It is the exclamation itself that is a noun, as an event, not as a name for (referent for) “the pain” (some object inside us). And the word is not a r...
“Ouch” is not a name, it is an expression; not like a saying, but like the opposite of being stone-faced. And so wincing is also an expression of pain...
Ask yourself: what makes it possible, what has to be the case, what would we judge as necessary or sufficient in order to claim that you know what you...
A=I think B=I believe In the sense of a guess or hypothesis, I think and I believe are the same. “I think it is raining.” is interchangeable with “I b...
But “phrasing” and “clarity” do not take seriously a claim about the workings of our concepts (like belief, or apologizing). The method of looking at ...
I only have a passing familiarity with Davidson, but, if my understanding is correct, the structure of a separate discussion of the workings of a conc...
Well if you said “I agree” it might mean you intend to apologize. If you say “You’re right” it maybe means you are giving your assent to my analysis o...
Let’s continue on then to see if there are different senses of belief. Provisionally (subject to assent), there at least appear to be different kinds ...
Kripke presents this as the discovery of a problem; Cavell reads Wittgenstein as stating a truth. There is no fact that ensures the extension of a con...
I agree with most everything you are saying and believe we are for the most part preaching past each other to the same choir. However. I agree with yo...
My point is that we do have criteria for each practice for the judgments we make about them (whether they are appropriate within what we identify as t...
Our practices can be appropriately done, but they are (mostly) not judged to be “accurate”. You can have an appropriate excuse, but it cannot be an “a...
There is more here that I agree with than disagree; I think the generalization and something about the non-situational ethical discussion trips me up....
I can understand how I could be held responsible and accountable for, say, an apology I did, held to the criteria for that practice. I can also imagin...
Rations The point is that there is not one goal or outcome like “objectivity”. The standard of objectivity is certainty with goals like repeatability ...
If I read this correctly, Barad wants to acknowledge that the world is not independent of us, abstract from our… particularity, situation. But she als...
Maybe a better concept is a fantasy. If there is something there or not, we have a desire that it, for example, serve a certain purpose (reference to ...
I didn’t say “theory”, because philosophy is not explaining vision or whatever the mechanism is for self-reflection or internal dialogue. And I’m not ...
And this is the story philosophy has told itself, that ordinary criteria for judgment are “inadequate” and/or “misleading”, thus the advent of “appear...
Abandoning our regular criteria for distinguishing an object in favor of a scientific explanation is the desire to have something we can know and whic...
When I say certainty I only mean predictable, repeatable, knowable, etc., which are the criteria for the conclusions of the scientific method. EDIT: m...
What we want with this picture is to understand seeing and identification of objects without our participation in the process. The chance of error pre...
Of course. I only meant to say activities, as: different and more than brain processes; ones we are responsible for, judge the adequacy of. We could s...
It’s a function of how objects have mattered to us over the course of human life; the different ways we are interested in them compared to, say, theor...
Philosophy has been getting mixed up about this for a long time. It starts with error (in recognizing or identifying) and then tries to gain certainty...
But it is the type of certainty that math has that matters: predictable, dependable, extendable to all applications, abstract from context, separate f...
His use of “has a wider scope” is not helping him here, but I take him to mean that we can act without thinking, that we can follow our will whether o...
@"Manuel" @"frank" @"Janus" @"Paine" I was surprised, at the 11th paragraph of the Fourth Meditation, to find Descartes’ discussion of truth centered ...
Yes, we of course can act however we like—the only thing “compelling” us would be our customary responses. We don’t even “decide” to agree or act appr...
@"Manuel" @"frank" @"Janus" @"Paine"@"wonderer1" The picture of a metaphysical “will” (largely uncontested still) is that intention is a human process...
Thank you for taking the time to read through those notes. Rather than having an alternative “answer” to Descartes’ metaphysics, I’m finding it more m...
@"Manuel" @"frank" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" @"Paine" The third meditation, beginning at paragraph 34, is not an argument for the existence of God; it...
@"Manuel" @"frank" @"Paine" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" By the 28th paragraph of meditation 3, there only remains the possibility that the idea of the “...
@"Manuel" @"frank" @"Paine" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" In the 13th paragraph of the third meditation, Descartes now moves on to question the impulse th...
@"frank" @"Paine" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" “Nature has apparently taught me to think that ... When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean...
@"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" @"Manuel" @"frank" You’d have to show me where in the Descartes. My quote you are commenting after is in response to Descart...
@"Paine" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" @"Manuel" I continue, into the 2nd meditation, to assert that “perceiving” and “perception” is not a natural brain ...
I am not making claims about what you are calling our “ordinary perception”, which I take as our habitual unexamined lives. I disagree that science or...
@"frank" @"Paine" @"Janus" @"Srap Tasmaner" I’m using “ordinary” in its sense of: not special, not as: unexamined; it is in contrast to creating clari...
@"Manuel"@"Janus"@"frank"@"Paine"@"Srap Tasmaner" “But although my perception of seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so ...
We are, of course far afield here, but, that people can disagree about it, does not mean that they ordinarily (“very often”) do, nor that the conditio...
If generalizing haunts us, it’s in connection with removing anything specific to something’s ordinary context, such as “experience”. Used without ther...
@"frank" @"Manuel" @"Janus" What I should have said was that it is not an ordinary “thing” (given, constant, observable), and that the characteristics...
Or we could take what he says on its face as stating a fact. Cottingham’s translation is “But I still can’t help thinking that bodies – of which I for...
So Descartes has identified himself as “a thinking thing”. But @"Paine"’s concern is legitimate; if I am to say thinking is not our inner dialogue nor...
Yes, that is the assumption of the bulk of the interpretation of the Meditations, but Descartes has not clearly parsed out exactly what he is referrin...
“hought! This is the one thing that can’t be separated from me. I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. But p...
Imagining that his internal dialogue is caused by something (certain), and being assured of the certainty of his self by his ability to convince himse...
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