An outline of reality
I have written a paper that outlines my metaphysics.
Abstract:
This paper aims to provide a basic explanation of existence, fundamental aspects of reality, and consciousness. Existence in its most general sense is identified with the principle of logical consistency: to exist means to be logically consistent. The essence of the principle of logical consistency is that every thing is what it is and is not what it is not. From this principle follows the existence of intrinsic, indescribable identities of things and relations between them. There are three fundamental, logically necessary relations: similarity, composition and instantiation. Set theory, mathematics, logic and science are presented as relational descriptions of reality. Qualities of consciousness (qualia) are identified with intrinsic identities of things or at least a certain subset of them, especially in the context of a dynamic form of organized complexity.
https://philpapers.org/archive/TOMAOO.pdf
Abstract:
This paper aims to provide a basic explanation of existence, fundamental aspects of reality, and consciousness. Existence in its most general sense is identified with the principle of logical consistency: to exist means to be logically consistent. The essence of the principle of logical consistency is that every thing is what it is and is not what it is not. From this principle follows the existence of intrinsic, indescribable identities of things and relations between them. There are three fundamental, logically necessary relations: similarity, composition and instantiation. Set theory, mathematics, logic and science are presented as relational descriptions of reality. Qualities of consciousness (qualia) are identified with intrinsic identities of things or at least a certain subset of them, especially in the context of a dynamic form of organized complexity.
https://philpapers.org/archive/TOMAOO.pdf
Comments (93)
Can you be more specific? The paper addresses many things.
I didn't read through it yet, but from your abstract, I disagree with taking existence and logical consistency to be identical. I'm fine with saying that existents are logically consistent with respect to how you're defining logical consistency, but I don't agree that the two are identical.
And what is the difference between a logically consistent thing that exists and a logically consistent thing that doesn't exist?
For example, you might be imagining a real (extramental) unicorn.
Logically consistent things that exist can obtain beyond the imagining of them.
In other words, the only way that "non-existent things" even makes sense is in talking about things that we're imagining but that do not obtain beyond our imagination of them.
You might say that it would be consistent for the thing to exist under different conditions, but then you can't argue that the nonexistence of the thing under present conditions is a proof that a consistent thing can be nonexistent. Under present conditions, the thing is inconsistent - and that's why it doesn't exist.
If I can offer up a simple, yet effective way of compartmentalize what reality is (for me) and maybe you can entertain my idea.
Reality is made up of our perceptions. If we want to change our reality, we need to first change our own perceptions. Once we change our perceptions, we change our reality.
But our perceptions are created from information that comes to our senses from external reality, no? So there is also an external reality that is the source of our perceptions.
Do unicorns, in some ontologically relevant sense, exist?
I am lost with this whole "existence = logical consistency" thing. In what sense is a billiard ball logically consistent? How can a physical object be logically anything? Logic applies to statements, not things. Can you give an example of any logical operation, process, or statement that applies to the peanut butter sandwich I am (rhetorically) holding in my hand.
Quoting litewave
I don't know what that means. Is a four-sided triangle not what it is or is it what it's not? I think of an old Popeye cartoon - "I yam what I yam and that's all what I yam," which I guess is fairly close to "cogito ergo sum." What would it mean for the moon not to be what it is?
It almost sounds like you're saying that existence is dependent on consciousness, but I don't think that's what you mean.
They are difficult to imagine/visualize and cannot be interacted with, so they are ontologically controversial. But they seem to be a necessary part of logic, and especially in mathematics they can be clearly and consistently defined, so I regard them as real entities. In my paper I regard the instantiation relation as one of the three fundamental, logically necessary relations in reality.
Quoting Chany
If they are consistent, they exist. Apparently not on our planet.
An object is logically consistent iff it is identical to itself and different from other objects.
Quoting T Clark
A four-sided triangle is a triangle that is not a triangle (because a triangle has three sides). In this sense it is inconsistent.
Quoting T Clark
It would mean for the moon not to be a moon. Of course, that's an absurdity and that's why such inconsistent "things" cannot exist.
