allies, committing to neutrality costs Ukraine nothing.
But let me get this straight, your counter argument is that the war was guaranteed and committing to neutrality would have changed nothing (in 2022, or anytime before) ... because Russia annexed Crimea after an illegal coup by CIA backed forces?
My argument is that declaring neutrality would make the Russian invasion far more costly diplomatically.
The reason the annexation of Crimea (as you note, there's no fighting or invasion as Russian forces are already there) was not difficult diplomatically is because Russia has a giant military base there so partners such as China and India understood the reasons for it.
I.e. neutrality would have real leverage in the real world and significantly increase the diplomatic cost to Russia of an invasion while removing the critical justification (even to the domestic audience) for it.
While hanging on to "we might join NATO someday" is literally zero leverage because NATO isn't going to let Ukraine join anyways.
However, are you really arguing that an illegal coup backed by the CIA is non-alignment, as well as the relationship between Ukraine and NATO prior to 2014 would satisfy the definition of a neutral country as per Wikipedia? (i.e. that Ukraine in 2014 was neutral just like Ireland and Costa-Rica and non-neutrality of Ukraine is just in Russia's head?).
We can discuss this if you want.
What the records actually shows is that insofar as Ukraine had leaders willing to navigate the situation Ukraine is actually in with some common sense, Russia did not invade as the cost of an invasion was far higher than moving forward diplomatically.
You get rid of the compromiser (who was elected legally) and replace the legal president with Nuland's "our man" and obviously Ukraine is no longer neutral in any way (not even some "formal" way) nor striving for neutrality (being taken over by people, that at least the CIA implies, work for the CIA) and you get the annexation of Crimea and the civil war in the Donbas.
As anyone would expect is extremely likely to happen, just as this much larger war is extremely likely to happen if Ukraine continues on it's delusional path towards NATO.
NATO in 2008:
Quoting NATO's own website, 03 Apr. 2008
Then, to avoid being invaded right away, as NATO notes:
Quoting NATO's own website
There's then a coup in 2014, and Russia annexes Ukraine and separatists in Donbas try to separate following this coup.
One party here, the "war party" as implied by @ssu, would have us believe that Ukraine's status as a neutral country is totally clear 2010-2014.
The reality is that this issue of neutrality or then trying to join NATO or then wanting better ties with Russia (for example to avoid being invaded and destroyed), is extremely controversial in Ukrainian society. There are large groups of people on each side of this policy issue.
Russia does not annex any territory nor invade the time this discussion within Ukraine takes place.
Ukrainians legally elect someone who is a compromiser with Russia, perhaps because a majority of the Ukrainian people understood at the time, as they have been made to understand all too clearly since, that antagonizing Russia by trying to join NATO does not benefit Ukraine and will cause exactly the war that the point of joining NATO would be to avoid.
The "will of the people" on this point is completely irrelevant to the "pro-democracy" NATO proponents: when the coup is "pro-West" then the will of the people is whatever the West says it is; elections certainly don't matter ... and yet the very same people will accuse Trump rioters in Washington of sedition?!?!?
Now, once the side that is literally backed by the CIA and the US is literally choosing who will lead Ukraine, then Russia annexes Crimea.
And people here would have us believe that the annexation of Crimea has nothing to do with the illegal replacement of the Ukrainian government by the CIA, that it was basking in it's "non-aligned status", happy as a clam, coup's having nothing to do with it and the annexation of Crimea was totally unexpected and everyone was all just Pikachu faced about it.
What the evidence actually supports is that Russia waits for a significant period of time for Ukraine to resolve its status as a neutral country or not.
Because someone else's doing something wrong doesn't make it right? When did the behavior of Israel become the gold standard of what is moral?
And yes, you are simply rewriting history.
What is the actual context:
Quoting Ukraine–NATO relations - Wikipedia
Which, as you may again note if have that reading comprehension you covet, is not neutrality, but a compromise position of keeping the status quo. Which, as you note, the status quo did not cause Russia to invade, or even make serious threats such as amassing troops on the border.
The status quo changes when the legally elected president who represents the above compromise position is illegally removed in a coup, by anti-Russian forces explicitly backed by Nuland and the CIA.
A bunch has circulated online about this interview making the points that all Russia wanted was neutrality and Boris Johnson was the reason to reject Russia's offer, but above are the points in context (which isn't quite as simply as Russia offered neutrality and Boris Johnson ordered Zelensky to reject it; although that is one reasonable interpretation).
A few points relevant to our current discussion seem to be clarified about the negotiations by someone who was actually there.
So not only did we know a lot about these negotiations and the Russia offer before, now we know even more!!
Russia's only important interest was neutrality (according to the chief negotiator for Ukraine talking to a Ukrainians journalist), all the other points were "cosmetic, political seasoning" in his words.
He then explains the reasons for rejecting the Russian offer was security guarantees (something we've discussed at length).
