Euthyphro
Socrates meets Euthyphro on the steps of the courthouse. Socrates is there to face charges of impiety and corrupting the youth. Euthyphro is there to bring charges against his father. The name Euthyphro means straight thought. The name is apt. He is not straight in the sense of being true, but of being incapable of seeing beyond his narrow focus. He says that because of his knowledge of divine things he is laughed at in the assembly and thought to be mad. (3c) He represents a character type. A type that seems incapable of knowing his ignorance.
Euthyphro claims to be a diviner and to know divine and pious things precisely (5a). Socrates ironically proposes that he become Euthyphro’s student. He asks him to identify the “idea” of the pious and impious. (5d) Euthyphro responds that what he is doing is pious. His answer is typical and the problem obvious. He assumes he knows what the pious is and so is certain that what he is doing is pious.
He points to Zeus’ castrating his father as justification for his bringing charges of murder against his own father. He assumed that by imitating Zeus, “the best and most just of the gods” (5e) that he too will be doing what is best and most just. The question of what is pious is then connected to the question of what is best and just. But to question whether if what Zeus did is just is, it would seem, impious. But it is necessary. Euthyphro unquestioningly accepts that Zeus is just. The evidence points in the opposite direction, but he accepts what he has been told and bends the idea of justice to conform.
Socrates returns to the question of the eidos of piety. Euthyphro now gives the kind of answer Socrates is looking for:
Socrates reminds Euthyphro of the quarrel between the gods. He points out that there is no quarrel when it comes to such things as calculation, greater or less, weight, that is not easily resolved. But when it comes to questions of the just and unjust, noble and shameful, good and bad we differ and these differences make us enemies. It is not because we are enemies that we differ but because we differ that we become enemies. (7d)
Socrates asks whether the gods disagree about such things. Euthyphro first denies that they do but then admits that they do (8a). The question of what is just, noble, and good has not been answered by the gods. It would seem that they have no knowledge of such things, for if they did there would be no disagreement.
The same thing then would both be loved and hated, pious and impious. What is loved by Zeus would be hated by his father Cronus. Euthyphro revises his answer, the pious is what all the gods love, and what all the gods hate is impious. (9e)
Socrates asks:
Euthyphro says he does not understand. Socrates says he will “try to explain it more plainly”, but what he says seems designed to confuse rather than make it clear. Or rather, it is intended to show the incoherence of the claim. It says no more than that what is loved is loved. The question of why this is loved and that is not loved is not addressed. That this is loved and not that tells us nothing about whether what is loved is best and just.
In confusion Euthyphro says:
Socrates now offers to show Euthyphro how he can teach Socrates about the pious. (11e) Things have indeed gone around with the need for the student to teach the teacher. Socrates proposes that the pious is what is just. (11e)
Socrates gets him to agree that where odd is there number and not where there is number there is odd. (12b) But there cannot be odd without number. The significance of this becomes clear when Socrates asks whether where the just is there too is the pious, or if it is that where the pious is there too is the just. Is the pious part of the just? (12d)
Just as there is no odd without number there is no piety without the just. If Euthyphro were to give an answer that is consistent with what was said previously and with his answer regarding number and odd, he would answer that without piety the just would not be. One consequence of this is that the just would be whatever is loved. No matter what gods or men do it would be just if a god loved it.
But Euthyphro seems to have forgotten all that and now agrees that the pious is part of the just.
Socrates asks what part of justice the pious is. If we follow the example of number and odd, just as the other part of number is the even, the other part of justice would be impiety. Socrates’ pursuit of justice is in part impious, he questions what should be piously accepted as true.
Euthyphro says that the part of justice that is pious is tendance to the gods. (12e) As tendance to horses requires knowledge of horses, and tendance to dogs or tendance to cattle knowledge of dogs and cattle, there must be knowledge of gods if one is to tend to them. (13a) Euthyphro does not object to this because he assumes he has knowledge of the gods, but when Socrates says that tenance to horses or dogs must benefit horses and dogs Euthyphro objects. He denies that man benefits the gods, that we make the gods better. (13c)
Euthyphro says that tenance to the gods is as slaves tend to their masters. (13d) Socrates asks what the noble work is that the gods do with us as their servants. (13e) Euthyphro answers “many noble things”. Socrates presses him to name the main thing they produce, Euthyphro says:
Euthyphro is prepared to destroy his own family and to the extent the family is necessary for the city, destroy the city as well in order to, as he imagines it, please the gods. And all because this “straight thinker” thinks he knows what pleases the gods.
Socrates asks once again what piety and impiety are. Euthyphro agrees that it is a certain kind of knowledge of sacrificing and praying, of giving gifts and making requests of the gods. (14c) Socrates calls this a kind of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro momentarily forgets that he had denied that the gods are benefited by us, but now recalls this. He says that what they get from us is honor, respect, and gratitude. (15a) But, Socrates points out, what is gratifying is what is dear to the gods.
The argument has gone around in a circle. Socrates proposes they begin again with the question of what the pious is. It is only if Euthyphro knows plainly what the pious and impious are that he can be sure that he is acting correctly in prosecuting his father. (15d)
But Euthyphro is unwilling to begin again:
Where is he going in such a hurry? Has Socrates convinced him of his ignorance and prevented him from causing harm? Or is he in a hurry to proceed with the prosecution before he begins to doubt himself?
It is not piety that makes one just but rather one must be just in order to be pious. To answer the question that engendered this post, belief in god is not necessary for being good. In Euthyphro’s case, it is his belief that leads him to do what is unjust to his family and the city.
Euthyphro claims to be a diviner and to know divine and pious things precisely (5a). Socrates ironically proposes that he become Euthyphro’s student. He asks him to identify the “idea” of the pious and impious. (5d) Euthyphro responds that what he is doing is pious. His answer is typical and the problem obvious. He assumes he knows what the pious is and so is certain that what he is doing is pious.
He points to Zeus’ castrating his father as justification for his bringing charges of murder against his own father. He assumed that by imitating Zeus, “the best and most just of the gods” (5e) that he too will be doing what is best and most just. The question of what is pious is then connected to the question of what is best and just. But to question whether if what Zeus did is just is, it would seem, impious. But it is necessary. Euthyphro unquestioningly accepts that Zeus is just. The evidence points in the opposite direction, but he accepts what he has been told and bends the idea of justice to conform.
Socrates returns to the question of the eidos of piety. Euthyphro now gives the kind of answer Socrates is looking for:
What is dear to (loved by) the gods is pious, and what is not dear is impious. (6e)
Socrates reminds Euthyphro of the quarrel between the gods. He points out that there is no quarrel when it comes to such things as calculation, greater or less, weight, that is not easily resolved. But when it comes to questions of the just and unjust, noble and shameful, good and bad we differ and these differences make us enemies. It is not because we are enemies that we differ but because we differ that we become enemies. (7d)
Socrates asks whether the gods disagree about such things. Euthyphro first denies that they do but then admits that they do (8a). The question of what is just, noble, and good has not been answered by the gods. It would seem that they have no knowledge of such things, for if they did there would be no disagreement.
The same thing then would both be loved and hated, pious and impious. What is loved by Zeus would be hated by his father Cronus. Euthyphro revises his answer, the pious is what all the gods love, and what all the gods hate is impious. (9e)
Socrates asks:
Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved? (10a)
Euthyphro says he does not understand. Socrates says he will “try to explain it more plainly”, but what he says seems designed to confuse rather than make it clear. Or rather, it is intended to show the incoherence of the claim. It says no more than that what is loved is loved. The question of why this is loved and that is not loved is not addressed. That this is loved and not that tells us nothing about whether what is loved is best and just.
In confusion Euthyphro says:
But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind. For whatever we put forward somehow always keeps going around for us and isn’t willing to stay where we place it. (11b)
Socrates now offers to show Euthyphro how he can teach Socrates about the pious. (11e) Things have indeed gone around with the need for the student to teach the teacher. Socrates proposes that the pious is what is just. (11e)
Socrates gets him to agree that where odd is there number and not where there is number there is odd. (12b) But there cannot be odd without number. The significance of this becomes clear when Socrates asks whether where the just is there too is the pious, or if it is that where the pious is there too is the just. Is the pious part of the just? (12d)
Just as there is no odd without number there is no piety without the just. If Euthyphro were to give an answer that is consistent with what was said previously and with his answer regarding number and odd, he would answer that without piety the just would not be. One consequence of this is that the just would be whatever is loved. No matter what gods or men do it would be just if a god loved it.
But Euthyphro seems to have forgotten all that and now agrees that the pious is part of the just.
Socrates asks what part of justice the pious is. If we follow the example of number and odd, just as the other part of number is the even, the other part of justice would be impiety. Socrates’ pursuit of justice is in part impious, he questions what should be piously accepted as true.
Euthyphro says that the part of justice that is pious is tendance to the gods. (12e) As tendance to horses requires knowledge of horses, and tendance to dogs or tendance to cattle knowledge of dogs and cattle, there must be knowledge of gods if one is to tend to them. (13a) Euthyphro does not object to this because he assumes he has knowledge of the gods, but when Socrates says that tenance to horses or dogs must benefit horses and dogs Euthyphro objects. He denies that man benefits the gods, that we make the gods better. (13c)
Euthyphro says that tenance to the gods is as slaves tend to their masters. (13d) Socrates asks what the noble work is that the gods do with us as their servants. (13e) Euthyphro answers “many noble things”. Socrates presses him to name the main thing they produce, Euthyphro says:
… if someone has knowledge of how to say and do things gratifying to the gods by praying and sacrificing, these are the pious things. And such things preserve private families as well as the communities of cities. (14b)
Euthyphro is prepared to destroy his own family and to the extent the family is necessary for the city, destroy the city as well in order to, as he imagines it, please the gods. And all because this “straight thinker” thinks he knows what pleases the gods.
Socrates asks once again what piety and impiety are. Euthyphro agrees that it is a certain kind of knowledge of sacrificing and praying, of giving gifts and making requests of the gods. (14c) Socrates calls this a kind of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro momentarily forgets that he had denied that the gods are benefited by us, but now recalls this. He says that what they get from us is honor, respect, and gratitude. (15a) But, Socrates points out, what is gratifying is what is dear to the gods.
The argument has gone around in a circle. Socrates proposes they begin again with the question of what the pious is. It is only if Euthyphro knows plainly what the pious and impious are that he can be sure that he is acting correctly in prosecuting his father. (15d)
But Euthyphro is unwilling to begin again:
Some other time, then, Socrates. For now I am in a hurry to go somewhere, and it is time for me to go away. (15e)
Where is he going in such a hurry? Has Socrates convinced him of his ignorance and prevented him from causing harm? Or is he in a hurry to proceed with the prosecution before he begins to doubt himself?
It is not piety that makes one just but rather one must be just in order to be pious. To answer the question that engendered this post, belief in god is not necessary for being good. In Euthyphro’s case, it is his belief that leads him to do what is unjust to his family and the city.
Comments (974)
And an audio here:
Please refrain from the gratuitous ad hominem commentary.
The specifics of the dialogue, centering around the question of the relationship between piety and justice, or, based on the thread that led to this, belief in God and morality.
It was ever so. The conclusion is aporia; an impasse; a hurried withdrawal.
Yes, this thread is a branch from a zombie. But we might take the point that what is right and what god wants are not the very same.
Could you elaborate what is meant by “piety”? Piety to what?
Are we just talking about ones dedication to justice and relating that to god being definitive of justice means piety to god is piety to justice?
Quoting DingoJones
Indeed! But try it for yourself. That's what the discussion is - what is piety? What is Justice? What is good?
The "Euthyphro problem" for theism is commonly misrepresented; as its central question being "Is something pious because it is beloved by God or is it beloved by God because it is pious?" The actual question in the text is "Is something pious because it is beloved of the gods, or is it beloved of the gods because it is pious?".
What is forgotten is that the Greek gods were quite capable of disagreement, and that that is the problem with equating piety with what the gods love. That something should be pious because it is beloved of (a single omniscient) God and beloved of God because it is pious presents no contradiction, inconsistency or paradox as far as I can tell. I'm open to correction on this..
Here's Dr William Lane Craig (one of the more competent).
[i]Dr. Craig: For those that aren't familiar with it, the question is: does God will something because it is good, or is something good because God wills it? If the theist says that God wills something because it is good then the good is independent of God and, in fact then, moral values are not based in God. They are independent of him. On the other hand, if you say something is good because God wills it then that would seem to make what is good and evil arbitrary. God could have willed that hatred is good; then we would be morally obligated to hate one another, which seems crazy. Some moral values seem to be necessary, and therefore there would be no possible world in which hatred is good. So the claim is that this shows that morality cannot be based in God.
I think it is clearly a false dilemma because the alternatives are not of the form “A or not-A” which would be an inescapable dilemma. The alternatives are like “A or B.” In that case you can always add a third one, C, and escape the horns of the dilemma. I think in this case there is a third alternative which is to say that God wills something because he is good. That is to say, God himself is the paradigm of goodness, and his will reflects his character. God is by nature loving, kind, fair, impartial, generous, and so forth. Therefore, he could not have willed that, for example, hatred be good. That would be to contradict his very own nature.
So God's commands to us are not arbitrary, but neither are they based upon something independent of God. Rather, God himself is the paradigm of goodness.[/i]
I would go further and say that if we do not simply accept what we have been told that god wants then in trying to determine what god wants we move in the direction of trying to determine what is right. Or we can forego the question of what god wants and go right to the problem of determining what is right.
But I think the question of what is right is best approached as part of the question of the good in the way that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle pursued the question. And this should not be confused with Plato's mythology of the Good.
Im trying to understand what other people mean by those words, they weren’t words I used so why would I seek to offer my own meaning of the words?
I can discuss it once its clear to me, and perhaps offer my own thoughts to n meaning then.
I understand you are being a teacher guy and getting me to think on my own as part of that but that approach does nothing for me. I just find it frustrating/obnoxious, and I mention that only to illuminate not to be snide or flip.
I already think deeply about things, I’m asking about those words to establish a baseline for a potentially interesting discussion. I promise I’m not trying to be a dick, I just am explaining myself in hopes of reaching a better understanding with you since I’ve had difficulty discussing things with you in the past and I would always want to smooth out those difficulties.
It is useful because it’s annotated, you can use the included section numbers to refer to specific passages, as Fooloso4 has done in the OP.
Then watch. Or read the texts provided and question.
...I'm not familiar with this.
If instead of gods there is one god then whatever that god loved would be pious, but if instead of that god it was another god then whatever that god loved would be pious. In other words, unless it can be shown that what is loved is what is "best and most loved", it does not matter whether it is one god or many. Although there would not be disagreement it would still be a matter of the god's preference rather than what is good and right.
Sorry i had gone back and edited that post. I accidentally hit the post button.
Those are options yes, but not as expedient as just having the simple questions answered.
The whole thing in the Republic about the ascent from the cave to the sight of the Forms to Good itself. Socrates in telling it admits this these are not things he knows. He presents it as if the reader is being given access to something only the few know. It is easy to forget that Socrates wisdom was "human wisdom", knowledge of his ignorance. One who knows the Forms and has beheld the Good would have divine wisdom.
Seems to me we are looking at about 9a, and that Euthyphro adjusts his position to what is beloved by all the gods.
That is, the point you make is explicit in the dialogue, and hence accounted in the conclusion.
But the thing about Plato's dialogues is that it is not about providing answers to simple questions. As Banno noted the dialogue ends in aporia. Most of them do.
...and yet in the process you and I have concluded that what is pious and what is beloved of god are distinct. Are we justified in this, if the end is inconclusive?
Hence there may be room for @Janus' objection. Some work is required here.
Euthyphro's dilemma is nowhere to be found in the dialogue. It is, however, something that has been discussed in the literature.
In my opinion, Craig attempts to avoid the appearance of an arbitrary divine will by arbitrarily positing God's nature, a God who is good. His sanitized God is at odds with what we see in the Bible and what we confront with the problem of evil. Craig, of course, has his responses.
I Understand that, I have read the dialogues. The Socratic method is about the questions and what they reveal.
Im assuming that you and banno who understand Euthyohro would posit it for a deeper purpose than to just reiterate what you already understand about it. I was just trying to establish what that purpose might be, if there was something being specifically sought in this revisit to a classic.
That is a theistic presumption, not THE theistic presumption. It is difficult to square the idea of omnibenevolence with what the God of the Hebrew Bible does, or with a New Testament God who sacrifices his son.
I do not know when the notions of omniscience and omnibenevolence were introduced. It is often assumed they were there all along but where are they found in the Hebrew Bible or New Testament?
I'd like to see how this connection works. Can you fill in the gaps?
In my opinion it is important to revisit the classics, they inform the whole of philosophy that follows. But the thread was started because Banno asked me to in response to the thread "Belief in god is necessary for being good" which veered widely off course of its original topic.
It's too ingrained for me to easily move past it. Just asking "What do you mean by..." in a discussion of Socratic method rings all sorts of alarm bells.
But my answer to "What do you mean by piety", as for all such questions, will be that it doesn't have an essence that can be expounded in a paragraph, and that instead one must look to what is being done with it; hence my advice:Quoting Banno
...stands.
I think the conclusion is justified. What remains inconclusive is what piety is.
I prefer the Socratic approach: the good is what we seek. It puts the question of the good in human terms.
Anticipating @Janus' argument, if god is omnibenevolent, then he cannot will anything that is not good; hence the good and the will of god coincide.
Ok, thats fair enough.
The point raised with Fool was that I already know the 101 understanding of it that the video shows.
I think if you want to explore a classic like this you have to come at it differently, otherwise its not exploring its just repeating it.
So when I asked about the term I was attempting to start a discussion wherein we go after the “essence” that cannot be expounded in a paragraph. I just prefer to get parameters good and clear first so we don’t waste our time discussing something with different understandings of the words most important to that discussion. Watching the video isnt going to do that, starting a dialogue does so thats what I tried to do.
The angle I wanted to explore is the application to monotheism. Hence the questions to Janus.
I think the idea is that omniscience grants certain knowledge, thus a certainty of what is good and this is what merges good and god in the way Janus mentioned. I don’t really buy into any “omni” based arguments myself. Theoretical concepts at best, hardly the basis from which to draw conclusions about anything.
A reasonable approach. It's a classic case of concepts being employed beyond their remit.
So, if we accept that there is a god who is all good, such a god can only will what is good; and if one ought do what is good, then (substituting) we ought do what god wills.
A cogent argument?
It is hard to square the notions of omnipotence and omnibenevolence with what God is reported in the Old Testament to have done, and with the sacrifice of his Son, but nonetheless the ideas are not logically contradictory.
If God loves only the good, and God as creator and sustainer of all things determines what is good, then there is no contradiction that I can detect. Do you see a contradiction there?
Id call it internally consistent, but not a very good argument based on its premises. I don’t think being “all good” is coherent for example, I have never heard a satisfying explanation of what that would even mean.
Also it starts with the acceptance that a god exists, which I do not accept.
So not cogent I’d say, in that any argument that relies on such baseless premises is not very close convincing.
An intuition with which I might sometimes agree; I'm not convinced that "...is good" works a predicate, at least not in the way "...is round" does. But there is much work to be done here, too.
SO you would say the argument is valid, but relies on a false premise - that there is a god - and so is not cogent.
This was what medieval people believed. It creates an identity problem. If you're good in thought and deed, then everything you do is the will of God. So you're like a puppet.
The only way to demonstrate a will of your own is to sin. In this setting the Devil becomes the primal separation from God: defiance.
This influenced the way warlords behaved. To maintain the allegiance of their soldiers, they needed to present themselves as being on God's side. If the soldiers came to doubt that, they would see themselves as being in a state of defiance, so they might flee instead of fighting.
Not all of them.
There' another question here; since I can do evil, I can do something that god cannot do. So I am in at least one way more able than god.
That's definitely the question.
I wonder - if all that is good emanates from god's nature then what is meant to be the case when a person does good? Is this a person simply embodying God's nature in some way, or are they making their own good? If it is their own good then God would love it because it is good?
Quoting Banno
It would seem so. Is this because god is unable to do what he doesn't 'want' to do or is it because god's nature makes it impossible for him to do evil? Would the logic underpinning this mean that if god did evil (by our standards) - a human race destroying flood, for instance, it becomes good?
I think pretty much everybody did.
I am intending to read it thoroughly now this thread has started, but by way of preamble: one thing I think ought to be stated is that, I think, God doesn’t appear explicitly in this dialogue. The Greek Gods obviously do - and one of the main sources of argument is the way they can differ amongst themselves. But, obviously, the ‘One God’ cannot differ with other gods, because there are no other Gods. I’m saying that, just to be wary of automatically equating ‘the Gods’ with ‘the one God’. Of course it is true that in the early part of the Christian Era, the Greek-speaking theologians found ways to ‘Christianise’ the whole Platonic corpus - hence the designation of Plato and Socrates as ‘Christian before Christ’. But that introduces theological and philosophical undertones that might not be really there but which nevertheless influence the interpretation of this dialogue. (Although I also recognise that the ‘Euthyphro Dilemma’ is a frequent topic of discussion in philosophical theology however in these cases, the reading is ‘adjusted’ to allow for the discussion of the ‘one God’.)
And then there's Augustine: 'love and do what you will.'
It's a pretty diverse and complex worldview.
The “all” is important too, “all good” implies only one pathway to good and a single conclusion at the end of that pathway. I think there are many good ways to get to the good and more than one good to be gotten to in each instance. (Good in the moral sense).
Quoting Banno
False premise (god), a problematic phrasing (“all good”)and it gets circular if “ought” is a reference to what is good. There is morevI think but those are the main cogency lacking factors imo.
Going back to your question about piety and justice, in connection with religion, I think that being pious became separate from justice in Western thought gradually. However, they are probably interconnected in foundation at some point, especially in ancient philosophy, like Plato, and 'Euthypro'.
I think that happened because there was a lot of focus on whether God exists, and I it is likely that Nietzsche's philosophy and influence lead to a belief if there is no God morality was not important.That is because he developed both the idea that 'God was dead' and of going 'Beyond Good and Evil'. However, there have been thinkers who thought that being good was not dependent on belief in God, especially the movement of secular humanism. If one only believes that being a good person is important because one is being supervised, or overseen, by God that is a fear based morality. As far as I can see goodness and justice are more important to some extent in a secular context. This is because this world of the here and now is the focus, rather than upon another reality of an afterlife, and of punishment or reward of heaven or hell.
Maybe you can tell me where the "ad hominem" is, because I don't see any?
The basic idea is that God is omnipotent from where it may be inferred that he is omniscient. However, God doesn't need to be omnibenevolent.
The concept of “omnipotent” (??????????? pantokrator or ???????????? pantodynamos) was certainly in use in antiquity. "Jupiter omnipotens" is used by Virgil and "omnipotent God" occurs both in the OT and NT texts:
"When the Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek as the Septuagint, Pantokrator was used both for YHWH Sabaoth "Lord of Hosts"[2] and for El Shaddai "God Almighty".[3] In the New Testament, Pantokrator is used once by Paul (2 Cor 6:18) and nine times in the Book of Revelation: 1:8, 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 16:7, 16:14, 19:6, 19:15, and 21:22. "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_Pantocrator
"Omnibenevolence" is often misconstrued and used by atheists or anti-theists to demonstrate alleged "contradictions" in the concept of God. It is conveniently forgotten that there are many different definitions of "God" - and of "omnibenevolence".
God is good in himself. But that doesn't mean that he is under obligation to be good to people in exactly the way or ways people want him to be, as that would be absurd.
Something is good if it is willed/loved by any agent, from that agent's point of view, god or not. Counterexamples welcome.
The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. What should guide Euthyphro’s actions, and how are we to judge Socrates’? Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? Although it may seem that with monotheism there is no problem of conflict between gods; but the problem remains with the conflicting claims, laws, interpretations, and practices of the monotheistic religions.
If Justice is taken to be a Goddess (Dike), then in following justice we are doing what is commanded by Justice.
Likewise, if the Good is taken to be a higher, quasi-divine entity (to Agathon), then in following good we are doing what is commanded by the Good.
We can't escape the fact that we are following a higher principle that is above us. All we can do is claim that that principle is not a personal God, and others may disagree resulting in a never-ending and pretty pointless debate.
In the final analysis it is a matter of personal choice as to which way we want to look at it. It simply can't be settled through logic or philosophy.
On another note, what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing (irrespective of their beliefs)? Coincidental/accidental? Say, do they somehow become part of God or something (un/wittingly)? Surely Aboriginal Australians did some good things before being polluted with ideas of Craig's God, err before the European invasions.
And some may have no interest in playing when they perceive the agenda behind the game.
At any rate, if we take "justice" to mean treating people as they deserve, then we need to know what is right and what is wrong and we learn this from society or some other source that is higher than us and has more authority than the individual. That's why Justice has been conceived of as a higher power or principle that we all must obey and has usually been associated with a supernatural entity to highlight this fact.
:clap: :rofl:
Quoting Janus
Sorry for butting in but the dilemma dissolves once we realize the fact that, beloved of God = pious. So, the question, "is something pious because it is beloved by God or is it beloved of God because it is pious?" becomes " is something pious because it is pious or is it pious because it is pious?" This boils down to, "is it pious because it is pious?" which is the circular argument, "it is pious because it is pious" in question form.
Socrates is right to criticize Euthyphro iff what is beloved of God can be impious but that would be a contradictio in terminis; after all, beloved of God = pious.
Unfortunately, the materialists will claim that the Gods love the pious man because he is pious which in their view demonstrates that you can be pious without following a divine command.
But good point, anyway.
I was merely pointing to the fact that "beloved of God" is just another way of saying pious. Socrates' argument only works if that isn't the case. That's how it seems to me. I could be wrong though.
I'm not saying you're wrong, only that the materialists will come up with new questions, arguments and "contradictions", given that this is their purpose of the discussion:
Quoting Fooloso4
They've already decided on the answer.
Socrates' education of Euthyphro begins when he points beyond Euthyphro's circular claim. He replaces the idea that what is loved by the gods is what is pious with the idea that the pious is what is just. (11e)
Quoting TheMadFool
Socrates argument is as follows: The pious is part of the just. If it were the other way around and the just is part of the pious then as the odd is part of number and the other part of number is its opposite, the even, the other part of the pious would be the unjust. If instead the pious is part of the just then the other part would be the impious. Socrates was accused of impiety, by questioning the justice of the gods he is impious.
If instead of gods we consider God then the question is whether something is beloved of God because it is just or just because it is beloved? In terms of piety the question would be: is it pious because it just or just because it is pious? If God loves the just and hates the unjust then what is pious, as what is loved by God, would be what is just. If someone like Euthyphro claims he is pious because he is doing what is beloved of God and what he does is unjust then either the unjust is beloved by God or he is not pious. In other words, the equation beloved of God = pious is insufficient without the possession of knowledge of God.
I believe Craig would argue that people know what is right and good because it is built into their being by God. Hence the good things done by people who are ignorant of the Abrahamic God.
What this misses is that some do what they do and are able to find their justification in that without any appeal to God or gods, and others are able to find their justification only by appealing to God or gods. It's called 'human diversity'; everyone does not have to agree with everyone else as to the justification of their ethical principles in order to have an acceptably healthy society, a sufficient number just have to agree (to a sufficient degree) as to what those principles are.
It is not so simple. It is not a matter of ethical principles but of whether particular acts are just or unjust. In a healthy society it is not enough that a sufficient number, (what number?),do something in order for it to be permissible. If we agree that murder is wrong, are we then wrong or is it both right and wrong if some group shouts "death to the infidels" and starts killing people? They consider themselves to be pious followers doing the will of their god, for which they will be rewarded.
I find it odd that Socrates should think up Euthyphro's dilemma and also, at the same time, lay the foundations of virtue ethics. The latter, if I'm not mistaken, isn't based on some theoretical framework of morality the likes of utilitarianism; au contraire, it, for moral guidance, simply asks the question, "what would a virtuous person do if such and such were the case?" In a MS word document of Socrates's virtue ethics, do the following: Find & Replace "virtuous person" with "God." That Socrates, in a sense, provides the solution to his own dilemma should jump out at you. Something is good precisely because, the paragon of a virtuous person - God - commands it.
Purity was and in some cases is still a major religious concern.
From Deuteronomy:
As a matter of piety one should do what the Law of God commands, majority of the pious today would not kill someone under such circumstances. It is not piety that leads us to see that this as wrong.
Would a virtuous person do what Euthyphro was going to do?
Quoting Fooloso4
Fooloso4, you always hate it when I shoot down Socrates, but yet once more I shalt.
I assume that Socrates' stand is that one must be just in order to be pious. So one part of piety is being just. The other part? unjust. Just like in the parallel example Socrates gave the parallel between odd and even numbers.
GMBA to Socrates: "Neener, neener! I caught you on the horn of your own dilemma!!"
I am sorry, but I am awash with the sweet feelings of victory. I will probably regret being this cocky, but hey, if you can't live for the moment, then you can't live at all.
Yep - the problem with religious ethics is they have no foundation. It is entirely down to people using personal preferences to determine what the correct interpretation of God's will might be. 'Thou shalt not kill' may be a commandment, but killing is clearly the Biblical way for so many situations and interpreted by followers in any number of additional ways.
Please remember, if your daughter isn't a virgin on her wedding night, she is to be stonned to death on her father's porch. I've always considered this especially pious advice.
There was a quote from William Lane Craig above that identifies the main supposed problem that 'Euthyphro' is used to refer to (no-one cares what the original text says). And that is, that if morality is made of God's commands, then morality will be arbitrary.
I believe morality is indeed made of God's commands and I think the Euthyphro fails to raise a reasonable doubt about it. However, I must take issue with Craig's solution (though it is not his specifically, as it is as old as the hills). If you say - as Craig is doing - that for a character trait to be a virtue is just for it to be being instantiated by God - then you have not answered the objection. For any character trait that God instantiates will qualify as a virtue. It's that way around. It isn't that the character traits are virtues and thus God has them. It is that God has them and thus they're virtues. But that does nothing to fix them in place or to prevent the metaphysical possibility of, say, sadism being a virtue in the future.
But anyway, what it is to be virtuous is not to 'resemble' God. After all, if that was the case, then really God isn't needed for morality. For one can 'resemble' a virtuous person even if no such person exists. And thus on Craig's strange view, it turns out that God is not actually necessary for morality.
SImilarly, if you insist that I am wrong to say that Craig's view is that a virtue is a virtue by virtue of God instantiating it and maintain that they are virtues independently of God, then once more divine command theory has been abandoned in favour of some kind of metaethical naturalism.
So, although I have the utmost respect for Craig as a philosopher, his solution is no solution at all.
Here's my solution. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason. So Reason is God (by which I mean that Reason is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). Does that mean that it is arbitrary what's right and wrong? No, for 'arbitrary' means 'for no reason'. To think that what Reason commands is arbitrary then, is simply to have failed to understand this is Reason we are talking about - the one against which arbitrariness is measured. It is, then, conceptually confused to think that Reason's imperatives could be arbitrary, for by their very nature they are the opposite.
Hard for me to say because virtue ethics is about character/identity of a person as stipulated, it seems, by culture i.e. as some have pointed out, virtue ethics, is relative and that's as big as hints get if you're trying to solve the Euthyphro dilemma - goodness is, to some degree, arbitrary.
If I may be allowed to speculate, Socrates was no fool or, more accurately, he's not the type who would say anything without having thought about it deeply. He must've, at some point, realized that no single moral theory is going to suffice - there'll always be exceptions/special cases that would render them useless on more occasions than can be reasonably tolerated. That's why, my best guess is, Socrates counts reason/wisdom among the virtues for you need them to ensure the best outcome absent a consistent (contradiction-free) and complete (covers all bases). In short, you need to be rational/wise to be able to handle all cases - ordinary/exceptional. Implicit in this emphasis on reason/wisdom is the acceptance of an unsavory truth - there's something whimsical/arbitrary about morality/ethics.
Down roughly a millennia and half later, Kant comes along and refines Socrates' insight that morality is simply a facet of reason/wisdom by formulating the cateogrical imperative (CI). The CI is, to me, old wine in a new bottle i.e. it's simply Socrates's virtue ethics given a new look so to speak. After all, Kant makes it absolutely clear that the bad/immoral entails a logical contradiction, inconceivable as it were. Doesn't this mean the same thing as Socrates's claim that goodness is reason/wisdom in action?
Which ethics is non-normative, may I ask? There would be no point in one, right? Divine command theory, as I understand it, is to quite literally put our faith in, trust completely, God's moral decisions. That's the metaethics of virtue ethics; if that floats your boat, amen!
That out of the way, virtue ethics is predicated on a person's character and one horn of Euthyphro's dilemma is what is purportedly an undesirable state of affairs - good being whatever God command. However, if virtue ethics is what it claims it is - about character - then God's character as the most virtuous person implies, as of necessity, that his commands are good, right?
Metaethics! Metaethical theories are theories about what morality is composed of (so they'd be theories of what 'normativity' is). Normative theories are theories about the content of morality - that is, they're theories about what we ought to do (not theories about what the oughtness itself is) and what has moral value (not what moral value itself is).
Virtue ethics is a normative theory - it is the theory that the right act is the act the virtuous person would do, or something like that.
It's not a theory about what the goodness of a virtue 'is'. That's what divine command theory is. Divine command theory would be the view that the goodness of those character traits that are virtues (where this means no more than a character trait that has moral goodness) consists of them being valued by God, or recommended by God, or some such.
Anyway, you can't deal with the Euthyphro criticism by appealing to the supposed truth of a normative theory, for the whole point would be that the theory in question would be true contingently, not of necessity. And thus even if virtue ethics is indeed true, its being true is arbitrary (that would be the criticism - the misguided criticism - anyway).
[quote=WLC]...the question is: does God will something because it is good, or is something good because God wills it? If the theist says that God wills something because it is good then the good is independent of God and, in fact then, moral values are not based in God. They are independent of him. On the other hand, if you say something is good because God wills it then that would seem to make what is good and evil arbitrary. God could have willed that hatred is good; then we would be morally obligated to hate one another, which seems crazy. Some moral values seem to be necessary, and therefore there would be no possible world in which hatred is good. So the claim is that this shows that morality cannot be based in God.
I think it is clearly a false dilemma because the alternatives are not of the form “A or not-A” which would be an inescapable dilemma. The alternatives are like “A or B.” In that case you can always add a third one, C, and escape the horns of the dilemma. I think in this case there is a third alternative which is to say that God wills something because he is good. That is to say, God himself is the paradigm of goodness, and his will reflects his character. God is by nature loving, kind, fair, impartial, generous, and so forth. Therefore, he could not have willed that, for example, hatred be good. That would be to contradict his very own nature.
So God's commands to us are not arbitrary, but neither are they based upon something independent of God. Rather, God himself is the paradigm of goodness.[/quote]
So, not accidental or coincidental but intrinsic.
Quoting jorndoe
Karl Rahner floated the idea of the 'anonymous Christian':
[quote= Rahner, quoted in Wikipedia; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_Christian]"Anonymous Christian" means that a person lives in the grace of God and attains salvation outside of explicitly constituted Christianity. A Protestant Christian is, of course, "no anonymous Christian"; that is perfectly clear. But, let us say, a Buddhist monk (or anyone else I might suppose) who, because he follows his conscience, attains salvation and lives in the grace of God; of him I must say that he is an anonymous Christian; if not, I would have to presuppose that there is a genuine path to salvation that really attains that goal, but that simply has nothing to do with Jesus Christ. But I cannot do that. And so if I hold if everyone depends upon Jesus Christ for salvation, and if at the same time I hold that many live in the world who have not expressly recognized Jesus Christ, then there remains in my opinion nothing else but to take up this postulate of an anonymous Christianity.[/quote]
Perhaps they're members of the 'invisible Church':
[quote= Wikipedia;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_invisible]The invisible church or church invisible is a theological concept of an "invisible" Christian Church of the elect who are known only to God, in contrast to the "visible church"—that is, the institutional body on earth which preaches the gospel and administers the sacraments. Every member of the invisible church is saved, while the visible church contains some individuals who are saved and others who are unsaved. According to this view, Bible passages such as Matthew 7:21–27, Matthew 13:24–30, and Matthew 24:29–51 speak about this distinction.[/quote]
Precisely, Euthyphro's dilemma is about what constitutes good and bad. Is it Divine command or is it not?
Quoting Bartricks
In my book, we can't have reached a normative ethics which virtue ethics is without having passed the metaethics waypoint.
Now, what is the metaethics of virtue ethics? Is it not Divine command theory; after all virtue ethics is about the character of virtuous people and God's commands would no doubt be a reflection of God's character, no?
Perhaps when I spell it out like that, you might be able to make the connection between the Euthyphro dilemma (metaethics) and virtue ethics (normative ethics).
That's how I feel anyway. I could be wrong of course.
Thus pointing at situations where piety may be detrimental to being good. E.g. human sacrifices.
Thus pointing at situations where piety may be detrimental to being good. E.g. human sacrifices.
As you correctly pointed out and as @Fooloso4 was forced to admit, "pious" = "loved by the Gods".
So, let's have another look at the so-called problem:
"Is the pious (?? ????? to hosion) loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?"
The first problem with this question or puzzle is that it seems to imply that only two answers are possible which is not the case.
The second problem is that it depends on our perspective of the concepts involved.
????? hósios means both pious in the sense of sanctioned by the Gods and pious in the sense of devout or observant of what is commanded by the Gods.
Thus the pious (to hosion) is in any case something that is sanctioned (loved) by the Gods.
Now, we could ask, if we had nothing better to do, why do the Gods love the pious?
