Good question. I'm against the concept of qualia. I think it's confusing and unnecessary. But I definitely do believe in subjectivity in the sense I think you mean it. I don't agree with attempts to explain subjectivity in terms of other things like functions or modelling or phi or whatever.
Everyone agrees that we have experiences of seeing color, hearing sound, feeling pain and what not. But people are going to hotly disagree on the semantics of those terms as they fit into one's preferred solution or defense of the hard problem when it comes to qualia. For some that means dissolving the dispute.
Objections to qualia include its incompatibility with physicalism, the problem it poses for a scientific understanding, and how it makes our conscious world private from others. Those who don't like the subjective/objective split tend to favor dissolving the distinction in favor of everything including mental activity being part of the world. For people who don't like how it's incompatible with the material world, they will point out that it's hard to see how the brain and qualia could interact. Thus the old objections to dualism.
And then there are those who just don't like there being a substantial philosophical problem that doesn't go away, particularly of the metaphysical variety. They tend to view such problems as highly suspect and in need of linquistic therapy.
Personally, I don't see any solution to the hard problem as workable (at least so far). We're conscious, consciousness is at least somewhat subjective, private and non-reducible to brain functioning. That it poses a significant problem is interesting. But I tend to think metaphysical problems are substantial and maybe we're just not smart enough or scientifically advanced enough to solve them yet.
Or alternatively, we're not epistemically situated to answer some questions. Some people hate that, but why should humans be able to answer any conceivable question?
And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia?
Let's begin with the fact that "qualia" are distinctions in cognitive neuroscience or philosophy of mind which make no informative difference ... (re: summary of Daniel Dennett's "Quining Qualia"). Also, see "the private language argument"(Witty). I'm all for dispensing with apparent / pseudo questions and empty concepts / terms – intellectual hygiene and all that.
Denying concepts is not a sound business model for a philosopher. Crafting new concepts is legit, using old words for new ideas is legit, refusing to use words that one deems unclear is legit. But telling other folks what words they should use and what words not to use, that is not legitimate philosophical work. It's more for the Gestapo.
If one doesn't like the concept of qualia, one can create another one, or just not use the word.
Merleau-Ponty had a problem with the concept of individual quale, which was that for him, the quale defined as the elementary unit of sensation is not really what perception is made of. One because perception is holistic, it goes from the general to the particular, two because what really matters in perception is not the positive, objective, elementary color 'red' here or there in the picture but the differences and relationships between colors. The elementary unit of visual perception is therefore (according to him) better defined as the differences we spot between two colors. If you paint a canvas with only one color, you can't really represent or perceive anything in it.
Because I accept this reasoning, I don't use the singular "quale". Like my data, my qualia are always plural and relative.
And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia?
Qualia seems to refer to that ineffable, unwordable, aspect of consciousness. To say that it's not real would mean that everything about consciousness is expressible in words and let's, for the moment, ignore the issue of how well such descriptions will be. Let's conduct a little experiment with me as the subject. I'm, as of this moment, typing these words from my keyboard and I get this distinct sensation from my finger tips - it has a certain quality to it - but as I try to put into words this "distinct sensation" I can't seem to do it. Similarly, I'm reading these words as I type it onto my computer screen - I can see the words clearly and know, to some extent, what these words mean and as I try to convey the conscious experience of reading and knowing these words, I still feel language is not up to the task - there's a certain part of the experience of consciousness that I can't seem to express in words. This, to sum it up, is qualia. Ask Daniel Dennett to describe his consciousness as best as he can and then ask him, "is that all?" or "anything else?" The answer should be "no" and "yes" respectively. In other words, there's something about consciousness that defies description and this ain't so because of linguistic issues; au contraire, something about consciousness is indescribable and that's qualia.
Do those who deny the existence of qualia also deny subjectivity altogether?
If only. Unfortunately they mostly can't resist taunting believers with a more subtle dance, wherein the beetle is supposed irrelevant, but not doubted. [Witness the next two pages...]
The issue is more about how useful the notion is (Oliver's criticism, as usual, misses the point).