Russia was not "pretending to negotiate" but really, really, really wanted a deal.
Boris Johnson did not arrive in Kiev simply for tea or to exchange masterbation tips with Zelensky, but encouraged Ukraine to repudiate negotiations and to fight instead.
I.e. exactly what I have been describing about the negotiations is exactly what happened according to someone who was there.
Now, of course, as I've already analyzed, it is completely possible that the Russian offer was in bad faith and they'd invade again later.
The problem with this reason for repudiating negotiations is that to "fight now rather than later" still required confidence that you can win now, which I would argue had no rational basis.
Especially at that time, the West was only supplying Ukraine with "defensive weapons", at the very least Zelensky should have demanded heavy weapons and air power to accept Boris' proposal of continuing the war.
Boris would have explained they won't get heavy weapons and air power (not anytime soon anyways, not until their current military is absolutely wrecked and advanced weapon systems would only for the purposes of propping up Ukraine a little longer) and then Zelensky would have been able to deduce that the Western offer was a poison pill.
As for taking Russia's offer, certainly there are no guarantees, but if you cannot win now then time is on your side and you should play for time in hopes that "events" transpire in your favour or then to find further diplomatic solutions.
And again, had Ukraine accepted neutrality, the diplomatic cost for Russia to invade Ukraine [i]again[/I] would be insanely high. Keeping India, Africa and even China happy to keep trading with Russia would be far harder.
Of course, had the West been discussing also with Russia (as the West does currently with Hamas) then additional guarantees from the West to Ukraine could also have made a peace agreement better for Ukraine.
The West does not hold talks because the West did not want peace and did not want to be in a position to be explicitly refusing any Russian proposals that would make the policy of having the Ukrainians fight the Russians, no peace, perfectly clear.
The West is immediately in talks with Hamas, doesn't remotely have the same policy of "it's between Israel and Hamas" because Western policy is peace in the middle-east is perhaps desirable and this will require negotiations. Of course, the US does not put much pressure on Israel at the moment, but it could become politically costly to support "too much" war crimes and ethnic cleansing and so its important to have peace as an option, and that requires talking to both sides.
Notice how no one criticizes the West for "talking with Hamas".
Quoting France 24
CIA cells, multiple contacts between President Joe Biden, did not, and are not, trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine-Russian conflict, no matter how "excruciating" ... why?
Because the West does not care about Ukraine or Ukrainian lives, and won't do anything whatsoever to contribute to a peace and if it seems like it could happen anyways, actively discourages it by sending Boris Johnson and his sophisticated Oxford debate skills to put an end to such nonsense.
Yet the obvious answer here is: using force to annex territories is against international law in both cases!
It's the US that has a moral dilemma here, other countries are pretty consistent on this. Maps still used here in my country do separate the West Bank and Gaza from Israel as they don't draw Crimea belonging into Russia. I think only one country gives that unwavering support for any action Israel makes.
More proper would be to say "was extremely controversial" and "there were large groups".
But of course, that the attacked unified Ukraine naturally is accepted by some here.
No, not 'some bureaucratic hangups', but a distinct change in the policy, which Yanukovych clearly stated in your own quote, and adopting the law that precluded Ukraine's membership of any military bloc, but allowed for co-operation with alliances such as NATO. That is exactly what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country, i.e. the Wikipedia article which clearly states that in 2014 Ukraine was neutral. That your own quoted source discredits your view is not exactly my problem, is it?
Quoting boethius
But that was not what my quote referred to. You have simply misunderstood it from the beginning. That happens, what is ridiculous that you try to double down on your claims with quotes that clearly support what I wrote (now you have added the third one).
Quoting boethius
No, the war was not guaranteed, but indeed the declaration of neutrality would have changed nothing, given that Russia has no problems with attacking a neutral country (as defined by your own sources), which it did in 2014.
Quoting boethius
But that is obviously false, given that Russia has invaded the neutral Ukraine in 2014. If your argument is 'Russian invasions on neutral countries are costly diplomatically, unless Russia has a base there', then I will mercifully refrain from commenting that. Not to mention that it completely overlooks Russia's involvement in Donbas.
We have every reason to believe that Ukraine's neutrality in 2022 would matter as much as its neutrality in 2014, i.e. very little.
Quoting boethius
Yes, and at this time Ukraine is neutral. And 'separatists' are mostly Russians imported by Girkin, as we know.
Quoting boethius
Well, actually elections do matter: it was the elected members of the parliament who removed Yanukovych from his office by 328-0. If you have any evidence that all 328 legally elected parliamentarians were actually from CIA, please present it. And further elections also did matter, given that Putin himself said that he respects the will of the people, when they have elected Poroshenko (the house speaker, Turchynov, has been the interim president according to Ukraine's constitution).