Quoting T Clark
Right, existence is about things, their identities.
You're using "it" there as if the thing in question exists and has properties. It doesn't beyond something we're imagining. So it doesn't have an inconsistent set of properties a la "it exists and it doesn't." And "I believe this exists (externally)" isn't inconsistent with "(externally) it doesn't exist."
In any event, you're getting way off topic re arguing for logical consistency being identical to existing.
The concept of unicorns is logically coherent. It is not like the concept of a square circle and does not automatically self-contradict itself, thus making it impossible. Therefore, unicorns are logically possible, and belong with all things that are logically possible. But there is no reason to believe unicorns actually exist beyond the mental. At the very least, they require a different ontological status, one I am not sure we would call "existence."
If we say that something being logically possible is enough to mean it exists, then we run into a problem, as it means anything that could possible be a concrete (non-abstract) object must exist as a concrete object in some way. This would mean that unicorns must exist in this world, as well as every counterfactual possibilities tied to our current existence. You would have to embrace multiverse theory and say that every single possible world is a real world, as real and concrete as the actual world. This leads to a contradiction, as it is also logically coherent (possible) that only the actual world exists and that the other possible worlds do not exist (or if they do exist, as mental objects only).
As such, we would have to maintain that multiverse theory is both true and false, as both possibilities are logically possible.
You define the thing as "existing where it doesn't exist"; such a definition is contradictory, it defines an inconsistent thing and that's why such a thing doesn't exist. It is not that there exists a thing that has an inconsistent set of properties, it is just you attributing an inconsistent set of properties to a thing.
But if you suppose that the unicorns exist in a place, for example on our planet, where the conditions are inconsistent with their existence (the requisite genes have not evolved here), then the concept of unicorns existing on our planet is inconsistent.
If the conditions on our planet were consistent with both the existence and nonexistence of unicorns then both scenarios would exist - but in different worlds, because it would be inconsistent for these scenarios to exist in the same world.
Quoting Chany
Indeed, that's what I am doing.
Quoting Chany
If the other worlds are consistent then they exist, and it is not possible that they do not exist. In the second part of my paper I elaborate that the principle of logical consistency entails the existence of relations between things and that there are three logically necessary relations: similarity, composition and instantiation. With these relations you can consistently define many worlds and their copies.
Because there seems to be no fundamental difference between logical possibility and existence. All logical possibilities exist in the sense that they have an identity and therefore they are not nothing. To deny existence to selected logical possibilities would be arbitrary, without a fundamental reason. Instead we can talk about various kinds of existence - spatio-temporal, abstract, mental etc.
Where do I define anything that way?
You defined the unicorn as existing in external reality (according to an imagination) and at the same time you said that it doesn't exist in external reality.
No, I didn't. I said "you might be imagining a real (extramental) unicorn." That's precisely saying the opposite of what you're claiming there. It's positing the unicorn as only existing as something imagined. It's not "defining" it as existing in an external reality. One can believe that it does, but that doesn't somehow "define it to."
So you made no claim about a unicorn existing in external reality? Then there exists just a picture of a unicorn in your mind. It is consistent and exists as a mental thing.
What doesn't exist is the extramental/objective unicorn.The idea of the unicorn is logically consistent insofar as it goes though.
If the idea requires environmental conditions that are inconsistent with the existence of a unicorn then the idea is inconsistent.
Only if you're conflating an objective unicorn with a subjective idea of a unicorn.
An inconsistent idea is a collection of thoughts/qualia that doesn't refer to anything in reality. The collection of thoughts/qualia itself is consistent and exists as a mental thing.
What would be inconsistent about that? You must be defining "inconsistent" in some unusual way.
An inconsistent idea defines something as not being what it is. For example the idea of an apple that is not an apple. That's why it has no referent in reality.
No one said anything about anything "defining anything as not being what it is" though. I don't know where you're getting that from.
Whether someone has an idea of a unicorn that they take to only be an idea, or whether they believe that it's something that exists extramentally, neither case is someone "defining it as not being what it is."