Perhaps "qualia" is just a new word for stuff we already talk about, albeit not without some confusion: "red" "loud", "sweet" and so on. If so, it's not too problematic.
But if it is a name for something new, and if as some advocates suggest, that something is not the sort of thing about which we can talk, then there is an obvious problem. They've named a something about which they say they cannot talk. See my reply to @TheMadFool immediately above.
The trouble is, if you cannot discuss something, if it is ineffable, then how can it figure in our philosophical rumination? We can talk about something being sweet or loud, without difficulty, because these are words for things that are part of our shared world. But if the supposition is that there qualia are not part of this shared world, then how is it that we might be able to talk about them?
Advocate for qualia seem to have answered this question to their own satisfaction, but others such as myself remain unconvinced. In conversation - and there have been many on this topic, even here in this forum - these advocates seem to equivocate, talking as if qualia were just "red", "sweet" or "loud" on the one hand, and next telling us that there is something here that cannot be shared.
The problem is an extrusion from talk of subjectivity. The same considerations apply, and in that way this is a continuation of an ancient philosophical briar patch. If "subjective" just means something like "from where I stand" or "for me", there's not much of an issue. Some folk propose a use of "subjective" which is somehow goes further than this, to be somehow beyond words. Unfortunately they sometimes look to construct entire theories of consciousness, knowledge and the nature of the world from this subjective stuff about which they cannot speak.
The character or quality of sensation 'S'; what it feels like. In Wittgenstein's argument, it is the private sensation itself, or what each person's beetle looks like.
In conversation - and there have been many on this topic, even here in this forum - these advocates seem to equivocate, talking as if qualia were just "red", "sweet" or "loud" on the one hand, and next telling us that there is something here that cannot be shared.
Wittgenstein's brilliant insight was that the character or quality of sensation 'S' is inessential to the use of the name ('S'). It does not matter how red looks to you or to me in order for us to competently use the word "red", because the word does not take its meaning from how red looks to you or to me, i.e. from some subjective character of the sensation. But, just because this character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game, this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us. Given that we are human, red probably looks the same or similar to most of us, but this cannot be verified. Additionally, there is the randomness of evolution and biology to consider.
All this talk about privacy is just one big distraction. Just so you know, telepathy is an illusion, a real one. Nobody can read other people's minds. Our sensations are private, like our memories are, until one shares some of them. People share only what they want to share, when they want to, and with whom they want to. And even the most loquacious among us can't tell it all. That one cannot verbalize all of one's thoughts and sensations is due to their almost infinite nuances and complexity. Words fail us.
My hypothesis is that qualia are the biological, memorisable "tags" or identifiers that allow you to recognize a taste or a color, to identify it correctly and consistently over time. One can usually recognize a taste, or a color. Logically, there must be some system of identifiers supporting this capacity.
Bnbb nnbb blnnbmb n bb bbnb bnbbbbbnnnb bb vnbbbnnnnmbnnnnnbbbnnbbbnbn. Nbjnnnnnnnnnnncnnnvbv vvv a n.bbnn. Jnnb nb can nb nbm. Nbbmnnbnnnvn. V nj nn n
For the most part I agree; but then this: Quoting Luke
...this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us.
Let's suppose that you are right here; that there is a 'character or quality of how red looks to each of us', that is such that this 'character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game'...
What you are doing is inventing a use of the word qualia to refer to something that drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
That looks like naming a nothing. It is as unhelpful as "Last night I saw upon the stair, a little man who wasn't there". The words look to be about a little man, but there is no little man to be had.
Merleau-Ponty had a problem with the concept of individual quale, which was that for him, the quale defined as the elementary unit of sensation is not really what perception is made of. One because perception is holistic, it goes from the general to the particular, two because what really matters in perception is not the positive, objective, elementary color 'red' here or there in the picture but the differences and relationships between colors.