Over a million Ukrainians take refuge from the war in Russia, so even if we ignore political parties and independent journalism and Ukraine becoming a police state with no elections, there are still large groups that want more ties with Russia, enough to move there.
But if you want to believe that all the refugees that fled to Russia are anti-Russian and Ukrainian society has zero dissenting voices to Zelensky's policy, feel free to believe that.
The point, which I assume you agree with, is that in 2008-2014 it is not clear which way Ukraine is going, more towards NATO or more towards neutrality. Ukraine elects a leaders in 2010 that essentially commits to the status quo, which had not caused any hostilities and maintains the status quo without there being any hostilities, until a CIA backed coup changes the status quo, then hostilities begin.
So, we can deduce that Ukraine's being simply "vaguely" committed to NATO "maybe some day" and maintaining the existing relationship with NATO as-is was sufficient to prevent Russia from invading, but a change of the status quo to get rid of the status quo guy, and you get hostilities beginning in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea.
As I've thought about it, this happens actually mainly for purely domestic political reasons. To put it bluntly, it isn't the 7 million Jewish Americans, it's the 70 million Christian Evangelists for whom Israel is the Holy Land and who want that support to be so staunch.
Someone whom I'm argued against in his views about the war in Ukraine is John Mearsheimer. Yet he does have a point in the case of the US-Israel relation: the "Israeli lobby" is no conspiracy, it is one of those very effective pressure groups that is typical for American politics itself (think for NRA and the gun lobby).
Mearsheimer in this case looks at domestic politics (of the US), which he should do also in the case of Russia too, but he sticks to his theories and doesn't do this.
Again, "what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country"?
Quoting Neutral Country - Wikipedia
"Co-operation" with alliances such as NATO does not fit the definition of neutrality according to the above definition. Co-operation could exist between NATO and a neutral country if it was for some clearly humanitarian purposes, but no one would claim that "cooperating" with a military alliance is a country that "holds itself as permanently neutral".
The status is not neutral but instead ambiguous (which is not neutrality).
Quoting Ukraine–NATO relations
Nevertheless, this ambiguity of intentions, playing footsie with NATO, is sufficient to avoid a Russian annexation of Crimea.
However, you get rid of the person that made this ambiguous "maybe NATO, maybe not, neutral but cooperating with NATO" policy in a coup and it's reasonable to assume that the policy is likewise gone.
You're basically arguing: Ukraine was neutral because Yanukovych made it neutral!
Ukraine was not neutral, but the status was at best ambiguous: declaring simultaneously non-alignment ... but not excluding cooperation with NATO, which is basically a contradiction: "We're not choosing sides, but we're allowed to choose this particular side" is not a constitutional declaration of neutrality.
The actual reality, as I've described, is that Ukrainian society is divided on which way to go, so elects a compromise candidate. Once there is a CIA backed coup, it is clear pretty clear which way things are going.
So Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk of a completely belligerent Ukraine.
The issue of neutrality remains unresolved.
From 2014 to 2022, Russia tries to resolve the issue of neutrality diplomatically.
Since there is an active border dispute, Ukraine is exceedingly unlikely to join NATO during this time, so there is time to see if there's a diplomatic resolution but the war in the Donbas can't be sustained forever either.
What immediately precipitates the full scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia is Ukraine amassing troops of their own to finish off the separatists.
These are the actual series of events, if you want to live in reality.
The argument that Russia would not be satisfied with neutrality since 2008 is an extremely weak one. Even a vague neutrality does not cause any Russian annexations, much less a full scale invasion.
Since Ukraine has no allies, and has essentially zero chance of getting any allies before the war in question (when allies would be useful to have), committing to neutrality is of low cost to Ukraine but would have significantly increased the diplomatic cost to Russia; perhaps enough to deter annexation and later invasion, perhaps not, but there is no point in fighting a losing war anyways in these circumstances. Sending hundreds of thousands of people to die "on principle" of what sovereign countries should be able to do, is not a moral nor politically astute position.
I don't think the US shows the Occupied Territories as part of Israel on any official maps either. The US generally refers to them as "Occupied Territories." This is why Trump moving the embassy to Jerusalem was a big deal; it was a tacit, if not open acknowledgement of Israel's possession of the land.
Way back in 1995, Congress passed an act urging that the embassy be moved there, but presidents of both parties demurred, seeing it as needlessly provocative.
US policy towards Israel hasn't always been a "blank check," e.g. forcing them out of the Suez. Rather, it seems to have evolved more towards one due to electoral pressured within the US and ill conceived GWOT policy.
Anyhow, I think the comparison to Ukraine is useful at showing just how counter productive Israel's apartheid policies have been. In Ukraine, no one outside of a very small fringe want to expell the 17% or so of the population that are ethnic Russians, a good deal of whom were settled there by force as recently as the 1930-1960 period. The groups get along and have a shared identity, despite the horrors of the 1930s.
