Plato's Phaedo

This is my favorite. I look forward to reading your thoughts on it.

Quoting frank

This is my favorite. I look forward to reading your thoughts on it.

And I look forward to a dialogue about this dialogue.

Quoting Fooloso4

I will be citing this online translation: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Plato_files/310585462-Plato-Phaedo.pdf

Thanks for this. I have downloaded it and hope to read along with you and others.

Quoting Fooloso4

We soon learn that Plato was not with Socrates on his final day. He was sick. (59b)... What would have been so serious as to keep him away?...But for now we should note that Plato is twice removed...Here it is his absence rather than his presence that he draws our attention to.

Ah, how intriguing. The dialogue sounds like a Russian doll. What kind of illness...hmm...physical, mental...a broken leg causing great pain...

Quoting Fooloso4

Socrates is doing something he has never done before, writing

Really ?

Quoting Fooloso4

the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing:

I've just been discussing dreams elsewhere in the forum - the fact that strange figures flit in and out and we can have weird conversations with them. Again, I once talked about dreams as a source of inspiration which led to real life problems being solved. Dreams are a bit of a mystery.

So, whose voice would be it be ? That of his daemonion ? Some kind of a spirit ?

Quoting Fooloso4

the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)

But why would it need to do that, or Socrates assume that - if it is a source of inspiration, then Socrates already has it in spades.

Quoting Fooloso4

I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments, and being no teller of tales myself, I therefore used some I had ready to hand …(61b)

Does S. then see himself as a poet, even as he makes arguments ?
Why, if he was being encouraged to 'make music and practise it' - or rhythmic lyrics - would he dismiss his own talent and rely on second-hand material?

Quoting Fooloso4

But here he tells a story about a dream from his past life. That it is just a story will become clear.

Oh, hot damn...this is beginning to sound like Dallas. Bobby in the shower. Everything that had happened previously - Bobby dying - was only his wife's dream...
So, we don't get to read any of Socrates' poems then ?

Quoting Fooloso4

What we will hear are not simply arguments but stories.

I am looking forward to seeing how this all pans out...soap opera meets political drama ?

Quoting Fooloso4

a comedy or tragedy

Both ?

Quoting Fooloso4

Phaedo says that he was not overcome by pity and that Socrates seemed happy (58e) Phaedo reports feeling an unusual blend of pleasure and pain. (59a). As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories.

A bitter-sweet play.

Quoting Amity

Dreams are a bit of a mystery.

Socrates obeys what the dream commands so as to acquit himself of any impiety. (60e) Only now, at the end of his life, he doubts that he has not obeyed by philosophizing. And it is only by chance that his death was postponed. Since the same dream visited him often in his past life, it is curious that he remembers the dream but only now questions he was doing what it asked.

Quoting Amity

So, whose voice would be it be ? That of his daemonion ? Some kind of a spirit ?

Plato's Socrates says that his daemonion only warned him about what not to do. Xenophon's Socrates tells a different story.

Quoting Amity

But why would it need to do that - if it is a source of inspiration, then Socrates already has it in spades.

I think it is Plato's way of telling us that what follows should be regarded as stories rather than reasoned arguments.

Quoting Amity

Does S. then see himself as a poet, even as he makes arguments ?

I think his intention is, like that of the sophists, to persuade. This leads to the question of the relationship of the sophist and the poet to the philosopher. Rather than attempting to resolve that problem I will leave it open, because I think that tension is always at play in the dialogues.

Quoting Amity

Why, if he was being encouraged to 'make music and practise it' - or rhythmic lyrics - would he dismiss his own talent and rely on second-hand material?

I will be addressing that.

Quoting Amity

a comedy or tragedy
— Fooloso4
Both ?

Yes. The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times.

Reply to Fooloso4
Thanks. I will disappear for a while to read the Phaedo...
Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ?

Quoting Amity

Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ?

I recommend reading at your own pace, moving forward and backwards with the eventual goal of seeing the whole.

According to some, Plato taught "animism" and "atheism". Is that true?

Quoting Fooloso4

moving forward and backwards with the eventual goal of seeing the whole.

To read to get the gist, for simple pleasure - followed by a slower, more analytical read. Perhaps zooming in on something I find interesting or puzzling. Sounds about right for me.
Look forward to hearing more from you, as and when...

Quoting Amity

Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ?

The next section will cover up to and including 64a.

Reply to Apollodorus

I will take up issues as they occur in the text.

Quoting Fooloso4

up to and including 64a.

Appreciate that :up:

Quoting Fooloso4

I will take up issues as they occur in the text.

Great. I look forward to that.

Ah, here it is!

Thank you, @Fooloso4; it would be remiss of us not to take advantage of having someone who knows what they are talking about to hand, and this is a text that has implications across our subject. It came up in the thread on reincarnation, mentioned in response to the question "what is it that is reincarnated": "There is no coherent idea or concept of the individual soul that is not tied to an actual individual" coheres neatly with the view I expressed there, so I'm interested in how this comes out in the dialogue; there seems then to be a deeper reading of the text that will be enjoyable to investigate.

But there is also the argument from recollection, which I have long considered somewhat dubious, yet is central to Plato's wider thought, and so worthy of reconsideration.

But mostly I'm looking forward to this reading because I expect the unexpected, the unknown unknown.

Quoting Fooloso4

I will be citing this online translation: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Plato_files/310585462-Plato-Phaedo.pdf

Plato's Phaedo - this pdf is the translation with notes by David Gallop.
Contents
The translation 1
Notes 74
Notes on text and translation 226
Bibliographies 239
Abbreviations 242
Index 244

Quoting Fooloso4

The next section will cover up to and including 64a.

An easy and short read; the section up to 64a takes us to p8. I hope more people will join in the conversation that @Fooloso4 has started with encouragement from @Banno. Thanks.
It should be quite a ride.
I have decided, against all my natural inclinations, not to search the internet for secondary sources.
Simply to read, think and make connections for myself. Looking forward to @Fooloso4 as a guide to a closer and deeper understanding - who will take and answer relevant questions.

Quoting Fooloso4

What we will hear are not simply arguments but stories. The question arises as to whether this is a comedy or tragedy. Phaedo says that he was not overcome by pity and that Socrates seemed happy (58e) Phaedo reports feeling an unusual blend of pleasure and pain. (59a). As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories.

I've read the section, looking out for these elements. I am intrigued already.
The concepts of death, suicide with religious themes. The pain/pleasure aspects - the mix and the separation. The subtle comedic parts.

Before I go into detail, I think it probably best to wait for @Fooloso4 to comment first...
And he might well be waiting for others to join in. I hope people do :sparkle:

Quoting Banno

it would be remiss of us not to take advantage of having someone who knows what they are talking about to hand, and this is a text that has implications across our subject.

Yes, and thanks for suggesting this to @Fooloso4. It is a most welcome surprise.

Quoting Banno

But mostly I'm looking forward to this reading because I expect the unexpected, the unknown unknown.

:cool:

Already on the first page I have a question. There is a reference to ‘the ship in which Theseus sailed to Crete’. Is this the same ship which is elsewhere the subject of the famous Ship of Theseus conundrum? Is that conundrum developed in this dialogue? (I suppose I could skip ahead, but I thought I’d ask. And notice that it has direct bearing on @Banno’s question about the nature of identity.)

60b Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, “What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think, (60c) he said, “if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and God wished to reconcile them, and when he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after.

This is a gem of the perennial philosophy - that pleasure and pain always accompany one another. Men foolishly chase pleasure and revile pain, not seeing that they are conjoined.

Quoting Amity

Before I go into detail, I think it probably best to wait for Fooloso4 to comment first...

Quoting Wayfarer

Already on the first page I have a question

Perhaps I am wrong. And the best way would be to post own thoughts and questions first.
Hmmm...
But I have so many :scream:

Reply to Amity I intend to stick with the narrative flow. Both those passages are from the first page.

Quoting Wayfarer

I intend to stick with the narrative flow. Both those passages are from the first page.

I think that is the way to go. Will post something later re the pain/pleasure issue.

[ My mind goes all over the place - I remember the poignant scene from the film 'Shadowlands' where Jack ( C.S Lewis ) and his wife, Joy shelter from the rain. Joy is dying and wants to talk about it. Jack not so much. He doesn't want to spoil what is a happy moment.

Jack: I’ll manage somehow. Don’t worry about me.
Joy: No, I think it can be better than just managing. What I am trying to say is that the pain then is part of the happiness now. That’s the deal. ]

...and I have a question, too. Presumably - I haven't checked - the word translated as "art" is "techne"?

So immediately we are involved in the issue of Episteme and Techne?

p1 59a Phaedo speaking:

That's why I wasn't visited at all by the pity that would seem natural for someone present at a scene of sorrow, nor again by the pleasure from our being occupied, as usual, with philosophy-because the discussion was, in fact, of that sort - but a simply extraordinary feeling was upon me, a sort of strange mixture of pleasure and pain combined, as I reflected that Socrates was shortly going to die. All of us there were affected in much the same way, now laughing, now in tears, one of us quite exceptionally so, Apollodorus-1 think you know the man and his manner.

So, here pain and pleasure are mixed together - blending the feelings and senses of reflecting on death and loss of Socrates even as they enjoy the philosophical discussion. Noting that some people are more emotionally affected than others - perhaps a criticism of a lack of rationality ? Being emotionally incontinent is not good ?

p3 60a

On entering we found Socrates, just released, and Xanthippe-you know her-holding his little boy and sitting beside him. When she saw us, Xanthippe broke out and said just the kinds of thing that women are given to saying: 'So this is the very last time, Socrates, that your good friends will speak to you and you to them.' At which Socrates looked at Crito and said: 'Crito, someone had better take her home.' So she was taken away by some of Crito's people, calling out and lamenting;

Again, there seems to be a dismissal of what 'kinds of things that women are given to saying'. Implying that it is an unwanted feminine characteristic. And yet, his wife would be the one to carry on and look after their son. I think she is misrepresented here - she has been the provider of finance. She has been there with her care. Living with Socrates and his absences would require a practical wisdom...at the very least.

p3-4 60b

Socrates, meanwhile, sat up on the bed, bent his leg, and rubbed it down with his hand. As he rubbed it, he said: 'What an odd thing it seems, friends, this state that men call "pleasant"; and how curiously it's related to its supposed opposite, "painful": to think that the pair of them refuse to visit a man together, yet if anybody pursues one of them and catches it, he's always pretty well bound to catch the other as well, as if the two of them were attached to a single head...
This is just what seems to be happening in my own case: there was discomfort in my leg because of the fetter, and now the pleasant seems to have come to succeed it.'

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.

* not convinced that is is how Socrates would see life though, nor about any joy in afterlife.
Although Phaedo seems to think that even in Hell, Socrates would be fine.
58e

I felt assured that even while on his way to Hades he would not go without divine providence, and that when he arrived there he would fare well, if ever any man did

Quoting Amity

Again, there seems to be a dismissal of what 'kinds of things that women are given to saying'. Implying that it is an unwanted feminine characteristic

Socrates despite his many virtues was probably in today’s terms not on board with gender equality. Don’t forget these dialogues hail from 300-400 BC.

On the other hand, some casual misogyny in chats between men brings it bang up to date.

Quoting Wayfarer

Socrates despite his many virtues was probably in today’s terms not on board with gender equality. Don’t forget these dialogues hail from 300-400 BC.

I am not forgetting time, place or person.
I don't see Socrates as a perfectly virtuous man, no matter what he says or is alleged to have said.
There is undoubtedly a bias towards males and their 'drunken' discussions - the strength needed in war - the heroic narrative.
Women are invisible but for their tears. It shows a complete blindness to the life and battles of women; their role and strength in keeping things going...providing support and care.

However, I think that Socrates in the business of 'knowing oneself' was concerned with humans; people including women. The vision of a better society with increased wellbeing. That includes acknowledging the opposites or the mingling...of pain and pleasure...of love and war...of life and death.

It would be easy to skim over, or skip this weeping episode but I think it worthwhile to note, especially given the discussion on supposed opposites. Reason v Emotion.
As Foolos4 said: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534374

Quoting Fooloso4

The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times.

Pass me the wine :party:

The 'no pleasure without pain' question is an example of a bigger issue for Plato. No pleasure without pain; no large without little; no beautiful without ugly; no being without not-being - at least in the things we see when we look around us. But these contradictions are only appearances. In the world that can be grasped by the intellect and not by the senses then we can understand things as they are and not as they seem to both be and not-be at the same time.

Quoting Cuthbert

On the other hand, some casual misogyny in chats between men brings it bang up to date.

I get what you are saying.

However, I am not sure that any parts of the dialogue written by Plato are 'casual'.
There is so much there - I don't think a word is ever wasted - we could be here forever...

A bit of dark humour re suicide and philosophers?

p5 61b

So give Evenus this message, Cebes: say good-bye to him, and tell him, if he's sensible, to come after me as quickly as he can. I'm off today, it seems-by Athenians' orders.'
'What a thing you're urging Evenus to do, Socrates!' said Simmias.
'I've come across the man often before now; and from what I've seen of him, he'll hardly be at all willing to obey you.'
'Why,' he said, 'isn't Evenus a philosopher?'
'I believe so,' said Simmias.
'Then Evenus will be willing, and so will everyone who engages worthily in this business. Perhaps, though, he won't do violence to himself: they say it's forbidden.'...

Cebes now asked him: 'How can you say this, Socrates? How can it both be forbidden to do violence to oneself, and be the case that the philosopher would be willing to follow the dying?'

61 e - [Socrates] I myself can speak about them only from hearsay; but what I happen to have heard I don't mind telling you. Indeed, maybe it's specially fitting that someone about to make the journey to the next world should inquire and speculate as to what we imagine that journey to be like; after all, what else should one do during the time till sundown?'

Can you imagine having this kind of conversation in your last hours ?
And why wait until then...

Quoting Wayfarer

There is a reference to ‘the ship in which Theseus sailed to Crete’. Is this the same ship which is elsewhere the subject of the famous Ship of Theseus conundrum?

Yes, it is the ship from the story of Theseus and the Minotaur. I don't think the conundrum is part of the myth, but Plato was aware of the problem. It can be found in a couple of the dialogues. There are several parallels in the Phaedo between the myth of Theseus' journey and Socrates own.

Quoting Banno

...and I have a question, too. Presumably - I haven't checked - the word translated as "art" is "techne"?

So immediately we are involved in the issue of Episteme and Techne?

The Greek term is mousikê. The translation I rely on uses the transliteration 'music' instead of 'art'. In Plato's Ion Socrates denies that poesis is a techne, it is, rather, enthousiasmos, that is inspiration. But here Socrates calls philosophy the "greatest music". As such it seems to cut across the distinction between episteme and techne. Despite what he says, Socrates is clearly a skilled (techne) storyteller, and further, his stories and images require knowledge (episteme) of the character of the person or persons he makes the story for. With regard to this, consider his calling himself a "physician of the soul".

Quoting Amity

A bit of dark humour re suicide and philosophers?

Right. He tells him to drop dead!

Quoting Amity

Being emotionally incontinent is not good ?

This and:

Quoting Amity

'kinds of things that women are given to saying'.

reflect common opinion at that time.

I think it may also be part of the theme of comedy and tragedy. If this play is to be a comedy then crying and weeping are to be dispatched.

Socrates begins not with something he recollects from a previous life or recalls or even his own stories but with “hearsay” :

'Well, I myself can speak about them only from hearsay; but what I happen to have heard I don't mind telling you. Indeed, maybe it's specially fitting that someone about to make the journey to the next world should inquire and speculate as to what we imagine that journey to be like; after all, what else should one do during the time till sundown?' (61d-e)

Inquiry and speculation based on what we imagine it to be based on hearsay. This is the measure by which to evaluate the stories that follow.

… sometimes and for some people, that it is better for a man to be dead than alive, and for those for whom it is better to be dead, perhaps it seems a matter for wonder to you if for these men it isn’t pious to do good to themselves, but they must await another benefactor.' (62a).

Socrates states that it would be better for some to be dead. In that case, it would be better for others to be alive. But he does not make the connection. Instead he moves to a defense of the prohibition against suicide.

Cebes gives a little laugh to which Socrates responds:

Well yes, it would seem unaccountable, put that way. And yet just maybe it does have an account. The account that’s given about these things in the Mysteries …

Socrates does not give an account. He appeals again to hearsay, to what is said in the Mysteries.

… we men are in some sort of prison, and that one ought not to release oneself from it or run away, seems to me a lofty idea and not easy to penetrate; but still, Cebes, this much seems to me well said: it is gods who care for us, and for the gods we men are among their belongings.

Socrates likens life to a prison. In that case it would not be just some men who would be better off dead, but all men who do not wish to be imprisoned. The irony here should not be missed. What Socrates is trying to persuade them of is not simply that death is not so bad, but that the soul will endure and be born again. But if life is a prison, then rebirth would mean to be imprisoned once again after having been freed from life.

Simmias objects:

… why, indeed, should truly wise men want to escape from masters who are better than themselves, and be separated from them lightly? So I think it's at you that Cebes is aiming his argument, because you take so lightly your leaving both ourselves and the gods, who are good rulers by your own admission. (63a)

Socrates responds:

'What you both say is fair, as I take you to mean that I should defend myself against these charges as if in a court of law.' (63 b)

Only Socrates made clear in the Apology that a court of law was not the proper place for him to defend himself. Socrates’ defense begins here, with those who are not hostile to philosophy.

'Very well, then,' he said; 'let me try to defend myself more convincingly before you than I did before the jury. Because if I didn't believe, Simmias and Cebes, that I shall enter the presence,
first, of other gods both wise and good, and next of dead men better than those in this world, then I should be wrong not to be resentful at death; but as it is, be assured that I expect to join the company of good men-although that point I shouldn't affirm with absolute conviction; but that I shall enter the presence of gods who are very good masters, be assured that if there's anything I should affirm on such matters, it is that. So that's why I am not so resentful, but rather am hopeful that there is something in store for those who've died-in fact, as we've long been told, something far better for the good than for the wicked.' (63c)

Socrates says that he is hopeful about something they have long been told, that death is something far better for the good than for the wicked. This is not a recollection of death, but a story that has long been told.

'Now then, with you for my jury I want to give my defence, and show with what good reason, as it seems to me, a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy feels confident when about to die, and is hopeful that, when he has died, he will win very great benefits in the other world.

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim?

Quoting Fooloso4

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim?

Philosophers are trying to see life, to gain a vantage point on it. It would appear that the only vantage point is in death.

Quoting Fooloso4

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim?

I don't know but it reminded me of something else - perhaps the Stoics. Something like it is only because of death that we appreciate life...i.e. it gives perspective as to what really matters.
How to live life well. Keeping death in mind...

Or it could be that the 'dying' refers to philosophers giving less oxygen to mundane matters. Paying more attention to the mental than the physical.

Or...the aim to attain a higher self by killing off the base instincts.

Or...living life in the moment so that there are no regrets or fears at point of death.

Or...practising arguments - so that the better man wins by killing any apparent conflicting reasons...or wrong conclusions.

Or...playing devil's advocate - pretending not to be alive to the better argument.

None of the above.

I think he is just trying to encourage his anxious young men that because they are philosophical they will be ready to die when the time comes. Not to fear it or to grieve his passing. He is setting an example of how to approach death with the right attitude.

Quoting Fooloso4

So that's why I am not so resentful, but rather am hopeful that there is something in store for those who've died-in fact, as we've long been told, something far better for the good than for the wicked.' (63c)

Perhaps that is why he sent his wife way...the tears...the lamenting...he wanted a positive message to be held in lasting memory.

[quote="Fooloso4;534838" ] If this play is to be a comedy then crying and weeping are to be dispatched.[/quote]

No. It's a tragicomedy. The tears are there in joy and despair.

Reply to Fooloso4 AH - thank you.

The next section will cover up to 67c.

Quoting Amity

I don't know but it reminded me of something else - perhaps the Stoics.

I will have something to say about this in the next section. Part of the Stoic practice of philosophy involved meditations on death.

Quoting Amity

I think he is just trying to encourage his anxious young men that because they are philosophical they will be ready to die when the time comes. Not to fear it or to grieve his passing. He is setting an example of how to approach death with the right attitude.

I agree. His arguments are rhetorical, intended to persuade, give them courage, and alleviate their fears.

Quoting Amity

If this play is to be a comedy then crying and weeping are to be dispatched.
— Fooloso4

No. It's a tragicomedy.

A tragedy is about the protagonist's downfall. But instead of the end of his life being a downfall
Socrates makes it seem as if it is a journey of hope. A happy ending and new beginning.

But I think you are right. No life is either one or the other, but a mixture.

Quoting Fooloso4

. What Socrates is trying to persuade them of is not simply that death is not so bad, but that the soul will endure and be born again. But if life is a prison, then rebirth would mean to be imprisoned once again after having been freed from life.

Quoting Fooloso4

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim?

That they're examples of the Ur-religion of the Ancient Greeks, relfected in Orphism, which was ultimately grounded in the pre-historic Indo-European mythology of the endless caravan of reincarnation and the fallen state of mortal man. Death in this context is a return to the source of life more than the ending of it all. The philosopher, being purified, being a 'good man', has nothing to fear at death because he will be 'joining the company of good men'. Philosophy is 'preparing for death' by letting go of the passions and attachments, as Socrates demonstrates by his calm demeanour.

Quoting Wayfarer

Philosophy is 'preparing for death' by letting go of the passions and attachments, as Socrates demonstrates by his calm demeanour.

And it couldn't have hurt that Socrates was over 70. All 'death prep' aside, I wonder how he would have taken the news at 35...

Reply to Tom Storm [quote=Dylan Thomas]Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.[/quote]

Reply to Wayfarer
I ask a wreath which will not crush my head.
And there is no hurry about it;
I shall have, doubtless, a boom after my funeral,
Seeing that long standing increases all things
regardless of quality.

Ezra Pound

Quoting Wayfarer

That they're examples of the Ur-religion of the Ancient Greeks,

Socrates does make use of mythologies as a means of persuasion, both stories of old and new ones he makes up, but this does not mean that he is persuaded by these stories. Regarding knowledge he demands logos not muthos, that is, not simply stories but the ability to give an account of what is said that can be defended against elenchus.

Quoting Wayfarer

Philosophy is 'preparing for death' by letting go of the passions and attachments, as Socrates demonstrates by his calm demeanour.

Yes, I think that this is part of it.

Quoting Wayfarer

That they're examples of the Ur-religion of the Ancient Greeks, relfected in Orphism, which was ultimately grounded in the pre-historic Indo-European mythology of the endless caravan of reincarnation and the fallen state of mortal man. Death in this context is a return to the source of life more than the ending of it all. The philosopher, being purified, being a 'good man', has nothing to fear at death because he will be 'joining the company of good men'. Philosophy is 'preparing for death' by letting go of the passions and attachments, as Socrates demonstrates by his calm demeanour.

I think "life as a preparation for death" is indeed the key to understanding Socrates and Plato. However, we find parallels in Egyptian culture.

The ancient Egyptians viewed death as a temporary transition into what could become everlasting life in paradise. The Egyptian outlook on death was not focused on fear as much as it was preparing and transitioning into a new prosperous afterlife.

The Egyptian Gods judged the merits of human character and deeds when deciding who was permitted to be immortal. As a result, much of human-life was centered on the hopeful attitude that if one is moral, one will live forever in a blissful afterlife. (This is somewhat comparable to Christian concepts of religion.)

So, basically, for the Egyptians – at least the wise or the initiated into wisdom traditions – life was a preparation for death. It seems to me that Greek philosophy was influenced by the Egyptian outlook. This may provide part of the explanation for the fact that the Greeks developed the philosophical system they did, whereas others whose beliefs were more similar to those of the Sumerians didn't.

The Ancient Sumerian and Egyptian Attitudes toward Death and the Afterlife

Philosophy as life-long preparation for death would be more than just about “letting go”. It would also entail the cultivation of virtues and spiritual knowledge, etc. i.e., all the elements that together constitute Platonic philosophy.

From 64a - 67c, pp. 8-12.

For me, reading this is both compelling and non-compelling.

Compelling: following the arguments put forward by Socrates to Simmias. Considering the purpose of philosophy. The importance of discovering what life and death is really all about. Philosophy as preparation for death. The questions of duality. Is it even possible to be a 'genuine' philosopher if it means turning away from body to soul ( or mind ) - to isolate oneself or by gathering in the company of like-minded souls only ?