He would have had a problem with the concept of plural qualia too. You’re right that for Merleau-Ponty what counts in perception is differences and relationships between colors , but he would also argue that colors , and all other perceptions, only emerge as as expressions of the body’s actions in the world. Perception is interpretive all the way down, which means that the concept of qualia is no more coherent than that of sense data.
just because this character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game, this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us.
Yes, but perception is itself a kind of ‘private’ language game. That is to say , what you want to call the felt sensation of red is not a stable primitive of experiencing but a bodily mediated interpretation. One can no more isolate a reproducible scenario of red that one can duplicate an expression of emotion. In both cases you have a complex interpretive activity that is context-dependent. How something looks or tastes in any instant of time cannot be separated from a larger whole of attitudes, perceptions and conceptions which are always transforming themselves. The upshot foe the OP is that you must reject the concept of qualia if you take embodied subjectivity seriously.
Reply to Joshs "That is to say , what you want to call the felt sensation of red is not a stable primitive of experiencing but a bodily mediated interpretation."
Yes, but perception is itself a kind of ‘private’ language game. That is to say , what you want to call the felt sensation of red is not a stable primitive of experiencing but a bodily mediated interpretation. One can no more isolate a reproducible scenario of red that one can duplicate an expression of emotion. In both cases you have a complex interpretive activity that is context-dependent. How something looks or tastes in any instant of time cannot be separated from a larger whole of attitudes, perceptions and conceptions which are always transforming themselves.
Maybe, but I'm sure you could pick out a red object if required.
Maybe, but I'm sure you could pick out a red object if required.
Yes, and I’m sure I could spell the word ‘book’ when asked, but that doesn’t tell us very much about what the word means for me, how I’m using it, whether the color red is smooth or textured, whether it feels warm or hot or neutral, what shape or tone or saturation it appears within, whether it is still my favorite color. That I continue to recognize a word doesn’t say anything about how my sense of the pragmatic meaning of the word changes from context to context.
Yes, and I’m sure I could spell the word ‘book’ when asked, but that doesn’t tell us very much about what the word means for me, how I’m using it, whether the color red is smooth or textured, whether it feels warm or hot or neutral, what shape or tone or saturation it appears within, whether it is still my favorite color.
You can say all that publicly, like you just did. But I still don't know how the colour red looks to you.
You can say all that publicly, like you just did. But I still don't know how the colour red looks to you.
I agree you don’t know how it looks to me, but if we are talking about the usefulness of the concept of qualia, the relevant question here is whether I know how it looks to me. That is, whether there is a such a thing as an interpretation and context-independent fact of privately felt sensation, such that when I say I know what red feels like to me, I can demonstrate for myself that it is the ‘same’ felt experience of red as the previous and the time before that. I adhere to constructivist , enactivist, phenomenological and Gibsonian ecological models of perception, that link private sensation to a self-organizing but constantly changing body-environment interaction. Sensations like color are always a new constructive achievement of the whole organism in interaction with its environment .
I agree you don’t know how it looks to me, but if we are talking about the usefulness of the concept of qualia, the relevant question here is whether I know how it looks to me. That is, whether there is a such a thing as an interpretation and context-independent fact of privately felt sensation.
You can't convey the subjective character of "how it looks/feels to me" in language (such that others can know, e.g., how red looks to you), so there's no point in trying. Does this make the concept of qualia useless? It apparently finds its use in philosophical discussions.
Next time you have the sensation, can you say "ah, that's 'S'"?
I maybe off track here but naming is not the same as describing. Certain aspects of consciousness though nameable can't be described. So, I may be able to remember the name "S" which I gave to a sensation when I experience it but describing it is an entirely different story, no?
Let's conduct a little experiment with me as the subject. I'm, as of this moment, typing these words from my keyboard and I get this distinct sensation from my finger tips - it has a certain quality to it - but as I try to put into words this "distinct sensation" I can't seem to do it.
I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S?
I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S?
I already told you, it would depend on how good my memory is. Supposing I possess a perfect memory, I would immediately recognize a sensation as one I had experienced before and I would also recall the name S that I had given it.
