Guest Speaker: David Pearce - Member Discussion Thread
Hi moderators @Michael @Baden,
I'm wondering if we could prepare some sub-forum for a Guest Speaker named David Pearce.
He is a British philosopher and is listed over at Wikipedia here and studied his alma mater at Oxford:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pearce_(transhumanist)
He has a website here avialble where members may be able to read some of his thoughts.
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=David+Pearce
Aquantance video.
Some more throughts from a interview:
https://sentience-research.org/the-imperative-to-abolish-suffering-an-interview-with-david-pearce/
I would preliminarily say that he is on board since I reached out to him yesterday on Twitter and said he hasn't much to do and would like to participate.
David Pearce is an acclaimed hedonist, which some might find unwelcome; but, he operates from a reduction of suffering rather than more happiness. This seems like the right way to not alter homeostasis but simply maintain it at a level away from suffering.
He is a proliofic author of many thoughts on his website and pursues at the moment a means of reducing suffering through enhancing the activity or neurotransmitter levels in the brain.
I became interested in him after being a quasi-transhumanist myself, and believe that most of his ideas about the future are on point, given that most people prefer pleasure than pain or suffering.
Hoping some others might comment on the idea of having him as a guest speaker questionarie.
One topic I posted on him here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8735/david-pearce-on-hedonism
I'm wondering if we could prepare some sub-forum for a Guest Speaker named David Pearce.
He is a British philosopher and is listed over at Wikipedia here and studied his alma mater at Oxford:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pearce_(transhumanist)
He has a website here avialble where members may be able to read some of his thoughts.
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=David+Pearce
Aquantance video.
Some more throughts from a interview:
https://sentience-research.org/the-imperative-to-abolish-suffering-an-interview-with-david-pearce/
I would preliminarily say that he is on board since I reached out to him yesterday on Twitter and said he hasn't much to do and would like to participate.
David Pearce is an acclaimed hedonist, which some might find unwelcome; but, he operates from a reduction of suffering rather than more happiness. This seems like the right way to not alter homeostasis but simply maintain it at a level away from suffering.
He is a proliofic author of many thoughts on his website and pursues at the moment a means of reducing suffering through enhancing the activity or neurotransmitter levels in the brain.
I became interested in him after being a quasi-transhumanist myself, and believe that most of his ideas about the future are on point, given that most people prefer pleasure than pain or suffering.
Hoping some others might comment on the idea of having him as a guest speaker questionarie.
One topic I posted on him here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8735/david-pearce-on-hedonism
Comments (212)
Sounds like an interesting guy. I'll raise this in the mod forum.
https://www.hedweb.com/hedethic/hedon1.htm
I disagree. For animals in nature, life is far more brutal than conditions on a farm. When an animal is born on a farm there's a vet - that ensures a safe and speedy delivery. In nature, any injury or disease can mean a slow and lingering death. Food and water is not guaranteed in the wild; and the temperature varies significantly. On the farm, humans minimise the suffering of animals they slaughter for food - whereas, in nature, animals are liable to be hunted, torn open and eaten alive. Sorry to burst your bubble but nature is the real horror show; and agriculture, by comparison, is humane.
Have you seen factory farm conditions?
The conditions of nature are pretty awful too, but tell me which you would prefer for yourself:
- being a prehistoric human in the untamed wilderness with all the risks that modern civilization has since mitigated, or
- being born and raised your whole life in a cage too small for you move, which gets stacked with a bunch of similar cages in a dark warehouse where you'll never see the sun, such that the piss and shit from the people in cages above you just rains down on you, but you're pumped full of antibiotics (on top of a diet of nothing but corn syrup to fatten you up cheaply) to make sure that you're likely enough to at least survive uninfected until adulthood so that you can be slaughtered and consumed safely enough (for the safety of the people consuming your body) that the people operating the warehouse full of you shit-covered cage-people can turn a profit.
The first option isn't great, especially compared to my life, but I'd pick that over the second option any day.
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/index.html
The logic seems funny. As if nature wasn't the natural conclusion where they ought to live.
No, I haven't, not really - and I'm sure the worst practices are horrifying, but when done well, farming need not be cruel. Indeed, it's a lot less cruel than nature.
Nature, as in their natural habitat? Keep in mind that pigs are domesticated animals.
So, no better place for them.
He's referred to as a British philosopher several times, and it appears he makes his living in his area of transhumanism. He seems to deal with ethical issues. But you guys can disown him if you wish. Makes no difference to me.
From what I can tell from my cursory search, he's no more a professional philosopher than some guy down the pub. Could be wrong, of course. But it's worrying to me that he doesn't seem to have a post at a university.
However, Julia Roberts can't come to my birthday party because I haven't invited her and she doesn't know me from Adam (I also don't want her to come as she'd suck all the attention away from me, plus I don't like her acting). Whereas nothing stops a philosopher from joining and contributing to these forums if they so wish.
Do you think a professional philosopher should be given special treatment, then? Should they be shielded from imbecilic comments and appalling reasoning? Why?
I was taught that if you want to get good at teaching philosophy - and at philosophy itself, frankly - it's a good idea to discuss philosophical ideas with precisely such people! They'll misunderstand things in ways you never thought possible, and you'll have to learn a good bit of patience too.
:lol:
No, it was not optimal because of some twat who had a hissy fit because we edited his question. Anyway, we're still in discussions on the mod forum concerning a potential invite for David and all suggestions are welcome.
You are misinformed. The designation "professional" means they earn money with it. It is their profession, or occupation, and they earn money with it.
Having a Ph.D. or an academic status or job is NOT the only way to make money with philosophy. You can be a celebrity, advocating a philosophical view, and be on TV, or other media, and demand and obtain money for your contribution.
To wit, Socrates was NOT a professional philosopher, although those were teeming in his time in Athens.
Quoting god must be atheist
That's what I was dwelling over, too; educational accreditation shouldn't be conflated with being a 'professional', albeit the overwhelming majority of (successful) academic professionals, are educationally accredited.
Furthermore (and this is solely an additive interpretation, with no suggestive insinuation of any kind), being professional doesn't necessitate that you be of an exemplary standard in a stated discipline; countless individuals are duplicitous enough to garner an exorbitant living, whilst desecrating the substance of a discipline, and/or disseminating misinformation to their audiences.
Philosophy is a subject matter for debate. Your "bad" may be the "good". You can't trust your own judgment and declare categorically that what you deem good is indeed good and what you deem bad is indeed bad. Your judgment is by force subjective, and as such, it is prone to error.
Your argument of catchy maxims getting generated only by populist mass philosophers is refuted by
"You can't step in the same river twice", "The only thing I know is that I know nothing", "cogito ergo sum", "eppur si mouve", "Workers of the world unite: you have nothing to lose but your chains", "Meet the new boss: same as the old boss", "Philosophy... is a talk on some cereal box. Religion: is a light in the fog. Philosophy... is a walk on some slippery rocks, religion... is a smile on a dog."
I calls them as I sees them. If "professional" means earning money, then "professional philosopher" means philosopher who earns money, be he or she good or bad. "Academic philosopher" is most likely also professional, but not all professional philosophers are academic philosophers.
And I have seen my share of bad academic philosophers. (Bad as judged by me.)
Yes, but the only value of inviting a 'professional' philosopher is surely that they are good at philosophy, as opposed to good at making money out of philosophy.
Quoting god must be atheist
Er, that isn't what I said. Read what I actually said.
Quoting god must be atheist
If they're academic philosophers they're highly unlikely to be bad at philosophy. They're almost certainly exceptionally good at it. I mean, that's the point (and if you judge them bad....well, you're not a professional philosopher are you?). By contrast, to make money at philosophy you don't have to be exceptionally good at it, rather you have to be a good salesperson. These are quite different skills.
Just look at all the marvelous lines of thought coming from those who are really good...
:death:
Really good at doing what, exactly?
*then, just wallows*
:up:
Quoting Shawn
:down:
We are close to making a decision on this. Hang in there.
This is not what you wrote?
He looks to have an interesting position...
I am a hedonist, inasmuch as I like pleasure and dislike pain. Anyone who is otherwise, must derive pleasure from pain, or derive pain from pleasure. That's possible, I am not trying to be funny.
The methods he suggests or proposes or predicts are questionable. But if they were not questionable, his speech would be not interesting.
I have three areas to suggest exposure of thought:
1. Much like pain killers are reactive to pain, we must experience mental anguish before the "mental anguish killer" can be administered.
B. Also, there is such a thing as getting used to substances; the human body is a superb adjuster, and attenuator if necessary, both for pain and for pleasure.
iii. Also, human perception requires change. That's a biggie.
Quoting god must be atheist
I did not say that proper philosophers never generate catchy maxims. I said that populist 'philosophers' will boil everything down to them. And indeed, 'philosophy' in their hands will really amount to nothing more than this because they can't afford to pursue an argument beyond a reflective member of the public's attention span. They need to make a living. Whereas academic philosophers have to produce good philosophy to earn a living.
Anyway, this guy does not appear to be an academic philosopher, or even to have a PhD in the subject, so far as I can tell. So he's not an expert, just a self publicist. But then I think most people here wouldn't know a real philosopher from their elbow. They probably think Sam Harris is one!
You're probably correct. And if he reads this thread there is no danger he will show up.
I'm sure he has thicker skin than that and like the rest of us doesn't give a damn what Barprick thinks.
That's somewhat ironic. Bumden.
And that is not true, either.Quoting Bartricks
Your opinion in this matter is respected, but it does not make any difference in our eagerness to listen to this Pierce.
:lol:
Getting the mod team to make a collective decision is like trying to herd cats. Of course, folks have other lives outside of PF to deal with. Give us a day or two more.