Yet in the case of Israel, its almost impossible to imagine an empowered PA state deciding that Israeli settlers were "a part of our community." Point being, peoples can overcome historical bad blood, but not if they live in largely separate ecosystem. It's a core example of Israeli apartheid undermining their own security.
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
So, taking all these together: What Zelensky needs to do in 2022 is to somehow re-establish the status quo before 2014. And doing so would cost Ukraine nothing, because Ukraine has no allies and is practically neutral, while being obviously not neutral and heavily tied to NATO.
I'm going to call this a straight up lie until I see evidence.
The strategic situation in the Donbas had not significantly changed just before the 2022 invasion.
That's what we are discussing, Zelensky's options in 2022.
My claim is that committing to Neutrality is low cost to Zelensky (and the other leaders needed to make such a change) in 2022 (or before), is low cost because Ukraine has no allies anyways and is not getting into NATO, but high diplomatic cost to Russia.
You then claim that there's no reason to assume neutrality would be sufficient for the Russians because the appearance of "non-alignment" in the 2010 constitutions changes means Ukraine is neutral, and that didn't prevent the annexation of Crimea.
Now, Ukraine is anyways neutral since as well, de facto neutral as it has no allies.
However, neither in 2014, especially during the coup, nor in 2022 is Ukraine making any sort of strong commitment to neutrality.
What we can see is that when there is even vague commitment to neutrality ("non-alignment" appearing in the constitution but paradoxically allowing cooperation with NATO, leaving entirely vague what that could involve), Russia does not invade.
When there is serious ambiguity (serious risk) of what the policy even is, such as in a chaotic coup, Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk to its military base there.
The policy then returns to being ambiguous, with 2 Minsk negotiation processes. During these negotiation Russia does not invade.
Then it is only in 2019 that:
Quoting Ukraine-NATO relations
It is after this that military and political tensions start to significantly rise leading to the Russian invasion in 2022, during which time Russia repeatedly demands from Ukraine that it declare itself neutral as well as demand NATO commit to not expand further eastward (it would not matter if Ukraine was constitutionally committed to join NATO if NATO officially repudiated further expansion).
Now, if somehow there was some plan to invade Ukraine come-what-may, then Ukraine simply plays into that plan by providing every possible justification (including tolerating literal Nazi battalions going around and doing their thing with NATO provided weapons) Putin would need to sell the war to both partners abroad and the domestic public.
Speaking of Girkin, apparently he is running against Putin as a presidential candidate? But last I saw he was arrested and disappeared, and the last picture we have he looked pretty beat up. Then his lawyer got arrested.
Makes me wonder if he is being coopted as a sort of "controlled opposition," or simply has a death wish.
Back when it seemed like Kadyrov was going to die (after allegedly burying his still disappeared friend and doctor "for poisoning him,"), Strelkov disappeared, and Prigozhin was killed — all in the same few weeks — I began to get serious Game of Thrones vibes from Russian politics. This was back when Shoigu had barely been seen since the coup too. Things seem more stable now.
I think he knows he's a dead man anyways, as Putin will not tolerate any challenger, especially not from the nationalist camp. Might as well drive up the political costs for Putin by declaring himself a candidate. Girkin seems to be a gambler - not an unusual disposition given his background. Had the situation in Ukraine deteriorated sharply for Russia, the kind of attack from the nationalistic right he was making might well have succeeded.
Exactly, Ukraine has and is attempting to become not-neutral and its problem is that it has and remains neutral.
Ukraine has no countries that send soldiers to its aid when it is invaded and mutually declare war on the invading country, and Ukraine has likewise no obligation to come to the aid of anyone or declare war just because someone else is invaded. The de facto status of a neutral country.
Of course, it would be nice for Ukraine if Ukraine was magically inside NATO anytime since 1991.
The problem is that Russia views NATO in Ukraine as a serious security threat and will act to stop that from happening.
Russia will obviously invade Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.
We can discuss the morality of this imperialistic position, but moral arguments would not change this reality.
Ukraine declaring it is going to join NATO, and NATO reciprocating by saying Ukraine is going to join NATO and cooperations and partnerships of various kinds and having NATO training and "advisors", are things that will clearly provoke Russia into invading Ukraine.
It's also a terrible strategy to actually join NATO, but if you (and more importantly NATO who has more experience) wanted to join NATO, you'd want to advance that as much as possible in secret. Then, as happened with Finland, you'd want some countries to commit to bilateral mutual defence during the final ascension process to get all the t's crossed and i'd dotted.
Of course, NATO has had zero intention to let Ukraine in, as it could trigger WWIII which no one wants.
The 2008 declaration was likely to test the WWIII waters to see how Russia would react (of course if Russia just lets it happen, then why not).