You’re right that for Merleau-Ponty what counts in perception is differences and relationships between colors , but he would also argue that colors , and all other perceptions, only emerge as as expressions of the body’s actions in the world.
That's where I think he needlessly complicates the matter. One cannot spot a difference between two colors without having a sense of each individual color. So perception (of similitudes and differences) builds upon sensation rather than compete with it as a rival paradigm.
...and how could you decide if that memory was correct? There's nothing to compare it to, except itself.
I realize that but what's the point? The fact that memory is unreliable and also that there's no memory-independent corroboration available does nothing to disprove that some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. Right? :chin:
Given that it makes no nevermind, why not just say that there isn't a how-the-colour-red-looks-to-Luke?
I was only agreeing that all supposed shared ’we’ experiences conceal a gap between my experience ce and your experience. I did t mean to
suggest that my experience of the color red is a persisting datum that can be returned to as
identical.
You can't convey the subjective character of "how it looks/feels to me" in language (such that others can know, e.g., how red looks to you), so there's no point in trying. Does this make the concept of qualia useless? It apparently finds its use in philosophical discussions.
My first observation is that qualia is only useful
for certain philosophers, but it seems to me that for those philosophers most closely involved in the latest research in visual perception ( J.J.Gibson, Noe and O, Reagan) it is not a useful concept.
As far as conveying subjective experience in language, I’m i. the camp that esther than constituting some ineffable and mysterious content added to objective experience, the subjective ‘feel’ has to do with organizational aspects of experience that can and are languaged in some sense. For instance, do you know what color is? It’s a black shape either emerging out of
or receding into a dark background. You can demonstrate this yourself. Cut out a white cardboard circle, paint one half black , and then drawn a series of black lines following the curvature of the circle on either side of the disk emerging from the r black half. Then attach it to a fan and watch the appearance of red and blue.
This explains why red is a metaphor for anger and aggression, and blue represents calm and coldness.
Red is literally a shape popping out at us and blue is a shape receding from us, even as these are just feature of a motionless surface.
So our language, through its metaphors , is in fact describing organizational characteristics ( agrees or approach vs passive receding) of the supposedly ‘private’ feel of color. But is this any different situation than the communicability of affectivity in general? Are all affects moments of engagement with others?
I'm fishing for "what it is" that is inexpressible. Or rather, pointing out that there is a prima facie contradiction in saying that there is something that cannot be expressed. If there is something then one ought be able to individuate it; to name it; hence, "S". But I think the argument shows that there are problems with naming "S".
The issue is phrased as if there were a limit on language such that there is something that language cannot set out. I'm saying that instead, there is a misguided notion that there is a something were there is none; that what is described is not a limit on language but an illusion.
According to the Wikipedia article on Qualia, qualia are defined as individual instances of subjective conscious experiences, where an example of a qualia would be the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache.
According to the SEP article on qualia, philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.
According to the IEP article on qualia, qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences.
I could say that "I have sensation S", meaning that I have the sensation of an individual instance of subjective conscious experience, eg, the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache
I could also have said that "I have the sensation of a qualia".
In answering the OP, as I know that individual instances of subjective conscious experiences exist, then according to the Wikipedia, SEP and IEP definitions of qualia, qualia exist.
Comments (38)
Objections to qualia include its incompatibility with physicalism, the problem it poses for a scientific understanding, and how it makes our conscious world private from others. Those who don't like the subjective/objective split tend to favor dissolving the distinction in favor of everything including mental activity being part of the world. For people who don't like how it's incompatible with the material world, they will point out that it's hard to see how the brain and qualia could interact. Thus the old objections to dualism.
And then there are those who just don't like there being a substantial philosophical problem that doesn't go away, particularly of the metaphysical variety. They tend to view such problems as highly suspect and in need of linquistic therapy.
Personally, I don't see any solution to the hard problem as workable (at least so far). We're conscious, consciousness is at least somewhat subjective, private and non-reducible to brain functioning. That it poses a significant problem is interesting. But I tend to think metaphysical problems are substantial and maybe we're just not smart enough or scientifically advanced enough to solve them yet.
