Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past provides a good account of what "constituent" means for naive realism: It also provides a good ac...
We feel pain – a mental phenomenon – and it is in feeling this pain that we feel the fire. We taste a sweet taste – a mental phenomenon – and it is in...
You misinterpret what "perceive mental phenomena" means. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hears voices, and these voice...
And this is where you're reading something into the grammar that just isn't there. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hea...
The existence of something like a mental representation is what it means for our perception of distal objects to be mediated. I addressed this before ...
And as I keep explaining, the issue with supertasks has nothing to do with mathematics. Using mathematics to try to prove that supertasks are possible...
It does follow. Something that exists in one location cannot be a constituent of something that exists in a different location. Distal objects are not...
If property dualism is correct then qualia I suppose. Otherwise the constituents of experience just are whatever physical things mental phenomena are ...
Conscious experience occurs in the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects are not constituents of conscious experienc...
As a regressive version of the argument, rather than me speeding up as I recite the numbers up to infinity let’s say that I slow down as I recite the ...
The operations in the sequence occur one after the other, so all operations are performed only if some final operation is performed. The logic of cons...
That my dog is named "Bella" depends on me. That Bella exists and eats and sleeps does not depend on me. That this period of time is named "60 seconds...
Martin, Fish, and Allen are naive realists, I'm unsure if Nudds is or if he's just explaining naive realism, and the two SEP articles give overviews o...
Then rather than recite the natural numbers I recite the digits 0 - 9, or the colours of the rainbow, on repeat ad infinitum. It makes no sense to cla...
This isn't the sense of "counting" I'm using. The sense I'm using is "the act of reciting numbers in ascending order". I say "1" then I say "2" then I...
Here's a definition for you: "a supertask is a countably infinite sequence of operations that occur sequentially within a finite interval of time". Th...
I'm not talking about infinite sets and transfinite ordinals. I'm talking about an infinite succession of acts. If you can't understand what supertask...
Those who argue that supertasks are possible claim otherwise, and it is them I am arguing against. You're the one who interjected. If I write the natu...
And it doesn't address the issue. If I write the natural numbers in ascending order, one after the other, then this can never complete. To claim that ...
You'll have to ask naive realists for specifics of what they mean; I can only quote what they say, which is that the relation between conscious experi...
No, I'm responding to you to explain that your reference to mathematical sets and mathematical limits does not address the issue with supertasks. I've...
Would you prefer the term "act"? It is metaphysically impossible for an infinite succession of acts to complete. Have you even looked up supertasks? I...
No. An infinite set is not an infinite sequence of events. An infinite sequence of events would be counting every member of an infinite set. It is met...
Because I'm arguing against the possibility of a supertask. You're the one who interjected with talk of mathematical limits. I'm simply responding to ...
That's precisely what we are doing when we describe the pain we feel and the colours we see and the voices we hear when we dream or hallucinate. We mi...
This isn't what naive or indirect realists mean by "experience". They are referring to a particular kind of mental state with phenomenal character. Th...
The first quote says that it seems to be that naive realism is correct; specifically "visual experiences seem to have the NR property." It doesn't say...
So either there is some non-physical/non-physiological difference or there is no difference at all and the way you're trying to frame the issue is a c...
What is the physical/physiological difference between mental representations mediating perceptions of real objects and them not mediating perceptions ...
It's what I said above: Indirect realists don't argue that percepts exist, that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of these perc...
I feel pain, pain is a percept, therefore I feel a percept. Nothing about this entails a homunculus. The schizophrenic hears voices and I see things w...
This is what the science of perception shows: This is indirect realism, not naive realism. Distal objects and their properties are not constituents of...
But none of this is relevant to the point being made. Naive realists claim such things as this: Indirect realists reject these claims, and the science...
My belief that my experiences are caused by distal objects is a "prejudice". My belief that a distal cow exists is inferred from a) my "prejudice" tha...
I believe in the existence of distal objects because I believe that the existence of distal objects best explains the existence and regularity and pre...
Yes. Indirect realists aren't idealists. They're realists. They just recognize, contrary to the claims of naive realism, that mental phenomena exist, ...
It provides us with knowledge that there are things around us and that our bodies respond in such-and-such a way to sensory stimulation, but that's it...
No it's not. It's a pertinent question that seeks to address the extent to which our body's physiological/psychological response to sensory stimulatio...
What is the physical/physiological difference between mental representations existing and not being mediations and mental representations existing and...
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