Zelensky even asks before the 2022 invasion point blank to the NATO commander, a clear time line for when they'll get into NATO (as pressure is building from Russia), and the answer was there is no time line but "the door will remain open", which was perhaps meant as a clear signal that it would be better to go negotiate a peace with Russia (just because the CIA wants to provoke Russia into a war, doesn't mean military commanders do).
The point is, yes, trying to establish the 2010-2014 status quo, or even the pre-2019 status quo where joining NATO wasn't explicitly a constitutional goal.
Of course, by 2022 there is a significant "extreme nationalist" (some Nazi's, some just super nationalists) contingent in Ukraine that rather war with Russia than peace or any sort of compromise. The Russian language repression being one other clear provocative example of the power of the nationalists.
The constitutional changes to make NATO an explicit foreign policy goal was precisely to make peace nearly impossible and prevent any president, such as Zelensky, from being able to negotiate with the Russians.
So, when I say what are Zelensky's best options, I do not mean they were easy to achieve.
Likely, only pressure from the West would have allowed Zelensky to force through a deal with the Russians. Since people would know Boris Johnson came to commit billions and billions in weapons and hard currency support, likely this made Zelensky's position extremely difficult even if he personally wanted the peace deal.
Why I say his main mistake is having no experience and not understanding that if Boris is pressuring him to continue the war he should negotiate conditions that would actually make the war winnable. Then with a clear refusal to commit the necessary weapons, then maybe Zelensky would have the leverage with enough of the nationalists right to negotiate some sort of peace. Some people, no matter how nationalistic, would see the logic of not losing a war.
This is true. And of course one thing no other administration had yet done.
Comes to mind the irony when the US got Morocco to normalize relations with Israel as it accepted that Western Sahara is part of Morocco.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is quite true and I've said it myself, actually. The real divider was the six-day war. This was the glorious achievement that Israel gave the US when then Soviet backed Egypt and Syria (and Pan-Arabism) was defeated. Before Israel's closest ally was France.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And it should be noted that the invasion in 2022 actually united Ukrainians quite well. I don't think that there's anymore a language issue (something similar happened in Finland during the Winter War).
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I've all the time said that there isn't a peaceful solution for the Israel-Palestinian question. That's the tragedy here.
Or then there is the way like the militaristic Europeans came to be pacifists and have this integration effort even to this day: have such violence as you had in WW1 and WW2 and then it's enough of bloodshed.
Exactly. Although, I've heard pessimists chalk this up to all the ethnic cleansing in that period, which effectively homogenized many areas. I think it's something like 15 million Germans who were expelled from Eastern Europe, with a further 500,000 to 2.5 million civilians being killed (1940-1948).
I prefer to be an optimist. That we don't hear about some great German project to reclaim all this land to the east, parts of which they had held for centuries, says something about peoples ability to move on given the right context.
The Ukraine war, like the Winter War and Soviet-Polish War before it, seems like the opposite phenomenon. A self destructive inability to move on. Putin's own words on the subject certainly seem to look backwards more than forwards.
Quoting Neutral Country - Wikipedia
The authors of the very article you quote describe Ukraine as neutral till 2014.
Quoting boethius
That depends on what the cooperation involves. Sweden has long coooperated with NATO and it is listed as formerly neutral country, Moldova cooperates with NATO and it is listed as neutral... So it is obviously false that 'no one would claim' that: the authors of the very article you quote do so. Either the authors of the definition you quote do not understand their own definition or you misunderstand it or interpret it incorrectly. Not to mention that even Russia has cooperated with NATO all these years (it held joint military exercises in 2011, for example).
Quoting boethius
It is only because you believe 'cooperation' means 'non-neutrality', which is obviously wrong, as the authors of the very article you quote show repeatedly.
Quoting boethius
No, there was no declaration that Ukraine would abandon its military neutrality after the legally elected parliament has removed Yanukovych. There was little popular support for that, as the focus was on establishing the cooperation with the EU. As you wrote yourself, the society was divided over the issue, so your current claim of 'completely belligerent Ukraine' is simply false. 'Hedging the risk' means simply attacking the then-neutral Ukraine just to prevent a possible change of policy.
Quoting boethius
Well, it is you who needs to support the argument that Russia this time for a change would be satisfied with neutrality, after it has once attacked a neutral country. So far you have given no such evidence. Given that Putin himself has given many different reasons both for invasion and for the escalation, I do not see how you could succeed.
Except the two times when Russia did actually invade Ukraine, nothing concerning NATO had recently happened.
So clearly just not joining NATO isn't actually protection against a russian invasion either.
Quoting boethius
So Russia gets to cuts off choice parts of Ukraine, and when this happens the best thing Ukraine can do is shrug and act like nothing happened?
Quoting boethius
That did not happen in 2022 and had in fact long since been rescinded.
A coup getting rid of the person who implemented the "non-alignment" (except cooperation with NATO ) policy is an obvious change the policy. If a political force topples the president due to his "pro Russian policies" it's pretty clear there's a change in both government and thus policies.