Some may answer that the Gods love the pious because it is good and just in itself. This may lead to the erroneous conclusion that there are moral standards that are independent of the Gods - which is what the materialists, the anti-theists and the neo-Marxists are trying to demonstrate, without much success however.
In reality, if, for example, justice is a manifestation of the divine principle of Justice (the Goddess Dike or Justitia), then the Gods love the pious because it is divine, i.e., a manifestation of their own innate goodness and justice.
Similarly, when humans assess what is right and what is wrong, they do so according to the divine sense of justice present in their souls.
As clearly stated by Plato, justice is not something external, it is an innate virtue of the soul which is essentially divine.
The world (cosmos) itself was created by God and arranged in such a way as to produce a vast array of good effects (Timaeus 28a).
So, when humans perform good and just actions they do nothing else than obeying the divine principle of justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne).
In mythological terms, Justice (Dike) was created/fathered by God (Zeus) and placed on earth to uphold justice (Theogony I. 901) which is another way of saying that justice is a divine principle.
Euthyphro first makes the mistake of saying that number is part of odd. By his actions he makes the same mistake, making the just part of piety. In that case the other side of piety would be, as you say, unjust.
One part of being just is piety, the other is impiety. One part of number is odd, the other is even. The observe is not true.
Right. I quoted a passage along with a couple of others from Deuteronomy. Another is:
She is raped but stoned to death as a matter of purity/piety. The evil must be purged "from among you". If instead of this happening in the town it happens in the country:
The Euthyphro dilemma is not found in the dialogue. The dialogue says nothing about divine command. Euthyphro is not doing what he was commanded to do, but what he thinks the gods would want. Divine command cannot be read into the text. It is a different problem. The only thing it has in common with the dialogue is the name Euthyphro.
Right.
It is clear that you have not read the dialogue or the OP. It is not something I was forced to admit, it is the premise of the dialogue. It is what Euthyphro says piety is. Socrates shows him and us why it is problematic.
'Good' is a different kind of concept in that way from, for example, 'mammalian'. Humans are mammals because they give birth to live young etc. It is not the case that humans' giving birth to live young and the rest had the consequence of their becoming mammals.
It is clear that, as usual, you are not reading your own statements. You wrote:
Quoting Fooloso4
Your statement does not dispute the validity of the equation. It only says that the equation is "insufficient".
Therefore, you admit that "pious" = "loved by the Gods".
He neither understands nor does he want to because he's got another agenda which is to use Socrates to ridicule religion in general and Abrahamic religion in particular.
The fact is that Socrates is not talking about Hebrew laws.
Sigh. I agree.
Piety is about obedience to the Law. The Law frequently deals with purity. The Jewish Law was mentioned for several reasons. If piety is obedience to the Law of God then it requires doing things we consider unjust. It is, to use Plato's terminology, questions of the just, noble (beautiful), and good that have prevented us from injustice in the name of piety. Euthyphro is prosecuting his father because it is a necessary purification. The Greek words for purification is related to the word for piety.
Edit: I am not making a direct connection between Euthyphro and Deuteronomy. The question is, what does it mean to be pious? In order to answer this question we need to look not only at the dialogue but at Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. What we find here is that pious obedience must be tempered to avoid injustice.
Piety isn't strictly about obedience, though it can have to do with purity. It's about showing devotion. Failing to show respect for the gods was the specific crime of which Socrates was found guilty.
In what famous speech did Jesus condemn the piety of the Pharisees? How did this echo through history in the form of Franciscans and eventually Luther and Calvin?
I guess I'm just looking for some sign that you're familiar with what you're wanting to criticize, such that you understand the roots of your own position (in religion ).
Everything must be tempered. That's why humans have a reasoning faculty and an innate, divine sense of what is right and what is wrong. And that means that by being pious, i.e., good and just, one follows a divine impulse.
I see no need to look at Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is simply anachronistic to do that. And you do it because your theory doesn't hold water when taken in an Ancient Greek context as I already explained:
"In reality, if, for example, justice is a manifestation of the divine principle of Justice (the Goddess Dike or Justitia), then the Gods love the pious because it is divine, i.e., a manifestation of their own innate goodness and justice.
Similarly, when humans assess what is right and what is wrong, they do so according to the divine sense of justice present in their souls.
As clearly stated by Plato, justice is not something external, it is an innate virtue of the soul which is essentially divine.
The world (cosmos) itself was created by God and arranged in such a way as to produce a vast array of good effects (Timaeus 28a).
So, when humans perform good and just actions they do nothing else than obeying the divine principle of justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne)."
Or perhaps vice versa, given that "god" seems to function in this thread as a place-holder for our "best self", our moral sense, what we believe is our moral duty... You know the saying of Voltaire: God created man at his image, and man returned the favor in spades. You in particular seems quite free in defining god as you see fit.
Another point: I've been confused with the use of "pious" as meaning "beloved of God" in this thread. This is not the case in French or Italian, where it means "someone who fears and loves god(s)", i.e. the opposite of "beloved by the gods". There could be folks who are very pious but gods don't love them back, and there could be folks who are not pious at all but nevertheless loved and supported by the gods.
Right, yet that doesn't really answer the inquiry in this context.
Quoting jorndoe
Is it by coincidence/accident that goodness is intrinsic to God?
There aren't any particular conceptual barriers otherwise or to the contrary; we just end up back at the Euthyphro.
Anyway, maybe (this incarnation of) God has no particular say.
Incidentally, the Manichaeists had their own take, which is somewhat better, in some ways at least.
By the way, Rahner's idea and similar could, in principle, be grabbed by anyone, and has.
The Muslims say that everyone's born Muslim (Noah, Jesus, you, I, aliens?).
We might say that anyone is just born neutral, good, bad, and anything in between, and then may become Catholic, Sunni, whatever, or not, and do deeds that are good and bad (anyone can concoct/hijack a narrative).
If something is surmised to have been installed by God, then why not just drop the extras (God) and say that the "something" is intrinsic to (our experiencing) minds, analogous to most of us having two legs?
This one at least has evidence going for it, but what's it mean for the take that Craig expresses (if anything)?
Anyway, I don't see a particular way out of the Euthyphro yet.
This is the way to understand piety: it's like magic, literally. The original mages were tribal priests who held the knowledge of how to appease the gods.
So piety is a tool for controlling the universe. But how does this technology work? If it's giving us power over the gods, how?
Does it work because the gods love it? Or do the gods recognize it as magic beyond themselves?
This doesn't have much to do with monotheism, because as the scripture says, God is love. God and Good are the same thing.
You make my point for me.
Oh good.
If you are good with that we can leave it there but I suspect you really do not know how it is that you made my point.
Ok, makes sense. So the pious (he who loves the gods) is expecting that the gods will love him in return and hence favor him in this world. This implies that some people may be pious for a paycheck, so to speak. The pious often expects a reward for his piety.
There are many parallels to that kind of transactional reasoning in the Bible. Yahweh's covenant with His people, His unleashing hordes of gentiles on Israel because them Hebrews didn't deliver on their end of the deal, etc.
But interestingly, there are also other texts in the Bible that point to the opposite situation: the case of the pious abandoned by God. We all know that this happens all the time: the world is unjust; the pious may live a happy life, but often he doesn't...
The Book of Job is the most obvious example: it starts with Job being pious and Yahweh favoring him in return with a happy life and much riches, i.e. the "default" transactional situation. Then the sons of God present themselves to YHWH in some sort of gods council. Among them, is one called Satan. When YHWH boasts that his servant Job is the best pious human being ever, Satan replies:
9“Does Job fear God for nothing?” 10“Have you not put a hedge around him and his household and everything he has? You have blessed the work of his hands, so that his flocks and herds are spread throughout the land. 11But now stretch out your hand and strike everything he has, and he will surely curse you to your face.”
And so the book goes on with YHWH taking away all the riches and good things He originally granted Job as His side of the piety bargain: first his flock, then his children all die, then his health goes to rot. But Job still praises Y.
Then three of his friends tell him to revolt against Y and curse Him. That would be the logical thing to do in a transactional mode: YHWH failed to provide, so the pious can stop being pious. And indeed Job get finally a bit worked up and argumentative against YHWH, who is being unreasonably unjust, excessive in his neglect of His creatures, and for too long.
In the end, YHWH rebukes pretty much everybody by saying: I'm the boss here and I know best; you have no idea what My plans are so will you all shut up? Then Job is restored to health, riches and family, and lives to see his children to the fourth generation. Back to the default.
The message seems to be: if the gods let you down, be patient. They know what they do. Keep loving them. Don't expect any immediate favor or qui pro quo. Don't be so transactional. (But it's okay to get a bit pissed in the end.)
I think you're confusing yourself because you aren't following the thread and you don't understand that the discussion is about Ancient Greece, not France or Italy.
It is Euthyphro himself who equates “pious” (?????) with “loved by Gods” (???????? ??? ????):
“Socrates:
Now what do you say about that which is pious (????? hosion), it is loved by the gods (???????? ??? ???? phileitai hypo theon), is it not, according to what you said? (10c – d).
Euthyphro:
Yes”
(10c – d).
Plato refers to “the Maker and Father of the universe (Poietes kai Pateras tou pantos)” and states that “this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good”, etc. (Timaeus 28a – 29a).
In the Iliad, the Greeks are also shown taking actions meant to pacify the gods.
If you think of that as early science, we can translate Euthyphro as: does the universe follow higher laws? Or do the laws emerge from the nature of this universe?
Something like that.
If Jesus is correct then piety is not a sufficient guide to doing what is right. And so piety does not equal what is loved by God.
One might say that their's is a false piety, but this gets us back to the beginning with the question "what is piety?" What Socrates was trying to get Euthyphro to see is that it is not enough to say that it is what the gods love. We must consider what it is that the gods love. To say they love piety is circular. Socrates steps outside the circle and in order to bring in the just, noble, and good.
People are different and are pious for different motives. This is precisely why @Fooloso4 has failed to prove his point and will never succeed even in a million years.
1. Some humans are pious because they follow the divine sense of goodness and justice within themselves.
2. Some are pious because they follow the command of God as communicated through laws, customs, etc. which they recognize as being good and just.
3. And others are pious to escape punishment in Hades and to reap the rewards of a pious life in paradise (Phaedo 114e - 115a).
Very simple, really.
As a higher law?
Nonsense. There is no logical connection between your premise and your conclusion.
Plus,
1. "Not sufficient" can mean "partly sufficient".
2. If you are saying "piety does not equal what is loved by God", you are implying that God hates piety, which is absurd.
This and Ecclesiastes have always been problematic. They do not give us the kind of answers we want. Instead they say that such things are beyond the limits of our understanding. We cannot understand why God would allow the Adversary to do all these things to Job simply to prove that Job is only righteous because his circumstances allow him to be.
The problem with Job's friends is that they insist that he is to blame, but, as the author says, Job is blameless.
We might read this as merely symbolism, that the author is pointing to what happens in life, that we do not always get what we deserve. That righteousness is tested against adversity. But the story says more than that. God does not defend the idea that he is just. He has no defense against Job's accusations.
The truth of the matter is Job is never fully restored. He endured terrible suffering. His children were killed. No happy ending, which some scholars think was a later addition, can fix that.
Unlike Euthyphro Socrates knows he does not know. If there is a higher law he does not know what it is. Socrates focus remains on the human things.
And that "proves" what exactly?
I think you're growing more and more irrational. If "Socrates doesn't know", how can you use Socrates' statements to prove anything?
Socrates was a zetetic skeptic. Because he knew that he did not know the just, noble, and good he spent his life inquiring about them, trying to determine what is best and avoid doing what is unjust.
Not every God lover is necessarily beloved of God. You may love god(s) with all you heart and not be sure that god(s) love you back. Worse: it may be presumptuous of the creature to be so sure that God loves her. Maybe He doesn't care that much. Or maybe He doesn't find that your love is enough.
Therefore, I propose that pious means NOT "what or who pleases the gods", but instead: "what or who tries to please the gods". The gods' actual pleasure or displeasure is never to be taken for granted by mere creatures, but given what we think we know of the gods, we believe and hope that such and such actions will please them. That's what to be pious actually means.
I think you're skirting the issue. :cool:
Since you approved of Jesus' impiety (which was pervasive), think about his solution.
However, according to Plato, the source of all goodness and all morality is the Good, i.e., a higher, divine source.
So, it looks like you are contradicting yourself and undermining your own theory.
Sure. The Gods are under no obligation to love you back.
However, the central issue is not the lover of God but the pious, i.e., piety - literally "the pious", to hosion, in the neutral - meaning "that which is good and just".
More like deliberate obfuscation and smoke-and-mirrors tactics. Nothing new there.
I think you still do not understand what is at issue.
Quoting frank
It has nothing to do with my approval of Jesus' impiety. The issue of the Euthyphro is the question of what piety is and what follows from his claim that piety is what the gods love. Despite his claims, he does not know what the gods love and is unable to say why he thinks the gods love what he thinks they love.
As I said:
Quoting Fooloso4
And since God or the gods, if good, do not love what is wrong, then:
Quoting Fooloso4
Why are you bringing Jesus and other Abrahamic religions into a discussion of a work by Plato?
You keep repeating yourself to no avail.
The pious (to hosion) is, by definition, what is sanctioned by the Gods.
Even you should be able to see that it is absurd to claim that the Gods do not love what they sanction.
You can't really assert that without giving an alternate account.
You seemed to want to end it with: 'Socrates didn't know...'
If he didn't know, then he couldn't rule out that it's what the gods love. Just because an argument is circular doesn't mean its premise/conclusion is wrong. Basic logic.
They may well be, but that is not the point. If he wants to ridicule Abrahamic religions then he can rename the thread "Fooloso4's rant against Abrahamic religions". That would be more honest IMO.
However, as it is, the discussion is of a work by Plato who was a Greek philosopher, not a religious Jew or something. Anyway, he isn't getting anywhere with his theory and it's silly to imagine otherwise. Everyone knows that the issue has been debated for centuries and Fooloso4 isn't bringing anything new to it.
Correct. Either Fooloso4 thinks we are stupid or else he's got some psychological or neurological issues that prevent him from realizing the logical implications of his own statements.
I'm not disputing that. I just think @Fooloso4 is making a terrible job of it and he should let someone else do it or just give up on the project and start some other discussion that he can handle a bit better.
That's fine by me. Until next time.
He does not even register Job's concerns as worthy of His attention, 'cause where was Job when God built the world? That's the whole point. The creature cannot box her Creator into a transaction (I'll be pious, and you favor me). The Creator does not have to answer of His acts to His creature, ever, because they don't sit at the same level at all.
Hence the kind of analytic theology you seem to rely on, is foly. God is not bound by human logic.
I agree the happy ending is proforma, like "they lived happily ever after". It's understood by the reader as such, as a mere decorative fig leaf for the nudity of God's unfathomability.
Brings to mind the book of Ahmadou Kourouma: ALLAH IS NOT OBLIGED TO BE FAIR ABOUT ALL THE THINGS HE DOES HERE ON EARTH. It's a book about a child soldier caught in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
A similar thesis is exposed in Candide, e.g. in the Lisbon earthquake when the wicked profit from the calamities hitting the just. God is not obliged to be fair.
That's just one of the things that @Fooloso4 fails to grasp and yet he is trying to teach us.
I think it is obvious that he is unable to establish his case by keeping within the Euthyphro context and is desperately trying to bring Abrahamic religions into it as if that is somehow going to "save" him. And then he is telling us that we shouldn't believe in miracles or religion....
Correct. God is good, but the way or ways in which he manifests his goodness in relation to humans is subject to his own free will, not to human wishes. It would be absurd to claim otherwise.
But you do exactly the same. You too try to box gods into your own logic. You are forgetting that if god(s) created the world, then the logical rules that make you mind go bye were created by them gods, and put into your head by them gods. These rules are not made FOR them but BY them FOR US.
By Socrates' argument and your own example we can say what it is not. That is an important starting point for further inquiry into what it might be. The Socratic dialogues do not give us answers, they help guide us in asking questions.
Quoting frank
Once again:
Quoting Fooloso4
Or do you think God or the gods love what is wrong?
Wrong. I said "good", not "omnibenevolent":
Quoting Apollodorus
That's why I said it is a fallacy to appeal to Abrahamic religions when discussing a work by Plato.
That's exactly what I'm saying.
If you are suggesting that we cannot provide reasonable answers to what God does or allows to happen, then I agree. But a great deal of theology does just that. In addition, all kinds of wonderful things are attributed to God. It is one thing to believe them as a matter of faith, it is quite another to make them the foundation of logical arguments attempting to defend those beliefs.
That's only pointing to more conceptual confusion. I think we can confidently conclude from human experience since Plato that not all pious person is just, and that not all just person is pious.
Yes, I could not agree more.
If there is no definition of terms from the start, then there will be confusion and no debate, for sure.
That's why I said that the terms involved may be interpreted in many different ways.
I for one, was using the dictionary definition. On that definition, it doesn't make sense to say that the Gods don't love what they themselves sanction.
Divine command theory is not normative. It is a metaethical theory - so a theory about what rightness and goodness are in themselves, as opposed to what has them.
The Euthyphro is supposed - but doesn't- to challenge the credibility of divine command theory.
He did make them, but he gives humans the freedom to use them as they think best. And some humans get it wrong. Most of us though, have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong.
That's why you can't prove your point and why it's pointless to try especially since many have tried before you and failed.
So what is the right thing to do about global warming?
How does Socrates warrant us to say what it isn't? The Euthyphro dilemma doesn't.
We ran into this same problem with infinite regression. You thought that if a statement can be seen to be associated with an infinite regress, it must be false. That's not how truth works.
Quoting Fooloso4
Zeus was a serial rapist. God puts people in hell. Of course divinities can love what's wrong. For Greeks, female divinities would tend to prompt you toward evil, but not always.
This is not to deny that the truth of DCT may operate to make some normative theories more likely true than others. The point is that DCT is a different kind of theory to virtue ethics. It's why Ethics - the study of morality - is divided into these two areas of inquiry: normative ethics and metaethics. Rival views to DCT would be metaethical naturalism; non-naturalism; non-cognitivism. Not virtue ethics
I said "most of us have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong" in terms of our personal conduct in society.
I haven't studied global warming but I'd venture to say that communism does not seem likely to be the solution.
Wrong. I do care. I do my best to save energy, recycle stuff, don't smoke, etc. And I vote for politicians I think are serious about finding real solutions.
Anyway, have a nice day. And enjoy your drink.
I had hoped that the straight-thinkers might be dissuaded from posting by binding the discussion to the dialogue, and indeed for a few pages they were. But they are back, muddying the topic with a flood of sludge, apparently in a game of posts-most-wins. Yawn.
Trying to return to my line of thought, pulling a few gems from the muck, I asked Quoting Banno
And the reply was Quoting Janus
Roughly speaking Janus seems to think that because what is beloved by god is what is good, because the two are extensionally equivalent, the dichotomy dissolves. But I think this a slight treatment of the dialogue. It wraps the discussion in comforting bandages of abstraction. That same problem applies to 's cited argument.
Hence the importance of:
Quoting Fooloso4as well as Quoting jorndoe
The dialogue ends in aporia. The considerations of the straight-thinkers have been shown to be irrelevant, indeed antithetical, to the task at hand: defending Socrates against the charge of impiety.
The lesson is the poverty of the self- righteous conviction of the straight-thinker.
In that case they probably aren't pious by the dictionary definition I provided. But putting a 21st-century spin on a work by Plato isn't exactly a solution either.
And it seems so does the thread.
That's a strawman argument; no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. It is in the name of nationalism (in the context of war or conflict between nations), not in the context of religion, that the most people would think murder is acceptable.
Correct. Most murders seem to be motivated by personal conflicts. Nothing to do with religion whatsoever.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deaths-usa-idUSTRE64C53R20100513
Roughly speaking this objection is nebulous and unargued. Can't you do better than that?
In any case mine is not an objection to the argument in the Euthyphro, but to its incoherent co-option by modern anti-theists.
I did:
Quoting Banno
That is the equivalence of the Will of God and the Good doesn't tell us what to do, and so is useless.
This is a rather cold case, and one could argue that Socrates himself didn't do such a great job at this task.
Euthyphro's basic reasoning could be summarized as follows:
1. There are gods
2. The gods are just and always do and want just things
3. If I fear the gods, and do just things, the gods will love me (because 2) and help me
4. Zeus killed his father
5. Therefore killing one's father is pious and just.
6. therefore, from 3 and 5, I am justified in killing my father.
Socrates attacks 2 with some success: several gods sometimes want different things. Gods are not consistent in what they want. He also attacks 3 as transactional, and doubt that any real commerce can exist between the gods and us (see the Book of Job for a biblical parallel).
In the final chapter, he implies that all these arguments above are mere pretense, that Euthyphro wants to kill his father, a crime under any latitude, and that he is simply chosing from the long list of crimes attributed to the gods one that will help him justify his shameful intention.
"Zeus did it too!". With that kind of argument, one could rape quite a few virgins and still feel pious.
That made me laugh.
As soon as your "arguments" are cogently challenged you lose interest and resort to pomposity. That is so disingenuous!
He was impious.
Perhaps Banno is just upset that his plan, for which he hired Fooloso4, hasn't quite worked out as planned.
And thus the dialogue points to the hypocrisy of the kind of "pious" folks who can justify pretty much anything by reference to theology, mythology or scripture. The kind of people who uses pious rhetoric to justify killing their father.
Yes, but that doesn't say anything about true piety and the truly pious.
It is not a strawman, it is an extreme example of why piety must be tempered. In fact, it often has been, but not as the result of piety.
This is true from the perspective of the city, but the gods of the city are not just. If the gods loved justice, however, then Socrates would be a paradigm of piety.
However, that doesn't prove that piety per se is bad or that the Gods don't love piety as you claim.
So it is a strawman.
Per Aristophanes he publicly questioned the existence of the gods. It doesn't get more impious than that
I am in general agreement, but I don't think his motivation was to kill his father. That is in his mind an unavoidable consequence
I do think that part of his motivation was to make a demonstration of his piety and expert knowledge of the gods.
Right, but there is more to it. Neither Aristophanes nor anyone else at that time thought to bring charges against him. It was not regarded as a criminal matter until Meletus brought charges against him. Why he did so is a question better addressed in a discussion of Plato's and Xenophon's apologies.
Socrates does not deny his impiety. His concern is not for the gods but for the city. Again, his concern if for the human things.
I explained this earlier. It was scapegoating that followed the defeat of Athens at the hands of the Spartans.
Quoting Fooloso4
And clouds. He apparently spent a lot of time trying to discover what clouds are.
The argument does work in a monotheist context:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
This is part of it but not the whole story.
Quoting frank
That is the joke from Aristophanes Clouds.
Really? What's the other part?
Right. It's monotheism again. So, what you are saying is that you are unwilling or unable to focus on Plato's text.
Anyway, here are the facts of the matter:
1. Socrates himself says, and Euthyphro agrees, that:
“The loved by the Gods is loved by the Gods because it is loved by the Gods, not loved (by the Gods) because it is loved by the Gods” (10e).
In other words, we cannot say that the Gods love it "because they love it". There must be another reason.
2. Nowhere does Socrates say that “pious” and “loved by the Gods” do not apply to the same things.
3. Socrates’ argument may or may not prove that we cannot define “pious” as “loved by the Gods” if and when the Gods’ reason for loving the pious is that it is pious.
But it does not prove that pious can’t be defined as “loved by the Gods”.
4. So the answer revolves on the reason or reasons for which the Gods love the pious.
You got it all wrong.
Exactly.
Yep. That's why he's been choosing his words carefully and constantly distracting people's attention with nonsensical pronouncements about Abrahamic religions. Apparently, it's the "Jews fault" that Fooloso4 is incapable of understanding a simple text.
A discussion for another time and place. Perhaps you can do a summary of the Apology and we can discuss it.
Socrates was one of many victims of scapegoating following the defeat of Athens.
If I had one piece of advice for you, it would be this: by lifting texts out if the time and place they were written, you end up with wrong conclusions and in the process miss the genius of Plato. Take it however you like
It seems to me that the reply to the god/gods is pretty straight forward, as set out by @Fooloso4. I agree that many will dismiss the argument forthwith, but that there is more to it. I don't agree that your argument - roughly that the will of god and the god are extensionally equivalent so the intensional distinction is irrelevant - works; of course I don't agree, since the terms have distinct uses; I think that line falls to the Naturalistic Fallacy.
I had thought @Olivier5 was making a joke with "Socrates himself didn't do such a great job at this task." - as if Socrates had as his task getting off the charge of impiety, when the opposite is the case.
All might be detailed more thoroughly, given time. Which line interests you the most?
I did not say it does. I said there is more to the story. Start by looking at the other accuser behind Meletus and at Meletus himself.
Quoting frank
Funny coming from the guy who could not grasp the problem of attempting to apply anachronistic terminology to Plato.
Funny that you keep doing it yourself all the time. I don't know why Banno thought it was a good idea to choose you for this thread, to be honest.
I would like to interpose an observation from philosophy of religion if I may. In many discussions, there is equivocation between God and 'the gods'. As you say, the fact that the pantheist gods quarrel among themselves ought not to appear in monotheism, but this can be transposed into the form of the different monotheistic faiths quarreling amongst themselves about God, which amounts to a different version of the same problem.
But I think there is a certain artificiality about that transposition, which is that it still regards God as a god. As soon as you qualify God with the indefinite or definite article ('a' or 'the') you're 'objectifying' the concept, treating God as a 'that' - similar in kind to Zeus or Apollo, but 'the Christian God' as distinct from 'the gods of the Greek pantheon'; 'this god', not 'that god', the 'Christian' God as distinct from 'Allah'. And I think from the perspective of philosophical theology, that is mistaken. Monotheism is not the insistence that God is a superior member of the set of beings hitherto designated 'the gods', although, considering the historical origins of monotheism, that is an all-to-understandable attitude.
About the only modern philosophical theologian who makes this point is Paul Tillich. I won't pursue it here as it's tangential to the dialogue proper, although it is central to many of the interpretations being made here.
Further digression. You may well be correct but my understanding of the Old Testament is the other gods referred to as false gods (Baal, Moloch, etc) are not denied as such, they are just not the true God of the Jews. Forgive the crassness of this comparison but I always took 'the one and only true god' to be analogous to the way film goers describe Connery 'as the one and only true Bond'.. Is there a reference that determines that these other 'false gods' do not exist? Additionally isn't Satan essentially a god too?
Sorry to break it to you but you saying it doesn't make it wrong. You began by telling me the Euthyphro dilemma is metaethics and virture ethics is normative ethics which I presume is what you mean by (comparing) apples with oranges.
I did admit that the above distinction is accurate but then I went on to show you that the metaethics of Euthyphro's dilemma has everything to do with the metaethics of virtue ethics. You're refusing to acknowledge this plain and simple fact. I confess I couldn't articulate my thoughts well, I was zoned out yesterday. With this clarification in place, you might be able to make sense of my previous posts. G'day.
But let’s get back to the Platonic dialogues. As I said in my earlier post on this thread, Socrates is quizzing Euthypro about ‘the gods’ but he also asks about the ‘real form of piety’ - not what makes this or that person a pious person, but what is its essence? I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here. The implication being that, though Socrates might have been sceptical about piety as bestowed by or an attribute of the Gods, he doesn’t doubt that there really is such a thing. But the dialogue ends in uncertainty about its source and nature.
In subsequent history, many Platonic elements were to be incorporated in Christian theology - or taken over wholesale. (Might bear some comparison to what is now disparagingly known as cultural appropriation.) Through that prism, Socrates’ skepticism about the Greek gods is because, the argument would go, he has a nascent awareness of the God who has not yet been revealed in the life of Jesus; that he unconsciously recognises (in modern language), the one God. That, at any rate, would be a Christianised re-telling of it, but I do acknowledge my conjecture has many gaps at this point.
No, I do not understand you. Virtue ethics is a normative theory. It is not a metaethical theory. That is, it is not an analysis of what the goodness of a virtue is, in and of itself.
These are metaethical theories: divine command theory; naturalism; non-naturalism; non-cognitivism
These are normative theories: virtue ethics; consequentialism; deontology; pluralism.
The euthyphro attempts to refute divine command theory - a metaethical theory. It does this - or seems to -be drawing attention to the supposed arbitrariness that would infect morality if it were true.
So that's the issue: is morality rendered arbitrary by a divine command analysis?
I have read Tillich. I think the idea of the ground of being as opposed to a supreme being has its appeal. But I don't think it helps resolve the issue. If for no other reason than it is regarded as one of many different views.
Agreed but it must have a metaethics of its own i.e. it should have some criteria for distinguishing good from bad. In short, that we have virtue ethics implies that there's a metaethical schema underpinning it. That metaethics of virtue ethics is, to my knowledge, all about the character of a virtuous person. The question that any and all virtue ethicists must ask themselves when faced with a moral question is, "what will a virtuous person do?"
Divine command theory is metaethics alright - is goodness whatever god commands or not? - but if one takes the position that goodness is what god commands, then such a position can be considered equivalent to putting one's faith in god's character, god being the perfect virtuous person. Did you get it now?
No, that makes no sense. There is no such thing as a 'metaethics of virtue ethics'. You can be a divine command virtue ethicist; a naturalist virtue ethicist; a non-naturalist virtue ethicist, a non-cognitivist virtue ethicist.
I think you do not really know what a metaethical theory is. Here are two questions:
"What is moral?"
"What is morality?"
Normative theories attempt to answer the first. Metaethical the second.
Virtue ethics is an answer - a much disputed answer - to the first question, not the second. (And its answer is "that which a virtuous person would do" or some such.
Divine command theory is an answer - a much disputed answer - to the second question. And its answer is "God's commands and approvals" or some such.
He does ask about the 'idea' and 'eidos' of piety, that is, the Form. If the Form or Kind can be identified then it can be determined whether what Euthyphro is doing is pious. But the Form is not discovered. As with the Form of the Good and the other Forms the best we can do is discuss what we think it looks like. 'Look' is another term for Form.
See my discussion of Socrates 'second sailing' in the Phaedo thread. Socrates says he is unable to see the things themselves and resorts to speech, to hypothesis, to images of things.
Normative ethics question: Is there good/bad in virtue ethics?
Answer: Of course there is, that's why it's an ethical theory i.e. it's supposed to guide our actions, ethically speaking.
Metaethics question: What is good/bad in virtue ethics? In other words, how do virtue ethicists distinguish good from bad?
Answer: All one has to do to get an idea of how one should behave is ask, "what would a virtuous person do in this situation?" To cut to the chase, in virtue ethics, good/bad are about a virtuous person's character/identity.
The Euthyphro dilemma: The metethical question, is what God commands good or not? If one believes that what God commands is good then, that goodness must be entirely part of God's character/identity. In other words, in the metaethical matter of Divine command theory, the question we should ask ourselves when faced with a moral issue is, "what would God do in this situation?"
Does it make sense now?
Metaethics of Virtue ethics: What will a virtuous person want us to do in a given situation? Focus on the character/identity of a virtuous person
Metaethics of Divine command theory: What will God want us to do in a given situation? Focus on the character/identity of God.
I can't make it clearer than that.
No, that's not a question in metaethics. The metaethicist wants to know what goodness itself is - what's it made of. So, not what has it. But what it is made of.
That's exactly what I said, right? Every ethical theory brings with it its own brand of goodness.
Virtue ethics is a theory about how goodness is distributed - it is about what has it.
A metaethical theory is a theory about what goodness itself is - what the property of goodness reduces to, if anything.
This is a theory about where a cake is: there is a cake in my cupboard.
This is a theory about what a cake is made of: a cake is made of flour and eggs and sugar and shit (by which I mean, some other shit, not actual shit - unless it is a shit cake)
The latter is equivalent to a metaethical theory about goodness, the former a normative theory about where you find it.
Where are cakes? Aisle three.
What are cakes? Combinations of flour and eggs and sugar and shit.
Where is goodness found? Character traits
What is goodness? The valuing activity of God.
It says that piety can be used to justify any crime, even the most disgusting. And that is true.
Of course. Most people today would think the Athenians wrong to prosecute Socrates for impiety, so nobody needs to defend Socrates against the charge of impiety today. He already won in the tribunal of history. And back then, Socrates himself didn't seem particularly interested in saving his neck by placating the pious.
I've already addressed that, but it seems you never pay attention.
Do you think it's important to be pious?
Your suspicion is absolutely correct and has been discussed by Louis Mix in ?? ?? ????? in the Meno and Euthyphro” (1970) and others.
This is a very important point that actually solves the puzzle. The apprehension of the forms is not "dim" at all.
Plato introduces the concept of the “idea” or “form” right from the start, by making Socrates ask what is the characteristic quality (idea) possessed by pious things (5d).
Euthyphro says that piety is “what the Gods love”.
Socrates does not dispute this. He merely asks whether (a) the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious or (b) it is pious because it is loved by the Gods (10a).
Euthyphro says that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious, not pious because it is loved (by the Gods) (10d).
Socrates and Euthyphro agree that:
“The loved by the Gods is loved by the Gods (a) because it is loved by the Gods, not (b) loved (by the Gods) because it is loved by the Gods” (10e).
Socrates explains that we cannot say that the Gods love the loved by the Gods “because they love it”. Otherwise put, we cannot say that the pious is loved by the Gods “because it is pious”.
Indeed, the dictionary definition of the Greek word for “pious”, hosion, is “sanctioned or approved by the Gods”. “Loved by the Gods” is the same as “sanctioned or approved by the Gods”.
Therefore, whilst we can define pious as “loved by the Gods”, we cannot say that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious (or that the sanctioned/approved by the Gods is sanctioned/approved by the Gods because it is sanctioned/approved by the Gods).
The Gods must perceive some feature or features in the pious other than (or in addition to) its being pious.
What might these features be?
It may be answered that some of these features are goodness and justice.
The materialists may use this to argue that in that case goodness and justice are moral standards that are independent of the Gods, thus rendering the Gods unnecessary for moral guidance (and, therefore, redundant).
However, this argument is baseless in an Ancient Greek (Platonic) context. Justice is a manifestation of the divine principle of Justice (the Goddess Dike or Justitia) and goodness is a manifestation of the creator of the universe who according to Plato is good.
Thus Goodness and Justice are divine properties, Forms or Ideas.
Essentially then, the pious is that which is loved by the Gods because it is good, just and divine.
Humans may still be pious in the wrong, or impious, way. But this is only due to an incomplete or incorrect understanding and/or application of the concept, idea or form of piety.
PS It may also be noted that Greek culture itself had a tendency to personify abstract concepts or universals. Time was personified by Cronus, Justice by Dike, Love and Beauty by Aphrodite, Sleep by Hypnos, Death by Thanatos, etc. So, the concept of eternal, ideal Forms or Patterns was in a sense implicit in Greek thought (which is why Plato found it a convenient device for communicating his thoughts).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11055/from-matter-to-intellect-to-the-forms-the-ascent-to-the-one-according-to-platonic-tradition
@Banno. @Fooloso4
Read Apollodorus' explanation above. This is correct.
If you read my OP you would see that except for the last part about the divine principle of justice I addressed the issues cited in this Master's thesis.
From the OP:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
As to Forms or Ideas of Goodness and Justice, a good deal of important scholarly work (and by that I do not mean a Master's thesis written 50 years ago) has been done on the Forms. If we believe Socrates when he says that he is ignorant about divine things, possessing human rather than divine wisdom, then a "divine principle of Justice" is not something he has knowledge of. In addition, a Form is not a principle.
Quoting Fooloso4
So Plato was faithfully taking dictation? No scholar believes that.
We're reading Plato (or someone who slipped his own work into the Platonic collection).
So believing Socrates isn't a relevant issue.
Anyway, this should be about the Euthyphro challenge to DCT's credibility. And the challenge is that moral content will be arbitrary if it is constitutively determined by God's attitudes.
Craig's 'solution' does not begin to work.
There is no sensible way for the DCT to deny that the content of morality can vary if DCT is true.
My way of dealing with it is best and works. God is Reason and Reason is God. Therefore it is conceptually confused to think any change in morality's content could be arbitrary.
One does not, then, deny the possibility of content change - for God is all powerful and so of course he can make sadism a virtue or lying right if he so wished - one denies that such variation could ever correctly be described as arbitrary.
This leaves another challenge, closely related to the previous one - so much so that many conflate the two. And that is that moral truths appear to be necessary, whereas they would be contingent if DCT is true.
Again, the correct strategy here is not - pace most contemporary theists- to accept the necessary status of moral truths and attempt to ground this in some necessity pertaining to God. The correct strategy is to deny the reality of any metaphysical necessity, for no necessity is compatible with God, moral or otherwise.
Have you also considered the consequence of this fact, which is that we cannot rely on piety alone to justify anything. Piety is not a good enough standard to ensure that we act justly.
If no scholar believes such things why bring it up? It seems you are trying to find something to dispute. When it turns out that what I have said is in agreement with the authorities you cite, you skip over that and fabricate a point of contention.
It makes no sense to say that believing Socrates isn't a relevant issue. These are Socratic dialogues. The dialogues point to Socrates' irony. To understand his irony we need to do more than just accept what he appears to be saying.
More to the point, if in the dialogue Socrates says he has no knowledge of divine things then we need to consider how he might respond to claims of "divine principles". Socrates says he is wiser that others because he at least knows that he does not know. Others, he says, do not even know that they do not know. In other words, no one has knowledge of divine principles. To accept them as things know and known by having been told the myths is to be ignorant of your ignorance.
Quoting frank
And yet Plato never speaks in the dialogues.
