litewave

Then our actions are partly intended and therefore partly unfree, and also partly unintended and therefore partly unfree too. So they are wholly unfre...

Are you saying that the agent can act freely even though all his actions are completely determined by his ingrained predispositions?

Can the agent choose not to avoid those actions? If he cannot, is he acting freely?

Even if your choice is driven by a goal you chose previously, the choice of that goal itself was driven by something ingrained in you or by another go...

But you are not isolated from your environment. You cannot think freely without breathing oxygen and you cannot walk freely without having a ground to...

Well, in physics the outcome is determined by the joint influence of all present forces. It seems similar with my decision/action - it is determined b...

So every thought that pops into your head is freely willed by you?

Like, I have an intention to read a book and also an intention to see a movie? How do I intentionally decide between them? I would need an intention t...

Oh, I can decide between them, I just need a thought to decide between them, except when I don't need a thought to decide between them, in which case ...

I want to eat a cookie and this wanting is the intention that drives me to get a cookie. If the wanting is of an obssessive intensity you can literall...

So it is not enough for my free will act to originate in me. I must also be alive and maybe also intend to do the act? But how do I choose an intentio...

I agree with OP. We cannot choose to think a thought without already thinking it. Which means that our choice of thoughts is just thoughts popping int...

Intents drive us and we drive outcomes. Seems like a row of billiard balls.

Why would agents do that? Because they are driven by thoughts, including by thoughts to choose between thoughts. Or when they are not driven by though...

So physics has free will?

I think the simplest interpretation of theory of relativity is that time is literally a space and therefore it doesn't pass, it just exists. But we ha...

If you slip on a banana peel is it an act of your free will or is it an act of the banana's free will?

It occurred to you to edit what occurred to you.

Yes, and it gets even worse if you consider that time doesn't pass because it is just a special kind of space, as theory of relativity implies. Do we ...

It means to emphasize that something is "real", especially when one doesn't know what "real" means.

Well but I was referring to logically possible (consistent) worlds, not ideal ones.

Kudos to David Lewis for saying out loud that there is no difference between a possible world and a "really real" world.

Nothingness cannot have an ontic occurrence since it has nothing to occur, and if there were an infinite God he would be different from other objects,...

But such a metaphysical infinity would still have a boundary of its identity because it would be differentiated from what it is not, for example from ...

So an infinite line has no ontic identity?

Every object is bounded in its identity, that is, it has a boundary that differentiates the object from what it is not. Does "ontically determinate" m...

Ok then.

For example, what is a universal circle? It doesn't look like a particular circle because every particular circle is continuous in space and around a ...

A particular is an object that is not a property of any object. As opposed to a universal, which is a property of some object. A general collection or...

No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as g...

Objects in a topological space can have a position in such a space. But a topological space is just a special kind of collection and there are many ot...

Your comment said that my OP wishes to make a distinction between a universal and a resemblance relation when I in fact question that such a distincti...

In set theory, ordered sets/collections (which have members arranged in a particular order) can be defined out of unordered sets. For example an order...

A particular apple is a collection of its parts. Is the apple not an object? What is an object then? Still the elementary particles are particulars an...

The title of my OP is asking whether there is such a distinction.

An empty collection is a collection of no parts. A non-composite object. What? They are particulars located in space and time. Why would they not be c...

It would be a concrete entity without parts. Some people may think that elementary physical particles are such entities but I suppose that they do hav...

Yes, that's how I think each particular is constructed. Except that there may be empty collections (non-composite particulars) at the bottom instead o...

Ok, how about this: The predicate "is red" refers to the resemblance to an arbitrary red particular, instead of referring to the instantiation of the ...

Yes but then you have two additional entities (a universal object and an instantiation relation) that are primitive and purport to explain the resembl...

So, for example there is a resemblance relation between two red particulars in the sense that they are both red. Sure, there is a circularity or primi...

But they are the same predicate, just in different words. "To be red" means "to reflect certain wavelengths of light".

No, both predicates refer to the same property of redness, the second predicate just elaborates what it means to be red. I just identify a universal w...

I don't see what "perfection" has to do with universals anyway. What would it mean for a universal tree to be "perfect"?

It seems that I could in principle define a part of the ball that constitutes the ball's particular red color. That part would be a subcollection in t...

But we see at least imperfect triangles and they resemble each other in a particular way. You can postulate "imperfect triangle" as a universal, with ...

I can also define a collection by enumerating its members, rather than by specifying a universal that is shared only by the members (or a resemblance ...

I haven't read Carnap's book "The Logical Structure of the World".

Ok, but I am saying that these "universal principles" are just resemblance relations between particulars rather than additional entities (universals) ...

I think that a general property without particular instances is an oxymoron because it is inherent in the meaning of "general" property that it is ins...