Michael

So you’re not a scientific realist? You believe in something like colour realist primitivism?

Then forget that term. Is the redness a property of that bundle of matter which is the apple?

Is the redness of an apple a mind-independent property of the apple?

Let's restart with something simple. Do we see colours?

There's a similar case with Smartmatic that's ongoing. They're suing for $2.7 billion.

I was thinking the same thing.

It’s perfectly coherent. The example of the dress that some see as white and gold and others as black and blue shows that we can have different sensor...

And this isn't exclusive to emotions; it's also true of so-called "qualia" (whether reducible to some physical phenomena or not). Just as words like "...

That's not the point. The point is that I can talk about your first person experience even if your first person experience is hidden from me, whether ...

Then why is it that we can talk about something that's hidden in practice but not hidden in principle? Again with Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box. In o...

You need to spell out how that fallacy is relevant to what I'm saying. My argument is simple: 1. I sometimes feel sad 2. This sadness is reducible to ...

The issue is that we can talk about and understand each other's feelings, as distinct from any consequential overt activity, and that these feelings a...

These aren't mutually exclusive. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I feel cold and I feel the Arctic air. I see shapes and colours and I see the cat. B...

The point is that him feeling enraged is a real thing that happens, independent of any overt action he may perform as a consequence. He can be enraged...

And yet it is still the intentional object that we talk about. Which is why your argument that we talk about trees has nothing to do with the epistemo...

There are two parts to this statement 1. He was enranged 2. He threw the coffee pot into the wall These mean different things. Both are true. The latt...

I said "I’m aware of the cat hiding under the covers. Doesn’t mean I directly see it." You responded with "Why would it ? No one promised a clear line...

The problem I have is with your use of "direct realism" to describe your position. You accept that I don't directly see the cat but that it is nonethe...

I’m aware of the cat hiding under the covers. Doesn’t mean I directly see it.

But again, direct and indirect realism are positions about the nature of perception, not about what we talk about.

When someone believes that something is true it’s normal for them to assert what they believe rather than that they believe it. I don’t usually say “I...

There’s a difference between me asserting “X is a fact” because I believe it to be so and me asserting “X is a fact because I believe it to be so”.

I haven't said that, so not sure the relevance of this.

So if I refuse to answer your question then I'm blind? Or I'm not blind but the carpet is transparent? Or the carpet isn't transparent but also not co...

I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet.

I know from my own experience that I can smell the difference between two different flowers despite not having a word to describe each smell. I know f...

Except here we have a problem. We accept that me thinking of a number is just the firing of certain neurons. But the firing of these neurons, although...

I've accepted as much when I said that consciousness is reducible to brain activity. The "moving parts" of my inner monologue is the firing of certain...

Not at all. Consciousness might just be reducible to brain activity, and brain activity obviously doesn't extend beyond the brain. If there's a "ghost...

To repeat something else I said earlier: we might nonetheless want to say that the experience is of external world objects, but then what do we even m...

Yes, and given that consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain, neither does intentionality. Unless you want to argue that consciousness is some im...

Which is no answer at all. The direct realist says we directly experience external world objects. The indirect realist says we directly experience men...

What needs to be explained is the meaning of "direct". One such explanation is given here: Another is given here: That experience is direct is that th...

That we have to use language to talk about perception isn't that when talking about perception we talk about language.

No it's not. These are two different claims: 1. John can see the apple 2. John can talk about seeing the apple The problem of perception concerns maki...

Good. Then can you finally stop talking about language and start talking about seeing?

The point is that, whether you want to talk about perception as involving phenomenal character or as involving concepts, I can see things without sayi...

I don't "mutter" to myself when I think. I just think. The mute can think.

That's fine. You can say that thinking of a number is reducible to brain activity if you want. The point is that it involves no overt action that ordi...

I don't understand what you're getting at. As a simple example, I can think of a number and not tell you (or anyone). I don't have to perform any kind...

Which has nothing to do with perception. I can see footprints in the snow and talk about the animal that left them. I can see mental imagery and talk ...

What's a concept? All you appear to have done is replaced the notion of phenomenal character with that of cognition. I'm not sure how that helps you a...

Then I think it's disingenuous of you to characterise your position as being direct realism.

Let's take colour as an example. Take someone who doesn't have a colour vocabulary. Show them two balls; one that we would say is red and one that we ...

I'm sorry but I don't really see how that's an answer. Does it make a difference if I amend my explanation above to end with "the thalamus sends elect...

Again, which means what? What is a "relationship"? In the context of visual perception, we know that there is an apple, that the apple reflects light,...

Almost nobody says that experience happens ex nihilo. Indirect realists accept that experience is a causal consequence of real things – and often thin...

Which means what? What does it mean for a perception to be "directly connected" to the real? All experience, whether veridical or hallucinatory or ill...

Then I'd question what "direct" even means here.

Direct realism is a position regarding the nature of perception, not conversation. I really don't understand why you keep talking about language. It j...