To point to the ancient Greek context and culture as if this provides the answers is to exhibit a complete lack of understanding of Socratic philosophy. Socrates does not accept the gods of the city. He banishes the poets, those who create the myths of the gods, from the just city. He is not defined by culture and context. He can only be understood in his opposition to them.
I'm trying to explain to you that we're reading Plato's ideas. Not Socrates'.
Quoting Fooloso4
:meh:
@Banno You're not helping this guy get his head on straight. You could, you know.
There is no point talking to Fooloso4 because as I said from the start and as has become more than obvious since, he's got a very specific political agenda.
Anyway, ????? eidos which Plato uses in his Theory of Forms means “that which is seen, e.g., form, image, shape but also fashion, sort, kind
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/?????
Plato in the Euthyphro introduces the concept of idea (idea) early on, followed by eidos and paradeigma, i.e., exactly what later emerges in the Theory of Forms:
1. Socrates asks “what is the idea possessed by pious things” (5d).
2. Socrates asks “what is the eidos by which all pious acts are pious” (6d).
3. Socrates asks “what is this idea that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a paradeigma” (6e).
It is clear that this comes very close to the later and more developed concept of “idea”, “form” or “pattern”.
So, we can identify three basic stages of the concept of forms:
1. As found in deities personifying certain virtues such as Justice, Beauty, etc.
2. As found in more abstract form in the Meno and Euthyphro.
3. As found in more developed form in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus.
We are not reading Plato's ideas. Some of us, at least, are reading Plato's dialogues.
In the Second Letter Plato says he has made Socrates "young and beautiful (noble)". I will leave it to you to work out what that might mean.
In the Seventh Letter Plato says: "There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be."
There is no consensus on the legitimacy of the Letters, but I think they accurately represent Plato's dialogues.
There is no need for you to explain these things to me. I am well aware of them and have discussed them on many threads here and elsewhere.
From an earlier post, in response to Wayfarer:
Quoting Fooloso4
Only I did not learn these things by copying and pasting from Wiki. I spent many years reading Plato, starting long before there were such things as Wiki and google. I did so formally in school and on my own with the use of secondary material that at the time was marginalized but is now becoming mainstream.
And your point is what exactly?
1. The point that Euthyphro may represent an early form of the Theory of Forms has been made for many years in academic publications. That's precisely why it shouldn't be lightly dismissed.
2. Plato has been read by millions of people worldwide. But there is no point reading Plato if you keep insisting on reading him in a narrow materialist or nihilist light. Plato was neither a materialist nor a nihilist and even less a fanatic.
You sound like you are stuck in a bygone era and are intellectually too set in your ways to move on. But that's your problem, not anyone else's.
The fact is that terms like idea (“idea”), eidos (“form”), auto to (“(thing) in itself”), paradeigma (“pattern”), etc., occur time and again in Plato’s dialogues.
In the Euthyphro we can also see how the dialogue shifts from the pious (to hosion) to piety (hosiotes), i.e., in the same general direction leading eventually to the "forms" in other dialogues.
Therefore, as a number of scholars have observed, dialogues like the Euthyphro are a possible base for identifying an “earlier Theory of Forms”. So, it isn’t anything new.
Quite possibly, Plato himself and his contemporaries, or at least his followers, saw it this way. If they did, then it is legitimate for us to see it in the same way. Pretty simple, really. I don't see why anyone would object unless they've got an agenda.
My point is that I learned to read books. Rather than being fed information, reading requires active participation, trying to think along with what is said, examining, interpreting, reexamining, and reinterpreting. Seeing how well all the parts fit and operate together in the interpretation and how the interpretation sheds light on the whole.
Quoting Apollodorus
And what do you make of this? How does it shed light on the text? In the dialogue Parmenides, a mature work,Plato presents the young Socrates' theory of Forms, which Parmenides demolishes. The Euthyphro takes place when he was 70 years old. The dramatic chronology is more revealing that any theory of the development of Plato's theory of Forms.
Quoting Apollodorus
Nice speech but irrelevant. Your accusations are misguided. I attempt to read the dialogues, to the extent this is possible, on their own terms. Following the action and arguments. If this does not conform to the Plato you desire to find that is your problem.
Quoting Apollodorus
You really are clueless. You appeal to Neo-Platonism. Do you think 'neo' means new in the 21st century?You cite someone's Master's thesis written in 1970 but are unaware of the scholarship being done around that time up and until the present that informs my own interpretation. This scholarship has only relatively recently gained widespread acceptance, precisely because it overturns the conventional scholarship of a bygone era.
Quoting Apollodorus
Actually, the opposite is the case. When I first read Plato I read him in a way you would not doubt find conducive. It was only years later that I began to see how problematic the conventional view is.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes, and I have frequently pointed this out. That these terms are there is obvious. How we are to understand them is not so obvious.
I think our main difference is that you see the outcome of the dialogue as a life-long quest, searching in the darkness, so to speak, for what constitutes righteousness.
Apollodorus and I are cheating because we both know quite a bit about how this will play out over the next 2400 years. If you're concerned about how that skews our viewpoints, I understand that.
If you want to take a new turn in interpretation, I think that's fine. You just need to make sure the new turn makes sense. If you're satisfied that it does, then good.
Quoting Apollodorus
I see it as broader than the forms. With Plato, we're starting to partake of the divine. Gotta focus elsewhere. Cool talking to you.
I think the point I was making was very easy to understand and entirely reasonable. If Plato and his disciples were to read the Euthyphro, would they, or would they not think of the forms when coming across words like eidos, idea, paradigma, etc.? If they would, then so can we. Nothing to do with "neo-Platonism" which, by the way, is a pejorative term.
Incidentally, your constant diatribes against monotheism in a discussion of Platonic dialogues clearly shows that you've got a political agenda and have no interest in an objective discussion. This is not the first time either.
I know many people who have read Plato, many of them in the Greek original. Apart from you, I'm not aware of anyone who feels they deserve a medal for that. It doesn't matter where knowledge comes from. Everyone uses Internet sources these days. I bet you're doing it yourself though you may not be wiling to admit it.
I mentioned Louis Mix for no other reason than to illustrate the fact that seeing an early Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro and other dialogues is nothing new. There are, of course, others like Prof R Allen, etc.
You keep claiming that "it is not obvious how to understand terms like eidos, idea, etc." Yet the minute someone proposes an interpretation that goes against your agenda, you suddenly "know beyond reasonable doubt" that this is not what Plato intended to convey.
The fact remains that dialogues like the Euthyphro leave many questions open. This not only justifies but positively invites a variety of interpretations and answers. And as I said, the question is how would Plato and his immediate followers read the dialogues. In the light of this, I don't think that my suggestions are too far of the mark.
I don't dispute that.
I do not think Socrates was searching in the darkness. I don't see how anyone who knows the works of Plato and Xenophon would think such a thing.
Quoting frank
It seems your need to congratulate yourself is being bought at the cost of underestimating me.
Then why end in aporia?
Of course they would. Eidos and idea are translated as Forms in English.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is completely unfounded. I am going to let my posts speak for themselves.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is bullshit. I started a thread on Plato, you and Frank attacked it. I started another thread and you and Frank attacked it. Neither of you know enough about Plato to know how misguided and uninformed your constant attacks are. The simple fact of the matter is that I happen to know a great deal more about Plato than both of you put together. I have the degrees to back that up. I don't need a medal, I would however like you to [edit].
I am thinking about starting a thread on the Socratic way of philosophy -his "second sailing", aporia, and what to do with knowledge of ignorance. I think it is still a viable way of life today.
I hesitate though because I am tired of the incessant yapping of little dogs under foot.
Goat has been gotten. My work is done.
Is this what you think philosophy is about? I have spent a good deal of time and effort trying to address what you have said. I thought you were arguing in good faith. I now see that I was wrong. I won't make that mistake again.
I was kidding. No, I entered the conversation because you had gone off the rails into the Torah.
It seemed we needed to talk about what this thing called piety was: what life and death issues were attached to it, how we might compare piety with science as a way to shape events.
Then I noticed you wanted Socrates to be a humanist, so I asked you how he would determine righteousness. You said he would muddle along. :lol:
Ok. I get your point. Philosophize in peace. No harm intended. Just know: you are not recognized as a teacher here.
Well, then, if Plato and his immediate disciples would think of "forms" on coming across words like eidos, idea and paradeigma, etc., in the Euthyphro, then for what reason can't we do the same?
Even if we deny that there is an early Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro, the dialogue is unquestionably concerned with justice. Euthyphro himself says that piety is a part of justice. Justice is good. Therefore, piety is clearly connected with both justice and goodness which are divine attributes (see Goddess Dike, etc.).
So, it can’t be wrong to say that the Gods love piety because of its association with divine attributes such as goodness and justice.
My argument is still correct. In fact, you haven’t refuted any part of it.
And, of course, your comments are intended to ridicule Abrahamic religions as is your use of derogatory terms like "neo-Platonism" and other invectives. You sound like a very bitter old man.
A work in progress. Sorry if it messes up the discourse.
Quoting Bartricks
Agreed but you might want to take a closer look at the appropriateness of the word "arbitrary" in your statement above. Hint: Is there any moral theory till date that's managed to invent/discover a comprehensive moral formula that can be applied in a mechanical manner to all moral issues such that it always outputs a course of action that's unambiguously good. By moral formula I refer to a rule that when applied to an ethical question will spit out the answer as to what we should do given a particular situation; some examples of moral formulae are Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI) (Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law) and Bentham's Greatest Happiness Principle (One must always act so as to produce the greatest aggregate happiness among all sentient beings, within reason).
I wouldn't be wrong if I say that given no moral formula seems to cover all the bases, something that seems to be a requirement for any moral theory to gain currency, our only option, our last resort, is to approach the issue of good/bad on a case by case basis i.e. we have to exercise our rationality instead of relying on a moral formula. How different will this approach in which each ethical issue is treated as unique and requiring a solution tailored to it be from one that's arbitrary in nature? In both cases, you won't find a pattern in the way moral issues are judged, something that could be abstracted as a moral formula however the crucial difference between them is that one utilizes rationality and the other doesn't. At this point your statement below,
Quoting Bartricks
enters the picture so to speak. The first point to be noted is that rationality (reason) = morality for reasons cited above - our only workable solution to moral matters is to exercise reason/rationality - the moral universe doesn't seem to function under a unified, single moral formula, forcing us as it were to treat every single situation as deserving of a solution specific to it which, if the solution is to distinguish itself from mere arbitrariness, requires the exercise of rationality/reason. Thus, if God = Reason, as you seem to be saying, God = morality itself [Reason = Morality & God = Reason. Hence, Morality = God] and the Euthyphro dilemma is no longer a problem. It isn't the case that God's commands are arbitrary, it isn't the case that anything goes and if one feels this way it's only because both morality that's arbitrary and morality that gives due consideration to features unique to individual cases are missing a moral formula the likes Bentham's greatest happiness principle.
As you can see, if one refuses to accept the absence of a moral formula in morality, we could justifiably say that the moral formula = reason/rationality itself; after all, we're endorsing the use of reason/rationality in all moral issues despite the fact that we agreed that each one of them be treated as unique enough to require a solution that's meant for it and it alone.
At this point Kant and his CI comes in. The CI basically states that immorality is irrational given that it leads to contradictions. According to Kant, immorality is an affront to reason/rationality - they're contradictions. It's very similar to what we said earlier: Reason = Morality but in an entirely different context. When we said Reason = Morality (see vide supra), we were talking about the absence of a moral formula like Bentham's greatest happiness principle but in the case of Kant's stand that immorality is irrational or, conversely, morality is rational (Morality = Rationality), the CI is a proposed moral formula.
How can we make sense of this? On the one hand, Reason = Morality means there is no moral formula (like Bentham's greatest happiness principle) and on the other hand, Kant claims that Reason = Morality because there is a moral formula (Kant's CI). It's a paradox.
Regarding the paradox above, all I can say is if Kant's CI is applied universally, we can achieve a perfectly moral world and Reason = Morality. In case Kant's CI is either not applied at all or only partially in effect, we would need to tackle moral issues rationally even if individually as opposed to applying the moral formula CI and again Reason = Morality. To make the long story short, whether Kant's CI is being followed or not, Reason = Morality and that's revelation insofar as I'm concerned. There's probably more that can be said but I'll leave that as an exercise.
Now, let's revisit the Euthyphro dilemma. It seems the right thing to do. Reason = Morality. We've established that above. The metaethics of virtue ethics states that the prime virtue is reason/rationality. God is the most virtuous being and so must be the perfection of reason/rationality i.e. God = Reason. Therefore, because Reason = Morality and God = Reason, God = Morality. Thus, against the backdrop of virtue ethics, the Divine Command Theory is validated - something is good because God (Reason itself, Morality itself) commands it.
Not even as a student. All he's got to offer is a big chip on his shoulder. Doesn't understand Greek, uses fake "translations", leaves out inconvenient bits of text, puts a materialist spin on everything, and then pretends to take offense when others contradict him. His problems seem to be more psychological than philosophical. But I could be wrong.
Perhaps in theory, but evidently not in practice. "You can't teach an old dog new tricks" is probably an apt description of him. But, as Frank says, he can continue the discussion on his own.
Good luck then.
Thank you. I have decided I will no longer respond to those who are here only to bicker.
In fact, I thought of using you as an example of how philosophically and emotionally mature people can disagree. We go way back and often disagree but we always present our reasons for the position we hold, and listen respectfully.
Thank you. If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo.
I don't think we should read too much into that.
The principal purpose of Platonic dialogues is to encourage critical thought leading to rational conclusions instead of unexamined beliefs.
Of course each dialogue should be read on its own terms, but I think it would be absurd to take it to be totally unconnected with ideas expressed in other dialogues.
Turning to the gods (or more precisely priests) to learn what righteousness demands is moral externalism. Things are changing, though.
True, the forms are independent, but we seem to know them by an internal source. Socrates is said to have followed an internal voice, so with Phaedo, Meno, and to some extent Euthyphro, we have a rising tide of internalism: justifications can be found within.
To the east of Athens, the Persians are also headed toward the idea that you're born with the knowledge of good and evil. It could be that Plato knew about that, or it could just be convergent evolution.
Do you agree with any of that?
Er, I did. I was describing the Euthyphro challenge to DCT. Not making it. Describing it. I think the Euthyphro challenge fails. It fails precisely because God's edicts and attitudes will not be arbitrary. Why?
Because arbitrary means 'without reason'.
God is Reason. (Not God is morality - morality is a set of prescriptions and valuings, not an agent - God is Reason, the issuer of those prescriptions and the valuer).
So God's edicts and values are not 'without reason'. They define the content of reason. Thus they are the benchmark against which arbitrariness is measured.
Quoting TheMadFool
I do not understand your meaning there.
Quoting TheMadFool
There is no such thing as a metaethics of virtue ethics. I've already explained that they are fundamentally different kinds of theory. You're just persisting in thinking they're two sides of the same coin. They're not.
If divine command theory is true, then virtue ethics may be true too. The point the Euthyphro makes is that virtue ethics - or whichever normative theory is actually true - would be true arbitrarily.
Virtue ethics may be true today. But tomorrow utilitarianism might be true. And the day after, deontology. And so on.
That's the Euthyphro problem.
It isn't a problem. But no matter how good the evidence may be that virtue ethics is true (and there isn't good evidence of this - it's false), it will not do anything to overcome the Euthyphro. For all you will have shown is that God approves of certain character traits and wants us to cultivate them and express them in our actions. To which the critic will simply say "so? the criticism I am making is that whichever normative theory is true today, it is true due to the arbitrary whims of God". Replying "yes, but virtue ethics is true" will not address their concern.
Showing that God is Reason and thus arbiter of what is and what is not arbitrary, overcomes the problem. Not because it establishes 'reason' as a virtue (presumably that virtue being the virtue of listening to and following Reason). But because her attitudes constitutively determine what is and is not arbitrary. So whether something is arbitrary or not is in her gift. The buck stops with her.
Thank you. I'm not much into Plato to be honest, but your summary in the OP was well done, a very decent work of extracting the gist, and I know that is difficult to do. You made this one dialogue alive for me. I went back and read it, found the conclusion quite witty although the dialogue procédé is tiresome at times.
Also I owe you one because I misunderstood you at first in this thread.
So yes, I'll check your Phaedo thread.
There is no reason why I should disagree with any of it. In fact, I have been saying that myself. There was a general movement from the concrete to the abstract and thus from the external to the internal. When we analyze external reality in mathematical terms as Pythagoras did, we internalize it.
Interiorization of consciousness is central in Plotinus but it started with Plato. The direction is absolutely clear. It describes the journey of return from the periphery of the circle or sphere of reality back to the center. The external Gods are interiorized and replaced with ideas, forms or patterns leading to the unfathomable and indescribable One within us and above us.
It may well be possible to see this in latent form in the Euthyphro. In fact, as already noted, we can be certain that Plato himself and his immediate disciples saw it this way. But this is far from explicitly stated and it doesn’t change much about my central argument.
Socrates has refuted Euthyphro’s belief that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious, but not that the pious is pious because it is loved by the Gods. As that is the definition of "the pious" (to hosion), he cannot reject it, and nor does he attempt to.
He does not deny the existence of the Gods, either. Therefore, it stands to reason to say that the Gods love the pious because it is good and just, at the very least. And because the good and the just are attributes or properties of the divine, we may even say that the Gods love or approve of the pious because it is divine.
Though the dialogue appears to end in “aporia”, this is no reason to claim that it has nothing else to offer and that we can’t draw any positive conclusions from it other than atheism and nihilism as some seem to do here.
In the Phaedrus Socrates says of a well structured speech:
Plato does the same for his dialogues. They are wholes with all the parts having a function and working together. It is up to the reader to see the whole and how the parts fit together, to make it more than just inanimate words on a page, but as something alive.
To show that the whole issue of piety is silly.
In a monotheist setting, you need to start with the premise that God sets all the terms.
As such, good is what God says is good.
Phrasings like "stuff is good because it is loved by god" or "stuff is loved by god because it is good" are not consistent with classical monotheism. They're formulations that are consistent with a demigod, ie. an inferior god who doesn't set all the terms.
I think Socrates is taking issue with wrong interpretations of piety, not piety itself.
I think the - shall we say - irreligious reading of Plato is owed to the irreligious nature of today's culture. It's not that Plato was 'a believer' - I think he would have firmly rejected any such designation. It's more that there is a latent and sometimes explicit philosophical spirituality in many of the dialogues which sits uncomfortably with our secular age. And because of the non-dogmatic nature of the dialogues, then they are, for that very reason, open to a variety of interpretations - one of the great things about Plato.
Some notes from an excellent introductory essay on Plato's dialogues:
[quote=Rafael Demos, Introduction to Plato: Selections; http://www.ditext.com/demos/plato.html]Plato hardly claims the power to grasp absolute truth for himself. Very often, when approaching the territory of final metaphysical ideas, he abandons the style of logical exposition for that of myth or poetry. There is something characteristically unfinished about his thought; he eschews neat systems and his intuitions often jostle one another. By contrast, the works of any commonplace thinker leave an impression of extreme artificiality in their orderly array of premises leading inevitably to the one possible conclusion. That is not -- one reflects -- how the thinker actually arrived at the solution; those neat proofs do not represent the complex processes of his mind in its fumbling quest. Only after he had worked out his thought to its conclusion, did he conceive of the systematic pattern which he sets down in his book. Nor is he really as pleased with the solution as he claims to be; in his mind, the conclusion is rather a tentative answer standing uncertainly against a background of aggressive alternatives impatient to replace it. Now, in Plato's works, we have not the manufactured article, but the real thing; we have the picture of a mind caught in the toils of thinkings we get the concrete process by which he struggled to a conclusion, the hesitation amongst the thousand different standpoints, the doubts and the certainties together. The dialogues are, each one, a drama of ideas; in their totality, they depict the voyage of a mind in which any number of ports are visited before the anchor is finally cast. And at the end, it is as though the ship of thought were unable to stay in the harbor but had to cast anchor outside; for according to Plato the mind must be satisfied with a distant vision of the truth, though it may grasp reality intimately at fleeting intervals.[/quote]
Towards the end of this essay (published 1927) Demos notes that Plato and Platonism have rather fallen from favour:
These strains of thought are clearly discernible in a good deal of the discussion on this forum. But I think part of the learning is to be able to recognise it without the need to leap in and try to set others straight (a temptation that I, of course, often succumb to).
Anyway, take all this as a footnote to the discussion.
The question of whether Plato (and Socrates) were actually monotheistic is a vexed one. I think the most straight-forward reading is that they were not - at least, monotheism is not an explicit theme in this dialogue. But as I noted previously in this thread, because of the subsequent adoption (or appropriation) of Plato by the Greek-speaking theologians, then it's common to read monotheism into the dialogues even if it's not explicitly present.
One more footnote, on the dialectic of belief and un-belief. Because of the constitution of the Christian faith, religion is to all intents equated with belief as distinct from knowledge, in Western culture. Christianity is a doxastic religion as distinct from a form of philosophical rationalism or gnosticism. The latter seeks to 'ascend' to a higher perspective, as it were, through the disciplined analysis of ideas traced to their origin. Christianity rejects that in favour of 'simple faith' which is open to all. The distinctive problem of post-Christian culture is that the platonic kind of philosophical spirituality is automatically characterised along with belief and rejected on that account. That is the dialectic of belief and un-belief that underlies many of the debates. See Metaphysical Mistake, Karen Armstrong.
Thanks for the quotes. I would like you to consider the following.
Euthyphro makes the following key statements regarding piety:
1. Zeus, the supreme God, is the best and most just of the Gods. Therefore, Zeus should be the standard for what constitutes pious human behavior.
2. People agree that the above is the case.
3. Piety is that which is loved (or approved) by the Gods.
4. Piety is a part of justice.
5. The Gods love the pious because it is pious.
6. Piety is to prosecute wrongdoers, i.e., those who are impious, whoever they may be.
7. Not to prosecute wrongdoers is impiety.
8. Piety is what he is doing now, i.e., prosecuting his father.
9. His views of piety and his actions are backed by the law.
Whilst Socrates appears to be critical of Euthyphro’s views, we cannot overlook or ignore the fact that he criticizes some points but not others.
Significantly, Socrates disputes particular actions attributed to Zeus, but not that Zeus should serve as the standard of human conduct.
Similarly, Socrates disputes certain points such as that the Gods love the pious because it is pious, but he does not dispute that the pious is pious because it is loved or approved by the Gods, etc.
What this logically means if we put all the above together, is that Socrates has no intention to denigrate piety or to demolish Euthyphro’s beliefs about piety – which he could easily do were this his intention – but simply to look for a more universal, unified, and better thought-out definition of piety.
It follows that the “aporia” is only apparent. If we think it through keeping in mind the cultural and religious context as well as related views held by Socrates and Plato as expressed in other dialogues, everything becomes clear: Socrates wants to establish what true piety is but wants the reader to come to the right conclusion following Socrates’ pointers.
Arguments along these lines have been made by Prof Diamond and others. I don't think they should be dismissed out of hand.
Eli Diamond, Philosophical Piety in Plato's Euthyphro - Academia.edu
This surprised me. The dialogues are mimesis, an imitation of act of thinking. The dialogues are highly crafted wholes.
Times have certainly changed. There is now a great deal of attention being paid to Plato. There is a difference, at least with regard to one approach to the dialogues. These scholars reject "Platonizing".
As to a "theory of knowledge", I have started a new thread "Socratic Philosophy. I will be discussing this in light of his "second sailing". Bottom line, Plato does not have a theory of knowledge.
Sure, but I think major parts of his philosophy is still out of harmony with today's zietgeist, pretty much as Demos says.
Quoting Apollodorus
Thanks, that's an interesting paper, I shall read it.
The Demos essay was published in 1929. I don't think the zeitgeist then, either in general of in philosophy, is today what it was then. But perhaps you are right about today. I don't keep up with the journals. I used to read Richard Marshalls interviews on 3 AM though, and my impression is that there is that things are pretty eclectic these days. I tend to look at what interests me, which is probably not representative of the mainstream if such a thing still exists or of current trends.
Plato's is a broad all-encompassing philosophy, How much new has been invented since to be philosophized over? The zeitgeist is the opposite. In the analytic quest for veritability philosophy has become so specialized that most of the subject is missing in action.
No argument from me! A lot of the reaction is driven by the fear of religion. As Plato became appropriated into theology, then he’s become a victim in the culture wars. Caught in the crossfire, you could say.
It was the age of essence. We're in the information age. The mechanical age stands between us and Plato.
Philosophical flint? :chin:
Concisely put, what we see in the Euthyphro is not that Socrates wants Euthyphro to give up the concept of piety. On the contrary, he wants Euthyphro to develop a broader and more precise definition that stands to reason and that, as we shall see, conveys a very profound Platonic teaching.
Socrates wants Euthyphro to expand his definition of piety from “that which is loved by the Gods” to “that which is loved by all the Gods (i.e., the divine)” and from there to what the actual nature of piety is.
Socrates starts in the role of student and keeps asking Euthyphro to teach him about piety.
Euthyphro eventually says that piety is a kind of justice
What kind of justice?
Of the kind that is pleasing to the Gods.
Socrates at this point assumes the role of teacher and suggests that piety is a form of justice that assists the Gods in achieving an act. What might this act be?
Euthyphro insists that piety is knowing how to speak and act in a way that is pleasing to the Gods.
Socrates suggests that piety must be the science of putting requests and giving returns to them (or giving and asking).
Euthyphro exclaims that Socrates understands him well.
Socrates agrees and explains that the reason he understands Euthyphro so well is that he pays close attention to everything Euthyphro says so that “nothing shall fall to the ground” (14d)
“Fall to the ground” means nothing else than “be rendered invalid”. In other words, Euthyphro’s words are accepted as valid. The concept of piety as something that is of service to the Gods stands. It only needs clarification.
The only thing that remains in need of clarification is (a) “what is the divine?” (ti esti to theion) and (b) “what is the act or work in the accomplishment of which piety can assist?”
The answer is that (a) the divine is the nous (a key conception in Plato) and that (b) its function or “work” (to ergon) is to apprehend the Platonic ideas.
Therefore, the service that piety renders to the Gods lies in aiding them to perform their “work” or function of apprehending the ideas.
The definition of “the pious” (to hosion) depends in the first place on the definition of “the Gods” and in the second on the definition of the “divine work” (to ergon) that piety is supposed to assist.
This is the true intent of the dialogue, to uphold the principle of piety whilst endowing it with a deeper, Platonic meaning.
W Gerson Rabinowitz, Platonic Piety: An Essay towards the Solution of an Enigma, Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1958), pp. 108 -120.
I think this would be an acceptable and rather neat solution (though variations of it are possible). What do you think?
My sincere thanks go out to Daniel Bonevac for teaching a very crucial fact regarding the very first steps taken by the Greek philosophers, particulary Socrates, the founding father of Western philosophy. Bonevac in a video, sorry the link to it is unavailable at the moment, were in, not surprisingly, linguistics, to be precise definitions. What use is thinking/talking/writing if we're, well, talking past each other and every disagreement we have is merely a verbal dispute as opposed to a genuine/authentic one?
Socrates was mostly concerned with definitions - piety, justice, to name a few. This might please @Banno to no end but did Socrates anticipate Wittegenstein and the linguistic turn in philosophy? Bonevac's assessment suggests that though he doesn't seem to realize that's what he's doing.
Just curious but have we talked about this before? Some of the posters here seem to have the ability to anticipate my thoughts! How remarkable. I'm going to sign all of you up for paranormal experiments. :joke:
What's the principle of piety?
When Socrates asks: "what is piety?" or "what is justice?" he is not simply asking for a dictionary definition. The question "what is X?" is the question of what it is by which we can know that in all cases something is or is not X. If we know what a triangle is then we are able to identify whether a particular figure is a triangle. If Euthyphro knows what piety itself is then he will be able to determine whether what he is about to do in the name of piety is pious or impious. If we know what justice itself is then there would be no dispute as to whether some action is just or not.
But it is not so straight forward. In the Republic it is agreed that justice is "minding your own business" (433b). What is and is not your own business? Plato does not provide complete answers to the "what is X?" questions. Instead he guides our own inquiry.
You're going round in circles I'm afraid. Socrates wants to know what piety is? Another way of asking the same question is, what is the definition of piety?
It is the principle that guides our actions or standard by which we measure them.
Piety is defined by Socrates as "that which is of service to the Gods".
In everyday life, "service to the Gods" is worshiping, sacrificing, obeying the laws, observing the customs, etc.
In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self.
In other words, "minding our own business" or attending to our divine self all the way to the final goal which is self-realization or union with the One.
From Merriam Webster.
Piety:
This is not particularly helpful. 1a points to the problem of Euthyphro's actions. Is his obligation to the city, his parents, the gods? He thinks his obligation is to the gods, but by prosecuting his father he neglects his obligations to family and the city. Defining the term does not tell us what piety itself is, it does not tell us whether Euthyphro was acting piously.
I mentioned this earlier, that piety is the way to control the gods; to derive their blessings in war, at sea, in procreation, etc.
So you're saying the Euthyphro dilemma leads us to transform this practice in the light of the idea of justice and goodness?
Sounds good to me. It makes me think: how much of morality is about control?
Correct. That's why proper scholars point out time and again the importance of understanding the precise meaning of words in the Greek original.
Words or concepts have different levels of meaning depending on the area of application.
On a social level, piety is worshiping the Gods, being a good citizen, etc.
On a personal level, piety is being good to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence, by recognizing its divine identity and acting according to what is good for the self (nous) in Platonic terms.
Otherwise put, piety is acting in ways that are good and just not only to others but also, and above all, to one's own inner self.
Well, you can't always keep everyone happy. Sometimes you need to make tough choices. But Socrates and Euthyphro have agreed that piety is "to be of service to the Gods".
Plus Socrates himself said that he would "rather obey God than the men of Athens" (Apology 29d). What is right for Socrates is right for Euthyphro, don't you think?
Quoting Fooloso4
Neither Socrates nor Euthyphro says that Euthyphro is not acting piously. Socrates merely says:
“For if you had not clear knowledge of piety and impiety, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not (15d – e).
Socrates has discussed the general meaning of piety which everyone must now apply as they understand it.
It may be said that he leaves it in the hands of the courts in the same way he did with his own case.
If your own father killed someone, what would you do? Would you call the police or would you bury the body in the garden? Ultimately, it is for the authorities to decide what action, if any, to take.
Socrates is the example of law-abiding citizen par excellence. If he made no exception for himself, why would he advise others to make an exception in other cases?
Also, he leaves it at that because he is conveying a more important philosophical message - to which the materialists unfortunately refuse to pay attention. But that isn't my fault.
That is in line with my understanding of Plato. Still can’t say if it *is* the case, but I’d sure like it to be.
Well, we can never be 100% sure but it certainly seems 100% consistent with Platonic method and thought. Personally, I can't think of any other reading that would bring more clarity to the dialogue in a Platonic sense and make it much less of a conundrum. In any case, I think that Rabinowitz's exposition is just brilliant. That's what I would call proper scholarship and I think everyone should read his paper.
I found this piece informative and well argued:
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/socrates/ifstoneinterview.html
The connection was through Critias, who had been a student of Socrates.
It is generally thought that Anytus was behind Meletus. He was a leader of the democratic regime that overthrew the Thirty Tyrants. His son had been a student of Socrates and Anytus thought that Socrates had turned him away from the vicious ways of his father.
Another student of Socrates, Alcibiades, had fled Athens for Sparta, Athens enemy.
This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject:
“… we may assume that, owing to Aristotle’s testimony, Plato when he wrote Euthyphro, believed in the existence of separate Forms, even though they do not appear as such in that work […] as has been argued recently by a number of scholars, it is simply false that Socrates in say, Euthyphro, is just a philosopher concerned only with the search for universal definitions and oblivious to metaphysics[52]. For example, Socrates in Euthyphro does not just want to know what the Form of Piety is; he also believes that there is such a thing as Piety that is the instrumental cause of the piety in pious things [see 6D 10 – 11. In addition, this instrumental cause is a “model” as in Parm. 132 D2] […] Since, as we have already seen that Plato at the time of writing the Euthyphro in all probability believed in the separate existence of Forms, the appearance that the question is left open is explained (far better, in my view) by the exigencies of the dramatic dialogue structure … “
52. See Kramer 1973; Prior 2004; Fronterotta 2007
(L. P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 2013, pp. 52, 58-9)
I believe that this answers @Banno's objection re aporia and I don't see any arguments presented by @Fooloso4 that would successfully challenge this.
Maybe I can take that. The end of Euthyphro is best understood as ironical, a tone frequently associated to Socrates.
[I]SOC. Let us begin again from the beginning, and ask what the holy is, for I shall not willingly give up until I learn (1). Please do not scorn me: Bend every effort of your mind and now tell me the truth (2). You know it if any man does, and, like Proteus, you must not be let go before you speak. For if you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty, you could not possibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action be wrongful, and you would be ashamed before men (3). But as it is, I am confident that you think you know with certainty what is holy and what is not. (4) So say it, friend Euthyphro. Do not conceal what it is you believe (5).
EUTH. Some other time, Socrates. Right now I must hurry somewhere and I am already late.(6)
SOC. What are you doing, my friend! You leave me and cast me down from my high hope that I should learn from you what things are holy and what are not, and escape the indictment of Meletus by showing him that, due to Euthyphro, am now wise in religious matters, that I no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation (7), and most especially, that I shall live better the rest of my life.(8)[/i]
1. Thus Socrates is not clear yet about what piety is.
2. Implying that so far Euthyphro was not telling the truth.
3. Accusing Euthyphro of doing something that most men would think unjust, and covering up his shameful act with false piety.
4. Note the wording: "you think you know", which is different from knowing.
5. Ditto: "you believe".
6. Euthyphro cannot provide a concise, clear answer, and eludes the question.
7. A glimpse into Meletus' accusation that Socrates indulges in innovation and lose speech about Athenian religion.
In other words, Socrates is accused of being impious. His defense is that "pious" means everything and nothing, that it cannot be defined, that it helps justify the most unjust behaviors such as Euthyphro's, and therefore that justice should not concern itself with piety.
As I mentioned earlier, Athens has just lost a war. It was a demoralizing defeat, and we know with hindsight that Athens will never recover and return to what it was during Socrates' lifetime.
The fact that Socrates had apparently praised the Spartans in the midst of the war wasn't helpful, but we know Socrates was widely scorned and ridiculed earlier.
His lack of piety is being blamed for the Athenian defeat. That he taught people to question the basics is seen as a truly diseased way of being that has brought on catastrophe.
The Athenians can't just drop piety. They would have to let go of a worldview that's ancient to them and upheld by Solon.
It's kind of obvious, really.
When I first read the Euthyphro, I had already read the Republic and other dialogues, so I was familiar with the forms, etc.. But for some strange reason I never took the "aporia" as a big deal at all.
Obviously, Socrates was trying to convey a message, but I never felt that he was too concerned about Euthyphro taking his father to court. After all, the courts could have ruled that it had been involuntary manslaughter or even an accident that didn't warrant any serious punishment. Surely, the courts would have considered his age, absence of mens rea, etc, right?
So that didn't seem like a big deal to me either. He was just using Euthyphro's court case to make some other point. And as he mentioned "idea", "form", "pattern", etc., why not a metaphysical point that dawns on you when you realize that the dialogue doesn't really make much sense if you read it any other way?
:100:
More probably, Anytus thought that Socrates had corrupted his son.
No way. Euthyphro examplifies the ambitious demagogue, plotting against his father in the most unprincipled way and covering it up with good old religion.
It seems pretty clear from the Republic that Plato's Socrates is antidemocratic, and holds a sort of Sparta ruled by a philosopher class as the ideal system. It is quite possible that the real Socrates was doubtful of democracy.
Certainly the victory of Sparta in the Peloponnese war seemed to show their system superior, at least in chosing capable admirals and generals. The Athenians were known to trial their generals after a defeat and sentence them to death. That's an absurd military strategy.
In the decades that followed, some authors, including Plato in the Laws, compared the political systems of Athens and Sparta with a view to find a sweet spot somewhere in the middle. The freedom afforded by the Athenian system and the material affluence it brought Athens, down to its poorest citizens, are generally acknowledged in this literature but the downside was seen as widespread immorality. Here is what so-called Pseudo-Xenophon had to say:
https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0158
Yep.
The Athenians took Socrates to court for offending their Gods. So, it wasn't just Euthrypho, that's how people saw things in that particular time and place. There was nothing unusual about Euthyphro citing religion in support of his actions.
Plus, what were the chances of a conviction? Socrates himself would have been acquitted on condition that he did not re-offend.
I am not saying that the character is unusual, on the contrary he is used as an archetype, an apt example or better, a caricature of the common, up-and-coming Athenian.
Let's not forget that this is a dialogue by Plato, right? Plato's main concern was not to criticize religion but to convey a metaphysical message. Socrates himself suggests that piety is of service to the Gods in aiding them to perform a certain "work". So, I think Gerson and other scholars are right.
Obviously, a new metaphysical message is always a critique of the old one.
Politics was an important purpose for all learned folks at the time. Plato devoted much of his attention to it. Which is why I think it is safe to see all of Plato's dialogue circling around the questions of not just what is right and just for the individual man, or for the gods, but also and most importantly what is just and right for the polis. And politics were tightly connected to religion back then (as it is still).
