I don't understand what that question has to do with the point I'm making. The point I am making is that if for all p, the proposition that p is true ...
Then the argument is valid. From the premise ?p: T(q) ? p it follows that ?p: ?x(x=q). For all p, the proposition that p exists. We didn't. This argum...
Did you bother even reading the rest of what was said? It's not ill-formed. And, to use ordinary English language, are you saying that the below is fa...
I asked a related question elsewhere and got this as the answer by someone more knowledgeable than me: But if you prefer, perhaps address the English ...
The relevant parts are these: Given that "water" on Earth and "water" on Twin Earth have a different extension (i.e. refer to different things), and g...
That doesn’t make it gibberish, it makes it trivial, much like p ? p. The pertinent point is that given the premise ?p: T(q) ? p, the conclusion ?p: ?...
Maybe use an actual example. “John is a bachelor” is true iff John is a bachelor “John is a bachelor” is true iff John is an unmarried man This shows ...
Another consideration; what if we drop the use of the word "false" and replace it with some substantial notion of falsity? 1. This sentence does not c...
My point is only to show you what Tarski said, which is that, to quote him again: And later: He quite literally says that the T-schema isn’t a definit...
It's not that we can't turn sentences into quotation-mark names, it's that such a proposed definition only applies to quotation-mark names, which is i...
The only point I am making is that the T-schema isn't a definition of truth. From his 1969 paper: That "imaginary infinite conjunction" (extended from...
This seems to be the only definition of truth that Tarski offers in that paper: He makes it clear that a definition of truth is impossible for colloqu...
Yes, that's what I meant. I was definitely not suggesting that you should remove his head from his neck using a sharp instrument, such as a sword, axe...
I don't think it even needs to reach the "Cartesian" standard. It's really just the same point you made earlier (which I missed): In the case of my ho...
Tarski does say in his 1933 paper: So perhaps Tarski is right in referencing Godel. What's wrong is interpreting Tarski as having said something about...
Given that I didn't use quotation marks it should be obvious. Most of us understand the difference between use and mention. a) snow being green isn't ...
I mean exactly what I said; that snow being green isn't a sentence. What I'm unsure of is what snow being green is. Here's a sentence: a) Joe Biden is...
Not exactly. I mentioned before that in The Semantic Conception of Truth (1944) Tarski only said that the T-schema must be implied by the definition o...
Then it just seems to be saying that "p" is true iff its truth conditions obtain which is a pretty vacuous theory. So as I said earlier, a more substa...
I don't think it's a matter of doubt, just a matter of admitting fallibility. I would say that I know that my housemate is a bachelor, but I also acce...
So it has limited applicability to natural languages as self-referential sentences can be constructed in English. What theory of truth is able to make...
"this sentence is false" is true iff this sentence is false If we accept that the T-schema is true then, using the above, "this sentence is false" is ...
How does the T-schema deal with self-reference? "this sentence has thirty one letters" is true iff this sentence has thirty one letters The above sent...
That's true. "vampires have no reflection" is true iff vampires have no reflection "snow is white" is true iff snow is white The T-schema doesn't real...
I wonder also if the order in which the T-schema is presented affects our interpretation of it: a) "snow is white" is true iff snow is white b) snow i...
I meant that when we make sense of the T-schema we cannot simply say that the consequent is a fact because sometimes it isn't. Is there some singular ...
I'll mention it again as it bears repeating. a) "snow is white" is true iff snow is white b) "snow is green" is true iff snow is green However we make...
I think the issue is that facts aren’t always things, e.g material objects. It is a fact that unicorns don’t exist, but the non-existence of unicorns ...
Not necessarily. “1 + 1 = 2” is true iff 1 + 1 = 2. 1 + 1 = 2 because this is what follows from the axioms of mathematics. The T-schema works with a c...
Something worth considering is that "snow is green" is true iff snow is green, but it is not a fact that snow is green. So what does "snow is green" r...
That string of words refers to a fact. When we say "Joe Biden is President" we're not saying that the string of words "Joe Biden" is President; we're ...
So the snow being white is a fact but the white snow isn't a fact. Or it is? I don't understand why it matters. Is the word "fact" important? This jus...
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