I think not. However, I am not sure that that is what Socrates is saying. He qualifies everything with 'as far as possible'. Nevertheless, there is a focus on abstract concepts such as 'Beauty' compared to the experience of seeing things that are beautiful (65d)

'Well now, what about things of this sort, Simmias? Do we say that there is something just, or nothing?'
'Yes, we most certainly do!'
'And again, something beautiful, and good?'
'Of course.'
'Now did you ever yet see any such things with your eyes?'
'Certainly not.'

It appears that the world is to be 'seen' by thought alone. This line drawn between sense experience and rational thought - I don't find compelling. There is an interaction.

Just as in the distinction between 'pure philosophers' who have a special knowledge of truth via the reasoning soul compared to the hoi polloi 'infected' (67a) as they are by bodily concerns or pleasures.
It seems that the 'true believers' * - the intellect having been purified (67c) - alone have access to the benefits of the hereafter:

" Such are the things, I think, Simmias, that all who are rightly called lovers of knowledge must say to one another, and must believe.* Don't you agree?'
'Emphatically, Socrates.

'there's plenty of hope for one who arrives where I'm going, that there, if anywhere, he will adequately possess the object that's been our great concern in life gone by; and thus the journey now appointed for me may also be made with good hope by any other man who regards his intellect as prepared, by having been, in a manner, purified'

(67c)

This all starts from the premise, the definition of death as: 'nothing but the separation of the soul from the body' (64c); 'the release and parting of the soul from body' (67d)

What is the 'soul' ?
Is it the reasoning mind alone ?
I think, if there is such a thing, it would involve the bodily senses - even if they are not always 'true' in the sense of correct.

When does the soul attain the truth? Because plainly, whenever it sets about examining anything in company with the body, it is completely taken in by it.' 'That's true.'
'So isn't it in reasoning, if anywhere at all, that any of the things that are become manifest to it?'
'Yes'

(65c)

What are 'the things that are' or 'that which is' - things that exist ?
Concepts such as 'Beauty' don't exist by themselves, do they ?
They arise from the real world - we create such - why ? To give ourselves something to think about.
Philosophy can be just as much an impure distraction as anything else...

"Concepts such as 'Beauty' don't exist by themselves, do they ?
They arise from the real world - we create such - why ? "

This is a viewpoint that Plato is dedicated to challenge. Man is not the measure of all things. Truth is different from mere appearance. Beauty (and justice etc) do exist "by themselves" quite independently of our mere opinions. We can apprehend beauty (justice etc) by exercise of the intellect. Poetry and myth are not enough.

He believed all that and at the same time was one of the most poetic and mythically inclined philosophers of all time. Quite a contradiction.

Quoting Amity

It appears that the world is to be 'seen' by thought alone. This line drawn between sense experience and rational thought - I don't find compelling.

I've long been fascinated by culture. In this case there's 2400 years of cultural change that stands between us and Plato.

I always wonder to what extent I can put down the lens of my own worldview and see through the eyes of someone like Plato.

If you analyze what I just said, you'll see traces of what Plato has Socrates say here.
Instead of saying that sinful flesh stands in my way, I say my worldview distorts the truth.

Compare this to Kant: that there is no knowable truth beyond what I couch in the language of time and space.

Does pure thought reveal to us that there is an unexplored landscape right in front of us? What do you say?

In the Apology Socrates suggests two possibilities of what happens in death:

to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place (40c).

In the Phaedo Socrates is silent about the first possibility. He wishes to leave his friends with a message of hope, but if death is nothingness then despite the attempt to portray the end of his life as a comedy it is a tragedy. The practice of dying and being dead cannot be the practice of nothingness. That practice must take into account both possibilities. If there are rewards and punishments, one must live a just life and be rewarded rather than punished. And if there is nothing after life then one should live life for its own rewards rather than live in expectation of what may never be. Here too it is the practice of justice, for the just soul according to the Republic is the healthy soul, in proper harmony with itself.

If we heed the words of Parmenides that “out of nothing comes nothing”, then if a dead person is nothing and out of nothing comes nothing, there can be no rebirth.

But a problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not.

Simmias laughs at Socrates claim that philosophy is the practice of dying and being dead:

'Goodness, Socrates, you've made me laugh, even though I wasn't much inclined to laugh just now. l imagine that most people, on hearing that, would think it very well said of philosophers-and our own countrymen would quite agree-that they are, indeed, verging on death, and that they, at any rate, are well aware that this is what philosophers deserve to undergo.' (64b)

The only good philosopher is a dead philosopher.

Socrates defines death:

'And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by Itself, and the soul's being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? Death can't be anything else but that, can it?' (64c)

Simmias agrees with Socrates’ claim, but we should not be so quick to agree. The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion. Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The idea of the soul itself by itself will be questioned.

Socrates then proceeds to make an argument for asceticism:

And certainly Simmias, most human beings are of the opinion that the man for whom none of these things is pleasant and who doesn’t have a share of them doesn’t deserve to live. In fact, the man who thinks nothing of the pleasures that come through the body is pretty much headed for death. (65a)

It is not Socrates who thinks this, it is the opinion of most human beings. So what is the opinion of Socrates who is quite literally headed for death? We are provided with a piece of evidence near the beginning: Xantippe is there with his little boy (60a). A seventy year old man with a young son is hardly a man who eschews the pleasure of sex.

Socrates asks:

So when does the soul get in touch with truth?

Isn’t it in her act of reasoning, if anywhere, that something of the things that are becomes very clear to her? (65b-c)

Socrates now introduces his “Socratic Trinity”, the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good. (65d) But he says nothing of them, and for very good reason:

… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead. (66e)

This is at odds with the Republic and the story of knowledge of the Forms. But of course those philosophers who had knowledge of "the Forms themselves by themselves" only existed in a city made in speech. A city that is the soul writ large. An image of the soul found in an image of the city. A fine example of Plato’s poesis.

Now if the soul is reborn this is not a problem. In fact, it is an essential part of the myth of anamnesis, that is, knowledge through recollection. But if death is the end then knowledge of such things is not possible.

“Then”, said Socrates, “if these things are true, my comrade, there’s great hope that when I arrive at the end of my journey, there - if anywhere - I shall sufficiently attain what our constant business in our bygone life has been for. (67b)

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul.

The Athenians lived on our side of the Bronze Age collapse. Out of the chaotic Iron Age came Athens.

What even Plato may not know is that something amazing is dying with Socrates. Athens is never going to be the same after its recent defeat at the hands of the Spartans. This defeat precipitated his trial.

One can imagine that just as Genesis is made of pre-Bronze Age images, maybe the waves of settlers along the Aegean who became the Greeks also held onto versions of the old stories. Those stories would have been as old to Socrates as Socrates is to us.

Those stories are about immortality.

Quoting Amity

The questions of duality. Is it even possible to be a 'genuine' philosopher if it means turning away from body to soul ( or mind ) ... I think not.

I agree.

Quoting Amity

However, I am not sure that that is what Socrates is saying.

Some readers are all too quick to reject. We need 'as far as possible' to figure out what he means. This often requires going beyond isolated statements. I think it is a good practice when you come across something questionable to note it, postpone judgment, keep in mind the circumstances, and see how things develop. With the dialogues it is always important to look not only at what is said but at what is done.

Quoting Amity

He qualifies everything with 'as far as possible'.

Socrates' many qualifications are important. How far is it possible to turn away from the body? The qualification 'it seems' and its variations are frequent.


Quoting Amity

Nevertheless, there is a focus on abstract concepts such as 'Beauty' compared to the experience of seeing things that are beautiful

The Forms differ from the things of experience but they are not abstract concepts or objects of the mind. They are said to be "things themselves by themselves". This formulation is used with regard to the soul. What this means will be discussed.

Quoting Amity

What is the 'soul' ?

Good question.Socrates gets Simmias to agree before they even raise the question.

Quoting Amity

I think, if there is such a thing, it would involve the bodily senses

In that case the soul would not endure separate from the body.

Quoting Amity

What are 'the things that are' or 'that which is' - things that exist ?

The Forms.

Quoting Amity

Concepts such as 'Beauty' don't exist by themselves, do they ?

Concepts do not exist by themselves. They require thought or mind. But Beauty is not a concept. It's existence is independent of the mind. Things are beautiful to the extent they are images of Beauty itself.

Quoting Amity

Philosophy can be just as much an impure distraction as anything else...

In the Symposium Socrates says that the love of wisdom is eros, desire. Philosophy then cannot be freedom from desire if it is motivated by desire.

Quoting Cuthbert

This is a viewpoint that Plato is dedicated to challenge. Man is not the measure of all things. Truth is different from mere appearance. Beauty (and justice etc) do exist "by themselves" quite independently of our mere opinions. We can apprehend beauty (justice etc) by exercise of the intellect. Poetry and myth are not enough.

He believed all that and at the same time was one of the most poetic and mythically inclined philosophers of all time. Quite a contradiction.

A paradox rather than a contradiction, perhaps. A paradox arises when the same thing is seen from different perspectives, and thus is different to a contradiction, although due to the difficulties in the subject matter, it might be difficult to differentiate them.

Quoting Amity

It appears that the world is to be 'seen' by thought alone.

I think the key word is 'nous' -

[quote=Wikipedia; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous#Plato]Nous sometimes equated to intellect or intelligence, is a term from classical philosophy for the faculty of the human mind necessary for understanding what is true or real.[/quote]

So it's a faculty rather more specific than is described by the general term 'thought'.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the key word is 'nous'

“nous” is the contracted form of “noos” which is also used in the sense of “heart” or “soul”, i.e. that part of the self that uses a more direct or intuitive form of perception or understanding.

A useful way to look at it is:

1. eikasia or “imagination”, “image forming” related to sense perception.
2. pistis or “belief”, related to the things we perceive or imagine.
3. dianoia or “thinking”, apprehending by means of thought processes.
4. noesis or “intuition”, understanding, wisdom.

Obviously, these levels of knowledge are more or less fluid forms/functions of mind or consciousness, they are not tight compartments.

The individual nous is in turn illumined by the Cosmic Nous or Divine Mind. So, there is a continuum extending from Ultimate Reality all the way down to the lowest levels of experience or existence.

Reply to Apollodorus True, and explicated in detail in the Republic, Analogy of the Divided Line, more so than the Phaedo. However the general point of nous as 'the faculty which sees what truly is', is certainly relevant across all the dialogues.

Reply to WayfarerHowever the general point of nous as 'the faculty which sees what truly is', is certainly relevant across all the dialogues[/quote]

Correct.

Quoting Wayfarer

It appears that the world is to be 'seen' by thought alone.
— Amity

I think the key word is 'nous' -

Amity is right. The passage under discussion is not about noesis but rather dianoia, thought or reason.

Quoting Wayfarer

True, and explicated in detail in the Republic, Analogy of the Divided Line, more so than the Phaedo. However the general point of nous as 'the faculty which sees what truly is', is certainly relevant across all the dialogues.

The Phaedo tells a different story than the Republic.It is certainly useful to compare the dialogues, but what is said in one cannot be substituted for what is said in another. Each must be read on its own as a whole. It is not explicated in the Phaedo because it is not there. As Socrates said, quoted above:

… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead. (66e)

Quoting Apollodorus

The individual nous is in turn illumined by the Cosmic Nous or Divine Mind. So, there is a continuum extending from Ultimate Reality all the way down to the lowest levels of experience or existence.

In which of the dialogues does Plato say this?

Reply to Fooloso4 Quite true, but the distinctions between ‘dianoia’ and ‘noesis’ can hardly be subsumed under the single English word, ‘thought’ which is so general as to be practically meaningless in the context. So to say that ‘the real can only be discerned by thought’ doesn’t convey what depth of the ‘idea of the good’, as it is too easy to characterise it in terms of the kinds of casual thoughts that persons have from one moment to the next without any real rigour or direction.

Quoting Fooloso4

In which of the dialogues does Plato say this?

In Phaedro 97-98, the discussion of the books of Anaxagoras, where Socrates criticises Anaxagoras for assigning causes such as ‘air and aether and water and many other absurdities’, contrasting this with the ‘real causes’ which is ‘the real good’ that always ensures that things are in accordance with the good. He uses the simile of physical causes as being like the ‘bones and sinews’, which, of course, Socrates cannot act without, but at the same time, saying that the reason he’s in jail and not escaped to some other province has nothing to do with bones and sinews, but the requirement that he observes the law. Although I don’t discern there any equivalent expression to ‘cosmic law’ or ‘divine mind’, the presumption is still that things are guided by intelligence, not by merely material causes.

Reply to Fooloso4
Yes, especially in the contrast with the "bodily" perceptions, ??????? is used.
As a matter of expression in Greek, the use of "???" to nous and logos are not far away from the nouns and verbs by themselves.

Quoting Wayfarer

So to say that ‘the real can only be discerned by thought’ doesn’t convey what depth of the ‘idea of the good’,

Once again, according to the dialogue knowledge of the good can only be attained in death if at all.

'So isn't it in reasoning, if anywhere at all, that any of the things that are become manifest to it?' (65b)

Noesis is not reasoning. It is direct apprehension.

Quoting Wayfarer

...the presumption is still that things are guided by intelligence, not by merely material causes.

Right, but that is very different from what Apollodorus is claiming. I will have more to say about this section when I get there.

Quoting Valentinus

As a matter of expression in Greek, the use of "???" to nous and logos are not far away from the nouns and verbs by themselves.

Right. The prefix "???" here means by or through, thus dianoia (???????)/i] through thought and [i]dialectic through speech.

Quoting Fooloso4

Once again, according to the dialogue knowledge of the good can only be attained in death if at all.

Quoting Phaedo 64b

I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.”

“And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is.

I take this to mean that knowledge that is only ‘attained in death if at all’ is not thereby shoved off into an unknowable never-never, although it might seem like that to us. Bearing in mind the later arguments about the fate of the soul and of philosophers and ‘good men’, I think the argument is being made that the philosopher can discern the Good by power of reason as is argued in [url= http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D79d ]79a-d.

I haven't read Phaedo and it doesn't appeal to me as much as it should probably but one of Plato's arguments, The Affinity Argument for the immortality of the soul seems to have similarities with An Argument From Boredom/Frustration For Physicalism/Dualism.

The thread I provided a link to suggests that our frustrations with what we are (immaterial souls/physical bodies) will automatically lead us to desire/wish to become that we are not. So, if we really are incorporeal souls, we would yearn to be physical bodies and if we're infact physical beings, we would be desperate to be nonphysical souls. Thus, the argument is, since we're all, in a sense, "dying" to be nonphysical souls, it follows, doesn't it?, that we're in fact physical beings.

Some may respond that we could've been souls before birth in physical form and were greatly dissatified to be so and opted for life on a physical plane. The problem is, why don't we have memories of making such a decision?

[quote=Wikipedia]Persons of such a constitution [those who favor the body] will be dragged back into corporeal life, according to Socrates...they [those who favor the body] will be unable to enjoy the singular existence of the soul in death because of their constant craving for the body. These souls are finally imprisoned in another body [/quote]

Quoting Cuthbert

He [Plato] believed all that and at the same time was one of the most poetic and mythically inclined philosophers of all time. Quite a contradiction.

Yes. I am trying to keep in mind that Plato is the one who wrote this dialogue even as he draws attention to the fact that he wasn't there, apparently due to illness. He has Phaedo narrate the events as he recalls them.

Interesting that there is a reliance on someone's memory for the 'truth', or is it a myth (both ?) of what happened. Also, that Plato in choice of content and method brings his own 'worldview', including bias. The danger is recognised that it might not always coincide with that of the historical Socrates.

Quoting frank

I always wonder to what extent I can put down the lens of my own worldview and see through the eyes of someone like Plato.

Indeed, the way we view the world is coloured by our knowledge, experience and beliefs.

Quoting frank

Instead of saying that sinful flesh stands in my way, I say my worldview distorts the truth.

There is more than one worldview or perspective. Even within a single person, there are tensions and conflict. Changes throughout our lives can alter our perspectives, or not.

My intention in this thread was to concentrate only on the particular sections as we proceed through the Phaedo. Also, of course, to listen to other points of view; some might call this 'mere opinion'. Interesting to read other interpretations...
Dialogue is as important here as it was to Plato and Socrates.

Quoting frank

Does pure thought reveal to us that there is an unexplored landscape right in front of us? What do you say?

I don't know what you mean by 'pure thought'. How do you understand it as it pertains to this section of the text ?

Quoting Fooloso4

But a problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not.

That is a quote I can relate to.

Quoting Fooloso4

The only good philosopher is a dead philosopher.

:smile: Am I speaking to a ghost ?

Quoting Fooloso4

The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion. Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The idea of the soul itself by itself will be questioned.

So, Plato in giving us an understanding of who Socrates was, gives several versions of what he actually thinks ? Talk about getting to the 'truth'... :roll:

Quoting Fooloso4

This is at odds with the Republic and the story of knowledge of the Forms. But of course those philosophers who had knowledge of "the Forms themselves by themselves" only existed in a city made in speech. A city that is the soul writ large. An image of the soul found in an image of the city. A fine example of Plato’s poesis.

Ideas of the soul - of afterlife - of life and death - all 'images' or 'imagination' or mere speculation as in a story...?

Quoting Fooloso4

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul.

Yes, it comes back to the story of hope that Socrates is giving to his audience. Does he actually believe what he is saying, or is it simply a matter of consolation...
If Socrates wants to inspire and for philosophy to continue, then he must offer hope in the very act of practising philosophy.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think it is a good practice when you come across something questionable to note it, postpone judgment, keep in mind the circumstances, and see how things develop. With the dialogues it is always important to look not only at what is said but at what is done.

Understood.
I can postpone final judgement but not at the time of my reading and questioning.
I assess as I go...
This dialogue continues to intrigue and challenge me as I try to focus only on a particular section of text.Quoting Fooloso4

The Forms differ from the things of experience but they are not abstract concepts or objects of the mind. They are said to be "things themselves by themselves". This formulation is used with regard to the soul. What this means will be discussed.

Thanks for clarification. Look forward to seeing what 'things themselves by themselves' actually means.

Quoting Fooloso4

In that case the soul would not endure separate from the body.

Correct.

Quoting Fooloso4

But Beauty is not a concept. It's existence is independent of the mind. Things are beautiful to the extent they are images of Beauty itself

OK. I still don't understand this...I will wait...

Quoting Fooloso4

In the Symposium Socrates says that the love of wisdom is eros, desire. Philosophy then cannot be freedom from desire if it is motivated by desire.

Indeed, I think the importance lies in the quantity and quality of desire.
Philosophy as a human enterprise can be as 'infected' by distractions or obsessions as much as the body. At death, desire is lost.
I guess, even if you believe in an afterlife...depending on what you think has been promised by 'being good' or temperate, it will have been satisfied.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the key word is 'nous' - a faculty rather more specific than is described by the general term 'thought'.

Right now, I am only reading this particular English translation.
That there are more ways of interpreting and understanding I have no doubt.

Informative to read the responses by:
@Fooloso4 https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535610
@Valentinus https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535632
@Fooloso4 https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535646

Quoting Apollodorus

I think "life as a preparation for death" is indeed the key to understanding Socrates and Plato. However, we find parallels in Egyptian culture.

Egyptian influence on early Minoan art is generally accepted. But there are also some interesting parallels between the Egyptian cult of the Mother Goddess and similar developments in Minoan culture. Obviously, Crete was just across the sea and there were trade and cultural links between the Minoans and the Egyptians.

Similar links also later developed between the Greek mainland and Egypt, with extensive Egyptian influence on Greek art in the 7th century BC. And then we have literary accounts of Pythagoras going to Egypt in search of secret knowledge which he apparently obtained from Egyptian temple priests.

“[Pythagoras] was also initiated into all the mysteries of Byblos and Tyre, and in the sacred function performed in many parts of Syria […] After gaining all he could from the Phoenician mysteries, he found that they had originated from the sacred rites of Egypt […] This led him to hope that in Egypt itself he might find monuments of erudition still more genuine, beautiful and divine. Therefore following the advice of his teacher Thales, he left, as soon as possible, through the agency of some Egyptian sailors […] and at length happily landed on the Egyptian coast […] Here in Egypt he frequented all the temples with the greatest diligence, and most studious research […] After twelve years, about the fifty-sixth year of his age, he returned to Samos …” - Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras

Quoting Fooloso4

Right, but that is very different from what Apollodorus is claiming.

How is that "very different"? As I said before, Plato is best interpreted in the Platonic tradition of Plotinus and others. If you choose a different standpoint then it might help to let us know what it is.

Quoting Wayfarer

Bearing in mind the later arguments about the fate of the soul and of philosophers and ‘good men’,

Yes, we will have to look a those arguments and whether they succeed or fail. This is why I ended my last reading this way:

Quoting Fooloso4

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul.

Quoting Amity

So, Plato in giving us an understanding of who Socrates was, gives several versions of what he actually thinks ? Talk about getting to the 'truth'...

In the Second Letter Plato says that the Socrates of the dialogues is made "young and beautiful", which can also be translated as "new and noble".

Quoting Amity

Ideas of the soul - of afterlife - of life and death - all 'images' or 'imagination' or mere speculation as in a story...?

Reading and thinking along we become involved in speculation, but Plato provides the images and stories.

Quoting Amity

Does he actually believe what he is saying, or is it simply a matter of consolation...

Before deciding whether we think he believes what he is saying, we have to figure out what it is he is saying. There may be more to it than at first appears.

Quoting Amity

If Socrates wants to inspire and for philosophy to continue, then he must offer hope in the very act of practising philosophy.

Yes! He will have much more to say about this.

Quoting Amity

At death, desire is lost.

The irony is that on the one hand the desire will be fulfilled, one will be able to see the truth unencumbered by the body. On the other, if philosophy is the desire for wisdom rather than its possession there would be no philosophizing in Hades.

Quoting Apollodorus

Plato is best interpreted in the Platonic tradition of Plotinus and others.

Platonism is an impediment to understanding Plato. You end up attributing things to Plato that are nowhere to be found in the dialogues.

Quoting Apollodorus

If you choose a different standpoint then it might help to let us know what it is.

It is not a matter of a standpoint but of letting the dialogues stand on their own. In the Phaedrus Socrates says about a written composition:

Every part must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work. (264c)

The dialogue should be read as a whole, with each part having a function within that whole.

If you want to read Plotinus you would do well to read Plato, but not the other way around.

Quoting Fooloso4

Platonism is an impediment to understanding Plato. You end up attributing things to Plato that are nowhere to be found in the dialogues.

Not necessarily. What kind of things might that be? Wouldn't an anti-Platonic approach also lead to misattributions or misinterpretations and perhaps even more so?

Philosophical systems do evolve over time. However, Platonism is generally consistent with Plato's writings, that's why it's called Platonism, and it does help in understanding uncertain or ambiguous points. Obviously, concepts that are unambiguous and crystal clear need no reference to external sources. But where this is not the case, it can do no harm to see what other Platonic writers have to say.

As I said in my previous post, it may even be helpful to refer to the wider cultural context, including non-Greek (e.g. Egyptian) influence, to better understand the worldview of Ancient Greek philosophers.

Quoting Apollodorus

Not necessarily. What kind of things might that be? Wouldn't an anti-Platonic approach also lead to misattributions or and perhaps even more so?

You are confusing terminology. Platonism and Platonic are not the same. "Anti-Platonic" would presumably mean against Plato. The result may well be misattributions or misinterpretations.

Quoting Apollodorus

Philosophical systems do evolve over time.

The dialogues are not a philosophical system and do not evolve. How the dialogues are read and interpreted change over time. The reliability of any of those interpretations can only be evaluated in light of the dialogues themselves.

Quoting Apollodorus

Platonism is generally consistent with Plato's writings, that's why it's called Platonism

This is simply wrong. It is called Platonism because it was influenced by Plato. It is not consistent with his writings. Nowhere in Plato do we find your assertion about the individual mind being illumined by the cosmic or divine Mind and the rest.

Quoting Amity

always wonder to what extent I can put down the lens of my own worldview and see through the eyes of someone like Plato. — frank


Indeed, the way we view the world is coloured by our knowledge, experience and beliefs.

In this case, there's a relatively profound change in worldview.

We can try to put ourselves there. Note that the Greeks did move between realism and idealism much the same way we do, but even the most materialistic people of his day still allowed divinity of some kind.