For a tight, professional historical analysis of the connections between politics and religion in Athens, 5th century BCE, I recommend:
https://www.academia.edu/33092520/RELIGIOUS_SCANDALS_AS_PART_OF_POLITICAL_STRUGGLES_OF_LATE_5_th_CENTURY_ATHENS_THE_CASE_OF_HERMOKOPIDAI_AND_PROFANATION_OF_THE_ELEUSINIAN_MYSTERIES
Socrates' irony is an important aspect of the question of how to read Plato. There are, of course, different opinions about how Plato is to be read. Certainly the Euthyphro would be read differently if one assumes he is what he claims to be. Socrates quickly shows that he is not. His irony, as well as Plato's, is on full display here. After telling Socrates that he is laughed at for saying things about the divine things he is laughed at and thought mad, (3c) Socrates says:
Euthyphro, being convinced of his advanced wisdom, that is to say, his divine wisdom since it is wisdom of divine things, is not at all concerned that he is doing something wrong. We are left to ask whether by the end Socrates succeeds in helping him gain enough self-knowledge to know that he is ignorant of such things.
Being ignorant of divine things Socrates shifts the focus from assumptions of what the gods love to considerations of justice.
Quoting Olivier5
I take it to be the other way round, piety should concern itself with justice. Claiming that doing this or that is doing what the gods love is insufficient.
To be continued...
We are in agreement. Turning his away from the vicious ways of his father would have been seen by Anytus as corrupting him. If he did not become a man of action, playing his role on the political stage and winning through ruthlessness he would have been corrupted.
One thing that should be kept in mind is that the Republic is a "city in speech" intended to make it easier to show that justice is, for the city is the soul writ large. The soul, according to Socrates, should not be democrat, it should be ruled by reason. As to actual regimes, the best city is the city with the best laws and the best laws are not arrived at democratically.
Good question. Aside from the political motivations, I do think they had a point. The tension between philosophy and the city is a major theme of Leo Strauss. In so far as philosophy questions traditions, ancestral ways, and questions of justice it is a threat to them. The larger question is whether the old and established is the same as the good. If the answer is no, and I think Socrates would say no, then in order to improve things things much change. Those who resist such change would see this as harming rather than helping the city.
Not at all. When we grow up we may see childhood in a new light. That doesn't mean that we criticize or want to abolish it. The same happens with religion. Common folk keep their religion whilst the more evolved souls move on to a more metaphysical or spiritual worldview.
Quoting Olivier5
It may be argued that Plato's political system was largely implemented by Alexander and his followers, with Hellenistic religion at its foundations and philosophy at its apex. There is no evidence that Plato intended to abolish religion and it never was. IMO, the Euthyphro has a metaphysical message that materialists are unable and unwilling to see.
When we are grown up, we have personally "abolished our own childhood" so your comparison doesn't work very well. I repeat: new metaphysics often compete with old metaphysics.
Quoting Apollodorus
That may very well be the case. The metaphysical message could well be: justice is something quite different from piety, because what pleases one god displeases another and thus, the piety of one man is different from the piety of his neighbour. That the concept of justice in society must be built on something stronger and more reliable than old time religion: on wisdom rather than traditional beliefs.
With regard to this, banishing the poets from the Republic means banishing the myths of the gods.
All well and good, but I don't want to jump the gun. I would like to see how the ideas develop in the course of the dialogues, rather than interpreting them in line with subsequent developments. (Although I will admit I haven't been devoting enough time to closely reading the actual dialogue and commentaries. )
Quoting Apollodorus
I suppose one might take it as a mere pedagogic device, leaving the conclusion open so as to induce further conversation after a reading of the dialogue.
My vaguely recalled prejudices, formed as an undergraduate in the late middle part of the last century, incline me to differentiate the Socrates who ends his discussions in aporia from the Socrates who builds an account that just happens to be in line with Plato's political leanings. The picture is of a cynical Plato using Socrate's fame to spin his own political agenda. On this view the dialogues that end with aporia are those which more sincerely represent Socrates rather than Plato.
And of course this sits comfortably with my view of philosophy as consisting in critique rather than construction. Socrates pulling stuff down, Plato trying to put it back together again.
Quoting Apollodorus
Is it? As if the dialogues have only one purpose, and you can discern this. It's apparent that more than a few of the dialogues simply do not "lead to a rational conclusion", as you put it; so the evidence looks to be against you.
It's simply not the case that an examined life must lead to rational conclusions. One has the option of remaining agnostic. Of course, there are those who for reasons of personal disposition feel a need to grasp at an answer - almost any answer - in order to avoid the discomfort of uncertainty.
A side note; it would be a matter of common curtesy, when a member is mentioned on a post, to link using the mention tag - @ - so that one does not appear to be talking behind someone's back.
You were talking about the "polis" and now you are shifting to the "personal". "We" is plural and stands for society or polis. Childhood in society is not abolished. As some grow up, others are born.
There are no new metaphysics. Metaphysical realities like soul and forms are eternal. They don't compete, they are complementary, just as childhood in the polis exists simultaneously with adulthood.
Plus Socrates doesn't say that he wants to replace one metaphysics with another.
In fact, by his own admission, Socrates is not any more knowledgeable than Euthyphro and thus not qualified to tell him what to do.
If Socrates is (a) not qualified to advise Euthyphro and (b) does not advise him, then (c) it is wrong to say that the dialogue is intended to advise him.
The only thing that the dialogue can possibly advise is for the reader to pursue the question or questions by appealing to their own reason.
For the materialists, one question may be whether Euthyphro should take his father to court. Unfortunately, the dialogue provides no indication or clue that would be relevant to the decision process.
As for the anti-materialists, they may have no interest in Euthyphro or his father. They may read Plato to gain spiritual knowledge. Therefore, they may take another lead offered by Socrates, viz., that "piety is doing service to the divine" that dwells within the soul, and accordingly turn their attention to the forms that take them to the divine above.
The conclusion needs to be consistent (a) with the text of the dialogue and (b) with what we know about Socrates and Plato from other dialogues.
The form of piety seems indistinguishable from the definition of piety to me. The former is what the latter describes. What, for example, is the difference between the form of a triangle and the definition of a triangle?
One also has the option of being irrational. It is still possible to arrive at that decision by applying reason or rational thought.
Quoting Banno
And there are also those who for reasons of personal disposition profess uncertainty whilst also claiming certainty that everyone else's suggestions are wrong.
Definition is the intellectual description or explanation of a thing. The Form is a supra-mental idea or pattern of which mental and physical objects are copies.
in descending order:
1. Supra-mental Form present in the Cosmic Mind.
2. Mental object and definition of it in the individual mind.
3. Physical object.
This is consonant with what Socrates describes as his practice in the Apology - making people see that they do not know what they profess to know. Whether or not he has been successful with Euthyphro remains an open question.
What is said is only half of what is at issue. Of equal or greater importance is what one does. A key statement quoted above. Socrates says:
Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do. He has noted importance of avoiding evil and injustice to the city, beginning with the hearth (3a). The hearth was both the center of both the family and its religion. The name of the goddess Hestia means hearth. Euthyphro, acting without the necessary knowledge of what he is doing, is ignorant of his ignorance. Socrates, knowing he does not know, would not prosecute his own father. He is aware of how corrosive this might be to the city, the family, and the hearth.
Quoting Banno
Dialectic both separates and joins together. I will have more to say on this in the Socratic philosophy thread. This relates to the problem of aporia. Can the two opposing methods be brought together to create an account of the whole?
I think that this is the proper way to do it if your interest is in reading and understanding Plato rather than Platonism or the history of philosophy.
I thought as much but, in my defense, the gap between the physical and mental seems to be greater than that between the mental and the form. I feel that way, could be wrong though, but if my instincts are correct, mental and form maybe the same thing.
You are making a lot of statements there for which (a) you have no evidence and (b) that are either self-contradictory or are contradicted by other statements of yours.
For example:
"Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do"
But what applies to Euthyphro must apply to others, don't you think? So:
Most people are not advanced in wisdom, therefore they should all drop everything they are doing.
Socrates' relatives are presumably not any more advanced in wisdom, therefore they should drop their objections.
Socrates himself says that he knows nothing, therefore he should quit telling others what to do, etc. etc.
And you still haven't told us how you know all that when even Socrates neither knows nor attempts to tell Euthyphro what to do.
Plato doesn't go into exact details because his ultimate objective is to use the forms to direct the mind to the intelligence beyond the forms.
But one way of looking at it is to think of (1) the concept of "blueness" as the Form, (2) the mental image of a particular shade of blue and object of that color, and (3) the physical object of that color.
(1) and (2) are not quite the same thing. And then you have the definition which is the intellectual description of the mental object.
Not necessarily. Depends on what you mean by "wise" and when.
As Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others have pointed out, the dialogue appeals to the reader to follow the lead of Socratic statements like "piety is being of service to the divine (including the divine spark within the soul)" and turn their attention to the forms, patterns or models mentioned in this and other dialogues.
Of course, this is just one possible reading. What is yours?
Some of the matter of what is "one's business" relates to family obligations in tension with others. There is piety as it relates to the gods but also the respect for the lives of parents and ancestors. The notion in the Republic that the City raise children instead of parents is drawn in sharp contrast to the fact that it is Socrates' brother who demands an argument that justice is not an arbitrary agenda of the strong. It seems that the family is not accepted as righteous without qualification but neither are the bonds of growing up together from a common source treated with contempt.
When reading Euthyphro with this tension in mind, it is striking that Socrates considers the betrayal of the the father as not warranted by the arguments presented as advancing the desires of particular gods.
It was particular Gods in the beginning but later they both agreed on "all Gods" or "the divine" in general.
And Socrates himself had the habit on turning to dreams, daimons, and Gods when deciding what course of action to take. That's how he started his philosophical career.
I'm asking what you think - not Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others. Do you think him wise?
For my part, he is a buffoon, a clown, a puppet made to dance to Socrates' tune, and running off when things don't go as planned.
So Quoting Fooloso4
...looks quite right to my eye; yet you questioned it.
So, do you think Euthyphro wise?
My comment was not meant to argue against that aspect of Socrates' approach. I was hoping to bring up the views of generation and respect for family into the picture.
1. Where does "should" come from?
2. Should all people who are "not advanced in wisdom" drop everything they are doing? Or is it just Euthyphro?
I thought I had answered that already:
Quoting Apollodorus
You implied that he might be. I'd like to understand how.
Quoting Apollodorus
Well, no.
I said it depends on what you mean by "wise" and when. Like at the beginning of the dialogue or the end, or in general, etc., etc.
I can't answer a question if I don't know what the question is.
Here:
Quoting Apollodorus
You implied that there may be an account in which Euthyphro is wise, and ought do as he intends. What is that account?
But it seems you will not share it.
Anything is possible. You seem unwilling to share what you mean by "wise".
Anyway, if we were to take Socrates' alleged description of "wise" as "knowing that one does not know anything", then Socrates was possibly "wise" in that sense.
But we can't say much about Euthyphro because he never said anything that would enable one to make an accurate judgement. As a general impression, I would say he was neither wise nor unwise, just a regular guy.
Having said that, I don't read Plato to worry about this or that character. I read him to see if he, Plato, has got any metaphysical thoughts to share. And I also read Gerson and other scholars to verify if I understood him right.
Quoting Apollodorus
Do many "regular guys" in your vicinity put their father on trial for murder? No, @Fooloso4 has the point; your criticism does not stand.
Yes. There is a tension that exists between the city and the family. The city demands that sons go to war. was brought sharply into focus during the Vietnam war. The communist idea of raising children in the just city was intended to avoid such conflicts of interest, but in an actual city would be a source of endless conflict, I think it was also intended to be anti-ideological. What seems best in speech is not what is best in practice.
Quoting Valentinus
Euthyphro, by claiming he is purifying the city and piously doing what the gods love, unwittingly sets the gods against the city and family.
Perhaps those who cannot see that his actions are wrong cannot because they are too much like Euthyphro. As I said in my first post:
Quoting Fooloso4
In some areas Apollodorus understands it better than you do, and he's also happy.
So all is well.
Yet I think he’s actually rather like the Pharisees in the NT. Thinks he knows, but doesn’t possess real wisdom. I think he’s a stand-in for what we would call ‘organised religion’. Socrates, the questioning gadfly, is nearer the mark, because he possesses one crucial attribute that Euthypro does not, which is knowing that he doesn’t know, as opposed to thinking he knows something he doesn’t.
I think the political dimension of Plato cannot be denied. It is NOT metaphorical but literal. He went all the way to Syracuse to try his hands at politics, with rather poor results. Besides, he quite correctly argues that justice means nothing for an individual living alone like an hermit. It is by definition a social, intersubjective thing.
In the Republic, to the degree the soul of the city REFLECTS the sould of its citizens, it also SHAPES it through education. So there is mutual influence between the souls of the citizens and the soul of the city.
Quoting Fooloso4
That was not the smartest idea in there, mind you. People cannot live without art. Good art is emotionally and socially intelligent. It can also be politically or philosophically subversive, hence perhaps the temptation to banish it from the Republic.
Re. religion, is there ANY role for priests in the Republic?
Sure, but since it is unknowable what it is that is truly pleasing to gods (because the gods themselves do not speak to us directly), the subject of piety becomes moot, and at best, becomes a matter of having high regard for what a particular human says.
Quoting Apollodorus
Clearly, he was not such, when he denied the gods.
Quoting Apollodorus
The way I see it, he was sentenced to death for failing to respect social taboos. Of course, when people are punished for failing to respect social taboos, their punishers don't use terms like "failing to respect social taboos", but something more socially tangible, like "murder" or "treason".
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
Can you provide some reference for this? Because it seems to be an awfully modern, self-helpy idea.
And you never heard about conflicts between parents and children about what to do and not do?
You don't strike me as the innovative type, that's for sure.
Quoting Apollodorus
The dialogue is obviously intended to advise its reader, somehow. Euthyphro is just a character, playing the role of the fool.
Sure. And as I've been saying, scenarios that are typical for demigods (who are not omnimax, such as the Greek goods) get transposed as if they apply for God (Jehovah fits the description of a demigod much better than he does that of God, a point apparently lost on so many Abrahamists).
Of course, the characteristic difference between a top-down approach (divine revelation) and a bottom-up approach (man tries to learn the truth about God on his own).
Which, of course, it is not.
It's the killing, raping, and pillaging done in the name of religion that I can't get past.
From the article linked above:
Christians bought into the scientific theology, and some embarked on the doomed venture of turning their faith's mythos into logos.
The impetus for this was surely the Christian emphasis on Divine Judgment and eternal damnation. Christian religions stand and fall with eternal damnation; without it, Christianity has no reason for existing. I don't agree with what Armstrong is saying above. I don't think Christians bought into the scientific theology, but rather, resorted to it in order to support their judgmentalism and weak identity.
1. There aren't many murders in my vicinity. And even if there were, I can see no logical connection with a work by Plato.
2. Are you saying that if someone's father committed murder then he should be acquitted on the grounds that he is someone's father? That doesn't really make sense, does it?
3. I asked @Fooloso4 what he would do if his father killed someone, would he call the police or would he bury the body in the garden? He didn't reply because he knows that the answer would demolish his case.
4. His statement was "Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do".
My point was, how does (B) "and so should not do what he intends to do" follow from (A) "Euthyphro is not advanced in wisdom"?
If we insist that is does follow, does it follow (a) in all cases or (b) only in Euthyphro's case?
If (b) then we need to explain why Euthyphro is an exception.
If (a) then everyone who is "not advanced in wisdom" should drop what they are doing and never do anything.
5. Plus, are Euthyphro's relatives any more "advanced in wisdom" than Euthyphro? Are people who are "more advanced in wisdom" always right? What is the definition of "more advanced in wisdom"? How do we arrive at that definition and who decides? Etc., etc. ....
I have heard of personal conflicts between parents and children. I have not heard of class struggle between parents and children as two opposed classes aiming to abolish one another.
Quoting Olivier5
That is exactly what I have been saying. Plato's dialogues are addressed to the reader, not to the characters in the dialogues. The materialists focus on Euthyphro's character in order to deflect attention from the fact that the dialogue may have a metaphysical message for the reader.
He seems like a constructed, composite character, a literary device.
I'm reminded of Polonius: "To thine own self be true" is what people often quote, in an ironic twist as the only thing they've remembered from "Hamlet".
Are such characters wise? They defend social norms, the status quo, the taboos, and as such, they ensure for themselves a measure of safety and wellbeing. So in that sense, they are wise. But on the other hand, social norms do not form a consistent, non-contradictory system, so anybody defending those norms is bound to run into a problem eventually, a problem that cannot be navigated without incurring damage to oneself or others. I think wisdom would be to be able to behave in line with social norms, but in a way that never results in damage to oneself (and ideally, others), but I don't see how this is possible.
Exactly. That's why the dialogue does not solve the problem of what Euthyphro should do. But people are reading all sorts of things into it in order to promote their own personal opinion that is far from objective.
He didn't deny them. That was the charge against him, which he denied. See Apology:
"Let the event be as God wills: in obedience to the law I make my defence ... I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true? Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either Gods or the sons of Gods?"
"Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the Sun or Moon, which is the common creed of all men? You are a liar, Meletus"
"If, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the Gods, if I disobeyed the oracle [i.e. Apollo]"
Quoting baker
You are kidding, right?
Socrates says:
“Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise”, etc. (Thaetetus 176a – b).
See also Timaeus, Plotinus, etc. Read Rabinowitz, Gerson, etc.
N Sedley, Becoming godlike
I agree that the distinction between speech and practice is critical and is the woof and warp of the Republic. But it doesn't seem to me to be a matter of either/or. As you note, the competing and converging influences of city and family create the environment we live in.
From that perspective, I would call the ideas for raising and educating children in "the city of words" communitarian rather than communist. The practice of philosophy by Socrates is, in that way, a form of education by the "city" in contrast to families reproducing their culture. Socrates acceptance of the judgment against him is a declaration that while he belongs to the city, the city also belongs to him.
Another element that makes the distinction complicated is how various "schools of thought" interact on the scene. They are like families themselves in some ways. They reproduce over generations and compete with other "families" in the public square. The legitimacy of the City as itself has to stand above these in practice somehow.
But you said earlier:
Quoting baker
This emphasis on oneself I don't see in the passage you quote above.
Quoting Apollodorus
Did they believe such things about women as well?
You said it seems "awfully modern, self-helpy"
Quoting baker
I'm saying you can find it in Plato, Plotinus and many others. Nothing "modern, self-helpy" about it at all.
The emphasis in the Euthyphro is on being of service to the divine.
According to Plato, the inner self is divine.
The goal of philosophy is to make the soul godlike.
Who or what "ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as it can and become like God, so far as this is possible?"
Obviously, the soul or self.
Quoting Fooloso4
Because he saw what was coming viz. nobody really knows anything at all! Even if he'd stayed long enough for Socrates to finish what was essentially Socrates talking to himself using hapless randoms from the Athenian citizenry as foils he would've learned absolutely nothing, nada, zip, zero!
Consider now the transformation Socrates undergoes - from, "I think I know" to "I know that I don't know" every time he engages in dialectics with an Atheniam. What makes this transition epistemically, by extension philosophically, mind-blowing? Well, it's a dilemma actually: either you live in a delusion (you know nothing but you think you know) or realize you're an ignoramus (you know that you know nothing). Tough choice, don't you think? Reminds me of my handsome 8 year old nephew who's fond of putting me in a spot with would you rather this or that? questions. So, lemme try this on you all, would you rather be a mad person or would you rather be a foolish person? We're to make a selection between Scylla and Charybdis. What luck!
All is not lost though because the real choices are a mad person who doesn't know fae is mad or a foolish person who knows fae's foolish. The crucial difference between the two - insight (see below for clarification)
[quote=Wikipedia]In psychology and psychiatry, insight can mean the ability to recognize one's own mental illness[/quote]
It all makes sense now: Temet Nosce
[quote=Wikipedia]In another case, when he was informed that the prestigious Oracle of Delphi declare that there is no-one wiser than Socrates, he concluded "So I withdrew and thought to myself: ‘I am wiser ( sophoteron ) than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows ( eidenai ) anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know."[/quote]
What about Euthyphro? Was I right about him? Did he see what was coming? I'm not sure but assume he didn't know Socrates' point, that being we have to gain insight into our condition as a first step towards wisdom, something Athenians probably had great respect for. In other words, Euthyphro was a madman who never realized he was cuckoo! Tragic? I hardly think so...
[quote=Oscar Levant]There is a fine line between genius and insanity. I have erased this line.[/quote]
I, on the other hand, have chosen to impale myself on both horns of Socrates' dilemma, I'm mad and I'm a fool, I'm TheMadFool. :rofl:
:clap: The problem with the materialists on here who think they are "advanced in wisdom" is that they claim that Socrates knew nothing, that they themselves don't know, and that Plato's dialogues aren't supposed to teach anything. But the minute you say anything they claim that they know everything and you know nothing.
Maybe you aren't a fool or mad, after all. :smile:
I don't know!
I completely agree, but I don't think the Republic is intended to be a model for an actual city.
Quoting Olivier5
And with this as well.
Quoting Olivier5
He bans the poets not poetry. He is quite specific about the kinds of music would and would not be allowed.
Quoting Olivier5
Good question. There is one mention at 461a of a child being born without:
There is no mention of which class they belong to or what their education is.
Neither do I. But I am nonetheless striving to become "advanced in wisdom". Though not sure what that is and Socrates he don't say.
By the way, to nothing, nada, zip, zero we may add "zilch", "nichts", and above all, "?????" (meden)
Have you read the Cloud of Unknowing? Different take on wisdom?
You've heard of generational divides? E.g. in the Republic, when exploring the theory of the four political regimes, Plato explains "how the democratic man comes out of the oligarchic one" (book VIII) and "the tyrannic man himself [...] is transformed out of the democratic man" (book IX).
Quoting Apollodorus
I'm not a materialist. My impression is that you are refusing to see the ridicule in the Euthyphro character. You take Socrates' irony and false praise at first degree. That's quite foolish in my opinion.
I mean communist in the original sense of the term, but neither term as they are used today includes the human breeding practices outlined in the Republic.
You are making that up and that's quite foolish in my opinion.
I have said many times that Euthyphro is of no interest to me at all, I only want to know what metaphysical message Plato has for the reader:
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
If I wanted to read about social and cultural critique, there are many other authors to choose from.
But, apparently, you can't read other people's posts. That's why you are unaware that many scholars like Prof Gerson quoted above are of the view that the Euthyphro has a metaphysical message.
But Euthyphro is not defending social norms. One of the ironies of the dialogue is that Euthyphro's acting on what he is convinced he knows regarding what the gods want is destructive of social norms. Prosecuting your own father is contrary to social norms.
Socrates calls himself a midwife and a physician of the soul. He acknowledges that both have knowledge. Like the sophists he has knowledge of how to argue using reason and rhetoric,
What Socrates calls himself is beside the point. The point is that he doesn't tell Euthyphro what to do in the court case.
How do you interpret it?
For the second time: of course it does. Who said it didn't? All I am saying is that you grossly misunderstand this metaphysical message.
For the most part, he understands it pretty well, because he understands the author.
it's about turning inward.
And what I'm saying is that I'm not "taking Socrates' irony and false praise at first degree" as you falsely allege.
If you think that I'm "grossly misunderstanding Plato's metaphysical message" then please demonstrate where I do so. Otherwise, you're just talking for the sake of saying something, which is rather foolish and pointless IMO.
Some people are like kids in a puppet theater. They are so mesmerized by this Euthyphro they forget he’s just a character in a dialogue by Plato.
But I think others do it on purpose and with a clear political agenda. They are activists in the culture war on Western civilization which is why they attack Abrahamic religion and everything else they see as an obstacle to “progress”.
Maybe a little.
That would require a very long and detailed explanation. One interpretation that I agree with is that it the Plato's philosophical apology for Socrates. His lack of a strong defense is at least in part explained by the difference between public persuasion and philosophical speech (17a-18a).
The Republic covers a very broad range of subjects from the theopolitical to the epistemological, from justice to power, from the proper order of the soul to the proper order of the city.
Rather than appeal to one or another of the conflicting "authorities" my interpretation is grounded in the details of the dialogues. The fact that one scholar or another holds views other than my own is inconclusive, for there are other scholars who do support my claims and have played a role in informing my views. The only way forward in my opinion is through the texts.
Plato is not a 'realist' or an 'idealist' or a 'materialist' or 'naturalist' and not a Platonist. If this prompts you ask "then what is he", read the thread. It is not intended to be the final interpretation, but rather, to turn your attention to the texts themselves. Plato does not provide answers that foreclose further inquiry but instead opens up the problems to in order to provoke further inquiry.
Yet there do seem to be definitive answers such as a 'theory of Forms', and such is what you are likely to find in standard textbooks. But don't take my word for it, or what you find in textbooks or elsewhere, see what the dialogues themselves say. And by this I do not mean isolated claims or passages but with a view to understanding the whole and how the parts function in the whole.
In other words, you are the only one who can decide what Plato is. And it amounts to ignoring a tradition of more than a millennium according to which he was a Platonist.
Quoting Fooloso4
I think we can read the texts ourselves, thanks very much. Besides, if you're saying "Plato is not a realist or an idealist, etc.", that sounds pretty final to me.
Quoting Fooloso4
The problem is you offer answers that seem to do exactly that. For example:
Quoting Fooloso4
1. Where exactly does Plato or Socrates say that and where is the evidence?
2. If you know that Euthyphro "is not advanced in wisdom", doesn't that amount to saying that you consider yourself "advanced in wisdom"? What evidence have you got to support your claim?
3. I asked you a simple question, "what would you do if your own father killed someone, would you call the police or try to cover it up"? IMO If you're unable or unwilling to answer, this may suggest that you aren't as "advanced in wisdom" as you claim to be.
I think you are showing that alright by deciding on Plato's behalf what his categories are.
Everybody is entitled to their opinion, right?
They should be. Problem with @Fooloso4 is he makes statements without providing any evidence. And then he expects people to take him seriously.
You could just say: "I respectfully disagree." and leave it at that.
From what I can gather from the bits and pieces of information available online, Socrates' was trying to get to the bottom of issues that figured prominently in Athenian society and those that were close to his aging heart - justice, piety, to name two. He seemed to have recognized very early on that without precise definitions, there would be no clear picture of the corresponding questions and trying to find answers would be moot. From snippets of his dialog with his fellow Athenians, one thing is clear - the conversations are largely disagreements on definitions. He never got round to formulating arguments that, instead of demolishing existing ideas/theories by critical analysis of the meaning of words, actually tried to prove a philosophical standpoint on ethics, metaphysics, etc. His signature move was, simply put, refutation and not proof and thus, he would have little to no use for rhetoric - he wasn't trying to convince people that his ideas were right, au contraire, he was refuting theirs.
In this sense, Socrates is a paradoxical figure in philosophy despite being honored as the father of western philosophical traditions because truth be told, ethics, theology, metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, and other branches of philosophy predated him and so, he didn't/couldn't have founded philosophy. Since he was challenging existing ideas in a philosophy that preceded him, he should be more correctly described as an anti-philosopher. He struck the first blow on the Athenian weltanschauung - the rest is history!
I suppose I could. However, you may remember that he did the same on the Phaedo thread. He conveniently left out the bit about immortality and when I challenged him he said it wasn't in the translation he was using. I posted several translations to show him that the missing bit should be included. I also posted the Greek text and he still denied it. IMHO something isn't right there. Either he doesn't know what he is doing or he is doing it on purpose.
You are probably correct in a sense. But the Hellenistic weltanschauung transmitted through Plato and Aristotle survived for many centuries, influenced Alexander, Rome, Christianity, Islam, and the Renaissance, and formed the very foundations of Western civilization. Not a negligible feat it seems.
I don't think it will help anything to argue, though. Let him have his opinions. Start your own thread to express yours, right?
I think the point was not to drop piety altogether, but to understand that the gods themselves do not always agree and men do not always agree on what the gods want. Therefore, while personal piety is something good, as it draws man to the supreme, personal piety is NOT a good judge of what is just, and should thus not feature in a court of law. Courts should only seek justice, not piety.
In more modern words, there should be some distinction made between justice and religion.
For those afraid that the gods could take offense, he reminds that the gods love what is pious not in an arbitrary manner, but rather because of something in the pious act which is lovable to them. And he proposes that this thing is justice. Therefore, the gods will love us more if our tribunals seeks only justice (without reference to piety), not less.
This is, I surmise, one possible meaning of "is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
Quoting Olivier5
Separation of church and state?
The students (philosophers) built their philosophies on the ruins of preexisting philosophies demolished by their teacher (anti-philosopher). So, yeah, Socrates created the vacuum and horror vacui did the rest!
I almost forgot how powerful Plato's and Aristotle's ideas were - they were probably expanded or tweaked to adapt them to regional conceptual paradigms but still remained recongizable as Platonic or Aristotelian.
If by precise definition you mean that by which we can recognize that was is said about it is true or false and what is done is either right or wrong, then I agree, But he never thought that it is pointless to pursue knowledge. You seem to want to begin with answers to the very thing that is in question. Socrates proceeds by way of the examination of opinion. We each have opinions about such things as what is just and unjust.
Quoting TheMadFool
I think there is more to it. Although he does not arrive at final answers the pursuit of the question has value. We still need to evaluate and judge. He helps us in developing the necessary skills to do so.
This is a good example of why I no longer respond to you. You misrepresent what I said. You have done the same with others here as well. Anyone who is interested can read the thread and see what was and was not said and judge your hectoring for themselves.
What is this thing higher than the gods and to which they aspire? Maybe the cosmic nous of Anaxagoras, or Plato's eternal forms... The Christians of course have another answer.
Platonism was far more powerful than it is often realized. It was of course heavily sponsored by Alexander and his followers. It was transmitted through Plato’s Academy which functioned from 387 BC to 529 CE and through the so-called Alexandrian School at Alexandria, Egypt, which lasted from 306 BC to 642. Other philosophical circles formed in Rhodes, Syria, and other parts of the Greek-speaking world. In Christian times Platonism was transmitted through the University of Constantinople from 425 CE into the 15th century when the capital city was taken by the Turks. But it also made its way to Italy and so it spread to the whole of the western world (as well as to the Islamic world).
The very fact that Platonic manuscripts were preserved in Christian libraries including in monasteries gives you some idea of the unique power Platonism exerted on Europe and the Middle East. But very few people actually know that unless they are into Byzantine studies or related fields.
Thanks but I disagree forestalls philosophical discussion. I have not problem with resistance. It is standard practice. If I disagree I say why. I back up my claims with textual support. Some here do the same, others do not. Some think that accusations and misrepresentation is the same as reasoned argument.
Well, I don't think that is the case at all. These are some of the comments made:
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting frank
Quoting Apollodorus
Etc., etc.
Anyway, what's wrong with asking you to provide some evidence for your statements like those on Euthyphro? How do you expect to have a discussion without dialogue?
Why can't you answer a simple question??? Not that you have to, but at least you could explain why. It shouldn't be a big deal.
Good to know. You know your history well. Always a pleasure to meet someone erudite.
Nothing wrong with the question. The problem is with who is asking. Your evasiveness and deceptive practices are not something I am willing to deal with anymore. You can put the blame on me and others who have experienced the same thing if you think that helps, but it is ironic given the context.
By the way, you need to read what Euthyphro says in the beginning of the dialogue to understand the circumstances. It was not a simple case of murder.
The pleasure is entirely mine. I wish all "fools" were like you. But, apparently, not.
No one said it was simple. Possibly it was not even murder, more like involuntary manslaughter or something that didn't even warrant any serious punishment.
My question was, where does the text say "Euthyphro was not advanced in wisdom, therefore he should drop the case"?
And, what would you do if your own father killed someone?
In that case would someone advanced in wisdom prosecute his father for something that may not even warrant serious punishment?
Quoting Apollodorus
It would depend on the circumstances. At worse I would report him. I would not bring a lawsuit against him.
Mine too.
But if it's higher than the gods, wouldn't that make it even more unavailable to humans?
How would you explain the human knowledge of justice?
By the way, one of the reasons why Platonism was so successful was that Hellenistic philosophy and culture in general stretched from the Italic peninsula (Magna Graecia) and North Africa all the way to Northwest India and it was very cosmopolitan. Many Platonist philosophers were Romans, Egyptians, Arabs, Jews, Persians, etc., not just Greeks.
The Duke of She said to Kongzi, "Among my people there is one we call 'Upright Gong'. When his father stole a sheep, he reported him to the authorities."
Kongzi replied, "Among my people, those who consider 'upright' are different from this: fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. 'uprightness ' is to be found in this." (13:18)
The premise is that filial piety is more important than civic piety. Without filial piety there will be no civic piety.
If he believed that it was his duty to do so, and Euthyphro explains that he does, yes. In the same way you said you would report your father.
Whether you report someone or take them to court, it is still for the court to decide. So, Euthyphro is simply doing what he believes is his duty. At any rate, neither Socrates nor Plato says that he should drop the case. You may be right or wrong, but it is your personal opinion.
But the city-state is based on the rule of law. Once you start tampering with it and making exceptions, the whole system falls apart. Either way, it changes nothing about the fact that the dialogue doesn't say what Euthyphro should do. Therefore, I believe that it stands to reason to see what other purpose it may have apart from not telling us about how Euthyphro should act.
:ok: The other day, I was having a discussion with my niece on how the Greeks were the first philosophers insofar as Western civilization is concerned, Alfred North Whitehead had gone on record that "All of Western Philosophy is little more than a footnote to Plato." That was 2,500 years ago. Fast forward to 2021 and Greece rarely makes the news and when it does, it has nothing to do with intellectual achievements. What happened to the Greeks? Have the Greeks lost their touch or is the Greek genius lying dormant waiting to be rekindled? :chin:
Me? I don't really subscribe to the idea of gods. I suppose that for Plato, justice and wisdom were eternal forms somewhere out of the cavern. Ideals to which we (and the gods) aspire to.
Good question. I believe that after losing Constantinople (the "New Rome") and being overrun by the Turks, the next blow was Western European Enlightenment that eventually made many turn to science instead of philosophy, after which nationalism and "modernity" took over and led the struggle for independence into a new era and new weltanschauung. There are still pockets of authentic Hellenistic philosophy and spirituality, that may one day lead to a national revival. But for the most part it's all down to politics and the corrosive influence of English-based global culture spreading through the news, entertainment, and social media just like everywhere else in the world.
Are you saying that there is no clear correct answer as to what Euthyphro should do?
I can't see one that would follow as an absolute logical necessity from the text. Can you?
So, it reaches an impasse. It seems you now agree with @Banno and I that at least one dialogue ends in aporia.
You are reverting back to materialism, aren't you? Socrates clearly makes no attempt to dissuade Euthyphro. It may at the most be said that he wants him to think about it and make a considered decision. That's about it.
However, as already indicated, the aporia regarding Euthyphro's court case or whatever isn't really the issue. The reader is left pondering and, as he thinks it over, if he hasn't already realized it, it dawns on him that Plato is really talking about "idea", "eidos", "paradeigma", "service to the divine", etc. which can only mean that the real message is metaphysical.
As shown by Gerson and others, Plato had already developed the concept of Forms. Therefore, when Plato and his immediate disciples read the dialogue, they would immediately see the words "idea", "eidos", etc., that would put them on the right track and put Euthyphro and his dilemma on the back burner. In fact, that was exactly my experience when I first read the Euthyphro.
I can understand that someone unfamiliar with Platonic concepts may read it differently. But I think it is obvious that Plato really wrote the dialogue for his disciples, for those who knew him and his thoughts, not for the uninitiated.
As i pointed out to @Olivier5:
Quoting Apollodorus
Let me put it in the form of a syllogism:
One who is not advanced in wisdom [correction -cannot] do the correct thing in this case
Euthyphro is not advanced in wisdom. He does not have "precise knowledge" of divine things.
Euthyphro should not do what he intends to do
That he is not advanced in wisdom is evident. He says that piety is doing what the gods love, but he does not show that what he is doing is something the gods love, unless the gods love patricide.
lol I do appreciate your sense of humor but I think you are going a bit off the rails there.
He may not show that what he is doing is something the Gods love. However, he thinks that they do and that suffices as far as he is concerned.
As for "the Gods love patricide", that is too preposterous even for you to believe it. Where on earth did you get "patricide" from?
If your father kills someone and you call or report it to the police as you are required by the law, is that "patricide"???
I don't know where you got that idea from.
Quoting Apollodorus
Perhaps not for you. The examined life is fundamental for Socrates. The just, noble, and good are fundamental for Socrates. If it cannot be determined whether what Euthyphro is just and proper or pious then it is at the heart of the issue.
Quoting Apollodorus
That is not at all obvious. No doubt his students read the dialogue but I suspect they had a wider audience. I think he wrote for posterity.
What "wider audience" and "what posterity"? Who? The dialogues were read by students of philosophy and other educated people who would have studied philosophy as part of the normal curriculum or would have heard of Plato's ideas by word of mouth. All educated Athenians were familiar with Plato and Aristotle, in the same way everybody had heard of Socrates and his exploits.
Editing error. I fixed it.
Quoting Apollodorus
And that is precisely the problem.
Quoting Apollodorus
5e and the myth cycle of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus in Hesiod's Theogony.
https://wiki2.org/en/List_of_patricides
You answered your own question:
Quoting Apollodorus
Posterity? Us!
I know exactly what "patricide" is, thank you. It still doesn't say anywhere that Euthyphro committed patricide.
Yes, Plato's wider audience were the educated upper classes, the people who knew him and about him, and who would have understood his dialogues in the intended sense, just as educated Brits would have understood Shakespeare or G B Shaw, especially those who belonged to the same social circle.