I'll be maintaining my homeostasis at a level away from suffering on that score. Anyhow, if we do a formal invite and David gracefully accepts, just... trust us, everything will be fine.
The cats have been herded and we would be delighted to have David on board. We are putting together a formal invitation and details of how we'll organize this.
Used to keep pigs, and they liked to roam in the forest. They came home for sleep and supper, and we had to keep them in when the hunters were out looking for wild boar. The forest is a better place than the pen.
You'll find those forest rich with no food in no time given how many of them are in pig pens.
There are no hunters in the house, either... and the domesticated pigs are not witnessing or experiencing their brethren or themselves being torn to pieces while alive by wild and untamed coyotes, wolves, bears, goats and gnats don't taunt them either.
With the same token, forests are better for humans too. We go out, trekking, walking, enjoying the air, the ambience, the beauty of the wonder... shooting wild boar... then come home, eat, and go to sleep in our warm, comfy beds.
We are basically pigs. Domesticated pigs.
I'm sure @schopenhauer1 et al would be interested in his suffering focused ethics.
Reminds me of Pink Floyd Animals
"And any fool knows a dog needs a home
A shelter from pigs on the wing."
I read this from Wiki:
He outlines how drugs and technologies, including intracranial self-stimulation ("wireheading"), designer drugs and genetic engineering could end suffering for all sentient life.[9]
His views might provide for some insight, considering many human beings are involved in, or enjoy consuming, some form of drugs and alcohol (for among other reasons, to mitigate their existential angst...).
It's more about writing and organising it, dates etc. We need multiple people to be quite attentive all at once while we have a guest (so we need multiple buy ins from staff), and it needs to be at a time the prospective guest can actually do it.
We also need to negotiate the format with them. These things take time.
Sent via Twitter. He's really active, so you can reach him on any medium.
Alright thanks, let's see if he replies to that. If not, I'll chase him up elsewhere.
We can't get large sections of the populations to wear masks, wait in line 6 feet apart, get vaccinated, stay home (for the good of all) and so on.
I have a feeling that somewhere in this super wonderful scheme a large amount of brute force is lurking.
Not in my schemes, BC. I don't want to change anything. I want to change everything. I want to cooperate insofar as is necessary to attack the global climate and ecological crisis from the supply side - starting by harnessing massive clean energy. If used only for the specified purposes of extracting carbon, desalinating water and recycling, we could do a world of good.
Oops, sorry David. I do not mean to hijack your thread. Welcome to the Philosophy Forum.
I would ask, if you believe in the transformative potential of technology, why is that? Is it just that you love gadgets?
Quoting counterpunch
I wasn't think of you -- more the "super" theorists.
Quoting Bitter Crank
I am a lousy theorist, that's true - but I look to the most scientifically fundamental and beneficial application of technology as a matter of my "belief" in the transformative potential of technology, energy and entropy, page one - the greatest benefit, with least disruption at the least cost, and so I'm keen to understand David's rationale. I'm concerned that, while longevity, well being and intelligence are goods in themselves, the implications are not theoretically dealt with - most obviously, of people living longer. How would that work? Bliss chips that have super-brilliant people stood at a production line, doing a mind numbing job 20 hours a day with a broad grin? Happy is good!
[quote=Somerset Maugham] Now that I’ve grown old, I realise that for most of us it is not enough to have achieved personal success. One’s best friend must also have failed.[/quote]
I'm letting it go. I imagine the science officer on Kirk's Enterprise must have had a PhD, at least!
We're going to keep the main thread tightly on topic. You have more freedom to maneuver on this one.
Dr Spok!
lol
On the other hand, I'm always a bit surprised by how common it is for scientists, philosophers or intellectuals in general, to deny or disagree with so called "mysterianism". That there are things that we cannot know, because we are creatures in nature, should be obvious. Saying this does not stop enquiry in any way, people can choose to study whatever they wish, but it would be a mistake, I think, to believe that anything we study, will in the long run provide answers for most of our most elementary questions.
But of course, I could be way wrong.
Seeing that the supernatural is not accessible, and seeing that some unanswered questions are about powerfully nefarious acts; therefore the only option humans have is to answer the unanswered by creating models of the natural world. This is the ONLY tool we got; whether it's adequate or not, is questionable; but no other tool presented yet.
Well, I have in mind people like Colin McGinn or Noam Chomsky, not some spiritualists or religious types. The basic idea is that there are many questions, that are outside our cognitive capacity to understand. Examples are plentiful, the most immediate one in contemporary circles is the so called "hard problem" of consciousness: how can matter possibly have the qualities of experience? Well, it simply does have these properties, but we have no idea why.
But there are so many other "hard problems". Why does gravity work the way it does? How is it that we give meaning to the world? Why do we have a sense of morality? Why existence? How can I move my arm or my finger? It's clear that I can do it, but I have no idea why I can do it, or how it is that I do it. And much more.
I'm not invoking any spiritual entities like God, soul-stuff or anything of that nature, that only appears to give an answer, when all it does is invoke an all defined and obscure aspect, which under closer analysis doesn't add anything to our comprehension of the world.
But it seems to me that at almost any instance, if we look at things closely, they just make no sense. Sure, many will say something like "what are you talking about?" I know how I move my arm, I just move it. Or, what do you mean why does gravity work the way it does? That's just the way gravity is. I'm inclined to say that we have no idea in either case. But we proceed as if we understood these things.
Quoting TaySan
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/519771
No one has ever thanked me for my time and expertise - and I look far more systematically to the potential benefits of science.
Benkei. If ALL cases of suffering stem from the state of affairs of being born, then ALL cases of suffering can be prevented by preventing that state of affairs. I don't see the problem there. You don't need to parse each individual case of suffering out to realize that all cases of suffering can be prevented for a future person by not procreating.
What you really seem to be saying is that there is a potential for each individual case to be ameliorated. This becomes an empirical question as to how well humans can really prevent suffering. David does seem to think that this is a possibility. I suspect many antinatalists, out of principle of not causing the suffering that gets to goal, would not recommend to procreate until we get to that Transhumanist goal. They would also probably be skeptical of its achievement.
(Please only tag or reply to David with comments or questions in the main thread. I don't want these two mixed up.)
Took it out of this thread
Thanks.
You may call me a hair-splitter, but how do you know we won't understand the answer to the hard question, once we found it? We may NEVER find it, but it's not guaranteed that it is beyond our cognitive capacity to understand it, once the answer is given or found.
Quoting ManuelTo this question, clear answers exist.
Quoting ManuelThis is not a problem. Quoting ManuelAgain, not a problem.
Quoting ManuelBasic biology can answer it.
I don't think human comprehension can be tested by human questions. Human knowledge, yes, it can be, but not comprehension.
Quoting Manuel I am sorry... I disagree. Most things, with a few exceptions, make sense to me. The few exceptions are the Bible, the Koran, etc.
Quoting Manuel If you ask me, you're looking for meaning in things that are not meant to have meaning.
Just curious, but from what I gather, the goal is to have a 80-100 hedonic range. Given this level of variability, wouldn’t the risk that one may experience low levels of pleasure (80) become the new AN cause for not procreating? If the risk of experiencing a 0 or -1 is reason enough to not procreate, then why would anything less than absolute 100 level pleasure suffice? How low would you allow the baseline to drop before you reverted back to AN?
Yes, I think unless paradise, not worth it. That sentence should read.. "Would not recommend: "Procreate-until-we-get-to-that-Transhumanist goal", meaning, do NOT procreate in the hopes of reaching this goal. Why? I mention in the next sentence, that most likely it cannot be achieved. But also the billions that would suffer on the possibility of a whim of a hope for this achievement.
My point is, nobody in their right mind and with a proper understanding of causality would agree "life causes suffering". When we say something causes something else, we're talking about sufficient and proximate causes. By abusing language and not familiarising you with how the words are actually used, you reach idiocy. But this had never penetrated your thick skull because you're not interested in challenging your own preconceived notions.
Well ditto. I think you are abusing language yourself here as you know perfectly well why procreation is the target:
1) If we take the deontological approach, then making this decision on another's behalf is construed as wrong. The big bang doesn't make decisions, humans do. But I obviously don't have to say that ridiculous point.
2) If we take the utilitarian approach, ALL harm that befalls a person comes from birth. Birth doesn't happen out of thin air, but out of decisions made by humans. Again, this is obvious and I don't have to say this ridiculous point.
I also mentioned (and you didn't address) that what your argument is really trying to address is the empirical question of whether each individual case of suffering in a person's life can be ameliorated and gotten rid of. Obviously I think that is near improbable to zero. Besides which, combined with the deontological approach, that might not even matter as a consideration being that you are making unnecessary risky decisions on another person's behalf in the first place- putting them in (what we know to be from empirical evidence) a lifetime's worth of enduring negative experiences and having to overcome them. I think whether or not positive experiences are involved too, doesn't negate the fact that this negative experience/overcoming "game" is being unnecessarily bestowed upon a future person (on their behalf) in the first place.
Where does pleasure from from? Does animal pleasure count? Why wouldn't animal suffering then? Animals won't kill themselves off, so what exactly are you proposing here. Why wouldn't life just re-create itself from whatever means it did in the first place? How can you be so sure life doesn't exist on other planets and so requires extermination there as well? Shouldn't we continue life so we can strive to become technologically advanced enough to exterminate all life as we know it across the entire universe? (I'm assuming that's your silent motive here :wink:)
No, I am not a utilitarian totalizer like this.
I don't like getting wet, water causes me to be wet, so we should get rid of water.
I don't like car accidents, cars cause these accidents, so we should get rid of cars.
I don't like getting sun burnt, the sun causes sun burns, therefore we should get rid of the sun.
Idiots.
You have to admit, you don't actually address my rebuttals.
