Michael

There's no such thing as what pixels "really" look like, if this is supposed to mean how they look when nobody is looking (which is why naive realism ...

So when the bionic eye is being used to play a VR game, the direct object of perception — the "object" acting as intentional object — is not a mind-in...

You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. You're an eliminative materialist so there are no menta...

I don't understand what you're asking. At the moment there is no ship, only a collection of pixels on my computer screen emitting various wavelengths ...

I disagree. Philosophy is us trying to reason about the nature of the world and its workings.

Are these intentional objects something the mind creates or are they mind-independent? Do these intentional objects only exist when the bionic eye is ...

What is the ontology of these virtual objects and environments? Are they material things situated outside the body? Are they the software running on t...

I'd be interested in what you think @"Esse Quam Videri". I don't intend to start a new debate so won't argue against anything you say, just curious.

If a bionic eye, as well as being able to help the otherwise-blind navigate the real world, can be used to play VR computer games, then what, if anyth...

If someone donates their Medal of Honor to me then do I become a war hero?

And it seems as if this coloured object exists beyond the body, but it is in fact a feature of the phenomenal experience that emerges from brain activ...

I said seemingly projected out beyond the body. Look up phantom itches and phantom pains. It seems as if there's an itch or a pain located where one's...

I explained it clearly above.

The distant object reflects light into our eyes which triggers neurological activity which causes conscious experience with phenomenal character, with...

The distant object.

We aren't watching things occur in our skull, just as when we feel pain we aren't touching something that occurs in our skull. You're misinterpreting ...

Which means what? Without reference to first-person experience, how do you even make sense of what it means for an organism to "see" distant objects? ...

There is a biological organism with photoreceptor cells in the eye that absorb electromagnetic radiation and in doing so reduce the release of glutama...

Because we are not idealists and we believe that there is an X and that it has properties that are causally responsible for Y. If your argument is an ...

They don't need to be publicly confirmable. I don't need you to tell me that I have a headache for me to have a headache, or for the word "headache" t...

What you have been saying is that meaning is use and that mental states have nothing to do with it, and this is wrong. Some words and phrases do in fa...

Philosophical enquiry ought take into consideration what science says about the world. If science says that colours are "in the head" then our philoso...

I do. When I look at the photo of the dress I see a white and gold dress, when others look at the photo of the dress they see a black and blue dress. ...

No, I'm saying that the word "ships" refers to ships. Perception and language are not the same thing. No, I'm arguing that some words and phrases refe...

Neither do I, but thanks for the discussion. I don't know if we can avoid going around in circles at this point so perhaps best to end it here.

I was talking about colour and Wittgenstein's beetle, not ships. You seem to be reading more into my comments than was meant. I'm not saying that all ...

I don't think I can explain it any simpler than this picture. With naive realism, experience isn't a mental phenomenon that occurs in the head; it's a...

I think you're reading too much into the word "object" — and note that I didn't even use the word "object" in the context of mental phenomena. Whateve...

Because we're interested in how perception and the world actually works. As I said before, Austin and Wittgenstein aren't "deflating" philosophy, they...

Reject what specifically? 1. That colours and pain are mental phenomena 2. That colours and pain are directly present to the mind in phenomenal experi...

Then we return back to something I said earlier: 1. Distal objects are directly present to the mind in phenomenal experience 2. Mental phenomena are d...

I don't really understand your questions. You and I are having a successful(ish) conversation right now despite the fact that neither of us is directl...

Now he's trying to blackmail Europe into selling him Greenland. Utterly absurd.

I bet Trump thinks that possessing the medal is the same as being awarded the prize. It's like buying a trophy off eBay.

Once again, this shows that you are arguing for semantic direct realism, which is distinct from phenomenological direct realism and compatible with ph...

I can perform the experiment on myself. I first stimulate neuron A and then neuron B and note that I have two different colour experiences. I then rew...

Why? You're just begging the question again. I'll respond by saying that in (2) the strawberry is the object of intentionality and the visor is part o...

Jim now uses the word "blue" when a 1nm light shines in his eyes because his experience has changed. After rewiring his brain 1nm light appears differ...

I wouldn't. I'd say "there's a cat in my box, not a beetle". It does matter even if we can't know. Something like the inverted spectrum hypothesis and...

Irrelevant for communication but not irrelevant for meaning. That's why the people wearing visors ask "why is the sky now green and why is the grass n...

This is a somewhat ambiguous claim. It's certainly practically irrelevant if the phenomenal character I experience when my eyes are stimulated by 700n...

Hallucinations are not delusions; they're not belief-like but experiential and with phenomenal character. When I eat shrooms I very much experience an...

So what is the relevant difference between: 1. People born without eyes and born wearing a visor that discharges electricity into their optic nerve 2....

Neuron A correlates to one colour experience and neuron B correlates to another colour experience, tested by directly stimulating neuron A and then ne...

I don't understand what you mean by saying that the standard is normative. If you just mean that my perception is direct if this is what I normally se...

What determines whether or not (4) counts as replacement or as intervention? If it helps, as it's pertinent to real life, all scenarios are fixed at b...

It is the original (4)? Compare with: (5) is direct perception if and only if (4) is direct perception, and above you argued that (5) is direct percep...

Then referring back to this post, do you now accept that (1) is direct perception if and only if (4) is direct perception? Because to rephrase the quo...

Let's assume that the people who wear the visor don't have eyes, and so absent their visor they don't see anything. Let's also assume that they are la...

The visor doesn't purport to do anything. It's just a machine that deterministically reacts to light, exactly like an organic eye. If it helps, the vi...