Ditto posterity, the educated people that came in the generations immediately after Plato, and who knew and understood his philosophy. The more distant posterity of today is obviously a different story. Anyway, have a nice day. And enjoy your drink.
Reading Plato requires doing more than just seeing the words on the page. Euthyphro was going to prosecute his father. If he was found guilty he would have been sentenced to death.
The Greeks were more than familiar with the the cyclical nature of reality (Kyklos & Anacyclosis) although they seem to have studied it only in a political sense. That their civilization as a whole would also cycle through stages - peak & trough, peak & trough - should've occurred to them a long, long time ago.
Christianity, of course. It changed everything.
:ok:
Religions, once they become dogmatic, become a pain in the neck - any difference in opinion immediately acquires a good vs evil quality. What could possibly go wrong? I wonder if Greek philosophy (Plato & Aristotle) absorbed Christianity and used the authority the latter commanded for propagation far and wide or was it the other way round, Christianity sold itself as a belief having a lot in common with Plato's and Aristotle's ideas, thus claiming it had the nod of approval of these Greek thinkers, making Christianity more appealing to the populace, including the elite? Both?
I very much doubt that. The court would have first established what the crime was after which it ruled on the exact punishment. I think in this particular case, it would have been a fine. So, no “patricide”.
I don't think so. It was not Christianity, it was Islam.
Christianity did have something to do with it, but not in the way people think. The Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire) was a regional power that did extremely well in the face of attacks from the Slavs, the Persians, and others. It was mainly the conflicts with Persia that weakened the Greeks in the Middle East after which they began to lose territory to the Muslim Arabs in the 600s. The next blow was when its capital Constantinople was sacked by West European crusaders in 1204. The last straw came with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.
We must not forget that ethnic Greeks were a very small population. By contrast, the Germanic tribes that took over the West and the Slavs that took over the East of Europe were much more numerous. The Greeks had established themselves as a power through their culture and civilization that had spread far and wide. When that was destroyed by Islam, there wasn’t much they could do. In a sense, they were betrayed by the (Christian) West.
So, a mutual pact then! Both Greek philosophy (at least Aristotle's & Plato's) and Christianity benefited from the relationship betwixt them - Aristotle & Plato gained wide recognition, their influence extending over all of Western civilization while Christianity legitimized itself through the association. My, my, ideas working together symbiotically and synergistically like that at such a grand scale. When will the world witness another such phenomenon?
It happens all the time. Ideas have their own life, they hybridize all the time.
It is a matter of his intention not of what the outcome might be. He thought he would prevail against his father.
The Eastern Roman Empire had a larger population than the Western Empire. It was the most developed and richest part of the Empire. And yes, it spoke Greek and thought Greek but mixed up many nationalities.
When I say that Christianity changed everything, I mean that the imposition of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire and the destruction of pagan temples and later the fight against heresies had a detrimental effect on the kind of freedom of thought that had characterized places like Athens or Alexandria, where a Christian mob killed Hypatia. In a way, they did the opposite of what Socrates advised in Euthyphro: they placed piety above wisdom and justice, rather than below.
Greek thought started to fossilize as a result.
If anything, Islam revived interest in classic Greek philosophy. The Arabs called Aristotle the "First Teacher" and had much respect for him. They also are the ones we have to thank for copying forward and thus saving many of these books.
You mean to say, we just don't live long enough to notice it. Perhaps such events can be observed at a smaller scale at human-level time (5 - 10 years max) to be noticeable. Richard Dawkins' memes come to mind.
Well, if you take "intention" as the criterion, then I'm afraid you are demolishing your own case.
If the court rule would have been a fine or, considering the defendant's age, etc., even acquittal, then intention to commit "patricide" cannot be established.
If you think so then you have completely misunderstood what is at issue as I see it. But that is understandable if you start from the assumption that the dialogue is about the Forms.
I see what you mean. However, the imposition of Christianity, though tending to have a negative impact, was not in the least fatal. The Greeks had enormous respect for Platonism and, as you say, many early Church Fathers had started as Hellenistic philosophers. Augustine says in his Confessions that he had been inspired to inquire into the truth after reading Platonic writings, probably Plotinus.
Christianity did not abolish philosophy. The centers of Hellenistic philosophy shifted from Athens and Alexandria to Constantinople where Classical philosophy was taught at the University of Constantinople from 425 CE to 1453 CE when the city fell into the hands of the Turks. That is a whole millennium in my reckoning.
All the works of Homer, Plato, Aristotle, etc. were preserved by Christian Greeks, Armenians, and others, and manuscripts were carefully copied by Christian librarians and even monks. The Arabs got copies of the manuscripts by soliciting them from the Byzantine court from the 700s when there was an extensive Translation Movement started by Muslim rulers who aimed to impart some cultural credibility to Islam just like the Christians did before them.
But Classical philosophy continued to be taught under the patronage of the Church at philosophical schools like Phanar College in Constantinople. As long as you did not profess to be a Pagan, you were free to learn and teach philosophy as you pleased, with some obvious restrictions. In fact, there was a Platonist revival in the Renaissance that spread to Italy through George Gemistos Platon, John Argyropoulos, Marsilio Ficino (who established a Platonic Academy at Florence) and many others.
Greek Scholars in the Renaissance - Wikipedia
Western civilization turned inward with the fall of Rome. Human life withdrew into private manors ruled by warlords. The only education that existed was protected by the fortress-like walls of monasteries. It was a good time to ponder Plato because their lives reflected his philosophy: the external world had become a dim shadow of the ideal, now past.
That's probably too poetic to be entirely true. :grin:
Not entirely true, but probably close enough to pass .... :smile:
1. The text says nothing about Euthyphro’s relationship with his father. There is no indication that he wanted to kill him.
2. The evidence he has or believes to have is pretty flimsy.
3. The fact that Euthyphro calls it “murder” is irrelevant. The only relevant thing is the court’s ruling.
4. My take is that, after hearing Euthyphro’s testimony, the court would have found the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
5. As a result, the court would have either (a) acquitted Euthyphro's father or (b) imposed a fine at the most.
No, it just intrumentalized it, tried to control it, and thus stifled it.
Porphyry's books were banned by Emperor Constantine. Even Christian philosophers were routinely repudiated. Justinian I condemned Origen as a heretic and ordered all his writings to be burned. There are dozens of similar examples.
Origen had produced thousands of treatises and books. He had reviewed systematically all the gospels available at his time, including some now lost. For this and many other reasons, the burning of his work was a grievous loss.
Not early on. The kind of Christianity that survived had a deep affinity for Platonism. Through people like Augustine, Platonism lived on for centuries.
With the rise of the Protestants, the Church became rigid and bloodthirsty. Could that be what you're thinking of?
Yes. Only some archeology of knowledge can evidence how philosophical ideas shape and reshape themselves organically over time, compete with one another, fuse with one another, and shape our world views along the way. And yes, Dawkins memes are a bit like that but too elemental to really matter. Systems of thought matter historically, ecosystems of thoughts, etc. Elemental thoughts (memes) are just pawns in this big game.
I don't dispute that there were excesses under Christian rule that should not have happened. But it could have been worse. Philosophy saw its power and influence curtailed but it managed to survive. In fact, there was nothing to replace it until the arrival of science and rampant materialism.
It could of course had been worse. Like the Huns could have sacked Constantinople and Rome, or a large meteorite could have wiped out mankind.
It could also have been better. Sometimes I dream about a world where Hypatia was spared and allowed to teach, where all the emperors had the wisdom of Constantine (who instated freedom of religion) and where pagan religions were left alone by Christian mobs.
Of course it was historically not possible, never in the cards, because the new polis, the empire, needed some sort of common, empire-wide moral foundation. It needed the one God if it was to remain one empire.
He was there to prosecute his father. If he prevailed the likely outcome would be the death penalty. There is no indication that he wanted his father dead, but he was fully aware of the consequences should he prevail.
Quoting Apollodorus
The dialogue leaves open the question of whether he even does prosecute. With regard to the dialogue there is no relevance of a court ruling for a trial that might never occur.
As you probably know the Council at Nicaea was convened because of a rift between Christian theologians regarding the divinity of Jesus. Under Constantine this was not just a theological matter it was political.
Quoting Olivier5
On the one hand I think that without the efforts of the Church Fathers to unify the early Jesus movement into the universal Catholic Church, the future of Christianity might have been very different in various ways. This may have saved it from splintering. On the other, this does done at the cost of destroying what was part of the movement's very spirit, that is, the indwelling of spirit expressed through gospels of witness of inspiration.
1. Unfortunately, that is exactly what you have zero evidence for.
Quoting Fooloso4
2. Precisely. So, it is all speculation.
Quoting Fooloso4
3. The issue of relevance was in connection with your unfounded assumption that the father would have been (a) found guilty of murder and (b) sentenced to death, should a trial have taken place. But you have zero evidence for that.
So, it's back to square one (1) above.
The penalty for murder was death. Of course we have no evidence of the outcome of a trial that had not yet happened and might never have happened.
Quoting Apollodorus
I made no prediction as to whether or not he would be found guilty. You are the one who speculated on the outcome:
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
You need to read more carefully. As an aid I bolded the part of the statement above that you quoted and missed. If he prevailed does not mean he would prevail or did prevail.
Correct. Platonism had a huge impact on the Roman Empire especially in the east, e.g., Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. There were important Platonic schools in Alexandria (Egypt), Antioch (Syria), and Tarsus (Syria), all cities with large Jewish communities, resulting in the emergence of Hellenistic Judaism.
Hellenistic influence is also evident in Palestine itself. Greek was widely spoken by Jews. St Paul who was a native of Tarsus, spoke fluent Greek and was sufficiently conversant with Hellenistic philosophy to debate with Greek philosophers in Athens. His teacher Gamaliel instructed his students both in Jewish and Greek traditions.
Christian philosophy was so close to Platonism, indeed it had been largely developed on Platonic foundations, that to suppress Platonism would have amounted to an assault on Christianity itself. Besides, Platonism stood at the apex of the Roman culture that Christianity adopted wholesale along with the administrative apparatus and legal system. In fact, Greeks called themselves "Romans" and inhabitants of Constantinople (New Rome) called themselves "Romans" (Romioi) until very recently (some possibly still do so). Arabs and Turks also referred to Greeks as "Romans" (Rum). The celebrated Persian poet Rumi, got his name from the same source (al-Rumi, literally, "from Rum", i.e., Greek Anatolia).
But all this was happening in the East. Western Christianity and, in particular, Protestantism is a different story.
It's complicated. Constantine himself was no theologian and couldn't care less which version of JC the bishops would chose. He just wanted the disputes to stop.
That's exactly what I'm saying, viz., you've got no evidence that (a) the penalty for murder was death and (b) the alleged crime was "murder". No evidence = no evidence, there is no if or but about it.
IMHO, you are flogging a dead horse there.
Right. That is why I said it was political.
If that's what he is "just" saying, I have no problem with it.
But what he actually says is this:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4 etc. ....
His argument is this:
1. The penalty for murder is death.
2. If taken to court on charges of murder, Euthyphro's father will be sentenced to death.
3. By taking his father to court on charges of murder Euthyphro causes his death, therefore he is guilty of patricide.
But he has no evidence for either (1) or (2).
The conclusion (3) is wrong. His argument fails.
As to the alleged crime being murder:
4a
Most of your challenges to what I say could easily be settled if you would just read the text.
I'm not sure anymore whether your misrepresentations are intentional or if there is something else going on that prevents you from understanding. Either way I am not going to waste my time responding again.
OK, let's have a look at you new "argument" if that's what it is. This is what you are saying:
1. The death sentence was generally reserved for those who had been found guilty of intentional homicide or who had commited another grave sin.
2. Socrates: What is the charge, and what is the lawsuit about?
Euthyphro: Murder, Socrates.
Let's take a closer look at what this means:
1. The death sentence was "generally reserved for intentional homicide".
True, but this was not mandatory. The penalty could have been exile or a fine.
2. Euthyphro thinks his father is guilty of murder or intentional homicide.
This is also true. But there is no evidence that it was murder or intentional homicide. In fact, it sounds very much like unintentional homicide or even an accident.
It follows that there is absolutely no evidence or guarantee that (a) Euthyphro's father was guilty of murder and/or that (b1) the court would find him guilty as charged and (b2) sentence him to death.
FIXED
Lol A bit too many "mays" and "ifs", and still no evidence. It can't be established that he is even "trying to be patricide". You just said he was a fool who didn't know what he is doing.
All we know is he intended to take his father to court because he believed it was his duty to do so.
He is a greedy fool plotting for his father's death or banishment, possibly for the heritage.
That may make an interesting possibility. But as I already pointed out, the text says absolutely nothing about the relationship Euthyphro has with his father. If he really believes in doing right and avoiding wrong as he seems to be saying, then it is unlikely. Besides, we don't know what the inheritance may be. And if his father is old and frail he may die soon anyway.
I knew this. I'm wondering about the world Jesus lived in. Weren't the Sadducees hellenized Jews? I wonder if they would have been familiar with Plato.
In the academic milieu of the last 100 years or so, Fooloso4's approach to read the dialogues as not being a map to a doctrine is the commonly accepted practice. Who are the "most" people you are pointing to?
I don't ask that rhetorically. I am only familiar with the "close study of the text" method that was my freshman year in college 45 years ago.
Did you see a post of mine that suggested otherwise?
Good question. The Sadducees were certainly the most Hellenized among religious Jews. Apparently, they controlled the Sanhedrin (named after Greek synedrion, "council") for some time. It seems tempting to think that Greek influence also meant Platonic influence. But I wouldn't know to what extent this was the case among the Sadducees. Was their rejection of an immortal soul even compatible with Platonism?
G Scott Gleaves in Did Jesus Speak Greek? provides an excellent introduction to the influence of Greek in Roman Palestine. He believes that Jesus spoke Greek as well as Aramaic which seems perfectly plausible to me. I am sure that any citizen of Palestine, Jew or Greek would have had access to Platonic philosophy if they wanted to. There were ten Greek cities (Decapolis) in the region. The city of Sepphoris was only three miles from Nazareth on the road to Cana of Galilee (where Jesus turned water into wine).
Good point. What Greek influence would that have been? Stoicism?
Thank you. It is nice to have some confirmation from someone familiar with the scholarship. As you have probably seen, some have accused me of making this up, not knowing what I'm talking about and on and on.
There are, however, still some around who think it is all about Plato's doctrines. They tend not to look at the whole of the dialogues, but pull things out of context.
Well, with Alexander's conquest of the region, the primary Greek influence would have been political, religious, and social. In cultural terms, I suppose Stoicism would have been more appealing to religious groups. Though, as I said, Jews must have been aware of Platonism and would have had access to its teachings any time. As with Christians and Muslims and, indeed, with Graeco-Roman Pagans, people would practice the mainstream religion in public whilst pursuing any philosophical current (Platonism or Stoicism or a mixture thereof) in private if so inclined.
You mean other than the quote from you saying it?
Where?
I said nothing about doctrine
Another point worth mentioning. Euthyphro says this happened when they were farming in Naxos. (4c) Naxos was lost in the Peloponnesian War with Sparta in 404, five years before the time of the dialogue. Why did he wait for five years to bring charges against his father?
The fact is that the scholarship is divided and so is general opinion on how Platonic texts are to be interpreted. Often more than one interpretation is possible, including such as involve well-known metaphysical concepts espoused by Plato.
I'm not denying your materialist interpretation, only your claim that your interpretation is the only possible or correct one.
Not being able to tag a label such as "materialist" or "idealist" upon a reading is to restrain from formulating a last word that is the product of a doctrine.
That's nice. Except I don't have a materialist interpretation. If you read my thread on Socrates together with the passages I cite you would see that. Or, most likely not. You do seem to miss and misrepresent a lot of what I say.
Quoting Apollodorus
Only I have never made such a claim. I defend my interpretation by citing the dialogues. You have not done the same. I look forward you reading your interpretation of one of the dialogues. And by that I do not mean copy and paste from Wiki or elsewhere.
According to some ancient authors Euthyphro is a fictitious character. Your objection may or may not be valid if there was evidence that he was a historical person. But there is none.
Once again, you are making a statement or suggesting a theory for which you are unable to provide evidence.
This sentence doesn't make sense.
It does.
Not to me.
It does not matter if he is a real person. We are analyzing the dialogue, or at least some of us are. He is the title character of the dialogue. Socrates has him say something that tells the reader that this happened five years before he was going to prosecute.
I've already done so. And I provided scholarly opinion in support of my interpretation. But you refuse to acknowledge it and irrationally insists that only a materialist, anti-metaphysical, and anti-theistic interpretation is acceptable.
A proper interpretation is sufficiently detailed. A proper interpretation attends to the text, to what is said and done. Not isolated statements and repeating what others have. What you say does not even come close. But if that's good enough for you then that's good enough for you.
Hate to butt in, but he did that Fooloso4. You probably just missed it
Socrates? Do you forget that Socrates is just another character in the same narrative by Plato? It is Plato who has them say this or that, is it not?
And, anyway, this is supposed to prove what exactly?
:up: Presumably he is far too busy carrying all those degrees he's got to pay attention to what is happening around him.
I will try it another way.
You claimed that Foolso4 was an outlier by eschewing labels such "idealist", "materialist" or what have you as adequate descriptors of the intent of the Platonic Dialogues. The reluctance to apply those labels is a well established method of current and recently past scholarship. The reason for that reluctance is that the body of work is not like Aristotle who did try to state what the best argument was as he saw it on each topic. When Aristotle could not determine what the best argument was, he said he was at an impasse. An aporia, if you will.
Breaking everything down into doctrines simplifies matters if the purpose is the taxonomy of writing a dictionary. But no one ever meets anything new by that method.
Nobody disputes that. But on an online discussion forum you often resort to labels for the sake of brevity. You can't compose an essay every time you state something.
Anyway, as already indicated, the issue seems to be that @Fooloso4 insists that the Euthyphro has no metaphysical content and he rejects all scholarly opinion to the contrary. Additionally, he often makes claims in support of his arguments without producing any evidence whatsoever.
Take a look at any recent scholarship that includes "Plato" and "idealism." There's no reluctance to identify Plato and his contemporaries as idealists.
Quoting Valentinus
I understand that. And at the end of the day, it is entirely appropriate to refer to Plato's outlook as a kind of idealism. This is not complicated.
Yes, you did not appear from nowhere.
I am all for disagreement for how to read a text. Arguments based upon authority are the weakest kind. On the other hand, when you live with someone for a long time, the words remind one of other words.
The conversation changes.
But what is "idealism"? Is it a self evident quality or a way to distinguish it from something that it is not?
That is your judgment of what has been claimed, not a reference to the argument made.
it's just a category.
If you throw your lot in with Fooloso4, then you'll assert that we should look to the life of Socrates to guide us in interpretation as opposed to Plato. You'll defend this view by noting that Plato doesn't speak in the dialogue.
You'll repeatedly assert that Socrates is failing to make his points instead of opening your mind to what Plato is saying.
And the list goes on.
There's nothing standard about any of this. Why are you defending him when you didn't read what he said?
That suggests that it is self evident. Such a notion is contrary to the proposal in the Republic that a special effort has to be made to see what things are as themselves. Our experience taken by itself without such an effort only shows us shadows thrown by a light behind us.
Categories are used specify. When I originally mentioned Plato's idealism, I was pointing out that when reading Phaedo, It might enhance understanding to contrast his view to that if Democritus, whose influence was also present.
Plato would have realized that his own idealism and the materialism of Democritus explain one another. In a sense, they create one another. This understanding is implied by one particular argument in Phaedo, which I'm sure you could pick out.
So as opposed to closing down exploration of Plato, noting his idealism is just the beginning.
Hence his talk of piety is cheap. That much is obvious. And sure enough, he soon gets confused when Socrates asks him how prosecuting one's father is pious, and what is piety.
The reason why he would try to get rid of his father doesn't need to be mentioned in the text. But if you wonder why, there are many possible answers, greed being one of them.
IDK. That could be a mistake of the author, writing after the fact and getting dates and places wrong. Besides, maybe one could still work the fields around Naxos independently of who controlled the town. Invaders do not want to starve.
The Catholic Church's corruption dates back to when it became the dominant religion in the empire. Power corrupts. The Protestants only smelled the coffee, one thousand years after it was brewed.
If a central political power controls philosophy, forbids certain thoughts, burns certain books, then that power stifles the growth of philosophy, out of fear of philosophy's power to influence people. This is what happened with platonism under Christianity: it became some dead piece of rhetorical furniture approved by the holy sea.
And I dare say this is exactly how "Apollodorus" uses platonism: as a mere rhetorical weapon against them materialists. He treats Plato's thought as a dead body, intrumentalized in defense of religion. And that is precisely why he totally misreads the text.
And I dare say it's the other way around. @Fooloso4 instrumentalizes Plato as a rhetorical weapon against them anti-materialists.
Quoting Valentinus
If my judgement is "wrong", then let @Fooloso4 explain why he thinks so. This is precisely my point, he either offers no evidence or explanation for what he is claiming or provides justification that is either irrelevant or invalid.
Here are some of the things @Fooloso4 is stating or implying:
1. The Euthyphro is incapable of having a metaphysical message.
Evidence? None.
3. Euthyphro is not advanced in wisdom, therefore he should drop the case.
a. Evidence? None.
b. Is it (b1) just Euthyphro or (b2) all those not advanced in wisdom that should drop what they are doing?
3. The punishment for murder is death.
Wrong. It can be exile or fine.
4. Euthyphro says his father is guilty of murder.
What Euthyphro describes is unintentional manslaughter or accident. The court is likely to dismiss the case.
5. Euthyphro is guilty of patricide.
Evidence? None.
6. Euthyphro hates his father and wants him dead.
Evidence? None.
7. The crime took place five years prior to his conversation with Socrates.
Relevance? None.
8. L P Gerson, D Sedley, H J Krämer, W J Prior, F Fronterotta, Gerson Rabinowitz, and many other scholars, along with millions of Platonists all are ignoramuses who don’t know what they are talking about.
Evidence? None.
And this is just a sample.
Edit. Also, when challenged, he says he has the degrees to back up his claims and anyone that contradicts him should just shut up:
Quoting Fooloso4
In your opinion, is that a valid argument or proof?
Plato was known for seemingly offhand comments regarding dates that situate the time of a dialogue and other events related to it.
There is quite a bit said in the literature about Naxos and the dialogue. Euthyphro indicates that they were no longer farming there. (4c)
OK. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is the case.
Would it be possible to know how this is of relevance to the topic? I hope this is not too much to ask.
Do you define yourself as anti-materialist?
Reminds me of some blogger who defines herself as a "chocolate mint hater". I hate chocolate mint too, and have only scorn for materialism too, but I wouldn't define myself by what I dislike. I could say that I am a chocolate lover, reason for which I don't mix mint in my chocolate. Also I have a passion for the study of human reason and ideas, reason for which I stay away from reductionist ideas.
I don't define myself as anything for the purposes of this discussion. You guys are taking things too seriously just like you are taking Euthyphro's character too seriously and forget he is just a character that Plato uses to convey a message or set of messages.
Anyway, IMHO the facts of the matter are as follows:
1. The central question of the dialogue is “If x is pious, is it the case that [x is pious] obtains in virtue of [The gods love x], or is it the case that [The gods love x] obtains in virtue of [x is pious]?”
Evan’s Interpretation of the Explicit Euthyphro Argument may be of interest to those who profess an interest.
2. Another question is, in view of Plato’s well-known metaphysical ideas, does the Euthyphro have a metaphysical message?
The affirmative answer is given, among many others, by Gerson Rabinowitz, Platonic Piety: An Essay towards the Solution of an Enigma, Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1958), pp. 108 -120.
I don't think it has anything to do specifically with Naxos other than it provides dates to indicate there was a five year gap between the time it happened and the time he was going to prosecute.
I have no definitive answer. There are a few things we can piece together. Euthyphro's father's defense of his negligence is that the servant was a murderer and:
(4d)
Euthyphro says that he died before the exigete arrived. According the the translators (Thomas and Grace West) the exigete is an official who expounded the sacred and ancestral laws of the city. His father regarded this as a matter of sacred rather than civil law. Euthyphro does not dispute this. So why does he prosecute his father rather than appeal to the exegete to interpret? Euthyphro does, after all, claim it is a matter of purification and piety. Perhaps it has something to do with the exegetes being officially recognized authorities on such matters and Euthyphro being laughed at for his professed knowledge of the gods and piety. And perhaps it also has to do with the private activity of conferring with the exegete versus a public trial in which Euthyphro can display his knowledge of divine things.
Just as I said from the start. It is a line of inquiry that leads nowhere. Speculation should not be substituted for fact.
Any other ideas?
Yes, but this leads to the question of why this detail, why this place. In this case I think Plato leads to reader to ask further questions about Euthyphro's intentions. It does seem suspicious to me that he waited all this time and then brought the case to a public rather than private forum.
To begin with, it needs to be established that the five-year gap is actual and not just imagined. If it is actual, then it may indeed seem suspicious. But in the absence of reliable verification and further relevant data, it still leads nowhere.
A somewhat similar case in Luke's gospel is in the story of the 'good Samaritan', which happens on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. Some scholars have asked why this location, and what would a Samaritan do there, far away from Galilee. But it could well be that Jesus just invented whatever location came to mind, not even aware that there weren't many Samaritan's outside of Galilee.
Good point.
It could well be the case as a theoretical hypothesis, but unlikely as it wasn't Jesus who was telling the story.
So, Eco was probably right about over-interpretation.
That makes no difference. Whoever invented the story might have chosen whatever location came to his mind.
I think it does matter. If it wasn't Jesus who wrote the story, then it wasn't he who "invented" the story.
But I agree that Plato probably invented the Naxos location and possibly the rest of it. After all, the dialogue is just a story he uses to make a point. We don't even know that Euthyphro is not a fictitious personage.
Which to me, incidentally, is exactly the same meaning than that of the good Samaritan parable: God is unimpressed by empty, ritualistic piety, be that from the high priest, the levite or Euthyphro; He loves justice best, even when it comes from the impious.
Why isn't it Jesus' story?
[Added: No offense taken. Mature people can have, express, and discuss different points of view.]
From Eco's Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Here is a partial list of the main
features of what he calls a Hermetic approach to texts:
If I understand him correctly overinterpretation is related to the pneumatic reader. I will leave it to the readers here to decide who in this discussion and this form are pneumatic readers.
I don't think a story from Luke is comparable to a Platonic dialogue. Plato was an extremely careful writer, I don't think Luke meets the same standard. In addition to set a timeframe by the detail is not an interpretation, the significance of the timeframe is. With regard to Eco, the interpretation I suggested is mundane, not at all what he is criticising.
More generally, where do we draw the line between interpretation and overinterpretation? I don't think Plato puts that in there without reason.
Exactly. That's why I said that the alleged "five-year gap" is a false lead and the logical thing to do is to focus on what Plato is trying to tell us.
Quoting Olivier5
Correct. However, what if Euthyphro is, after all, just? I don't think that is has been proven that he isn't.
Maybe Plato makes it deliberately ambiguous to get the reader to think it over and as he goes over the text again, what stands out are words like "idea", "form", "pattern", etc. that lead him to think that the real message lies elsewhere and that Euthyphro's "dilemma" was simply intended to stimulate and sharpen his thought in preparation for the true message.
After all, Plato and other philosophers did believe in several layers of meaning when interpreting the poets and myth-makers.
Right. This should be too obvious to mention, but unfortunately it is not.
The dialogues are all inventions. Parmenides was a real person but his meeting and discussing the Forms is usually regarded as fictional. The characters is Plato's Symposium are real people, but it is not an historical account. Even the Apology is not an historical account of what was said. It differs significantly from Xenophon's account.
Only someone like him would think the dialogue was not a condemnation of his pretense to wisdom and piety.
The narrative is in the third person: “When a Samaritan woman came to draw water, Jesus said to her … “ (John 4:7).
It isn't Jesus relating it.
I thought he was talking about the parable of the Good Samaritan. That was supposed to be Jesus narrating. Doesn't mean it was, though.
They are stories. That's why it doesn't make sense to read too much into the alleged "five-year gap" for which there is no evidence anyway.
Again with this. Boring crap :yawn:
Deletions can only be done by a moderator who judges any full-of-shit posts flagged.
I am not the only one but guess I am now on the tag team's 'hit list'.
Unfortunately, I can't flag this off topic post but I will do others...and this should disappear.
From Nalin Ranasinghe, late professor of philosophy at Assumption College. His writings include:
The Soul of Socrates, Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology and Crito, and Socrates in the Underworld: On Plato’s Gorgias.
https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2016/03/theology-socratic-piety-nalin-ranasinghe.html
But would you want to return to the dilemma? Or are you finished pondering it?
I appreciate you and others, and there have been several others, for stepping in. They have chosen to make Plato's Euthyphro and Phaedo about me.
I did not get a chance to read the posts that were deleted, but it is certain that they were not substantive or on topic. As you said, it was a moderator who thought they should be deleted.
Unfortunately, you have become a target too. But nothing to them in response.
First of all, the dialogue is not about "the dilemma".
Second, it is my opinion that a proper interpretation of the dialogue looks carefully at the details.
Third, I was asked:Quoting Olivier5 I gave some some suggestions as to what the relevance might be.
And Fourth, I responded to what you and Apollodorus said. But now that I show that this is a real concern in the literature and that my suggestions are not without support, you want to just drop it and move on.
Feel free to flesh it out. We're listening.
I kind of feel bad that you're feeling so attacked. I think if we go around the room, we'll find that each of us zeroed in on something in particular and ran with it, to personal benefit if nothing else. As you've mentioned, that's the nature of Plato.
I would like to hear these personal testimonials. I don't want the conversation to be dominated by one and only one viewpoint. I think you'd agree?
A bit of emotional intelligence says: if you want others to listen to you, be a listener. I've found that to be true, haven't you?
Well, if Amity is going to delete any posts that are inconvenient to you, then we have no choice but to drop it and move on. People have better thing to do in life, you know.
Anyway, Ranasinghe does not provide any evidence in support of your theory. Even if we were to suppose, for the sake of argument, that "Euthyphro is resurrecting old grudges to support his ambitions and prospects. He is impiously digging up matters from the past for his selfish advantage", that doesn't prove or change anything.
You're saying that you now show "concern in the literature" but that means absolutely nothing without evidence. There are thousands of "concerns in the literature", so what? It's still all just theory, no matter who comes up with it.
And it must be said, not a particularly convincing or interesting theory either. Even you must have noticed by now that there is hardly anyone on this thread. The truth of the matter is that nobody cares about Euthyphro and his "dilemma" or whatever you choose to call it. You're only using him to attack religion which is definitely boring as Amity said and with which I fully agree.
But, by all means, do carry on if it makes you happy.
I think you have enough emotional intelligence to know what is really going on here. I am going to leave it at that.
If you want to discuss the dialogue please do so.
Not completely without reason; I believe he just chose a plausible location for his story. For the story to work, it had to be far away from Athens because a judge had to travel there, and had to arrive too late, after the criminal labourer had already died of his wounds.
I'll write another post about Luke, who indeed may not have been as good a Greek writer as Plato, but then, he had a better teacher of philosophy than Socrates.
Basically, Amity and I complained to our beloved Euthyp... err... sorry, Apollodorus about his personal vendetta cluttering the thread, then Frank joked that we were cluttering the thread with our complains about cluttering, and then a mod came and deleted half a dozen posts.
Apparently they have no problem with overdrawn personal feuds.
I mentioned Luke, not John, and the good Samaritan parable, which I assumed everyone knew about. But that was evidently not the case.
For the edification of the ignorami among us, let me quote the entire parable.
With a little attention and luck, you will note that there is this character Jesus in there. The Jesus character is involved in a dialogue with another fellow, about what God wants from us, and he tells a story somewhat similar to the story of Euthyphro, involving a man beaten up and left to die by the roadside. So the parallels with Plato's dialogue are numerous.
Luke 10:29 and following
Quoting Olivier5
Unfortunately, the misrepresentations and lies continue. Such blatant dishonesty:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555262
I will leave it stand. As an example.
My concern is that it will not stop - not particularly from the point of view of being a 'target' - but that any further threads concerning Plato's Dialogues will suffer the same fate.
I prefer now to read and consider any Dialogue in peace.
Hope that others continue in good spirit...
As usual, you aren't paying attention. As I pointed out to @Frank, the narrative is in the third person and this applies to John, Luke, or any other Gospel text.
"In reply Jesus said ... " (Luke 10:30).
It's exactly like Plato writing, "Socrates said". No difference whatsoever. There is no need to bring the Bible into it and it is obviously off topic.
That's exactly what we've been doing but you keep providing "evidence" that on closer examination turns up to be no such thing, take Ranasinghe, for example. I can understand @Amity’s exasperation but we are exasperated with your tactics too. It would seem more helpful to simply say "I have no evidence, it's just a working hypothesis" or something to that effect. Why can't you do that?
Anyway, the matter stands as follows:
Socrates believes that people should act piously or virtuously because this is good (a) for the soul (e.g. Crito) and (b) for the Gods or the divine (e.g. Euthyphro).
Socrates also believes (and Euthyphro agrees) that the pious is pious because it is loved (sanctioned/approved/commanded) by the Gods.
The only thing that remains to be established is what exactly is the pious (and why the Gods love or command it).
This may be a complex issue. However, it is evident from Plato’s dialogues that the telos of human life is to attain the highest degree of happiness. Happiness is attained by being pious, virtuous or righteous (dikaios), i.e., good and just.
There are several ways of knowing what is good and just:
1. Authoritative opinion (doxa) which may include religious beliefs.
2. Reason (episteme).
3. Innate sense of what is right and what is wrong which is an attribute of the soul which is divine (gnosis).
4. A combination of the above.
Euthyphro’s behavior can at the most show that religious belief (religion-based virtue) may lead to undesirable results when improperly understood and or applied. It doesn’t show that religion-based virtue in general is bad.
IMHO you have failed to demonstrate your case. If you think otherwise, feel free to show us how.
Luke's good Samaritan passage also alludes to other things possibly not present in Plato's, such as a certain universality of the human race (the original question is: "who is my neighbour?").
Of course. That's why justice was divine as in Goddess Dike. I never disputed that.
Yes, I agree. The question then is why did Euthyphro wait five years?
In other words same old shit. Be careful! Soon "Euthodorus" will include you in his personal vendetta.
You mean like this?
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
We don't know that the text implies that. Plato may not have remembered the dates so well. Naxos could just be a place reasonably far away from Athens for the story to work.
You cannot see past your defensiveness. I did not say that religion-based virtue in general is bad. I have said repeatedly that it is about Euthyphro, about what he intends to do in the name of piety. The problem is you are still hanging on to the idea that he did nothing wrong and that Socrates does not say he did anything wrong. It is not clear whether Euthyphro learned anything from Socrates, but it is clear that you have not.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
It has nothing to do with religious belief (religion-based virtue) per se, but with piety without consideration of the just, noble, and good.I could go on quoting things you ignored, but all that matters to you is to continue trying to find something to argue against.
That's one way to interpret it. There are others.
Quoting Fooloso4
That could be one layer of it. There are others.
I for one see no point, to be honest. The OP says:
"To answer the question that engendered this post, belief in god is not necessary for being good."
@Fooloso4 has failed to prove his case on the basis of the dialogue. The discussion can only move in circles from this point and IMHO is a waste of time and space.
True. And vice versa, it is easy to hide evil under the guise of religion.
And yet you will continue to post. Please prove me wrong.
Why don't you start a thread on it? It is not part of the dialogue, which is what this thread was intended to be focused on.
First, do not blame your failure to understand the dialogue on anything or anyone else.
Second, although the thread was engendered by Banno's request, it has been about the dialogue and not the thread that engendered it. I never intended for the discussion of the dialogue to be proof that belief in god is not necessary for being good. That question can easily be answered empirically.
I see. So can you state very briefly and as clearly as possible what the true point of the thread is?
The Euthyphro dilemma isn't in Euthyphro?
The true point of the thread is to discuss the dialogue.
Quoting Fooloso4
As I suspected, you have not proven me wrong.
As a forum member, I have the same rights as other members to post comments.
Quoting Fooloso4
I was under the impression that you wanted to discuss the dialogue to show that "belief in God is not necessary for being good", as stated in the OP and which, incidentally, you have failed to demonstrate.
Anyway, who said you can't discuss the dialogue? My only objection was that you should provide some evidence to back up your statements as is customary in normal discussions. You demand evidence from others whilst producing none yourself, which I find rather odd for someone with lots of "degrees".
I think the matter is becoming more and more mysterious and I fear the answer can only be found in @Fooloso4's psychology. Could there be a reason why he calls himself a "fool"?
But what is he talking about? Why is he saying that?
Alright. What are some of the other possible interpretations then? Let's try and be constructive here.
The Euthyphro dilemma as it is referred to today is not the problem that Socrates posed to Euthyphro.
Socrates question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" leads to the subsequent versions of the Euthyphro dilemma. Euthyphro says he does not understand the question. It is not for him a dilemma because he does not even understand what the difference is between the two. Euthyphro's claim as it stands - "What is loved by the gods is pious, and what is not loved is impious." (6e) is inadequate. The problem is made clear by his initial response to Socrates question, what is the idea of the pious and impious. (5d) His answer is that what he is doing is pious. (5d) He assumes that the gods love what he is doing because he is pious and that he is pious because he is doing what the gods love. When Socrates introduces the question of the just he shows the inadequacy of Euthyphro's answers.
Euthyphro may have no agenda than to be pious. Being impious could bring disaster down upon his house, so he may want to attend to it before he embarks on a project.
