The positive reason is that after disintegration there is still the appearance of an apple even though there is no apple, and so either a) the appeara...
What does this even mean? Are you saying that these properties are properties that inhere in distal objects, but only when you exist and look at them ...
Which reaffirms what I have been saying since page 1. Indirect realism is concerned with phenomenology, and which things in the world we have direct p...
Is there a difference between these two claims? 1. At t1 the intentional object of perception is the apple-at-t0 2. At t1 I have direct perception of ...
As an aside, this is why I think my example with the apple is actually a stronger argument than the argument from hallucination. Direct realists often...
Do you not recognise your hypocrisy? If it's not odd or telling that you say "I see an apple" instead of "I see light" then it's not odd or telling th...
The possibility of (2) only depends on the possibility of a brain living in a vat and the possibility of a cortical visual prosthesis being able to st...
No it doesn't. Which is also true for the indirect realist. Then I'll respond a different way: you should use language consistent with your theory; fo...
You're implying that direct realism avoids scepticism, but that simply begs the question. It's entirely possible that both of these are true: 1. If we...
Thought experiments are a legitimate philosophical tool. They can show that a prima facie reasonable theory doesn’t actually work. For example, you sa...
Sorry, I'm not entirely sure what you're saying here. Is there a question? I'll present the argument in full, starting with the naive view of percepti...
Which part do you reject? Colours and shapes as qualia or that I continue to believe that there is an intact red apple 10m in front of me because I co...
I don't understand what this means, or how it relates to what I am saying or to indirect realism. I am saying that during the second interval I see sh...
There's the negative thesis that distal objects and their properties are not the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience and there's the po...
An example of first-person phenomenal experience? It's what occurs when the visual cortex is active, whether dreaming, hallucinating, or having ordina...
By light being causally responsible for but not a constituent of the first-person phenomenal experience that emerges from neural activity in the visua...
Of course it matters. If we don't have direct visual perception of apples then our ordinary understanding of perception is wrong, and there is an epis...
Yes, because it's important. This is the proposition under consideration: 1. We have direct visual perception of apples According to most direct reali...
This isn't my claim. This is the consequence of your claim. I am simply pushing you to acknowledge this. According to your theory of perception we do ...
Yes, but I'm specifically talking about visual perception. But if you want me to be explicit, then according to your theory of perception, our percept...
But our eyes don't, which is why you must accept that we do not have direct visual perception of apples; that either we only have indirect visual perc...
I'm not saying that the causal story is sufficient to cash out intentionality and epistemic normativity. I'm saying that distal objects and their prop...
I think the crux of the disagreement is that I don't think there is a disagreement, as I have been trying to explain since page 1. We both agree with ...
By them causally affecting our bodies, or causally affecting energies that causally affect our bodies, and then our bodies causally affecting our mind...
The same thing that enables the people with bionic eyes to do this? Unless you can point out exactly what the problem is I don't know how I can answer...
Indirect realism doesn't say that it doesn't? You're reading something into indirect realism that I just don't understand. The people wearing the viso...
Well, yes, that's how all arguments work? So now you reject P3? Here you said "I would then point out that the relationship of the apple to the light ...
That's not what's claimed? The claim is that the world might be very different to how it appears — and I think science has proven that it is. Science ...
Who says it's not? It's entirely possible that all these are true: 1. Distal objects and their properties are not constituents of first-person phenome...
It's very relevant, and drives the epistemological problem of perception. The worry is that if distal objects and their properties are not constituent...
Yes. Given that I have perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds but don't have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds i...
You're committing an association fallacy. As apparently I need to be even more explicit: P1. We have direct perception of X iff our sense organs are i...
Your argument rested on the premise that we have direct perception of X if and only if our sense organs are in direct physical contact with X, but if ...
No, the claim is that we do not directly see the tennis. We still indirectly see the tennis, much like when watching it on TV. And it's not ridiculous...
Except you have been arguing that the following proposition is true: 1. I have direct perception of X if and only if my sense organs are in direct phy...
I don't leave it open? C3 literally says "I do not have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds". No, because as per C3 I do not ha...
It's indirect visual perception of apples and trees and everything other than light, which is a very significant asterisk to your "direct visual perce...
That's not what I said. I'll start again from the top. The important points to take from this are: P1. If I have direct perception of an object then t...
And the way scientists say we see things is the way indirect realists say we see things, in contrast to naive realists who say that distal objects and...
I'll rephrase the two claims: 1. The constituents of first-person phenomenal experience are distal objects and their properties 2. The constituents of...
Yes, and this is indirect perception of the object reflecting the light even according to your account of direct perception. I'm not saying it does. A...
That comment of mine was directed at NOS4A2, not you. He does say that we only have direct visual perception of light. The apple doesn't exist during ...
No, indirect realism says that we do not have direct perception of the tennis when watching it on the screen; that we only have indirect perception of...
I don't know, and it's not how I've defined it. This is the scientific account of perception: This is clearly what indirect realism argues, as contras...
Yes, as I have tried to explain several times, e.g. with the distinction between phenomenological direct realism and semantic direct realism. It is po...
No, I'm saying that: P1. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds then it is not a constituent of the experien...
The relevant issue is that when I see the tennis match on television I do not have direct perception of the tennis match. In the context of the disput...
I don't understand what you're trying to say. Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else t...
Comments