Quoting Amity

My intention in this thread was to concentrate only on the particular sections as we proceed through the Phaedo. Also, of course, to listen to other points of view; some might call this 'mere opinion'. Interesting to read other interpretations...
Dialogue is as important here as it was to Plato and Socrates.

And it may be that I need to cut out. Images from Phaedo have gone deep into my thoughts since I first read it.

So I'm like, when are you guys going to relate Wittgenstein to what he's saying about the transcendent vantage point?
Maybe later.

Quoting frank

Images from Phaedo have gone deep into my thoughts since I first read it.

What kind of images ?
When did you first read it?
What was your worldview then related to philosophy, religion...? What is it now ?

Quoting frank

We can try to put ourselves there.

We could. How would you do that relative to the Phaedo?
Other than do a heap of research, we can read and discuss the text as a glimpse of a certain worldview as seen and portrayed by Plato.

Quoting frank

it may be that I need to cut out

Why would you think that ? Is it too difficult to read again with a fresh pair of eyes?
Perhaps you know enough already and wish to explore further.
Clearly, we are all at different levels of understanding. Some might be frustrated at content, interpretation and the process. So be it.

As far as I am aware, the purpose of the thread is to read and discuss Plato's Phaedo.

Quoting frank

So I'm like, when are you guys going to relate Wittgenstein to what he's saying about the transcendent vantage point?
Maybe later.

So, I'm like, when are you going to realise what @Fooloso4 is attempting to do here ?

I note you ask questions of me but haven't answered mine:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535717

Quoting Amity

I don't know what you mean by 'pure thought'. How do you understand it as it pertains to this section of the text ?

Quoting Amity

So, I'm like, when are you going to realise what Fooloso4 is attempting to do here ?

I think that was a fuck-off. Fair enough.

Quoting Amity

I don't know what you mean by 'pure thought'. How do you understand it as it pertains to this section of the text ?

Ask Fooloso4.

Quoting frank

I think that was a fuck-off. Fair enough.

If I had meant to say, "Fuck off", I would have. You wouldn't have to think about it.
Your interpretation of my post as such, combined with an unwillingness to answer questions is telling. I'll end it here. For now.

@frank

I would like for you to stick around. This tread was started in part because of things you said about Plato and the soul.

Quoting frank

Images from Phaedo have gone deep into my thoughts since I first read it.

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again. I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. Certainly I do not the Phaedo now the same way I did when I first read it.

Quoting Fooloso4

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again

I agree. That was behind my questions re @frank 's deep ( ? ingrained ) images and any changing worldview.

Quoting Fooloso4

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different.

It is the same for me, with any book or film there is always something I missed first time round.

However, some may have fixed views on what the text means.
Responses can be ready-made. Re-heat in microwave for 3 minutes.

Quoting Fooloso4

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again. I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. Certainly I do not the Phaedo now the same way I did when I first read it.

I am re-reading it. I've read it many times.

Reply to frank

Did I misunderstand you when you said you "need to cut out".

Quoting Fooloso4

Did I misunderstand you when you said you "need to cut out".

Uh, carry on. :cool:

Quoting Fooloso4

This is simply wrong. It is called Platonism because it was influenced by Plato. It is not consistent with his writings. Nowhere in Plato do we find your assertion about the individual mind being illumined by the cosmic or divine Mind and the rest.

Plato and his disciples didn’t call themselves “Platonists” or their system “Platonism” so the designation is irrelevant. What matters is that this was a living tradition that was transmitted orally from master to disciple for centuries after Plato. Its representatives didn’t think they were just “influenced” by Plato, they believed and had reasons to believe that they followed Plato in all his main teachings.

It is clear from Plato’s writings that he believed in an eternal “Good” which is the source of all ideas, both in the higher world of realities and in the lower world of appearances. The immortal aspect of man, soul or spirit, is obviously connected with the Good, that’s why the philosopher can ascend or reascend to the Good.

Plotinus and others identified the Good with the One, etc. which they had every right to do. That doesn’t mean that they “misinterpreted” Plato or that they made things up just for the sake of it.

Quoting Fooloso4

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different.

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it? What happens if following the closure of the discussion you decide to find "new and different things" in the texts?

Quoting Apollodorus

Plato and his disciples didn’t call themselves “Platonists” or their system “Platonism” so the designation is irrelevant.

And yet that was the designation you used.

Quoting Apollodorus

What matters is that this was a living tradition that was transmitted orally from master to disciple for centuries after Plato.

That may be what matters to you. What matters to me is the dialogues themselves. I have no interest a Platonist cult.

Quoting Apollodorus

Its representatives didn’t think they were just “influenced” by Plato, they believed and had reasons to believe that they followed Plato in all his main teachings.

Well, if what you claimed is an example of following his main teachings then they thought wrong.

Quoting Apollodorus

It is clear from Plato’s writings ...

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

Quoting Apollodorus

I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different.
— Fooloso4

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it? What happens if following the closure of the discussion you decide to find "new and different things" in the texts?

It does not make it pointless. It simply means that there is more there then I have seen. It is not a matter of "deciding" to find something new and different things. If they are there to be found I consider myself fortunate to have found them and revise my interpretation accordingly.

Quoting Fooloso4

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

That's precisely why I pointed out that in the Greek philosophical tradition, teachings were transmitted orally.

Even if there is no "treatise" by Plato, certain core teachings must be acknowledged and they have been acknowledged, both by Platonic philosophers like Plotinus and by modern scholars. If you don't acknowledge that, then you might as well throw the book out of the window and forget the discussion.

On the other hand and as I said before, if you do want to have a discussion of Plato then it would be helpful to state what you think Plato's core teaching are or are not, and then adduce evidence for or against as the case may be. This would be a sensible procedure IMO.

Quoting Apollodorus

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)
— Fooloso4

That's precisely why I pointed out that in the Greek philosophical tradition, teachings were transmitted orally.

Oh. really. You said:

Quoting Apollodorus

It is clear from Plato’s writings ...

It cannot clear from his writings if he did not write what he actually thought about such things.

Has an oral tradition ever been authenticated?

Quoting Apollodorus

Even if there is no "treatise" by Plato, certain core teachings must be acknowledged ...

The core teaching of Plato is not in the form of a doctrine. He teaches those who are thoughtful and perspicacious enough how to philosophize. To the careful reader he does not provide answers, although there are plenty of things he says that can be latched onto as answers. This dynamic plays out in the dialogue, as we shall see.

Quoting Apollodorus

... if you do want to have a discussion of Plato ...

I am not going to allow you to dictate how I will proceed in this thread. I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose.

Socrates wraps up his defense by saying:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

Cebes breaks in:

Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soil is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.(70a)

Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?” (70a-b)

Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such was as this”. (70c)

… do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.' (70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. The living come from the living. The argument that life comes from death requires a soul that does not come to be or die. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents.

Socrates now shifts from living things to beauty and ugly, just and unjust, larger and smaller. It should be noted that he mentions justice and beauty but not the good. According to the argument, doing good would result in doing bad. (70e)

In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b)

The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?' (72 b-d)

Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. But that would be impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before being born in this human form; so in this way too, it appears that the soul is something deathless.' (72e-73a)

Two points to be noted here. Socrates just went through this long argument from opposites, how life comes from death, but if the soul is deathless then it could not come to be or become again from its opposite.

Second, note the qualification: “if it is true”. Simmias does not share Cebes enthusiasm. He does not place his hope in the possibility that it might be true. He wants to be reminded of the demonstrations that it is true. There is a play here between recollection and remembering.

'One beautiful argument,' said Cebes, 'is that when people are questioned, and if the questions are well put, they state the truth about everything for themselves-and yet unless knowledge and a correct account were present within them, they'd be unable to do this; thus, if one takes them to diagrams or anything else of that sort, one has there the plainest evidence that this is so.' (73b)

He is referring to the demonstration in the Meno where a slave without any education is able to solve a complex geometric problem. Cebes mentions but seems to fail to recognize the importance of Socrates’ “well put” questions. Without them the slave would have never “recollected” the solution. The irony here should not go unnoticed. An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different. There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge.

Socrates breaks in:

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly
convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Socrates now shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”. (74a).

'But still, it is from those equals, different as they are from that equal, that you have thought of and got the knowledge of it?' (74c)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is questionable.

'Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal. But Socrates’ concern is not simply with the equal:

Because our present argument concerns the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and just and holy, no less than the equal; in fact, as I say, it concerns everything on which we set this seal, "what it is", in the questions we ask and in the answers we give. (75d)

Can the earlier argument for opposites be reconciled with “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself”? What each is itself does not allow for its opposite.

As Socrates wraps up this argument we should not overlook a difficulty that is introduced but only developed later:

Just as sure as these beings are, so also our soul is (76e)

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away.

Quoting Fooloso4

I am not going to allow you to dictate how I will proceed in this thread. I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose.

You can proceed any way you wish. I don't care and I'm not stopping you. I'm simply pointing out that there are major inconsistencies in your statements.

Like all other philosophers, Plato naturally preferred to convey his teachings orally, from master to disciple as had always been the practice. Hence he was reportedly reluctant to write down anything. Whatever he did write down is obviously incomplete and ambiguous and may be interpreted in many different ways.

There is, however, a scholarly consensus as to the core teachings that can be extracted from the available texts. You seem to deny both the scholarly consensus and the Platonic tradition itself.

If your claim that "He teaches those who are thoughtful and perspicacious enough how to philosophize. To the careful reader he does not provide answers, although there are plenty of things he says that can be latched onto as answers", then you can read into the dialogues anything you like and you don't need a discussion.

Since you have already decided to reject both the Platonic tradition and the scholarly consensus, the conclusions cannot be anything but your personal opinion, in which case you might as well state from the beginning what that opinion is.

Quoting Apollodorus

There is, however, a scholarly consensus as to the core teachings that can be extracted from the available texts.

Quoting Apollodorus

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it?

I must intervene here because quite simply you are spoiling the thread with your focus on @Fooloso4.
It is not the case that the discussion is pointless. Perhaps it is to you but not to me, or anyone else who simply wants to read Plato's Phaedo.

Even if there is a degree of scholarly consensus, that is beside the point as far as I am concerned.
I am here to read and think for myself first and foremost. Then to write and exchange thoughts about the extract in question.
As mentioned previously, I had wanted to do this without recourse to secondary sources.
A change for me.
However, given the turn of events, I looked up one of the SEP entries concerning Plato.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/

Quoting SEP article on Plato

what we often receive from Plato is a few key ideas together with a series of suggestions and problems about how those ideas are to be interrogated and deployed.

Readers of a Platonic dialogue are drawn into thinking for themselves about the issues raised, if they are to learn what the dialogue itself might be thought to say about them. Many of his works therefore give their readers a strong sense of philosophy as a living and unfinished subject (perhaps one that can never be completed) to which they themselves will have to contribute.

All of Plato's works are in some way meant to leave further work for their readers, but among the ones that most conspicuously fall into this category are: Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides.

[my bolds]

Quoting Fooloso4

I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose.

@Fooloso4 has patiently explained his approach a few times now.
It works for me and, hopefully, for others reading along.
Please respect the spirit, allow a 'thinking for ourselves' without any further side-tracking, thanks.

Quoting Apollodorus

Plato naturally preferred to convey his teachings orally

We know nothing of his oral teachings. I asked you to provide authentication of any oral teaching. You could not.

Quoting Apollodorus

You seem to deny both the scholarly consensus and the Platonic tradition itself.

I deny that there is a scholarly consensus. The fact that you think there is shows that you really do not know what is going on today.

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others.

Quoting Apollodorus

then you can read into the dialogues anything you like and you don't need a discussion.

It is evident that you have not been reading what I have written and have not checked it against the text. You have not made even one specific textual comment on anything I have said. Show me where what I have said cannot be confirmed by the text. I asked you to provide textual evidence for your claim but you have not been able to. Instead of point to Plato's texts you cast about elsewhere.

Reply to Amity

Thank you.

Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers,often of the Christian variety.

Reply to Amity Reply to Apollodorus

Indeed, Apollodorus comments on the proceedings are unhelpful and unwelcome.

Quoting Fooloso4

I deny that there is a scholarly consensus.

This pleases me immensely; A consensus would make this thread mere scholasticism.

That's Aristotle, not Plato...

Reply to Banno

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus. Each year, after all this time, hundreds of books and articles are published on Plato. One would think that if a consensus existed none of that would be necessary.

Quoting Fooloso4

There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge.

An interesting wedge...

I have long found the discussion of recollection unconvincing; but this shows how it might have seemed plausible to our Greek companions.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus.

Of course.

There is an obvious methodological error in
Quoting Apollodorus

if you do want to have a discussion of Plato then it would be helpful to state what you think Plato's core teaching are or are not, and then adduce evidence for or against as the case may be.

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it.

Quoting Fooloso4

I asked you to provide textual evidence for your claim but you have not been able to.

Of course I have. I said:

"The individual nous is in turn illumined by the Cosmic Nous or Divine Mind. So, there is a continuum extending from Ultimate Reality all the way down to the lowest levels of experience or existence"

To which you said:

"In which of the dialogues does Plato say this?"

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts. But here is the text from The Republic 509D-513E if you insist:

"And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind [...]

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence [...]

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?[...]

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power."

After which he introduces the line that divides the phenomenal from the noumenal or the physical from the spiritual as I pointed out in my earlier post which you also chose to ignore.

What the text is saying is that above the phenomenal world or world of appearances is the intelligible or noumenal world which is illumined by the Good (ton Agathon). The Good is also the source of all ideas that constitute the intelligible world, copies of which make up the phenomenal world. In other words, the whole of existence, including soul, originates in the Good and is bathed in its light just as the physical world is bathed in the light of the sun.

Very simple, really. I don't know on what basis you are denying it. You may have a reason but you refuse to tell us what it is.

He's not going to stop. We'll have to ask fdrake to help.

Reply to frank We could try appealing to his better nature...
@Apollodorus?

Your objections having been duly noted, please allow the thread to continue without obtrusive interjection.

Reply to Banno I've already stated a few times I'm not stopping anyone and I don't care. If you're saying I'm not allowed to respond to posts on this thread, that's fine. Keep your thread. I don't need it.

Quoting Fooloso4

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away.

Gotta love a cliffhanger...

Quoting Apollodorus

I'm not stopping anyone

Yeah, you are. I'd like a clear run at the dialogue; your interjections detract from that for me. It seems I am not the only one who thinks so. By all means, start another thread, or wait until we complete the reading; but this is a thread specifically set up to work through the text under @Fooloso4's tutelage.

Let it be.

Quoting Apollodorus

I don't care

Obviously disingenuous, since you continue to post.

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d).

My inclination is to say that learning the use of words such as "equal" is exactly learning the concept of equality. On this account there is nothing more to understanding what it is for two things to be equal than to be able to use the word "equal" with success.

For Plato, and others, there is a something more... a reification fo the use of "equal"; making it a thing and necessitating that being able to use the word requires familiarity with that thing.

I hadn't appreciated the similarities between Plato's recollections and, say, Kant's synthetic a priori.

SO we have here the beginnings of a tradition that runs right through to Chomsky's universal grammar.

Quoting Banno

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it.

The same occurred to me but decided not to give him something else to turn into an extended rant about Marxism and liberals.

Quoting Banno

My inclination is to say that learning the use of words such as "equal" is exactly learning the concept of equality.

Not arguing with you here, just asking, if you were to teach a child the use of of "equal", how would you do that?

Would you show them two equal sized objects? Something like that? Hope that they get it and are able to abstract from what you show them?

Endpoint being: inquiry may involve examples. An example is not a reification of anything.

Then we could talk about Meno's Paradox, when Fooloso4 is ready.

Reply to Fooloso4 Understood. Standing down.

Reply to frank "The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same - both are red; despite their being quite different shapes. Both are heavy, despite being made of very different things. So the process is not recollection, but recognising and copying a pattern in the use of a word.

Quoting Apollodorus

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts.

Actually I read it. And I responded. It is your fault for not reading other people's posts.

Quoting Apollodorus

The Republic 509D-513E

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind

Quoting Fooloso4

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind

Oooo I can't resist...

If one assumes a cosmic mind, anything might count as evidence for it.

Quoting Banno

Gotta love a cliffhanger...

I would throw in some sex but Socrates already said the philosopher has not interest. Although, as I mentioned, at seventy years old he had a young son.

Quoting Banno

The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same -

I thought you were teaching them "equal"

Reply to Fooloso4 Mmmm. Young men tend not to be my fancy, being basically CIS hetro.

Reply to frank IS it that different that the process is dissimilar?

Quoting Banno

k
IS it that different that the process is dissimilar?

I guess I'm just wondering why you changed it from equal to same.

Quoting Banno

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d).

I will be addressing his eagerness to agree in my next section. As I see it, it has little or nothing to do with the strength of the argument.

Reply to frank A teacher chunks the lesson - building on previous understanding. Learn how to use "red" and "Heavy", then "the same", then "equal".

SO force of habit.

Reply to Fooloso4 :up:

Quoting Banno

For Plato, and others, there is a something more... a reification fo the use of "equal"

In my opinion, which is certainly not original, the Forms are themselves images rather than, as he says, what things are images of. But that is a discussion for another time.

[quote="Banno;536063]A teacher chunks the lesson - building on previous understanding. Learn how to use "red" and "Heavy", then "the same", then "equal".[/quote]

Oh, I see. Previous understanding. :naughty:

But yeah, that's why I was asking, I know you're a teacher and we're talking about inquiry.

Quoting Fooloso4

Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers, often of the Christian variety.

I will acknowledge that I have been much influenced by Christian Platonism, in the context of which Socrates and Plato have been described as ‘Christian before Christ’. But as I’ve also been influenced by Indic philosophical teachings, I’m aware of overtones of non-dualism that can sometimes can be discerned (Thomas McEviilly's book The Shape of Ancient Thought is a rich source of insight into those). But in either case, I don’t see those influences as necessarily in invidious. In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age. (What did he really mean by 'soul'?)

That said, I too am dubious of injecting phrases such as 'cosmic mind' into the discussion or the interpretation. But on the other hand, as I've already stated, I think that the Greek term 'nous' has to be considered throughout, as it has nuances which are completely foreign to the modern use of 'intellect'.

Reply to Wayfarer So, to be sure, nous is here translated as soul?

Edit: Wayfarer avoided answering... @Fooloso4?

Reply to Wayfarer Plato was like the science of the day around 200 AD. Christianity absorbed it much as the Catholic Church gives pre-approval to what scientists come up with today

Christianity could have been all sorts of things It's Platonic because it has Plato stuck in one of its central columns.

To place Phaedo in the context of religion vs science isn't helpful. Idealism vs realism, yes.

Quoting Banno

So, to be sure, nous is here translated as soul?

This is a digression, but I’m very interested in the later conception of ‘the rational soul’. Very briefly - just as the Ideas of things are their real essence, so the capacity of the mind to grasp the ideas is its higher aspect. The bodily senses receive the physical shape, but nous perceives the Idea or the principle, immediately through intellectual apprehension, not through the intermediary of sense. This became much more developed in the scholastic hylomorphism of Aquinas and others, but the seeds of the idea are visible going back to the Parmenides. It is this conception of the rationality of nous that distinguishes the Western philosophical tradition most strongly from the Asiatic (as Russell remarks in his chapter on Pythagoras.)

As I said, a digression or perhaps a footnote, but I really don’t want to sidetrack this thread and henceforth will try and confine my comments to the specific passages under consideration.

Quoting Wayfarer

In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age.

The following from my last posted reading:

Quoting Fooloso4

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

Quoting frank

Idealism vs realism, yes.

I think this is anachronistic.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think this is anachronistic.

Why do you say that? Democritus was his elder.

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. The terms were not used and do not fit. What we take to be the real world was said to be an image of the Forms. The Forms are independent of the human mind.

Quoting Fooloso4

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

I don't agree that his intent is to demystify. Typical modernist secular analysis, making Plato safe for the secular academy. (We find exact parallels in the 'naturalisation of Buddhism' which likewise attempts to strip the entire tradition of any suggestion of a life beyond.)

All of the following arguments - the argument from opposites, the cyclical argument, the affinity argument - are arguments for the immortality of the soul.

There are two kinds of existences: (a) the visible world that we perceive with our senses, which is human, mortal, composite, unintelligible, and always changing, and (b) the invisible world of Forms that we can access solely with our minds, which is divine, deathless, intelligible, non-composite, and always the same (78c-79a, 80b).

Which, as I say, is the template for the development of hylomorphic dualism, notwithstanding Aristotle's revision of the nature of the Forms.

So, the rationale for a life of moderation, justice and courage, is so as to act in accordance with the Good. As has already been stated on the section on death, the philosopher has less reason to fear death, because he will find himself in 'the company of good men'. Added to which, the soul is most likely to attain knowledge when apart from the body:

Quoting Phaedro 65c

it [the soul] thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.

Demystify that!

Quoting Fooloso4

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. The terms were not used and do not fit. What we take to be the real world was said to be an image of the Forms. The Forms are independent of the human mind.

Yes, it's ontological idealism.

Reply to frank Philosophy by name-calling.

Quoting Banno

Philosophy by name-calling.

It was 2400 years ago. Cut him some slack.

Quoting frank

It was 2400 years ago.

Yep, hence the absurdity of applying terms invented in the interim. Like calling a shield a type of anti-missile defence, it's too easy. It's anachronistic.

Quoting Banno

Yep, hence the absurdity of applying terms invented in the interim. Like calling a shield a type of anti-missile defence, it's too easy. It's anachronistic.

Is there some impending confusion we're trying to avoid?

Reply to frank Yep; assuming that Plato was an idealist. Quoting Fooloso4

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist.

Let's read the case.

Reply to Banno
Ok. The SEP says he was an idealist. Let's see if they got it wrong.

Quoting frank

The SEP says he was an idealist.

Where? Not in the article on Plato. The idealism article claims him, but with reservations.

Detail.

Quoting Banno

Where? Not in the article on Plato. The idealism article claims him, but with reservations.

In the Idealism article.

My point was that his views can be contrasted to those of contemporary materialists like Democritus.

If you don't want to call it idealism when you're considering that contrast, that's fine. Call it what you like.

Quoting frank

Yes, it's ontological idealism.

I think it’s better described as objective idealism. That is, Ideas or Forms are real, in that they’re not dependent on your or my mind, but they’re only graspable by a rational intelligence. Consider Pythagoras’ theorem as a paradigmatic example. (In my view, it's the mainstream tradition of Western philosophy.)

Quoting Wayfarer

I think it’s better described as objective idealism.

That works.

Think I'll just call him "Plato".

Quoting Wayfarer

I don't agree that his intent is to demystify.

Here are the quoted terms from 69c-d in context and bolded, starting with what I quoted above with a break in the paragraph. It is one paragraph though without a break.

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier.

And it looks as if these people who initiated our mythic rites weren't a bunch of bunglers but spoke with a genuine hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever arrives in Hades ignorant of the mysteries and uninitiated will lie in Muck, but he who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with gods.

The purification is as he identifies it, moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness.

78c-79a, 80b)

In due time.

Quoting Wayfarer

Demystify that!

Socrates has done it for me, but I do not want to get ahead of myself.

Quoting frank

Yes, it's ontological idealism.

Neither term existed then.

Reply to Fooloso4 So, what do you mean when you say Socrates 'demystifies' these virtues etc?

Quoting Amity

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.

That release on the last day of his life is important. The inclusion of Xanthippe gives sharp relief to her charge that one last party is planned with his friends. The friends' concern about the subject of death is mixed up with the realization that they won't have Socrates to animate them any longer.

Pardon the lateness of my reply. I am working in meatspace presently so I will participate in a delayed fashion.

Quoting Fooloso4

Neither term existed then.

I'm trying to understand why that's significant to you. No one called Plotinus an early Neoplatonist at the time. We call him that for our own convenience. Is there a danger of confusion there? Maybe, but the convenience has proven more significant.

Plato's views are called idealism by professionals. So I'm just curious more than anything. Why the objection?

Quoting frank

In the Idealism article.

The article continues:

"Although we have just referred to Plato, the term “idealism” became the name for a whole family of positions in philosophy only in the course of the eighteenth century."

Reply to frank Neoplatonism is a much more specific term than "objective idealism" (which is at its most specific associated with Hegel) not to mention "idealism"; an even less specific term.