There are endless scenarios where he thinks he doing what's right. Chaining someone up and leaving them to die is pretty horrific.
So perhaps what Socrates reveals is not iniquity, but the shifting ground beneath our certainty.
Think about the dilemma this way:
Do we love money because it's valuable? Or is it valuable because we love it?
Notice the unresolvable circularity? As if it might be both.
Yes. That's the dilemma. I was starting to think you might be suffering from dementia or something (I really did).
But then, what is the metaphysical or moral message of that interpretation? Do all you can to cleanse yourself/your house/your city of impiety, even if you need to prosecute your own father?
In context, that sounds unlikely to me, coming from Plato, a student and admirer of Socrates, met in the dialogue at the door of the tribunal prosecuting him for impiety. And if Euthyphro is justified, why is he presented as somebody who cannot even explain piety to Socrates?
Quoting frank
IDK. In economic terms, the monetary value of anything is a complex function of desire, utility and availability, and yes it is iterative (rather than circular), but this kind of thinking seems too relativist for Plato. He is all about eternal absolutes. More probably he is telling us something about the inherent desirability and universality of justice vs the relativity of religious practice.
This is what the Athenians did to Socrates. The sentenced him to death to cleanse their city of his influence. We know this had a profound effect on Plato.
But he would have known that the scapegoating that swept the city was coming from innocent superstition energized by the pain and dishonor of defeat.
There's no need to villainize Euthyphro. You can if you want to, but the dialogue works fine if Euthyphro just isn't thinking things through.
If he does, he may decide that justice does call for the prosecution of his father.
Quoting Olivier5
And that is priceless, right?
Quoting Olivier5
I wasn't talking about what you can buy for money. I'm talking about money itself. It's an abstraction just like piety. In fact in some ways, they play similar roles.
So what do you think? Do we love money because it's valuable? Or...
I held off answering him. You provided a better answer than I would have.
I think Euthyphro did have an agenda. He could have done what his father did and asked an exegete, an official who expounded the sacred and ancestral laws of the city. Instead he brought it to a public forum to demonstrate his own expertise in such matters. He says:
... whenever I say something in the assembly concerning the divine things ... I have spoken nothing that is not true ... they envy all who are of this sort. (3c)
He is blindly convinced that he knows divine things and that what he is doing is right. In addition, he makes a public display of it.
As to his family, he tells Socrates that they are indignant and that they tell him that it is impious for a son to proceed against his father for murder. But he claims they:
And according to your interpretation, Plato would have agreed with his teacher Socrates' scapegoating.
Quoting frank
Unlike piety, money can be quantified, stored, stolen, changed, and exchanged against physical goods and services. I see it as a very practical thing and not an abstraction.
Not at all. He just would have known that Socrates was the victim of superstition.
Quoting Olivier5
You're avoiding the question?
We already know that. What we don't know is what you think the point of this thread is.
You said the point is not to show that belief in God in not necessary for being good, even though the OP states this to be "the question that engendered this post":
Quoting Fooloso4
You said it is to "discuss the dialogue" and that the dilemma "is not part of the dialogue":
Quoting Fooloso4
And yet, you keep mentioning it. So, I think people are entitled to ask what exactly it is you want to discuss.
We have already seen that obsessing about the alleged "five-year gap", cannot lead anywhere except to further unfounded speculation. Hence my suggestion to discuss something more constructive and, if possible, more interesting and more intellectually rewarding.
Exactly. That's the dilemma that, allegedly, he "doesn't want to discuss", yet he keeps mentioning it.
Not only that, but it seems rather weird not to discuss it when Socrates and Euthyphro discuss it from one end of the dialogue to the other.
And he would have written a dialogue about it, right? Where this Euthyphro superstitious character would be a fool, unable to justify himself...
Quoting frank
I've already answered it. I think that Plato is not looking for tradable, relativist value, like money, but for absolutes that are absolutely desirable. He doesn't think that piety is inherently and absolutely desirable. Rather is is like money: a tradable good. A means to an end. And the real absolute end, for which piety is only a means, is proposed to be justice.
From many of your posts it is evident that you don't or until some point did not.
Quoting Apollodorus
Do I need to explain to you what engendered means? This topic and the one that engendered it are two different things. One started out one way shifted to general opinions on the relationship between God and morality. This one started by looking at the dialogue Euthyphro and some of us have been doing our best to keep it on topic.
Quoting Apollodorus
As some posts here show, what is generally thought of as the Euthyphro dilemma is not what is found in the dialogue. See my response to frank: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555554
Quoting Apollodorus
It is this kind of misrepresentation that leads me to ignore you. What is the point? Do you really think such tactics are persausive?
Or to use his expertise.
From the dialogue, we can assume that Euthyphro thinks he is quite skilled at manipulating this particular tribunal. So bringing the case there could be highly tactical. I mean, he probably lost already in some first jurisdiction in Naxos, and is bringing the case to a higher court that he thinks he has good chance of overcoming.
Yes. This line of discussion started with my saying that we don't have to see Euthyphro as a villain. I think you're agreeing that he might have just been superstitious with a little consciousness of his social standing in the mix. These two qualities would have made him pretty average.
Quoting Olivier5
True. And how do we know about the ideal of justice?
They do not discuss it from one end of the dialogue to the other. Socrates quickly dispatches it.
The dialogue comes to an end when Socrates once again asks him what piety is. There can be no dilemma where the terms have not been adequately determined.
Starting on page one what is called the "Euthyphro Dilemma" is not what is found in the dialogue.
Quoting Tom Storm
The average person does not say he is an expert on divine matters. Euthyphro would deny that he is superstitious. It is his assumption that he knows what he does not know about such things that is at issue. He does not simply hold this misguided belief he acts on it.
That's a very good point actually. And, of course, the Athenians believed that what they were doing was right. Moreover, to be fair, they offered to acquit him if he desisted from engaging in any further mischief, which he refused.
Quoting frank
Of course it does work fine. It is a very short dialogue and it seems out of place to read too much into it and resort to pure speculation as a substitute for legitimate conclusions as @Fooloso4 apparently tends to do.
By contrast, my own suggestion is far more plausible. We know that Plato believed in Ideas or Forms and in intuition (noesis) as a faculty of the soul (nous) which philosophy aimed to awaken and develop.
The dialogue contains terms like "idea", "form", and "pattern" which, in anyone even remotely familiar with Plato, would lead to an intuition of coherence or associative memory. The time required for the association with Platonic Forms to be retrieved by the mind would depend on the reader's intelligence and training (some may have to re-read the text several times), but the association is clearly intended, it can hardly be accidental.
Of course other interpretations are theoretically possible, but they are to be regarded as necessarily of a lower order, value, and interest. They are more likely to occur among the lower social and intellectual strata or among the metaphysically untutored.
Average, and therefore worthy of some scorn by the wise... But I think you are not picking up the clues Plato left about Euthyphro's venality and ruthless ambition. The text does not exclude ulterior motives for prosecuting his own father, and perhaps I agree with "Fooloso4" that the mention of Naxos implies some ulterior motive.
Quoting frank
You tell me.
That's a question that he himself seems unable or unwilling to answer. We are forced to draw our own conclusions.
What suggestion is that? That the moral of the dialogue is "there are forms and ideas"?
Sounds a bit dry.
Sure. You just asked what the alternative interpretation is. That's it. Athenians were heavily into appearance, whatever we might think if that. It wasn't evil, it was just their culture.
Quoting Olivier5
I think Plato is about to hatch some Forms which we know about from birth, but uncover through experience.
I think we all agree on this.
Plato was upper-class and he wrote for the educated upper classes. He also believed in a tripartite soul reflecting the three classes of Athenian society, etc.
What if his dialogues have several layers of meaning intended for different social, intellectual, and spiritual classes, such as (1) the unawakened, (2) the awakened, and (3) the wide-awakened or enlightened?
According to this scheme, @Fooloso4's interpretation would seem to pertain to the lowest social/intellectual/spiritual class of readers. Obviously, this is just a hypothetical suggestion. But I believe it to be true.
All this brouhaha for that?
Anyway, whatever rocks your boat...
This. In lieu of his own interpretation one of his many cut and paste. This one from Lloyd Gerson:
Quoting Apollodorus
The key is the theory that the Forms are instrumental causes.
First, the passage cited. Socrates is asking what the pious itself is:
Gerson takes this to mean something that causes pious things to be pious. But Socrates goes on to say:
That one thing that is the cause of the pious would then be the cause of the impious. But what he means is that:
A pattern is not an instrumental cause, it does not cause anything to be like it. It is, rather, that by which we can identify something as being of that kind.
Correct. It must be remembered that for Plato to learn was to remember. Therefore, Plato's dialogues are meant to stimulate the soul's innate memory leading to intuitive perception of metaphysical realities such as the Forms and, eventually, recognition of one's own essential divinity.
Well, that settles the matter. You go from demanding proof of everything I say to what you believe to be true.
The divisions of the tripart soul do not correspond to your division of the unawakened, the awakened, and the wide-awakened or enlightened.
The term "pattern" (paradeigma) refers to Platonic Forms which, as you yourself admitted, were known to Plato and his immediate disciples at the time he wrote the Euthyphro.
You can't deny established historical facts. Though you may, of course, try.
No one disputes that the Forms are often talked about in the dialogues. We went through this already. What is at issue is what they are.
Of course pattern refers to the Forms, that is the point. The dialogue refers to the Form as a pattern, not as an instrumental cause. Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo. An hypothesis is not an instrumental cause. If you cannot provide textual evidence that a Form is an instrumental cause and not, as Socrates says, a hypothesis, then, despite what you may believe, your interpretation is without grounds.
He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato.
Plato merely translates the older, more intuitive concept into philosophical language.
Our friends are saying that Plato believed in forms and used that concept in Euthyphro, and therefore that this MUST be the message of Euthyphro.
That's like saying: Plato used the letters of the alphabet to write the Republic, therefore the message proclaimed by the Republic is simply: I BELIEVE IN ALPHABETIC WRITING SYSTEMS !
No he doesn't. He doesn't talk about Forms at all. He talks about one Form and calls it a pattern. He says nothing about instrumental causality, a concept of central importance to Gerson. I suspect you do not understand what you copied and pasted and used as an argument from authority.
Quoting Apollodorus
You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms.
Socrates certainly describes the Forms as causes in the Phaedo. And he doesn't mean that they are mere hypotheses, what he does is to discuss them hypothetically.
And of course, as has been noted by many scholars, he mentions Forms at 6e in the Euthyphro. For Plato and his immediate disciples, terms like "idea", "form", and "pattern", meant Forms. They could mean other things in the everyday sense of the word, but on one level they indisputably meant Platonic Forms as you have already admitted. IMO it would be irrational to dispute this.
"Tell me then what this aspect [form] is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy."
"?????? ?????? ?? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?????, ??? ??? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????????, ? ??? ?? ???????? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ? ?? ?? ?? ????????, ?? ??."
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asection%3D6e
As may be clearly seen, Socrates uses the terms ???? idea or "form" and ?????????? paradeigma or "pattern" and, significantly, says that he wishes to fix his eye upon it and use it as a standard of reference in deciding what is pious or impious.
The Form is "seen" by the inner eye of spirit (nous) in intuitive, supramental perception (noesis).
So, this is something a bit more than empty "hypothesis".
He used alphabetic letters too, mind you. Hence his message must be about the use of alphabetic letters, right?
Please re-read my earlier posts. Terms like "idea" and "paradeigma" would evoke the concept of "Forms" in the mind of those familiar with Platonic thought. @Fooloso4 has already admitted this.
A concept, in other words. Plato tried to eek out the meaning of concepts by interrogating them. That's a style of enquiry more that a metaphysical message. In fact I find a rather facile way of discarding concepts, to ask for their precise definition. Concepts are not easy to define, so yeah, Euthyphro could not really define piety to Socrates' satisfaction, but if if he had asked Socrates "define justice", I bet Socrates would have struggled too.
"Style of inquiry" that in association with the concept of "Forms" that it evokes in those familiar with Platonic thought, produces a metaphysical message.
Very simple. Though, possibly, too complex for the intellectually or metaphysically challenged to grasp.
The only thing that is irrational is your repetition of what I have said more than once as if it is in dispute. I even quoted myself saying as much some pages back showing I had already said it pages before that.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is what he says about causes in the Phaedo:
Later he reintroduces physical causes:
He does not discuss them hypothetically. They are hypothetic.
Clearly then...
The attributes/properties of being just, good, and divine are independent of being loved by the gods, which is an insurmountable problem for any position that believes in creator god(s) repsonsible for creating everything as well as the problems faced by divine command theory.
You just quoted the same passage I did using a different translation!
Quoting Apollodorus
Do you think by repeating the same thing you can avoid having to deal with the problem of instrumental causality?
Quoting Apollodorus
What he wishes to do and what he able to do are two different things. He has no knowledge of the Forms and has never seen them. He says as much in the Republic.
If you want to discuss it further I will do so here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11210/socratic-philosophy/p1
If the attributes/properties of just, good, and divine are divine, then they are part of the divine.
They have no separate existence from the divine, especially in the human soul which is essentially divine.
They do not "evoke the concept 'Forms'. They are terms we translate as Forms. You have a concept of Forms based on the myth of transcendence from the Republic. It is philosophical poetry, images of what Socrates thinks true knowledge must be.
That doesn't fix the problem...
If those attributes are independent of the gods[hide](as they must be if the gods love things as a result of those things possessing those attributes)[/hide], but those attributes are part of the divine or are the divine, then the divine is independent of the gods...
Again, you fail to see the fallacy of confusing Socrates with Plato. The theory of Forms was proposed by Plato.
Socrates is a character in Plato's dialogues, remember?
This is part of his knowledge of his ignorance. As long as we cannot say what justice itself is we can only have opinions about whether something just or unjust and no standard by which to measure.
That is your opinion.
Of course philosophical poetry is used to convey metaphysical concepts and experience.
You keep confusing Socrates with Plato and vice versa.
They are not independent, just as sunlight is not independent of the Sun.
Whether or not the historical Socrates talked about Forms is irrelevant. I am talking about the Socrates of the dialogues. It is never "Plato said this" always "Socrates said this". You never find Plato saying anything.
Argument by defnitional fiat. Fantastic. Gods love themselves. You win.
Why would the Gods hate themselves?
Yes, my opinion. But my opinion backed up by what is said in the text.
Quoting Apollodorus
The metaphysical concepts are created by the poetry, just as the gods were created by the poets.
Again, if you want to pursue this further: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11210/socratic-philosophy/p1
Not interested. Revisit the argument/objection given. It's still an insurmountable problem. Believe what you like.
Plato speaks through his characters. And he clearly spoke to his pupils like Aristotle. Unless you believe he was using sign language and even that is a form of speech.
It isn't a problem that I created. And of course I believe what I like just as you do.
1. That is your opinion, that, incidentally, is unsupported by the text.
2. I don't believe there is anything to pursue further as you are not contributing anything new. I have stated many times that this "discussion" is going around in circles and is a total waste of time and space.
The problem with your particular line of thinking is that it results in the following...
The gods love themselves.
The question/problem is - of course - do the gods love something because it has the attributes of goodness, justness, and divinity or iare such things just, good, and divine because the gods love them.
Your answer was that gods loved things that are just, good, and divine.
So, either those properties exist in and of themselves independently of the gods, or the gods love themselves.
Not an acceptable answer to me. Results may vary.
Right. You seem to understand this. I am glad you cleared up your confusion that you attributed to me.
Quoting Apollodorus
But we have not written record of what he might have said.
Quoting Apollodorus
Claiming that it is unsupported after I just gave several quotes in support of it shows that you really don't know how to discuss these things, you just ape phrases that wee used against you.
Quoting Apollodorus
And yet, here you still are.
I think you haven't been following the thread.
Socrates believes (and Euthyphro agrees) that the pious/good/just is pious/good/just because it is loved (sanctioned/approved/commanded) by the Gods.
The only thing that remains to be established is what exactly is the pious/good/just and why the Gods love/sanction/approve/command it.
If you think that you have a better answer, feel free to tell us what it is.
And yet, so are you.
It is you who has not followed the dialogue. Socrates does not believe that the pious/good/just is pious/good/just because it is loved (sanctioned/approved/commanded) by the Gods.
If you were consistent it is pious because it is Pious, good because it is Good, just because it is Just.
bolding above mine
So, piety, goodness, and justice somehow exist, in their entirety, independently of the gods...
:brow:
... which is the problem for divine command theorists, and it is also a problem for anyone who holds belief that god(s) created everything.
Quoting Fooloso4
Of course I do. And since you agree with it, you can't deny it.
Yes. This is a thread that I started and that I and others think is of some value. You said it is a waste of time and space. So why are you still here?
Lol Not at all. The fact that something is loved by the Gods does not mean that it is independent of the Gods.
The Gods may perfectly well love what is divine, i.e., themselves.
Unless you think they have reason to hate themselves ....
You really have lost track of things. You said I was confusing Socrates and Plato. Any confusion was on your part.
Because people, including yourself, keep asking me questions. And as I am a polite kind of person, I waste my time answering ....
As before. Not interested. Congratulations. You win. Argument by defnitional fiat. Gods are good. Gods love good things. Gods love themselves. Perfect reasoning.
Is that really what you think is going on? No, don't answer. I have no more questions.
It isn't about winning. This isn't a debate or competition. Just a friendly exchange of views.
As a matter of fact, I wasn't going to answer.
However, since you're asking, politeness obliges me to answer.
Yea. The dilemma doesn't exist for a monistic objective idealist, though.
Quoting Fooloso4
This is what I don't get. If something is not worthy of consideration, silence is the best response.
It is clear from the text that what makes the loved by Gods the loved by the Gods is the fact that the Gods love it:
Whatever they (the Gods) all love is holy (9d).
The pious becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved (by the Gods) (11a).
Like Euthyphro he wants to demonstrate his advanced knowledge of divine things and ends up being laughed at.
Well, I don't want to make a judgment of intentions. I see that you are struggling to decide what to respond to.
I showed my son this thread and he laughed at how your challengers don't actually respond to your comments as given. That is what is funny.
Okay, a knowledge that Euthyphro and his followers lack, full of their own certitude.
You are confused and challenged because you are not looking at the right place. You are looking at the tools (concepts) used by Plato, not at what he says with these tools. You are staying at level of words, at the surface therefore.
When the wise points at the stars, you dissect his finger.
Do they use godes, too? Sorry, couldn't resist...
That just has to be the absolute best one-liner in TPF history.
Very funny indeed. However, the text says "all the Gods":
"I should say that what all the Gods love is holy" (9e).
"All the Gods" obviously means "the divine", to theion, or God.
I can see no reason why the divine/God would hate itself/himself.
Any reason why it wouldn't?
Why would the good hate itself?
What should be clear from the text, but is not clear to you, is that Socrates is showing him that these statements go nowhere.
Do you not see how meaningless it is to say that what makes something loved is that it is loved?
A. (I love it) because (it's pious.)
B. (It's pious) because (I love it.)
it's not like equations where it ends up being that I love it because I love it.
With A, I'm passive. I respond to the world as it is.
With B, the world becomes fixed by my love.
And don't we experience the world as both? I must move the bishop diagonally because I'm invested in the game.
This reminds me of something from Alice in Wonderland. Alice is told to either say what she means or mean what she says. She can't see the difference and is told that it like the difference between seeing what you eat and eating what you see.
Yes, similar. There's the added dimension of creating a language game vs playing one.
1. First of all, this is what Socrates is saying and, in the absence of additional information, it is all we have.
2. Why is it "meaningless"? Is the definition of "beloved" or "loved" not "loved person or thing"?
Otherwise put, in what sense may it be said that "the loved" is not "what is loved"???
First of all, you need to read it in context. The paragraph from which you quote at 11a begins:
He goes on to show why all that follows is problematic.
No, the definition of loved is not that it is loved. The definition of 'dog' is not "it is a dog". The definition of 'obtuse' is not "it is obtuse". The definition of 'dim witted' is not "he is dim witted".
I think "loved" or "beloved" is "person or thing that is loved":
Noun beloved (plural beloveds) 1. Someone who is loved; something that is loved.
beloved – Wiktionary
Are the dictionaries wrong?
Loved is not a person or thing that is loved. The meaning of 'loved' is not defined by saying something is loved. Beloved can be defined as something that is loved but love cannot be defined by loved.
Do you really not know this?
Do you not realize that you are being dishonest here, or at least that what you’ve posted could seem like dishonesty?
The salient word is “loved”, and you introduce “beloved” as an equal term and then lo and behold you post the dictionary definition of “beloved” as if that in any way supported what you are saying about “loved”. Do you know what I mean? You muscled in a dictionary definition that suits your argument. Why didnt you post the dictionary definition of “loved”? I googled it after I read your post…it really wouldnt help your case would it? So you ignored it and instead found a word that would.
Thats a sneaky, dishonest way to engage with someone, and I’m wondering if its so sneaky you din’t even know you're doing it.
Edited for clarity
I think "loved" or "beloved" is "person or thing that is loved":
Noun beloved (plural beloveds) 1. Someone who is loved; something that is loved.
beloved – Wiktionary
Are you a lexicographer?
Do you think the dictionaries are wrong?
If yes, then feel free to get in touch with Wiktionary and explain to them that you intend to introduce a new definition.
In the meantime, I reserve the right to go by what the dictionaries are saying, not by your unexamined opinion.
I am left wondering whether you truly are incapable of understanding or if it is just a pretense to save face or whatever tatters are left of an argument.
Well, @Fooloso4 didn't complain, did he? He said:
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm talking about "loved" or "beloved" as in "person or thing loved by the Gods".
Edit. @Fooloso4 agrees with me that "beloved can be defined as something that is loved", see above.
His objection is that "love cannot be defined by loved", which is totally irrelevant IMHO.
Again, I am left wondering whether you truly are incapable of understanding or if it is just a pretense to save face or whatever tatters are left of an argument.
Either way, I'm done.
Whether or not he complained is not relevant to whether or not you were being dishonest.
Do you recognize that what you did is dishonest? Or at least recognize that it could come across that way? Please answer that question, it is direct and simple.
It is difficult to distinguish between dishonesty or ineptitude. I suspect it is some combination of the one to cover up the other.
I find it fascinating that someones mind can just slip past something like that, and Im compelled to inquire so I can understand better when my own mind might be doing something like that. Its kind of terrifying to me honestly, he doesnt seem to realize he is doing it. I dislike the idea of not knowing my own mind in that way.
How on earth is it "dishonest"???
Socrates’ question is, “Is that which is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? (10a).
The Greek phrase is ???????? ??? ??? ????, phileitai hypo ton theon. Which means “loved by the Gods” or “beloved of the Gods” where “loved” = “beloved”.
Are you well? Or are you just a relative of @Fooloso4?
Ok, so when you swap out “loved” for “beloved”, thats the dishonest part.
Why would you do that except that the dictionary definition of “beloved” suits your argument where the dictionary definition of “loved” does not? It seems you are doing it because your argument doesn't work with the definition of “loved” so you just used a different word that does help your argument…you pretend that “loved” and “beloved” are interchangeable when you know very well they have different dictionary definitions. That is a deception, dishonesty.
If it isn’t dishonesty then please share your reason for using the dictionary definition of “beloved” instead of “loved”, since “loved” is the word being discussed.
The dishonesty is entirely yours. Though, quite possibly, you aren't aware of it.
In relation to the passages under discussion, there is no difference whatsoever between "loved" and "beloved".
@Fooloso4 himself agreed that "beloved is defined as something that is loved".
Quoting Fooloso4
"Beloved" is the word used by translators for phileitai hypo ton theon:
"But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it" (10d).
Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press.
Feel free to contact the translators and lexicographers and suggest alternative definitions or wording. I am sure they will be more than delighted to hear from you and Fooloso4 :grin:
That does not mean the terms are interchangeable. The beloved is the object of love. You can't just turn it around. Love is not the object of the beloved.
In any case, you are avoiding the issues raised. You take Socrates' criticism of Euthyphro as an endorsement. That you are unable to see that is either ineptitude or willed blindness, or maybe some combination.
I never said it was.
Quoting Fooloso4
Of course not. I'm taking a statement by Socrates as a starting point for a constructive interpretation of the text. By contrast, you are using mere imagination and baseless speculation admixed with falsehoods and fake definitions.
If what counts as good, just, and pious counts as such because it is loved by the gods, then all things loved by the gods are good, just, and pious merely as a result of being loved by the gods, and nothing is good, just, and pious unless or until it's loved by the gods. In this particular scenario, humans either have no direct access to the gods and thus cannot know what is good, just, and pious, or they somehow have access to the gods in order to be able to know what they love, and by doing so also know what's good, just, and pious.
That's one logical possibility, and it ends in the good, just, and pious being arbitrary(at the whim of the gods) and unknowable to humans as a result of humans not having knowledge of gods' whims/preferences, and/or some human(s) claiming to know the minds, whims, and preferences of the gods.
If the good, just, and pious is loved by the gods because that which is loved is already good, just, and pious, then there must be a criterion - independent of merely being loved by the god as in the example above - by which the gods compare/contrast things to the criterion in order to see if they count as being good, just, and pious. In this scenario, should the gods find that something satisfies that criterion, then the gods love it as a result. Should something or other fail to satisfy that criterion, then the gods do not love it. If this particular scenario is true, then what counts as being good, just, and pious exists in it's entirety completely independent of the gods approval because the approval comes as a result of meeting the criterion for what counts as being good, just, and pious.
This logical possibility drives an insurmountable wedge between what's good, just, and pious and the gods by negating the idea that divinity/gods is equivalent to the good, just, and pious.
Neither is acceptable(to the believer anyway). I personally find the latter to be the case.
BTW, thanks for pointing out that "loved" and "beloved" are synonyms. It looks like the dictionary now agrees with you. I don't know how you managed to persuade them to change their definition, but well done.
[b]loved (comparative more loved, superlative most loved) 1. Being the object of love
Synonyms See Thesaurus: beloved[/b]
loved – Wiktionary
In what way am I being dishonest? If I am mistaken in my view that you are being dishonest then thats a mistake not dishonesty. (Though if you are confused by that distinction it becomes easier to understand why you can’t sense your own dishonesty.)
Anyway, what did I do that was dishonest?
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes there is a difference, if you use the dictionary definition of “loved” it doesnt in any way support your argument. Exactly why you chose to smuggle in a new word, “beloved”, which does support your argument.
Why didnt you quote the dictionary definition of “loved” instead of “beloved” if there is no difference whatsoever?.
Oops, you forgot to include the whole definition. You are referencing the adjective use, I the verb. So that distinction seems to have caused a miscommunication.
If you look at the quotation for the definition of “loved” as an adjective it references its use in psych/self help books. Is that the way you intend on using the term here? As used in the psych/self help sense of the words?
That would appear to be the logical implication. However, as already stated, I believe that it is necessary to go by what Socrates says as there is nothing else to go by. I suppose we could make up our own story, but in that case we would need to ignore the dialogue and start another thread.
Quoting creativesoul
That's exactly what the dialogue does not say, hence the difficulty. However, if (a) we take the Gods (literally, all the Gods) to refer to the Divine (to theion) in a general or abstract sense, and if (b) we admit that the human soul is divine, then (c) knowing what is good amounts to the divine knowing what is divine.
In those cases where humans do not know or know only in part, it is because their innate divine knowledge is insufficiently awakened.
The text is ancient. The logical implications are what interested me. If we use the text as though it is infallible, we arrive where they did... nowhere. I personally think that we are well equipped to do much better.
I disagree. We're just good at adhering to our own worldview.
It's about language games.
Some of us, perhaps. For my part, I built a worldview around things that I knew were true, and/or had warrant to believe. Disparate, at first, this worldview... but becoming more and more coherent as I go. Dependable and true as well, if lack of surprise is any indication.
:wink:
:rofl: Obviously, "noun" or "adjective" is irrelevant here for the reason already indicated above, viz., the original Greek phrase is ???????? ??? ??? ????, phileitai hypo ton theon.
As you can see for yourself, phileitai in Greek is a verb, not an adjective or noun, hence it may be translated into English as either adjective or noun, whichever you prefer. The meaning in Greek remains the same irrespective of what English equivalent you choose.
But I'm glad that you now finally got it. As I said, well done. And you persuaded Wiktionary too, so what can I say?
Care to elaborate?
The human soul is all the gods.
That follows, you know?
I tend to think so too. Unfortunately, the text isn't very helpful.
That's why I suggested, as others have done, to see if the dialogue has a range of meanings from the literal to the moral to the metaphysical. I believe this would be consistent with Plato's method. And there is nothing to lose IMHO.
Surely you adhere to the worldview that's prominent during your lifetime. You have to in order to interact with others.
Truth is relative to your worldview, except for the stray philosophical truth?
The Soul is rooted in the Divine. Yea.
Well, Plato used the terms sensibly, and if he did so without equivocation, then pursuing a range of different meanings would be to say stuff that Plato did not. So, I would be hesitant to do anything aside from examine Plato's use/sense given what we can know about the historical context.
Of course I know. That's exactly what Plotinus and other Platonists are saying, not to mention followers of Advaita Vedanta and other monistic systems, as earlier pointed out by @Frank.
Two different claims.
According to Plotinus, the human soul emanates from the One and eventually returns to the One. So, yes, it is essentially divine, as Plato says.
Yep.
Reading the dialogue in a Platonic sense or senses is exactly what I have been proposing. Unfortunately, some started bringing Abrahamic religions into it and derailed the discussion.
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
?
As far as monism goes in light of this discussion...
One finger cannot point at itself. Distinction requires a plurality of things, as compared/contrasted to a plurality of different names for the same thing.
First, there is more than one. Second, I can interact with someone with a different worldview. Third, I can understand a completely different worldview and not agree with it.
So, no I need not adhere to any worldview that's prominent in my lifetime. Bits and pieces of lots of them, sure...
Truth is a relation between what's believed about what's happened and/or is happening and what's happened and/or is happening. I would not agree that "truth is relative".
The One
The human soul
The divine
All the gods
The Divine
Are these different entities or different names for the same entity?
Ok, I understand, thanks.
The One is divine. The Soul is an emanation from the One.
This is Platonism. Anybody who's familiar with it will call it to mind while reading a Platonic dialogue. It's unavoidable.
If you aren't familiar with it, you can make whatever you want of the text. It just depends on your purposes.
I think you probably have to.
So then the human soul is not the divine.
It's divine. God is everything.
If you mean that I probably have to adhere to bits and pieces in order to interact(currently, as an adult). Sure. If you mean that my initial worldview(mostly adopted as they all are) adhered to prominent ones amongst my family, friends, and acquaintances while developing that initial worldview, sure.
But altogether adherance is only necessary if one lives in a small pond with limited worldviews.
There ya go.
Leads to utter nonsense, meaningless language use, equivocation fallacies, and inevitable self-contradiction and/or outright incoherence.
Just because you say so?
This is what I said in the rest of the post you quoted:
Quoting baker
Of course, such things are consistent with their pantheism.
But what I'm saying is that some of your formulations (e.g. "On a personal level, piety is being good to one's own self, the inner divine intelligence", "In philosophical (Platonic) life, piety is practicing philosophy whose aim is to "become as godlike as possible" = "serving one's own God", i.e., one's own self") sound more like narcissistic self-aggrandizement rather than pantheism.
In other words, it leads to typical troll behavior.
Quoting baker
It is unfortunate but I think you have a point. Anyone following this thread closely will have noted a pattern of behaviour showing signs of a narcissistic personality disorder. Unfortunately, @Fooloso4 has been the main target. Anyone else showing support has been likewise treated with disdain. There is a tendency to belittle people so as to validate own sense of superiority. There are plenty of posts both here and on the other thread 'Plato's Phaedo' which, if they haven't been deleted by mods, provide evidence.
A consistent disregard of others' wishes and feelings combined with a need to control - not addressing the careful responses given with patience. And so on...
--------
Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555886
Quoting Valentinus
It actually isn't funny at all. But if your son can see it...then he is more astute than some. Well done.
--------
Quoting Olivier5
Yes. And still it goes on. With bells and whistles attached.
--------
From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555379
Quoting Amity
--------
Mods. This needs to be addressed. Please reconsider the previous complaints and issues raised.
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Once a conversation is centered upon contempt for the participants, it reminds me of why I dropped out of high school.
Sorry to hear of your experience.
Unfortunately, such behaviour is not always obvious to those who should take action.
And people don't like to complain or give evidence because it seems so flimsy. Easy to dismiss.
At TPF, for a complaint to be taken seriously, it is necessary to contact the mods by PM including links to posts objected to.
This post will probably be deleted !
So it goes...
Yes, so the dilemma could be interpreted this way: did the gods invent the language game associated with piety, or are they just playing it?
I think we actually do both in regard to money, we are continuously reinforcing the money language game by playing it?
I have no reason to believe that "God is everything" leads to typical troll behaviour. I cannot find any way of making sense of "God is everything", at least not if "God" refers to some supernatural entity.
Different techniques are used, one of which is to try and confuse others, to muddle the minds around and the discussion with nonsensical blah until no one remembers what they were discussing about anymore.
Right. This thread is about the Greek arguments concerning the origins of piety, goodness, and justice... isn't it?
How would that work if we also hold that "God is everything?"
That's what it's about indeed, least we forget.
That's been my focus.
I would not say it is about the origin of them but rather the problem of piety and how it relates the goodness and justice. What Socrates tries to get Euthyphro to see is that piety without regard to goodness and justice leads to impiety.
As @Olivier5 has said, the thread has unfortunately been muddled by a troll who cannot abide the fact that his belief in Platonism is not the focus of every discussion of Plato's dialogues.
Could you offer a succinct explanation of this? I have always understood the problem to be an issue for divine command theory(that what counts as pious, just, and good is either independent of the gods or is arbitrary). Have I misunderstood?
Divine command theory is an offshoot of the question posed by Socrates: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" (10a)
Euthyphro says he does not understand the question. He cannot see passed his assumption that the pious is what he is doing. (5d) That he is doing is what the gods love. What he cannot say is how he knows what the gods love and thus that what he is doing is what they love, but he blindly believes he does know. Socrates introduces the idea that the pious is what is just. (11e )The question then becomes whether the pious is part of the just or the just part of the pious. Socrates' answer is just as odd is part of number, the pious is part of the just. The other part of number is the even. The other part of justice then is impiety. Socrates was found guilty of impiety.
Ah. Forgive me for not having read the primary source, or for having forgotten if I have. I've nothing further, for Socrates' answer introducing the just as the whole of piety and impiety seems to unnecessarily multiply entities. Given the historical context and knowledge base of the time, it's understandable.
Be well.
We could probably analyze all of Platonism in terms of language games, but the dilemma would be a start.
Doesn't sound like you're too interested in Plato meets Wittgenstein.
Nah. I'm not as big a fan of Witty as many others are here. In general, I mean, I've read enough of the letters to Cambridge to see the man behind the philosophy. Also knowing that the overwhelming majority of his published writing was gathered, collected, and published posthumously. Certainly not a fan of Plato's 'dialogues'. They seemed more like monologues to me(the ones I've read).
However, given the hstorical context, and what both had to work with at the time, they are both brilliant in their own ways.
The question I asked remains however. If God is everything, what sense does it make to talk about whether God invented anything at all? That was the point.
Actually, it is the opposite. One less entity. Rather than doing what one imagines will please a god or gods, one strives to do what is just.
That is due to two or more levels of worldview and experience:
1. To the Platonists, God, Ultimate Reality or Universal Consciousness is everything. Philosophy of the monistic idealist type is what explains reality for them.
2. To ordinary people, God, the World, and man are totally separate realities. They rely on dualistic religion and mythology to understand the world.
Yes. It appears you've rooted out the blasphemy. :up:
Okay.
:brow:
Well, I'll have to take your word for what the Platonists believe. It does, from my vantage point, look a bit different from Plato. Regardless, when it pertains to monism, Spinoza's Ethics is the only account thereof that I've been fortunate enough to read that is coherent. However, it too assumes the existence of that which can conceive in and of itself(God). This seems too tangential to the OP though, so I've nothing further unless it can be showed as relevant. Even then, my interest in that is waning quickly, and I'll not want to be a part of distracting dialogue. I don't like it in my threads, so...
Platonism in general, perhaps. But surely not Plato's views in a discussion of a work by Plato.
For a proper understanding of the dialogue I think it is essential to take into consideration the author's own views as reflected in other writings and not impose an artificial and anachronistic interpretation on it. But, as I said, this is just my opinion.
Other writing by Plato, or other writings by others interpreting Plato, or writings by others claiming to be based upon Plato?
'Platonists' who use notions like God, Ultimate Reality, or Universal Consciousness are like Plato in namesake only.
1. I meant other writings by Plato as in other dialogues of his.
2. Plato did not write for himself, he wrote for his immediate disciples and wider audience including posterity, i.e., largely (though not exclusively) Greek Platonists. That's why he must be read in the cultural, religious, and political context of the time.
I see. That seems relevant to me. So, what other dialogues are relevant to the Euthyphro and how?
I think that to understand an author's mode of thinking and what message he might intend to convey it would be useful to read all or most of his dialogues but especially those containing terms like "eidos", "idea", "paradeigma", "theophiles", etc., and see how he uses them and in what sense.
BTW, I don't think it would be entirely wrong to refer to Plato's disciples and followers as "Platonists". In any case, the way they read his dialogues may actually help us to better understand and interpret them. IMO There can be no harm in looking at a text from various angles.
You are getting some really awful advice.
Cicero said:
It is not the Forms but to the human things that Socratic philosophy is about. No matter how metaphysical it is always the human things that ground the dialogues. "Know thyself". "The unexamined life is not worth living". It is through the human things that he regards the rest.