However you characterize it, I have given you my response. If you would like to address it, please do.
What do you mean by that? I addressed your claims, this is evasion. If you want to show my how I didn't address your claims in my rebuttal, go ahead.
Here's another analogy for you. A painting has paint, therefore the painting causes paint.
We don't understand gravity. We can describe it with equations, but that doesn't mean we understand it. Newton, who discovered it, was baffled by this, as was Locke, Hume, Schopenhauer, Russell, etc.
As Newton said: 'It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact... That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.
We've just accepted this fact and moved on. Why do I say that it's a mystery how consciousness emerges from brain? We have no idea how non-mental stuff could possibly lead to mind. Suppose in the future someone says, regions X, Y and Z in the brain are responsible for consciousness, if they aren't functioning, we can't be conscious. How could a region in the brain possibly explain this blue sky I am seeing? This hypothetical theory can't answer that.
Quoting god must be atheist
You can speak of chemical reactions, muscle contractions and so on, but questions of will aren't illuminated by this.
Quoting god must be atheist
This might be the answer.
And we don't need to understand it, either. You seek meaning where there is no meaning. This is a mindset problem, not a philosophical problem.
You are correct, in part. It's true that we don't need to understand it. But Descartes, Locke, Newton and the like expected understanding. They thought they understood how bodies worked: like a giant mechanical clock, the universe was thought merely to be a massive mechanistic machine. But Descartes realized that mechanical philosophy cannot explain mind, which is why he postulated a second substance. We are born with mechanistic, meaning, based on direct contact, intuitions that make sense to us.
And it was generally accepted, until Newton showed that our intuitive notions of mechanism, were false of the world. He could not believe that gravity worked the way it did, because it did not make any sense. And till' the end of his life he sought to reintroduce some mechanical aspect that could explain gravity intuitively. He failed in that, but that's what he wanted.
So it was clearly a philosophical problem. And you still listen people saying "we don't understand quantum mechanics, or why brain produces mind - yet." all the time! But as you said, there is nothing to understand, only something to describe. It's still a (mistaken) explicit goal.
I did address causality here:
Quoting schopenhauer1
So if you actually read it, you can parse out several ideas. I will do it for you since you refuse:
1) It's an empirical question of if suffering exists to varying degrees and levels in a human life.
2) You think that the individual cases of sufferings in life can be ameliorated completely. I don't. I think that individual cases of suffering will probably never be gotten rid of.
3) Being that life will never be a paradise/charmed life, whatnot, and that it is unknown how much and what kinds of suffering there are in a human life, then it would be wrong to make the unnecessarily risky decision on another person's behalf, putting them in a lifetime's worth of well-known and unknown forms of negative experiences.
Point 1. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't.
Point 2. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't. Also, at no point have I said all suffering could be prevented or ameliorated.
Point 3. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't.
So, no, at no point has any of your points addressed the fact that life is merely a necessary cause for suffering, not a sufficient cause and certainly not a proximate cause.
Um, so how is that not an empirical question? This I am admitting.. We would have to observe what suffering there is, and what causes it.
So what is your point Benkei? I am directly answering your ideas about proximal cause, etc.
Even if we were were to empirically observe what causes each individual case of suffering, I contend that life contains many cases of suffering (via empirical evidence), and it cannot be ameliorated easily.
What can prevent all cases of suffering? Let me see.. Preventing birth. I don't need to know each case of suffering to know that all of it can be prevented with one non-action.
Because it's sufficient to establish that it isn't life and after that I don't care, because suffering is particular. And if life doesn't cause it, there's no moral case to be made against having babies.
I don't buy it. If the same state of affairs is almost always (by empirical evidence) coupled with any X particular cases that cause suffering, why does it matter proximate cause if it is ALWAYS accompanied by some cases X? Then why would this fact of its causal necessity not be factored in?
If every time you did X, Y negative happened, why would it matter which particular Y, we know that X will lead to Y? And Y (cases of suffering) ALWAYS accompanies X (by empirical evidence).
Are you trying to make a case that, there is a possible world where Y is not accompanied by X? If so, is that really our world? Hence my emphasis on empirical evidence rather than simply possibilities.
If life doesn't cause suffering, then my decision to create life doesn't cause suffering, then there's no moral obligation against creating life because I don't cause any suffering.
Your complaint about the state of affairs is the same as complaining because I dealt the cards with poker, my dealing of the cards caused you to lose. We both know this isn't the case, while still acknowledging it's only possible to lose because I dealt the cards.
As I've repeatedly stated, you don't understand causality. That's really the only problem here.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Don't raise another straw man. That all life at some time experiences suffering is not the subject of debate and totally irrelevant. All games involve losing but the game doesn't cause you to lose.
This is the crux of our disagreement. I am saying that we should not force others to play a game where they sometimes (and sometimes a lot) will lose. And loss here isn't just losing some change, but many varieties, complexities, and degrees of suffering.
Edit: this is in any case a tangent to my point that I still haven't caused suffering so there's still no moral obligation.
You are not addressing the argument that if Y always follows from X, then if you don't want Y, X.
You are trying to do a switcharoo where I am aggregating all instances of Y and you keep on trying to parse it back out to each instance of Y. Each instance of Y is contained in Y.
Each instance of suffering is contained in life. Life is caused by birth. If b is caused by a, you can prevent b by not causing a.
@Benkei's argument is not about what it is possible to do, but about what one is morally obliged to do. It is not a sufficient argument to merely show one can bring x about by doing/abstaining from y, you must also show that it is the node at which one ought to intervene.
That's why proximity matters. All things being equal, the most proximate cause carries the burden of responsibility in order to preserve as much freedom and autonomy as possible. If we start accruing responsibility for any node at which we could intervene our burden becomes rapidly unbearable.
Another example is being an asshole or an internet troll. That's not illegal, but in a minor way, may be immoral in some sense if one bases morality on character, deontological or even consequentialist terms.
Because this isn't true and I don't like to repeat myself. Restarting the same isn't a new argument. There's plenty of life happening right now where not only suffering is absent but entirely blissful. So Y does not always follow X, if it did, or would be a sufficient cause, which it isn't.
So what. If even only half the time, or part of the time it was suffering, if you want to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person, and add to that the empirical part of knowing that there are known forms of inescapable suffering and unknown (to the parent) forms of suffering for what the child will suffer, that cannot be mitigated easily, then yes antinatalism would be the best claim.
I can't force you to see the claim as something you yourself should follow. However, I can make the argument which itself is sound. You can prevent another person from suffering X suffering (the suffering incurred in a life) by preventing birth. That is not even an argument but a fact. The argument would come in as to whether this is particularly moral or not. I think your reasoning here that it is not in the realm of morality because it is not the proximal cause is weak at best because if one is looking to prevent all the forms of suffering that occur for a person in a lifetime, than this would not satisfy it. If this does not bother you than nothing the antinatalist would say would convince you.
I also have my own spin which is the "dignity" of the future child may be considered violated because an unnecessary step of put in conditions of being caused to suffer and game-playing (the game of life) was enacted for the child where one did not have to do this. I did have an debate with Khaled about what dignity entails. As I look at it more, it is more about degrees of harm one is causing unnecessarily. For example, waking up a life guard to save a drowning child is a degree of harm that is not sufficiently overlooking the lifeguard's dignity. However, if I forced the lifeguard into a lifetime of lifeguarding school to get the most positive result overall, that would be overlooking his dignity. Starting a life on someone else's behalf due to the lifetime of conditions of possible harm occurring would be overlooking the child's dignity because one is now looking at outcomes (seeing a new being play the game of life) rather than caring about preventing the harms on the child itself.
No. Antinatalism would be the most effective means (in that case). Even if we ignore the patent absurdity of someone wanting to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person and had no other objective, for some odd reason, just being the most effective means to an end does not make it the 'best' morally.
The most effective means of preventing rape might be to castrate all men, doesn't make it the 'best'.
Take a look at the wide range of moral intuitions in the 'fat man' dilemma (on the main page at the moment). Even when killing the fat man is deliberately set as the only means to prevent mass suffering, people's intuitions are still mixed as to whether it is therefore the best course of action morally.
We're just back to square one. You have this odd objective - remove all suffering, no matter how minor at all costs. You've found a method by which it can be done (one which most people are at least a little repulsed by), and you sneer at any other moral imperative (such as the greater good, or community values). All of which is fine, but then acting like you're the injured party when people don't agree is just wierd. You've got a bizarre premise which hardly anyone shares, a favoured method which even many psychopaths would still baulk at, and a lack of any of the other usual moral sentiments that humans seem to have... it really shouldn't come as a surprise that you get this amount of push back.
@Pfhorrest
You said:
"I’m very pleased to see a professional like him touting the right ends, especially after all the pushback I’ve gotten on this forum for supporting the radical idea that maybe all that really matters morally speaking is reducing suffering any kind."
I don't think it's just this forum. The idea that suffering is virtuous is deeply ingrained in western culture. Jesus is supposed to have said that those who are sad are blessed. It fits well with an ethic of sacrifice. You have to work hard to get ahead.
The alternative would be blatantly antiprotestant. It would be more taoist. You don't have to balance reward with the pain of toil. You can do without doing, or what not.
It would represent a big shift in worldview for some people. Most people?
I actually agree with you on the ever-presence of the PWE in Western culture. I think this speaks to the topic of my thread on Credibility and Minutia here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10642/credibility-and-minutia
But you run into a viscious circle justifying why "strength of character" matters other than Aristotle said it. You can maybe throw in the other typical things associated with him- the ancient form of eudaimonia and some modern form like Maslow's hierarchy, but this too would be hard to justify as to why people other than yourself must endure anything. When it comes to other people, the "negative ethics" of preventing suffering may be more tied to their inherent dignity than the "positive ethics" of promoting character building. One major reason is that ethics around preventing suffering is the minimal amount of "judging what's best for other people" while still considering their inherent dignity or worth as people.