Or alternatively, we're not epistemically situated to answer some questions. Some people hate that, but why should humans be able to answer any conceivable question?
Let's begin with the fact that "qualia" are distinctions in cognitive neuroscience or philosophy of mind which make no informative difference ... (re: summary of Daniel Dennett's "Quining Qualia"). Also, see "the private language argument"(Witty). I'm all for dispensing with apparent / pseudo questions and empty concepts / terms – intellectual hygiene and all that.
If one doesn't like the concept of qualia, one can create another one, or just not use the word.
Merleau-Ponty had a problem with the concept of individual quale, which was that for him, the quale defined as the elementary unit of sensation is not really what perception is made of. One because perception is holistic, it goes from the general to the particular, two because what really matters in perception is not the positive, objective, elementary color 'red' here or there in the picture but the differences and relationships between colors. The elementary unit of visual perception is therefore (according to him) better defined as the differences we spot between two colors. If you paint a canvas with only one color, you can't really represent or perceive anything in it.
Because I accept this reasoning, I don't use the singular "quale". Like my data, my qualia are always plural and relative.
Qualia seems to refer to that ineffable, unwordable, aspect of consciousness. To say that it's not real would mean that everything about consciousness is expressible in words and let's, for the moment, ignore the issue of how well such descriptions will be. Let's conduct a little experiment with me as the subject. I'm, as of this moment, typing these words from my keyboard and I get this distinct sensation from my finger tips - it has a certain quality to it - but as I try to put into words this "distinct sensation" I can't seem to do it. Similarly, I'm reading these words as I type it onto my computer screen - I can see the words clearly and know, to some extent, what these words mean and as I try to convey the conscious experience of reading and knowing these words, I still feel language is not up to the task - there's a certain part of the experience of consciousness that I can't seem to express in words. This, to sum it up, is qualia. Ask Daniel Dennett to describe his consciousness as best as he can and then ask him, "is that all?" or "anything else?" The answer should be "no" and "yes" respectively. In other words, there's something about consciousness that defies description and this ain't so because of linguistic issues; au contraire, something about consciousness is indescribable and that's qualia.
If only. Unfortunately they mostly can't resist taunting believers with a more subtle dance, wherein the beetle is supposed irrelevant, but not doubted. [Witness the next two pages...]
Quoting noname
Neural networks: learning, but without the internal images.
You might now say: "I have sensation S".
What is it that has been left out?
Nothing is left out, since "S" is the name of that sensation, so it includes everything about it...
As if names were somehow short descriptions.
"...denying the existence of quailia"...?
The issue is more about how useful the notion is (Oliver's criticism, as usual, misses the point).
Perhaps "qualia" is just a new word for stuff we already talk about, albeit not without some confusion: "red" "loud", "sweet" and so on. If so, it's not too problematic.
But if it is a name for something new, and if as some advocates suggest, that something is not the sort of thing about which we can talk, then there is an obvious problem. They've named a something about which they say they cannot talk. See my reply to @TheMadFool immediately above.
The trouble is, if you cannot discuss something, if it is ineffable, then how can it figure in our philosophical rumination? We can talk about something being sweet or loud, without difficulty, because these are words for things that are part of our shared world. But if the supposition is that there qualia are not part of this shared world, then how is it that we might be able to talk about them?
Advocate for qualia seem to have answered this question to their own satisfaction, but others such as myself remain unconvinced. In conversation - and there have been many on this topic, even here in this forum - these advocates seem to equivocate, talking as if qualia were just "red", "sweet" or "loud" on the one hand, and next telling us that there is something here that cannot be shared.
The problem is an extrusion from talk of subjectivity. The same considerations apply, and in that way this is a continuation of an ancient philosophical briar patch. If "subjective" just means something like "from where I stand" or "for me", there's not much of an issue. Some folk propose a use of "subjective" which is somehow goes further than this, to be somehow beyond words. Unfortunately they sometimes look to construct entire theories of consciousness, knowledge and the nature of the world from this subjective stuff about which they cannot speak.