As for dialogues: The Apology and the Phaedo are most often used in both introductory and higher level classes. I also used the Republic but many students found it daunting. If you are reading it on your own a good commentary is very helpful. In my classes I used and recommend Bloom's translation and his introductory essay and notes.
See my other thread on Socratic Philosophy for more.
As you can see, @Fooloso4 is using Cicero to interpret Plato. :grin:
My own suggestion would be to read Plato's own statements according to which the soul is immortal and divine and therefore the most important part of man.
Plato's theory of soul
"However, since the soul turns out to be immortal ... these are the reasons why a man should be confident about his own soul ... if he is one who in his life ignored bodily pleasures and adorned his soul not with an adornment that belongs to something else, but with the soul's own adornment, namely, temperance, justice, courage, freedom, and truth, and thus awaits the journey to Hades as one who will make it whenever destiny calls ..." (Phaedo 114d - 115a).
That was one of the inscriptions on the Temple of Delphi. Per legend, Socrates visited it and spoke to the oracle.
Are mystical prophecies part of the human things you're talking about?
The dialogue Charmides talks about the inscription. I do not recall the details. If I get a chance I will look it up, but part of the discussion was about the inscription being written by man and, if I remember correctly, the question of authorship and how it is to be understood.
The prophecies are part of the human things in so far as the prophecy is about human beings. As to their origin, I suspect that has more to do with the assumptions you bring to it.
Or you could learn from a scholar who specializes in ancient Greece.
In fact I have. A scholar whom many consider one of the best - Seth Benardete. You may have someone else in mind. Who I find persuasive and who you find persuasive has a great deal to do with our assumptions about the relationship between the human and the divine.
Good. So it's not "more to do with the assumptions you bring to it." We rely on experts.
It is both. If I find Benardete persuasive and you find someone else persuasive instead, then that has to do not only with them but with us.
Quoting frank
Socrates was accused of atheism. If he did not believe in the gods then he would have regarded the mystical prophecies as human inventions.
Could be. We really don't know.
He was actually accused of perverting the youth by teaching them or preaching them atheism. His own atheism was collateral damage.
He was found guilty of failing to show respect for the gods.
I would say that even more important is evidence. The opinion of so-called "scholars" isn't worth much without evidence, don't you agree?
Anyway, are we still discussing the dialogue and your lack of evidence, or have you run out of ideas?
We don't. And that is why I said I suspect the answer to your question has to do with the assumptions you bring to it.
Quoting god must be atheist
Don't know if you guys are being sarcastic or not, but Socrates was neither an atheist or formally/expressly charged by the Athenian state for teaching "atheism"; taking "a-theism" in the most literal sense of the word, as one who denies or disbelieves in the existence of any kind of God &-or gods. In fact, he'd considered himself to be sent by "God" (whom he refers to in the singular form during his hearing/trial) to the Athenians.
Socrates, as he's quoted by Plato in the "Apology," had stated during his hearing/trial, "I am the gadfly of the Athenian people, given to them by God, and they will never have another, if they kill me. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state...."
See 26c
True. I think since divinity played a part in any ancient conception of the world, it isn't likely that Socrates was an atheist in the modern sense of the word. They didn't have the conceptual apparatus for that.
We know Socrates influenced the Stoics, so maybe his view of divinity was similar to theirs. And that would fit well with the passage you quoted.
Not only that. He clearly says:
"Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the Sun or Moon, which is the common creed of all men? You are a liar, Meletus"
Unfortunately, some appear to be of the view that all ancient texts are to be read in an atheist, and where possible (and sometimes even when not possible), neo-Marxist sense.
godless communists!
To be fair to them, many aren't quite as "godless" as generally assumed. They do have their own gods and idols, as well as prophets, messiahs, promised lands, and paradise on earth, though they may not always realize or admit this.
Unfortunately, Marx wasn't very good at philosophy. That's why he had to get a part-time job as a journalist, cutting and pasting from other people's publications (when Engels wasn't writing articles for him) and was unemployed for many years. The apple doesn't fall far from the tree and this seems to be true of his followers ....
Are you Greek?
Apparently, we all are:
'Speaking at a banquet in the presidential palace of Athens on Wednesday night, Prince Charles quoted the great English Poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley and said: “We are all Greeks".'
https://greekreporter.com/2018/05/10/prince-charles-we-are-all-greeks-video/
It is called a Stephanus number. It is a numbering system for citing the dialogues. Not all translations have them but you can find online translations of the Apology with them.
In the Republic Socrates says that the sun is the offspring of the Good. (506e) Nowhere does he refer to the Good as a god.
That much is true, and I readily confess that I am one of them.
Unfortunately, the Greeks involved in the Parthenon's "reconstruction" appear to have made a right mess of it. And Prince Charles refuses to return the marble statues.
So, it's all Greek to me.
He is using that in his defense against the charge of asebia or impiety toward the Gods.
He starts his testimony by saying "Let the event be as God wills".
And he says that he would rather obey God than the men of Athens, etc. (29d)
Quoting Fooloso4
That looks like another straw man to me. In reality, Socrates says:
"Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise” (Thaetetus 176a – b).
He unquestionably believed in God, as already discussed and established beyond reasonable doubt.
Can you read ancient Greek?
Quoting Fooloso4
Correct.
A little bit.
What we do know is his concern for the human things - self, morals, political life.
And you, of course, never bring any assumptions to your questions. Except when you do, right?
And don't forget the soul that gives life to a human being and that, according to Socrates/Plato is the most important part of man.
You means the reader, including me.
Correct. And this is what you usually deny when it is pointed out to you.
One of the things that gives us that impression is the style of Diogenes.
Examining the contrast between Plato and Diogenes, one might be inspired to stop mining Plato for traces of who Socrates was and just rely on Xenophon and Diogenes.
When talking about the Platonic dialogues it is standard practice to refer to Plato's Socrates simply as Socrates. Plato's Socrates is not the historical Socrates, but neither is Xenophon's.
There are some, who like Guthrie, back in the early 70's, tried to establish the historical Socrates. I don't know if there is much interest in that today. I haven't looked at Guthrie's "Socrates" in a long time, but I do remember that my impression at the time was that the evidence was thin and tenuous.
I think there is a tendency to pay too much attention to Socrates. The problem with this is (1) we know very little about the historical person and (2) he is a character in other authors' works and therefore represents their views to some extent.
With regard to understanding Plato, I think looking into his connections to the traditions of Pythagoras, Zeno, Parmenides, et al., would be more productive. Though, of course, I wouldn't exclude Plotinus and other Platonists.
You mean since the early 70's? I think that explains a lot ....
Thoughts on the atheism of Socrates?
Hi Frank,
I wouldn't say that Socrates was atheist, I would say that his form of theism was non-conventional. Couldn't we say the same of Jesus, that his form of theism was non-conventional? But no one would say that Jesus was atheist. I think both were accused of blasphemy, but that doesn't make one atheist.
But he was accused of impiety. What does that mean regarding his beliefs?
To me, that means he did not uphold the conventional rules of what it means to be pious, in his society. I think it says very little about his beliefs, it says something about what he refused to believe. Do you acknowledge the difference between rejecting a belief, and replacing the believe with something else? Skepticism rejects beliefs, and many people would argue that skepticism is a matter of replacing those rejected beliefs with others, but I don't think that this is really a good description.
What do you think he believed?
And could you explain the Euthyphro dilemma? What do you take away from it?
Socrates professed to know nothing, so his beliefs are scarce.
Quoting frank
I think that the Euthyphro dilemma was simply presented as an indication of the problems existing within the religious thinking of his day. It's not meant to be resolved, just like Zeno's paradoxes are not meant to be resolved, it's meant to show a problem in the habitual ways of thinking that are prevalent. It's a skeptic's tool, to show deficiency in the accepted ways of thinking.
If I remember correctly, the problem is in the relationship between God and good. I think the lesson is that it's wrong to even define "good" in relation to the gods, or even in relation to God, because it can't be logically done. And so with Plato and Aristotle there's a moving away from this, toward a pragmatic definition of "good", "that for the sake of which", in Aristotle, the end. This defines "good" in relation to what the individual person needs or wants. Then there's the further distinction of the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is what appears to the individual as what is wanted, and "real good" is an appeal to some reasoned or rational good, beyond the individual's wants. So the ethical human being seeks to produce consistency between the real good and the apparent good, such that what is wanted is the rational end.
That makes sense. Thank you!
In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates corrects the Athenians in the traditional interpretation of their gods, showing them how those views are not rational...
...as far as how Aristotle defined the good according to individual need...I would desire proof to believe it. The individual good, that is, the good for every man, is a product of the Enlightenment.
The problem as I understand it is with our inability to know the good itself.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/557494
I believe the distinction between real good and apparent good (good as apprehended by the individual), was first presented in its primitive form by Aristotle. I do not have time now to look up a reference. However, it was definitely expounded on by Aquinas, who presented many thoughts on this distinction. So the idea was around long before The Enlightenment.
Quoting Fooloso4
I guess that would depend on how you define "know". According to Plato In The Republic, the philosopher gets a glimpse of the good, enough to know of its existence. The good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible. In a way we see the sun, and in a way we know the good. So in the cave allegory, the philosopher sees that the things people look at, material objects, are just reflections, or shadows, of the immaterial objects, But the philosopher also sees the good, behind the real immaterial things, which is responsible for creating the shadows or reflections, the material things which the cave dwellers see as the real things.
From this, Aristotle proceeded to define the good, in the teleological terms of final cause, that for the sake of which. Plato gave priority to the immaterial ideas, in the cave allegory. But a principle is needed whereby material things might come into existence from the immaterial Forms (Timeaeus). This principle is "the good", which moves the will to act, in the case of human beings and artificial things, and also, the Divine Will in the case of natural things. Final cause (will) is an immaterial cause, which causes material things to come into existence from immaterial Forms.
Correct. Aristotle, who understood Plato sufficiently well, speaks of contemplating divine realities.
But Greek "contemplation", theoria, is not mental ideation, it is the act of observing something that you actually see. The Platonic Forms are "that which is seen" (eidos), they are not ideas or assumptions.
Noesis. What the intellect grasps or sees.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The good is not something that is.
The argument, laid out in the other thread, leads to the conclusion that there can only be opinion about the good itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He gives his opinion about it. (509c) Whether it is true or not, he cannot say.
A god could say, but he is not god and neither are we.
Dianoia is the discursive thought that intellectually "grasps" an abstract or metaphysical concept.
Noesis is a more direct form of perception in which the subject actually perceives or sees what the intellectual concept can only describe.
The whole point of philosophical training in Plato, Aristotle, and other Platonists is to enable the philosopher to actually see the Forms and other metaphysical realities in a higher form of perception.
The true telos of Platonic philosophy is to fine-tune and refine man's intellectual faculties whereby he can perceive realities that are imperceptible to the untrained intellect, in a similar way a trained wine taster can identify flavors and scents that are imperceptible to an ordinary person, or a trained tracker can read animal trails that are invisible to the untrained eye.
An essential key to understanding the Republic is to understand the role of the dual position of opinion. It opines both what is below being and above or beyond being, both about the visible world, and the good itself.
Socrates is circumspect in his discussion of this. It is better to have an opinion of the good shaped by his opinion than one in which any and every man is the measure. To this end he conceals his opinion and in its place presents an image of the good not only as something known to the philosopher, an eternal, unchanging truth. But the concealment is not complete. Behind the salutary public teaching is the teaching suitable only for the few.
This was a common practice in both ancient and modern philosophy. In Plato we find:
And about Plato and the practice in ancient times:
These are taken from https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/melzer_appendix.pdf
The site contains many more testimonials both ancient and modern. A real eye opener!
There are the easy to find statements in the dialogues for all to see, and for those who look carefully enough, something quite different.
“Theoria, a looking at, viewing beholding,...of the mind, contemplation, speculation, Plat , etc.” from Liddell and Scott. The word speculation itself derives from the act of seeing. I suspect there is a connection in every language between words which convey the notions of seeing and thinking, as in English, when we say, “I see that” in the sense “I understand that”.
Of course every word has more than one meaning. But I think when Aristotle, for example, speaks of theoria of divine realities he means "contemplation" in the sense of observing something that is seen.
Also, Plato when he speaks of Beauty, for example, he say that the philosopher "sees" it.
So, the Forms and other metaphysical or divine realities are seen, i.e., directly experienced.
We first think about them in discursive thought (dianoia) and then actually experience or "see" them in a higher form of perception (noesis) that cannot be described in words.
I think Plato separates the intelligible objects (ideas and Forms) from the visible objecys.
Quoting Fooloso4
For Plato, opinion is still a type of knowledge.
Quoting Fooloso4
[quote=508, translation Grube]What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible real, in relation to sight and visible things.
...
So what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good - for the good is yet more prized. [/quote]
I think so too. However, I think that it is essential to understand the terminology used.
The fact of the matter is that the following association of concepts is found throughout the Platonic texts:
“idea/form” + “pattern” + “contemplate” + “seeing” + "eye"
“Invisible” does not mean “absolutely incapable of being seeing or perceived”. It only means invisible to the physical eye. The Forms are seen with the eye of the soul.
There are three kinds of eye/sight, (1) physical, (2) mental (3) spiritual.
“if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone” (Phaedo 66d – e).
www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D66e
Socrates asks “what is this idea that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a paradeigma” (Euthyphro).
“And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence” (Republic).
“... the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye ...” (Republic).
“... in that state of life above all others, a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty […] there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible” (Symposium).
It follows that, on a higher level, “contemplation” of the Form is a form of “seeing”.
At that level, we do not see with the physical eye as in everyday life, nor with the eye of the mind as in dreams or imagination, but with the paranormal or metaphysical faculty of sight of the nous which is the "eye of the soul".
His treatment of mathematical objects is particularly instructive: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-mathematics/
Regarding Forms as patterns Aristotle says:
Metaphysics 1.991a
Looking at the divided line in the Republic, mathematical objects are seen with the mind. They are objects of thought, but what is seen are not Forms, they are images, likenesses.
The relationship between the top two parts of the divided line are the same as that of the bottom two, that is, a relationship of images to things.
Some readers forget that their perspective is a human perspective, not that of a god. Plato gives us images of beauty itself and the just itself and the good itself. Some mistake these images for the things they are images of and imagine they have become knowledgeable about such things having read about them. The objects of our contemplation are not the Forms but images of the Forms, what we imagine them to be.
Socrates provides an image of the Good, its likeness, the sun. That the good gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower, is, as he says, his opinion, not something he knows by having seen the good itself. It is an opinion he thinks it best that we hold too.
Note he says: "say" that the Good provides the truth to the things known (508e). This is the opinion he wants others to hold.
i totally agree with that. i guess i just misunderstood your use of "see".
This is a passage from Plato (among many others) that I find worthwhile thinking about:
“It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine ...” (Republic 527d - e).
The “eye of the soul” or “eye of the heart” (ophthalmos/homma tes psyches, ophthalmos kardias, etc.) has been absolutely central to the Platonic tradition that has come down from Plato through Plotinus, the Church Fathers, medieval philosophers, and Islamic philosophers and mystics to the present.
The objective analysis of the facts suggests that practicing Platonists are neither delusional nor uneducated ignoramuses. As for those who insist on taking an exclusively intellectual approach to spiritual matters, by definition, they prevent themselves from experiencing anything other than their own unexamined assumptions.
It's a religion now?
So, it can be (1) religion on one level, (2) philosophy on another, and (3) mysticism at the top.
As Plato says, philosophy is midway between (1) and (3).
In any case, it doesn't seem very scientific to impose an exclusively intellectual or materialist interpretation on a system that involves metaphysical experience as its ultimate objective.
Glaucon says "astronomy compels the soul to see what's above and leads it there away from the things here". Socrates corrects him. When studied in this way it causes the soul to look downward. (529a)
He calls the stars "decorations in the heavens embroidered on a vaulted ceiling". The image of the starry night, is the opposite of the image of Good in the sun. Astronomy when studied as Socrates proposes is not the study of visible things in the heavens, it is about "what must be grasped by argument and thought, not sight" (529d) The "organ or instrument" in the passage is not some spiritual faculty, it is the instrument of thought, of reasoned argument.
Plato uses the term 'thymos" for the middle part of the tripartite soul, the spirited part. It is ruled by the highest part, reason. He does not identify a "spiritual" part.
Plato's exoteric teaching mimics the religious and mystical teachings of the poets, his esoteric teaching to something quite different. He cleverly disguises the exoteric as the esoteric, so that what is in plain sight can be quoted and revered as if were about some "metaphysical experience" and mystical reality. It is only when one follows the argument that what is really being said becomes clear. If one imposes assumptions about the "ultimate objective" of the dialogues, then it is no surprise if that is what will be see. But when one attends carefully to the details of the text and follows the arguments where they lead then things begin to look very different.
Given that Plato believed in an immortal soul, it follows that the spiritual part of the soul is the part that carries on living after the death of the physical body.
Plato can be properly understood only by studying Platonism which has followed Plato's teachings from the 4th century BC to the present.
Right, and Plato rejects that. Follow his argument as outlined above.
Quoting Apollodorus
But it is not a given. As you know, I posted a long thread on the Phaedo that shows that the arguments for the immortality of the soul all fail. The mythological stories may persuade some, but that Plato is persuaded by the stories he makes up is far from given.
Quoting Apollodorus
Where does Plato say that there is a spiritual part of the soul? Certainly not in the Republic or the Phaedo.
Quoting Apollodorus
That is a statement of your belief. In my opinion to understand Plato one must begin with a careful, open minded reading of the dialogues, not by imposing religious and metaphysical assumptions on them. In doing so one must ignore the dialogic arguments that threaten those assumptions.
There is a long and varied history of interpretation of the dialogues. In the ancient world, prior to and contrary to Neoplatonism, we find:
Plato clearly says, through Socrates and others, that the soul is immortal - the bit that you left out from the Phaedo in your translation. As immortal means non-physical, the soul has a part that is non-physical, i.e., metaphysical or, in modern terminology, "spiritual".
No one studies Marxism by applying chemistry or astronomy to it. Likewise, no serious scholar attempts to study Platonism from a materialist or anti-theist perspective, i.e., by denying the fundamental principles upon which Platonism is based.
There are some excellent studies of Platonism that have been published since the 1950's and 60's like From Plato to Platonism (2013) by Lloyd P Gerson who is a respected professor of philosophy and author of many academic works on the subject. As I said, it is imperative to keep up with the times, and not stay stuck in the outdated ideas of post-war neo-liberalism and intellectual nihilism.
But you may do as you please. I don't care.
Once again, Neoplatonism and the works of Plato are two different things. One choose to interpret the latter through the former. Using your analogy you study Plato from a Neoplatonist perspective. There are many serious scholars who think that is wrong. The bit about a materialist and anti-theist perspective is a non-sequitur. I follow the arguments where they lead. You ignore the arguments whenever they do not conform to what you want them to say.
Quoting Apollodorus
I previously provided a list of contemporary scholars doing work on Plato. They are, more and more, becoming representative of the direction current scholarship is going in. It is clear that you have not even looked up who they are. Instead you create a caricature that is not even close to the truth.
Quoting Apollodorus
And yet, you repeatedly come here, day after day, and post the same illinformed Neoplatonist rant.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D114d
He also says:
“God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness” (176c), etc., etc.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DTheaet.%3Apage%3D176
If you are really convinced that all the translations and/or original Greek texts are wrong, you are free to contact the translators and editors and inform them that they are "illinformed neoplatonist rants". Good luck with that. :grin:
Once again, context is important. When taking things out of content they may seem to mean something different than they do.
Socrates is wrapping up a myth he created about the immortality of the soul. Immediately following the myth and before the quote you take out of context he says:
"It turns out" refer to the myth, It is a belief he says that one should risk, not to anything that has been established as true. One need not risk believing something established as true.
Quoting Apollodorus
A fine example of your disregard for the arguments in the dialogues. You join two different arguments from two different dialogues as if one follows from the other. And then follow that with another statement taken out of context.
And on the subject of taking things out of context, your ill informed Neoplatonist rants refer to your claim Plato should be interpreting through Neoplatonism and what follows from that. And, more importantly, what does not follow, any attention to the arguments themselves.
I'm afraid that proves absolutely nothing. "Secrets" can mean anything. It certainly doesn't have to mean atheism and is in no way, form or shape "contrary to Platonism". If anything, as history shows, it means exactly what scholars like Gerson are saying.
Another Islamic mystic, Mansur al-Hallaj wrote “I saw my Lord with the eye of my heart”, i.e., exactly what Platonists and Christians had taught for centuries before him.
We have already seen that Plato taught that a philosopher had to become as godlike as possible. That meant seeing God within himself and experiencing a state of oneness with him. That was what
al-Hallaj did. He proclaimed (the Platonic doctrine) "I am the Truth/God".
In 922 CE al-Hallaj was executed by the Islamic authorities.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avicenna
So of course Ibn Sina would say that Plato’s teachings were secret. He didn’t want to meet the same fate as al-Hallaj. It's just common sense when you live under strict Islamic rule.
So, your own "evidence" demolishes your case rather nicely and conclusively IMHO.
You are getting closer to the problem with your comment on Ibn Sina's concern for his fate. Plato had the same personal concern and for the same reason as Ibn Sina. What you forget is that Plato's teacher was sentenced to death for his teachings, for talking to everyone, for being open and candid.
Again, you need to be able to put things to get the full picture of the conditions under which Plato wrote.
“So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings. Such is the accusation" (Apology 24b – c).
The exact phrase is ????? ???????? ????? hetera daimonia kaina, “other new daimons (spiritual beings)”. The charge was ??????? asebia, “impiety or irreverence”, not atheism.
Xenophon says the same:
“Socrates came before the jury after his adversaries had charged him with not believing in the gods worshipped by the state and with the introduction of new deities in their stead and with corruption of the young” (Xenophon, Apology 10).
The exact phrase is ????? ????? ???????? hetera kaina daimonia, “other new spiritual beings/deities”
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0211%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D10
In Euthyphro, a dialogue on which it seems you are an expert, Socrates says that the charge is that he "makes new Gods":
“For he says I am a maker of Gods; and because I make new Gods (?????? ???? kainoi theoi) and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says” (Euthuphro 3b).
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D24b
Plato's metaphysics is a multi-layered system starting from traditional religion and gradually ascending to higher forms of thought and experience.
Another important thing to remember is that Socrates was going to be acquitted on condition that he refrain from preaching his new religion, which he declined. All he needed to do was to moderate his language and not promote it in public. It follows that Plato had nothing to fear.
You need to be able to put things together and see that Plato was not teaching atheism but a form of monistic idealism:
Definition of monistic idealism: a system of philosophical idealism emphasizing the primacy of the One (as the Absolute or Nature) rather than of the many
I hope you agree that, as a matter of general principle, one should in the first instance read the texts one is proposing to discuss before discussing them.
You have already said many times that you read the dialogues through the eyes of the Neoplatonists. Repeating it every time I post something is at best ill mannered. Your's is not the final word on Plato, and yet you have a compulsive need to have it be so in this forum. Why? I strongly suspect it is really not about Plato.
Hey! You finally noticed it's Plato, not Socrates. Good for you!
Sorry, but I don't know what you are talking about. Of course you can believe that Plato was an atheist if that makes you happy. All I'm saying is that if you expect people to accept that theory, you need to provide some evidence. You have failed to do so, and both the original texts and logic contradict that theory.
The fact is that Plato’s philosophy is a form of monistic idealism that holds that consciousness (nous) is the only absolute reality, and entails a hierarchy of realities ascending from the physical to the mental and from the mental to the supramental or spiritual, culminating in the ineffable One Ultimate Reality.
Because reality is an emanation of Ultimate Reality which is Consciousness, and is therefore, real, Plato’s philosophy may be described as realistic idealism: though the world is a product of consciousness, it is not the product of the individual mind but of the Universal Consciousness, Cosmic Intellect or Mind of God. Plato’s Forms are the product of the Cosmic Intellect.
This is 100% consistent with the Platonic texts and equally inconsistent with "atheism".
Even Wikipedia which is run by liberals and atheists classifies Plato and Platonism under Idealism.
Idealism – Wikipedia
The notion that Plato taught atheism is not only contradicted by the evidence and logic but it is a fringe theory introduced in the early 1900’s. I suspect you are drawing your inspiration from Shorey who also preached that Jesus was a Pagan and other similar ideas that were popular at the time under the influence of Marxist and Fabian Socialist deconstructionism.
Unfortunately, Shorey has long been thoroughly refuted by Gerson and other respected scholars. This is why I suggested you read Gerson's From Plato to Platonism. It would have clarified your doubts and would have saved all of us a lot of wasted time.
I'm beginning to think that it's all Greek to him :grin:
Hey frank. You have not been paying attention!
At the point that you suggested that we're looking at Socrates rather than Plato because Plato doesn't speak much in the dialogues, I stopped paying attention to anything you said.
No offense intended. It's just a fact
Have you read Shakespeare?
I think that's another self-inflicted misunderstanding and confusion of yours. I have explained to you that "Neoplatonism" is a modern anti-Platonist concept. Platonists regard themselves as Platonists, i.e., "followers of Plato".
Even in antiquity, Plato's teachings were known as ??? ??????? ??? ????????? “the (true) doctrine of Plato”, ????? dogma being that which one believes to be true, true doctrine or teaching.
You keep repeating the same things over and over makes you right?
You would make a great juror for the defense in a murder trial: "He said he was not guilty. His friends say he's not guilty. That's all the evidence I need."
It is you who are attacking the long-established, evidence-based position that Plato is an idealist, and you claim that he was an atheist.
I have no problem with your belief, I just think that the onus is on you to provide the evidence for your claim.
If you believe you are right, why don't you join Wikipedia as an editor and tell them about your new discovery and get them to classify Plato and Platonism under Atheism?
You could even write a thesis on it and publish it. Just make sure you don't exclude the inconvenient bits from your translations.
What I said is that Plato never speaks in the dialogues. There is not one place where it would be true to say: "Plato said" when discussing the arguments in the dialogues.
Quoting frank
And so what is the point of your comment? If you have not read what I said why make uninformed comments on what I said?
And that "proves" he was an atheist? By what logical reasoning???
I noticed you were finally referring to Plato instead of Socrates. That's good. :up:
And this is your example of logical reasoning? They are two different things. I think even you must know that.
Your frequent appeal to the Church Fathers is telling. You have shown yourself to be just as intolerant to views that contradict your orthodoxies as they were.
Yes, as Frank says, we were congratulating you for finally acknowledging that we are talking about Plato, not about Socrates, and that you have not proved that your theory that Plato was an atheist is correct. Congrats! :up:
Yes. As @Metaphysician Undercover mentioned, Socrates wasn't an atheist. He just had unusual ideas about divinity.
Plato certainly wasn't an atheist. There's overlap between our idea of nature, and their ideas of divinity.
There was no concept of a world without divinity at that time. That came much later
Correct. Religious reform, not denial of the divine. That's why charges of "atheism" against Plato are not only inconsistent with the evidence but also positively anachronistic.
A true zealot never rests. You must be very tired.
I disagree. A true zealot is always full of energy and inspiration and never tires.
Anyway, why don't you tell us the truth? Why did you start this thread? Was it just because Banno asked you to, or was there some other reason? I am curious to know. I think we can still talk to one another even if we disagree on some minor things.
It's not zealotry to point out that Plato wasn't an atheist. Its just a fact.
You are right, but it is being "pointed out" repeatedly following everything I say across two threads. It's just a fact.
Just go ahead and acknowledge it, then. What's the problem?
I stand corrected, you never tire in you zealotry.
Quoting Apollodorus
Asked and answered. But your never ending game requires it have its place in the cycle.
The already identified the problem.
:grin: You're talking about me getting "tired" but I think it's rather you who is getting tired and it's still early in the morning. You are beginning to speak in parables and riddles. Maybe you think you are Socrates or Plato?
Anyway, this your own statement:
Quoting Fooloso4
You have admittedly failed to prove your theory but still keep claiming that you have proved it. And that, without any evidence whatsoever!
So, why did you start this thread if you knew that you can't prove your "atheism" theory?
Yes, I am tired of this relentless repetition of your beliefs and intolerance of other interpretations. I know that I am not alone.
Why this need to post the same thing across threads? Who are you trying to convince? Are you afraid that someone might read what I have said and decide to read the dialogue? Are you afraid that if they do so they will not see things as you do? Do you think that your tireless repetition will prevent them from drawing their own conclusions?
So, more diversion and evasion.
As I said many times before I have absolutely nothing against your interpretation.
I'm simply asking you to provide some evidence to prove that your interpretation is correct.
Instead of doing that, you retort that you have nothing to prove and that anyone who disagrees with your interpretation is too intolerant or too stupid to see that you are right.
So, I'm beginning to wonder whether you actually realize what you are saying ....
And yet several times a day you come here attempting to pick it apart and repeatedly advocate for your own Neoplatonist view. You have made it knows, why the perverse insistence to repeat it again and again?
Quoting Apollodorus
You have this notion of the one true interpretation in your head. I am not saying my interpretation is correct. Although I think it can be said that some interpretations are wrong, including your own, I do not think that there is such a thing as the one true, final interpretation. I have said so many times. Instead, I follow the arguments in enough detail suitable to this forum, to allow the reader to draw her own conclusions, conclusions I hope the arguments will show should be tentative and subject to revision if something new comes to light. This is fundamental to the aporetic nature of the dialogues. Something you deny.
The dialogues are informed by Socrates knowledge of his ignorance, and no matter where the arguments go they always return to this. Now you may believe that Plato possesses the divine knowledge that Socrates denies humans possess, but that is an assumption that you will never find sufficient support for in the dialogues. The fact that Plato never says anything in the dialogues is in this respect significant.
You are charmed by stories such as the ascent from the cave, but fail to see that unless you have knowledge of the Good and the rest of the Forms, the story serves as a measure of your ignorance. You mistake stories for the truth itself. As if Plato is a prophet revealing the word of God.
OK. So what you are saying is this:
1. Plato never says anything.
2. The only thing that Socrates says is that he knows nothing.
If Plato says nothing and Socrates says he knows nothing, then on what basis do you claim to know that Plato doesn't teach monistic idealism?
:meh:
The literature on this is extensive.
No. It isn't.
Extensive or not, if Plato says nothing, then the literature on it can hardly be anything more than mere speculation ....
And have you read the literature? I just did a quick google search. The first thing that came up is an article in SEP from a fine scholar Charles Griswold. Then something from another scholar whose work I admire, Drew Hyland - "Why Plato Wrote Dialogues". And this: "Modern Views on Plato's Silence"https://voegelinview.com/modern-views-of-platos-silence-pt-1/
That's absurd.
Having trouble following along?
If Plato is silent, and he is, then we cannot correctly say that Plato said this or that.
And I didn't say that either.
I also pointed out the Socrates does not say that he knows nothing. Perhaps if you hadn't decided to ignore me you would know that.
That's exactly what I'm saying. You can't say anything but are still talking. Not only that, but you are appealing to a mysterious "extensive literature" to "prove" that you are right and others are wrong.
I think I'm beginning to like this .... :rofl:
You seemed to be saying that above. Good to know you weren't.
Again: Plato was not an atheist. Period.
What does Plato say in any of the dialogues?
Quoting Apollodorus
Nothing mysterious about it. Is google something you find mysterious? Perhaps someone can explain to you how to use it.
I pointed out to frank Voeglin's "Modern Views on Plato's Silence" https://voegelinview.com/modern-views-of-platos-silence-pt-1/ and two other sources simply by using the mysterious google.
If he were an atheist do you think he would come right out and say that?
What do you make of the absence of God or gods in the discussion of the Good in the Republic. Why does Socrates say that the Good and not a god is the cause of all things?
The conceptual framework for atheism, as we know it, did not exist then. Stoicism, which was influenced by Socrates, was the closest thing to it in the ancient world, but Stoicism affirms divinity.
Would you please read the above sentences about 10 times until you get that?
Right. But much of Platonism (in the broader sense) was to be assimilated by Christian theology in the worlds of the Greek-speaking theologians - Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others. Socrates and Plato were deemed ‘Christians before Christ’ and Greek philosophical concepts provided the philosophical framework for Christian theology.
Note from the above linked abstract:
Similarily, the Hindu philosophical dialogues are called the Upani?ads. The etymology of that world means 'sitting up close'. This is interpreted to mean that these dialogues were also discussed between guru and chela in an intimate pedagogical framework, similarly to Plato's. You find something very similar in Buddhism also. There is a scripture which says that the Buddha's teaching is like a water-snake, in that it has to be 'grasped correctly' in order not to turn around and bite - not that anything about it is 'hidden', but that it's easily misunderstood, and this misunderstanding can have consequences opposite to the intention behind it.
But something to consider is this. The rationale of the Christian religion is 'salvation offered to all who believe and accept it'. It is held up as a universal religion, not as the exclusive prerogative of those wise enough to understand it. That itself is inimical to the spirit of the Platonic dialogues, which regarded beliefs of any kind as dubious; as 'deficient cognitive attitudes', according to Katja Vogt. But this association with Christianity also colors or narrows our view of what religion is, in that depicting Plato's dialogues in those terms associates it with just the kind of dogma which Plato abhorred. (There's always been a tension in Christianity around this point - 'what does has Athens have to to with Jerusalem?', 'Foolishness to the Greeks', and so on.)
So, I'd be wary of saying, or rather projecting, that Plato 'believed in God', any more than did the Buddha (who explicitly did not). But I also agree that this doesn't make him an 'atheist' in the modern sense, either. I think what it requires us to do, is considerably broaden our understanding of what constitutes the religious or spiritual life.
Quoting Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament
Ignoring the ill placed condescension, you do a good job of making assumptions and then arguing against them.
What assumptions did I make? How did I argue against them?
A good passage to show the need for esoteric writing.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agreeQuoting Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament
Yes, this is why his search for the Good plays a central role. His inquiry whether it is of the self, the polis, or the cosmos is always centered on the "human things".
Really? You posit a modern definition of atheism and then argue that it does not apply the charge of atheism against Socrates.
I've already told you why. Because Plato's monistic idealism believes in the Universal Consciousness, Cosmic Intellect (Nous) or Mind of God, as the cause of everything including the Gods.
That's what you are doing. You decide in advance that Socrates was an atheist and then try to twist the term "atheist" to make it fit Socrates. Or, you take the actual charge of "introducing or inventing new deities" and try to reinterpret it as "atheism" in the modern sense. Unfortunately, without much success as only too evident.
That's exactly what we've been trying to explain to @Fooloso4. Unfortunately, he seems to think that we only do so because we are "intolerant" of his views.
If he had even a shred of evidence for his "atheism" theory, it would be a different story. But he hasn't. He just keeps insisting that anyone who doesn't read Plato in an atheist sense is an ignoramus and an idiot.
But that is not what he says. There is no mention of universal consciousness or cosmic intellect or mind of god. No mention of gods at all.
Where did I say this? You make up shit and claim I said it.
Let's make a deal. Show me where I said all this and I will concede that I am wrong and leave the forum, and if you can't then you do the same. Deal?
I don't necessarily agree with fooloso4's interpretation, but I also don't feel the same compulsion to take issue with it. It can be a dialogue, where different contributors advance different interpretations which are considered on their merits. So-and-so sees it this way, whilst I see it like this. Some read it in a more secular perspective, some in a more religious perspective. It's also in keeping with the manner of the dialogues themselves.
Quoting Apollodorus
That is an interpretation made in hindsight, through the lens of later interpretations and cultural syncretism. Those terms are never used in[s] the texts themselves[/s] this dialogue. They might be defensible, but that would be a thread about 'later developments in Christian platonism', not about this particular dialogue.
That said I agree with Rafael Demos' interpretation of Plato's philosophy of religion:
[quote=Rafael Demos] The place of God in the Platonic system has been the subject of long controversy among scholars. Too often the tendency has been to regard the idea of God as an undigested concept in Plato's mind, an afterthought, or, at best, a symbolic expression for the idea of the good. Yet, a study of the later dialogues, notably the Philebus, shows that God plays a necessary role in the Platonic metaphysics, and one distinct from that of the ideas. In the earlier dialogues God is mentioned rather incidentally; and a student who takes up the later dialogues after he has formed his views upon the basis of the earlier ones, is liable to interpret all references to God as implied references to the ideas. But it is not a question of how far one can go in interpreting one conception in terms of another, but of what Plato himself believed; and an unprejudiced reading of the later dialogues suggests that God, in Plato's mind, stands only for Himself, and is not a name for anything else. A question of this sort cannot be settled by a mechanical comparison of words and passages; Plato is at no point explicit on the connection of God with the good; one has to steep oneself in Plato and get, if possible, the pattern, the 'feel' of his mind. Clearly, to Plato religion is a genuine personal experience; in his references to God there is a suggestion at once of reverence and of intimacy; God seems to have been for him not an abstract conception but an immediate intuition. To reduce God to the ideas is to fail to do justice to the religious nature of Plato as distinct from his detached contemplative attitude. [/quote]
So in that general sense, I agree with you and Frank that Plato is not an atheist in any meaningful sense, but neither does that make him 'a theist' in today's sense. That's what I was getting at in my previous post, and if it's hard to understand, then good, it needs to be.
Appollodorus was describing pre-Christian Platonism.
I think you're taking everything way too personally, and that is not a philosophical attitude. I don't want you to leave the forum, just to admit that, in the absence of any evidence, it is highly unlikely that Plato was an atheist. You've lost the argument anyway, so what's the point?