Quoting Janus

Neoplatonism is a much more specific term than "objective idealism".

It really isn't. Look into it.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think it’s better described as objective idealism. That is, Ideas or Forms are real, in that they’re not dependent on your or my mind, but they’re only graspable by a rational intelligence.

Why call it idealism at all? Is everything that is grasped by a rational intelligence a form of idealism? Is mathematics a form of idealism?

Quoting Fooloso4

The article continues:

"Although we have just referred to Plato, the term “idealism” became the name for a whole family of positions in philosophy only in the course of the eighteenth century."

Yes. I'm going to just note that your objection comes with no support understandable to me and move on.

Reply to frank
In regards to the Enneads by Plotinus, that book is an ordering of reality in relationship to the One. It is a system that attempts to be consistent to itself. The semantics and concern are much different than the character of Plato's Dialogues where the conversation goes where it goes.

Quoting Wayfarer

So, what do you mean when you say Socrates 'demystifies' these virtues etc?

... moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier.

It is this kind of purification that is needed for those who arrive in Hades.

Reply to frank Better if you tell me why you think it isn't.

Quoting Valentinus

In regards to the Enneads by Plotinus, that book is an ordering of reality in relationship to the One. It is a system that attempts to be consistent to itself. The semantics and concern are much different than the character of Plato's Dialogues where the conversation goes where it goes.

I'm aware of that. I probably should have used Gnosticism as an example of the freedom we give ourselves in baptizing ideologies.

Quoting Janus

Better if you tell me why you think it isn't.

What?

Quoting frank

I'm trying to understand why that's significant to you.

As a general interpretive principle I think it best to minimize the use of anachronistic terminology.

Quoting Fooloso4

As a general interpretive principle I think it best to minimize the use of anachronistic terminology.

Sure.

Quoting frank

Better if you tell me why you think it isn't. — Janus


What?

Quoting Janus

Neoplatonism is a much more specific term than "objective idealism"

Better if you tell me why 'neoplatonism' is not a more specific term than 'objective idealism', not to mention 'idealism'. If 'objective Idealism' is a specific term then it refers to Hegel's philosophy; if it is used to refer to Plato's (completely different) range of ideas as found in the dialogues, then the term has lost its specificity. Is there controversy about what the term 'neoplatonism' refers to?

Quoting Janus

Is there controversy about what the term 'neoplatonism' refers to?

No controversy. The term picks out philosophers over a 1200 year span and multiple cultural settings.

Quoting frank

Plato's views are called idealism by professionals.

There are different schools of thought. There are also many scholars who avoid the use of anachronistic terminology. The idea is, to the extent it is possible, to understand an author on his own terms using his own terminology.

Quoting Fooloso4

Why call it idealism at all? Is everything that is grasped by a rational intelligence a form of idealism? Is mathematics a form of idealism?

Mathematical Platonism is, and it’s strongly rejected by many modern philosophers on those very grounds. I agree that Plato would of course not have used the term ‘idealism’, but practically all synoptic accounts of Western philosophy trace what later becomes ‘idealism’ back to Plato’s theory of Ideas, for reasons that ought to be pretty obvious.

//edit @Janus - as to the matter of classifying types, Hegel’s is generally classified as absolute idealism. Strangely enough, if you do a random search on ‘objective idealism’, one of the first name that comes up is C S Pierce. However that is again another issue - a ‘meta-philosophical’ one, you might say.

Quoting Fooloso4

There are different schools of thought. There are also many scholars who avoid the use of anachronistic terminology. The idea is, to the extent it is possible, to understand an author on his own terms using his own terminology.

Do you want to continue this here or start a different thread?

Quoting Fooloso4

As a general interpretive principle I think it best to minimize the use of anachronistic terminology.

Yep.

It really is that simple.

Reply to Wayfarer The terms 'absolute idealism' and 'objective idealism' being polemically opposed to relative or subjective idealism are synonymous, as I understand them. Both terms are definitely applied predominately to Hegel.

I don't deny that Plato's philosophy could, with a bit of judicious massaging, be understood as a form of objective idealism, but I think the term is correctly applied to monistic thinkers who reject any kind of transcendence, or noumenon, which Plato's philosophy (and Kant's, which Hegel was explicitly working against) does not.

I think @Fooloso4 is right to reject the use of what can only be considered anachronistic, unnecessary and unhelpful terminology. Trying to equate Plato's philosophy with neoplatonism would be no different than trying to understand Kant in terms of neokantianism, that is it would be bound to mislead.

Quoting Valentinus

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.
— Amity

That release on the last day of his life is important. The inclusion of Xanthippe gives sharp relief to her charge that one last party is planned with his friends. The friends' concern about the subject of death is mixed up with the realization that they won't have Socrates to animate them any longer.

Pardon the lateness of my reply. I am working in meatspace presently so I will participate in a delayed fashion.

Your reply is most welcome - indeed any considered replies and comments about the text are - no matter when they arrive on the scene.

The themes of pain/pleasure - chains/release - body/soul - fear/desire - bad/good continue throughout. *
From the OP:
Quoting Fooloso4

As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories.

Later: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534374
Quoting Fooloso4

a comedy or tragedy
— Fooloso4
Both ?
— Amity

Yes. The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times.

Right now, I am struggling to keep up with the reading, now at:
67c - 76e pp12-25 as covered by @Fooloso4 here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535924

* p12 67d

Then doesn't purification turn out to be just what's been mentioned for some while in our discussion--the parting of the soul from the body as far as possible, and the habituating of it to assemble and gather itself together, away from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to live, so far as it can, both in the present and in the hereafter, released from the body, as from fetters?

The weekend is here, the sun is shining, I am going out...having just finished p14.
Way to go... :cool:

Quoting Janus

Trying to equate Plato's philosophy with neoplatonism would be no different than trying to understand Kant in terms of neokantianism, that is it would be bound to mislead.

I don't think anyone was "trying to equate Plato's philosophy with neoplatonism". "Neoplatonism" is a neologism anyway.

But @Fooloso4 appears to have gone in the opposite direction or extreme and made up his mind to reject everyone's reading of the dialogues except his own.

Quoting Janus

Trying to equate Plato's philosophy with neoplatonism would be no different than trying to understand Kant in terms of neokantianism, that is it would be bound to mislea

By Fooloso4's principle Neoplatonism isn't idealism either. :joke:

Whatever, let's move on.

Quoting Janus

I think @Fooloso4 is right to reject the use of what can only be considered anachronistic, unnecessary and unhelpful terminology.

Sure. But that raises the difficulty as to what constitutes non-anachronistic, necessary and helpful terminology. Are we going to start using Plato's own Greek terms? And how do we decide on their precise meaning when it has already been determined that the dialogues can, and maybe should, be interpreted in many different ways?

Quoting Apollodorus

Plato's own Greek terms? And how do we decide on their precise meaning when it has already been determined that the dialogues can, and maybe should, be interpreted in many different ways?

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed.

Quoting magritte

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind.

Perhaps. I think another reason was that philosophical or spiritual teachings were transmitted orally. But that doesn't eliminate the problem of terminology and meaning.

Quoting magritte

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Interesting. Well worth keeping in mind. I expect there exists a Glossary somewhere which might help ? *

Quoting Apollodorus

the problem of terminology and meaning.

Which translation are you reading ?
I have read English translations of e.g. original Chinese; 'The Tao Te Ching' being the most recent.
I appreciate the problem of understanding the meaning.
However, good translations of foreign texts will usually include an Introduction, Notes on the text and address problems of interpretation. They discuss other interpretations and meanings and give reasons for their own choice.

Quoting Fooloso4

I will be citing this online translation: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Plato_files/310585462-Plato-Phaedo.pdf

but relying on this one: Plato-Phaedo-Focus-Philosophical-Library/dp/0941051692. Certain terms from this edition will be used in place of what is found in the online translation.

If you look at the Contents page here:

Quoting Amity

Plato's Phaedo - this pdf is the translation with notes by David Gallop.
The translation 1
[b]Notes 74
Notes on text and translation 226[/b]
Bibliographies 239
Abbreviations 242
Index 244

The Notes run from pp 74 - 226.

For me, looking up each and every note as I read the translation stops the flow.
However, if a problem arises or when I have completed the reading, then the Notes should prove useful.
How about the translation(s) you are reading/have read ?

* found this glossary - there might be a better one elsewhere:
https://users.manchester.edu/Facstaff/SSNaragon/Ancient%20Philosophy/Glossary.htm#N

Now, can we get on with the job of reading the text ? [ Perhaps comparing translations if and when necessary] ?
That would be nice...

Quoting Amity

However, good translations of foreign texts will usually include an Introduction, Notes on the text and address problems of interpretation. They discuss other interpretations and meanings and give reasons for their own choice.

No one disputes that. But @Fooloso4 said he reads the dialogues differently every time he reads them and he intends to disregard meanings suggested by Platonists like Plotinus and modern scholars alike.

Quoting Apollodorus

No one disputes that.

N.B. I was addressing your post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536374
Quoting Apollodorus

But that doesn't eliminate the problem of terminology and meaning.

Quoting Apollodorus

But Fooloso4 said he reads the dialogues differently every time he reads them and he intends to disregard meanings suggested by Platonists like Plotinus and modern scholars alike.

Still you focus on @Fooloso4.
I will leave him to address your 'concerns', misunderstandings or misrepresentations - yet again... :roll:

More distraction from actually reading the text.
Why ? Continual thread disruption needs to be addressed - possibly by the mods ?

Quoting Amity

I will leave him to address your concerns - yet again

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond. Disagreement is one thing, dishonesty another. Disagreement I address, dishonesty I call out and the conversation ends.

Quoting Fooloso4

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond.

Good call.
I have had enough and contacted @fdrake via PM.
Also flagged posts.

@Apollodorus - this thread is an earnest attempt to engage with the text of Plato's Phaedo, if you are unable or unwilling to do so, take it elsewhere. I invite people to flag posts in this thread that they believe are not strictly on topic and I (or someone else) will moderate them accordingly.

If you want to join in, do your best to make it textual. That's gonna hold for everyone.

Quoting fdrake

If you want to join in, do your best to make it textual. That's gonna hold for everyone.

Thank you for quick response :sparkle:

I realise this is a multipost, but considering that "going off topic" isn't generally against the rules, I cleared the mod queue for the thread. I will leave up the exchanges that you used to summon me.

Quoting fdrake

considering that "going off topic" isn't generally against the rules, I cleared the mod queue for the thread. I will leave up the exchanges that you used to summon me.

I agree that going off-topic to a certain extent can be a valuable and further exploration.
However, this appears to be more a continual pattern of dishonest and disruptive behaviour, even if it seems to be, at first glance, genuine questions or concerns.
Thanks.

'You're right, Simmias,' said Cebes. 'It seems that half, as it were, of what is needed has been shown-that our soul existed before we were born; it must also be shown that it will exist after we've died, no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is going to be complete. (77b)

Cebes does not remember what went before, the cyclical claim about life and death he had agreed to. Socrates reminds them that it has been demonstrated, but is willing to go through it again. Their fears, he says, are childish. (77e) We might then wonder whether Socrates will attempt to persuade them the way one might persuade a child. And sure enough, that is exactly what Cebes asks him to do:

'Try to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather, not as if we were afraid ourselves-but maybe there's a child inside us, who has fears of that sort. Try to
persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as if it were a bogey-man.' (77e)

Cebes is too manly to admit that he is afraid of death.

What you should do,’ said Socrates, ‘is to sing him incantations each day until you sing away his fears.’
Then where, Socrates,’ he said, ‘are we to get hold of a good singer of such incantations, since you,’ he said, ‘are abandoning us?’ (77e-78a)

There are a few things here to note. First, Socrates tells him to sing his own incantations to sing away his fears. Second, Cebes sounds like a child when he accuses Socrates of abandoning them. Third, it appears that he really does not want proofs and demonstrations but incantations to charm away his fears. I think this is why they are so ready to accept what really are weak arguments. It may be why some readers are so ready to accept them as well.

'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' (78a)

Socrates says they could search both Greece and foreign cultures to find a singer of incantations to spend their money on. In the earlier passage on purification he also abruptly talks in terms of monetary exchange, but suggests that thoughtfulness is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold. The incantational songs are the Greek and foreign mysteries and mythologies.

But Socrates says that they are not needed, that there is no one and no song more capable of preparing them for death than themselves by their own thoughtfulness, courage, moderation, justice, and true virtue.

At Cebes urging they return to the point they left off. Socrates uses an argument that Descartes will borrow:

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?' (78c)

Cebes agrees.

Then aren’t those very things that are always self-same and keep to the same condition most likely to be non-composites; and aren’t those that vary from one moment to another and are never in the self-same condition likely to be composites? (78c)

Cebes forgets about “the child inside us”. Their fear of death and turmoil at Socrates’ impending death are at odds with something that is always self-same and keeps to the same condition.

Socrates now returns to the discussion of Being, the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, what is invariant and constant, and contrasts them with the many beautiful things and equal objects, that is, things that change. (78d-e)

'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?' (79a)

Cebes agrees, no doubt he has heard Socrates talk about the Forms. But the distinction between the visible and intelligible realm in the Republic is not the same as the distinction between the visible and unseen. Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchangeable.

In accord with this distinction Socrates divides body and soul, here and There, the senses and thoughtfulness, master and slave, divine and mortal.

'Whereas whenever it studies alone by itself, the soul departs yonder towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying, and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company, whenever it has come to be alone by itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its contact with things of a similar kind; and this condition of it is called "phronesis", is it not?' (79d)

I left the Greek term phronesis untranslated here. The online translation uses ‘wisdom’, Brann uses ‘thoughtfulness’. It is commonly translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Brann’s choice is intended to distinguish phronesis from sophia, that is, wisdom and to emphasize thatphronesis, “ … in spite of its strong connotation with the heights of intellectual vision in this dialogue, refer in its most basic meaning to a thoroughly healthy state of mind - to good sense and sound judgment”.


What Socrates here calls ‘ phronesis’ is instead the state of the soul separated from the body. The condition Socrates elsewhere calls death. The attempted division does not hold. Practical wisdom is about living, the union of body and soul. The soul alone has no use for phronesis or thoughtfulness. We should recall that Socrates previously said that knowledge of things themselves, the Forms, is only possible, if possible at all, in death. Despite the high flown language, Socrates’ feet remain firmly on the ground, tethered byphronesis.

Don't you think the divine is naturally adapted for ruling and domination, whereas the mortal is adapted for being ruled and for service?'
'I do.'(80a)

It is instructive to compare this with the divisions of the soul in the Republic. A tripartite soul undermines the argument for a unitary soul. The problem of self-rule in the Republic is not a matter of competition between the body and soul, but takes place within the soul itself and introduces an element that is absent here: thumos or spiritedness, the love of honor and recognition, loyalty, anger, defensiveness, and so on. With the split between body and soul desire, eros, is atopos, without a place. Socrates has tied it to the body, but philosophy, the love of wisdom is described in the Symposium as eros and is not a bodily desire. Is eros then an in between, between body and soul?


The assertion of separation and the unchangeable nature of soul now becomes more doubtful:

'Whereas, I imagine, if it is separated from the body when it has been polluted and made impure, because it has always been with the body, has served and loved it, and been so bewitched by it, by its passions and pleasures, that it thinks nothing else real save what is corporeal-what can be touched and seen, drunk and eaten, or used for sexual enjoyment-yet it has been accustomed to hate and shun and tremble before what is obscure to the eyes and invisible, but
intelligible and grasped by philosophy; do you think a soul in that condition will be released herself all by herself and unadulterated ?' (81b)

Cebes agrees. Previously he agreed that the soul is unchangeable but he has changed his unseen mind.

What happens next seems to undo what has been done. The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

Quoting Apollodorus

But that raises the difficulty as to what constitutes non-anachronistic, necessary and helpful terminology. Are we going to start using Plato's own Greek terms?

A translation is being read here, not the original text. Anyway I don't want to derail this thread any further. I don't have time to read along with the text at the moment, so I already feel somewhat like an interloper. But reading just the thread I have found very interesting.

Reply to frank

:up:

A reading:

Phaedo librivox

Reply to Janus

It varies moderately from the text being used here, but I found it useful.

Reply to Banno Thanks, if I find some more time I will check it out...

Odd, that the poor old Donkey rates lower than bees and wasps in Socrates' esteem. (82b)

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?

The reputed last words of the Buddha were 'all compound things are subject to decay. Ardently seek your own salvation'.

Quoting Fooloso4

The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (

viz. the Indo-European myth of Sa?s?ra.

Reply to Fooloso4
The focus you bring to what Cebes agrees to despite the inconsistencies between the particular arguments is interesting. Cebes also changes the subject when pressed beyond his willingness to just agree. His mention of "knowledge as recollection" in response to Socrates at 72a is a dodge:

If there were not perpetual reciprocity in coming to be, between one set of things and another,
revolving in a circle, as it were-if, instead, coming-to-be were a linear
process from one thing into its opposite only, without any bending
back in the other direction or reversal, do you realize that all things
would ultimately have the same form: the same fate would overtake
them, and they would cease from coming to be?'

It is fair enough to say that Cebes' reference to what Socrates argued for before is germane to the discussion but it is not a response to Socrates' statement in the moment.

The Argument from Opposites

I'd like to see what others make of the 'argument from opposites' (70c-72e).

It seems to operate on the presumption that 'the opposites' - those given include larger and smaller, weaker and stronger, faster and slower, the beatitful and the ugly, and of course the living and the dead - are intrinsic to the whole process of generation and decay. Also there's a correlative relationship, in that one gives rise to the other - what was smaller becomes larger, what is weaker becomes stronger, and so on.

There are some problems that I think are easy to see with this argument - firstly that whilst weaker and stronger are comparative - things can be weaker or stronger - being alive or dead is not a comparative, as something can't be more or less dead. So there's something of an equivocation going on. Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures, that they've since died is immaterial to the nature of their origination. And that it's not hard to envisage that the process could come to end with complete extinction.

I'm also interested in the provenance of this type of argument. I can think of one example from the pre-socratics, and another, even more alike, from completely different culture setting roughly contemporaneous to Socrates. (Any guesses?) But I'm surprised that Cebes seems to so willingly accept the premisses of the argument without voicing any of the above kinds of objections.

I'm also intrigued by the argument that if things didn't arise from their opposites, then everything would end up dead, or asleep (like Endymion, the legendary sleeping ruler.) I've read elsewhere of a later argument, I think from Islamic philosophy, that says that if the universe was of infinite duration, then everything that could happen, being of finite duration, would already have happened.

Quoting Banno

Phaedo librivox

It varies moderately from the text being used here, but I found it useful.

Thanks. It is useful. Especially if suffering from eye strain.
I downloaded the 8 audio files of Jowett's translation.
Listening to the 1st one (17mins) late at night I fell asleep before the end.
I hear that is one way of absorbing material in to the subconscious - well, for language learning anyway.
For philosophy, methinks tis better to time it for daylight hours...
Then again...

Progress report: *struggling *
Reading from beginning to end, as in a novel, is fine.
However, this text is nested and includes sets of philosophical arguments.
I need to see how everything fits in. Also to look outside the text for help.

So, I looked for an overview and found this helpful
https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

Outline of the Dialogue

• The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
• Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
• The Cyclical Argument (70c-72e)
• The Argument from Recollection (72e-78b)
• The Affinity Argument (78b-84b)
• Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
• The Objections (85c-88c)
• Interlude on Misology (89b-91c)
• Response to Simmias (91e-95a)
• Response to Cebes (95a-107b)
• Socrates’ Intellectual History (96a-102a)
• The Final Argument (102b-107b)
• The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
• Socrates’ Death (115a-118a)

References and Further Reading
General Commentaries
The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
Socrates’ Death (115a-118a)

Quoting Fooloso4

The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times.

Quoting Amity

Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.

Quoting Wayfarer

the 'argument from opposites' (70c-72e).
It seems to operate on the presumption that 'the opposites' - those given include larger and smaller, weaker and stronger, faster and slower, the beautiful and the ugly, and of course the living and the dead - are intrinsic to the whole process of generation and decay. Also there's a correlative relationship, in that one gives rise to the other - what was smaller becomes larger, what is weaker becomes stronger, and so on.

Plato gets much justifiable but undeserved grief for setting up formal and informal pairs as opposites and for being illogical in their resolution. But back in antiquity Parmenidean proto-logic was a huge advance over hand waving and its details fall far short of our modern elementary logic. Much that is obvious to us was a work in progress for Plato.

Scott Austin (2010):The question at issue in the contrast between upward and downward [~transcendental] models is this: whether the unity of opposites exists in the opposites or whether it transcends them. Plato in the Sophist tries [~correctly] to have both [~one for intermingling of Forms and one for participation of particulars in Forms]: the forms remain transcendent while now being the abode of opposites. Aristotle sees in this an opening for a revised, dynamic notion of species and genera. Hegel, it could be argued, tries to join sameness and difference in his own [~i.e. illogical] way.

Heraclitean pairs of contraries are different than strictly formal Parmenidean contradictions. Parmenidean negation and Socratic elenchus don't work for informal overlapping interacting pairs. Plato was well aware of the logical difficulties, and for the most part presents them to the reader as a challenge for better suggestions of resolution. We haven't advanced quite enough yet to fully do that. Just try a few and see.

Reply to Valentinus

This got me thinking about why Plato chose Cebes to be a major participant in this dialogue. I will be trying to tie some things together in an upcoming post.

Quoting Wayfarer

Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures

Right. I pointed this out. The opposite of soul is body, which would mean that the soul comes from body.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. (84c)

This kind of hint should not be overlooked. Plato is well aware that the arguments will not persuade somebody who is going to go through it sufficiently. We see here that he is writing to two different audiences: those who in one way or another will benefit from hearing his “songs” and those who will not be charmed. Socrates will himself make this distinction.

Instead of another argument Socrates says:

… you must, it seems, think I have a poorer power of prophecy than the swans, who when they realize they must die, then sing more fully and sweetly than they've ever sung before, for joy that they are departing into the presence of the god whose servants they are. (84e-85a)

This is Socrates’ swan song. Interlaced with all his arguments are his songs, his music.

I believe, because, belonging as they do to Apollo, they are prophetic birds with foreknowledge of the blessings of Hades, and therefore sing and rejoice more greatly on that day than ever before. Now I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god, that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs, and that I'm departing this life with as good a cheer as they do. No; so far as that goes, you should say and ask whatever you wish, for as long as eleven Athenian gentlemen allow.' (85b)

There is something comical about Socrates’ likening himself to the swans. He is, by all descriptions, not at all like a swan in appearance.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

Later Socrates will talk about his “second sailing”. For the moment I will note only a few things. There is pilot in control of the raft. It goes wherever it is takes. Short of knowledge, what is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. He is fully aware that these accounts may not bring them safely to where they want to go. As an alternative he proposes “some divine account”. This safe account is one that is accepted, but does not stand up to exhaustive examination. They are stories that calm men’s fears and give them courage. Like Socrates’ prophetic swan song.

Simmas:

...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished … (86a-b)

This is an argument that deserves closer attention, but rather than respond immediately Socrates gives Cebes a chance to voice his objection to Socrates’ argument. Cebes says that he too, like Simmias, must make use of “some sort of likeness” (87b) The making of a likeness or image, the use of the imagination, eikasia, plays an important but often overlooked role in the dialogues. The reoccurring play of images operates throughout the dialogues on many levels.

Cebes draws the likeness: the soul is to the body as a weaver is to his cloak.

'The relation of soul to body would, I think, admit of the same comparison: anyone making the same points about them, that the soul is long-lived, while the body is weaker and shorter-lived, would in my view argue reasonably; true indeed, he might say, every soul wears out many bodies, especially in a life of many years-because, though the body may decay and perish while the man is still alive, still the soul will always weave afresh what's being worn out; nevertheless, when the soul does perish, it will have to be wearing its last garment, and must perish before that one alone; and when the soul has perished, then at last the body will reveal its natural weakness,moulder away quickly, and be gone. (88d-e)

Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments have shaken the confidence of the others.

