Michael

It's saying that they mean the same thing, much like "bachelor" and "unmarried man" mean the same thing.

This sentence is true: 1. If the King of France is bald then the King of France exists And this sentence is true: 2. If "there is gold in those hills"...

Sure, but that's not the same as semantic equivalence. Take these two biconditionals: 1. John is a bachelor if and only if John is an unmarried man 2....

So we have three different claims: 1. "there is gold in those hills" is true 2. it is true that there is gold in those hills 3. there is gold in those...

I'm not trying to use language in the absence of language. I'm using language in the presence of language. Language exists and I'm using it. And I can...

We are talking about Platonism. See for example the SEP article on propositions that you referenced: I disagree with Platonism. A truth is a true prop...

Language currently exists and so I can assert the true proposition "gold will continue to exist even after all life dies". But the claim that the true...

Given that "a truth" means "a true proposition" your claim is just the claim "if there are no truthbearers there is no true proposition about anything...

I'm saying what I said here:

It does make sense. Propositions are features of language; ergo if there is no language there are no propositions.

Yes, the word "proposition" has a technical meaning in philosophy, but that meaning does not entail Platonism. See for example the section titled "The...

One does not need to believe that propositions are abstract entities that continue to exist even after the death of all life to talk about proposition...

You're not paying attention to tense. 1. It will rain tomorrow 2. "It will rain tomorrow" is true 3. "It is raining" will be true tomorrow (1) and (2)...

I don't know how you come to that conclusion. I think you're overthinking it. There's gold in Boorara. If I say "there's gold in Boorara" then what I ...

I’m not a Platonist, I don’t believe in the existence of abstract entities. There are just meaningful sentences that we describe using the adjectives ...

Well, instead of a sentence we could consider a painting. Obviously if there was someone around to paint the landscape then there could be an accurate...

What some are saying is that "a truth" means "a true proposition" and "a falsehood" means "a false proposition", that a proposition requires a languag...

Right, just Janus then if I’m reading him correctly.

So we have three different ways of talking: 1. “It is raining” will be true tomorrow 2. It will be true tomorrow that it is raining 3. It will be rain...

What is the "it" that will be true tomorrow? If truth is a property of sentences then what you are saying is "tomorrow, the sentence 'X exists' will b...

I think he's saying that the sentence "X will exist" is true but the sentence "X exists" will not be true. As an example of this, the sentence "langua...

What do you mean? You're the one who brought up ¬p ? ¬?Kp, not me. I am simply explaining that this is not true a priori because ¬p ? ?¬(p ? JBp).

No, I'm saying that ?Kp ? p, just as ?p ? p, and so ¬p ? ?Kp is consistent, just as ¬p ? ?p is consistent. So both the antecedent and the consequent o...

It certainly does attempt to, arguing that the correct theory of meaning entails that it is not logically possible that we are brains in a vat. But I'...

Assuming the law of excluded middle, BIV ? ¬BIV is a truism, and is true even if ¬?BIV. Realism entails more than this, as explained in the IEP articl...

The argument is: R ? ?BIV, ¬?BIV ? ¬R Well, ?Kp doesn't entail p, and so ¬p ? ?Kp is consistent, and not to be confused with ?(¬p ? Kp). But the anti-...

It's saying that if "p" does not entail "q is true and not known to be true" then if "p" is true then it is possible to know that "p" is true. It's ce...

Well there's certainly a distinction between the concept of pain and the sensation of pain. They are both brain states but they're different kinds of ...

I didn't say it isn't real. I said that I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is more real than justice. There is the concept of ...

I distinguish sensations from concepts. Colour is like pain, not like justice.

These are two different arguments: P1. If I am a human woman then I am a human: P ? Q P2. I am a human woman: P C1. Therefore, I am a human: Q P1. If ...

Certainly my concept of justice exists as a physical brain state, but when we talk about justice we're not talking about people's brain states.

Well, one definition of "real" is "existing or occurring in the physical world; not imaginary, fictitious, or theoretical; actual". Justice, for examp...

Gravity Kings Justice I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is "more real" than kings and that kings are "moral real" than justic...

Incorrect. P1. If I am a human woman then I am a human P2. I am a human woman C1. Therefore, I am a human The argument is valid. It's modus ponens. P1...

And the antirealist will agree, because the antirealist denies the conclusion of Fitch's argument (either because they are intuitionists or because th...

I'm suggesting just the bare minimum to avoid Fitch's paradox: ?p?q((p ? (q ? ¬Kq)) ? (p ? ?Kp)) The only unknowable truths are "p is an unknown truth...

Yes. So the anti-realist responds by either noting that antirealism rejects classical logic or by accepting that the knowability principle as written ...

There seems to be a lot of ambiguous phrasing in this discussion and so I want to try to be as precise as possible: 1. For some p, p is true and unkno...

There are two different claims: 1. It is possible for the truth to be unknowable 2. It is possible for the truth to be unknown These are represented a...

Linda McMahon for Secretary of Education and Dr Oz for Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. :chin:

I address that here. If "for all p, it is possible that p is unknowably true" is true then "for all p, if p is true then p is necessarily not known" i...

I think something like "for all p, it is possible that p is unknowable". So take any proposition at random, e.g. that there is a suitcase under my bed...

Some more general musings. From here, we have these sets of propositions: 1. "the cat is in the box" is true and justified (is known) 2. "the cat is i...

So we have two propositions: 1. The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle. 2. The realist believes that truth i...

Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability:

That follows from the claim, quoted from the SEP article, that "the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle". If ...

1. "the cat is in the box" is true and I have looked in the box and seen the cat 2. "the cat is in the box" is true and justified If "the cat is in th...

If the existence of objects is mind-independent then the truth of “the object exists” is mind-independent such that it could be true even if it is not...

I'm going to try to summarise the reasoning. I'm taking it for granted that knowledge is justified true belief. Given that the proposition "the cat is...