Whenever you have an idea of a thing, you define that thing. You define what that thing looks like, its properties, its parts, its environment etc.
You could say you "define" it as your idea, sure. No one is defining a unicorn as "not being what it is" though.
Now if logical consistency is equated with ontic existence, then the unicorn exists. Does 'instantiation' also mean that same thing? It has to. Let's say a magic amulet (that changes color in the presence of danger, kind of like Bilbo's sting) is logically consistent, but it happens to be instantiated in a place with no observers. What does that mean? Danger to what? Well, perhaps the nearby rock formation, in danger of the impending frost breaking it up. But the amulet is identical to itself, and is not what it isn't.
Anyway, that's my attempt to describe something improbable but not logically inconsistent, and with an instantiation not dependent on idealistic ontology. This sort of thing is implied by equating existence to consistency. I cannot find fault with the assertion, but it seems to weaken the whole concept of ontology if there is no distinction with possible but nevertheless nonexistent, an intuitive state that I assign things like my older sister.
Final comment on what Chany wrote:
Quoting ChanyI don't think this is a contradiction. There can be a logically consistent MW universe as well as a single world one, and both of them contain this same state as we see here. The truth of the other one seems not to contradict how ours works, and MW being false here does not preclude the existence of those alternate worlds. Ouch. Did I just contradict myself? This uni-world is identical to one world of the MW setup. They would seem to be the same thing, so MW has to be true given the definitions posited here.
Now what made me change my mind?
You said "It is logically consistent that some logically consistent thing (other worlds for instance) to not exist". Not sure if you can use that as an argument against, since it boils down to "It is logically consistent that some logically consistent thing is not logically consistent". That is not logically consistent, so the nonexistence of the other world is false. If you can make a paradox of it, then we have something.
If someone imagines a unicorn existing on our planet, then they define it inconsistently, even when they are not aware of the inconsistency. They define it as existing in a place where it doesn't exist, and thus as something that is what it is not.
I am not sure what you mean by "instantiation". I mean the instatiation to be the relation between an abstract (general) thing (property) and its instance, for example between red color and a particular red thing. Both the red color and the particular red thing exist.
If Joe believes that there's an extramental/objective unicorn on Main Street, then we could say that he "defines" as his idea that there's an extramental/objective unicorn on Main Street. It's important to note that he's only defining his idea--and that's all one can do. We can't say that Joe's idea is thus that no extramental/objective unicorn exists on Main Street--that would be exactly the opposite of his idea that he defined.
But his idea is inconsistent, because it is about an inconsistent thing (a unicorn on Main Street).
How would you state a specific example of P & ~P re the idea?
Joe has the idea "There is a unicorn on Main Street". He may not know that there is no unicorn on Main Street, but his not knowing it doesn't make his idea consistent. He may only be aware of "There is a unicorn on Main Street" but his idea is de facto "There is a unicorn on Main Street & there is no unicorn on Main Street" (because there is in fact no unicorn on Main Street).
He might as well have the idea that a circle is a square without knowing that a circle is not a square, but his not knowing it doesn't make his idea consistent. He may only be aware of "A circle is a square" but his idea is de facto "A circle is a square & a circle is not a square" (because a circle is in fact not a square).
Joe's idea is NOT that there is not a unicorn on Main Street. So his idea isn't inconsistent in that respect.
You can't say that someone's belief that P is inconsistent with the fact that not-P. Logical contradictions have to be cases of asserting and denying the same proposition, in the same respect, etc., otherwise you're committing the fallacy of equivocation.. This wouldn't be in the same respect. One is a person's belief, and the other is a fact (filtered through some other person's belief).
So you would say that Joe's idea that a circle is a square is consistent?
You're not getting the square circle thing right, first off. The issue there isn't the shapes. It's the idea of constructing a square equal in area to a given circle.
Anyway, note that I'm not claiming that someone can not have an inconsistent belief. So jumping to other examples isn't very useful.