And without noticing the irony.
The character or quality of sensation 'S'; what it feels like. In Wittgenstein's argument, it is the private sensation itself, or what each person's beetle looks like.
Quoting Banno
Wittgenstein's brilliant insight was that the character or quality of sensation 'S' is inessential to the use of the name ('S'). It does not matter how red looks to you or to me in order for us to competently use the word "red", because the word does not take its meaning from how red looks to you or to me, i.e. from some subjective character of the sensation. But, just because this character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game, this does not mean that there is no character or quality of how red looks to each of us. Given that we are human, red probably looks the same or similar to most of us, but this cannot be verified. Additionally, there is the randomness of evolution and biology to consider.
Quoting Banno
As if the character/quality of qualia and subjectivity were somehow necessarily linguistic or communicable.
What's useless to Paul may be useful to Peter.
All this talk about privacy is just one big distraction. Just so you know, telepathy is an illusion, a real one. Nobody can read other people's minds. Our sensations are private, like our memories are, until one shares some of them. People share only what they want to share, when they want to, and with whom they want to. And even the most loquacious among us can't tell it all. That one cannot verbalize all of one's thoughts and sensations is due to their almost infinite nuances and complexity. Words fail us.
My hypothesis is that qualia are the biological, memorisable "tags" or identifiers that allow you to recognize a taste or a color, to identify it correctly and consistently over time. One can usually recognize a taste, or a color. Logically, there must be some system of identifiers supporting this capacity.
Quoting Luke
Let's suppose that you are right here; that there is a 'character or quality of how red looks to each of us', that is such that this 'character or quality "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language game'...
What you are doing is inventing a use of the word qualia to refer to something that drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
That looks like naming a nothing. It is as unhelpful as "Last night I saw upon the stair, a little man who wasn't there". The words look to be about a little man, but there is no little man to be had.
He would have had a problem with the concept of plural qualia too. You’re right that for Merleau-Ponty what counts in perception is differences and relationships between colors , but he would also argue that colors , and all other perceptions, only emerge as as expressions of the body’s actions in the world. Perception is interpretive all the way down, which means that the concept of qualia is no more coherent than that of sense data.
I obviously didn't invent the word "Qualia".
Quoting Banno
"It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either!"
Quoting Banno
Depends what you deem to be "helpful". It seems relevant to the OP.
Yes, but perception is itself a kind of ‘private’ language game. That is to say , what you want to call the felt sensation of red is not a stable primitive of experiencing but a bodily mediated interpretation. One can no more isolate a reproducible scenario of red that one can duplicate an expression of emotion. In both cases you have a complex interpretive activity that is context-dependent. How something looks or tastes in any instant of time cannot be separated from a larger whole of attitudes, perceptions and conceptions which are always transforming themselves. The upshot foe the OP is that you must reject the concept of qualia if you take embodied subjectivity seriously.
Unpack this, please.
Maybe, but I'm sure you could pick out a red object if required.
Yes, and I’m sure I could spell the word ‘book’ when asked, but that doesn’t tell us very much about what the word means for me, how I’m using it, whether the color red is smooth or textured, whether it feels warm or hot or neutral, what shape or tone or saturation it appears within, whether it is still my favorite color. That I continue to recognize a word doesn’t say anything about how my sense of the pragmatic meaning of the word changes from context to context.
You can say all that publicly, like you just did. But I still don't know how the colour red looks to you.
Quoting Luke
I agree you don’t know how it looks to me, but if we are talking about the usefulness of the concept of qualia, the relevant question here is whether I know how it looks to me. That is, whether there is a such a thing as an interpretation and context-independent fact of privately felt sensation, such that when I say I know what red feels like to me, I can demonstrate for myself that it is the ‘same’ felt experience of red as the previous and the time before that. I adhere to constructivist , enactivist, phenomenological and Gibsonian ecological models of perception, that link private sensation to a self-organizing but constantly changing body-environment interaction. Sensations like color are always a new constructive achievement of the whole organism in interaction with its environment .
