I didn't say that. I'm saying that Searle's necessary and sufficient conditions (1)-(9) do not entail that if S promises to do A then S is obliged to ...
That's why I'm asking you to make sense of them (and then justify their existence). As it stands, I am content with accepting Searle's conditions (1) ...
No, because it isn't clear to me what obligations are, or whether or not they exist, and you are yet to make sense of them. So you will neither make s...
I don't know what it means to be held to a promise. You don't seem to want to make sense of obligations, so maybe you can at least make sense of this?...
No. Where have you derived that conclusion? My issue is with the suggestion that promises entail obligations. These are two distinct propositions: 1. ...
Where? I can see these closely related conditions: 7) S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A, and 8) S intends t...
The ambiguity is in making sense of the distinction between a) communicating the proposition "I promise to do this" and b) placing oneself under an ob...
This is an ambiguous claim. Are you suggesting that "I promise to do this" means "I am obliged to do this"? Are you suggesting that "I promise to do t...
Anything that isn't a contradiction is possible. It doesn't then follow that it is not reasonable to believe that some possibilities are true and some...
This is so vague and ambiguous as to be meaningless, i.e. illogical. I would say that it is reasonable to believe that Zeus does not exist, that Odin ...
Are these propositions insufficiently justified? P1. Zeus does not exist P2. Odin does not exist P3. Shiva does not exist P4. None of the Greek, Norse...
Then what specifically do you mean by "illogical" if not "contradictory"? Do you just mean that the proposition "no deities exist" is insufficiently j...
I'm unsure but perhaps: For each real number there is a universe in which that number is selected by Michael at random, and the real numbers are uncou...
I think this is a misunderstanding of the problem. Say we accept that Thomson's lamp entails a contradiction; the lamp can neither be on nor off at 12...
Well it's not a mathematically rigorous proof as it doesn't prove each of the three steps. A mathematically rigorous proof is much more complex, as se...
Thomson’s lamp revisited makes much the same points I have made: i.e. the lamp can't turn into a pumpkin. i.e. the lamp is on if and only if the butto...
The simple reasoning is that if time is infinitely divisible then pushing a button an infinite number of times within two minutes is theoretically pos...
I think you've misunderstood these: 1. ??x(F(x) ? A(x)) 2. ??x(F(x) ? ¬A(x)) They say: 1. It is possible that there exists some X such that X is the o...
Yes, good catch. I should have used ???xP(x). What I am saying is that ??xP(x) ? ???xP(x), i.e "it is possible that X exists" does not entail "it is p...
No I'm not. I accept that one of the premises of the thought experiment is physically impossible. That doesn't then mean that we cannot have another p...
S5 has as an axiom that ??p ? ?p. Therefore, under S5, these cannot both be true: 1. ??q 2. ??¬q Therefore, under S5, this is not true: 3. ¬?¬p ? ??p ...
See the opening post, where Gödel's argument is presented. See line C: https://i.imgur.com/mzhrHsL.png These are the kinds of modal ontological argume...
I'm addressing modal ontological arguments. These arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God. It was just an example. Replace with...
Modal ontological arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God. In particular, they use S5's axiom that ??p ? ?p. At their most fund...
Both this claim and the claim that God is necessary amuse/confuse me. Imagine that some intelligent, all powerful, all knowing, creator of the univers...
So, X is God if and only if X has all positive properties. Necessary existence is a positive property. Being all powerful is a positive property. Bein...
Here are three different claims: 1. If X is God then X has all positive properties 2. If X has all positive properties then X is God 3. X is God if an...
It's not a mathematically unobjectionable proof. In its simplest form it is: ?p p ? ?q ? ??q ? q But given the second line, this is equivalent to: ??q...
I'll translate it into English for ease. Neither of these are contradictions: 1. There exists a unique creator god who performs miracles 2. There exis...
I don't understand your question. Asking me why I'm using P1 as a premise is as nonsensical as asking me why I'm using P2 as a premise. They are just ...
Benacerref claimed that the supertask being performed and then the lamp being on is not a contradiction. I am trying to prove that it is (or rather th...
A supertask has no last stage. Again to quote Thomson, "I did not ever turn it on without at once turning it off I did in the first place turn it on, ...
If the button is never pushed then as per P1 and P4 the lamp will forever be off, consistent with C1. Yes, "off" means "not on". The lamp's bulb is ei...
So, the first question to consider is: 1. If something is possibly necessary, is it necessary? Under S5 (one type of modal logic), the answer is "yes"...
As per P1, the lamp cannot spontaneously and without cause turn into a pumpkin, and there cannot be a god or wizard or gremlin magically turning the l...
That's precisely the problem. Both of these things are true: 1. The lamp can never spontaneously and without cause be on 2. If the supertask is perfor...
Did you mean that the phrase "completed infinite sequence of tasks" is self-contradictory? If so then yes. To prove it. Those like Benacerraf and fish...
Yes, this is how refutations by contadiction work. I'll quote Thomson for you: This is what proves that "super-tasks are not possible of performance"....
Consider this: 1. ?xF(x) ? ?x?y(F(y) ? (x = y)) If we take F(x) to mean something like "x is the only unicorn" then (1) is true. Now consider these: 2...
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