Given that "I see X" is true if "I indirectly see X" is true, it is a non sequitur to argue that if "I see X" is true then "I directly see X" is true....
No they don't. I always did. Why is it so difficult for you to just read what I write? As per the thought experiment, both of these are true: 1. At 10...
No I don't. "I see X" is true if we directly see X or if we indirectly see X. It's not a "foil". It's a very real philosophical position, and is the i...
That's not how it's defined. This is the naive realist view that indirect realism disputes: Represented as a picture, it would be this: /uploads/resiz...
No, it says that seeing an apple is not the "direct presentation" of an apple, where "direct presentation" is understood in the naive realist sense: W...
I'm not saying any of that. In fact I explicitly said several times that at 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me. The issue is that y...
Indirect realism means that (a) is false and (b) is true. The sense datum and representational theories say that (c) is true. As before, there are two...
Yours is the rhetorical argument. You are misrepresenting the grammar of "seeing a mental representation". Once again, the grammar is to be understood...
What does it mean to see the apple as it was? Given the scenario as described, both of these are true: 1. At 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in...
That doesn't follow. You claim that we only have direct visual perception of light, and yet presumably you think that this allows us to know about the...
Of course there's light beyond the proximal stimulus, but according to your theory it isn't directly perceived because it isn't in physical contact wi...
No, it's a proximal stimulus. Distal objects are things like apples that reflect the light. When the traditional direct realist says "we directly see ...
You don't solve the problem because "most authors" (who are direct realists) also say that we have direct visual perception of apples. You appear to a...
We can phrase the dispute without using the words "direct" or "indirect". Group A believes that a) mind-independent objects and their properties are "...
I have no idea. Science primarily relies on falsification, not verification. If direct realism claims that ordinary objects are "constituents" of expe...
Either way, what you mean by "direct perception" isn't what most other direct realists mean by it. They will say that we do have direct visual percept...
As I said to NOS4A2 there are (at least) three distinct claims: 1. We have direct visual perception of apples 2. We have direct visual perception of l...
It's not the indirect realist conclusion. It's the meaning of the term "direct perception" as used by both indirect realists and their direct (naive) ...
Yes, but in the second time period the apple is not the direct object of perception because there is no apple. I don't know what you mean by "really w...
The "fuss" is that between 10:00:20 and 10:00:30 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me even though there isn't an intact red apple 10m in front...
And evidently you refuse to provide a consistent answer, and seemingly conflate (1) and (2). It's a simple question: is (1) true or false? I can't add...
These are three distinct claims: 1. We have direct visual perception of apples 2. We have direct visual perception of light 3. We have direct visual p...
I think we need to distinguish between "object of perception" and "direct object of perception". The apple was the object of perception when it existe...
Maybe you missed the earlier post. This is the thought experiment: Let's assume that we live in a world in which the air is thick and light has mass a...
You previously said "Yes, we directly see the environment. That includes the things in that environment." You now seem to be saying that we do not hav...
Do you disagree with C1? Surely if I see an intact apple 10m in front of me but there is not an intact apple 10m in front of me then the direct object...
Then let's extend the thought experiment. The apple is disintegrated after 20 seconds. P1. The direct object of perception cannot be something that do...
I'll repeat a thought experiment from earlier in the discussion. Let's assume that we live in a world in which the air is thick and light has mass and...
It's not trivial in the sense of being obvious. The naive view that ordinary objects are "phenomenally present" and are (usually) exactly as they appe...
Strictly speaking I didn't do this. I said that a) the word "cold" in "the 37°C water feels cold" refers to a sensation and that b) if "the 37°C water...
That's the definition of "direct perception" as used by traditional direct realists and indirect realists. When they say that "we (don't) have direct ...
I think you're equating indirect realism with the sense-datum theory. As I said before, there are two distinct claims: 1. We only have indirect percep...
I very explicitly said that John and Jane agree that the bath water is 37°C but disagree as to whether this 37°C water is hot or cold. You seem to be ...
I think you're reading too much into it. The word "pain" refers to pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, and if I perceive pain then pain is the object o...
You are making an ontological claim when you accept that headaches are mental phenomena. Yet you then say that the word "headaches" does not refer to ...
Again, this is exactly what I have repeatedly argued; on the first page quoting the Wikipedia article on direct and indirect realism which says "indir...
Correct, they measure temperature. A thermometer can't tell you if 37°C water is hot or cold. Correct, unless these people are naive realists and beli...
As I keep saying, whether or not perception of distal objects is direct has nothing to do with language. We can quite reasonably ask if plants, non-hu...
It's not orthogonal. Here are two propositions: 1. The 37°C water feels cold1 2. The 37°C water is cold2 My claim is that "cold1" refers to a sensatio...
Esse Quam Videri is. I think Hanover is as well. I thought you were too, but happy to be wrong. No it isn't. I'm getting sick and tired of repeating m...
That's because this "thinner, grammatical use" suffices. The word "pain" refers to pain, and pain is a sensation. The word "thoughts" refers to though...
Yes, and? I'll repeat my previous post, as both the part you quoted and the part you didn't quote are still relevant: If just one word refers to priva...
"private sensations" is an English term that refers to private sensations. The first (quoted) use is an example of mention, the second (unquoted) use ...
What is this "a-metaphysical stance" other than the stance that metaphysical stances are false? This is a discussion about perception, not meaning, so...
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