If there are non-physical objects then they are as much a part of reality as the physical is. I don't think it's committed to this. It's committed to ...
No, because I'm saying that sensation is a type of brain activity. In the case of visual sensation, that brain activity involves the primary visual co...
Sensation is the mediation. I am directly aware of feeling pain, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that pain I am indirectly aware ...
No I don't. I claim that the sensations which constitute conscious experience are brain activity. We know this from the fact that we can stimulate the...
That the entities described by our scientific models are real and discovered rather than just instrumentally useful fictions. As I said before, if you...
Colour is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, colour is real. Pain is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. There...
I think you're being pedantic here. If string theory is correct then the entities that the theory describes – superstring – are the constituents of al...
That's fine. I'm just saying that colours, like pain, are a type of brain activity, not a property of apples. They're still real. They're just not wha...
I don't think it smuggles in naive realism. It accepts scientific realism. But you highlight here the exact point Bertrand Russell made, as I explaine...
There's nothing in principle that stops us from manually activating the occipital lobe in a manner similar to how it ordinarily responds to signals se...
Yes. Different things have different properties. Pain is a type of brain activity, and apples don't have brain activity so don't have properties of pa...
I feel pain when I put my hand in the fire. The pain I feel is "in my head", not a property of the fire. Do you understand this much? Now just replace...
Also on this point, as Bertrand Russell explains, it is in fact direct realism that is incompatible with scientific realism: But then if the direct re...
I've never claimed that. My claim is that things like shapes and colours and tastes and smells are properties of conscious experience, which is restri...
I suppose that depends on whether or not you're a dualist. If there is such a thing as a non-physical mind then it is literally meta physics. I think ...
Is being a scientific realist question begging? What evidence do you have that external stimuli, when not being seen, are accurately described by our ...
Only one accurately describes the independent nature of the external stimulus. The other describes an appearance, which is (at best) only representati...
I don't think perception has anything to do with metaphysics. Perception has to do with biology and psychology and physics. and so science is the appr...
Well, I would say that the scientific evidence proves scientific realism and disproves naive realism. You might think that question begging, but I thi...
The point is that them hearing and them making a judgement are two different things. Hearing voices happens when the primary auditory cortex is activa...
It's not me joining them in their madness. The primary auditory cortex in their brain really does activate. It's just that it activates without being ...
They do hear voices. They mistakenly believe that the voices originate outside their head. You confuse experience itself with our interpretation of ex...
No, that's why it fails to address the philosophical disagreement between direct and indirect realism. I've already shown you the SEP articles. There ...
That's an impoverished account of what it means for perception to be direct. What does it mean to see an apple? What does it mean so see an image of a...
That's precisely why the indirect realist says that there is an epistemological problem of perception. I would argue that our modern scientific unders...
But you're not defending direct realism. Direct realism claims that there are mind-independent objects, with mind-independent properties, and that the...
Not in the libertarianist sense. Either our decisions are determined by some prior cause or they occur spontaneously, neither of which seem to satisfy...
I've said this many times before: antirealism isn't unrealism. Being a realist about something doesn't just mean that you believe that thing is real. ...
Not in a metaphysical realist sense, unlike (perhaps) the existence of electrons. So when you say that apples are red, are you saying that this is tru...
"Best" as in "pragmatic" or "best" as in "true"? We're concerned with what's true. It's a perfectly reasonable question. And direct realists do say th...
That's not relevant to the epistemological problem of perception. What matters to this topic is whether or not objects like apples and cats exist even...
His reasoning appears question-begging. The world is counterintuitive. Quantum mechanics has shown that. Common sense doesn't trump scientific evidenc...
You're right, because I don't know what you're trying to say below: Regardless, I don't think your approach has anything to do with direct realism at ...
If it is either fictionalism or antirealism then in no sense is it direct realism. In fact in no sense does it address the epistemological problem of ...
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