I said nothing about the area of a circle or a square. I said a circle is a square, which is a clearly inconsistent statement. The statement "There is a unicorn on Main Street" is inconsistent too, even though it may not be obvious.
Quoting Terrapin Station
The example about the circle is similar to the example about the unicorn, only in the unicorn example the inconsistency may not be obvious. So I wanted to show the parallels. Joe's idea is inconsistent no matter whether he believes it. If he believes it then his belief is inconsistent too.
When I explained all of this earlier:
You didn't address any of it head on, which I should have made a point of then. You deflected rather. So it's time to address it head on.
It is contained in the definition of a unicorn that it doesn't exist on Main Street (at least in our world), just as it is contained in the definition of a circle that it is not a square. So the idea that a unicorn exists on Main Street says that something that doesn't exist on Main Street exists on Main Street.
Joe's not saying anything about a unicorn not existing on Main Street, is he? So where is a proposition that a unicorn doesn't exist on Main Street coming from?
It is coming from the same source as the proposition that a circle is not a square: from reality. Every thing exists in the sense in which it is defined (constituted, placed) in reality. Unicorns don't exist on Main Street; it's part of their definition.
I don't agree that "reality itself" issues propositions. It's something that individual persons do.
Propositions are a kind of properties of reality. People's statements refer to these properties.
No. Propositions are the (meanings of) the statements.
Propositions are the meanings of statements, that is, the referents of statements in reality.
Take the proposition "There is no unicorn on Main Street". The proposition is true in our world, so it is a property (characteristic, feature) of our world. On the other hand, the proposition "There is a unicorn on Main Street" is false in our world, so it is not a property of our world. Maybe it is a property of some other world.
The proposition "A circle is not a square" is a tautology because it is true in every possible world, so it is a property of every possible world. On the other hand, its negation is false in every possible world, so it is not a property of any world.
Meanings are specific mental events in particular individual's brains.
And truth value is a subjective judgment particular individuals make about the relations of propositions to other things.
Do you think there is no objective truth? No external reality?
External reality, yes. Objective truth, no.
But a statement is true if it corresponds to reality. It is irrelevant whether anyone subjectively judges it as true.
What it is for a statement to correspond to reality is for a person to make a judgment about the relation of the statement--and specifically its meaning, which is a subjective phenomenon, to reality.
Also, correspondence is just one possible truth relation. Different people use different relations.
The idea of a statement corresponding to reality mind-independently is simply nonsensical. Mind-independently, "statements" are simply sets of marks on paper, marks on a screen, or soundwaves propagating through a medium like air, etc.
It's fine to say "P is true if P corresponds with reality," but then we need to ask, "Okay, how, exactly, does that obtain? How, exactly, does a statement correspond with reality? How does it work 'mechanically'?" And the answer to that is that a person makes a judgment about it.
Words have their referents in reality. Once it is chosen which words refer to what in reality, it is an objective fact whether a statement made of those words corresponds to reality (accurately describes reality), not a matter of subjective judgment. If you jump out of window you will fall, no matter what anyone's judgment may be.
Could you describe how you believe that works?--That is, describe the mechanics of it in some detail?
"If you jump out of window you will fall."
It is well known what the words in this statement refer to. Do you think that the truth of this statement depends on someone's judgment? That the statement may not be true and so you will not fall if you jump out of window? (of course we assume that usual conditions hold, such as the presence of gravity, the position of the window above the ground, you not having wings etc., which I am not going to enumerate)
What I'm asking you is how it works--basically in "mechanical" terms--that those words refer to something. You're claiming that they refer to something mind-indepedently. Well, how does that work exactly?
We can start wherever you like. With those marks on the screen, or we can imagine someone making those sounds or whatever. So, there are those marks on the screen, and mind-independently, they refer by . . . ? (And then you fill in the blank explaining the process by which this works.)
Words are just our names for things and relations in reality. For example, people in English speaking countries agreed to use the word "window" as a name for the openings in the walls of houses that serve to let in light and air. Words are useful in communication. If you want to tell someone about a window you just utter a simple sound instead of having to draw a window or show them a physical one.