Phaedo:

Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust. (88c)

Echecrates:

'What argument shall we ever trust now? (88d)

Simmias’ likeness of a raft in dangerous waters was prophetic. Can Socrates restore their trust in arguments? This is an issue of grave concern. Socrates suggests they should be in mourning if the argument cannot be brought back to life. (89b) Socrates makes the problem explicit:

“So that we don’t become haters of argument (misologic), as some become haters of human beings (misanthropic); for it is not possible for anyone to experience a greater evil than hating arguments. Hatred of arguments and hatred of human beings comes about in the same way, For hatred of human beings arises from artlessly trusting somebody to excess, and believing that human being to be in every way true and sound and trustworthy, and then a little later discovering that this person is wicked and untrustworthy - and then having this experience again with another. And whenever someone experiences this many times, and especially in the hands of just those he might regard as his most intimate friends and comrades, he then ends up taking offense all the time and hates all human beings and believes there’s nothing at all sound in anybody. (89d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time. (90b-c)

I think that this is a remarkable demonstration of the power of Plato’s insight into human psychology.

The danger here is that they may come to believe that philosophy has failed them. Socrates is about to die because he practiced philosophy and nothing he has said has convinced them that he will be better off for having practiced it. It is because of Socrates that they came to love philosophy, but it may be that philosophy cannot do what they expect of it. They are in danger of misologic, hating what they once loved.

I possess prophetic power from my master.

His 'daemon'?

Reply to Fooloso4
One reason the role of Cebes is odd is because Plato is not there. Which is pretty strange given that we would not know Socrates without Plato.

Reply to Valentinus

In the first section of my reading I discussed Plato's absence. I will have a bit more to say toward the end.

We might still know of Socrates through Xenophon and Aristophanes, but although Xenophon had his admirers, including Machiavelli, he is not held in the same high esteem or enjoy the same popularity as Plato. From Xenophon we know of Socrates as a comic figure hanging from a basket in the Clouds.

Quoting Wayfarer

I've read elsewhere of a later argument, I think from Islamic philosophy, that says that if the universe was of infinite duration, then everything that could happen, being of finite duration, would already have happened.

As a side note, Nietzsche argued for a version of this in his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. So, arguing for the infinity rejected by others. Also a part of rejecting what he saw as "Socratic"

Reply to Fooloso4
Plato brings an intimacy that is special to the dialogues. A chance to be there when they were.

Quoting Wayfarer

I possess prophetic power from my master.

His 'daemon'?

In the works of Plato Socrates daemon only warned him away when from doing things. One argument he made is that if death were bad he would have been warned.

Reply to Fooloso4 So - who is the reference to?

Quoting Valentinus

Plato brings an intimacy that is special to the dialogues. A chance to be there when they were.

Many who are taught to read philosophy are taught to pay attention only to the arguments. With Plato the setting, characters, and action are all essential elements.

Quoting magritte

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed.

I agree. This openness is a reflection of his zetetic skepticism. Knowing that he does not know he inquires. The other half of his openness may at first seem to be its opposite. The dialogues frequently end in aporia.

Quoting magritte

Heraclitean pairs of contraries are different than strictly formal Parmenidean contradictions. Parmenidean negation and Socratic elenchus don't work for informal overlapping interacting pairs. Plato was well aware of the logical difficulties, and for the most part presents them to the reader as a challenge for better suggestions of resolution. We haven't advanced quite enough yet to fully do that. Just try a few and see.

That is a very interesting comment. Thanks for opening up that perspective. I guess what caught my attention was the way that the interdependent nature of opposites is assumed as more or less self-evident in those passages. I wonder how or if this sense is preserved in modern philosophy and science.

Quoting Wayfarer

I possess prophetic power from my master."

His 'daemon'?

Socrates means Apollo, his master and god of prophecy.

Quoting Wayfarer

Fooloso4 So - who is the reference to?

The swans owe their prophetic power to Apollo. Socrates says: "I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god ..." which would seem to indicate that his master was Apollo. But (and with Plato there is always more to it) he goes on to say: "... that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo.

Short answer: I don't know.

Quoting Fooloso4

that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo.

How does it indicate that? To me it is clear that he means Apollo.

My translation (Sedley & Long, 2011) of 85b has:

"Now I believe that I myself am the swans' fellow-slave and sacred to the same god, and have prophecy from my master no less than they do"

There is nothing unclear in the text.

Reply to Apollodorus
The text includes an unnamed authority after the reference to Apollo.

Reply to Valentinus

The Sedley & Long version doesn't. You're using the wrong translation.

Socrates is the dedicated servant of Apollo who is his master and god of prophecy. Hence the gift of prophecy is naturally and logically from his divine master Apollo.

The reference to 'my master' caught my attention because of the suggestion that he was referring to his spiritual master. (In Asiatic traditions, one's guru is not necessarily a person.) Happy to reserve judgement on that pending further reading (however Apollodorus' account seems perfectly reasonable.)

Reply to Wayfarer

Yes, but especially with reference to prophecy, I think in this case the text refers to Apollo as indicated by the Sedley & Long translation.

'In literature and myth, the swan symbolizes light, purity, transformation, intuition, grace. In Ancient Greece the swan stood for the soul and was linked to Apollo, the god of the Sun,'

Reply to Apollodorus
In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time.

Reply to Wayfarer

Here's another translation by Fowler that supports the Sedley & Long one:

85b] but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask what ever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit.”

There is nothing unclear that I can see.

Reply to Wayfarer

I checked a few other translations. I think I misread the one I used:

"I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs ..."

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.

Quoting Fooloso4

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.

I thought so because the Greek text doesn't have that ambiguity.

[85?] ????????? ????? ???? ?? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ??? ????????? ?????, ???????? ?? ???? ??? ?????????? ?? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ? ?? ?? ????????? ?????. ??? ?? ??? ????? ??????? ????????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ????, ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ????????, ???? ???????????? ????? ??? ???? ?????????????. ???? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ????????, ??? ?? ???????? ????? ?????? ??????.

Anyway, that clarifies it.

Quoting Valentinus

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time.

In the Apology:

"And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. (39c)

He speaks here in his own name.

Reply to Apollodorus Reply to Fooloso4 Agree. Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now.

There is one other comparison I simply can't help but make with regard to the early Buddhist texts:

Quoting Phaedrus 85c-d

he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely.

[quote=The Simile of the Raft; https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.022.than.html]The Blessed One said: "Suppose a man were traveling along a path. He would see a great expanse of water, with the near shore dubious & risky, the further shore secure & free from risk, but with neither a ferryboat nor a bridge going from this shore to the other. The thought would occur to him, 'Here is this great expanse of water, with the near shore dubious & risky, the further shore secure & free from risk, but with neither a ferryboat nor a bridge going from this shore to the other. What if I were to gather grass, twigs, branches, & leaves and, having bound them together to make a raft, were to cross over to safety on the other shore in dependence on the raft, making an effort with my hands & feet?' [/quote]

Reply to Wayfarer

Very interesting. Maybe we can discuss a few other points as well, once this has come to a conclusion. (Hopefully soon.)

Quoting Wayfarer

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now.

It would seem that no amount of deference to the gods will free Socrates of the "hatred for logos" that sees him as the corruption of youth.

Reply to Valentinus Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.)

Quoting Valentinus

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. But let's park that for now.
— Wayfarer

It would seem that no amount of deference to the gods will free Socrates of the "hatred for logos" that sees him as the corruption of youth.

Quoting Wayfarer

Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.)

Re: Socrates. I step back from the whole debate about what kind of an -ist he is alleged to have been. What particular spirit led him and how - if he had any god, or religion, it was that of philosophy.
To encourage people to think for themselves in a spirited and rational manner; to base their actions on that rather than follow dead dogma.
He lived and died for that. He followed a different god from that of the status quo.

Re: Plato. From what little understanding I have - he was a brilliant writer who muddied the waters of understanding in different dialogues. Clearly, he made his name and here we are - how many words have been spilled in all the many and conflicting interpretations of his writings.

Some here have already made up their mind and follow Plato from their own 'worldview'.
That's fine. I don't care. Some want to move on quickly once they think they have proved a point.
Again, fine. I don't care.
I will take my own time, even if it is away from this particular thread.
If that means stepping back and looking at other resources - or even abandoning ship - so be it.

I appreciate all the time, patience and effort that @Fooloso4 has given to starting and maintaining this thread. It is quite the challenge.
He continues to be open to re-reading and admitting where he might have misread or misinterpreted.
That says a lot.

Plato's Phaedo is about more than arguing over -isms. For me, Socrates was a spiritual thinker who acted on his belief in the power of philosophy. A heady mix of reason and spirit to move.

I am interested enough to look around; head out of the TPF for a while to read and think at my own pace.
I found an Open Yale course on 'Death' - lecturer Prof. Kagan.
https://oyc.yale.edu/NODE/196

Look under 'Sessions', you will see that Lectures 4,6,7,8 and 9 are dedicated to Plato's Phaedo.
Videos, transcripts and audio files are available.
Might be worth a look, I don't know.

Best wishes, everyone :sparkle:

Reply to Amity Looks a fascinating course. Amazing, the resources you can find nowadays. Best.

Quoting Wayfarer

Amazing, the resources you can find nowadays

So many ways to skin a soul :halo: :sparkle:

Quoting Wayfarer

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo.

A major theme of the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it? His concern is threefold: what this would mean for him, what it would mean for others, and what it would mean for philosophy if he openly professed atheism. We have seen what it meant for Socrates. What it means for philosophy is a perennial problem. There are always those ready to condemn and censor. What it means for others depends on the person. This is something Socrates will address.

Quoting Fooloso4

f the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it?

Socrates didn't tend to care much about prudence. He expressed admiration for Sparta in the middle of a devastating war. He managed to irritate the crap out of most Athenian citizens.

I think it's more likely we're taking in Plato's flair for poetic expression.

A comment made by Valentinus Reply to Valentinus about Cebes got me thinking about why Plato chose to use him to play such an important part in Socrates’ last dialogue with his friends.

Early on Socrates makes a comment that will pr

ove to be ironic:

'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
what anyone may say.' (63a)

As we have seen, this is in part true but in part not. There are things he readily accepts but he keeps returning to the same questions. There is a peculiar mixture of remembering and forgetting. It is Cebes who remembers Socrates’ story of recollection, but he loses the scent of the current argument. He is a lover of philosophy, but not a philosopher. He is like the lover of music who is not musical. He admires what the philosophers have to say, but seems incapable of making the “greatest music”. (61a)

The danger of misologic leads to the question of who will keep Socratic philosophy alive? Put differently, philosophy needs genuine philosophers and not just scholars.

Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. He now introduces what is an all too common problem:

I run the risk of being in a mood not to love wisdom but to love victory., as do altogether uneducated people … I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible. (91a).

What Socrates is saying here may not be what he seems to be saying. He is not saying that he is not interested in “making the weaker argument stronger” so as to gain victory. He is not going to try to persuade others, but to persuade himself that what he says seems to be true. Now persuading himself that what he says seems to be true is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. It appears as if he is taking his own advice when he tells Cebes and Simmias that they themselves might be the most capable of singing their own incantations about death.

If this is correct, then what he is recommending is that sound arguments be put aside and in their place songs to make the soul sound. That something like this is what he has in mind is confirmed by what he goes on to say:

For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death. (91b)

Here, for the first time, Socrates suggests that there might be nothing at all for those who die, that they have met their end. The timing is important, coming immediately after the questioning of the ability of arguments to establish the truth.

Socrates returns to the argument but, following Cebes example of the weaver, introduces a new definition of death:

… this very thing is death - perishing of soul (91d)

Socrates once again returns to recollection, and both Cebes and Simmias agrees that:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body (92a)

With this agreement Socrates returns to Simmias’ argument that the soul is a tuning. It is only with this being agreed on that Socrates is able to dispute Simmias’ argument that the soul is an attunement.

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning
(92c)

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But
there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

Simmias denies this, but note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul".

'Well, but is one soul said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, while another is said to have thoughtlessness and wickedness and to be bad? And are we right in saying those things?'

'Quite right.'

'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?' (93c)

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning? (93e)

Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls. (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis. Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Quoting Fooloso4

Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis

Why do you think this?

Reply to frank

https://sententiaeantiquae.com/2018/07/05/homer-divine-not-human/

Reply to Fooloso4
And this article convinced you that the ancient Greeks, in general, believed Homer was divine?

Reply to frank Reply to frank

No. That was simply the first thing that came up on search. For a more scholarly source:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3f59n8b0&chunk.id=d0e3428&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e3009&brand=ucpress

Reply to Fooloso4
Per Moses Finley,

"No other poet, no literary figure in all history for that matter, occupied a place in the life of his people such as Homer's. He was their pre-eminent symbol of nationhood, the unimpeachable authority on their earliest history, and a decisive figure in the creation of their pantheon, as well as their most widely quoted poet."

They honored Homer out the wazoo, that's true. They didn't actually think he had been made into a god.

Reply to frank

From the article cited:

"The Hellenistic portrait belongs to another category. The heavy, archaizing locks framing the face, the fillet containing the hair rolled up in the back—also an archaizing trait—and the full, heavy beard all conjure up the majestic aura of a god."

Mention is also made in the Archelaos Relief , also known as, "Apotheosis of Homer":
http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Art/Ancient/en/HomerArchelaos.html

The point that should not be lost is that Socrates called him the "divine poet" in the Phaedo and in the Ion calls him the "best and most divine".

This is not the place to get into the concept of apotheosis. Here is a short quote from Wiki before I move on:

Apotheosis is the glorification of a subject to divine level and most commonly, the treatment of a human like a god.

Reply to Fooloso4 See pm.

You're in conflict with one of the greatest classicists of the 20th Century.

Reply to frank

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

Quoting Fooloso4

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

Since you asked, quite frankly it indicates that you don't know much about the setting of the work. You're prone to jumping to odd conclusions, and then you refuse to accept facts when they're presented.

Reply to frank

The setting of the work is Socrates last day. If you think that any conclusion I have arrived at is odd then I would welcome a discussion of it. The fact is what he called Homer divine. If I am wrong that others did not regard him this way what difference does that make?

Quoting Fooloso4

The fact is what he called Homer divine. If I am wrong that others did not regard him this way what difference does that make?

One of the things one could do is analyze the argument that Homer affirms that the soul can be separated from the body.

Who is Plato arguing with here? Would this opponent (who believes the soul is essentially motion, or what we might call energy) be persuaded by an appeal to divinity? Is that was Plato has Socrates doing?

Who was the great Athenian law giver? A god? No, it was Solon, a man.

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? Think about the images in the works of Homer. It's the Greek epic. It describes how people should relate to one another and it clearly gives precedence to an aristocrat like Plato. Maybe it's: I speak for tradition. I speak from the depths of the Greek soul.

Or maybe it's something else.

Quoting frank

Socrates didn't tend to care much about prudence. He expressed admiration for Sparta in the middle of a devastating war. He managed to irritate the crap out of most Athenian citizens.

I think it's more likely we're taking in Plato's flair for poetic expression.

Perhaps that is the case. On the other hand, the dialogue begins with Socrates trying "bodily" music composition to satisfy what his daemon might be requiring from him. That and the calls for phronesis are at odds with the harsh division between the body and the mind in many of the arguments.

Maybe all that time in fetters messed with his old modus operandi.

Quoting frank

One of the things one could do is analyze the argument that Homer affirms that the soul can be separated from the body.

Where in the dialogue is it? Stephanus number?

Quoting frank

Who is Plato arguing with here?

Where?

Quoting frank

Who was the great Athenian law giver?

What is the relevance to the dialogue? Again, a stephanus reference would be helpful.

Quoting frank

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry?

See above. As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. Socrates certainly was not.

None of these things speak to the specifics of your claim that my conclusions are odd. None of them speak to your point that the Greeks did not deify Homer.

Reply to Valentinus
One cool thing about Plato is the way he presents the repeating theme of oppositions.

It will come through in a dry logical argument, then it shows up in the tone of the work.

Quoting Fooloso4

Where in the dialogue is it? Stephanus number?

You just posted it.

Quoting Fooloso4

Where?

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this.

Quoting Fooloso4

See above. As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. Socrates certainly was not.

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates. In what sense was Plato conservative?

Quoting Fooloso4

None of them speak to your point that the Greeks did not deify Homer.

Holy crap, man.

Quoting frank

You just posted it.

Do you mean where Socrates said "Homer put it poetically"? (94d) Socrates makes the distinction between poetry and argument several times. Homer does not present and argument. He says:

Odysseus struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you
have endured worse than this.'

Socrates uses this to claim that the soul is not a harmony of the body, but rather the soul rules over the body.

I pointed out that:

Quoting Fooloso4

But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger.

And:

Quoting Fooloso4

In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Quoting frank

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this.

I don't know what you mean. If you explain it I will respond. If you mean the appropriateness of using the term 'idealistic' I have nothing further to say.

Quoting frank

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates.

It is all Plato we are hearing, from the early dialogues to the end, simply from the fact that he wrote the dialogues. We cannot make a clear distinction between where he might be repeating what Socrates said and where he is not. Some scholars have attempted to do this, but others reject this approach. One thing is clear: With the possible exception of what he wrote while awaiting the poison, Socrates did not write anything and Plato never speaks in the dialogues. In this dialogue attention is drawn to the fact that he was not present. Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues. His dialogues differ from Plato's, even when they are writing about the same thing. Compare, for example, Plato's Symposium and Xenophon's.

In what sense was Plato conservative?

I don't think he was. You said:

Quoting frank

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry?

And I responded:

Quoting Fooloso4

As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative.

Plato was an aristocrat but not a conservative. He was truly a revolutionary. Socrates was not an aristocrat but was a revolutionary.

Quoting frank

Holy crap, man.

Is this what stands as an argument for you? You have not told me why it makes a difference to our understanding of the text if Socrates was alone in calling Homer divine. It is right there in the text. No one who heard it disagreed or found it odd for him to have said this.

Quoting Fooloso4

You have not told me why it makes a difference to our understanding of the text if Socrates was alone in calling Homer divine.

We might take it that Socrates is suggesting that divinity was at work in Homer. He's not suggesting that Homer is really divine.

You specifically stated that Socrates was calling on Homer's divine authority.

We could look at how an appeal to divine authority differs from an appeal to tradition. In this, I suggest we'd need to think about the competition of ideas at the time.

Reply to Fooloso4
In some cases, your interpretation is just wrong. The bigger problem is that you seem to think there is one right interpretation.

Think of Phaedo as food for thought.

Reply to Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer

Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.)

The hatred of logos is a big part of this dialogue. At the beginning of Phaedo, there is a proposal that that the trial would be played out again amongst those assembled. To that extent, doesn't the topic of corrupting people fall within the parameters of the dialogue under discussion?

Quoting frank

In some cases, your interpretation is just wrong. The bigger problem is that you seem to think there is one right interpretation.

I do not think there is one right interpretation, but you have not given me a single case of where you think my interpretation is wrong. Without details your accusations are empty. Provide specific cases and where you think my interpretation does not agree with what is said in the dialogue, as well as what you think is a better interpretation, and we can talk.

Reply to Fooloso4 Socrates is not being presented as believing Homer is divine.

Do you understand that?

Quoting frank

Socrates is not being presented as believing Homer is divine.

Do you understand that?

Socrates calls him divine. In what way is his calling him divine not presenting him as being divine?

What he means by this is another matter. And whether or not he believes it cannot be determined without first figuring out what he means.

Once again, you said in some cases my interpretation is wrong, but you have not given a single case. So what are those cases? Saying that he calls him divine is not an interpretation. It is a direct quote from the text.

From the OP:
Quoting Fooloso4

The question arises as to whether this is a comedy or tragedy.

Thanks to @Fooloso4 for drawing this to my attention. It meant that I paid more attention and found comedic elements I wouldn't otherwise have done. It surprised me at the time because I had the wrong impression that Plato did not think highly of humour. So, another paradox.
See SEP article on 'Philosophy of Humour':

Quoting John Morreall

Plato, the most influential critic of laughter, treated laughter as an emotion that overrides rational self-control. In the Republic (388e), he says that the Guardians of the state should avoid laughter, “for ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter, his condition provokes a violent reaction.” Especially disturbing to Plato were the passages in the Iliad and the Odyssey where Mount Olympus was said to ring with the laughter of the gods. He protested that “if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must not accept it, much less if gods.”

Another of Plato’s objections to laughter is that it is malicious. In Philebus (48–50), he analyzes the enjoyment of comedy as a form of scorn.

Humour compares, I think, to the issue of desire, as a bodily disturbance to be disdained.
However, as mentioned previously, this is not absolute. It includes the idea of temperance. The Goldilocks effect. Keeping the right balance. So, what matters is the quantity and quality of the emotion; the type and motivation, virtuous or vicious.

I have probably missed some of the wry, subtle humour sprinkled throughout. Some are obvious: 'chuckles'. We have to work at noticing. No emoticons here :smile: :sad: :chin: :brow:
In general, it is a way of looking at the human condition; the bitter-sweet connections, the experiences of pain/pleasure.

Listening to the second of the audio files recommended earlier by @Banno
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536659
I woke up in time to hear the last few minutes:

pp15-16 ( 70b-d)

...on just this point, perhaps, one needs no little reassuring and convincing, that when the man has died, his soul exists, and that it possesses some power and wisdom.' (14)
'That's true, Cebes,' said Socrates; 'but then what are we to do?
Would you like us to speculate (15) on these very questions, and see whether this is likely to be the case or not?'
'For my part anyway,' said Cebes, 'I'd gladly hear whatever opinion you have about them.'
'Well,' said Socrates, 'I really don't think anyone listening now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I'm talking idly, and arguing about things that don't concern me. If you agree, then, we should look into the matter.
'Let's consider it, perhaps, in this way: do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, (16) that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead;

Bracketed numbers within the text refer to the Notes.
I haven't looked there yet. Curious as to why 'speculate' and 'recalled' have been highlighted. I could speculate...that mere or idle 'opinion' had been frowned upon...that 'recall' occurs when thinking in the present about things past, we don't need a re-born soul.

Socrates mentions his scornful and critical 'comic poet' - ? Aristophanes *
Again, we can see why this kind of humour was not appreciated and objected to.
Nevertheless, it is used to good effect in the dialogue(s), helping us to form the picture.

For example: the audience is fearful about death and loss. What happens after death.
Socrates brings in some wry comments that raises chuckles - a release from pent up nervous energy and anxiety. Both Plato and Socrates are more than aware of the human condition - the interplay between body and mind. The need for a sense of humour...

Not to mention patience with those who hurl false accusations :brow:

-----

* Edit to add from the Notes, p104:

Socrates' denial that he is 'talking idly' (70cl-2) may be an allusion to Aristophanes' caricature of him in the Clouds. For the gibe cf. Republic 489a, Gorgias 485d-e. As if in answer to charges of 'irrelevance', the close connection between the present inquiry and Socrates' own situation is stressed again and again (7 6b 10-12, 78a1-2, 80d7-8, 84c6-85b9, 89b, 91a-c, 98c-99a).

Surely the expression that ‘there is an ancient doctrine that we’ve recalled’ signifies something more than here-say, in the context of one who believes that true knowledge is recollection of knowledge obtained before this life.

Quoting Wayfarer

Surely the expression that ‘there is an ancient doctrine that we’ve recalled’ signifies something more than here-say, in the context of one who believes that true knowledge is recollection of knowledge obtained before this life.

What do you think it signifies?
Re any stated belief, how do we know that this is an absolute belief sincerely held ?

I think that the point is: we don't know, even if we think we do...
Even recent past events are seldom recalled perfectly by one person, never mind if more are involved. And as for the recall of a soul events...or knowledge of...any truth...

Quoting Amity

What do you think it signifies?

I think it signifies that it is something other than what us moderns think of as a 'myth', by which we mean, something that could never happen. The way myths are told in ancient literature - not only by Plato - they're often allegorical presentations of truths which can't be stated directly. Which is convenient for modern intepreters, because they can also be dismissed as 'merely myth'.

Quoting Wayfarer

they're often allegorical presentations of truths which can't be stated directly. Which is convenient for modern intepreters, because they can also be dismissed as 'merely myth'.

Interesting. Do you have any particular examples in mind ?

Quoting frank

Since you asked, quite frankly it indicates that you don't know much about the setting of the work. You're prone to jumping to odd conclusions, and then you refuse to accept facts when they're presented.

I tend to agree with that. Take the example of 85b where, on being asked who Socrates refers to (Apollo or some other master), he replied "I don't know" only to later claim that he "misread" the text and corrected himself after consulting other translations and even that only after I pointed out that his reading is incorrect.

How can you "misread" a text written in plain English?