It's not a circle, but there is the possibility of an infinite regress. Why is A good? For the sake of B. Why is B good? For the sake of C. Etc.. That's why Aristotle posited happiness as the ultimate end, to curtail that possibility of infinite regress.
In my discussion with Mr. Pearce, the question is whether agony and despair are ever good, in the sense of valuable. In my examples, we value these in some relations with others, as we inflict them onto others and it helps us to get what we want from them. Intentionally inflicting agony and despair is a pressure tactic. It was evident in President Trump's so-called great deal making ability.
But in a much more subtle way, these feelings are a natural part of our relations with others, (not intentionally inflicted on others, as my examples bring out the extremes), and they form a large part of what we call empathy. So for example, (another extreme), if a good buddy is suddenly killed accidently, one feels great agony and despair. This is part of the empathy we have, we feel another's pain. And when the other is the victim of circumstances beyond our control, there is an immense feeling of agony and despair.
The issue I see is that it appears to be the wrong approach, to rid ourselves of the internal cause of such painful emotions, rather than addressing the external conditions which are conducive to these feelings. The real wrong, bad, or evil in the world, is the external conditions which induce within us those painful feelings, it is not the feelings themselves. So moving to rid ourselves of those feelings is nothing more than addressing the symptoms rather than the illness itself. And if we could succeed in removing such emotions, it would just render us oblivious to the real evil in the world.
In other words, these goals proposed, provide us only with an illusion of a better life, because what is really necessary for that better life, more power over the external world (omnipotence), is not addressed. But this is an extremely difficult issue because it involves human relations.
Yes, I see what he did there, but then one can ask, "Is putting another person in a game of character-building to survive/flourish better, good in itself to do on behalf of someone else in the first place?"
Preventing/reducing suffering seems to be the only ethical stance that avoids assuming others should deal with X thing, even if you yourself thinks it is valuable. It is much harder for people to eschew the idea of preventing suffering than it would be almost any other value (including the oft-praised "character-building" trope and "flourishing" when discussing virtue theories).
So in a truly ethical (and not mixed with some other concern such as political decision-making), one must ask, "Is this going to reduce or prevent harm to someone without unreasonably assuming what is "best" for another person"? Procreation, for example fails this test, because it does the opposite of prevent harm, and at the same time, thinks what is best for someone else.
I had a debate with another poster about waking up a lifeguard to save a drowning child. Technically, I did violate the lifeguard's sleep. They were "forced" to wake up, and I assumed what was "best for him" in that situation. But when balancing the reduction of harm with the aspect of not unreasonably assuming what is best for another person, I would think this does not meet that threshold. However, I do think that if I forced the lifeguard into a lifetime of lifeguard training because I thought the best outcome would result from his teaching others to be competent lifeguards, then that would be unreasonably assuming what is best for another person, even though it was reducing the most harm. So suffering/harm reduction isn't the only consideration. The dignity of the people involved, which includes not unreasonably forcing them into what you think is best for them is also a factor. Thus, one must balance these two considerations of harm reduction and violating people's dignity as their own decision-makers and autonomous people.
I don't think that this is a true claim. As Plato demonstrated pain and pleasure are categorical distinct. They are not simply the opposite of one another, such that pleasure is only derived by means of a delivery from pain. There are pleasures which do not have an opposing pain. Ethics may focus on bringing about such pleasures, and this would be completely distinct from preventing suffering.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Preventing harm, whether it's to oneself or another ought not be the primary focus of ethics. The primary focus ought to be bringing about what is good. When we look at the future, we move toward what is designated as the "best" course of action, we do not make our decisions based on avoiding the worst. It is only when an extremely bad circumstance is imposing itself, that we must focus on avoiding it, but in most ordinary situations we are focused on bringing about the good. This is the same principle which Plato demonstrated, the good is not diametrically opposed to the bad. So avoiding the bad does not produce the good.
My problem in the realm of ethics here is that it is forced on autonomous adults. As long as that is not the case, then character-building is perhaps "ethical" just as any self-help thing might be for people who prefer that. However, I don't see it as strictly "ethics" in terms of obligatory. I think it more properly belongs under a larger axiology though because it has to do with "value".
While it might be something we might recommend, to others, the negative ethics of preventing suffering when one clearly sees it, seems more obligatory. Once one gets into the realm of unnecesasry "force" onto autonomous beings (adults with usual faculties let's say) we are treading on not just amoral (yet axiological grounds), but actually unethical grounds.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes I am perfectly fine if people want to pursue this or that axiological program. My beef comes in when it is forced onto others. Thus, ethics proper (not just axiological pursuits of "the good") if it is based on what is obligatory, seem to be balancing preventing harm/suffering while balancing not unreasonably forcing others into one's own agenda. Force being the key here. Thus for example, procreation is definitely a force because life itself is the agenda of the challenge/overcoming-challenge (you may spin it as a chance for character-building). That doesn't matter what you call it, it is a forced program that others have to follow. If that person doesn't feel this program was something they wanted, you have have now assumed an agenda that violated their own autonomous attitudes, feelings, experiences, etc.
The same would be said for the lifeguard.. If I was to force the lifeguard into character-buildign classes to make him a better lifeguard, that would be wrong. I can try to persuade him what was best.. but my idea of what "the good' is, just to me rings hollow as "ethics". Rather the stronger obligations are to force and unnecessary suffering prevention.
I think you ought to distinguish ethics from law. Law is enforced, but law is not properly "ethics". Ethics is a code of principles for moral behaviour, and adhering to that code is a matter of choice. You might have people criticize you for being unethical, but so long as you break no laws in your unethical behaviour, ethics will not be forced on you. I believe it is fundamental to western ethics, that ethical behaviour is a matter of choice.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think you are moving in the wrong direction here, to make "value" the broader term than "moral". But that's my opinion, and this is a matter for debate. I place morality as the highest possible value, and all other values must fall in line behind this. This is the Platonic tradition of "the good". The modern trend however, is to place quantitative value (mathematics) as the highest value. Then morality is segregated as a distinct form of value which is fundamentally incommensurable with quantitative value. Now we are left with at least two distinct and in some ways incompatible and competing hierarchies of value.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I agree, this is a fundamental problem with negative ethics, enforcement is required. As I see it, in the western world moral principles have evolved in a positive direction, away from the negative. The Old Testament has ten commandments, negative. The New Testament has one principle, love your neighbour, positive. I believe the transition to positive is a Platonic influence, identification of "the good" as the first principle. Guiding people towards the good, as a general principle discourages them from the bad, such that a listing and outlawing of every bad thing is not of foremost importance.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The principle of "the good" is based in what is natural, not in some form of obligation. As living beings we have needs and wants, so we naturally seek what is apprehended as "good". Obligation is a result of relations with others, and we are required to adjust our perception of "good" accordingly.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm not sure what you mean by "force" here. Could you expound? I don't see how procreation is a force. But I would see two distinct types of force, an internal force which inclines one to act, which I would associate with "the good" as described above, and an external type of force, which if it isn't consistent with the internal force is a hinderance to action. The difficulty in moral philosophy is the effort required to create consistency between these two types of forces. Consistency facilitates good actions.
True, I do think that distinction should be made as well. However, when I say "obligatory", I don't mean, liable by state prosecution. It's more following one's own intuitions to alleviate acute suffering when one sees it- a drowning child, a person in danger, etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So if I was to kidnap you and "force" you to follow a character-building life, that would be wrong. It overrides my good will to want to see what I think is best for you. Procreation is the same thing. The parents have a preference for the game of life, yet they presume that their preference should be enough justification to create more people who must follow this game of life (lest they die of immediate suicide or slow death of starvation/neglect). I call this de facto situation of having to play the game of life being "forced", because the only alternative is violent self-harm.
More broadly then, we have to not assume that our worldview is something others must take on (including the game of life itself). This would be a violation of someone's dignity as autonomous beings. Thus there is something deeper going on here than some "positive program" for things like self-improvement. Rather, what is a deeper ethic is not messing with other people unnecessarily, and preventing situations of unnecessary suffering if one can help it. Suggesting and persuading is about all that is permitted without going too far in the violation of someone else. Procreation falls under violating that threshold of violating autonomy as it is a definite unnecessary force and certainly causing unnecessary harm (unnecessary because there is no person to mitigate a lesser harm for a greater one, but purely creating conditions for all harm for that person).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This I don't really understand because I can show you many cases where what people seek are any number of things and define those things as "good".
Quoting schopenhauer1
Quoting schopenhauer1
You describe "obligatory" as following one's own intuition. But then you do not understand "good" in the sense of what one wants. Aren't they essentially the same thing? When you follow your own intuition you are doing what you want to do.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sorry, I just don't see it. If a person wants to have children, and follows one's own intuition, into this endeavour, then the person is doing what one feels obliged to do, or what one believes is good. I don't see how you can characterize this as force. If what you are saying is that the coming into being of a person is not something chosen by that person, therefore the person is forced into being, then I have no problem with this. There are many things about this existence which are beyond our capacity to choose, and are forced upon us. That's just reality, and like birth, death is forced on us as well. But there are very many things which are forced on us in between, because our powers of freedom to choose are very limited.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I have a real problem with this sort of negative ethics, (don't do this, and don't do that), because it requires all sorts of definitions and criteria. How can you even speak of these matters in terms of "unnecessarily", and "unnecessary suffering"? We are talking about acts of free choice here, so everything chosen is unnecessary. But then we can't avoid "messing with other people" because we exist in relationships, and we can't avoid suffering because of that great magnitude of force which is beyond one's very limited capacity of free choice.
