This is why I said in either this or the other topic that too many people are getting lost in irrelevant arguments over grammar and vocabulary. It's l...
So how could we ever come to the conclusion that every rule has an exception? Because we'd also have to find an exception to the rule that every rule ...
No, I think Bartricks is right. A rule prescribes, it doesn't describe. That every rule has an exception, were it true, is a description, not a prescr...
If you're suggesting that philosophers don't make these kinds of claims, and that they are just a strawman fabricated by indirect realists, then maybe...
Yes, exactly. Maybe this is the case. That's the point I'm making. I'm not sure what the rest of your comment is trying to say. That I am unable to na...
This is an interesting take: Semantic Direct Realism The SEP article seems to say something similar: I think that this "quasi-direct" realism wants to...
If you're going to define "seeing X" as such that it's only satisfied in the case of veridical direct perception then you're begging the question by a...
We can do that in cases of dreams, hallucinations, and illusions as well. Therefore it says nothing about the direct realist claim that mind-independe...
The point is they don't need language. So this notion that Wittgenstein's "beetle in a box" argument or how English speakers use the word "red" or any...
I have no idea what you're talking about. A hermit with no language can recognise when he feels pain. A hermit with no language can recognise when he ...
You confuse me being able to know that that he recognises colours with him being able to recognise colours. He either can or he can't, irrespective of...
I don't know this but it's true nonetheless. We have evidence that animals can recognise colours and no evidence that they share a common colour vocab...
It's nothing to do with language. A hermit with no language could look at two objects and see them to be the same colour (or different colours). That'...
That the colour you see roses to be is the colour I see grass to be and vice versa. I think it more accurate to say that red is the colour that roses ...
I don't think it needs to be the same. It could be that your red isn't my red in something comparable to Locke's inverted spectrum hypothesis. But als...
The problem with this account is that it doesn't seem to say anything about experience at all. Does a Venus flytrap experience the fly when that fly d...
You’re asking me to give an internally (and scientifically?) consistent account of direct realism. I can’t do that because it isn’t consistent, hence ...
That's for them to explain, not me. That we can be wrong shows that something other than an external object being directly present in experience must ...
Except it's not about inference. They claim that the external cause is directly presented in experience, and so it isn't hidden. Direct realism is not...
And that's where you're getting confused. Direct realists don't claim that a red apple is a hidden state. Direct realists claim that a red apple is a ...
@"Isaac" And on the topic of color dispositionalism, as it appears at first glance to be your view (and please correct me if I'm wrong), but from that...
I am simply pointing out that people believe(d) that the world resembles how it appears to us. Locke, an indirect realist, argued that it doesn't rese...
They just make the same assumptions as the rest of us; that the world will continue to behave as it has always done. See time-variation of fundamental...
I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are you saying that Humean causation isn't the counterfactual theory of causation? It's not supposed to. The cou...
And what does it mean to say that A forces B to happen if not just that if A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened? Your account is just replaci...
They certainly thought so of at least some appearances, hence Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. And see color primitivist r...
There's a difference between the phenomenology of experience and any subsequent intellectual interpretation. I think you're conflating two different s...
The epistemological problem of perception asks: is the world as it appears to us? Direct realists answered in the affirmative. However they made sense...
According to you, something is green if it causes most humans to see it as green and something is purple if it causes most humans to see it as purple....
I don't understand your objection. If in all possible worlds A causes B then in all possible worlds if A doesn't happen then B doesn't happen. If in s...
It's the same account; that A causes B is that if A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened. It's just that in one universe A doesn't always cause...
Is it supposed to? I just understood it as an attempt to explain what causation means. Is it supposed to? It just explains that "A causes B" means "If...
So A causes B if some C makes B follow from A? But then what does it mean for C to make B follow from A? Does it mean that if C were false then B woul...
We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause. Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of...
No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct. What I'm saying here is that your account of perception – that A directly ...
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