But he goes even further and baselessly asserts:

Quoting Fooloso4

But (and with Plato there is always more to it) he goes on to say: "... that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo.

So, he uses his own misreading to infer quite a lot from it. "It is not Apollo" (even when it obviously is Apollo) and, anyways, "with Plato there is always more to it" so let's turn the dialogues into something else, like a "comedy" for example. Plato, after all, was not a philosopher but a playwright.

Quoting Wayfarer

The way myths are told in ancient literature - not only by Plato - they're often allegorical presentations of truths which can't be stated directly. Which is convenient for modern intepreters, because they can also be dismissed as 'merely myth'.

Correct.

Quoting Amity

Interesting. Do you have any particular examples in mind ?

The very one we’re discussing! Socrates refers to ‘an ancient myth’ and also ‘the mysteries’. ‘The mysteries’ are a reference to the Greek ‘mystery religions’, notably Orphism (the cult of Orpheus) which taught a doctrine of re-incarnation very similar to ancient Hinduism (to which it was distantly related). It has been called the ‘ur-religion’ of Ancient Greece, ‘ur-religion’ being the ancestral indigenous belief system which originated with the ancient Indo-European peoples. (On a side-note, the original definition of a ‘mystic’ was ‘one initiated into the Mysteries.’ And if, as legend suggests, Plato was such an initiate, then he was literally ‘a mystic’).

Quoting Wayfarer

The very one we’re discussing!

OK. I thought you were thinking of philosophical interpreters of Plato's Phaedo who dismiss it as 'merely myth' as you expressed:
Quoting Wayfarer

as a 'myth', by which we mean, something that could never happen.

And wondered if you had anyone specific in mind.

Reply to Wayfarer Quoting Wayfarer

The very one we’re discussing! Socrates refers to ‘an ancient myth’ and also ‘the mysteries’. ‘The mysteries’ are a reference to the Greek ‘mystery religions’, notably Orphism (the cult of Orpheus) which taught a doctrine of re-incarnation very similar to ancient Hinduism (to which it was distantly related). It has been called the ‘ur-religion’ of Ancient Greece, ‘ur-religion’ being the ancestral indigenous belief system which originated with the ancient Indo-European peoples. (On a side-note, the original definition of a ‘mystic’ was ‘one initiated into the Mysteries.’ And if, as legend suggests, Plato was such an initiate, then he was literally ‘a mystic’).

Plato is also said to have been initiated into Egyptian mysteries as was Pythagoras. But you are right, we can't ignore the mystic aspect of Platonism and try to force an exclusively atheistic or materialist interpretation on Platonic texts. Otherwise we take a dogmatic approach which to my understanding the discussion intended to avoid.

Quoting Amity

And wondered if you had anyone specific in mind.

I was thinking of passages like this:

[quote=Phaedo 69c; http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D69c] And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods.[/quote]

Quoting Amity

In general, it is a way of looking at the human condition; the bitter-sweet connections, the experiences of pain/pleasure.

Quoting Amity

Both Plato and Socrates are more than aware of the human condition - the interplay between body and mind. The need for a sense of humour...

You make some good points.

As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. Here are two examples from the Phaedo of Socrates laughing.


At 84d: "When Socrates heard this he laughed quietly " (or in other translations "gently")
At 115c: "laughing quietly" (serenely)

This looks interesting:

From the summary of the book "Plato's Laughter":

Counters the long-standing, solemn interpretation of Plato’s dialogues with one centered on the philosophical and pedagogical significance of Socrates as a comic figure.

Plato was described as a boor and it was said that he never laughed out loud. Yet his dialogues abound with puns, jokes, and humor. Sonja Madeleine Tanner argues that in Plato’s dialogues Socrates plays a comical hero who draws heavily from the tradition of comedy in ancient Greece, but also reforms laughter to be applicable to all persons and truly shaming to none. Socrates introduces a form of self-reflective laughter that encourages, rather than stifles, philosophical inquiry. Laughter in the dialogues—both explicit and implied—suggests a view of human nature as incongruous with ourselves, simultaneously falling short of, and superseding, our own capacities. What emerges is a picture of human nature that bears a striking resemblance to Socrates’ own, laughable depiction, one inspired by Dionysus, but one that remains ultimately intractable. The book analyzes specific instances of laughter and the comical from the Apology, Laches, Charmides, Cratylus, Euthydemus, and the Symposium to support this, and to further elucidate the philosophical consequences of recognizing Plato’s laughter. https://www.sunypress.edu/p-6468-platos-laughter.aspx

Quoting Amity

Socrates mentions his scornful and critical 'comic poet' - ? Aristophanes

Nietzsche said:

I know of nothing that has caused me to dream more on Plato’s secrecy and his sphinx nature than the happily preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his deathbed there was found no “Bible,” nothing Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic—but a volume of Aristophanes. How could even a Plato have endured life—a Greek life to which he said No—without an Aristophanes?

Reply to Wayfarer

The Sedley and Long translation is slightly different. But in 69d it says:

[quote=]For in fact, as those involved in the rites [mysteries] put it, "many carry the fennel-wand, but few are inspired". The latter, in my opinion, are none other than those who have pursued philosophy correctly. In trying to become one of them I left nothing undone in my life, at least as far as I could, but did my utmost in every way. Whether I did so correctly and achieved anything, I'll know for certain when I've got there, god willing, and I don't think it will be long.[/quote]

This and other statements would suggest that the speaker does see himself as a follower of the mystery traditions.

Quoting Wayfarer

Surely the expression that ‘there is an ancient doctrine that we’ve recalled’ signifies something more than here-say, in the context of one who believes that true knowledge is recollection of knowledge obtained before this life.

You seem to have missed the irony. They have recalled the doctrine. They have not recollected. It remains something they have been told rather than knowledge they have attained.

Quoting Fooloso4

The book analyzes specific instances of laughter and the comical from the Apology, Laches, Charmides, Cratylus, Euthydemus, and the Symposium to support this, and to further elucidate the philosophical consequences of recognizing Plato’s laughter.

No one denies that there is humor in Plato's dialogues but to dismiss them as "comedy" is stretching it too far. Plus, even comedy may have a spiritual message. Your conclusion doesn't follow from the facts.

Quoting Fooloso4

Nietzsche said ...

Yes. But on what grounds do we ignore or dismiss other views like those of later Platonic philosophers in favor of Nietzsche?

Quoting Fooloso4

They have recalled the doctrine. They have not recollected. It remains something they have been told rather than knowledge they have attained.

Yes, but they are vindicating the doctrine in 72c and 72d are they not?

If the living come back from the dead, this justifies belief in learning as recollection, as discussed at 72e ff

So, where is the "irony"?

Reply to Apollodorus I guess a verbal flourish can be difficult to translate.

I don't know what to say about that.

:up:

Phaedo 69c:And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods.

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

Quoting Fooloso4

But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

Well, if Socrates was not opposed to divine madness, why would he be opposed to the Bacchic rites?

And, anyway, at 72c and 72d he vindicates the doctrine of rebirth and of learning as recollection does he not?

So, the text does seem to have a spiritual message after all, and it isn't only "comedy"?

Thank you @Fooloso4 for https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538287
You are right the book you mentioned does sound interesting but expensive !!
Here is another : 'Laughter, Humor, and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy'

Quoting Book review by David Konstan

The introduction by the editors, Pierre Destrée and Franco V. Trivigno, explains the organization of the book in three sections, on the psychology of laughter, the norms that govern humor, and the way philosophers make use of humor in their works. In fact, there is no sharp division among the chapters, and, as is to be expected, a good deal of overlap.

As the editors note (8), the primary type of humor turns out to be abrasive or polemical, and Plato's treatment of humor in relation to phthonos ("envy," "malice") is a theme that runs throughout.

It is also the focus of the opening chapter, by Trivigno, who observes that "Plato's explicit theorizing about laughter and comedy is . . . focused on particular sorts of laughter that are presented as morally harmful" (13). Laughter poses a double danger: it threatens to become uncontrollable and overwhelms one's judgement, appealing as it does to the lower part of the soul. Furthermore, the pleasure it provides is mixed, as Plato argues in the Philebus, since the envious feel pain at the success of others even as they delight in the anticipation of their failure.

[b] In the Laws, however, Plato contemplates dividing "comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is playful [paizein] or not" (935D), the latter being free of animosity.

When Socrates makes fun of his interlocutors, Trivigno suggests, his humor is not hostile but aims at their moral improvement. Whether this counts as playful is perhaps questionable.[/b]

[my bolds]

Again, we see the opposites pain and delight > mixed pleasure.

Quoting frank

I guess a verbal flourish can be difficult to translate.

Sure. But he wasn't translating. He was reading Gallop's English translation.

1. How did he misread that?

2. Why was he so quick to read so much into his own misreading?

Quoting Fooloso4

As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done.

Indeed. And I have kept that in mind when reading.
It is something I am alert to in real life, including being aware of my own actions and if I follow my own advice. Some things are easier said than done :wink:

Reply to Apollodorus
BTW, Greeks, like others in the ancient world, were aware that great civilizations preceded them. They liked to think of themselves as descendants of the great elders (and they were, they just didn't know how as we do).

They would have been predisposed to honor old wisdom. We're the opposite. We think of ourselves as the highest point humanity has yet reached. We look with suspicion on our elders, ready to snicker at their folly.

So it probably helps to put ourselves in Plato's shoes in order to understand him.

Quoting frank

So it probably helps to put ourselves in Plato's shoes in order to understand him.

Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy? I think the evidence tends to suggest (1) as the correct answer.

Quoting Fooloso4

— Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites

Again, interesting information. I didn't know about the Bacchants.

Good to follow the continuing themes as outlined in the OP:
Quoting Fooloso4

As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories.

:cool:

The interplay.
The pain and the pleasure.
The chains and release.
Life and death.
Body and spirit.
The tragi-comedy of the human experience...

Quoting Fooloso4

There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

Of course there is. That is Plato's obvious method. But his play of opposites suggests that another reason for using humor may have been to provide a counterweight to the seriousness of the subject matter.

After all, spirit is light and joy. Humor is uplifting, while a somber mood may be depressing. And the purpose of philosophy is to elevate the spirit. Combining humor with metaphysical teachings does not seem to be a contradiction.

Quoting Apollodorus

Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy?

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world. :grin:

Quoting frank

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world

lol I think you might be right there. But maybe we should wait for the final verdict before we give up completely?

Quoting Amity

I didn't know about the Bacchants.

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed!

Socrates is quite clear it is not rites that purify:

Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and phronesis itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. (69c)

There is, however, one more piece of the puzzle:

There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.(69d)

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

Quoting Fooloso4

practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

I think that was already obvious. But practising moderation and courage and justice must be considered in the context of Socrates' belief in rebirth, etc. as discussed at 72a - 72d.

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)

As if to emphasize this change, Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

And Cebes said:

There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say.(95d-e)

After Cebes says this:

Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. (95e)

Then says:

"This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. (96a)

One might think that what will follow is a discussion of natural science.

Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it is. (96a)

But he did not find the answers he sought.

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97b-d)

Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his “second sailing” to find the cause. (99d).

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true. (99d-100a)

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself.

With his “second sailing” Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.

I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they
exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion. (100b-c)

Cebes does not really seem interested in the forms and agrees without question in order to get to the point that concerns him, the immortality of the soul.

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound. He settles instead for the “safest answer”. The image of sailing brings to mind, or rather, as we may recall, a “recollection” of the image of the raft sailing through life in the midst of danger.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

According to Simmias' image, if we cannot gain knowledge, the raft will be out of our control and tossed about, unless there is a more stable carrier, some divine account. Is Socrates’ safe account just such an account? What is the cost of passage?

Socrates “assumes” the existence of the Beautiful itself and a Good itself, and so on. He does not try to prove them and does not say how they actually relate to things.

Recollect also the following: Socrates said he persuades himself that what he says seems to be true, (91a) which is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. Is he trying to persuade himself that the forms seem to be true? Has he been successful? However we may answer this, one thing should be obvious: if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest.

Socrates ends with a very odd bit of advice:

Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. (101c-d)

When one is added to one it is not the addition of one to one that makes two but it is two by sharing in Twoness. Socrates tells him that he should “loudly exclaim” this. Yelling has seemed to take the place of persuasion by reason.

And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing both the beginning and what emerges out of it, if you wish to discover any truth … but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.”
What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together. (101d-102a)

Compare this to the description of dialectic the Republic:


"Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too." (511b)

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection.

Quoting Fooloso4

if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest.

I think you are missing some important points, e.g.:

1. Full recollection of past knowledge is not automatic. it needs training by means of philosophy, etc. and may require more than one lifetime to develop fully.

2. What you recollect in this life depends on what you knew in your past life or lives. If you were not a fully enlightened soul in your past life then you wouldn't have experienced Beauty Itself, Justice Itself, the Good Itself, and all the rest, and you couldn't recollect all that in this life.

Quoting Fooloso4

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed!

Thanks for further explanation.
Sometimes things need spelling out, even if they might seem obvious to others.

Even when things seem more clear or obvious as we discuss the dialogue, repetition does no harm.
Indeed, I think there are instances of such in the text. To reinforce or to replay the arguments all the better for analysis and assessment of any conclusions.
This helps to consolidate any short term 'Aha, got it!' or 'OK...but not quite there yet' into the long term memory. All the better for later recall. No rebirth required.

Memory recall or retrieval is remembering the information or events that were previously encoded and stored in the brain. Retrieval is the third step in the processing of memory, with first being the encoding of memory and second, being the storage of the memory. Retrieval of the encoded and stored memory is very important because otherwise there is no point in storing information.

I repeat the themes in my posts because it helps keep them in mind as I go.
For example: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538325

Quoting Fooloso4

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself.

Yes. I recall that, even if I am not overly familiar with it. Thanks for the memory :cool:
I had thought of it fleetingly in the previous discussion re chains and release. Freedom from the painful fetters - the pain gradually being eased as Socrates rubs his legs. It is a process.
Just like the pain and pleasure of reading a difficult text...

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round.

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace.

Quoting Fooloso4

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

Understood. But got a long way to go...thanks for being a guide along the way :sparkle:
Even if you are not an Absolutely Perfect Sage :wink:

Quoting Amity

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace.

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different.

Quoting Amity

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round.

Consider the following from my last post. Socrates says:

[quote]I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.(95d)/quote]

As I pointed out:

Quoting Fooloso4

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)

Also consider what Socrates says about incantations. Sometimes we come to believe something is true just through repetition.

Quoting Fooloso4

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different.

Have you considered that "others" possibly includes yourself?

The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”.

IMO the discussion so far has failed to show that Phaedo is a “comedy”.

If anything, it is a tragedy (???????? tragodia) in the traditional sense of drama invoking an accompanying catharsis, or a "pain [that] awakens pleasure", for the audience, with a very clear spiritual message.

In your own words, "Plato did write and he is a very capable storyteller, capable of the greatest music. His dialogues are akin to the work of the poets’ plays".

The fact is Plato is far greater than a "very capable storyteller" or "poet", as stressed time and again by later Platonists. So, the real question is for what reason you choose to deny this.

Quoting Apollodorus

The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”.

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc.

Quoting frank

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc.

"Drama" in the sense of "play". Obviously, not a conventional one. But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated?

Quoting Apollodorus

But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated?

If that's what it becomes for you, fine. The dialogue format was popular at the time. It's just the format Plato used.

I don't see a spiritual message. I see the expression of ideas that will course through philosophy for the next 2400 years.

To each his own?

Quoting frank

I don't see a spiritual message. I see the expression of ideas that will course through philosophy for the next 2400 years.

You don't have to see anything. The dialogues can be interpreted on many different levels, such as literal, allegorical, etc.

Platonism, by which I mean the philosophical and mystical tradition that regards itself as closely following Plato, does see a spiritual message in the dialogues, though.

But, as you say, "to each his own".

Quoting Apollodorus

Platonism, by which I mean the philosophical and mystical tradition that regards itself as closely following Plato, does see a spiritual message in the dialogues, though.

Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart?

I am enjoying this discussion so much. All the different points of view which lead to more intriguing questions. More food for thought:

Quoting SEP article: Plato's Myths

Plato was not willing to go as far as Socrates did. He preferred to address the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora.

He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less philosophically inclined audience. The dialogues are, most of the time, prefaced by a sort of mise en scène in which the reader learns who the participants to the dialogue are, when, where and how they presently met, and what made them start their dialogue.

The participants are historical and fictional characters. Whether historical or fictional, they meet in historical or plausible settings, and the prefatory mises en scène contain only some incidental anachronisms.

Plato wanted his dialogues to look like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely invented a great deal of them. References to traditional myths and mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues.

However, starting with the Protagoras and Gorgias, which are usually regarded as the last of his early writings, Plato begins to season his dialogues with self-contained, fantastical narratives that we usually label his ‘myths’. His myths are meant, among other things, to make philosophy more accessible.

As above:For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do. But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....


Myth can embody in its narrative an abstract philosophical doctrine. In the Phaedo, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection (72e–78b). The theory is there expounded in rather abstract terms. The eschatological myth of the Phaedo depicts the fate of souls in the other world, but it does not “dramatize” the theory of recollection.

33 - LAST JUDGMENTS: PLATO, POETRY AND MYTH
Peter Adamson

Plato criticized both the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod, and the tragic and comic poets. Yet he invented myths of his own. So what was his attitude towards literature and myth? Peter tackles this question in a final episode on Plato.

Audio Player - c. 20mins.
https://historyofphilosophy.net/plato-myth
The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps - King's College London.

Excellent, easy to listen to - knowledgeable with light touches of humour. Er.
I think the bit about Phaedo is roughly 12min in. But the whole thing including the background to the music at start is enjoyable :cool:

Reply to frank

From an interview with Stanley Rosen, an influential scholar who has written extensively on Plato:

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

Rosen demonstrates the approach in Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image.

A few more points from the interview that are worth considering:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

Reply to Fooloso4
The degree to which tidbits might be buried in what looks like offhand comments is very different issue to that of the dialogue's status as a play.

Quoting Fooloso4

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

That happens to be correct. But works of this type were not meant to be studied on your own because in that case you could reach any kind of conclusion that might be diametrically opposed to the author's own outlook. These texts were normally read under the guidance of a qualified teacher.

In any case, precisely because the dialogues are intended to stimulate the reader to think for himself, it doesn't seem proper to tell him from the start to stick to a materialist interpretation of the text. Let the reader decide for himself.

Quoting frank

Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart?

Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition.

Reply to frank

You said:

Quoting frank

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama.

In response I quoted Rosen making specific points as to the dialogues being dramas:

in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously.

there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer.

within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue

Quoting Fooloso4

within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue

That's what I'm saying, "drama" or play with a moral and spiritual content.

At the risk of going off piste for a minute. We can get back to discussing Plato's Phaedo whenever, or as soon as...

What is 'Platonism' ? It depends on your view. Some have already offered thoughts but don't give references.
Post your definitions or understanding here, or not. Preferably with links to sources.

Here's the SEP version:

Quoting SEP article on Platonism

Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view.

It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here.
In order to remain neutral on this question, the term ‘platonism’ is spelled with a lower-case ‘p’. (See entry on Plato.)

The most important figure in the development of modern platonism is Gottlob Frege (1884, 1892, 1893–1903, 1919). The view has also been endorsed by many others, including Kurt Gödel (1964), Bertrand Russell (1912), and W.V.O. Quine (1948, 1951).

Or I suppose another thread can be started by Platonists or spin-offs ?

But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....

I think that this is correct. It is something that I have been attempting to show. Cebes and Simmias are the image of just such non-philosophical readers and listeners. They have to have their childish fears charmed away by myth and incantations.
By contrast:

For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do.

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere.

Quoting Fooloso4

It is something that I have been attempting to show

Yes. I have been attempting to understand and slowly getting there.
I think most careful readers and followers of this discussion can see and appreciate your approach to this.

Quoting Fooloso4

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere.

Yes. It is unfortunate.
However, interesting questions have been raised and I have learned more than I would have if I had just stuck to the text.
I am trying to do both. Not easy.
Hopefully this will lead to a better understanding :sparkle:

Quoting Apollodorus

Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition.

He was influenced by Neoplatonism. I think Hegel also came across a brand of it, but that'd be for some other thread.

Anyway, which part of Phaedo reminds you of Hegel's take on oppositions?

Quoting Fooloso4

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere.

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?

To zoom out a little.
For those interested in interpretations. 'Methodologies for Reading Plato' :

Quoting Christopher Rowe

Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them—more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions;

and among literary interpreters, who insist on the literary and dramatic form of Plato’s works and argue that we can no more read off his intentions from what he puts in the mouths of his characters than we can infer what an Aeschylus thought from what he has his Clytemnestra or Cassandra say.

But one problem faced by both of these approaches, as by the skeptics of the New Academy, is that of explaining why, if they are right, certain ideas keep recurring in the corpus...

...Platonic metaphysics, that backbone of historical Platonism, also looks comfortably at home in an ethical context, insofar as it places a reconfigured goodness, beauty, and justice within the very structure of things—however it may be that Plato thought that trick could be pulled. Indeed, without that context (and without its inventive elaboration and re-elaboration by successions of Platonists and idealists), it can look as unmotivated as it appeared to an unsympathetic Aristotle.

Just a few snippets from this article which has 12 short sections !
OK enough already... back to the text...

Reply to frank

From the Rosen interview:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

And from @Amity above:

Quoting Christopher Rowe

Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them —more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions

Quoting Amity

Platonic metaphysics, that backbone of historical Platonism, also looks comfortably at home in an ethical context, insofar as it places a reconfigured goodness, beauty, and justice within the very structure of things—however it may be that Plato thought that trick could be pulled. Indeed, without that context (and without its inventive elaboration and re-elaboration by successions of Platonists and idealists), it can look as unmotivated as it appeared to an unsympathetic Aristotle

Well, we understand that. But I think that what needs to be established is whether metaphysical concepts such as "forms"/"ideas", "soul", "rebirth", etc. occur in the dialogues. If they do, then it is legitimate for traditional Platonists to extract metaphysical teachings from the dialogues irrespective of Plato's actual intention that, incidentally, is impossible to determine beyond reasonable doubt.

In other words, if the true and only intention of the dialogues is to stimulate thought or reason, how can we claim that they should stimulate the reader exclusively in a materialist sense? It seems to be a self-contradictory claim.

Quoting Fooloso4

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere.

Well, Socrates says many things in the dialogues. He certainly seems to agree with traditional Platonic concepts such as soul, immortality and rebirth as at 72a - 72d etc.

Incidentally, although the structure of the Platonic texts has been compared to that of a drama or play, the true setting of Plato’s dialogues is more akin to a symposium.

Symposium - Wikipedia

Symposia (“drinking together”) were central to the Greek cultural context in which philosophers like Socrates and Plato operated. They were the part of banquets after a communal meal held in honor of the gods, when drinking of wine tempered with water (hence the Greek term ????? crasi, literally "mixed" for wine) was accompanied by games, music and discussions among the men. There were big differences between symposia. Philosophical symposia naturally revolved around philosophical discussions (and not around sexual or other such activities as sometimes erroneously assumed).

The dialogues taking place in works like Phaedo are very much like conversations that would have taken place in a philosophical symposium, from which satire or humor would not be lacking.

So, the dialogues may be seen as a combination of dramatic performance and symposium.

In terms of the dialogues' function of stimulating thought, though they may not provide a "dogma" as such, they do provide moral and metaphysical concepts such as justice, immortality, rebirth, etc. that can guide the reader's thought in a moral and metaphysical-mystical direction, should the reader be so inclined.

Quoting Fooloso4

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection.

Lies to children are simplified versions of the truth, containing intentional lies that cover deeper, more detailed or complex issues in order to explain the overall picture.

Wittgenstein's ladder is different int hat it is necessary to climb the ladder in order to then dispose of it.

Is what we have read so fr a lie-to-children or Wittgenstein's ladder? Is Socrates engaged in pedagogy, or is this a necessary logical step in the argument?

Reply to Banno

That's a good question. I don't think it is a step in logical argument, but I do think that Plato intends for the most thoughtful of us to work through the logic of the accounts he gives. In the next section that I will present (probably tomorrow) he will call the "safe answer" he proposes here as a hypothesis , an "ignorant" or "unlearned" answer, and will propose another.