Yeah correct. I just think intuition as it relates to negative ethics are obligatory than ones related to positive ethics because without the negative, you don't have room for everyone's different positives. More likely your positives aren't mine, but our negatives are closely aligned so we can have our versions of positives intact.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Cool.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Right, but all of these "de facto" forces you mention only come about from the original force in the first place. This essentially makes my point that the original force is making people "play the game" of all these other de facto forces.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Unnecessary suffering I define here (in terms of the person who will experience this suffering) because unless is trying to lessen a greater harm with a lesser one, there is no need to cause suffering in the first place.
I see this as a somewhat backward approach. As living beings, we are inclined to act. This is our nature, and we will do so regardless of obligation. So if we take this as a starting premise, and proceed toward listing everything which we ought not do, we could keep listing forever, and keep coming up with more things forever, as people keep finding new things to do which they ought not do. To list all the things which we ought not do is a futile task. If we look the other way, toward what we ought to do, then all we need is general guidance, in broad terms of types of activities which are good, and this will incline us toward the avoidance of numerous bad acts.
This is a simple feature of the difference between the universal and the particular. Consistency between the universal (general law) and the particular is what defines correctness. So if we strive to make the universals consistent with what is morally good, then we have a reasonable argument whenever an act is outside of the universals, that the act is bad. But if the universals describe what is bad, then we lose the capacity to say that an act which escapes the universal is a bad act. This is what gives people the capacity to exploit "loopholes", when the universals dictate what is bad. And people will always find an endless supply of loopholes.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, but we cannot characterize any "force" as either good or bad. This is what Plato demonstrated, power on its own is neither good nor bad, it is only how power is used which can be judged in this way. Force is simply what the free will must cope with as a given restriction to one's capacities. We cannot categorize it as either good or bad because it can just as easily be used to support and assist one's actions of bringing about the desired end (good), as it might sometimes act against the desired end. So force on its own must be treated as neutral, even though it restricts one's capacities, it equally enables capacities.
So it is true that procreation is a use of force to bring about the existence of others, but we cannot judge this action as good or bad, just on the merits of "using force", because force is used for both moral and immoral actions. All human acts involve the use of force and we must accept the fact that human beings, as living beings, are inclined to act, and this is not bad. You wouldn't argue that human beings ought not act at all would you? Likewise you ought not assume that the use of force is immoral, because all human acts involve use of force.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's not realistic to attempt to distinguish necessary suffering from unnecessary suffering. Let's assume for the sake of argument, that all suffering is brought about by force, it is not willed by the individual, but imposed by external force. Whether that force is imposed by another (artificially directed at another), or is natural, might be a distinction we could make. We can say that the individual will attempt to avoid natural forces which would bring about suffering, and such suffering brought about by natural forces would be due to a deficiency in the individual's capacities. Now we can direct our attention at the artificial use of force by ourselves, and other human beings, in carrying out actions. Would you agree on two categories of inflicting suffering on others, intentionally acting in a way known to inflict suffering, and accidentally inflicting suffering? Neither of these can be properly classified as "unnecessary", because the accidental would have been avoided if avoidance would have been foreseen as possible, and the intentional is seen as necessary for the sake of some end. So it doesn't make sense to propose a category of "unnecessary suffering" because this would just be defined by arbitrary criteria.
I think we get a slippery slope here anytime forcing a situation is used, even for the good. If I was to kidnap someone to go to the awesome school of "Metaphysician Uncover" to learn Plato, that would still be wrong, in my opinion as someone's autonomy was limited. In procreation, this is always happening, because though the game of life is the only "game in town" so-to-say, it is still a forced game.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I struggle with this one too. If I was to take a page from Plato, Not Causing Suffering, would be some sort of ideal. However, in the world of materiality (the world of Shadows on the Wall), there are degrees of not suffering, not simply the ideal itself. Thus if I push someone down a flight of stairs for no reason, that would be worse than if I was to push someone down a flight of stairs because a gun was going to be fired, and the person would be shot. It was suffering, but prevented a greater harm. Procreation is more like the first. It just causes conditions of suffering, for no reason as there was no person beforehand to have to X, Y, Z, rather, you are creating those conditions in the first place. It's like creating a problem for someone else, to watch them climb out of it. So in the world of the shadows, there are degrees and thresholds for which the ideals take place.
As usual, I think you're not using language correctly.
If there wouldn't be any cars, it would be weird to talk about how the absence of those cars prevented car accidents. No such thing could exist because the existence of a car precedes the possibility of car accidents.
Or how happy we should be that the zombie virus of the Walking Dead doesn't exist so that zombies are prevented.
That simply isn't prevention.
Yet as long as there are people around who know the consequence of the harm, this objection doesn't matter.
Quoting Benkei
Is it a situation that we know exists and can be prevented? No, because it's a fake thing? Okay, no worries then.
It's called a reductio ad absurdum, which demonstrates the idiocy of the position. But I see logic and language are lost arts to you.
Oh please. "Idiocy" blah blah. Your arguments are all insult with a smidgen of not-thought-out objections.
It's a tired approach and one used too much on this forum.
You haven't shown any of what you said. It's not a reductio because the thing that can be prevented is known. That is my response. You have not found a rebuttal yet, but I'll wait for one other than the claim its a reductio without explanation.
Yet, you haven't answered my rebuttal. Waiting...
No dude.. I know what it is. You haven't proven that's what I am doing. You are asserting.
You: claim reductio...
I said where? If you are alive and you know the event leads to X, then there is no reductio
You: reductio
Not very fruitful there.
Lmao. If you don't pursue the conclusion to its extremes then indeed, by definition, you don't have a reductio ad absurdum. Your reply to my reductio is "let's imagine it isn't".
No.
Are humans alive to know the rule? Yes.
Then the rule applies to those humans. Cool.
Are there no humans around to know the rule? Yes
Then there is no need for the rule. Cool.
What's the problem?
That you don't understand a reductio ad absurdum. :roll:
We can play this game all day :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:
Or you can make a case other than, "You just don't understand". Cop out because you probably don't have much of a case. Oh well. Maybe one of your friends will drop in to help you and provide some more insulting but unenlightening posts, which seems to happen in this forum a lot:
"For fuck's sake, if you weren't so thick-skulled.. idiotic.. ignorant..." blah blah
I don't think you're quite grasping my use of "force". Force is anything external to the will of the free agent, so it includes all the natural forces described by physics, gravity, energy, etc.. When we act, as free willing agents we use these forces toward our ends. So even speaking to another, giving gifts to another, and other forms of persuasion like this, are instances of using force.
This is why it doesn't make sense to use the blanket assumption that using force to persuade another, is wrong. Then we'd have to discern all the instances of using force in a good way, and somehow describe these as something other than using force. In reality, saying "if you do that I'll kill you", and "if you love me don't do that" are equal in the sense of "using force", because each is a simple statement. However, it is the meaning of what is said which makes one of these a threat, and therefore much worse than the other.
So there is nothing inherently wrong with using force in our interactions with others, and nothing wrong with a "forced game" if this is how you wish to describe procreation, because a forced game might just as well be good as bad. That force might be the force of love.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't believe that there is ever such a thing. If you willfully pushed someone down the stairs, then you decided to do that, so you have a reason for having done it. If you have no reason, then it was not willful, and it was an accident. So when you say "procreation is more like the first", the first has been eliminated as not a real possibility. Therefore your characterization of procreation, as like the first, is not acceptable, because the first is not real, and procreation if it is compared with pushing someone down the stairs, is not carried out without a reason unless it is accidental.
Ok, so this then would be degrees and threshold.. see analogy I used with preventing suffering. Persuading someone with words vs. physically forcing an intractable game, let's say is a huge degree of difference.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, so let's split then reasons vs. causes. Person A caused Person B to fall down the stairs by Person A pushing Person B. Person A's reason was not to help Person B but some reason that was not to save from a greater harm. The reason Person C pushed Person A down the stairs is because there was a bullet, presumably a greater harm.
It's not like that. You can physically force a person with love and affection. So I'm totally dismissing the degree thing as relevant to good or bad. What I am saying is that one can use force in a good way or force in a bad way, no matter what degree of force is being used. Force on its own is neutral, whether it's a huge force or a small force, and it's how the force is used which is good or bad.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So person A did a bad thing and person C did a good thing? How does that relate to procreation? Some people don't care about their children, so it's bad for them to procreate? But others do, so it's good for them to procreate?
Again, if you kidnapped an adult to go to the school of MU, because you thought that was the best course for that person, is that wrong? I would say yes.
No that wasn't the conclusion I was going with. Rather, no one exists prior to birth to even balance a lesser harm with a greater harm. Thus it is purely creating the conditions for harm for someone else (and the good created doesn't matter here as not creating good is not a "bad" when "nothing" exists in the first place).
I can't see your point. Your premise that no one exists prior to birth is wrong, because it ought to state that no one person exists prior to one's own birth. Therefore your conclusion that nothing exists prior to one's birth is also wrong.
As I said already, we ought to judge morality on the basis of doing good, not preventing bad, for the reasons I explained. The principal result of this reasoning is that "not creating good", (inactivity, which is contrary to living nature), is then actually rendered as bad. Stipulating what is good, which renders what is not stipulated as good, bad, allows us to avoid the loopholes which result from having to stipulate what is bad. The loopholes are in the form of 'if it is not stipulated as bad, then it is not bad'.
Again, you are misunderstanding me. If a potential parent exists, whereby the consequent is a new person who suffers, the rule is in play- prevent said suffering. How is that a reductio?
If you are saying there is no one to prevent suffering for then you are the one abusing language because you refuse to recognize the common linguistic and psychogical practice of counterfactuals. Someone would have suffered but didn't.