The choice and use of a word is mind-dependent but the thing in reality that the word refers to is generally not. Whether there is a thing called "window" in a particular wall of a house is true or untrue regardless of how we call it and even regardless of whether anyone makes a statement about it. The truth is completely mind-independent. The proposition "There is a window in the wall" is a special kind of complex property, with a subject-predicate structure, and when such a property is instantiated in a world, it is true in that world.
And if someone makes the statement "There is a window in the wall" then of course it requires a mind to make a statement but whether the statement is true depends on whether there is a window in the wall in reality, not on someone's judgment.
What you're not really explaining is how you believe it works mind-independently, in terms of the mechanics involved. Okay, so say that we have the sounds or the text "There is a window in the wall." First, I say that mind-independently, we only have a set of sounds, or a set of marks on paper, say. You're claiming that we actually have some mind-independent "subject predicate structure"--well, how do we have that with just sounds or marks on paper, exactly?
My claim is that a "subject predicate structure" is a way of thinking about those sounds or marks on paper. But in your view, it's something mind-independent. Just what properties of those sounds or marks on paper is it?
The subject-predicate structure is the structure of the window existing in the wall. It is a feature of reality. It is mind-independent. The sounds or marks on paper can correspond to this feature if we assign to those sounds or marks what they refer to in reality.
How would they mind-independently refer to something? Take the sound or ink marks "window." It mind-independently refers to something by ______?
I didn't say they refer mind-independently. It takes a mind to assign referents to words.
First, you need to differentiate between proposition and statement. Proposition is a feature of reality, completely mind-independent. Its truth in a world is mind-independent too - it is identical to the instantiation of the proposition in that world.
Second, a statement requires a mind to assign referents to words. But once those referents are assigned, the truth of a statement, based on the assigned referents, is mind-independent, depending on whether the statement corresponds to reality, that is, whether it corresponds to the instantiated proposition.
I don't at all agree with the distinction you're making. (I do agree with a distinction between a particular sentence and a statement/proposition, however.)
But we can ignore that for the moment.
So, once those referents are assigned, you'd say that the statement refers mind-independently, right?
So again, I'll ask you how, in that situation, the statement refers mind-independently. What are the mechanics of that? Just how does it work?
I don't agree with your view that it is a matter of subjective judgment whether there is a window in a wall or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It's just the reference/correspondence relation between the statement and reality. If you point to a dog and say "This is a window", you refer to a dog with a word that refers to something else and therefore your statement doesn't correspond to reality and is false.
I'm not saying that the fact of whether there is a window or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window is subjective. I'm saying that truth, which is a property of propositions (namely, it obtains via a person making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else), is subjective.
Quoting litewave
What I'm asking you is how that corresondence relation works, in mechanical/physical terms.
You can't talk about people pointing at things, saying things, doing things, etc.--that's not mind-independent. You're claiming that once the reference is set, it's mind-independent.
But if it is a fact that there is a window then the proposition "There is a window" is true. And if it is a fact that there is no window then the proposition "There is a window" is false.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I said what is mind-dependent and what is mind-independent about statements. I don't know how to put it more clearly.
I'm having a conversation with someone else about the same thing on another thread, and we're kind of at the same place.
On my view, a proposition only obtains when an indiviual thinks that proposition. You might not agree with that, but that's my view. Is that much clear?
Ok but I don't see how subjective truth is useful. I am interested in reality, not in beliefs.
Usefulness is irrelevant to reality. The reality is that propositions only obtain when individuals think them. There's absolutely no evidence of them existing otherwise.
And "thinking a proposition" is a state of an individual's brain, right? It is not a relation between the individual and an object, the abstract object that the proposition is, because there are no abstract objects.
Yeah, it's a particular state of a particular individual's brain. "Abstract objects" are conceptual particulars in persons brains.