You can't convey the subjective character of "how it looks/feels to me" in language (such that others can know, e.g., how red looks to you), so there's no point in trying. Does this make the concept of qualia useless? It apparently finds its use in philosophical discussions.
Quoting Joshs
I'm a bit surprised to see you agree here, Joshs.
Given that it makes no nevermind, why not just say that there isn't a how-the-colour-red-looks-to-Luke?
As the millennials say, qualia "is not a thing".
And that, @noname, is the same as saying qualia don't exist.
When encountering "S" I don't actually experience the sensation "S" refers to and therein lies the rub. No?
Next time you have the sensation, can you say "ah, that's 'S'"?
I maybe off track here but naming is not the same as describing. Certain aspects of consciousness though nameable can't be described. So, I may be able to remember the name "S" which I gave to a sensation when I experience it but describing it is an entirely different story, no?
SO you have a sensation, and name it "S". Later, you have a sensation and say to yourself "Ah, that's S again..."
How do you know this second event is a recurrence of S?
That all depends on how good my memory is, right? I don't see the relevance though unless you're trying to go Wittgenstein on me. Private language?
A variation on Wittgenstein - yes. Quoting TheMadFool
I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S?
:ok:
Quoting Banno
I already told you, it would depend on how good my memory is. Supposing I possess a perfect memory, I would immediately recognize a sensation as one I had experienced before and I would also recall the name S that I had given it.
This is not quite the private language argument - see SEP 3.3 Interlude: the Rejection of Orthodoxy.
That's where I think he needlessly complicates the matter. One cannot spot a difference between two colors without having a sense of each individual color. So perception (of similitudes and differences) builds upon sensation rather than compete with it as a rival paradigm.
I realize that but what's the point? The fact that memory is unreliable and also that there's no memory-independent corroboration available does nothing to disprove that some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. Right? :chin:
I was only agreeing that all supposed shared ’we’ experiences conceal a gap between my experience ce and your experience. I did t mean to
suggest that my experience of the color red is a persisting datum that can be returned to as
identical.
My first observation is that qualia is only useful
for certain philosophers, but it seems to me that for those philosophers most closely involved in the latest research in visual perception ( J.J.Gibson, Noe and O, Reagan) it is not a useful concept.
As far as conveying subjective experience in language, I’m i. the camp that esther than constituting some ineffable and mysterious content added to objective experience, the subjective ‘feel’ has to do with organizational aspects of experience that can and are languaged in some sense. For instance, do you know what color is? It’s a black shape either emerging out of
or receding into a dark background. You can demonstrate this yourself. Cut out a white cardboard circle, paint one half black , and then drawn a series of black lines following the curvature of the circle on either side of the disk emerging from the r black half. Then attach it to a fan and watch the appearance of red and blue.
This explains why red is a metaphor for anger and aggression, and blue represents calm and coldness.
Red is literally a shape popping out at us and blue is a shape receding from us, even as these are just feature of a motionless surface.
So our language, through its metaphors , is in fact describing organizational characteristics ( agrees or approach vs passive receding) of the supposedly ‘private’ feel of color. But is this any different situation than the communicability of affectivity in general? Are all affects moments of engagement with others?
Ok.
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
I'm fishing for "what it is" that is inexpressible. Or rather, pointing out that there is a prima facie contradiction in saying that there is something that cannot be expressed. If there is something then one ought be able to individuate it; to name it; hence, "S". But I think the argument shows that there are problems with naming "S".
The issue is phrased as if there were a limit on language such that there is something that language cannot set out. I'm saying that instead, there is a misguided notion that there is a something were there is none; that what is described is not a limit on language but an illusion.
According to the SEP article on qualia, philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.
According to the IEP article on qualia, qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences.
I could say that "I have sensation S", meaning that I have the sensation of an individual instance of subjective conscious experience, eg, the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache
I could also have said that "I have the sensation of a qualia".
In answering the OP, as I know that individual instances of subjective conscious experiences exist, then according to the Wikipedia, SEP and IEP definitions of qualia, qualia exist.