Following your argument, it would actually lead to a reductio ad absurdum because we would be left with the stupid conclusion that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring.
Not sure the objection. I guess I do mean "a particular person", but how does that change the conclusion. That person that might be born is not "deprived of good" and it does not matter whether "a thing exists that experiences good". Rather what does matter is "a state of affairs did not occur where someone has suffered". This is Benatar's asymmetry- good only matters if one exists already to be deprived of that good. However suffering matters in all circumstances.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This has not really answered my question. Quoting schopenhauer1
I think your answer would be no, that person should not be kidnapped, even if the result is a person who has a stronger character. I go back to something deeper going on here- the autonomy of the individual (e.g. contra procreation), and the prevention of unnecessary suffering (e.g. also contra procreation).
In a weird way, this may collapse positive ethics and virtue theory into a hedonic framework where:
IFF negative ethics of autonomy and not causing other people unnecessary suffering is met, then one can be free to choose whatever path one gets a benefit from, which can include character-building programs.
Aren't you making the exact same "non-existence argument" as you are dismissing from @Benkei?
No, because in the counterfactual case of "not having the goods of life", preventing this (or rather not starting this on behalf of someone else) is not unethical. Preventing unnecessary suffering is however the ethical part. That is the asymmetry.
Would you say that a person killed has been deprived of life's good? If so, the unborn are not deprived of life's good solely due to their non-existence?
Because of the other part of the asymmetry- It is only "bad" to be "deprived" of good, if there is someone who exists to be deprived of good.
It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention.
Edit: have you figured out the reductio yet or are you going to continue to pretend I don't know what I'm talking about?
Yes I know this is your beef. But as I said:
Quoting schopenhauer1
And again,
Quoting schopenhauer1
Does it matter if the counterfactual person is "prevented good"? No.
Now do the same with suffering.
Does it matter that a person is "prevented bad"? I believe, definitely yes.
There is an asymmetry of "no good" and "no bad" for something that does not exist, but potentially can.
Note: "No good" would only matter if the person exists. But not the same with "No bad". No bad is good, even if there was no one around to realize this. Otherwise we get the stupid absurdem:
Quoting schopenhauer1
At the end of the day, no one is obligated to create "good" but there does seem an obligation to prevent bad (which WILL happen if someone is born at some point).
I have to disagree.
An example
When planning a statue portraying American rock star Bruce Springsteen, the statue does not exist at the moment of planning. Were the statue project to become successful, however, the statue is the object of the action (or one of them). The statue existed as an object, even if not as an actual and existing one, as early as the brainstorming and planning stage. The participants and executors of the statue project can be justly seen as actors responsible for the execution and act of acquiring the statue. The situation is fully analogous to that of knowingly having a child. It is true that the individual does not exist at the moment of conception. The individual also does not exist without the act of conception. Therefore, even though the act of conception is the reason or one of the crucial reasons as to why an individual, fulfilling the requirements of a person, will later be born, this person does not exist at the time of the act – in fact, not even as a potential person (R.M. Hare).
Can we therefore talk about "true causation"? (Note: if we cannot talk about "true causation", the oft-mentioned concern about future generations and, above all, the moral claim to do something for a better life for the yet unborn future generations – actions to be taken to preserve the Earth in a more viable state, perhaps – is completely absurd.) My argument is that R.M. Hare’s viewpoint is unfounded.The object of the action is a potentially forthcoming person, in similar manner to sperm and an egg cell. Even though it is a fact that, unlike the egg cell and the sperm that exist at the moment of executing the act – the attempt to have a child – this person does not exist nor will s/he perhaps ever exist (the conception may not be successful, a miscarriage may take place, or other complications may prevent childbirth), the act is to be assessed in connection with the object of the act (the forthcoming human being) and the potential person. However, as the person materializes, the individuals behind the act of conception hold central roles in the creation chain of the person. These individuals are therefore, in both good and bad, responsible for the emergence of a certain person.
If existence was nothing but suffering, then your point regarding the undesirability of creating new life would stand. In that case existence would still be only the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for suffering (just as it is the necessary condition for anything at all), because it would be the terrible contingent conditions that come with that imagined wholly bad existence that cause the suffering, not existence per se (since conditions can always change).
But existence is not nothing but suffering, therefore your point fails; because there is no adequate calculus with which to accurately measure suffering against happiness. Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering,
Personally, given the impending problems humanity faces, I wouldn't want to be responsible for bringing a child into this world; and I've always more or less felt that way (and hence had no children); but that is just me, and I don't seek to universalize what I see as a personal attitude. So all I am disagreeing with is what I see as your unjustified proselytizing.
But is that true? There is unnecessary suffering caused to another. Why do benefits even play a factor in this? That is all you need to know. If I kidnap you to play a game, then that is wrong. The game of life I see as no different. You have to work to survive, find this or that to occupy time and to get comfortable, and to navigate the world, all the while getting impinged upon from all sorts of contingent harms (e.g. pandemics). So I disagree with this one off the bat.
Quoting Janus
Well, that is actually something I was going to bring up. What calculus would sufficiently be considered the threshold as "too much".. I had an argument with another poster on this...
If I needed to wake a sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning child's life, and I nudge the lifeguard to wake him, but I wanted to save the child, I don't believe I have gone beyond the threshold of "overlooking the lifeguard's autonomy/dignity" in saving the child.
What happens if after doing calculus for greatest good outcomes, I realized if I kidnapped the lifeguard and made him teach classes on lifeguard training, that actually created the most good. The outcome here doesn't matter. At this point, I have violated the threshold of autonomy/dignity of the lifeguard. Procreation, I believe, falls in this "violated the threshold" mark on the front of "causing unnecessary suffering to another" and "violating the autonomy to another" so if these things are valued, then it should give pause to just go ahead and procreate simply because there are good things in life.
Quoting Janus
And who are you to be the decider for someone else? If you guess wrong? Doesn't matter?
Quoting Janus
Makes sense.
Quoting Janus
See what I said to Unenlightened here for this canard:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/521502
As I said, no calculus is possible, so
Quoting schopenhauer1
I wouldn't presume to be able to decide whether a potential life will have a greater portion of joy than suffering.
On balance I would say my life has has a greater proportion of joy and I certainly have no regrets at having existed. If, per impossible, I could have been present to advise my parents whether or not to conceive me, then I would advise them to go ahead.
The point is that there is no calculus of joy and suffering such that anyone could make a fully informed decision whether or not to have children, so it must come down to personal feeling.
We know what your feeling is, which is fair enough for you, but you are not rationally, or in any other way, justified in attempting to universalize your personal feelings on the matter.
Must it? Again, if you kidnapped the lifeguard because you feel it brings about a greater good, or even worse, because it makes you feel good, is that justified?
Quoting Janus
But you do get the irony, right? If my "feeling on the matter" is followed, no "one" gets hurt. The other one, does cause substantial harm, by definition of causation of the conditions of said suffering in the first place.
Anyways, why am I not "justified" to persuade people on a logical reason to not do X action? Why are you singling out this one as not rational when this is certainly justified for many other political/ethical ideas? Seems like special pleading. Also, am I "forcing" anything on people or just presenting a case? And if you want to say that anything counts as force, then we get all sorts of absurd conclusions.
Because it is not a logical, merely an emotional, reason, given that your premise (feeling) that life is overall more suffering than joy, cannot be substantiated.
So any premise can't be substantiated then because at the end of the day, it is up to the person who follows the ethical framework. However, if the premises are shown to be quite sound and the logic follows, then it is logical overall. But your claim can be made at any ethical framework. Ironically, it is partly based on that freedom to choose and not be chosen for, that antinatalism is based which strengthens its argument, being the very ethic for choosing an action or ethic is founded on it too.
Why is it sound? Because though it's contrary to current views, it is based off quite ordinary intuitions about not substantially forcing situations on others and creating unnecessary harm. The logic follows from there by the asymmetry of not being obligated to create good for someone else, while still being obligated to prevent harm- in other words, negative ethics (deontological or utilitarian).
It seems that anything substantially more than 50% suffering could plausibly be argued to be grounds for rejection of life. But since no percentage can be established even in relation to an individual life, much less all of human life, then it seems there cannot be rational grounds for general rejection of life.
Being that all conditions of suffering are created from the conditions of birth itself, I would say it's pretty substantial. It literally foists the game of life on another. I would say anything less than a paradise, honestly. Even if you didn't agree with that standard, this particular world isn't even close.
Quoting Janus
So again, if the person kidnapped into lifeguarding school actually ended up identifying with his kidnapping and enjoyed it 50% of the time, it was thus justified? No. Forcing an X on someone unnecessarily and suffering unnecessary is never right. It is only just when mitigating a less harm for a greater harm, which can only happen for people that already exist. In other words, using people by forcing the game on them to create better outcomes for humanity would be like kidnapping the lifeguard.
I get that that's your personal feeling, but there can be no rational basis for rejecting life unless it could be shown that suffering outweighs happiness, which is impossible to do.
See, this is why you get accused of proselytising. It's not because you're 'discussing' a philosophical position, it because you keep repeating points that have already been countered without addressing that argument.
You equivocate on 'existence'
You start by positing harms and here the non-existence of the un-concieved child doesn't matter - they will exist and so one can consider the harms that will befall them. But here, the aggregate argument carries. There will be more harm by not conceiving them than there would by conceiving them (if you have a reasonable expectation that they'll mostly enjoy life).
You then switch to the dignity/will argument citing kidnapping. But here the non-existence of the un-conceived child does matter. There's no person who's dignity or will needs to be considered. We're not kidnapping someone against their will, there's no person who exists yet for their will to be considered. It's a unique situation not analogous to any other we face in life. so we have no other intuition on how to handle it that the one most people have about conception (that it's morally fine).