I think the main purpose is rhetorical. It is the pharmakon against misologic. (89d) The truth is, logos or accounts or arguments cannot accomplish what is hoped for, knowledge of the fate of the soul. But this is not a truth they are ready to hear. Socrates does not want them to give up on philosophy so here he resorts to the myth of recollection, with its promise of knowledge and the safe passage of the soul to Hades and back. In the Republic to the story of the ascent from the cave to transcendent knowledge of the whole. This story in particular has inspired generations to pursue philosophy. And, as Nietzsche nicely sums it up, Christianity becomes Platonism for the people.

This discussion has taken me beyond reading the text. Before I return, one last step out...

Reading Rowe's article, I understand that interpretations of Plato's dialogues lie on a spectrum; the neoplatonist and a reductionist analytical approach being at opposite ends.
The approach taken by @Fooloso4 is analytical; with fine attention to detail.
However, there is no reduction to argument and counterargument alone.
There is much more colour...

Quoting Fooloso4

...with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done.

I appreciate that even with his level of expertise, it is not only a challenge to decipher the dialogue but to present and discuss any understanding.

The article excerpts I found useful :
VIII. The Problems of Cherry-Picking
Quoting Christopher Rowe

A second problem with both the Neoplatonist and the analytical approach is that their choice of contexts and issues, and indeed of dialogues, to privilege over others is too obviously dictated by their own preoccupations...

Neoplatonizing accounts catch something of the larger picture in which this critique is framed while either missing the critique itself altogether or representing it one-sidedly in terms of oppositions between soul and body, human and divine, descent and ascent.

Such oppositions clearly are Platonic, but they are at one end of a spectrum that also includes, and more frequently, a carefully reasoned, hand-to-hand engagement with people and their ideas: an engagement that presents alternatives that look to this life as much as to anything beyond it.

For their part, analytical interpreters may end up failing even more spectacularly to capture the passionate tone of the Platonic dialogues, by reducing them—at least by implication—to a locus for quasi-academic 26 argument and counterargument.

IX. Two Worlds or One?
Quoting Christopher Rowe

The last section has implicitly proposed a compromise on another of the dividing lines between interpreters of Plato.

On the one hand there are those who think he believes in another world, over and above this world of ours, inhabited as it were by the ideal forms and by gods and other purified souls, to which it is our business to make our own way, even in this life, by (as Socrates puts it in the Phaedo) “practising for death.” Such a reading 27 accompanies a literal interpretation of the eschatological myths, which are there, on this view, to terrify us into changing our ways if we cannot be persuaded by argument.

But there is also another view of Plato’s position, namely that the talk of another world is at bottom metaphorical and that the myths in question are chiefly allegories of this life. What is clear is that there are grounds, in Plato’s texts, for both readings; the problem for the interpreter is to know how to make room for both.

Quoting Fooloso4

This story in particular has inspired generations to pursue philosophy. And, as Nietzsche nicely sums it up, Christianity becomes Platonism for the people.

And everything that Nietzsche said is true, of course. How could it possibly be otherwise?

But I think you have failed to show that the dialogues are "comedy" or that Plotinus, Proclus and other Platonists are inconsistent with Plato.

Quoting Amity

The approach taken by Fooloso4 is analytical

Based on the divisions in the article you cite my approach would be "Straussian":

Historically important modes of interpretation, like the Neoplatonic, and their modern counterparts—“unitarian,” “developmentalist,” analytical, esoteric, and Straussian

By contrast Leo Strauss and his followers specifically start from the multiplicity of the dialogues and the characters, situations, and conversations in them. At least in its original form, “Straussianism” is probably—at least in principle—the most sensitive of all approaches to the Platonic corpus (other than the most exclusively literary) to its dramatic aspects. Its methodology is hard to summarize but can perhaps fairly be said to consist in trying to see how the choice of characters, their setting, and their interactions affect the apparent outcomes of the argument.

From an earlier post:

Quoting Fooloso4

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others.

These are the people I read and whom I have learned the most from.

An important statement from Strauss's student Stanley Rosen:

Quoting Fooloso4

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:

Quoting frank

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?

Quoting Fooloso4

my approach would be "Straussian":

I thought as much.

Quoting Fooloso4

Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen...
— Fooloso4
These are the people I read and whom I have learned the most from.

I had absorbed this but my recall is rubbish !

The Rosen quote is referenced in the Rowe article in Section X - Hidden Meanings ?
which says more about the Straussian approach and the different versions:

Quoting Christopher Rowe

One of the central features of such an approach is its deployment of the concept of (Socratic) irony. It appears that one can never take anything anyone says in a dialogue at face value; to see what we are to make of any statement or proposal, an interpreter has to stand back and ask how it relates to everything else that is said or done in that particular dialogue.

That looks fine, up to a point, and especially as a corrective to overliteral interpretations of the texts that refuse to take notice of context, dramatic or otherwise. The trouble is that this way of proceeding lends itself too easily to abuse. Thus what began in Strauss himself as an interesting method with the potential for plausible readings, not least of the Republic, has hardened, in the hands of some of his epigoni, into the treatment of Plato as an advocate for a conservative politics:

I have returned to the pdf text and Librivox audio files in an effort to catch up.
Just finished listening to audio 3 which corresponds roughly to pp16-26 ( 70d - 78b)
Also to your discussion, here ( about 6 days ago ! )
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535924

The first 2 Arguments for the Soul's Immortality:
1. Opposites/Cyclical
2. Recollection

Still thinking about them. But when it comes to comedy - listening to the audio really brings it out.
The request to be reminded of the Recollection proof: 'Not sure that I remember the doctrine !'.

Quoting Fooloso4

...An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different

I had remembered the story of how Socrates helped someone work through a problem but couldn't recall who or where ! And yes, it made me wonder again just how much of this Recollection argument is more about stilling the fears of the 'child within us' - Cebes and Simmias.
Anxiety about losing Socrates continues.
Socrates gives some counselling:
There are plenty of 'charmers' in Greece - incantations to reduce fear.
However, I think the final words at 78b say it best:

And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.'
'That shall certainly be done,' said Cebes; '

It does help to have a guiding hand...in this world...
Going forward and reaching back even as we speak.

Quoting Fooloso4

Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?
— frank

Indeed. As if what counts as drawing out a significant idea is separate from someone's interpretation :brow:

Quoting Christopher Rowe

Thus what began in Strauss himself as an interesting method with the potential for plausible readings, not least of the Republic, has hardened, in the hands of some of his epigoni, into the treatment of Plato as an advocate for a conservative politics:

I agree. One time I shared my concern about this with Rosen. He said that this is why he deliberately tried to distance himself from the "Straussians". More recently there has been a split between "East Coast" and "West Coast" Straussians over the conservative activism of those on the west/right. Whereas Rosen emphasizes the unresolved problems, they have convinced themselves that they have the answers. It is remarkable how Strauss has engendered such a wide, varying, and opposing set of views.

Quoting Amity

But when it comes to comedy - listening to the audio really brings it out.
The request to be reminded of the Recollection proof: 'Not sure that I remember the doctrine !'.

I am glad you caught that. Plato's playfulness goes unnoticed by those searching for his doctrines,

Quoting Amity

Socrates gives some counselling:
There are plenty of 'charmers' in Greece - incantations to reduce fear.
However, I think the final words at 78b say it best:

And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.'
'That shall certainly be done,' said Cebes; '

And to be clear, Socrates is talking about myths and those involved in the cults of mystical rites. Some here are advocating that we pay attention to them but ignore what Socrates says about them. If they are to be looked at, it should be from this perspective if looking at them is intended to shed light on the dialogue.

Quoting Fooloso4

And to be clear, Socrates is talking about myths and those involved in the cults of mystical rites. Some here are advocating that we pay attention to them but ignore what Socrates says about them. If they are to be looked at, it should be from this perspective if looking at them is intended to shed light on the dialogue

You keep saying "to be clear", but it isn't at all clear what you are on about.

Nobody says we should ignore what Socrates says about myths. But then nor should we ignore the other things he says regarding soul, immortality, and rebirth.

Either the dialogues are intended to stimulate thought or they are not. If they are, we can't ignore the fact that myths may have some truth in them and just dismiss them out of hand. The dialogues merely demand that we don't accept tradition unthinkingly, not that we become nihilists, atheists or communists.

Reply to Fooloso4
So how would you sum up Phaedo in a few words (if you had to)?

Quoting frank

So how would you sum up Phaedo in a few words (if you had to)?

Are you joking or just ignoring what has been said?

Quoting Fooloso4

Are you joking or just ignoring what has been said?

You're not able to sum up your view?

@Apollodorus
So we have one vote for "can't give a summation"

How would you package your view?

Quoting frank

How would you package your view?

Very briefly, I see Phaedo as a combination of philosophical discussion as would take place during a symposium and a drama or play. It encourages analytical and critical thinking and points to a higher plane of experience that may be reached by way of reason but that can only be fully "lived" or "realized" in mystical experience. Concepts like soul, immortality, rebirth, forms/ideas etc. all point in the same metaphysical direction but together with moral concepts like virtues and justice have a practical application in the attempt to build a better society.

Reply to Apollodorus Excellent.

My summation (super tiny):

Phaedo is a vehicle by which Plato presents antithesis to materialistic ideas that were developing at the time.

His strategy is to point to aspects of thought that seem to rule out a materialistic view. The significance to "point out" is that per one the arguments, the ideas he presents can't be taught. They can only be revealed through examples and stories meant to uncover them for the reader.

One of the first ideas has to do with the apparently inherent imperfection of things sensed. The point here is related to aesthetics. If we examine a greek statue, it may seem perfect from a distance, but when we get closer, we'll see little imperfections here and there. This is fascinating notion that many people have realized long before encountering Plato. Maybe because Plato is just endemic to Western thought at this point? Or maybe Plato was right: some ideas are just native?

Another fascinating idea he presents will haunt philosophy for thousands of years, all the way to the 20th Century. It was in Aristotle, Kant, in Heidegger and Merleau Ponty, Schopenhauer and so on. It's that a thing has meaning relative to its opposite.

He also talks about forms and such.

In short, it's a philosophical smorgasbord wrapped up in a charming little dialogue (it's not a play).

Quoting Apollodorus

"What has been said" by whom? Are you taking us for a ride or something?

In case there are some here who are seeing this and might be confused, read the quoted statements above by Rowe and Rosen. The desire for a neat little "package" tied with a pretty bow is antithetical to an educated reading of the dialogues.

Quoting fdrake

this thread is an earnest attempt to engage with the text of Plato's Phaedo, if you are unable or unwilling to do so, take it elsewhere. I invite people to flag posts in this thread that they believe are not strictly on topic and I (or someone else) will moderate them accordingly.

Thank you for the deletion of flagged posts and for continued moderation.

The best and safest hypothesis according to Socrates is the hypothesis of kinds (eidos or Forms). Two “shares in the reality” of Twoness, one in the reality of Oneness. Recall that the discussion of Socrates second sailing came up from the need for a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction (96a)


Mind arranges things according to their kind, that is, what kind of thing it is. But the arrangement according to kinds is only part of the story. Things are as they are, according to this hypothesis, because it is best that they be this way.

What happens when we use this hypothesis to investigate the cause of generation and destruction? It would seem that living things are alive because they share in the reality of Life and things that are dead because of the reality of Death. It follows that it is best that living things are alive and dead things dead.

There are two problems with this. First, it contradicts the argument that things come to be from their opposites. Second, it undermines what Socrates said about life being a prison and being alive the destruction of the soul by the body (95d). Unless, of course, it is better to be a slave and better that the body destroy the soul.

Socrates introduces the forms Bigness and Smallness.

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

At this point an unnamed listener speaks up. Phaedo says he does not remember who it was. (103a) What is the significance of this? Perhaps the anonymous participant is the model for the anonymous reader who does not accept what is said but questions it.

"By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now think we are saying that this would never happen?" (103a)

Socrates responds:

… you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the
opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another." At the same time he looked to Cebes and said: "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?" (103b-c)

The anonymous man to whom he turns and then turns away from is not given a chance to respond and does not interrupt. While it is true that Socrates was talking about things coming to be and now the Forms themselves, there is the problem of how they are related.

Although it appears that Socrates simply dismisses what the unnamed man said, the conversation moves in that direction. Socrates says:

Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. (105b-c)

Why would Socrates have previously gotten them to agree with an answer he now says is an ignorant one? Is Socrates’ new safe answer different from the answers he rejected as a young man because in part they made use of the senses? But how could he now know that fire is hot without the senses?

Before his second sailing Socrates rejected natural causes including heat, cold, and fire. (96b) As well, or so it seemed, to two being the result of adding one to one. He claimed that the safe
answer was caused by twoness. Upon closer reading, however, what he was saying is that neither the one added or the one added to becomes two. (96e) In other words, each one remains one and together they are two.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. We must consider how this relates to the Forms, which are each always one even when combined.

The significance of the unnamed man’s challenge now becomes evident.

Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul. (105c)

It is not, as the ignorant answer would have it, Life that makes a body living but soul.

Now the soul does not admit death?—No.
So the soul is deathless?—It is.
Very well, he said. Shall we say that this has been demonstrated, do you think?
Very sufficiently demonstrated indeed, Socrates. (105e)

But has it?

Well now, Cebes, he said, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?—Of course.
And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true. (106a)
Socrates is now doing exactly what he criticized the unnamed man for doing, mixing things and Forms of things. The Form Uneven can never become even, but three things are not indestructible. When the Hot is brought to snow it does not retreat safe and unthawed, it melts. The Form Cold, however, if the Forms are indestructible, would not be destroyed when the snow is.

One might object that the Forms “Triad” and “Snow” are indestructible, but this points to the problem of Socrates’ distinction between Forms and things. When it snows it is not the Form Snow that snows.

Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. (106b)

The Cold in snow is indestructible, but snow is not. If the soul is like snow then it too would be destroyed. But Socrates has confused Cebes, and no doubt some readers.

So the Soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said? (105d)

The opposite of what the soul brings along is Death. In accord with what has been said, snow brings Cold and three Odd. Snow cannot admit Hot without being destroyed. Three cannot admit Even and remain three. So, soul cannot admit Death and remain soul.

Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death. (106e)

According the examples, when the opposite approaches - Hot or Even, the Cold in snow and the Odd in three retreats. But if it is the soul in body that retreats then what is the opposite of soul that approaches?

Socrates has not been able to navigate the ship to safety. They are in treacherous waters, in danger of being shipwrecked, just as Simmias feared.

Quoting Banno

Is what we have read so fr a lie-to-children or Wittgenstein's ladder? Is Socrates engaged in pedagogy, or is this a necessary logical step in the argument?

The dialogue of Cratylus approaches your question from a particular point of view. Cratylus claims names are natural entities while Socrates argues that they are assigned values. The argument is not rancorous. Cratylus won't be climbing the ladder with Socrates. Pedagogy is dispensed sparingly.

Quoting Fooloso4

The best and safest hypothesis according to Socrates is the hypothesis of kinds (eidos or Forms). Two “shares in the reality” of Twoness, one in the reality of Oneness.

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"?

Quoting Phaedo 85c-d

to acquire clear knowledge ...
[1] either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters,
[2] or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers,
[3] unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation

This epistemic approach might appear to match the powers and methods of the three parts of the tripartite soul. The tuning might then be finding the right balance among the three parts, however way Plato might think that possible.

To know a Form, Socrates has already proposed that [2] cannot possibly be sufficient, with only [3] having any chance of success as anamnesis gained through prodding one's own inner soul/mind and not as originating based on samples of individuals hypothetically grouped from the outside world.

Quoting Phaedo 73c

when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?

Quoting magritte

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"?

Thanks for your contribution. I am not sure I understand you. But based on what I think you are getting at.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. In one sense a half and a half is two, but in another it is one.

But with regard to twoness:

And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness ... (101c-d)

Note the similarity to the quote from 73e.

He is not claiming that Twoness is a thing known. It is an hypothesis.

From my discussion of recollection at 73 :

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something.

Cebes is unaware of the problem and says that he is completely satisfied with Socrates’ account of the deathlessness of the soul and has nothing further to say. (107a)

Simmias says he has some lingering distrust:

I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the bigness and importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some lingering distrust within myself about what we have said. (107b)

Socrates responds:

Not only that, Simmias. What you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses - even if to all of you they’re trustworthy - must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety. And if you sort them out sufficiently, you will, as I think, be following up the argument as much as its possible for human beings to follow it. And should this very thing become sure, you’ll search no further. (107b)

Socrates is telling them that they should not be so ready to accept what is said as the truth. There seems to be a play on a double sense of human weakness, the limits of human argument and Simmias’ ongoing concern that death means our destruction, that we are too weak to endure. In any case, there is a limit we human beings cannot go beyond, and we should not search further. That limit occurs at death.

Socrates leaves it there for us to sort it out. Generation and destruction are each one and together two, but it is by the division of what is one, that is, the cycle of generation and destruction, that they become two. Socrates has identified two causes: mental and physical. Mind arranges or orders things according to their kind or Form. Things are not Forms, they come to be and perish. We can now see the difference between Socrates’ unlearned or ignorant hypothesis and the one that has replaced it. The first used only Forms and could not account for things coming to be and perishing. It was a static model that did not allow for change. But change itself needs an account. The two accounts must be unified, made one, by the good, that is, by an account of why it is best that things are as they are. This has not been done.

The discussion of generation and destruction is guided by two considerations that at first may seem odd to have conjoined: physical causes and number. The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death.

According to Cebes’ argument, body and soul are each one and together are two, each separate and distinct. Weaving is an ordering or arrangement. Arrangement or ordering, an activity Socrates attributes to Mind. The act of weaving requires something physically acting on something else that is physical. A disembodied soul cannot be a weaver. Unless the two are one, the man Socrates is cut in two.

Simmias’ account is physical. Body and soul are not separate entities, they are one. A harmony. But harmony is one from many. An attunement is an arrangement. A purely physical account is not adequate either. This is why Socrates initially rejected physical causes but later reintroduced them after the introduction of Mind. Physical things cannot order themselves without Mind.

The problem with Simmias’ account is that if body and soul are one then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. Socrates attempts to separate them in order to save the soul, but can only do so by blurring the distinction between the Form Soul and a soul. If Soul is imperishable it does not follow that Socrates’ soul is. The human soul is átopos, literally, without place, unclassifiable,. It is not a Form and not a physical thing. If there is no distinction between Soul and Socrates’ soul, then it would not be Socrates’ soul that is undying. The fate of Socrates in death is not assured by the fate of Soul. Just as the snow is destroyed at the approach of heat, Socrates’ soul is destroyed at the approach of death, while Snow and Soul remain unchanged Forms.

He turns back to stories that have been told:

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here.(107e)

The trustworthiness of the story is not questioned. This seems to be because arguments have come to its end, and stories are all that is left. In his last minutes Socrates turns from Hades to the Earth. It is here that he has been all along. (61d)

His tale of the Earth mixes science and myth. The Earth is a sphere in the middle of heaven balanced at rest without support or force. It is very large and we live in only a small portion of it, “like ants or frogs around a swamp”. Many other peoples live in many other similar parts.

Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where the stars are situated … We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other,heavenly bodies through the water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the upper
limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light and the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water. (109b - 110a)

There are similarities and differences between this story and the allegory of the cave in the Republic. In both stories humans are unaware of their true condition and believe that what they see is the whole of things as they are. The cave images are human artifacts, but what is seen in the hollows is by the nature of our condition.

What the humans say is based on what is seen or experienced. Because of the limits of our experience there are natural limits to our arguments. Myths have no natural limits. In both stories there is an image of an ascent to the truth, a journey from here to There. We have no experience of death and so Socrates’ arguments are not strong enough to transcend that limit. His myths of death, the journey from here to There, are myths about the ascent to truth.

It is only in myth that Socrates can find what is sought in argument: the good. Why it is best that things be as they are. In the myth we find:

The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is
superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their
happiness is in accord with this. (111 b-c)

But the question of the good of the whole is not complete without the inclusion of human actions:

Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. (113d)

Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. (114c)

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)

Crito asks about final instructions. Socrates says they should take care of their own selves.(115b)

Socrates goes into a chamber to bathe. What should we make of this? Why care for his body when the whole time he has been treating it without regard and even with contempt?

Despite all that Socrates has said to convince his friends that what is happening is a good thing, they are distraught:

So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again
talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. (116a-b)

Socrates, on the other hand, did not appear to be troubled at all as he took the cup and drank.


Perhaps the appropriate question is not whether this is a comedy or a tragedy but rather the question of how we choose to persuade ourselves. One might wonder how this can be seen as a comedy. To begin to answer that question we might consider that Socrates himself did not regard his life or its end as a tragedy. This is so not because of what happened but because of how he judges. Argument cannot reveal the good, why it is best that things are as they are. Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best.

Being told he could not, as he ironically requested, pour a libation (117b), he says:

“I understand but I suppose I am allowed to, and indeed should, pray to the gods that my emigration from here to There may turn out to be a fortunate one. That’s just what I am praying for - and may it be so!” And with these words he put the cup to his lips and downed it with great readiness and relish. (117c)… these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius (118a)

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

Reply to Fooloso4The Theaetetus, so often taken as an argument for knowledge as justified true belief, ends with no such conclusion. We are left with the same doubt here; not a lack of progress, but the absence of closure. The task left to those present is to continue the discussion.

It was this that caught my eye in your comments on reincarnation, and that had me encouraging you to produce this thread. I find an uncertain Socrates far more agreeable than a dogmatic Socrates.

Thank you for your efforts. I trust the thread was worth your while, perhaps in terms of ordering your understanding, perhaps in terms of addressing the various comments here.

Reply to Banno

You are right, The Theaetetus, as well as many of the other dialogues, ends in aporia. What is less well known or agreed upon is that there are also aporia in Aristotle. Some recent work addresses this.

In my opinion, and I am not alone, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all zetetic skeptics - driven by the knowledge that they did not know to inquire.

Another thing worth pointing out in the Theaetetus is that there is no mention of recollection. It would be here, in a dialogue devoted to knowledge, that one would expect to find it if it was something he accepted.

Quoting Banno

I trust the thread was worth your while ...

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter. I know that there are some here who admire Plato who did not appreciate what I had to say because it runs counter to their own assumptions. But running counter to assumptions is fundamental to Socrates and Plato.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

Reply to Fooloso4 Thanks again. It's amusing to see the putative Father of Philosophy engaging in anti-philosophy.

Reply to Fooloso4
I learned a lot.
The absence of Plato in the discussion is very strange set against the work to make the dialogues a report of what Socrates said. There is something about the distance from what happened that frames the dialogues.

Quoting Valentinus

I learned a lot.

I am glad to hear that.

Quoting Fooloso4

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

I've been following along, and thanks for your patient explication. This thread has taught me to pay more attention to the detail - particularly the objections from the various interlocutors, and the subtlety of some of the distinctions made in the arguments. Also one thing I do commend is your emphasis on interpreting the texts on their own terms and being aware of hidden interpretive agendas. (Although I think I'm probably one of those you have in mind when you say that you challenge my own assumptions, but I'm also confident that if I concentrate hard enough, I wouldn't have too much trouble defending them. )

I wonder if you're familiar with Katja Vogt. She is a contemporary professor of philosophy at Columbia. She's the author of the SEP article on ancient skepticism.

I bought her book, Belief and Truth, on the basis of the [url=https://katjavogt.github.io/belief-and-truth/]abstact on her website -

In Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, I explore a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs, doxai, are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.” As I argue, this is a serious philosophical proposal. It speaks to intuitions we are likely to share, but it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief. Belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things.

although I found it a very hard book to read, in part because it's one of those academic texts where the footnotes seem to make up about two thirds of every other page, and I didn't make a lot of headway with it at the time. I will go back to it.

However, I think there's an underlying tension between scepticism ancient and modern. I think that it's because modern sceptics tend to be scientific sceptics - for many, scepticism implicitly pertains to non-scientific claims, the natural target of which is religion, which is invariably depicted in terms of unjustified belief, whereas those claims that can be tested against empirical evidence can be regarded as justified. That seems the natural faultline in today's culture.

But I think the ancient sceptics were sceptical in a completely different way, that is, they were sceptical of the testimony of the senses. Which means that, in some sense, they are sceptical of the reality of the empirical world. insofar as this is something only ever known by the senses. For instance, Vogt says in the SEP article:

In the Timaeus, Plato argues that an account of the natural world can only be ‘likely’: it is an eikôs logos. Most generally speaking, the idea here is that certain explananda are such that theorizing about them can do no more than mirror their, comparatively speaking deficient, nature. This idea has ancestors in Xenophanes and Parmenides, and it plays a crucial role in the Timaeus (Bryan 2012).