Russia act vis-a-vis the risk, the risk that Ukraine is taking a big and, to the Russians, unacceptable step towards NATO is exceeds what they are willing to tolerate, so they mitigate that risk by annexing Crimea and supporting (perhaps causing if the "Girkin is the key" theory is true) the separatists in the Donbas (so there is additional on-going fighting which makes Ukraine joining NATO exceedingly unlikely before it is resolved).
If you want to ague: NO! Ukraine would have remained neutral! Nuland had zero intention to bring Ukraine closer to NATO nor serious cooperation with anyone in Ukraine! She was just riffing bro!! Russia over reacted!!
Ok, I guess you can make that counter-factual argument. But, even so, Russia is reacting to their perception of Nuland's phone calls, other intelligence, and the violent and chaotic nature of the coup.
Then the status is changed in a major way again in 2019, literally putting the aspiration to join NATO in the constitution, and a full scale invasion happens in 2022.
My argument would be that maybe it takes 3 years to prepare a major invasion especially as the pandemic starts in 2019 and is only more-or-less resolved (enough for people to stop caring much about it) in late 2021 (when winter wave fails to be so impressive).
So, unless starting a full scale invasion in the middle of a pandemic is a good idea, it's possible that delayed Russias plans or then 3 years was anyways the minimum to prepare a full scale invasion.
An additional factor is Zelensky is elected in 2019 promising to make peace with Russia, so seeing what Zelensky does, if peace is feasible, is additional reason to wait.
Another big factor is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This is the other major point of contention along with Ukrainian neutrality. They are also closely connected, as refusing to open Nord Stream 2 would be a strong signal of Europe taking an aggressive posture towards Russia. If the pipeline was opened and business continued as normal with Europe, especially against US protest, that would have been a strong signal that at least Europe does not want any hostilities with Russia ... and there's also the money to consider.
If Nord Stream was opened, the situation in the Donbas remained unsustainable in the long term, but it seems to me extremely likely Russia would not have invaded in 2022, since it was pretty clear (certainly that's what the Western media understood) that Russia was amassing troops as pressure to open the pipeline, and refusing to open the pipeline significantly angered Putin and the Kremlin and invading Ukraine was one outlet for that anger.
So there are other factors, but I would argue that military action in Ukraine was inevitable as long as Ukraine has joining NATO literally in their constitution and a conflict in the Donbas, and 3 years is reasonable time frame to prepare an operation as big as the invasion of 2022. In the meantime there's the pandemic as well as the completion of the pipeline. Pandemic has obvious reasons to wait for its resolution, and the pipeline would have changed the situation in significant ways: would signal Europe has a non-hostile position towards Russia and an independent foreign policy to the US as well as bring in significant money (money that you can then rationalize can support the separatists, at least a little longer); so considering this, my guess would be that Russia would want Germany to get used to the new pipeline and prospering more due to that (strengthening, if not pro-Russian, pro-Russian-gas actors in Germany) and then undertake military action at some later time (potentially the exact same plan, just more active pipelines as leverage, or then tried more limited military options that can be presented as more to do with supporting the separatists than invading Ukraine on 4 different fronts).
The above would be an analysis based on actual facts, but if you want to believe that because 2022 is not literally the same year as 2019 then events in 2022 cannot be triggered by events in 2019 ... I guess be my guest on that.
Right, but that's the precise problem. If it's the risk that Russia reacts to, then Ukraine's current status is pretty much irrelevant. Ukraine can do whatever it wants to remain neutral. As soon as Russia detects a risk to their interests they nevertheless act.
And since Russia clearly considers some domestic political changes risks, Ukraine would be forever under the threat of Russian aggression as soon as the political situation turns in a way Russia considers too risky.
Quoting boethius
Russia amassing troops made sure the pipeline would not be opened. The idea that Ukraine was just s convenient "outlet for that anger" is just utterly ridiculous, especially since you acknowledge the invasion must have been planned well in advance.
Quoting boethius
It seems unlikely that the pipeline played much of a role. It seemed to still be on track in summer 2021 and was first suspended in November 2021. Invasion plans must have been well underway by then.
The event that seems most likely to coincide with the beginning of definite invasion plans is Putin's success in altering the constitution so he can be president for life. It seems plausible that, at this point, in the middle of the chaos caused by COVID-19, he felt Russia was strong enough to just get rid of the Ukrainian problem permanently.
Pretty much.
The alternative is the war that is currently happening where Ukraine loses far more land, lives, economic power, mass exodus, mass trauma, nothing good.
NATO could send troops into Ukraine at any time since 2008 to protect Ukraine from the current fate, but NATO doesn't because NATO doesn't care about Ukraine nor Ukrainians.