You've had all this explained to you before and yet you just bring it up as if you hadn't. That's why people get annoyed.
If you want to continue the discussion qua discussion, address the arguments, don't just ignore them and move on to fresh meat you hope might not spot the flaws, that just makes you seem like you're recruiting, not discussing.
All the stuff about harms has been discussed and resolved - no need to bring it up fresh as if it hadn't. If you take an aggregate harms position there's an argument that not having a child causes more harm than having one for some prospective parents. There's a threshold of autonomy/dignity above which we all cringe at considering aggregate harms (such as your kidnapped lifeguard). So harms are now completely irrelevant to the argument because it has moved on the the threshold of dignity/autonomy and its relation to conception.
You're view on this is that childbirth is like kidnapping, but you've not provided anything to support that view. Most people think childbirth does not cross the threshold of dignity/autonomy, mainly because the person whose will we'd normally consider doesn't yet exist.
You have an unusual view about this threshold. unusual views lead to unusual conclusions.
Nothing here is about the 'logic' at all, nothing about the discussion. It's all about that view. You think conception is like enough to kidnapping that your intuition about kidnapping applies to ti. Most others think conception is dissimilar enough to kidnapping that their intuition about kidnapping does not apply to it. Since conception and kidnapping are certainly dissimilar in many ways you can't show anyone to be wrong about that by necessity. There's therefore no 'argument' to be had.
I don't think anyone's disagreeing there (obviously parents are responsible for having their kids, who else is?). What Benkei (and I) disagree with is the asymmetry. I used to be AN and even when I was I thought the asymmetry is a load of BS.
The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.
This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself a good act. It should go:
Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good
Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral
not
Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering - good, prevention of pleasure - neutral
That's the asymmetry.
I have to agree with you.
But if you mean having a child and not having a child are both neutral acts, then I have to disagree.
Thank you.
This seems right to me:
Quoting khaled
As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what @Benkei is saying.
Quoting Antinatalist
Oh. Wasn't expecting that. Most ANs I've met swear by the asymmetry as if it was some holy scripture.
Quoting Antinatalist
I'd say it's situational.
Note that this:
Quoting khaled
Only applies when you only consider the child as part of the "system". When you instead look at suffering inflicted overall it doesn't become so clear cut. Not having a child has consequences too. If the child was going to be a positive influence, you can't simply say that not having a child is purely preventative, it could also be harmful. The people the child would have helped would now be worse off.
If your child wasn't going to be a positive influence you're probably just a bad parent and shouldn't be having kids (not a personal attack, just a general statement). That's my position at least.
It doesn't matter. This is unacceptable to do for someone else, as what you are doing to them is like the lifeguard situation, unless you agree, the lifeguard should be kidnapped because you think it is good.
And no, I argue BOTH that unnecessary suffering/harms and dignity violated (for other people) are the two rules. They are related but separate reasons and it is a matter of degree/threshold at which it is being violated. I also admitted I had no calculus yet but that in the case of birth there was high amounts of autonomy/dignity violated and unnecessary suffering violated being that all suffering that will occur come from the act, thus the high threshold violation.
Quoting Isaac
Yes it is supremely annoying to ME when we've discussed this. If you think you're frustrated...
Once the person is born, and the decision was made for them, that was the "force". It is a unique situation but the displacement of decision-made and consequent doesn't change the analogy. Is this not a huge decision you are making on behalf of someone else? And even though @khaled doesn't agree with my position anymore, I think he has made dozens of examples that proved this point over and over previously.
Quoting Isaac
This is silly. Recruiting.. :rofl:. Yep, I find "recruits" left and right here :roll:.
Quoting Isaac
No that's the point, you can't just look at aggregate harm, as dignity/autonomy IS in the equation too. It hasn't moved, it's that both rules are in play- don't cause unnecessary harm and don't cause dignity to be violated. I used to think one was subsumed in the other, and still not sure honestly if they are just separate limiting factors on actions or one is a subsection of another.. Of course you wouldn't help me parse that out so, I won't even ask because you're not going to have a constructive conversation about something you hate so much... so don't worry about that part of it, cause it doesn't hurt the main position that both shouldn't be violated.
Quoting Isaac
Right, and I discussed how displacing the time of decision and the time of the consequence doesn't change anything about this crossing the threshold of dignity/autonomy and being analogous to kidnapping. A state of affairs that takes time to actually unfold, why would that make a difference? A bomb didn't go off now.. but will go off, well technically now, there is no bomb blowing up. Obviously that is bone-headed.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I explained how life is akin to a game.. the "game of life" of "overcoming challenges". If you do not do X, Y, Z then you will die. It's a deadly game. But just because you don't mind playing (at least at the moment we are discussing this), doesn't mean that your preference should be assumed for other people.
And I am not switching arguments but separately, the threshold for unnecessary suffering also is met being that all suffering will occur to that person who is born, and there would have been no downside for any "one" by not having them. If you start railing about the aggregate "good" for the "whole" had by having your kid (which is really presumptuous by the way), then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. That indeed is also like the kidnapping scenario.. The lifeguard would be creating the greatest amounts of good, but you are overlooking the lifeguard himself (dignity violated) for your "cause" of the "greatest good".
@Antinatalist too
It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. is in some way "good". Benatar has also stated his asymmetry can be used in any normative ethical system, so it could be deontological or utilitarian, for example.
However, I don't see it being a problem as an act either. This is more my spin on it. If you have the gun, the rule would be to not cause the the unnecessary suffering (preventing bad). It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!".
“If you start railing about the aggregate "good" for the "whole" had by having your kid (which is really presumptuous by the way), then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. That indeed is also like the kidnapping scenario. The lifeguard would be creating the greatest amounts of good, but you are overlooking the lifeguard himself (dignity violated) for your "cause" of the "greatest good".
I am quite interested in how you would respond to this. I think your system is appealing and close to how I think, but I wanted to wait and see what others thought of this
Yes it is different.. If someone is not born, there is no "deprivation" of pleasure. If someone is born, they are deprived when it is taken away. This is the crux of the asymmetry. Pleasure denied in respect to "non-existence" is neutral. Suffering prevented, in respect to "non-existence" is good. And as explained to Khaled, this is in respect to a state of affairs of "good" and "bad" and "neutral".
In that case it should be:
Quoting khaled
By what standard is a state of affairs where someone is not suffering worse than one where there is someone suffering, but at the same time a state of affairs where someone is not having pleasure is just as good as one where someone is having pleasure.
If we're just talking about states of affairs, obviously being in pleasure is better than not. In that case it should be:
Quoting khaled
I don't see a way of getting an asymmetry here. If we're talking about states, they're symmetrical. If we're talking about acts, they're neutral.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sure, but that doesn't make "not doing this" good. I think there is a difference between what is moral and what is good. Sometimes something is moral but not good, as in it is a minimum requirement. "Not killing people" is definitely moral, but not enough to be called good. You're not virtuous simply because you haven't killed anyone.
Yup. It depends on how much the harm that is being inflicted is and how much good is done by inflicting it. I doubt anyone here tends the absolutist position of never imposing on someone unjustly even if it will alleviate suffering elsewhere.
Say for example, if you could save person A from untold suffering for 30 years by giving a completely innocent person B a hearty slap, I'm pretty sure most people would find the slap at least permissible. Even though it is an unjust imposition.
My point then is that having children falls in this category of actions. It depends on how big you think the imposition is and how much you think not doing it can potentially cost. So you can't get hard AN out of a simple desire to alleviate suffering. And no one here thinks that "dignity preservation" is the end all be all either, so you can't get hard AN out of that alone (since there are exceptions where it should be violated).
My only argument against @schopenhauer1 is that his argument is not logical though he makes it seem so. He accepts that the whole preservation of dignity thing is and should be violated sometimes. As such, he can't really argue that having children is unilaterally wrong without begging the question (assuming that having children is already one of the instances where dignity violation is not acceptable). He could try to argue for that separately so as no longer to beg the question by taking a misanthropic angle, and trying to show that in most or all cases, having a child is a heavy enough burden, and doesn't alleviate enough to be considered acceptable. But he doesn't do that. So as it stands I think his argument begs the question at worst, or is insufficient at best.
Quoting Albero
And I can list a million things that aren't happing that I would like to happen. "It's a bad thing that I'm not a millionaire, not tall enough, not strong enough", etc. So..... What?
Even if we accept an "asymmetry of states" where bad things not happening is good but good things not happening is not bad, what does that lead to exactly?
Now, when you talk about Impositions, isn’t having children a bad imposition because it’s too long? Some people can live to a 100 or more
Yea I never bought this one either. I don't see what sense it makes insisting that people are suffering when they keep assuring you they're not. If they're fine with it, why is it wrong to do?
But still, this doesn't change the fact that an "asymmetry of states" (even if we accept it) has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not it's right to have kids. So idk why he spent so much of his book talking about it.
This is in respect to non-existence and its absence. The absence of pain that could have occurred, is always good. The absence of pleasure for someone who does not exist but could, is neutral.
I do see why you find this harder to claim. His basis are intuitions like, "We don't seem to care over the absence of pleasure on a deserted planet, but we would probably empathize if there were aliens that were in tormenting pain". There is something valuable about not suffering sub species aeternatatis which is not the case for not feeling pleasure sub species aeternatatis.
So some conclusions might be:
A universe devoid of people with pain is just a "good" state of affairs.
A universe devoid of people with pleasure is just a "neutral" state of affairs.
However if it is person-dependent (because they are already born), then:
A person devoid of pain is a "good" state of affairs.
A person devoid of pleasure is a "bad" state of affairs (if the person feels "deprived" of this pleasure).