To correctly understand Plato, you need to read all his dialogues or at least the most important ones. If you do that with an open mind, you will see that monistic idealism is a much more accurate description of the ideas presented in them than "atheism".
Read the Timaeus and do some thinking about other dialogues you have read. What does Plato mean by "nous"? Are the individual minds the only form of intelligence? Could the Forms be part of a Universal Consciousness, or Cosmic Intellect? Etc., etc. There is no rush, take your time.
Wow. Could you be a little more full of it?
I have and I agree.Quoting frank
No. He sees it as a continuum.
I had meant that for Wayfarer, whose lecture included some misinformation.
But true, there are several centuries between Plato and Plotinus.
I agree. Incidentally, when I think of Plato or Platonism, I think Platonism and nothing else. I take Gerson's view (and that of Platonists themselves) that there is only one Platonic or Platonist system (with some variations) stretching from Plato to the present. I am using descriptions like "monistic idealism" exclusively when attempting to explain to others how I classify Platonism.
But I fully agree with Demos. Thanks for the quote.
It really does seem perverse. Hour after hour, day after day.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right, I have said exactly that. The dialogues are an opportunity to dialogue.
Quoting Wayfarer
Exactly, but he believes that it all timeless, part of cosmic consciousness.
Quoting Wayfarer
But he seems to be more interested in trying to bury divergent views under an avalanche of words.
As he notes, there is scholarly difference of opinion. After a lifetime devoted to studying the dialogues some come to conclusions contrary to his. This is part of the dialogic process.
Thanks for the post. Perhaps some of it will get through.
And yet:
Quoting Apollodorus
I noted this remark in particular:
The latter is the strongly expressed view of many here.
Do you think it's possible to admire both Plato and Nietszche? Personally, I can't see how it could be,
I haven't finished reading it yet, but will do so over the weekend, and thanks for posting it.
I agree with you that the dialogues stand on their own, but I don't think we can diagnose the metaphysics of either Socrates or Plato based on them.
And that proves what exactly? Of course Platonists see Platonism as essentially one system. "Platonism", "Middle Platonism", "Neoplatonism", etc., are modern concepts that make no sense to Platonists, as shown by Gerson.
As already stated, followers of Plato already referred to themselves as "Platonists" (Platonikoi) in antiquity and it would be absurd to claim that they were something else. Of course there were some variations according to different schools but that doesn't make the Platonism of one historical period a different system to the Platonism of other periods.
Correct. Like other Platonists, Plotinus did his best to fill whatever gaps he could by borrowing from Aristotle and others. But we must not forget that Aristotle learned a great deal from Plato and that Plotinus did not borrow anything that was incompatible with Plato's fundamental ideas that had come down to him through a long chain of teachers.
Plato’s Academy functioned from 387 BC to 529 CE and its members were naturally in touch with philosophers from other Platonic schools in Alexandria and elsewhere. So, there is no reason to assume any major modification or distortion in the Platonic tradition, just as there were few changes in the religious sphere.
There were a humongous amount of changes in the religious sphere during this near millenary, and chances are that any platonic oral tradition got heavily built upon and modified during the same very long period.
I said "essentially":
Quoting Apollodorus
Of course there were some modifications or, rather, expansions of the Platonic teachings. But the original texts remained the same and any modifications or expansions of the system were essentially consistent with the original blueprint, as shown by Gerson and others.
IMHO there is no evidence that Plato was an atheist. Period/full stop.
Yes. I think they are kindred spirits. He says:
He is a complete skeptic when it comes to Plato because they are both skeptics and only a skeptic knows how to read and understand a skeptic.
I don't think there is much we can know about Socrates. Aristophanes gives us a comic caricature and neither Plato nor Xenophon give us a biography.
As to Plato, how do we diagnose his metaphysics if not based on the dialogues?
Yes, over and over again. That is your opinion. It does not become more then that by repeating it post after post.
Maybe you can’t, because the dialogues do not provide enough information to draw a proper conclusion. We shouldn't let our desire to know more about Plato’s views make us see things that aren’t really there.
You seem to be wedged to their views, or to like them very much. That's fine, a bit passé in my opinion but fine. However, the neo-platonists were not the owner of the Plato copyright. They were just people who re-interpreted Plato in their own time, to suit their goals and answer their own questions.
We are all doing the same today. That's what reading old texts is all about: to try and reuse them today. Only fundamentalists care (or pretend to care) about what Plato really really meant in the secrecy of his soul. And even them only do so because of something important to them today.
In your case, you are trying to enlist the prestigious Socrates and Plato brigade in your fight against atheists and materialists, and to do so you must ignore the radical doubt introduced by Socrates, and make of him a BELIEVER. That's your bias, your take. It is a rather banal take, echoing and agreeing to the recuperation of Plato by the Church fathers. You are not trying to think by yourself; instead all your say is: "some old Christian scholars opined that Plato was all about nous and forms, so that's all there is to say about Plato; no need to enquire any further."
Fooloso4's take is more original: he understands Plato as a critique of naïve yet cocksure religion. He sees the Republic as an effort to imagine a city (be it literal or metaphoric) where religion would be replaced or transcended by philosophy.
I like his take best, I think it is far more likely to reflect certain actual ideas of Plato than yours. It also explains the death of Socrates quite well.
There are however differences between my take and Fooloso4's. I don't think very highly of Plato's metaphysics or of his political ideas, for one. I think he mistrialed democracy, failed to see its value. And here I agree with Popper, who sees Plato an an enemy of "open society". Another difference is that I see a lot of parallels between the trial of Socrates and that of Jesus; something which is probably closer to your take than to Fooloso4's.
I am in general agreement. I think it is wrong to assume that what we find in the dialogues represent Plato's own views on metaphysics. In addition, although dialogues do discuss metaphysical issues they end in aporia not answers.
I do think highly of Plato. I think the Laws rather than the Republic are better representative of his political thinking, but we live in a very different world. I think that one advantage of Plato, and Aristotle as well, is that political philosophy is about more than just political order. They lead us to reflect upon more than just political expediency, on questions of how we ought to live and what are desires and goals are as a community and country.
And because there is zero evidence that it wasn't, presumably that means that it was. Great logic.
On the other hand, the fact is that Aristotle was a member of Plato’s Academy and he became Alexander’s teacher in 343 BC. Alexander was a great promoter of Greek language and culture including philosophy and this tradition was continued by his successors. In addition to Athens, Alexandria became a major center of learning and the seat of a major philosophical school in the Platonic tradition.
With royal patronage, Platonism became an established philosophical system that became part of higher education throughout the Greek (and later Roman) empire. Being based on Plato and Aristotle’s own works which were transmitted unchanged, it couldn’t have undergone too many changes.
In fact, modifications were far from arbitrary and were introduced solely for the purpose of increasing the inner logical coherence within the system. Platonists like Plotinus took great care to be as faithful to the original as possible and of course copies of original manuscripts were always available for reference.
At any rate, IMHO the very fact that Plato’s works and teachings were sponsored by the state would seem to indicate that they did not promote atheism.
One way to approach the matter is to look for what is the matter of human agency versus the influence of gods, fate, or what have you. The Cratylus dialogue finds Socrates arguing against a "natural" language given to us by default. That point of view is not a rejection of many elements being given to us. Identifying which is what is tricky.
The centrality of the trades-person in the Republic gives a particular topology of possible experience. There are conditions that need to be recognized before changing them can be an option.
Even by the time of Aristotle there was no such thing as one consistent "Platonism". Aristotle claimed to refute "some Platonists" with his cosmological argument. But Neo -Platonists took a position more consistent with Aristotle. So there must have been some fine tuning of "Platonism" and rejection of certain types of Platonism Therefore we can assume a reason for the name "Neo-Platonism" rather than simply "Platonism". And Aristotle himself is, in a way, a Platonist. The thing is, Plato had a lot of different teachings which could be interpreted in different ways.
Correct. Plato's own system was far from finalized. Obviously, all the essential features were already in place. But there was some debate within the Academy concerning the exact role of first principles, Forms, Mathematical Numbers, and their relation to one another, etc.
These issues were not completely resolved in Plato's times and had to be worked out later. Eventually, an effort was made to systematize his teachings and at the time of Plotinus the final touches were still in progress. Aristotle certainly improved on some of Plato's ideas and Plotinus used Aristotle for his own fine-tuning.
Even so, something like what Gerson calls "Ur-Platonism" may be identified and all subsequent modifications are essentially in agreement with it. "Neo-Platonism" is a modern concept. Platonists themselves did not call themselves that and would not regard "Neo-Platonism" as a different or "new" system.
Actually, if you look really closely, you'll see that the issues haven't been resolved yet. I think you have something to work on Apollodorus. Get back to your studies!
Well, looking at this thread, it certainly looks that way :grin:
But I wouldn't worry too much about it. When I was in my early teens, no one at school spoke of “Platonism”. It was always individual authors like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus. So, when I first read Plato’s dialogues like Timaeus, Symposium, Republic, I was unaware of the existence of a system called “Platonism”.
However, the main points I took away from reading the texts were: the creation of the world by the Demiurge, the necessity of cultivating the four virtues in the attainment of societal and personal happiness, the importance of justice or righteousness as a guiding principle, the illusory nature of the sensible world, the tripartite soul and its ascent to higher planes of existence or experience, the nous, the Forms, the Good, the One, becoming virtuous and godlike as far as possible as the ultimate goal of life, and the role of philosophy and contemplation in facilitating the achievement of that goal.
It was several years later that I learned of Platonism as an actual system and what to me felt quite natural was that “Platonism” was based on exactly what I had read in the dialogues.
Incidentally, as Gerson points out, if you were to ask any moderately well-educated person in antiquity what the goal of life is according to the teachings of Plato, they would answer “to become godlike as far as possible”. So, it seems to me that the main difference is not so much between Plato and Plotinus as it is between how Plato was understood in antiquity and how he is interpreted today by some academic authors.
If we insist that there were major changes, for example, from Plato to Plotinus, we should be able to show what those changes are and to what extent (if at all) they are inconsistent with (a) the text of the dialogues and (b) with how Plato was understood in the interim.
As Gerson says, and I agree with him, is that:
“… what we find in the dialogues is an expression of one positive, continuously refined, construct out of UP [Ur-Platonism]. Actually, as I have argued, the positive construct is properly located within the ongoing work of the Academy under Plato’s leadership and the dialogues represent in effect occasional dramatized summaries of provisional results in the course of that work … Aristotle’s own work, both within the Academy and then in his own Lyceum, represents an alternative positive construct out of UP … Plotinus did not think that a systematization of Plato’s Platonism was a novelty … As far as we know, he thought that the system was articulated by Plato, not for the first time, but most profoundly and persuasively. And by ‘system’, of course, I mean fundamental metaphysical principles, certainly not all the possible consequences that can be drawn from there … Was Plato a Platonist? My answer to this question is yes, with what I hope to have shown is a reasonable qualification. ‘Platonism’ refers to any version of a positive construct on the basis of UP. For all soi-disant followers of Plato from the Old Academy onward, Plato’s version takes the crown … As I have argued, the unification of the elements of UP into a single positive construct was of paramount importance. That is why Platonism is a metaphysical doctrine … I have argued in this book that Proclus’ praise of Plotinus as leading the way in the exegesis of the Platonic revelation is essentially correct. This is a view shared by scholars of Platonism and by Platonists, too, well into the nineteenth century …”
Gerson correctly points out that any contrary views are a recent development arising from the over-critical reading of individual dialogues independently of other dialogues which in some cases has led to the absurd inference among a few scholars that the dialogues represent no philosophical writings at all!
Gerson concludes that:
“Platonism is not primarily what we might term a ‘dialogic artifact’. It was primarily a way of life. And the focus of that way of life, at least within the Academy, was the positive construction of a theoretical framework on the foundation of UP. This does not make the dialogues irrelevant; it makes them what all Platonists took them to be, namely, ????? [logoi] of that way of life” - L. P. Gerson, From Plato to Plotinus, p. 309
I agree with Gerson when he says about:
Quoting Apollodorus
The dialogues form larger wholes. Two or more dialogues are tied together in various ways, by the chronology of events, such as Euthyphro and Apology or extended to include Crito and Phaedo, or by a central question such as with the trilogy Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, or Phaedrus and Symposium on eros. That the dialogues are not independent, however, does not mean that they are not each wholes in themselves. They can be seen in this regard as a version of the problem of the one and the many, with each being one, and together being both many and a whole or one. The Forms themselves represent the same problem.
Quoting Apollodorus
I don't know if Gerson identifies these scholars, but we should not mistake a few scholars for all scholars whose reading of the dialogues does not agree with his or your own.
Quoting Apollodorus
I agree with him on this as well. Socrates' concern with the human things is a concern for a way of life - the examined life.
This leads back to the question of what guides that way of life. Euthyphro thinks it is some notion of piety, but he is unable to say what that is. To say that it is what the gods love does not tell us what it is that the gods love or how we are to determine what the gods love.
The Socratic way is the way of inquiry, engendered by the desire to become wise. It is to lead an examined life. Rather than assume, like Euthyphro, that you know what you do not know, knowing that you do not know you continue to inquire, to examine, to question.
Gerson may be right about Platonism being about building a theoretical construct out of "Ur-Platonism", but if he is, this shows how far the Socratic way of life is from Platonism. I agree with those scholars who think that Plato and Aristotle are Socratic. But Plato and Aristotle know that the Socratic way of life is only for the few. The many need answers, and so, they give them salutary answers that will guide them.
It comes down to whether we put our faith and trust in and hold fast to these answers or if we do not rest content with what we are told and continue to inquire and examine and evaluate.
We didn't get any education in philosophy in high school, so I wasn't exposed to Plato or Platonism until university.
Quoting Apollodorus
What I find, is that in Plato's dialogues, Socrates produces unanswered questions. So if Plotinus made some progress toward answering some of those questions, that would constitute a change between Plato and Plotinus.
Quoting Apollodorus
I had to do a Google search to find out what Ur-Platonism is:
;[quote=Platonism Versus Naturalism, Lloyd P. Gerson, University of Toronto] Here I briefly sketch a hypothetical reconstruction of what I shall call ‘Ur-Platonism’ (UP). This is the general philosophical position that arises from the conjunction of the negations of the philosophical positions explicitly rejected in the dialogues, that is, the philosophical positions on offer in the history of philosophy accessible to Plato himself. [/quote]
I really do not see how a "general philosophical position that arises from the conjunction of the negations
of the philosophical positions explicitly rejected in the dialogues", can be called "a theoretical framework". I think these two are miles apart. A position of skepticism, which rejects philosophical positions, cannot be said to provide a theoretical framework. So any supposed theoretical framework would have to come from some principles other than those found in Plato.
We might say that Aristotle build a theoretical framework on UP, but we wouldn't call Aristotelian metaphysics Platonism, it's Aristotelianism.
This is your logic:
1. Gerson may be right about Platonism being about building a theoretical construct out of "Ur-Platonism".
2. But if he is, this shows how far the Socratic way of life is from Platonism.
Something is missing there, viz., the logical connection between premise (1) and premise (2).
And you are not paying attention. What Gerson is saying is that, into the 19th century, scholarship saw Platonism exactly as the Platonists did.
It was in the 1800’s, after Schleiermacher, that scholars began to look at the individual dialogues in isolation from the corpus of Platonic works and the system of thought associated with it, and this has led some of them down a rabbit hole resulting in absurd claims to the effect that the dialogues have no philosophical content at all.
Gerson doesn’t need to name those scholars (though he does refer to Shorey and others earlier in the book) because we know exactly who they are. They are mainly liberals, Christian Socialists and Fabian Socialists starting with G L Dickinson (The Greek Way of Life) and R H S Crossman (Plato Today) who taught Classics at Cambridge and Oxford.
Crossman who had been a Classics don at Oxford wrote:
“Since the war it has become quite fashionable to pull Plato off his pedestal. But when Plato To-day was published, the idea was novel and made quite a stir”.
So, the practice of arbitrarily atomizing the dialogues started in the 1800’s and culminated in the 1930’s with a complete reinterpretation of Plato from which all metaphysical and even philosophical content was deliberately excised.
As Gerson points out, this procedure is obviously flawed and can lead to absurd results - as may be seen from unsubstantiated claims that Plato was an “atheist”.
Well, even a "position of skepticism" is a position.
But I think you are probably talking about radical skepticism there, which in my view is a form of nihilism. This is not what Plato is doing. The way I see it Plato is using skepticism more as a style of argument and mode of inquiry leading to knowledge than a rejection of all positions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I’m not entirely sure what you mean by “we”, but some school kids have parents and some parents have Plato on their book shelf, so there is no need to wait for university. And, if I’m not mistaken, there are certain places called “libraries” where books may be borrowed and read, should there be an interest to do so .... :smile:
There is nothing missing. It is not a syllogism.
Quoting Apollodorus
What I am saying is that you pay far too much attention to Gerson. Unless a scholar from the 19th century can shed light on the dialogues, such things are of no concern to me.
Quoting Apollodorus
No, he doesn't. You, on the other hand, use his criticism of those scholars to dismiss other sholars.
Quoting Apollodorus
And exactly who they are are not the scholars I make use of. Simple strawman.
That's what I'm saying, it isn't a syllogism because it doesn't show how you arrive at that conclusion.
So it must be just random and unconnected statements then.
Quoting Fooloso4
Well, you would say that, wouldn't you?
The fact is that Gerson is not criticizing the scholars, he simply points out that their procedure is flawed.
Maybe this upsets you because their procedure and conclusion sounds very much like your own?
It's got wings and flies, it's not a dog.
I had already said what I think the Socratic way of life is, and it ain't about building a theoretical construct out of "Ur-Platonism".
Quoting Apollodorus
The fact is, you are criticizing scholars you know nothing about, simply because Gerson criticizes some other scholars.
I know enough to criticize their methodology and so does Gerson. Of course you would disagree with the criticism since you are following the same flawed methodology.
Bullshit! You do not know who they are or anything about their methodologies.
As a matter of fact, I know far more than you think. And anti-Platonists like Dickinson, Shorey, and Crossman are rather notorious characters in the literature. That's why you deny knowing anything about them, because you don't want to be associated with their names. Subversive liberals, Christian Socialists, Fabian Socialists. It's all politically motivated, without a doubt.
Your second sentence shows the first to be false. It does not matter what you may know about anti-Platonists like Dickinson, Shorey, and Crossman, they are not who I read and do not influence the scholars I learn from. What you do not know is who the authors I read are and what it is that they say.
Quoting Apollodorus
I deny knowing them because I have never read them and they are not cited by the scholars I do read. Strawman bullshit.
And yet you sound very much like Shorey and other anti-Platonists of the 1930's onward.
Their usual method is to start by taking a dialogue in isolation of other Platonic texts, after which they use terms like "irony", "elenchos", "aporia", "skepticism", etc. to arrive at the most preposterous conclusions designed to demonize Plato and Platonists.
Anyway, if you are not reading scholars like Sedley and Gerson, who are leading in the field, which scholars do you actually read then???
What is it you hope to accomplish by making such false claims?
Above on this same page:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Apollodorus
Do you really find it hard to understand why scholars from different schools would use the same terms that are found in the dialogues?
Quoting Apollodorus
I have mentioned them before. I'll start with Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein, both Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. Their students and students of their students include most notably Seth Benardete, Stanley Rosen, Allan Bloom, Thomas Pangle, Christopher Bruell, Laurence Lampert, Ronna Burger, Charles Griswold, and many others.
None of them "demonize" Plato. He is of central importance to their philosophical work.
Well, I don't know if you realize this, actually you probably don't, but you are proving my point. You are talking about the 1930's there, are you not?
So, you may or may not have read Shorey, but as per your own admission, you have read others from the same period, exactly as I predicted from the start just by reading your posts!
"Turning to the context of Strauss’s claims about esotericism helps to unravel a number of other important themes in his work, including what he calls the “theologico-political predicament of modernity,” the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, and the relation between revelation and philosophy (what Strauss also calls “Jerusalem and Athens”)"
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/strauss-leo/#Cont
"In the late 1930s his [Strauss'] research focused on the rediscovery of esoteric writing, thereby a new illumination of Plato and Aristotle, retracing their interpretation through medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, and encouraging the application of those ideas to contemporary political theory."
"After receiving a Rockefeller Fellowship in 1932, Strauss left his position at the Higher Institute for Jewish Studies in Berlin for Paris."
"Strauss moved in 1937 to the United States, under the patronage of Harold Laski"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Strauss
Laski, of course, was a notorious Marxist and leading member of the Fabian Society (member of the executive) whose London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) was funded by Rockefeller foundations.
"Laski was one of Britain's most influential intellectual spokesmen for Communism in the interwar years"
"Laski returned to England in 1920 and began teaching government at the London School of Economics (LSE)"
And, "Strauss's closest friend was Jacob Klein" - Wikipedia
“Some time during 1934, R. H. Tawney, at that time professor of economic history at the London School of Economics and at the very height of his academic fame and intellectual powers, took pity on an unknown, unemployed German-Jewish scholar, one recently exiled from his land of birth, and much in need of professional patronage and institutional preferment. His name was Leo Strauss.”
S. J. D. Green, “The Tawney-Strauss Connection: On Historicism and Values in the History of Political Ideas”, The Journal of Modern History Vol. 67, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 255-277 (23 pages) The University of Chicago Press
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2125059
Like Laski, Tawney was a member of the Fabian Society executive committee.
So, "1930's", "Fabian Socialism", "esotericism", etc., etc. ....
I think you agree that there is no point looking into your other eminent scholars. Strauss himself is more than sufficient to demonstrate where you acquired your unsalutary fixation with "secret Platonic teachings", "atheism", strange "reinterpretations of Platonism", and the whole shebang. :grin:
That is both remarkably arrogant and startingly ignorant.
Do you know what the content of the Tawney article is? Strauss was opposed to Marxism, Socialism, and historicism.
I suppose I should not be surprised by this. Previously you summarily dismissed the entire field of Biblical scholarship and American universities because they are all liberals and Marxists.
There's a link between 'perennialism' (which is the academic notion of there being a world-wide and history-transcending perennial philosophy of which the ancient Greeks were exemplars) and reactionary politics. I think the reasons are obvious - the tension between the idea that there are perennial moral truths, and the Enlightenment and post-modern attitude that deprecates any such idea. That 'reactionary' aspect of such thinking found extreme expression in Julius Evola. (And I was depressed to learn that the scumbag Steven Bannon gave talks on Guenon, another exponent. And I think it's why Karl Popper declared Plato an 'enemy of the open society'.)
:up:
I have recently discovered the writings of Remi Brague, a current French academic, whose ideas are often compared to Strauss (although he denies being a 'disciple' of Strauss.)
Quoting The Kingdom of Man: The Genesis and Failure of the Modern Project
This is more or less the theme I've been exploring.
Well, Strauss has been accused of many things just as he and others have accused Plato.
However, as stated by R H Crossman, it had become fashionable by the first half of the 20th century "to pull Plato down from his pedestal". Crossman and other Fabian Socialists were at the forefront of this trend.
As Gerson points out, new interpretative procedures emerged in the 1800's and 90's that are fundamentally flawed and lead to absurd conclusions including that Platonic works have no metaphysical or even no philosophical content.
The problem with the esotericism of authors like Strauss is that it can lead to any number of readings that are ultimately incapable of being proved.
In addition to atheism, another "secret teaching" that classicists like G L Dickinson saw in Plato was homoeroticism.
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/literature/dickinson_gl_L.pdf
This may have constituted "secret teaching" in the eyes of late 19th and early 20th century readers, but it is highly unlikely that this is how Plato himself saw it.
And, of course, according to one's political inclinations, some saw Plato as a revolutionary and others as a reactionary - and this is still the case today.
I think this illustrates the danger of imposing modern readings on 4th-century BC texts. We can't simply dismiss more than two millennia of Platonism just because modern worldviews have changed.
From Wiki:
Strauss was certainly close to Fabian Socialists like Laski and Tawney so presumably there was some influence?
But I suggest you read my post again. My point was that anti-Platonism was a trend arising from liberal, Christian Socialist and Fabian Socialist circles.
In any case, accusing Plato of "atheism" is just ludicrous unscholarly nonsense as you ought to realize yourself.
There you go again. Of course texts may have "a deeper meaning". The issue is to be able to provide evidence in support of what you claim is that deeper meaning.
So far, you have presented zero evidence for your claim that the Euthyphro or any other dialogue teaches "atheism".
If you were to do more than judge a book by not even reading the cover you would see that what Strauss is talking about is not a teaching in this sense of the term. It is, in fact, just the opposite. It is teaching in the way Plato describes in the Republic. It does not put something in the soul, it turns it around so that it can see. And, of course, here you will be mistaken in thinking it is the Forms that are seen.
The fact of the matter is, we do not see the Forms. Whatever you think it may be possible for us to see, what we can see here and now, if we are self-aware and honest, is that we do not see the Forms. They remain for us images, hypotheses. We remain in the cave.
They helped him emigrate, just as hundreds of other scholars were helped. What is clear if you would actually read him is that he was opposed to socialism.
Quoting Apollodorus
Strauss was educated in Germany not England. He was not liberal or Christian or a socialist.
Quoting Apollodorus
That's because I never said that they do. You have a distorted view of what the Socratic teaching is. It is not about telling you what to think, it is about teaching you how to think. It is zetetic. It is about inquiry, examination, evaluation, not indoctrination or insemination. Not the disclosure of revealed truths.
Socrates hypothesizes or speculates about many things. That doesn't make those things. e.g., virtue, beauty or justice, just speculation.
The point Socrates is making is that the philosopher first thinks about them and eventually "sees", i.e., experiences them.
Quoting Fooloso4
Remain in the cave then. It doesn't bother me in the least. :grin:
Irrelevant. The fact that they helped him does not mean that they didn't become friends or that their anti-Platonist ideas did not influence him.
They were anti-Platonists and they helped him promote anti-Platonism. In any case, he was promoting the same anti-Platonist line as they were.
Quoting Fooloso4
But that's exactly what you are doing. You have decided that Plato and Socrates were "atheists" without any evidence and you mock everyone who disagree.
So, I think we can all see what "zetetic" means to you.
As I said, when someone keeps indiscriminately using terms like "irony", "aporia", "zetetic", and the like, as if they were chanting incantations or trying to give themselves a false air of learning, you just know that they are engaging in sophistry for nefarious purposes.
Unless they are things known that is exactly what they are. They are not things that you know. They are things that Socrates says are his opinion, that is, not things he knows.
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, and the problem is, the gap between one and the other. You have not bridged that gap. It remains for you a matter of faith. Socrates, by his own admission, did not bridge the gap, they remain for him a matter of opinion.
Quoting Apollodorus
You have not managed to take even the first step, the awareness that the cave you are in is not the real world. You have not even learned from Plato to see your own ignorance.
Quoting Apollodorus
You have no idea who or what influenced him. You are way off on this.
Quoting Apollodorus
And this is something you know from not having read him!
Quoting Apollodorus
Not only are you blinded by fear but by paranoid conspiracy theories.
They remain a matter of faith until experienced, like everything else.
Faith doesn't mean "atheism".
Are you claiming to have divine wisdom, to have seen the Forms themselves?
Quoting Apollodorus
Faith does not mean knowledge. Socratic philosophy is driven by the recognition of ignorance.
Are you sure English is your first language???
The philosopher first uses reason to think about the Forms and eventually "sees" or experiences them by means of the nous. This is the logical implication as pointed out by Plotinus and others.
Nothing to do with atheism. You're making it up.
So the story goes, but Socrates, despite having told the story, denies having seen the Forms. Plato never introduces anyone else in the dialogues who has seen the Forms. You have not seen the Forms and so you cannot know if they even exist. It remains for you an article of faith. Shadows on the cave wall you mistakenly take to be reality. You cannot even tell the difference between the image and that of which it is an image.
Faith does not equal "atheism". So, unless you can prove that it does, you are talking nonsense.
Faith is the absence of knowledge. You are talking about something you know nothing about.
Socrates does not explicitly deny the existence of gods, he does not affirm their existence. You cannot see that they are absent in his account of the Good, you fill in where they are not with things that are not said anywhere in the dialogues.
That's exactly what I'm saying.
Socrates does not explicitly deny the existence of gods. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that he was an atheist.
You fill in "atheism" where the dialogues nowhere say this.
He does not affirm the existence of gods either. The question of Socrates atheism is made explicit in the Apology (26c )with the distinction between not believing in the gods of the city versus not believing in the gods at all. Meletus forgets that the original charge was that he taught about novel gods (26b) and now asserts that he does not believe in the gods at all. Socrates nowhere denies the charges, he point to Meletus' contradiction. He also points to the sun and moon without ever saying that he believes they are gods. In fact, he cites Anaxagoras, who denies they are gods. Rather than deny he is an atheist he leads us to the question of whether he is like Anaxagoras. In the Phaedo, when he introduces the Forms, he again, brings Anaxagoras into the discussion.
Spinoza serves as a good example of the complexity of the problem. He never explicitly denied the existence of gods either, but he too was found guilty of atheism, and to this day the issue has not been resolved. If God is the god of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, then Spinoza was an atheist, but by equating God and Nature some will say he is a pantheist or panentheist, but others will deny that Nature is God and so conclude that he was an atheist.
By the standards of the city Socrates was an atheist. By the standard of Orthodox Judaism Spinoza was an atheist. Those who hold that God is the supreme being might regard Platonism atheism. Those who hold that God is not a being but the ground of being might regard belief in a supreme being atheistic.
In other words, your concern for whether Socrates was an atheist is simple-minded and uninformed by anything but your own narrow beliefs.
I think you are becoming irrational now.
What you are saying is that you are unable to prove that Socrates was an atheist, so you bring "Spinoza" and "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" into it to prove that he was.
Edit. The charge against Socrates was not that he didn't believe in God but that he introduced "other new deities", thus showing irreverence. Irreverence is not "atheism".
No, that is what you assume I am saying. I have told you many times that it is not. But you ignore what I say and make up something you think you can argue against.
Quoting Apollodorus
Read the passages I cited and what I actually said.
I've rephrased that for clarity.
What I'm saying is that the issue is not whether he disbelieved in the Gods of Athens but whether he disbelieved in Gods in general.
If someone doesn't believe in one particular God, he may still believe in another God or deities.
If the charge was that he introduced "other new deities", then the logical implication is that he believed in those deities he introduced. Therefore, he was not an atheist.
I see you still do not understand. If the Good and God mean the same thing the whole question of atheism becomes meaningless.
The question of atheism was meaningless anyway since Socrates was not an atheist. He believed that the charge against him was wrong. That's why he contested it.
Your statement was this:
Quoting Fooloso4
What the city of Athens believed is beside the point. The only thing that matters is whether or not he was an atheist. And that can only be decided on the basis of evidence.
1. There is no evidence that he was an atheist by the standards of the city.
2. There is no evidence that he was an atheist in general.
3. There is even less evidence that Plato was an atheist.
That's why you can't find any evidence and you're still looking for it! :rofl:
He does not deny it.
Quoting Apollodorus
Too bad you were not around to tell Socrates and the court and Plat and Xenophon and others that.
Do you really not realize the absurdity of what you are saying, or are you just pretending?
Whether someone is guilty or not depends solely on the evidence.
Miscarriage of justice isn't unheard of. If Socrates was taken to court and/or sentenced for political reasons or because the jury erroneously believed he was guilty, that doesn't make him guilty as charged.
Suppose the state takes you to court on some cooked-up charge or you are set up by someone who holds a grudge against you and you get sentenced to death and executed. Does that make you guilty of the crime alleged???!!!
Yes. You have stated your opinion several times now. I have explained why I think you are mistaken. If anyone is reading this and is interested they can go back and read it. But it now seems likely that no one is. There is only so many times people will hear you repeat yourself before they lose interest.
You read Plato as if it was revealed religion. In order to maintain the illusion and protect your beliefs you ignore everything in the text that is a threat to your beliefs. And because it has been said you believe your opinions are the truth.
If you say so ....
I don't just say so, we have a record of it across several threads. You have shown yourself to be just as ridiculous as Euthyphro.
I don't think so. :grin:
When you close your eyes the evidence cannot be seen. It is all right here for anyone who might read it to make up their own mind.
It follows that Socrates was the prototypical agnostic. I agree with him here. We don't really know how many gods there are: 0, 1, 2, a million, or 3.1416...
His defense in the Apology was his "human wisdom" his knowledge of his ignorance. He also said that the oracle proclaimed that no one was wiser than Socrates. That is, no one has knowledge of such things.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is logically possible that Socrates was an agnostic.
As to his "ignorance", it says nothing about his religious beliefs and even less about those of Plato.
This raises the question of what Plato is up to when he has Socrates tell stories of transcendent knowledge. Platonists take these stories to be revealed truth, but Socrates says they are him opinion, not things he knows. So on the one hand we have Socratic skepticism and on the other a mythology posing as truth.
Another solution would be that Socrates, while doubting, had a sort of hunch that the good was beyond the gods and all that.
The question is why Socrates? If this is Plato's images of the truth then why not put them in the mouth of a stranger? After all, a stranger plays a role in some of the dialogues that Socrates does in others. Putting them in Socrates' mouth seems to undermine the truth of the claims, making them simply opinions.
Quoting Olivier5
Socratic philosophy is oriented around the question of the good. It is what is sought for. This orientation is, however, necessarily a human orientation. That is, the question of the good is the question of the human good. Although we find in the dialogues metaphysical speculation, it is serious play not science. The activity itself, when done in the right way, is seen as good. It is inspirational and aspirational. It is eidetic.
Skepticism does not equal atheism, either in Socrates' or Plato's case.
So, skepticism may be another "mythology posing as truth".
Quoting Fooloso4
You have already admitted that the dialogues do not teach atheism.
If all Socrates does is ask questions and express opinions, then it cannot be inferred from this that Plato was an atheist.
You seem to be cherry-picking Socrates statements and ignore those where he speaks of the soul's immortality or God in positive terms that do not sound like skepticism and even less like atheism.
You are not simply stating that "Socrates is a skeptic". You are saying he is telling myths or lies, therefore anyone who believes in the metaphysical realities discussed by Socrates is a believer in myths or lies.
But you have not demonstrated that this is the case, or even that Socrates is a skeptic. Gerson and other scholars do not believe that Socrates' position, or that of Plato, constitutes skepticism.
What I gathered from my superficial reading on the subject is the conventional wisdom that Plato went through 'phases' or 'periods' like Picasso. At the begining he was following upon Socrates rather closely, but progressively he took some distance from his master, as he developed his own ideas. This would be reflected in his dialogues, where the figure of Socrates is prominent in dialogues classified as early, and in later dialogues he tended to be replaced by 'the stranger' (that is to say Plato himself, since he was a stranger in the strange land of Sicily at this point).
Quoting Fooloso4
The trick is that we know of Socrates through Plato and a few others but not directly. Like Jesus, Socrates could have written a book, but he chose not to, and so we know of his thoughts and deeds only through others.
This composite picture has some contradictions that you highlighted. It could be that the reports by Plato are inaccurate, or it could be that Socrates himself harboured some contradictions.
It is telling that you do not have enough confidence in your own arguments to let them stand, or fall, as the case may be.
Not at all. I am simply pointing out the inconsistencies in your claims. Isn't this what Socrates does and what philosophical discussion is about?
"In the course of recounting his conversations with others, Socrates says something enigmatic: “About myself I knew that I know nothing” (22d; cf. Fine 2008). The context of the dialogue allows us to read this pronouncement as unproblematical. Socrates knows that he does not know about important things. Interpreted in this manner, Socrates does not appear to be a skeptic in the sense that he would profess to know nothing. Even though some readers (ancient and modern) found such an extreme statement in the Apology, a more plausible reading suggests that Socrates advocates the importance of critically examining one’s own and others’ views on important matters, precisely because one does not know about them (Vogt 2012a, ch. 1). Such examination is the only way to find out."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/#SkeIdeEarClaGre
The fact that Socrates appears to have some skeptical tendencies does not make him, and even less Plato, a skeptic.
So, it seems that you are buying too much into the "Socratic skepticism" idea and end up constructing and believing your own mythology which you assume to be the "truth".
There are noticeable differences between the earlier and later dialogues, but the question of whether his thinking is marked by different periods is complex. For example, a later dialogue, Parmenides, is about Socrates as a young man. Parmenides is critical of the Forms. It remains an open question whether the Forms survive the attack, and if so, how they were altered. Theories of Plato's development based on theories of the chronology of when the dialogues were written should be considered in light of the dramatic chronology that Plato provides. In other words, if there was a change in his view of the Forms, the dramatic chronology suggests it is a change that informed Socratic philosophy from near the beginning of Socrates' own development.
Quoting Olivier5
The stranger appears in some but not all the later dialogues. The question of who the stranger is is related to the question of who philosopher is. There is no dialogue "Philosopher", but the question is taken up in the Sophist and Statesman. The philosopher is in some ways like them, but in what way he is unique is never resolved.
Here is a nice summary: "The Real Name of the Stranger: The Meaning of Plato's Statesman"
https://voegelinview.com/real-name-stranger-meaning-platos-statesman/
In the dialogue we find Socrates, the Stranger, and "young Socrates".
Quoting Olivier5
In the Second Letter Plato says:
The dialogues are not reports. Plato distances the man Socrates from the person created in the dialogues. In addition, he distances himself from what is said in the dialogues.
https://voegelinview.com/
and have referred to it couple of times already. It contains some very good essays. For anyone interested in the question of Plato and Platonism, "Plato's Critique of Platonism"
https://voegelinview.com/plato-s-critique-of-platonism-pt-1/