@"Banno" @"Benj96" The irony is that we of course would have to judge whether they are being earnest (or not). But even if we are not determining whet...
We do not want gravity to be a universal principal; it already is one. We want a rule about what is right to be like gravity, because then if we follo...
In the face of the truth of the human condition that it is possible for things to go wrong, come to a place we are lost—that our very lives might clas...
This is basically the path to the slippery slope caused by the fear of skepticism, from Descartes. “It is now some years since I detected how many wer...
I have responded to a similar thread here with the short version being that a moral claim about eating an animal is the same (in the same structural c...
When you draw the workings of language as: intention—words—interpretation, you insinuate that it is just my trying to read your thoughts, which you ta...
This makes it sound like it depends on me how language works; as if it depends on you how what you said, says what it does. But the reason we can infe...
I was drawing out the implications of what you said, which was to make language seem sketchy (characterize it as such). Part of language’s “polysemant...
Because of the place of information in our world, I think we bring the assumption that there is always something we are going to be told, that the goa...
The characterization of language as irrational, unable to be clarified, etc. is only in contrast to the fantasy for certainty (“hard rule”s; mathemati...
I suggest looking at the Republic as an analogy for the human self. Also, note your thoughts and reactions in reading it, more than trying to understa...
I didn’t address the ability to extrapolate because the issue is a red herring**. A computer very well may come up with a novel response, be “creative...
I agree that AGI could be capable of imposing rules, norms, codes, laws, etc. on itself (as I was trying to acknowledge in bringing up the social cont...
I was discussing “deciding” and self-imposing norms, as you mentioned, and the difference between that picture of morality and the idea of responsibil...
I don’t know if that’s an expression of a lack of interest or an inability to follow, but, assuming we’re here to understand each other, I was pointin...
Well of course you can says things like “that’s not what I meant” or “I’m sorry you took it that way” or “that’s just your perspective” but when someo...
I was characterizing deontological morality, and roughly attributing the desire we have for it to be rational certainty so that I don’t have to be per...
I’m not saying self-monitoring is the only means, but, without being bound to your word, who knows what is going to come out of your mouth. Though wit...
Not attributing an inherent nature to AI is something Hobbes of course famously also assumed about humans, which anticipates moral agreement only comi...
It seems there are at least two important differences. The first is epistemological (and ontological I guess for the AI). AI is limited to what alread...
I was trying to allude to Kant’s sense of duty and moral imperative, with my point being that, even in that case, the desire is for impersonal rationa...
I agree that an ‘act’ (especially speech) involves not only me, and that that condition is not appreciated enough by philosophy. But he is not focused...
@"Banno" @"baker" @"Dawnstorm" Only imagining an “act” as like a physical movement comes from the desire to insert the question of intentionality. But...
@"Banno" @"Ludwig V" I continue to struggle with Chapter 2 unfortunately. I can’t seem to see the truth or confused conflict between the two “position...
@"Ludwig V" @"Banno" (if anyone else is actually reading this book, please let me know.) Without having read the whole of Lecture I, I want to point o...
@"Banno" Just catching up with the preface. I find it ironic that the book is entitled Dilemmas when Ryle says his examples are only when two thinkers...
Anyone? Myself included. Like if I make a claim and you question it; I clarify, or provide evidence, stand by my words, or rescind them, try to weasel...
If you consider what actually makes up the criteria of "objective" (and not just the picture), then what I am describing can be reasoned and intelligi...
The fact of it is not because of its import. The “reality” of it is the structure of our relation to ourselves and society following the limitation of...
But what I was describing is not a fact about our “psychology”. That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world ...
@"Banno" Wittgenstein refers to this as well, but what I take it to mean is that sometimes OLP’s method does not work because the things we say in a p...
The fact that taking into consideration further or wider circumstances (and even responses) can change what is meaningful about an expression shows th...
Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make exc...
Ditch Sophie’s World. It makes the error of requiring a certain answer which twists the “inquiry” into the issues. I would also skip summaries and his...
Just to throw a curveball out there, Stanley Cavell makes the claim that it is our shared lives that are normative, in that we have (implicit) criteri...
@"Banno" I feel this might be misunderstood if we don’t make clear that the circumstances are of greater importance than any “form of words”. Yes, the...
I’ll grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions; Austin is drawing out how we judge their use, distinctions, application, possibilities, the ...
@"Banno" @"javi2541997" Yes, and I think it’s also good to point out that the goal is not to negate everything that Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, meta...
I meant the whole discussion, but there are a few essays in Must We Mean What We Say by. Cavell that set it out better than I can. Descartes, Socrates...
OLP is not about definitions. In trying to understand seeing (“perceiving”) the method is to find examples of the kinds of things we would say in a pa...
It absolutely is not named by them. It isn’t about language (although Wittgenstein looks at “meaning” as an example to investigate); it’s getting at t...
Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on t...
I agree, though I don’t think it is absent entirely. Part of what I take Austin to be doing is to defend the practice of philosophy, thus, not what we...
@"Ludwig V" @"javi2541997" This is how I take Austin’s “How to Do Things With Words”. Of course, with him, he is not so much “defending emotivism” as ...
@"Banno" @"javi2541997" Austin on Ayer, p, 119 I agree the above doesn’t track, but what I thought was interesting was that Austin does again hint at ...
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