The reason small countries that are close (or close enough) to large powers that they are not friends with (such as Ireland vis-a-vis the UK) often adopt neutral status is precisely to avoid the kind of situation Ukraine is in now. If you don't want to be allies with the large power next door, then the best strategic move is to commit to neutrality and not being allies with anyone. The only exceptions is if there is an imminent or ongoing war between large powers and you are forced to pick sides anyways (can't just stay out of it like Sweden or Switzeralnd).
It's a nice epic fantasy to "reconquer the lost territories" but it was effetively impossible to reconquer Crimea after 2014 and impossible to reconquer the 4 additional oblasts in 2023. It was possible to reconquer at least some of the oblasts in 2023 as the Russians had not yet built extensive fortifications and had a small expeditionary force vulnerable to attack, but that would have required all the heavy weapons that was "common sense" could not be sent to Ukraine in 2022 to as an extension of "whatever it takes" but somehow equally "common sense" needs to be sent now in 2023.
And as soon as the war started I started to explain how offensive actions were not possible without heavy weapons, that it is ridiculous to believe Ukraine could retake significant territory with only shoulder launched missiles.
So, if Zelensky or his generals followed philosophy forum, they would have known my lengthy analysis of why ATGM's and manpads were obviously not sufficient to conduct any sort of offensive, or even counter offensive effectively:
And not just fro me! But this was one point of consensus!
Quoting ssu
An exchange from March 10th, 2022.
The key is to navigate risk.
Why didn't Russia annex Crimea before 2014?
Because there's also risks to annexing Crimea, so as long as the risks of annexing Crimea, or a full scale invasion, are greater than not-doing-those-things, then Russia doesn't do them.
Hence, you want to minimize risk to your larger neighbour, and the best way to do that is be neutral.
And definitely the position Ukraine is in entails permanent risk and a permanent need to manage that risk.
Joining a military alliance hostile to Russia is a high risk gambit that has enabled (because it provided consolidation of Russian elites about the subject and a justification to the domestic audience) and triggers exactly the war the gambit is designed to prevent.
There is not too many situations in history where this sort of gambit works, and I would honestly be mind-blown if such a gambit has worked in a position analogous to Ukraine.
And if such a gambit ever worked in even remotely similar circumstances, it was because it was entirely prepared in secret, the actors in the gambit knowing that if the large neighbouring power got wind of the plan they would be invaded essentially the next day.
Ukraine has sub optimal strategy at pretty much every critical juncture.
One interpretation is that the troops started being amassed due to delays in opening the pipeline. It's not so much the physical completion of the project that is the key point but approving the license to open the pipeline on the German side; the physical completion of the project just makes delays on licensing cost money and focuses tension on the issue.
Another interpretation was that Russia would do essentially the same exercise every year (albeit bigger every year) as a show of force to Ukraine (Russia does lot's of readiness exercises) and that it became a media thing in 2022 because the US wanted to put pressure on the Germans to not open the pipeline, with the forces being amassed as evidence the Russians are a hostile.
The pipelines were not merely a strong economic incentive to both the Russians and the Germans to cooperate and maintain peace, but also a symbol of Russian-German "friendship", or whatever you want to call it.
My reading of these events was that the pipeline was absolutely critical and would have informed further decision making. As I explain, the money the pipeline would generate can "finance" the situation in the Donbas at least a little longer (be rationalized as the "cost of doing business") but it would also change the diplomatic situation as Germany would be making a strong signal it has a different foreign policy to that of the US.
This was a huge investment designed to create closer ties and more peaceful relations with Central Europe, and the biggest EU player of Germany, so I think it's common sense Russia would have wanted to reciprocate the good faith act of opening the pipeline with the good faith act of not-invading. The pipelines to Germany dwarf in terms of economic value and diplomatic leverage anything the Donbas has to offer, there is no reason to trade one for the other.
Rather, once not only the Nord Stream 2 is not opened and then Nord Stream blown up entirely, only then does Russia annex the regions as ... if Nord Stream no longer exists then the Donbas and even more of Ukraine is better than nothing.
Or our lost Karelia. Nobody ever has thought that it could be gotten back and Finns even wouldn't like it back: it has now a Russian population that has lived there nearly 80 years.
Well, not a lot are craving either for those lands. As all the Finns living there were evacuated out from there, there was basically the memories and some unscrupulous Finnish politicians who after the Soviet Union fell held the view that talks with Russia could perhaps be possible just to get some votes of elderly (and foolish) Karelians. Of course it was nearly the first thing that Yeltsin in and interview had said that Russia would never in any situation give back land. (At least there was an opening that people could visit their old places.)
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Russia simply has a character problem as Russia has always been an empire. People who support Putin basically fear that it will otherwise collapse even further than it did when the Soviet Union collapsed. And when those dying now in the Ukraine war come from Dagestan and other minority held places while St Petersburgh and Moscow don't feel the mobilization, it differences just grow.