Quoting khaled
Granted, I would make that distinction too I think. But one is the foundation, the other are some implications if one believes the foundation. For example, Benatar himself had several other asymmetries that followed from the initial asymmetry. See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benatar
So after our conversations, I am of the idea that really unnecessary suffering and dignity are inextricably intertwined as some sort of "limits" of morality and that it is not binary but of degree and that if a threshold is reached then it becomes violated. Thus nudging the lifeguard to wake up is not to the degree of violating dignity or unnecessary suffering prevention that forcing the lifeguard into a lifetime of teaching lifeguarding lessons would be doing.
Even if we were to "know" the greatest good would come from this, the dignity threshold has been violated. In the case of procreation, even if you believed the greatest good for society is to be had from the birth, the dignity violation of violating someone's autonomy (forcing a game on them) is met. Certainly, there is a balanced calculus that has to be made regarding how much unnecessary suffering and dignity violation is happening. In most cases, an "aggregate" approach to suffering is almost always violating the dignity violation of an individual.
There are cases when one must cause harm to an individual but that is to ameliorate a greater harm with a lesser harm for that person.. Being person-contexted rather than aggregate contexted, and being that it is "necessary" to prevent further suffering for that individual, it may not be a violation.
Procreation is causing (the conditions of) unnecessary suffering for an individual, and aggregating the "use" of the individual for some "greater good" idea violates the dignity of that individual, so fails on both accounts.
So basically procreation can be:
Violating unnecessary suffering prevention: Yes
Violating dignity using people for aggregate: Yes
Violating dignity, forcing a game on them: Yes
I understand your point. But when I´m saying that not having a child is morally neutral, I mean not having a child is a moral obligation.
Quoting schopenhauer1
My point of view slighly differs from Benatar´s.
I think his asymmetry argument has valid point of person´s moral rights and moral obligations.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I agree.
Based on all this, your position seems to be deontological of the negative ethics variety, which is about where mine is too :up: . That is to say, the concern lies in what not to do (preventing force of autonomy if possible, preventing unnecessary harm if possible, etc.).
I have to strongly agree, at least for the second part.
For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life.
In any event, the wording would only matter to deontologists. The asymmetry argument is of no use to a pure consequentialist?
No it can certainly be used by a consequentialist. The least amount of suffering is preventing birth, and there's no downside to the absence of good in reference to non-existence.
Thank you. That was at least quite familiar. But perhaps I should revise things that I´ve read years ago and now forgotten. And in moral philosophy in general are of course things and ideas that I don´t know, but maybe I should.
Deprivation is not the right word.
Something, which doesn´t exist doesn´t suffer from deprivation.
Then again, if someone who already exists will be killed, it´s extreme violation against her/his sovereignty and autonomy.
And if you think not having a child is morally as same level as murdering someone, think again.
But, let´s assume that having a child is a good thing. Absolutely good thing, in any circumstances.
If this is true, it might not result in the duty of producing as much life for the Earth as possible, but it would undoubtedly be a supererogatory – a Mother Theresa-like – act. Therefore, it is a considerably immoral deed for social workers or anyone else to persuade potential heroin addict mothers to use contraception or even to terminate their pregnancies!
But, the epistemic state of people being as it is, we cannot plead to the value of creating life with such speculative arguments.
This comes from conflating the state with the personal opinion of someone.
If we’re comparing states, the absence of a good state is bad and the absence of a bad state is good.
If we’re comparing “how would someone feel”. The absence of a bad state and a good state are neutral in this case (since there is no one to feel anything)
You get an asymmetry when you mix them up. You can get the opposite asymmetry by mixing them up the opposite way.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Even if we accept these (which I still don’t), it doesn’t help his argument. You can’t get AN from this.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sure. But then you’d have to argue that having children IS of that degree. And you haven’t done so yet.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You need to show this.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You need to show that the calculus would conclude that “having children is bad enough an imposition to get wrong”. To simply assume it is question begging.
Quoting schopenhauer1
If you could save person A from untold suffering for 30 years by forcing person B to play League of Legends for 4 hours with toxic teammates that make him want to tear his hair out, would you do it?
I would at least find that permissible. Even though it meets the 3 criteria above. So it’s not like having all 3 guarantees that “violating dignity” wins out.
Maybe. But then we are just talking about degrees of meeting the threshold.
Quoting khaled
But I explained earlier that it isn't binary but a matter of degrees meeting a threshold.
Yes, the calculus does have to be worked out because intuitively I can say the waking of the lifeguard doesn't meet it while kidnapping the the lifeguard for a lifetime does. Thus, the situation you provided does not necessarily violate it, as it doesn't meet the threshold. The violation happens only after the threshold is met.
It's not conflating.. it is about state of affairs in regards to non-existence (no human), it is person-contexted in regards to already existing.
The point is, "absence of good" is only bad when there is actually a person affected by this. Not so with the absence of suffering (the asymmetry).
Quoting khaled
I think that Benatar may agree and hence it's the interlocking of all the asymmetries and empirical evidence that really is the force behind the argument. The initial asymmetry is sort of the foundation where the other arguments come from. We must first believe that suffering is bad person-independent.. Which he thinks is intuitive that suffering existing counts more than goodness not existing.
But you argue for a binary position. Having kids is wrong. Period. Quoting schopenhauer1
And you haven’t shown that the threshold is met in the case of birth. If that’s your intuition that’s fine, but it’s not a common one.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Absence of suffering is also only good when there is a person actually affected by this. Idk where you’re getting otherwise.
No that is true.. but that is after the threshold is met.. Degrees that reach a threshold.
Quoting khaled
I think it can come from common intuitions, it's just people don't think to apply them to common intuitions that other things often apply to. So the intuitions are common, this particular application of it is not.
Quoting khaled
But that is the axiom which the asymmetry is based.. that suffering not occurring (if it could have) is always good. So the objection that this means that a bunch of things not occurring is "good" I guess would be yes for Benatar.
Don’t you also say that having a child already meets the threshold in every case?
Quoting schopenhauer1
No because I would add “a bunch of good things not occurring is bad”. A no for Benatar.
So yes, I should say that suffering not existing is always good.. even if there was no person to benefit from this good. Good things not occurring is not good (or bad) unless there is a person for which there is a deprivation.
Quoting khaled
Yes, it always meets the threshold.. I am not saying individual cases of having children (it always meets the threshold) but comparing procreation with other actions that have force or harm involved. Though I could argue actually that unnecessary harm which counts (in respect for the individual being born) rather than aggregate harm (in which case it can be considered "necessary" in a certain way, but then violating dignity/not respecting the individual/autonomy).
Where do you get this? That’s the main point. You don’t have a real argument unless you can argue for this premise. It’s crucial.
Right, and I did answer you previously:
Quoting schopenhauer1
Where there did you argue that having children meets the threshold of “too much dignity violation”?
Now I don't understand. Procreation meets the threshold, similar to the lifeguard example.. I just cannot provide a concrete calculus (yet) of how these thresholds were met other than an intuitive understanding.
Why? On the basis that both are “for a lifetime”?
I would say there are some things that are ok to force onto people for a lifetime because of the suffering doing so alleviates. Like taxes.
So “for a lifetime” doesn’t seem to be enough to unilaterally say that too much dignity is being violated.
Anyways, I have to go now. Will be back later.
Presuming the game of life should be played, or the challenge/overcoming challenge game.
Quoting khaled
Sure.
Quoting khaled
Right, an intractable game of challenges forced onto someone and cannot be escaped easily. Have you read some of my numerous other posts explaining the ways in which the "game of life" can be a harm?
Depending on the difficulty of said game, I will think it’s over or under the threshold.
I happen to think it’s often under the threshold. While you think it’s over the threshold.
We could agree to disagree, but you furthermore seem to want to establish some objectivity to your view. That it is a matter of fact that the game of life is over the threshold of acceptable impositions. That’s why I ask you to argue further to establish that.
I think even a threshold right there is met being that it is unknown for the person involved being such an immersive and intractable game for the person this would be happening to. Perhaps this is beginning to answer the calculus for the lifeguard forced teaching for life argument...How easy is it to leave the game? Here the argument would center on whether "life itself" can be considered a game.. An objection would be that because it cannot be escaped easily, and is the reason for all other games, it can't be considered a game. I think that debate can be hashed out.
Certain tasks have to be met (though it happens in any number of avenues).
De facto limits are involved (historical and cultural contingencies)
Challenges have to be met and overcome..
What if you want to "quit" the tasks de facto tasks involved? What happens if you don't want to encounter the particular contingencies that befall you?
T
Quoting schopenhauer1
We can argue over whether or not the absence of good should be defined as a downside to being unborn, but considering that that good would be experienced should they be born, to a consequentialist it wouldn't matter.
Not for a negative utilitarian: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism
Quoting schopenhauer1
A NU or indeed anyone doesn't need the asymmetry to tell them that birth leads to suffering. The meat of the asymmetry is that the unborn are not being deprived, which would be no use to a consequentialist, as the consequence of not giving birth is absence of the good that would have been experienced if the unborn had been born.
Right but presumably harm is weighted as what counts or matters here.
I'm finding transhumanism to be a very interesting idea. I'm oscillating between thinking it's a very good idea and it being complete horseshit.
Why not try for it in case its possible, right?
I'm just not convinced it's a desirable end. I'm new to the concept though an there are lots of variants and complexity. I often think we should have stopped at horse and cart technology. And sailing ships.
And we much appreciate it!
Quoting schopenhauer1
The crux of the alleged asymmetry lies in the status of the non-existent, but all that matters to the consequentialist is what would result if someone were to be brought into existence. As I've already highlighted, at least some of the asymmetry argument conclusions conflict with the consequences of giving birth.
While I am opposed to procreation, your path to getting there is impossible for me to follow.