So that might be a form of scepticism, but it's nothing like today's scientific scepticism, I would contend. Likewise, as is well-known, it is thought that Pyrrho of Elis, an important source of ancient scepticism, was influenced by the Buddhist philosophers of Gandhara who taught the 'doctrine of cessation' which was very similar to his 'doctrine of ataraxia' (see Everard Flintoff, Pyrrho and india). But because in today's culture, we identify Buddhism with religion, then it is naturally assumed that it must be a form of belief, and so, must be incompatible with scepticism.

Also, there's another couple of passages in the Phaedo that I would like to revisit, (although I'm finding it difficult to concentrate on it, as I have many other balls in the air right at the moment.) But I will certainly be appending some more questions and comments on the text.

Thanks @Fooloso4 for providing this commentary and replying to comments/questions.

Quoting Fooloso4

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter

I have no particular fondness for Plato - he gives me such a hard time !
You are right, the details matter and, of course, you have left pieces out (otherwise it would be a book !). They possibly contain some less important details...but then again...
I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over, here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534770
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534835
Perhaps it was discussed later and I missed it ?

All in all, it helped me gain a far greater understanding than I had before.
Admittedly, not difficult given my beginner's starting point.

Quoting Banno

I trust the thread was worth your while, perhaps in terms of ordering your understanding, perhaps in terms of addressing the various comments here.

Quoting Fooloso4

I look forward to a dialogue about this dialogue.

As noted, I have struggled on a few levels: To read the text, analyse and understand it. At the same time as keeping up with the commentary and comments. Also, discovering the whole spectrum of interpretations...
For me, the pace was about as twice as fast as I would have liked.
I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too...

Quoting Wayfarer

This thread has taught me to pay more attention to the detail - particularly the objections from the various interlocutors, and the subtlety of some of the distinctions made in the arguments. Also one thing I do commend is your emphasis on interpreting the texts on their own terms and being aware of hidden interpretive agendas.

Likewise. Also, this:
Quoting Wayfarer

there's another couple of passages in the Phaedro that I would like to revisit, (although I'm finding it difficult to concentrate on it, as I have many other balls in the air right at the moment.) But I will certainly be appending some more questions and comments on the text.

I have been following the text and audio files as recommended:
Quoting Fooloso4

http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Plato_files/310585462-Plato-Phaedo.pdf

https://librivox.app/book/4421

Different translations.
So, after audio 2 of the 8 files, I decided to list a rough correspondence to the text :

2. ends at 70b-d > ( c. 20 mins)
3. 70d - 78b > pp 16-26 ( 24m)
4. 78b - 84b > 26-34 ( 21m)
5. 84c - 95a > 34-46 (33m)
6. 95a - 102a > 46-54 (17m)
7. 102b - 108c > 54-63 (21m)
8. > final segment (27m)

I hope this encourages any other beginner trying to read or follow/participate in the discussion.
Quoting Fooloso4

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

I am sure that, given the view count (1.3K) there could well be a few...

Also, as linked to earlier:
Quoting IEP article Plato: Phaedo

Outline of the Dialogue

The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
The Cyclical Argument (70c-72e)
The Argument from Recollection (72e-78b)
The Affinity Argument (78b-84b)
Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
The Objections (85c-88c)
Interlude on Misology (89b-91c)
Response to Simmias (91e-95a)
Response to Cebes (95a-107b)
Socrates’ Intellectual History (96a-102a)
The Final Argument (102b-107b)
The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
Socrates’ Death (115a-118a)

* the audio files are great and help identify the tones, especially those of humour...
Best not to read in bed - unless suffering from insomnia - they have a hypnotic quality :yawn:

Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”

I don't know the context but this seems to be overstating the problem. Belief should be critically examined but where it cannot be replaced by knowledge it is all we have to work with. In the quest for knowledge saying that it is shameful might be a rallying cry but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all begin with the examination of opinion and end it aporia; thereby providing knowledge that we do not know.

You are right about their zetetic skepticism being something different from modern skepticism. Modern skepticism, as I understand it, occurs as the result of representational theories of perception. What we see are representations in the mind. We cannot step outside these representations to determine whether things are as we represent them. It also differs from Pyrrhonian skepticism. The goal of zetetic skeptic is not the suspension of judgment. It is an inquiry into what seems best or most likely to be true, while fully aware that what seems to be may not be what is.

Quoting Amity

I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over

The issue arises because of Socrates' choice to stay in Athens and drink the poison rather than flee. To some this seems like suicide, but it is questionable whether not doing everything you can to save your life amounts to suicide. In the Crito Socrates gives his reasons for his decision to stay.

At the end he does not simply calmly drink the poison, he:

downed it with great readiness and relish.

I don't think this is an indication of suicide but rather his eagerness to find out what happens next, if anything. And, of course, if death is nothingness then he won't find out.


There is also another issue: if being dead is so much better than the prison of life why not escape. Socrates appeals to the gods and our being their servants, but I do not know if there is a better argument to be found in the dialogue.

Quoting Amity

I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too...

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview.

Thanks for more about the issue of 'suicide'. I am still pondering...

Quoting Fooloso4

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview.

Quoting Amity

I hope this encourages any other beginner trying to read or follow/participate in the discussion.
I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.
— Fooloso4
I am sure that, given the view count (1.3K) there could well be a few...

Yes, that might be helpful. As you know, I am not a complete 'beginner'. However, every time there's a book discussion I certainly feel like one as I try to navigate the path to understanding.
Would be great to have a World Wide Map. The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy starring Plato and friends.

If you take this path, then this is where you end up. Great scenery but tough hill to climb.
There's a short cut here...for those less able.
Isn't that what Plato did - catering for 2 types of audience - Arguments v Myths ?
What is the final destination - why - what motivation is there to set out in the first place ?
All types of travellers...

So, any cartographers out there ?
Can you draw a picture of the highly structured overview: 'The Examined Life: Notes on Plato's Phaedo' by Sean Hannan (free pdf) ?

He writes in sections and subsections.
For example:
1. Background
a. to f.
2. The Final Conversation Begins (57a- 62e )
a. Setting the Stage
i. to vii.
b. The Highest Art
i. to v.
Etc, etc...

A sample from page 1.

Quoting Sean Hannan: Notes on Plato's Phaedo

1. Background
a. The Phaedo tells the story of Socrates’ final days. Taking place after the events
depicted in the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, this dialogue serves as his swansong.
b. Whereas the Apology had a fairly straightforward structure, consisting mainly of
Socrates’ monologues to the citizens of Athens (with a bit of back-and-forth with
Meletus thrown in), the Phaedo is a full-blown dialogue. In fact, it operates as a
dialogue on multiple levels. First we have the framing dialogue, which consists of the
eponymous main character Phaedo’s account of Socrates’ final words, which he gives
to Echecrates and others on his way home from Athens. Then we have the dialogue
recounted by Phaedo, which takes place between Socrates and those who were with
him in his final hours.
c. First, let’s take a closer look at the framing dialogue. Phaedo (the character) is on his
way back from Athens after attending the trial and execution of Socrates. As he
approaches his hometown of Elis in the Peloponnese, he runs into a group of
Pythagoreans, the most vocal of which is Echecrates. These men are dubbed
‘Pythagoreans’ because they follow the teachings of Pythagoras. While most of us are
familiar with his theorem, Pythagoras had much more to say on the topics of
philosophy and mathematics. For our purposes here, we should only note these
Pythagoreans would’ve been especially open to the mathematical examples Phaedo
tells them Socrates made use of in his final conversation—e.g., the difference
between odd and even numbers, etc.
d. We shouldn’t glide past this framing dialogue too swiftly, although it can be easy to
forget it’s there. The fact that Phaedo runs into Pythagoreans is itself potentially
meaningful. It could, among other things, suggest that the version of Socrates’ ideas
he’s sharing with them has already been re-shaped to suit their interests...

I think @Fooloso4 you have set yourself another challenge - I look forward to whatever draws people in...or connects the dots :cool:

Quoting Fooloso4

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

I think you are using the wrong translation.

Socrates says:
“… when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, having retreated from death […] And so, more surely than anything, Cebes, soul is immortal and imperishable, and all our souls really will exist in Hades” 106e -107a

Cebes replies :
“For my part, Socrates, I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any way”. 107a

Simmias agrees, but still has some doubts:
“… I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said” 107b

Socrates has the final word:
“As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal, it could have no means of safety or of escaping evils, other than becoming both as good and as wise as possible”

Concerning the myth he tells of Hades, Socrates says:
“… since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so it is both fitting and worth the risk – for fair is the risk – to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places” 114d

For some strange reason you keep leaving out "However, since the soul turns out to be immortal".

Conclusion: Socrates does not doubt the immortality of the soul or its journey to Hades.

Here's another translation:

“Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+phaedo+114d


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Reply to Apollodorus

You neglect to include the following from this translation:

and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms

Whether or not the soul has been shown to be immortal is a basic question of my essay. I show how and why each of the arguments fail. It is because the arguments fail that he used myths to persuade, charms and incantations.

Note how many of the translations you cite include the idea that it is worth the risk to believe. If something has been proven to be true there is no reason to risk believing it is true.

Quoting Fooloso4

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

I followed the text, and only your commentary on it, for which I offer respect. Silently.

Reply to Mww

Thank you. I am familiar with some of the secondary literature but chose to read the dialogue itself by itself without recourse to it. My intention was in part to demonstrate how a Platonic dialogue can be read; or at least one way it can be read.

Quoting Fooloso4

Whether or not the soul has been shown to be immortal is a basic question of my essay.

That's precisely why it doesn't seem right to leave out statements like "since the soul is shown to be immortal" from the translation unless you have a good reason or explanation for it, which you don't seem to have.

Why does the statement "the soul is shown to be immortal" bother you so much as to exclude it from the translation? Freudian slip, perhaps? And it isn't for the first time that you "misread" the text.

Socrates has already shown at 72a - 73a why it is logical to believe in the immortality of soul and rebirth.

Socrates says:
"We agree in this way too that living people have come to be from the dead no less than dead people from the living" 72a

Cebes agrees:
"... and in my opinion what you're saying is completely true" 72d

To which Socrates responds:
"I think that is exactly how it is" 72d

Simmias continues to doubt:
"But Cebes, what are the proofs for this?" 73a

etc.

Obviously, Socrates has no hard proof, but he has presented convincing arguments which are accepted by Cebes while Simmias is still doubting. And even Simmias in the end is nearly fully convinced.

On the whole, what the dialogue is showing is that the philosopher should accept a belief only after rationally examining and analyzing it. That's the only way to acquire knowledge instead of relying on opinion or belief. But some will never be totally convinced. That is all. There is absolutely no need to read too much into the text.

Quoting Apollodorus

That's precisely why it doesn't seem right to leave out statements like "since the soul is shown to be immortal" from the translation unless you have a good reason or explanation for it, which you don't seem to have.

Read it in context. The myth is about the soul's immortality. It is followed by the statement above calling the truth of the myth into question. Once again, I do not include it because he did not show the soul's immortality. To repeat that the soul is immortal is to sing the incantation.

Quoting Apollodorus

Socrates has already shown at 72a - 73a why it is logical to believe in the immortality of soul and rebirth.

You have not bothered to read what I said about that argument. It does not show that it is logical, but you have to follow the argument to see that. I did. A statement is not an argument.

Quoting Apollodorus

Obviously, Socrates has no hard proof, but he has presented convincing arguments which are accepted by Cebes while Simmias is still doubting. And even Simmias in the end is nearly fully convinced.

Yes, Cebes accepts it. He accepts everything Socrates says, even when it should be clear to a thoughtful reader that he should not. In fact, Socrates himself makes it clear that he should not. Both Cebes and Simmias are followers of Pythagoras. They come into the discussion believing in the immortality of the soul. The fact that at the end Simmias is less certain does not show that the arguments convinced him, just the opposite.

Quoting Apollodorus

On the whole, what the dialogue is showing is that the philosopher should accept a belief only after rationally examining and analyzing it.

Then why the need for myth? Again, all of this is discussed.

Quoting Apollodorus

That's the only way to acquire knowledge instead of relying on opinion or belief.

But in the end all they have is opinion and belief. They do not have knowledge of the fate of the soul.

Quoting Apollodorus

There is absolutely no need to read too much into the text.

It is not reading into the text, which was something you were quite anxious to do. It is carefully reading the text. But clearly you think there is no need to read the text at all.

[quote=Fooloso4;541920"]Once again, I do not include it because he did not show the soul's immortality.[/quote]

Your approach is odd. It's normal to bring something personal to interpretation, but it's not normal to edit a work based on your views.

Quoting Fooloso4

But in the end all they have is opinion and belief. They do not have knowledge of the fate of the soul.

They do have an account of the fate of the soul which Cebes agrees with and even Socrates says that it may not be exactly like that but it's worth insisting that either the described situation or something similar is true.

Nowhere does he reject the account. He concludes with the remark:

"Now as for you, Simmias, Cebes and you others, you will each make the journey [to Hades] some time hereafter" 115a

Why would Socrates conclude with that remark if he didn't believe in his own account?

Reply to Apollodorus

Read the essay.

Quoting Fooloso4

Then why the need for myth? Again, all of this is discussed.

Not "discussed", more like misinterpreted.

Plato is using mythos and logos but nowhere does he suggest that one should be reduced to the other.

Socrates’ account of Hades is simply given to complete his interlocutors’ understanding of the issue and to contrast it with Aeschylus’ Telephus:

“So it turns out that the journey is not as Aeschylus’ Telephus says. He says that a straightforward “path” leads to Hades, whereas it seems to me to be neither straightforward nor single …” 108a

Very clear and it requires no reading into whatsoever, unless you want to put a spin on it.

Quoting Fooloso4

and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms

Why do you think this undermines the assertion of the immortality of the soul? Soon afterwards, Socrates says a man ‘should be in good cheer’ about his life, if he ‘has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good’ (114e). And then exhorts Crito to follow his instructions carefully, so that he too might enjoy a similar fate.

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? (Perhaps even as a mantra.) I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul.

Quoting Wayfarer

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul.

Absolutely. This is also suggested by Simmias' habit of forgetting things.

I can understand that @Fooloso4 is an atheist and all that, but his "interpretation" is simply an unacceptable farce.

Quoting Wayfarer

Why do you think this undermines the assertion of the immortality of the soul?

I don't. It is the arguments that fail. In the absence of reason he uses myths and charms as a means of persuasion.

Quoting Wayfarer

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’?

But it is in life that he exhorts them to care for their soul. No one knows what happens in death.

Quoting Wayfarer

I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul.

We need to follow the arguments are draw conclusions or be persuaded by charms or incantations.



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My view is that many current interpretations of Plato intentionally deprecate the religious aspects of his philosophy, as incompatible with the secular outlook of modern culture. Platonism's absorption into Christianity hasn't helped there, because secular critics of Christianity can easily dispose of the baby with the theological bathwater.

That said, I'm sure Plato is determinedly NOT religious in a Christian, 'God fearing' sense, as 'a person of faith'. I think he would utterly scorn such an attitude. He was, as has been correctly stated, enquiring after knowledge and was contemptuous of mere belief. But the kind of knowledge he sought is demonstrably nearer to a kind of spiritual illumination than to today's scientific naturalism, even though his (and Aristotle's) philosophy were the precursors of it.

Quoting Fooloso4

We need to follow the arguments are draw conclusions or be persuaded by charms or incantations.

Had it ever occurred to you that you may not have understood the arguments?

Quoting frank

Had it ever occurred to you that you may not have understood the arguments?

Of course, but no one has actually shown where I have misunderstood them. I have repeated asked you to do so,

Quoting Fooloso4

Of course, but no one has actually shown where I have misunderstood them. I have repeated asked you to do so,

Actually you used this thread to write an essay. You didn't engage other viewpoints.

Quoting frank

Your approach is odd. It's normal to bring something personal to interpretation, but it's not normal to edit a work based on your views.

I did not edit the work, I pointed to a specific point. Whenever we quote from a text we do not include the whole of the work.

Quoting frank

Actually you used this thread to write an essay. You didn't engage other viewpoints.

Actually, the essay was written over the period of a week. Several times I asked for viewpoints on the section under discussion.

Quoting Fooloso4

did not edit the work, I pointed to a specific point. Whenever we quote from a text we do not include the whole of the work.

@Apollodorus asked why you ignore the fact that the text has S saying immortality was shown.

You responded that you ignore it because he didn't show it. wtf?

Quoting Fooloso4

Several times I asked for viewpoints on the section under discussion.

I didn't see those. Sorry.

Quoting frank

You responded that you ignore it because he didn't show it. wtf?

Socrates did not show that the soul is immortal. I laid out the arguments. Read what Socrates says to Simmias when he expresses his doubts. Read what he says about the limits of arguments. Read what he says about the evaluation of arguments.

He just finished a myth that included the immortality of the soul and followed it with:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

As I said, if the immortality of the soul has been demonstrated there would be nothing to risk in believing what has been shown to be true is true.

Quoting Fooloso4

Actually, the essay was written over the period of a week. Several times I asked for viewpoints on the section under discussion.

You ignored other people's views or had their posts deleted.

In their Introduction, Sedley & Long say:

“… in this concluding moment Socrates and his companions are in no doubt as to what it amounts to: soul must leave the body and go to Hades. Thus, at the very close of the defence of immortality, at the point where argument reaches its limit, and is about to give way to eschatological myth, Socrates is seen yet again reaffirming the Hades mythology” p. xxxiii

It looks like you have deliberately chosen another, incomplete translation because it suits your agenda. Sedley & Long’s translation and commentary would have demolished your theory.

You need to consider other scholars' views as well, not only those of atheists and materialists.

Quoting Fooloso4

Socrates did not show that the soul is immortal.

Whether this is true or not, you do not ignore a passage where Socrates says it was shown. ???

Quoting Apollodorus

You ignored other people's views or had their posts deleted.

I am not able to delete other people's posts and had nothing to do with them being deleted.

I asked for comments on what was being read, not what you can find on Wiki or elsewhere. It is my opinion that Plato must be read rather than read about.

Quoting Apollodorus

Thus, at the very close of the defence of immortality, at the point where argument reaches its limit, and is about to give way to eschatological myth, Socrates is seen yet again reaffirming the Hades mythology

This is entirely consistent with what I have said. The immortality of the soul has not been shown because to do so would go beyond the limits of argument. Of course he reaffirms the mythology. How could he persuade them otherwise?

Quoting frank

Whether this is true or not, you do not ignore a passage where Socrates says it was shown. ???

This is something he said many times already. He says he repeats it as an incantation.

I want to return to one of the opening passages. This is one of the passages cited in respect of the famous quotation that philosophy is the 'preparation for death'.

[64a] (Socrates) “Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practicing.”

And Simmias laughed and said, “By Zeus, [64b] Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.”

“And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is.

Emphasis added.

I think the reference to 'our people at home' is clearly a reference to non-philosophers, i.e. those who haven't been trained in philosophy. The fact that they 'know very well' that philosophers 'deserve death' is a mocking reference to the idea that the 'people at home' don't understand at all what the philosopher does about the significance of death, because they do not know in what way the real philosopher desires death, nor in what way they deserve it, nor 'what kind of death it is'.

What does 'what kind of death' mean? How many kinds could there be?

Socrates implies here that the philosopher does 'know very well' the way in which real philosophers desire death. In the next few verses, he describes the fate of the philosopher as joining the 'good men' in a beneficial afterlife, which is distinct from 'the mire' into which the unrighteous fall.

Quoting Fooloso4

I asked for comments on what was being read, not what you can find on Wiki or elsewhere. It is my opinion that Plato must be read rather than read about.

As already stated, Sedley and Long aren't nobodies, they are highly regarded scholars.

David Neil Sedley is a British philosopher and historian of philosophy. He was the seventh Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University.

David Sedley – Wikipedia

Alex Long, of St Andrews is the editor of Immortality in Ancient Philosophy, which brings together original research on immortality from early Greek philosophy, such as the Pythagoreans and Empedocles, to Augustine. The contributors consider not only arguments concerning the soul’s immortality, but also the diverse and often subtle accounts of what immortality is, both in Plato and in less familiar philosophers, such as the early Stoics and Philo of Alexandria.

So, Sedley & Long would have been highly relevant to your “essay” IMHO.

Reply to Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? (Perhaps even as a mantra.) I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul.

Looking at the matter through Timaeus, the identification of oneself as a soul in the sense of being the person you are after death is in tension with the recognition of our mortality. The myth of the Creator working through agents of creation distinguishes mortal man in this way:

On the other hand, if they were created by me and received life at my hands, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that they may be mortal, and that this universe be truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you.
The part of them worthy of the name immortal, which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and you--of that divine part I will myself now sow the seed, and having made a beginning, I will hand the work over to you. And do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal and make and begat living creatures, and give them food and make them to grow, and receive them again in death. — Plato, Timaeus,41b, translated by Benjamin Jowett

That is not the sort of immortality many are hoping for.

Quoting Valentinus

That is not the sort of immortality many are hoping for

I follow. I don't think the eschatology is by any means worked out or finalised. This comes up in the Phaedo in the discussion about 'snow' as being 'a kind' on the one hand, and 'an instance' on the other. So it's a question about the relationship between universals and particulars which was of course to continue being explored for millenia thereafter before petering out in the mangrove deltas of modernity.

But, confining the discussion to what is said and implied in the Phaedo, I think it's still fair to say that the intimation of the immortality of the soul seems more than just a wish.

//ps// Incidentally, check out this title. It's on my to-read list.

Quoting Wayfarer

I don't think the eschatology is by any means worked out or finalised.

Sedley & Long make the following observation:

“And that the souls of the dead exist in Hades was a well-entrenched popular belief too, with its roots in Homer (Odyssey I I). Socrates’ aim in the Phaedo is to establish both the scientific respectability and the real meaning of these traditions [immortality and reincarnation]. The soul’s survival in Hades and its eventual reincarnation start out with the credibility that ancient tradition is assumed to confer on a belief, and Socrates’ central strategy is to establish scientific laws (as we might call them) to which these particular beliefs confirm. Arguments which fail as complete proofs of a thesis may nevertheless have considerable corroborative force when used in this way.”

Reply to Wayfarer
The relationship between "universals and particulars" is mixed up with different ways we have talked about them over a long time.

What strikes me about the Timaeus passage is the "one who weaves" the immortal and the mortal together must be ourselves. Or if not ourselves, pretty closely related. It is left open as a consideration.

Reply to Valentinus Indeed, but the Timaeus is a whole other can of worms! I think it would be useful in this thread to confine ourselves to intepretive questions raised by the Phaedo. Maybe in future we can do some of the other dialogues, I would certainly be interested in it.

Reply to Wayfarer
Well, I brought it up because myths were being discussed and there is a dialogue devoted to them.

I read the dialogues as conversations between themselves. They disagree with each other. Some things become more important in one place than in another. But Plato himself puts them side by side. Like they need each other.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the reference to 'our people at home' is clearly a reference to non-philosophers

In the beginning of the paragraph he says "the multitude" and then toward the end "our people at home". I don't know if he is making a distinction between them. It may be some reference to something related to Thebes.

Quoting Wayfarer

'know very well' that philosophers 'deserve death'

Two ways in which he may have meant this, and possibly both -

The ascetic life, a life without pleasure, is not worth living
There was a distrust of philosophers

I do not know if Socrates says in any of the other dialogues that the philosopher desires death. I think it may have something to do with the theme of both fear of death and their despair over Socrates death. He tells that this is what philosophers want all along.


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Quoting Valentinus

The relationship between "universals and particulars" is mixed up

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100c-e)

Quoting Wayfarer

This comes up in the Phaedo in the discussion about 'snow' as being 'a kind' on the one hand, and 'an instance' on the other.

I discuss this. It is important because the same thing occurs with Soul/soul. At the approach of Heat Snow retreats but the stuff melts. Analogously, at the approach of Death Soul retreats but the soul of the man is destroyed.

Quoting Wayfarer

So it's a question about the relationship between universals and particulars

Right. Socrates' soul is of the Kind Soul, but his soul is not the Kind or Form Soul