Michael

They are not premises. (3) isn't intended to follow from (1) and (2).

There is a universal set in New Foundations but not in ZFC. The surreal number line, unlike the real number line, includes infinity and infinitesimals...

There are many different, incompatible, mathematical systems. Assuming Platonism, which mathematical system is "correct", and how is this determined?

If lots of civilisations are capable of and willing to make simulations then they will, and so simulated persons will greatly outnumber non-simulated ...

I'm confused by what you're saying. Bostrom is saying that one of these is almost certainly true: 1. Almost every intelligent civilisation is incapabl...

Artificial consciousnesses programmatically fed phenomenal experience, e.g. man-made brains-in-a-vat.

A supertask is "a countably infinite sequence of operations that occur sequentially within a finite interval of time."

Bostrom's Simulation Argument is that one of these is almost certainly true: 1. The fraction of human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage...

I don't think the question makes sense, but you'll have to ask a physicist who knows more about quantum gravity to explain it. I can only point out to...

You seem to be imagining a model of discrete space overlaying some model of continuous space and then pointing out that in continuous space there is a...

And the passage of time that we would measure as being 60 seconds occurs even when we don't measure it.

The question makes no sense. You're asking for some second "level" of time to define the time between T1 and T2. There's no such thing. The only time ...

We can't examine this at the macroscopic scale. At whatever the smallest scale is: at Time1 it's at Location1 and at Time2 it's at Location2. There's ...

And you're just making the same mistake again and falsely claiming that indirect realists believe that our eyes respond to light reflected by sense da...

Yes, hence the epistemological problem of perception. It concerns whether or not sensory perception provides us with direct knowledge of distal object...

It's only equivocation if they start from the premise that we are acquainted with mental phenomena and then conclude that our eyes respond to light re...

What indirect realists mean by "perception of some other entity" isn't what you mean by "perception of some other entity". You're equivocating. Indire...

Except by this you mean "our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data" which isn't what indirect realists believe.

By "we do not perceive some other entity, such as sense-data" you mean "our eyes do not respond to light reflected by some other entity, such as sense...

Except according to what you mean by "perceive some other entity, such as sense-data", (2) is something that indirect realists accept. I have spent 70...

As has been established, your position misunderstands indirect realism. You think that by "we perceive mental phenomena" the indirect realist means "o...

Some things can be dismissed on logical grounds, like the notion of continuous motion and the infinitely divisible half-way points an object in motion...

No it's not. Light often causes us to see colours, but they are not the same thing, as evidenced by the obvious fact that I can see colours when I dre...

This is where you're getting confused by grammar. The words "see" and "experience" and "perceive" and "aware" are all being used ambiguously and inter...

Are you asking if I'm aware that eliminative materialism and property dualism are incompatible? Yes, I'm aware. I'm undecided between them, but my inc...

As I've said before, I'm undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. If eliminative materialism is true then experience and its co...

Yes. How so?

That’s a question for physicists to answer.

Qualia/sense-data/mental phenomena.

Indirect realists don't believe or claim that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena and that our ears respond to sound emitted by me...

See here: I have been arguing that it is a non sequitur to argue that because the sum of an infinite series can be finite then supertasks are metaphys...

What do you think "perceive mental phenomena" means? Do you think it means that my eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena? Do you think i...

And that's where you're being deceived by maths. We can't have counted down from infinity because there is no first number and so we can't have counte...

Brains aren't presented with cows. Brains respond to signals sent by the body's sense organs. But most importantly, the phenomenal character of consci...

So what’s your third-person account of belief and what it seems like?

It’s not begging the question to accept the reality of a first-person perspective with phenomenal character; it’s the foundation upon which the disput...

The relevant concern is the phenomenal character of conscious experience. Everyone agrees that veridical perception involves the body responding to an...

I don't understand your question. It is simply the case that I'm acquainted with the phenomenal character of my experience, and that this phenomenal c...

Try reading more of the article. I am simply, irreducibly, aware of my pain. I don't know what my pain is or what causes it; it's just there in awaren...

Maybe read up on the linked article on acquaintance. I'll start you off with this quote:

We don't know; the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. All I know is that I am acquainted with pain and that I can't describe this pai...

Qualia:

This doesn't follow. It is properties with which I am acquainted. You're asking for a property of a property.

I'll quote from the SEP article on Acquaintance:

I'm definitely acquainted with the pain I feel when I stub my toe, and the cold I feel when it's winter, and the blue I see when I look to the sky.

I don't know what you mean by "object". I'm only saying that in perception I am acquainted with mental phenomena.

Yes. They're primitives, so can't be explained further. I am simply acquainted with them.

Pain, cold, red, sour, etc.

A simple summation: P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience. P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of...

Visual experience occurs when the visual cortex is active. We don't need to talk about what a cow is doing to talk about what the brain is doing.