I know that reifying the structure or a structure of language is often done in modern philosophy, but it's a move to be justified. Many won't agree that it is as self evident as "it's the structure of things as evidently showed by experience". What's the subject-predicate structure of instinctual action? Of surrealist art?
First, you need to differentiate between proposition and statement. Proposition is a feature of reality, completely mind-independent. Its truth in a world is mind-independent too - it is identical to the instantiation of the proposition in that world.[/quote]
The usual distinction is between proposition and states-of-affairs, no? And weither or not states-of-affairs are mind-dependent, and to which degree, and further weither or not propositions are, and to which degree, and in which relation those two are to each other, is that not the whole modern interrogation of philosophy of language? Of the largest branch modern metaphysics, even? To distinguish authoritatively during a debate is jumping the step of putting the question to everyone's evaluation.
Quoting litewave
Could you explain how language is capable of such a trick? First, there are wild propositions roaming reality, and their structure is that of language, but they are outside of language because there's no mind. What changes about the proposition when it is snared by a hunting mind, that it wasn't true before it could be put in words?
What I called instantiated propositions is what you called facts. If you jump out of a window you will fall - that is a fact and a true proposition.
So you wouldn't say that propositions necessarily have to do with meanings?
Propositions have a subject-predicate structure, for example "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery." "Surrealist art" is subject and "is exhibited in the local gallery" is predicate.
Quoting Akanthinos
The trick of corresponding to reality? Apparently, language evolved to do that trick because it was useful to communicate in a way that corresponded to reality.
Quoting Akanthinos
A proposition is true or false regardless of whether it is thought by someone.
They have, but their meanings are in reality, in facts.
I have no idea what your philosophy of meaning would be then or how it would work, but it's sure different than mine. We seem to have a lot of very different views on a lot of fundamental issues.
I don't know anyone who would think that it is a fact that you will fall when you jump out of a window, and at the same time doubt that the proposition "You will fall when you jump out of a window" is true. But that seems to be your view.
How about non-finite clauses? They certainly expresses states-of-affairs, but do not have a subject-predicate structuration. And yes, you can translate one from the other and then backwards again a thousand times, but how do you justify epistemologicaly the claim that reality is also so structured, which is logically incompatible with the claim that non-finite clauses can correspond to states-of-affairs?
How about every realistic phenomenon involving surrealist art which aren't expressed by the proposition "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery". Do they find no place in your ontology? If so, that's a pretty tiny reality you live in.
Quoting litewave
So, before language was evolved, we had no way to correspond to reality? That must've been rough.
Once saw a dude who claimed he was Jesus and that the bonfire wouldn't burn him.
You shouldn't doubt the ability of people to deny reality.
Then you don't have a very good grasp on what my view is. Probably because you really aren't that interested in understanding it for its own sake.
If someone believes that there are facts that they can know, such as that one will fall if one jumps out of a window, and they believe that's a fact, then it would be very unlikely that they'd not assign "true" to the proposition "One will fall if one jumps out of a window" (assuming no unusual meaning assignments, etc.)
This doesn't imply that meanings are not simply something that individuals do, that propositions aren't simply something that individuals do, or that truth values aren't simply judgments that individuals make about the relations of propositions (to facts from their perspective in this case).
Non-finite clauses have an implied subject-predicate structure too, and they can be reworded to make the structure explicit.Quoting Akanthinos
That was just an example of a proposition.
Quoting Akanthinos
Well, there was non verbal language, like animals have, but that was much more limited.
But I guess he didn't think that it was a fact and simultaneously that it wasn't true.
They can be translated from one to the other, and with enough imagination, probably to an equal degree. Which means that you have to explain why you posit subject-predicate as the structuration of the world, if it happens that non-finites clauses are just a co-extent with reality as finite ones. As of now the move seems arbitrary.
But what are facts if not objective truths?
As I said, non-finite clauses have a subject-predicate structure too, just not explicit.
States of affairs. (Dynamic) ways the world is.
If it is a fact that the world is a certain way, then I would say that it is objectively true that the world is that way. This seems to be the usual concept of objective truth.