The invasion was certainly planned in advance, that does not mean refusing to open the pipeline didn't anger Putin and the Kremlin and that anger didn't contribute to the final decision to invade.
These sorts of actions are never "locked in". War is an option, diplomacy another option. Diplomacy fails, Germany decides to humiliate Russia by refusing to open a pipeline that took 10 years to build (and plenty of money to German contractors) and Germany didn't make that clear at the common sense time (i.e. before the pipeline is built), so Russia invades to demonstrate, among other things, its not about to be humiliated by Germany.
This is how any business person would read these events.
Imagine if I let you build a bridge across my property, take your money to help build the bridge, but then when the bridge is finished I tell you the paperwork required to actually use the bridge isn't finalized and also go fuck yourself.
You'd be pissed. I guarantee you Putin and all of the elites in Russian business, politics and the military would be equally pissed.
Only to Americans is it "normal" that America can order a country to do some self-defeating thing in order to humiliate another country that it sources energy from to run major sectors of its economy ... while saying it should buy energy from the US instead at way higher cost.
To the rest of the world, having someone build a 10 billion Euro pipeline only to refuse to have it opened is not a normal way to behave.
The fundamental fallacy Zelensky and co. use to reject Russia's peace offer and accept neutrality, that Russian promise not to invade later isn't a "guarantee" is that neither winning a war against Russia is guaranteed and, much worse, NATO support required to even have a chance isn't guaranteed.
Boris Johnson's promises of aid and money and whatever weapons Ukraine needs and so on required to fight the Russians, was not anymore guaranteed than Russia's peace offer.
More critically, Boris Johnson's offer could have been easily probed for being disingenuous, as there was zero offer at that time for the weapons systems required to have even a reasonable chance of "beating the Russians".
Zelensky and his generals clearly didn't go through a simple exercise of war gaming out a scenario of the steps required to "beat" the Russians.
Either that or they were explicitly told that they wouldn't be given the weapons needed to go on an offensive, but the idea is Russian society would collapse under sanctions, which didn't happen and now they are essentially trapped in the war.
But considering the Ukrainian leaders, at least Zelensky and Zeluzney, seem genuinely surprised the great big counter offensive didn't work at all and are only now explaining they need better technology to "win", seems to me they genuinely had no idea how Boris was manipulating them.
Obviously there are no guarantees about almost anything.
Saying "we can't trust Russia" is not a reason to reject a deal with Russia. Russia invading anyways later is a risk, but losing the war on hand is also a risk. Russia can't offer some iron-clad guarantee ... neither can NATO of even sticking it through with the hundreds of billions of dollars a year needed to even stay in the war.
Furthermore, even if you can't trust a party doesn't necessarily matter all that much in international relation (especially in international relation when you don't even know who will be in charge later anyways), there would be solid reasons to believe Russia would be simply incentivized to not-invade more than it would be incentivized to invade a neutral Ukraine and also strong reasons to believe there is no winning a war against Russia anyways (and certainly even less at an acceptable cost).
It's so common sense that neutrality is the best strategic option, that completely absurd reasoning is needed to support the war: fighting for a "right to join NATO", fighting to protect other Eastern European countries (that are in NATO), fighting because a peace deal might lead to losing a war later (without a credible plan to win the current war), fighting because "Putin can't be trusted" (NATO being no more trustworthy: go ask the Afghans).
The original article is behind a paywall, but Alexander Mercouris discussed the article on his channel.
Zelensky is probably resisting because the West initially spurred him on to fight, even though the Russians and Ukrainians were ready to negotiate.
Anyway, if this is true, and it most-likely is, the war is essentially over and the only question is how long the Ukrainians can continue to refuse negotiations, and how much they will be forced to concede in the end.
I hope the Ukrainians will be able to find a way to pay Washington and Brussels back for dragging Ukraine into this war and subsequently throwing it under the bus.
The craziest thing about this, is how obvious this was from the start. Propaganda is a helluva' drug.
Your strategy to "navigate" risk involves just handing Russia whatever they want whenever they want it.
But actually even that isn't sufficient, because you have now added yet another wrinkle: other countries also need to act in Russia's interest, otherwise Russia might feel forced to take Ukrainian land in compensation for e.g. a pipeline project.
Everything Russia does is just an obvious common sense thing, while Ukraine is equal parts stupid, crazy, and controlled by the west. On literally any issue you take the most ardently pro russian position, repeating verbatim the official russian positions on the Euromaidan, the Donbas, etc.
You're even inventing entirely new justifications for Russia, like that they might have somehow substituted Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, never mind that this goes against Russia's public statements and demands. Even Russia's propaganda would not expect anyone to take that one seriously.
To conclude, your proposed solution is to simply hand Ukraine to Russia. Your pretend reason for this is that this would avoid the war. Your statements though make clear that you would simply prefer Russia to win as much as possible.