Michael

That is unclear. Prima facie these might mean two different things: 1. I sometimes tell the truth 2. I only sometimes tell the truth Strictly speaking...

I think you are confusing matters by being imprecise with your descriptions. There are three types of person: 1. The person who always tells the truth...

I've made a few edits to my first comment since I first posted it. If you haven't already, refresh the page and check it out. It should answer everyth...

Gotcha, thanks.

A is the person who sometimes tells the truth. That depends on whether or not "I sometimes tell the truth" entails "I sometimes lie". If it does then ...

If "sometimes tells the truth" entails "sometimes lies" then: If Person A is the person who always tells the truth then Person B is the person who alw...

In this context what is the difference between these two propositions? 1. He is more likely to fulfil his obligations 2. He is more likely to complete...

Which still needs to be explained. I've offered my own understanding of obligations; they are commands treated as if they were truth-apt propositions,...

She intended to marry me. That’s all there is to it. You still haven’t explained what an obligation is.

As a specific example: my girlfriend promises to marry me, but several weeks later changes her mind. Is my girlfriend obligated to marry me? What even...

Searle’s conditions (1) - (6) (and maybe sometimes even (7) and (8)). These do not entail the undertaking of an obligation.

People want a contractor who will build them a house; they don't want a contractor who will not build them a house. You are really overthinking this.

The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed". The judge then rules that I did not fulfil th...

The terms of the contract simply say "Michael is to build the house or pay a fine". The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their...

I can say whatever I want. I doubt it would convince a judge. The contract states that if I do not build the house then I am to pay a fine. The law st...

I can do all of that. And then I will presumably face some further punishment.

I don't understand the relevance of the question. If you're asking what I would do in real life then I would either pay the fine or hire lawyers to fi...

For not doing what I was contracted to do.

As in, "If I don't build the house on time then some authority will fine me." This is true if in the terms of the contract. But this does not prima fa...

I was thinking of it in terms of the conditional "If I don't do X then Y will happen", and that this proposition does not entail "I ought X".

Right, by "owe" you mean "obligated to give you the money"? Again, you haven't told me what it means to be obligated to do something. I just either do...

Well I can certainly change my mind and not give you the money, and then face whatever punishment follows. I don't really understand your question.

Yes. I've been very clear on that. This is true even using Searle's definition of a promise. Your claim that if S promises to do A then S has undertak...

Yes.

That's not what I'm saying. I am saying that Searle's conditions – even with conditions (7) and (8) – do not entail that when one promises to do somet...

Yet again you still haven't told me what it means to be obliged to do something. He didn't do what he was contracted to do and so as per the terms of ...

Even with (8) it doesn't count as undertaking an obligation. Here are two propositions: 1. S intends to produce in H the knowledge that the utterance ...

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions: 1. Promises exist 2. People promise to do things If (1) and (2) mean the same thing then I a...

The colloquially normative sense is just to treat a command as if it were a truth-apt proposition. It's fictionalism. If you think there's more to it ...

Searle's conditions 1-6 that you linked me to. I would copy them here but I cannot copy and paste from that document and I'd rather not manually type ...

Searle’s conditions 1-6 seem sufficient. But again, even 7 and 8 don’t entail the existence of an obligation. The problem with this claim is that I ca...

I haven’t missed it. I’m asking you to justify this claim. It doesn’t follow from Searle’s list of necessary and sufficient conditions. His conditions...

Well, Plato certainly asked that question in ancient Greek. It's where "justified true belief" comes from.

I'm sure people of other languages make the same arguments about the words in their language – some of which may be exactly translatable into English ...

Something like that. For example, I think that this is a sufficient account: a) I promise to do something. If I do it then I did as I promised. If I d...

I'll make this exceptionally simple for you @"Banno", as it seems I must. Prima facie these are two different propositions: 1. S intends that the utte...

The only oddity is why you continually misrepresent what I am saying. I am saying that you haven't shown that anyone places themselves under an obliga...

No. What relevance is this question?

My promise was sincere because I intended to fulfil it when I made it. I was being honest at the time. I just happened to change my mind after making ...

Sufficient for what? I don’t really understand the question or how it relates to my comments to Banno.

No, because I may choose not to, i.e. I changed my mind.

Because a promise is sincere only if one intends to do as one promises.

Huh? I'm reiterating/agreeing with your claim that "it doesn't matter whether you put the halving ad infinitum as an antecedent in a conclusion or as ...

Yes, it makes no difference if it's an antecedent in a conclusion or as a premise. Either way, the supertask is the completion/end of an infinite/endl...

This is my argument. Notice the antecedent of C6: "If the button is only ever pushed at 11:00, 11:30, 11:45, and so on ad infinitum...". If I am only ...

P5 is an inherent contradiction, just as travelling back in time is an inherent contradiction. The lamp being neither on nor off at t1 and killing one...

The infinite button pushes ends after two hours. That's the premise of Thomson's lamp (albeit minutes in his specific case). In his own words, "after ...

@"TonesInDeepFreeze" As a different example, consider the grandfather paradox. I don't just take this as a proof that one cannot travel back in time a...

A supertask is an infinite sequence of operations that ends in finite time. One of the contradictions does; the state of the lamp at 12:00. This isn't...

An infinite sequence of operations is by definition an endless sequence of operations. An endless sequence of operations does not come to an end. That...